What makes randomized controlled trials so successful—for now? Or, on the consonances, compromises, and contradictions of a global interstitial field

Neuwinger, Malte Article — Published Version What makes randomized controlled trials so successful —for now? Or, on the consonances, compromises, and contradictions of a global interstitial field Theory and Society Provided in Cooperation with: Springer Nature Suggested Citation: Neuwinger, Malte (2024) : What makes randomized controlled trials so successful —for now? Or, on the consonances, compromises, and contradictions of a global interstitial field, Theory and Society, ISSN 1573-7853, Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht, Vol. 53, Iss. 5, pp. 1213-1244, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-024-09564-5 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/315623 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Vol.:(0123456789) Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-024-09564-5 1 3 What makes randomized controlled trials sosuccessful—for now? Or, ontheconsonances, compromises, andcontradictions ofaglobal interstitial field MalteNeuwinger1 Accepted: 26 May 2024 / Published online: 20 June 2024 © The Author(s) 2024 Abstract Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are a major success story, promising to improve science and policy. Despite some controversy, RCTs have spread toward Northern and Southern countries since the early 2000s. How so? Synthesizing previous research on this question, this article argues that favorable institutional conditions turned RCTs into “hinges” between the fields of science, politics, and business. Shifts toward behavioral economics, New Public Management, and evidence-based philanthropic giving led to a cross-fertilization among efforts in rich and poor countries, involving states, international organizations, NGOs, researchers, and philanthropic foundations. This confluence of favorable institutional conditions and savvy social actors established a “global interstitial field” inside which support for RCTs has developed an unprecedented scope, influence, operational capacity, and professional payoff. However, the article further argues that the hinges holding together this global interstitial field are “squeaky” at best. Because actors inherit the illusio of their respective fields of origin—their central incentives and stakes—the interstitial field produces constant goal conflicts. Cooperation between academics and practitioners turns out to be plagued by tensions and contradictions. Based on this analysis, the article concludes that the global field of RCT support will probably differentiate into its constituent parts. As a result, RCTs may lose the special status they have gained among social science and policy evaluation methods, turning into one good technique among others. Keywords Field theory· Global fields· Interstitial fields· Illusio· Policy evaluation· Randomized controlled trials * Malte Neuwinger [email protected] 1 Faculty ofSociology, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany 1214 Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 1 3 Introduction Few topics in the social sciences are as hotly debated as randomized controlled trials (RCTs). This is not because drug trial-style experimental studies with randomly allocated “treatment” and “control” groups are more interesting or important than, say, poverty, global political turmoil, or the threats posed by new technologies. It is because RCTs hit so close to home. Over the last decade and a half, many economists, political scientists, and sociologists have begun to claim that well-designed RCTs will greatly improve both the theory and the practice of social science (Baldassarri & Abascal, 2017; Banerjee & Duflo, 2009; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2009), giving rise to what some have called a “credibility revolution” (Angrist & Pischke, 2010). Even beyond academic social science, RCTs are seen as so useful for getting a handle on real-world problems that three of their main proponents, Esther Duflo, Abhijit Banerjee, and Michael Kremer, have recently won a Nobel Prize. Evidence gained from RCTs is advertised as a new way out of the “ideology, ignorance, and inertia” many policy debates appear to be stuck in (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011, p. 16). Some fifty years after social science methodologist Donald T. Campbell first dreamed of an Experimenting Society based on RCTs, a “twentyfirst century experimenting society” seems to be emerging (White, 2019). By now, RCTs in social settings are not only a scientific method—they are also a multi-million-dollar business. Given such high hopes, bold proclamations, and economic potency, it is hardly surprising that a sizable group of social scientists begs to differ. Critics argue that RCTs are no more rigorous than other techniques (Bédécarrats etal., 2020; Deaton & Cartwright, 2018), limited at best when it comes to addressing real-world problems (Berndt, 2015; Pearce & Raman, 2014), and generally ethically worrisome (MacKay, 2018; Teele, 2014). In this view, RCTs rarely generalize to other places, rely on limited and faulty data, marginalize broader political problems, introduce a technocratic focus into social science, and are in danger of violating people’s rights. While to proponents more and better RCTs seem like the only way to go, their critics often find it puzzling that the much-maligned “rationalist” model of policymaking keeps cropping up in yet another disguise (Kelly & McGoey, 2018; Oliver, 2022; Picciotto, 2012). This article takes arguments for and against RCTs seriously, but it engages with them only after taking a more empirical approach to the recent success of RCTs in scientific and applied contexts. Instead of starting from the premise that they revolutionize credibility or claiming that they fall back on a long-debunked chimera, it asks, What accounts for the proliferation of RCTs in the first place? Note that, in this conception, the question of the “success of RCTs” is quite independent of the question of whether they have in fact solved the scientific and political problems they purport to solve, or even whether they can do so in principle. It simply acknowledges that RCTs have spread enormously and asks how this could have happened. Though having gotten little attention in the heat of the present debate, this approach turns the controversy into a theoretically intriguing research problem 1215 1 3 Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 of considerable practical relevance. Theoretically, it zooms in on questions of the interconnection of science and politics and the merging and decoupling of social fields. More practically, it helps to make the debate more level-headed and productive. The article addresses praise and critique of RCTs not by explicitly favoring one side, but by showing that the dominance of RCTs is less extreme than it may seem and that many practitioners have begun to accept critiques and adapt accordingly. This makes it possible to argue that RCTs are a fine method among others, with strengths and weaknesses, and that top RCT proponents at leading institutions are coming around to