The problem of developing a model for the settlement Transnistrian conflict in the context of European integration of the Republic of Moldova

Dirun, Anatolii; Teosa, Valentina Article The problem of developing a model for the settlement Transnistrian conflict in the context of European integration of the Republic of Moldova CES Working Papers Provided in Cooperation with: Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University Suggested Citation: Dirun, Anatolii; Teosa, Valentina (2023) : The problem of developing a model for the settlement Transnistrian conflict in the context of European integration of the Republic of Moldova, CES Working Papers, ISSN 2067-7693, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Centre for European Studies, Iasi, Vol. 15, Iss. 2, pp. 130-146 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/286695 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ CES Working Papers – Volume XV, Issue 2 130 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License The problem of developing a model for the settlement Transnistrian conflict in the context of European integration of the Republic of Moldova Anatolii DIRUN*, Valentina TEOSA** Abstract The participation of the European Union in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict created favorable conditions for the implementation of the concept of "involvement without recognition" of the Transnistrian region in the legal field of the Republic of Moldova. The effectiveness of this approach largely depended on the effective functioning of the EU as an intermediary and the tools used to solve this problem. The purpose of the work is to consider the influence of the "post-military" stage on the effectiveness of the implementation of the mediation activities of the European Union, as well as to analyze the strategy of "Europeanization" from the point of view of rational choice theory, which affects the change in the behavior of the conflicting parties in the context of the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. Keywords: Transnistrian conflict, Europeanization strategy, post-war stage, conflict transformation Introduction The consolidation of the Moldovan society around the idea integration in the EU has not removed all the contradictions between the center and the regions in the Republic of Moldova on issues of domestic and foreign policy. This problem has been actualized for the Republic of Moldova as a state that has received the status of a candidate for EU accession in the context of the war on the territory of Ukraine. The rupture of socio-economic relations with Russia does not find full support among Moldovan citizens, and is also negatively perceived in Transnistria, in the southern and northern regions of the republic. One of the explanations for this attitude is the fact that the implementation of the Moldovan policy of integration until 2022 took place against the backdrop of maintaining trade and cultural relations with Russia. In turn, the official inclusion of the European Union in the process of settling the Transnistrian conflict took place only in 2005, when Tiraspol and Chisinau decided to grant observer status to the EU and US representatives in the negotiation process. * Anatolii DIRUN is postdoctoral fellow at Moldovan State University, Republic of Moldova, e-mail: [email protected]. ** Valentina TEOSA is professor at Moldovan State University, Republic of Moldova, e-mail: valentina.teo[email protected]. CES Working Papers | 2023 - volume XV(2) | wwww.ceswp.uaic.ro | ISSN: 2067 - 7693 | CC BY Anatolii DIRUN, Valentina TEOSA 131 Since by the time of the “pivot” towards Europe during the reign of President Vladimir Voronin in 2005, the republic had already formed the foundation of the negotiation process with Transnistria. In a generalized form, it can be said that since the official start of the negotiation process in 1994, two main solution models have been used in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict: ‘Transnistrianization’ and Europeanization. And if, ‘Transnistrianization’ was typical until the early 2000s, after 2005, the mechanisms of Europeanization became more widespread. By this time, the EU was guided by the adopted European Security Strategy, approved in 2003, in which regional conflicts were considered as one of the main challenges for European security. General approaches, as well as the procedure for the use of forces in peacekeeping operations and missions under the leadership of the EU, were regulated by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the Petersberg (1994) and Helsinki Declarations (1999). The proclaimed “EU Security Comprehensive” model included a wide range of tools: peacekeeping operations, police operations, security reforms, and post-conflict economic recovery. Such attention to the settlement of regional conflicts was due to the fact that “problems similar to Kashmir, conflicts in the Great Lakes region, on the Korean Peninsula directly or indirectly affect the interests of Europe, just like the centers of conflicts closer to it, primarily the Middle East. Violent or deadlocked conflicts that persist along our borders are a threat to regional stability”. Regional conflicts can often lead “to extremism, terrorism, statehood failure; they create conditions for the formation of organized crime and can fuel the need to master weapons of mass destruction”. Obviously, in each individual case, the EU has taken a different approach to resolving the problem, referring to the most practical approach is sometimes to address the roots of long-standing regional conflicts. It is recognized, however, that