this view. Debate in the name of advancing social science is legitimate, necessary, and welcome. Yet there is no need to villainize RCTs or be afraid of them—just as it is unhelpful to idealize RCTs or be blinded by the current hype. Explaining the success of RCTs, it has been said, is “like trying to chart the birth of rock and roll. Early influences are many, and every fan has a story” (Angrist & Pischke, 2010, p. 5). One popular and initially intuitive explanation is to point to their inherent scientific superiority. Particularly proponents claim (or at least imply) that RCTs became popular simply because they are better than other techniques (Duflo & Kremer, 2005; Leigh, 2018). However, several scholars have noted that this view is not particularly convincing (Bédécarrats etal., 2019; de Souza Leão & Eyal, 2019; Donovan, 2018). For one thing, if RCTs had spread purely because of their superiority, why were they not popular all along? Considering that there have been several “waves” of RCTs since the statistician Ronald Fisher popularized them in the 1920s (Jamison, 2019), the inherent superiority hypothesis does a bad job of explaining why each of these waves subsided after a few years. For another, if one wants to claim that RCTs will “revolutionize social policy” in roughly the same way as they did for “medicine in the twentieth century”, as Duflo and Kremer (2005, p. 228) allege, shouldn’t one take the actual circumstances of this supposed historical precedent much more seriously? After all, the establishment of RCTs as the “gold standard” of drug testing is a textbook example of strongstate regulatory policy, not of everyone magically being swayed by the power of Reason. Randomized double-blind clinical studies only became standard practice in the 1960s after the German pharmaceutical company Grünenthal had managed to poison thousands of unborn babies through its sleeping pill Contergan, otherwise known as thalidomide. This incident put pressure on regulatory agencies worldwide to prevent other pharmaceuticals from doing similar things in the future (Carpenter, 2014). The issue here is not whether mandating RCTs was epistemically warranted—it may well have been—but that the “revolution” in medicine was supported through a level of state regulation previously unheard of that made selling drugs without backing them through RCTs simply illegal. In other words, if most of today’s medical professionals believe in the value of RCTs, they began believing only after most states of the industrialized world had declared that not doing so was equivalent to advocating the free exchange of poison (Marks, 2000). As these examples make clear, this article’s main concern is not whether RCTs are a good research technique but (much more modestly) whether they could plausibly have spread solely as a result of their alleged superiority over other methods. The historical record suggests that they hardly could. A more plausible story is suggested 1216 Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 1 3 by the title of one recent history of social policy RCTs, written by two proponents: Fighting for Reliable Evidence (Gueron & Rolston, 2013). As their emphasis on fighting suggests, the insight that the recent proliferation of experimental methods came about through a process mostly unrelated to science proper can be shared by critics and proponents, even while legitimate disagreement about the adequacy of these methods persists. Whether you think that RCTs are unnecessary and unethical or revolutionary and righteous, the question arises: How exactly did the process of RCT popularization unfold? The argument of this article is developed in close conjunction with two recent answers to this question. One is that RCTs have become part of a “scientific business model” through which researchers, often by establishing elite research networks like the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), have managed to sell their research to a variety of non-scientific customers (Bédécarrats etal., 2019). The other is that favorable institutional conditions—such as shifts in academic economics and development aid—turned RCTs into “hinges” between formerly disconnected fields, durably linking them together by rewarding RCTs in both academic and applied contexts (de Souza Leão & Eyal, 2019). While both perspectives are valuable, one central difference among them is that the former explains the success of RCTs through the scientific and political savvy of strong actors pursuing their interests, while the latter takes a step back to uncover an institutional dynamic that “rewires” the interests of all actors involved. Both studies describe a political process, but one tells a story of power and influence while the other tells a story of unlikely alliances among former strangers. This article provides empirical evidence that the truth involves some combination of both accounts, often working in parallel. But while accepting several of their arguments and observations—notably the latter’s field theory perspective and its description of developments in economics and philanthropy—it also goes significantly beyond them. The main argument remains that during the 1980s and 1990s shifts toward behavioral economics and small-scale project-based development aid did indeed create key institutional conditions suitable to establish RCTs as “hinges” between scientists and practitioners. What is new is that these favorable conditions were never confined to the development sector, instead gaining ground through an additional—more general—shift toward New Public Management. By the early 2000s, RCTs thus functioned as hinges not only in countries of the Global South but also of the Global North. Through a process of intellectual and political cross-fertilization among numerous fields, the early 2010s then saw the crystallization of what I call a “global interstitial field” (Buchholz, 2016; Eyal, 2013; Medvetz, 2012)—a conglomerate of states, international organizations, NGOs, researchers, and philanthropic foundations in favor of RCTs, connected through a relatively stable social arrangement with institutionalized boundaries and internal hierarchies. United in this shared field, proponents became able to run RCTs in an increasing number of policy areas and garner significant political influence. Most importantly, the RCT success story comes with a catch. The article shows that cooperation among researchers and practitioners is anything but smooth in practice. Because researchers prioritize publishing papers in academic journals, while policy-makers and funders focus on improving real-world programs and achieving 1217 1 3 Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 quick policy impact, contradictions and goal conflicts emerge. The hinges between fields do exist, but they are much weaker than often assumed and somewhat “squeaky”. Because researchers and practitioners originate from diverse fields, they also partly “inherit” the illusio—the central incentives or stakes—operating in these fields (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 98–99). This leads to coordination problems among key actors. In this sense, the success of RCT proponents’ fight against ideology, ignorance, and inertia depends on their ability to manage the consonances, compromises, and contradictions of the global interstitial field in which they find themselves. In the sections that follow, the article first reviews recent explanations of the rise of RCTs since the early 2000s. It argues that the two main weaknesses of this branch of research are that they mostly focus on experiments in poor countries and attribute an implausible amount of agency to a small number of “model cases” like J-PAL (Krause, 2021). Therefore, they overlook developments in wealthier countries and downplay the number and diversity of RCT supporters. Recent accounts that interpret experimental methods as a scientific business model or as hinges between fields partly ameliorate these oversights, but also reproduce them in certain respects. After analyzing the crystallization of the global interstitial field of RCT support and the goal conflicts it produces, the article concludes with two tentative predictions. First, support for RCTs will probably differentiate according to the scientific and applied fault lines already perceivable today. Second, and partly as a result, RCTs may lose the special status they have gained among social science and policy evaluation methods, turning them into one good method among others. This does not necessarily mean that the general influence of RCTs will subside, but that their production may become organized much like drug testing or market research are organized today. Recent explanations oftherise ofRCTs Because debates among social scientists have focused largely on the scientific, political, and ethical pros and cons of RCTs, they have devoted less attention to the empirical question of why RCTs have been spreading in the first place. Implicitly, many probably assume that the latter question is merely a “special case” of the former, in the sense that high popularity is a result of compelling arguments in favor of RCTs. But as I have argued, the popularity of RCTs is at best loosely coupled with arguments speaking in their favor. This section reviews the explanations and empirical studies currently available that acknowledge this point. It argues that most of them share two main starting points, which lead to two main drawbacks. First, most researchers assume that the current success of RCTs is rooted in applications in the Global South, leading them to neglect experimental evaluations in developed industrialized countries. Second, most researchers treat small research networks like J-PAL as “model cases” that stand in for the proliferation of RCTs in general. Explicitly or implicitly, this leads to the attribution of an implausible degree of agency to a relatively small number of actors, what I call a “baseline individualism” of current research. To some extent, these tendencies even pertain to two of the most inspired contributions to the discussion, namely the claim that RCTs form 1218 Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 1 3 part of a new “scientific business model” (Bédécarrats etal., 2019) and that they have created “hinges” between formerly separate social fields (de Souza Leão & Eyal, 2019). This analysis suggests that explanations of the success of RCTs can be improved by considering a larger number of supporters, paying attention to RCTs in Northern and Southern contexts, and further clarifying the broader institutional conditions that made this support possible. “Model cases” indevelopment research Whether supportive or critical, many social scientists maintain that the current “wave” of RCTs originated in the new development economics of the early 2000s (e.g. Donovan, 2018; Fejerskov, 2022; Leigh, 2018). One touchstone for this impression is Banerjee and Duflo’s influential book Poor Economics (2011). In strong rhetoric, the authors argue that the economics of development are better conceived as the economics of poverty—and that most economists in this sub-discipline have done their job poorly. Positioning themselves between supporters and critics of foreign aid, Banerjee and Duflo argue that better science and politics can only be achieved through more and better evidence. And “better evidence”, they make clear, usually requires RCTs (Labrousse, 2020). Amplified by prizes and enthusiastic media coverage, their story has been subject to a classic Matthew Effect: a few superstars get the credit for the work of a large community (Merton, 1968). Supposedly, the main push for RCTs came out of the small field of development economics, triggered by an even smaller sub-group of elite innovators. Of course, the story is not entirely baseless. Household examples are analyses of cash transfer and micro-credit schemes in developing countries (Banerjee etal., 2015), with the Mexican Progresa study as an early highlight (Tollefson, 2015). Another major success story used to be RCTs on programs in which African children were “dewormed” off intestinal parasites, though by now the so-called “worm wars” have turned deworming into a more controversial issue (Allen & Parker, 2016). And while the “reproducibility crisis” in the social sciences has raised some further issues (Czibor etal., 2019), concerns about whether experimental results are replicable in other contexts do little to alter the perception that the center and initial trigger for conducting more RCTs is to be found in development economics. Even when critics talk about RCTs as the emergence of an unethical “global lab”, their critique is premised on the claim that researchers from the Global North experiment on subjects in the Global South (Fejerskov, 2022). As a consequence, scholars have rarely connected RCTs in developing countries with their counterparts in wealthy industrialized ones—or vice versa. They rarely discuss that RCTs have been part of American labor market policy since the 1960s and that a veritable research industry used to conduct experimental trials on health insurance, tax schemes, and housing (Berman, 2022; Breslau, 1998; Gueron & Rolston, 2013). Nor have they considered how aspirations to reinvigorate these efforts began to form in the governments of Northern states at about the time as development economists started to build their research networks, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom. As I will expand on below, the US government’s idea to use RCTs for 1219 1 3 Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 playing “Moneyball for government” (Nussle & Orszag, 2015) and take a behavioral approach to public policy may be considered as at least as important for shaping the RCT agenda as the concerns of academic economists. Though scholars of public policy are well aware of these trends (Haskins & Margolis, 2015; Jones & Whitehead, 2018; Pearce & Raman, 2014), they have rarely related their work to the question of the initial success of RCTs. If scholars do note the connection, they tend to tacitly agree that experimental methods first emerged in international development (e.g. Jones & Whitehead, 2018). Connecting to the assumption that the present wave of RCTs first emerged in the Global South, the second assumption broadly shared among social scientists is that the current wave of RCTs is led by a small number of newly