both military action and effective policing may be required. Economic instruments serve the purpose of economic recovery, and civilian crisis assistance helps restore civilian rule. The process of settling the Transnistrian conflict has been going on for more than 30 years since the signing of the ceasefire agreement between the parties in July 1992. At the same time, the causes of the conflict, its development and culmination in the form of hostilities between the parties obliges the researcher to turn to the origins of the confrontation, the roots of which go back to the late Soviet period. In this regard, the correct typology of the conflict is important for the researcher, as it affects the development of tools for its settlement. At the same time, there is a need to take into account all the elements - both those that were at the heart of the conflict, and those that emerged during the peace process. The conflict in Transnistria is inherently ethno-political, categorized as identity conflicts. Along with the conflicts in Georgia and Azerbaijan, the events in Moldova were the result of contradictory internal political processes in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At CES Working Papers | 2023 - volume XV(2) | wwww.ceswp.uaic.ro | ISSN: 2067 - 7693 | CC BY The problem of developing a model for the settlement Transnistrian conflict 132 the same time, unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan, the Republic of Moldova has developed its own approach to conflict resolution, in which the post-military stage in relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol has taken a significant place. 1. Post-war stage as a new stage in the settlement of the Transnistrian issue An analysis of the protracted nature of the Transnistrian conflict allows us to single out one important pattern, namely, the cessation of hostilities and the provision of a mechanism for controlling the situation over a long period of time, allows us to speak about the emergence of a new, post-war stage in the context of peacebuilding in protracted conflicts. The post-war stage can be defined as "the period of peaceful relations between the parties to the conflict from the moment of cessation of hostilities until the conclusion of a political agreement on the settlement of the ethnopolitical causes of the conflict" (Dirun,2021). It is quite logical that since the ceasefire in 1992, the parties have been using this time, including for the modernization of their armed forces. However, when we talk about the beginning of the post-war stage of the conflict, in practice this means the implementation of three mechanisms that minimize the possibility of resuming hostilities. First, the conduct of a peacekeeping operation on the line of contact between the conflicting parties; Second, the organization of a direct dialogue between the parties to the conflict in the framework of the negotiation process; Third, the public demand for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, not by armed means. In the case of Transnistria and Moldova, we are talking, first of all, about the factually equivalent military potential of the parties, and the negative experience of solving the problem by armed means. To understand the importance and complexity of the emergence of the post-war stage in the Transnistrian settlement, it must be compared with a conflict of low combat intensity, which persists between the parties even after the signing of a ceasefire agreement. Since this happened over the past years in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thereby complicating the peace process in these regions. Thus, the creation of a peacekeeping mechanism in the region in 1992 is one of the reasons for the effective implementation of the negotiation process as the main institutional instrument for resolving the conflict. The official start of the negotiation process was laid on July 21, 1992, when the President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin and the President of the Republic of Moldova M. Snegur, in the presence of the leader of Transnistria I. Smirnov, signed the Agreement “On the Principles of Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Pridnestrovian Region of the Republic of Moldova”. In accordance with this Agreement, joint trilateral peacekeeping forces were created, as well as the Joint CES Working Papers | 2023 - volume XV(2) | wwww.ceswp.uaic.ro | ISSN: 2067 - 7693 | CC BY Anatolii DIRUN, Valentina TEOSA 133 Control Commission (JCC), a Security Zone was established along the administrative border of Transnistria and Moldova on both sides of the Dniester. The JCC was formed from representatives of Russia, Transnistria and Moldova. The military contingents of the three sides were transferred to her subordination to ensure the ceasefire and security in the region (six battalions from Russia, three from each of the parties to the conflict). The principles for resolving the conflict were determined, obliging the parties not to use armed violence. The document mentioned “both sides” of the conflict, as well as three parties involved in the settlement”. The conclusion of the 1992 Agreement legally established the end of the war, marked the beginning of a peacekeeping mission on the banks of the Dniester and created conditions for the negotiation process, and for the first time recorded the international dimension of the settlement of the conflict in Transnistria (United Nations, 1992). Thus, for the first time, a trilateral settlement format was established: the two sides of the conflict and Russia. It is important to note that a short period