established research organizations (e.g. Fejerskov, 2022; Jatteau, 2018; Karlan, 2011). The first on everyone’s list is the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), occasionally accompanied by Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) and the World Bank’s Development Impact Evaluation office (DIME). The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and the UK Department for International Development (DFID, now FCDO) also sometimes receive an honorable mention, largely because they provide the necessary funding (Donovan, 2018). But this is about the most detailed things get. In this sense, recent research has turned a few select organizations into “model cases” that stand in for a much larger epistemic target (Krause, 2021), namely the success of RCTs in general. Especially J-PAL and its Nobel Prize-winning founders have become the starting point for explaining the phenomenon of experimental trials, and they are the privileged research object for interested scholars. Paradoxically, insofar as social scientists have been able to say anything about the rise of RCTs, this general depiction is achieved by looking at a particularly narrow set of examples. Model cases are useful to focus scholarly attention on particular research objects and sites, but they also trigger analytical problems. While support for RCTs, according to one scholar, consists of “a dizzying array of initiatives and organizations” (Donovan, 2018, p. 30), in actual research practice the focus on model cases leads to extreme selectivity regarding actors considered truly relevant. For instance, another scholar presents “the elitism of the J-PAL and the tightened network of randomists as an explanation for the success of RCT” (Jatteau, 2018, p. 115), hence leaving all other initiatives of the “dizzying array” out of the picture. The main downside of turning a few heroic innovators into model cases is that it leads to a strong “baseline individualism”: while no one seriously claims that focusing on J-PAL tells the full story about the spread of RCTs, the fact that J-PAL is the only actor that has been seriously researched makes scholars fall back on the familiar one-dimensional story. Before correcting these oversights, it makes sense to investigate two recent explanations of the rise of experimental methods in some more detail. A new “scientific business model” andtheemergence of“hinges” betweenfields The weaknesses of recent explanations of the success of RCTs—neglect of its broader international scope and a baseline individualism—are also present in two of 1220 Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 1 3 the most insightful articles on the topic: Bédécarrats, Guérin, and Roubaud’s (2019) claim that RCTs form part of a new “scientific business model” and de Souza Leão and Eyal’s (2019) proposal that experimental methods establish “hinges” between the fields of academic economics and practical development work. Acknowledging this is useful not only to show that the weaknesses are real but also to suggest how they may be overcome. While especially the former explanation remains strongly individualistic and both neglect experimentation in the Global North, I argue that they are the most plausible approaches we currently have. Extending and relating them to one another thus provides the basis for the main argument of this article. Rooted in political economy, the main strength of Bédécarrats and colleagues’ argument is to connect a scientific trend like experimental methods with political and economic interests. It argues that leading social experimenters, led by future Nobelists Duflo, Banerjee, and Kremer, “have generated an entirely new scientific business model, which has in turn driven the emergence of a truly global industry” (Bédécarrats etal., 2019, p. 752). Young researchers “from the inner sanctum of the top universities” (ibid.) have managed to combine the “mutually reinforcing qualities of academic excellence (scientific credibility), public appeal (media visibility and public credibility), donor appeal (solvent demand), massive investment in training (skilled supply) and a high-performance business model (financial profitability)” (Bédécarrats etal., 2019, p. 752). To make the business model function, researchers have set up NGOs like J-PAL and IPA, which can receive funds from a variety of sources: support comes not only from public research funding but also from philanthropic foundations and businesses. As a consequence, researchers and their NGOs “have created an oligopoly on the flourishing RCT market”, including a large field infrastructure necessary for conducting RCTs (Bédécarrats etal., 2019, p. 753). Overall, Bédécarrats and colleagues construct a straightforward model involving a group of powerful actors who have mobilized their economic, cultural, and social resources to gain enormous scientific influence and operational capacity. The result of these efforts is a scientific business model that profits from conducting RCTs and supporting their perceived superiority. What makes this explanation somewhat problematic, though, is that it largely rests on the assumed influence of a small group of researchers and organizations assumed to be all-powerful (again, a case of baseline individualism resulting from reliance on model cases) and that the “global industry” they have supposedly created does not include RCTs in the Global North. Rooted in political sociology, de Souza Leão and Eyal’s approach focuses less on uniquely powerful individuals and more on the broader institutional infrastructure that is necessary to support them. Substituting Bédécarrats and colleagues’ leading analytical concepts, “market” and “interest”, in favor of “fields” and “hinges”—in the sense of Bourdieu (1985) and Abbott (2005)—enables the sociologists to reconcile the research industry’s expansion with its broader social and political environment. As they put it, the contemporary success of RCTs is better understood as a product of historical and institutional processes that have changed the political and scientific context in which RCTs are implemented, rather than as evidence of their “gold 1227 1 3 Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 number of collaborations and financial ties, they were joined by a growing number of supporters. Gradually, a social structure emerged. Some actors were in, some were out. Some set the agenda, others followed. The first key institutional move toward RCTs came from the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the executive office responsible for making sure that government agencies’ activities comply with the president’s political line. In 2001, OMB introduced the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), a procedure intended to link budget decisions to “program performance” by grading programs from “effective” to “ineffective” (Haskins & Baron, 2011, p. 8; Moynihan, 2013). In part because of effective lobbying from the Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy, a 2004 document titled “What Constitutes Strong Evidence of a Program’s Effectiveness?” (OMB, 2004) clarified that OMB’s yardstick for “performance” was Fig. 1 Four snapshots of the developing global interstitial field of RCT support. Organizations are connected if they collaborated on experimental trials or financed each other for purposes of RCTs, each over several years. Particularly collaborative and well-financed organizations appear closer to the center while the rest mark the periphery 1228 Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 1 3 RCTs. OMB thus became the unlikely “quarterback of evidence-based policy making” inside the Bush administration (Stack, 2018, p. 112). Lobbying OMB was a big deal because it meant politically linking funding decisions to the use of a particular research method. As another interviewee put it, “When money was at stake, suddenly everybody learned what a randomized trial was, in the nonprofit community and elsewhere” (Interview CEBP). These developments were further strengthened with the inauguration of the Obama administration in 2008, culminating in what economist and former OMB president Peter Orszag and his predecessor Jim Nussle call “Moneyball for government” (Nussle & Orszag, 2015). Obama’s stimulus packages, made available against the fallout of the global financial crisis, allowed OMB to increase its evaluation capacity, provide technical assistance to ever more branches of government, and in many cases tie funding decisions to RCTs (Haskins & Margolis, 2015; Stack, 2018, pp. 117–119). Over the same timeframe, support for RCTs also became increasingly strong outside the US government. In 2001, Peter Rossi, Fred Mosteller, and Robert Boruch established the Campbell Collaboration. In 2002, Dean Karlan founded Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), and in 2003 Esther Duflo, Abhijit Banerjee, and Sendhil Mullainathan started the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL). The year 2005 saw the establishment of the World Bank’s Development Impact Evaluation unit (DIME), followed by the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) in 2008. These NGOs, international organizations, and research networks are generally regarded as key RCT supporters, far more consequential than the US government (Bédécarrats etal., 2019; de Souza Leão & Eyal, 2019; Donovan, 2018). Yet the reality is more complex. The early 2000s saw a cross-fertilization among government circles, development researchers, philanthropists, and NGOs. The US government’s domestic concerns to evaluate performance and its experience with RCTs provided initial fertile ground for the establishment of NGOs like J-PAL—but by the late 2000s, as the success of the latter players became evident, excitement “looped back” toward the domestic policy space and larger government-backed organizations more generally. Another example of this cross-fertilization among domestic politics, academic economics discourse, and development work is the establishment of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Set up in 2004, MCC was designed as a crucial NPM-inspired reform of US development policy, namely to directly link foreign aid to developing countries’ willingness to enact market-based and democratic reforms (Hook, 2008). Yet the impetus for MCC to focus on RCTs emerged through a highly influential 2006 report by the Center for Global Development, titled When Will We Ever Learn? (Sturdy etal., 2014, p. 438). Written by leading supporters of RCTs—among others, Esther Duflo, World Bank Chief Economist François Bourguignon, and Gates Foundation Chief Economist and future USAID Administrator Raj Shah—the report argued that the key problem of development policy was an “evaluation gap” that made it impossible to assess to what extent a policy was having the causal “impact” it aimed for (CGD, 2006). At a time when J-PAL and IPA were still in their infancy, RCT supporters focused on persuading state-backed development actors of the value of RCTs. But as the newly founded research networks gradually built up their intellectual reputation, their influence became more direct. As Esther Duflo describes 1229 1 3 Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 it, RCTs “suddenly became a way to do business […], with academics starting their own projects or starting to participate in large projects” (Duflo in Gueron & Rolston, 2013, p. 466). Only when this “business” showed potential, during the second half of the 2000s, did international organizations like the World Bank manage to acquire large-scale funding for RCTs (DIME, 2010, p. 50). This let DIME grow from “maybe half a dozen staff in total” in 2010 to about 300 today (interview DIME). The early 2010s are the time when the cross-fertilization among RCT supporters eventually crystallized into a relatively stable global field of its own, durably linking diverse actors around the world under the leadership of a set of NGOs (J-PAL and IPA), international organizations (World Bank), and key philanthropic financiers (particularly the Gates and Hewlett Foundations and, later, Arnold Ventures). Various anglophone countries began to establish organizations doing RCTs, sometimes relying explicitly on the role model of US public policy (AUE & Nesta, 2011; Ball & Head, 2021; Pearce & Raman, 2014). IPA and J-PAL started their first country offices in Africa and Asia, establishing the unequal North–South research relations today criticized as a “global lab” (Fejerskov, 2022). Hundreds of smaller players followed their lead. Recent highlights of the global field’s expansion are the World Food Programme’s 2019 Impact Evaluation Strategy (World Food Programme, 2019) and the 2022 nomination of IPA founder Dean Karlan as Chief Economist of USAID. By the late 2010s, RCTs had durably connected the “Moneyball for government” project of the US with the “scientific business model” of academic economics. A confluence of efforts, led by leaders in the US and Europe and increasingly finding followers all over the world, had turned RCTs into a global success story (Fig.2). Fig. 2 The global field of RCT support, as of 2021, arranged on a world map. Organizations are connected if they collaborated on RCTs or financed each other for the purposes of conducting them, each over several years. Organizations’ geographical locations are based on their head office. Note: Because so many organizations are based in certain global centers (particularly London and New York, but also others), there is significant over-plotting in these areas 1230 Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 1 3 How strong are thehinges? Compromises andcontradictions intheglobal field The argument so far has traced the success of RCTs to a heterogeneous group of academically successful, affluent, applied, and media-savvy supporters who, in conjunction with favorable institutional conditions, managed to establish durable links among previously unconnected fields. This argument has attempted to synthesize previous research on the rise of RCTs and extend it where necessary, particularly emphasizing the cross-fertilization of RCT support in Northern and Southern countries and the dual rewards RCTs began to promise in academic and applied contexts. However, skeptical readers may have wondered whether this story might not be a bit too neat. Is it really plausible that a global field, premised on support for RCTs, could emerge without