of time was required from the moment the Agreement was signed to the final cessation of hostilities. On July 31, the head of the Transnistrian Defense Department, Major General Sh. Kitsak, signed an order “On the cessation of hostilities in all sectors of the front”, and on August 1, an order “On the withdrawal of troops from the front line to permanent deployment points”. Officially, hostilities between Transnistria and Moldova have ended. On the same day - August 1, formations of the 106th division of the Russian Airborne Forces occupied the central part of Bendery. In addition to the Russian military, 50 law enforcement officers from Transnistria and Moldova remained in the city. In general, the period of hostilities lasted from March to June 1992 and claimed more than 1 thousand dead and 4.5 thousand wounded on both sides. For the Moldovan society, these figures were a real shock, which had a huge impact on the formation of the domestic and foreign policy of the state. Since the signing of the Agreement on the Principles of a Peaceful Settlement, it took the conflicting parties almost two years to officially start direct negotiations. At the same time, it is important to note that informal communication between the officials of Transnistria and Moldova never stopped, even during the period of hostilities in 1992 (Dirun, 2021). As a result, on April 28, 1994, the first joint statement was adopted by the leaders of the conflicting parties - Moldova and Transnistria, who agreed on the basic parameters of the negotiation process. Then the parties agreed to immediately and without preconditions begin a negotiation process on the entire range of issues of mutual interest, as well as to remove all barriers that impede the normal implementation of economic, social and cultural ties and establish mutually beneficial ties in the economic, trade, credit, financial and other areas. The statement also recorded the consent of the parties to create a system of mutual and international guarantees for the full and unconditional CES Working Papers | 2023 - volume XV(2) | wwww.ceswp.uaic.ro | ISSN: 2067 - 7693 | CC BY The problem of developing a model for the settlement Transnistrian conflict 134 implementation of the agreements reached. In the same year, on October 21, as a follow-up to the agreement to start negotiations, a number of documents were signed on the methods and timing of the withdrawal of Russian troops to ensure the conduct of a peacekeeping operation on the Dniester. The parties agreed to synchronize the withdrawal of Russian troops with a political settlement of the conflict, which, in the opinion of the developers and signatories, could be achieved within a threeyear period, which they called transitional. The principle of such synchronization was also recorded in its documents by the OSCE, which from the very beginning played an active mediating role in the settlement (Agreement on Confidence Measures, 1998). The first practical result of the negotiations can be considered the Agreement signed on July 5, 1995 at the highest level “On the maintenance of peace and guarantees of security between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria”, by which the parties assumed obligations not to use military force in mutual relations and not to exert political, economic or other forms of pressure on each other. At the same time, the parties to the conflict turned to Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE with a request to be guarantors of compliance with the agreements. This is how Ukrainian mediation began in the process of resolving the conflict in Transnistria, and the negotiation format itself expanded to a five-party format. With the active mediation of Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE, the parties were looking for formulas for a future political settlement and were building up negotiating potential. The question of why the parties expected to find solutions to the conflict in a three-year period deserves special attention. One of the reasons in our opinion, the circumstance is that both Moldova and Tiraspol actively resorted to the help of Russia as a mediator and guarantor. It would not be an exaggeration to say that in the 1990s Moscow had a serious influence both on the left and right banks of the Dniester, which in turn was reflected in the positive dynamics of meetings between the conflicting parties. Since the mid-1990s and early 2000s, the years have been productive in terms of developing a political solution to the Transnistrian issue. First of all, we are talking about the “Primakov Memorandum” of 1997, in which Transnistria and Moldova fixed the concept of a “common state”. It should be noted that in addition to the efforts of international mediators, this became possible thanks to personal contacts between the leader of Transnistria, Igor Smirnov, with Moldovan presidents Mircea Snegur and Petr Luchinskiy. In 2001, after the communist party headed by Vladimir Voronin came to power, the first serious crisis arose in the region, connected with the activities of the customs of Transnistria. The official authorities of Moldova withdrew the customs seals previously issued to Tiraspol for cargo clearance, thereby complicating the foreign economic activity of Transnistrian enterprises. As a result of these actions, negotiations between the parties were terminated. The guarantors and mediators had to CES Working Papers | 2023 - volume XV(2) | wwww.ceswp.uaic.ro | ISSN: 2067 - 7693 | CC BY Anatolii DIRUN, Valentina TEOSA 135 quickly create a new format - an auxiliary negotiation mechanism that would allow maintaining a