internal conflict, coordination problems among key players, and the kind of bad luck most people experience once in a while? This concern is more than justified. Perhaps the greatest weakness of current research is that it tends to present the rise of RCTs as an unstoppable avalanche. While some scholars have moved away from the assumption that RCTs have spread because of their internal superiority, their exclusive focus on the movement’s expansion is in danger of establishing another tautological story in which RCTs necessarily come out on top. Even many critics, who over the past decade have elaborated important epistemic, political, and ethical problems of the RCT movement (Bédécarrats etal., 2020; Deaton & Cartwright, 2018; Teele, 2014), seem less interested in discussing what their criticism has achieved than in puzzling over why RCTs keep spreading despite having solved few of the political problems they meant to solve (Devaux-Spatarakis; Neuwinger, 2023). Yet the reality is that the accumulation of criticism, and even more so the practical difficulty of conducting RCTs and attempting to change real-world decision-making, is putting supporters under increasing pressure (Ball & Head, 2021; Williams, 2023). As we will see in the following section and the conclusion, this pressure leads them to gradually adapt their position and accept common critiques. Naturally, this acceptance and adaptation occurs slowly, grudgingly, and remains somewhat under the surface. Yet it is happening, and critiques of RCTs have played no small role in the recent shift. My main argument, however, is that the hinges RCTs have established among researchers and practitioners are weaker and less coherent than often thought. Instead of linking fields “seamlessly”, as de Souza Leão and Eyal (2019, p. 405) argue, the hinges making up the interstitial field are often fragile and, in some cases, contradictory. Academics do face incentives to team up with practitioners and conduct experimental trials—but their desire for innovation and novelty does not quite fit with the more mundane demands of regular program evaluation. Governments do want to demonstrate that their domestic policies and development aid are backed by “rigorous” evidence—but this usually involves long-term commitments to real-world policies and programs, clashing with academics’ desire to test exciting new approaches. And funders, especially philanthropic donors, do 1231 1 3 Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 have affinities with testing policies like companies test new products—but they have little patience with the frequent “null results” experimental evaluations tend to produce. While hinges between previously disconnected fields make the global interstitial field possible, they also create goal conflicts. This might be a more general consequence of the functioning of interstitial fields (Eyal, 2013; Liu, 2021). Tensions betweenresearchers andpractitioners: Interesting publications vs. addressing real‑world problems The theory of a functioning hinge is ingenious and attractive. As de Souza Leão and Eyal (2019, pp. 401–402) argue, because RCTs have become valuable to economists, government practitioners, and philanthropists, all of these diverse social actors have an incentive to contribute to the movement. By the early 2000s, doing RCTs started to provide dual rewards for academics (in the form of publications) as well as for practitioners and funders (in the form of “rigorous evidence”). In the language of field theory, RCTs function as hinges because they align the illusio of distinct fields—the main incentives or stakes to which actors are exposed (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 98–99)—enabling the emergence of an interstitial field in which everyone can cooperate effectively.2 Hinges therefore eliminate the problem of converting institutionalized resources—or “capital”—relevant in one field to resources relevant in another field. I want to stress, however, that this argument cuts both ways. Because RCT supporters originate from the fields of science, politics, and business, they also “inherit” some of the central incentives and stakes relevant inside these fields. This is because the global interstitial field’s relative level of autonomy—the extent to which it can develop field-specific logics, practices, and modes of relevance of its own (Buchholz, 2016, pp. 36–40; Krause, 2018, pp. 8–11)—remains limited. While I have argued that the community of RCT supporters has indeed crystallized into a field of its own, more autonomous and settled fields keep projecting their logic and criteria of relevance on the interstitial field. In this situation, the incentives of the diverse field members become imperfectly aligned—they are torn between different fieldspecific logics and criteria.3 The hinge between researchers and political practitioners provides a first example. Over the course of the 2000s, doing RCTs had become a way for academic researchers to get published in prestigious journals. Pulling off an experimental study had turned into a central marker of skill and “rigor” (Bédécarrats et al., 2 Note that illusio has nothing to do with illusions or false beliefs. Instead, it derives from the latin ludus (english “game”) and describes a state of mind in which people are really involved in the “social game” they are playing and accept its incentives and stakes as important (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 98–99). If a researcher leaves the scientific field and starts working in a real job, publishing papers and getting quoted by fellow academics does not become unreal—it just becomes unimportant. 3 This argument is somewhat akin to investigations of clashing “institutional logics” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008), though I would argue that the field concept is clearer about outside boundaries and inside stratifications. 1232 Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 1 3 2019, p. 754; Gërxhani & Miller, 2022). But because the incentives of academics rarely align with those of practitioners, conducting RCTs in applied contexts is often difficult. As one World Bank researcher explains, for DIME evaluators (and even more for researchers with the Bank’s Development Research Group) “the metric you’re evaluated on is, like, ‘how many papers do you publish?’, which pushes towards that academic side, and pushes away from being really responsive to the concerns and questions from the operational team” (Interview DIME). Similarly, another economist laments that her colleagues tend to “create the questions, instead of thinking, you know, ‘we should be there in service of the problems and questions that the practitioners have”’ (Interview economist 2). And an evaluator with the German KfW Development Bank remarks, KfW: Academic work is often rather detached from real practical work, of the things that are really going on in terms of programs. Ideally, this shouldn’t be so, but it is. And the reason is of course: The scientific world incentivizes great RCTs, funky designs, new data, precise identifications. And this is easier to get if I [as an academic] do my own experiments. But actual practical work depends on technical solutions that depend on realworld situations. And reality often may not be interesting enough that you can do a great RCT on it, or anything that you can publish in a top journal. But as you know, this is what young researchers need to do. From this perspective, the global interstitial field and its scientific business model suffer from a clear internal divide. In their everyday work, researchers are primed to focus on novelty in their publications while practitioners must aim for practical improvements of existing policies and programs. In the words of one researcher who works for the philanthropy Arnold Ventures, Arnold Ventures: I mean, [at research-focused organizations] there’s certainly an effort and an attempt to ensure that the questions that are being asked are the questions that implementers or governments would want the answers to. But at the end of the day, the projects that get developed at, like, the IPAs and the J-PALs of the world are driven by academics. I think that’s a real difference from what we’re trying to do here. The existence of tensions between the illusio of actors operating primarily in scientific rather than applied contexts, and vice versa, leads to one additional insight into the dynamics of imperfectly aligned fields. De Souza Leão and Eyal (2019, pp. 404–405, 398) argue that part of the homologous transformations that enabled the hinges among academics and practitioners to emerge was that current RCTs are based on small nudges rather than large-scale government interventions. As they see it, both groups of actors have converged on a view according to which small changes, tested through small-scale RCTs, may lead to big improvements—an idea that has been called “radical incrementalism” (Halpern & Mason, 2015). But quite to the contrary, interviewed researchers suggest that evaluations of real social programs and small-scale academic “funky designs” are rarely the same (Interview KfW). Because many academic researchers are “on the tenure 1233 1 3 Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 clock”, hoping to get a university professorship, long-term RCT evaluations on real-world projects are rarely pursued and left to corporate actors with fewer time and funding constraints like the World Bank (Interview DIME). As one expert at the German Institute for Development Evaluation puts it, DEval: When I think of the Banerjee’s of this world, they have their three institutions and three countries they work with. And with those they develop fancy interventions that produce nice publications. But this is not the stuff that USAID or FCDO [i.e. the US and UK aid agencies] need. These comments suggest that the hinges between academics and practitioners do indeed exist, but they should rather be regarded as the smallest common denominator academics and practitioners can agree on. Rather than the result of a perfect confluence of methods, worldviews, and practical needs, small-scale “nudging” RCTs are a compromise necessary to overcome fundamental differences among scientific and applied fields (White, 2014, pp. 21–22). The diverging illusio of different fields does not entirely unhinge the linkage provided by RCTs, but the hinge that actually exists is squeaky at best. In some cases, this “squeakiness” has downright bizarre implications. As a large funder of RCTs, 3ie had agreed with the Mexican government to find qualified academic evaluators for one of its social programs. But as a 3ie employee explains, 3ie: This team bid to evaluate [the program]. And they said, “Well, the only design we can think of is this design. And Esther [Duflo] and Abhijit [Banerjee] already published a paper with this design for programs in India. So we don’t want to do that and publish it because that design has been used already. So we’re not gonna do it.” I’m like, “But you agreed about evaluating this program. We don’t care what design you use, just use a valid design”. And they said, “No, we’re not going to do it, it’s not gonna be publishable”. This episode drives home the conundrum of imperfect hinges in interstitial fields. Academics prioritize novelty and originality while governments prioritize realworld improvements and long-term commitment. The hinge turns out to be so fragile that it breaks under the weight of misaligned illusio. Tensions betweenresearchers andfunders: Learning what works vs. therequirement ofquick success Having discussed the hinge between academics and political practitioners, it is also worth looking at the hinge between academics and funders. According to recent research, the particular strength of the scientific business model is that RCTs receive funding not only from public sources, but also from foundations, patrons, and corporations (Bédécarrats etal., 2019; de Souza Leão & Eyal, 2019; Donovan, 2018). Indeed, as one interviewee explains, J-PAL sees itself largely “as a convener between donors who are interested in supporting [RCTs] and researchers who want to engage in the work” (Interview J-PAL 1). Establishing links with new funders is part of senior staff’s everyday business. Describing J-PAL’s fundraising efforts, 1234 Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 1 3 one annual report describes how its Executive Director, Rachel Glennerster, “presented at an Effective Altruism conference in California and had several follow-on meetings with potential donors from Silicon Valley”, an audience from which J-PAL hoped to raise “up to US $10 million annually” (J-PAL, 2016, p. 22). In a followup to its influential 2006 report, the Center for Global Development (2022, p. 22) stresses that strengthening existing funding relations and establishing new ones is key for keeping up the momentum of evidence-based policymaking. Once again, RCTs seem to function as a hinge between academics and funders, promising dual rewards for both parties. But again, the hinge turns out to be squeaky. As the Arnold Ventures researcher describes: Arnold Ventures: As funders, we didn’t want to fund a bunch of beautiful studies that all came up with null findings. Which, it turns out, the [US] Department of Education, that’s largely what happened there. They funded a ton of really great studies, but one after another they came back with disappointing findings. Because that can suck the life out of anything, you know, if you’ve got this great method [of RCTs] and you’re finding out all these things that don’t work. I mean, what’s the path to improving people’s lives then? So we decided that we were going to only fund trials where there was prior promising evidence. This excerpt demonstrates at least two tensions in the hinge between the field of science, on the one hand, and the fields of business and politics on the other. First, while from a research-focused perspective finding out that programs do in fact not have the intended effects is just as valuable as finding out that they do, in the business perspective of Arnold Ventures a “null finding” is an obstacle to the evidence agenda. Considering that they personally support the program being tested and that their own money is at stake, demonstrating positive results is a much higher priority for funders than for researchers and evaluators. As Robert Granger, the former