dialogue between the conflicting parties at the level of political representatives of the parties. For this purpose, the creation of the “Permanent Conference on Political Issues in the Framework of the Transnistrian Settlement Process” was initiated. The corresponding agreement was reached in February 2002 during a meeting in Bratislava of political representatives of the countries-guarantors and mediators of the settlement - the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the OSCE, and one of the parties to the conflict - Transnistria. Moldova joined soon after. In diplomatic circles, the new negotiating mechanism was called the “Bratislava format”, which was a consultative body that did not involve the direct participation of the heads of state in its activities. As experts noted, the mechanism of the negotiation process has become more cumbersome, but the main thing is that it itself has been preserved. But even under these conditions, attempts were continued to find solutions at the institutional level based on the political formula of a settlement. First of all, we are talking about the creation and work of the Joint Constitutional Commission in the spring of 2003, within the framework of which Tiraspol and Chisinau took the first steps to develop a draft constitution for a future federal state. The closest political project to be signed was the “Kozak Memorandum”, which envisages a solution to the conflict based on the model of asymmetric federalization of the Republic of Moldova. The failure of Russia's diplomatic efforts related to the refusal of President Voronin to sign the “Kozak Memorandum”, in fact, drew a line under the project of federalization of Moldova and became the starting point for turning the foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova towards the European Union. In turn, the problem of developing a model for the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict with the participation of the European Union is due, in our opinion, to contradictions in the implementation of the two models of “Europeanization”. Within the framework of the first model, “Europeanization” is considered by the leadership of the Republic of Moldova as a task - to become part of the process of creation, dissemination of institutional norms, rules and procedures, which are first developed and agreed upon at the supranational level, and then implemented by the member states (Radaelli, 2003). The second model is used to resolve protracted conflicts, in which europeanization is interpreted as a process driven and stimulated by European institutions, by linking the final outcome of the conflict to a certain degree of integration of stakeholders into European structures (Borzel and Risse, 2000). In practice, this meant that in the context of the protracted conflict, in which Moldova is one of the parties, it was the political institutions of the European Union that needed to develop a course in order to most effectively use each of the two indicated strategies. At the same time, it is important to take into account that the speed of implementation of each of these strategies in practice differs CES Working Papers | 2023 - volume XV(2) | wwww.ceswp.uaic.ro | ISSN: 2067 - 7693 | CC BY The problem of developing a model for the settlement Transnistrian conflict 136 significantly from each other, which in turn affects the results achieved. It is significant that in her interview, the President of Moldova, Maia Sandu, expressed her hope that the accession of the country to the European Union will take place in parallel with the reintegration of Transnistria into the republic. According to her, both processes should occur side by side. Sandu noted that if the standard of living in Moldova rises, then many more residents of Transnistria will be in favor of unification with Chisinau (Sandu, 2023). Formally, the country's reintegration policy began to be implemented from the first days of the negotiation process. However, it is the effectiveness of the use of the strategy of europeanization of the conflict that affects the achievement of practical results of reintegration in general. An analysis of 20 years of EU activities on the Transnistrian track allows us to better identify common patterns and evaluate the results obtained in the context of rational choice theory. 2. The “Rational Choice Model” in the Transnistrian Conflict: а working hypothesis The object of study of the theory of rational choice are individuals, organizations or states that operate within a certain institutional environment. In turn, institutions with their limited capabilities influence the choice of an individual who, under these conditions, chooses the most beneficial strategy for himself. As Olson writes, the key motivation of an actor in choosing a strategy is his individual interest in realizing his own goal (Olson, 1971). At the same time, the researcher separately draws attention to the fact that the individual has his own hierarchy of values and priorities, within which he makes a decision. From the point of view of studying the behavior of the parties to the conflict, in addition to their own benefit, a number of researchers believe that the rational choice model is also able to take into account the possibility for the participants in the conflict to receive ideological advantages (Nicholson, 1990). However, the starting point in this case, the parties to the conflict should have the same understanding of the current situation, due to which a rational attitude to the present is formed. The difference in approaches to assessing what is happening should be resolved by transforming the