president of the William T. Grant Foundation notes, philanthropic foundations in the United States are becoming increasingly worried about “a cascade of mixed or null findings from Obama-era efforts” and “a restive practitioner community that has not seen strong benefits from rigorous evaluations” (Granger, 2018, pp. 151–152). Put more strongly, from a funder’s perspective “rigorous evidence” could turn out to be self-defeating: if you seriously commit to RCTs, negative results threaten to disregard your pet policy—so do you really want to take chances? Indeed, generations of RCT advocates have repeatedly run into this very misalignment between scientific and applied fields (Campbell, 1969, pp. 409–410; Pritchett, 2002). The second tension, as Ravallion (2020, p. 64) points out, is that Arnold Ventures’ decision to “only fund trials where there was prior promising evidence” is in direct contradiction with the argument that a trial is ethical only if there is no ex ante evidence that a program has positive effects, a principle known as “equipoise” (MacKay, 2018). Among the researchers interviewed, agreement with this ethical proviso is virtually universal. Yet the incentives of funders point exactly in the opposite direction. For them, doing an RCT based on equipoise is the equivalent of throwing money out the window. 1235 1 3 Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 There is some evidence that the tension between researchers’ desire to accumulate evidence and funders’ rationale to demonstrate positive results has become stronger over time. As one interviewee notes, 3ie: In 2008, you had an environment where funders, particularly foundations like Gates and Hewlett, were willing to put money into the global public good of evidence. That was no longer true by 2015. So, the funding environment changed, people wanted back to... they really wanted things of interest to them, not global public goods. Even Gates threw a lot of money initially into 3ie in the first couple of years, but within a year and a half they were saying, “We wouldn’t have done that now, we wouldn’t give it now”. And the money we got after that was for the particular grant programs they were interested in. But simple core funding to 3ie? That’s gone. It should be noted, however, that 3ie’s experience seems to be relatively unique. As shown in Fig.3, the revenue of RCT supporters (for whom numbers were available), peaked around 2015. Yet in the years that followed contributions did not decrease as much for other organizations as they did for 3ie. Even so, RCT proponents have recently cautioned that “the financing of IEs [i.e., impact evaluations, which here means mostly RCTs] depends to a troubling extent on a small body of official agencies and foundations that regard IEs as extremely important products. Major shifts in policy by even a few such agencies could radically reduce the number of IEs being financed” (R. Manning etal., 2020, p. 38). Numerous interviewees worry about this possibility, complaining that RCT funders “wax and wane” in their commitment (Interview economist 2) or commenting that “it kind of goes in and out—sometimes philanthropies are more interested in evidence building, sometimes they become less interested because an advocacy agenda seems more important” (Interview MDRC). Overall, this section demonstrates that the hinges RCTs have created between researchers and practitioners are weaker than usually thought. Researchers and policy-makers experience a constant tension between creating academic publications Fig. 3 Annual revenue of RCT supporting organizations over time. Data: Organizations’ annual financial reports 1236 Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 1 3 and improving real-world policies and programs. Researchers and funders, for their part, are misaligned regarding the desire to learn new things and the rationale to invest in success stories. From this perspective, the progress of RCT proponents’ self-proclaimed fight against ideology, ignorance, and inertia depends on their ability to manage the consonances, compromises, and contradictions of global interstitial fields. Conclusion: The future ofRCTs This article has shown how support in favor of RCTs has crystallized into a global field of its own. Capitalizing on favorable institutional conditions in Northern and Southern countries, by the early 2000s many governments, NGOs, international organizations, research institutes, and philanthropic foundations found themselves in a situation in which conducting, funding, and collaborating on RCTs began to become a rewarding endeavor. To some extent, this “hinge” enabled researchers to better engage in research widely seen as especially rigorous, and it enabled practitioners to be seen as taking an evidence-based approach to policymaking. At the same time, the article has shown that hinges among formerly separate fields have led to imperfectly aligned incentives. Because RCT supporters originate from the fields of science, politics, and business, they partly “inherit” these fields’ stakes (or what field theorists call illusio). This, in turn, makes the global field suffer from goal conflicts among researchers, political practitioners, and funders. As an interstitial field, sitting in between more established fields, the global field of RCT support is therefore less stable than usually assumed. This analysis can be read as contribution to theoretical questions some social scientists are interested in: How do social fields emerge? How do they hang together? How do they influence each other? As I have suggested, the RCT story points to a more general hypothesis, in that the liberation from the constraints and expectations of more established fields that makes interstitial fields strong may be precisely what makes them weak. But the analysis also has wider,more practical implications. As I discuss now, assessing the effects of the interstitial field’s internal dynamics and the critiques waged against RCTs leads to two predictions about the future of RCTs. The first prediction is that the global field will probably differentiate according to the scientific, political, and economic fault lines that are observable already. This may imply professionalization and larger-scale trials for evaluations in applied policy contexts and a simultaneous tendency toward more technical “mechanism experiments” in more academic contexts (Ludwig etal., 2011). The former will probably be run by large firms specialized in RCTs, while the latter are run by academics. The official rationale may be a more productive distribution of labor, but in practice, research firms and academics need not have much to do with each other. The basis of this prediction is the relative internal weakness of the global interstitial field of RCT support, discussed in this article, and the fact that the trends being predicted have already started to emerge. To begin with, differentiation into academic and applied branches would resolve some of the goal conflicts of the global interstitial field. Academics can publish slightly esoteric econometrics in specialized 1243 1 3 Theory and Society (2024) 53:1213–1244 middle-income countries? 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