structure of interests of the conflicting parties. The use of the rational choice model in the analysis of the actions of the conflicting parties in the Transnistrian conflict lies in the following hypothesis. In the context of the equivalent combat potential of the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria, resolving the conflict by military means is an elusive task. The conflicting parties were forced to look for new points of contact, as the request for a peaceful settlement was demonstrated by residents, both on the right and on the left bank of the Dniester. At the same CES Working Papers | 2023 - volume XV(2) | wwww.ceswp.uaic.ro | ISSN: 2067 - 7693 | CC BY Anatolii DIRUN, Valentina TEOSA 137 Since the most important condition ensuring the promotion of europeanization in the context of the conflict was not so much a political discourse focused on the values of euro integration, but the real interest of the participants in the conflict (Emerson, 2004). An analysis of the activities of the EU as a mediator for more than 20 years, based on the method of historical analysis, allows us to empirically verify the effectiveness of sanctions and incentives, and to highlight the emotional factor of values, the influence of which on the behavior of the parties significantly reduced the effectiveness of rational choice. 3. Sanctions as a tool for transforming the interests of Transnistria The EU began to show interest in the Transnistrian settlement only at the beginning of the 2000s. The preparation and accession of Romania to the EU in 2007 brought the conflict closer to its borders. In this regard, already in the spring of 2003, the European Neighborhood Policy was proclaimed, in the context of which the EU's desire was declared to play a more active role in resolving the conflict in Transnistria, including the use of financial instruments for post-conflict reconstruction (European Parliament, 2003). Analyzing the process of Europeanization of the negotiation process, it is important to take into account the fact that the period of EU involvement in the negotiations (2003-2005) included two fundamental positions. First, the EU has never proposed projects related to the political status of Transnistria. In this matter, Brussels considered Tiraspol from the standpoint of the Law On the main provisions of the special legal status of settlements on the left bank of the Dniester (Pridnestrovie), adopted by Parliament in July 2005. Secondly, the main efforts of the EU were reduced to the need to return Transnistria to the Moldovan economic and customs space. The justification here was the arguments about the damage caused to the Moldovan economy by the unresolved conflict. For example, British experts, assessing the scale of economic damage, time, the difficulty of reaching a political agreement was offset by the desire of the parties to focus on the economic aspect of the relationship. The economic approach made it possible for politicians in Moldova and Transnistria to see their perceived benefits and risks, as well as the tools to achieve and neutralize them. In turn, the effectiveness of economic interaction largely depended on the efforts and capabilities of the EU as an intermediary. To solve this problem, the European Union had to choose the right instruments of sanctions and incentives, as well as determine the algorithm for their use in order to effectively involve Pridnestrovie in the legal field of the Republic of Moldova. CES Working Papers | 2023 - volume XV(2) | wwww.ceswp.uaic.ro | ISSN: 2067 - 7693 | CC BY The problem of developing a model for the settlement Transnistrian conflict 144 European labor market and education. Third, the EU funding of projects to increase confidence building measures between the banks of the Dniester, gradually removes the enemy image from the parties to the conflict from the agenda and translates it into a complex but pragmatic relationship. At the same time, stimulating the parties to the conflict, primarily Transnistria, to the European choice as a political platform has demonstrated the limits of using the rational choice methodology. For Transnistria and the Republic of Moldova, European integration takes place in different systems of value coordinates. If for Tiraspol the process of European integration is of an economic nature and does not contradict the pro-Russian vector of the statehood of Pridnestrovie (Rytovuori-Apunen, 2020). For the Republic of Moldova, Europeanization is a consolidating factor for the Moldovan society. Such a different understanding of European integration among the parties to the conflict is reflected in a different assessment of the Soviet past, which is transformed into problems in the present and forms opposite approaches to understanding the common future. The outbreak of hostilities on the territory of Ukraine in February 2022 became a serious test of the strength of the agreements reached between Transnistria and Moldova mediated by the EU. Since in wartime conditions the logic of war comes to the fore, and rational tools no longer have such effectiveness. The question remains how long the status quo can be maintained in maintaining peace in the region, which, in fact, ensures the independence of Transnistria. Such a formulation of the problem is natural in that the emergence of the Transnistrian issue in 1990, as well as the hostilities on the territory of Moldova in 1992, were the result of the collapse of the Soviet state. After 30 years, the war in Ukraine actualized the issue of the struggle for influence in the post-Soviet space. 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