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Agency-linked risk management with ownership and board sub-committee governance: Evidence from an OECD economy

Al Farooque, Omar

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Al Farooque, Omar Article Agency-linked risk management with ownership and board sub-committee governance: Evidence from an OECD economy Journal of Risk and Financial Management Provided in Cooperation with: MDPI – Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute, Basel Suggested Citation: Al Farooque, Omar (2021) : Agency-linked risk management with ownership and board sub-committee governance: Evidence from an OECD economy, Journal of Risk and Financial Management, ISSN 1911-8074, MDPI, Basel, Vol. 14, Iss. 10, pp. 1-16, https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm14100472 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/258576 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/     J.RiskFinancialManag.2021,14,472.https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm14100472www.mdpi.com/journal/jrfm Article Agency‐LinkedRiskManagementwithOwnershipandBoard Sub‐CommitteeGovernance:EvidencefromanOECD Economy OmarAlFarooque  UNEBusinessSchool,UniversityofNewEngland,Armidale,NSW2351,Australia;[email protected] Abstract:Fromariskmanagementperspective,thisstudyexaminestheroleofownershipand boardsub‐committeegovernanceondirectmeasuresofagencycostsinasmallOECDeconomy— NewZealand.UsingLogisticandOLSregressionapproaches,twoproxiesofdirectagencycostsare testedonapooledsampleof466firm‐yearobservationsrangingfrom2012to2018.Thestudypro‐ videsevidencethatinsiderownershipconcentrationoutperformsoutsiderownershipconcentration inconstrainingagencycosts.Moreover,auditcommitteeindependencecanalsoeffectivelydeter agencycosts.Thesefindingssuggestthatbothinsiderownershipconcentrationandauditcommit‐ teestructureareimportantriskmanagementmitigatingfactorfordeterringagencycostsinNew Zealandcompanies. Keywords:riskmanagement;directmeasuresofagencycosts;ownershipconcentration; boardsub‐committeestructure;NewZealand JELClassification:G30;G34  1.Introduction Weinvestigatetheroleofownershipandboardsub‐committeegovernanceon‘di‐ rect’measuresofagencycostsamongpubliclylistedcompaniesinNewZealand(hereaf‐ ter,NZ)fromariskmanagementviewpoint.Thestudyismotivatedbythefactthatno priorstudiesexaminethisrelationshipwhenthereareconsiderabledebatesandscepti‐ cismsintheliteratureregardingtheperformance,accountabilityandcommitmentofra‐ tionalbehaviouroftheboardofdirectorsub‐committees(Wintoki2007)andwhetherin‐ dependentdirectorsalwaysfulfiltheirdutiesasexpected.Liuetal.(2016)arguethatthe effectivenessofindependentdirectorshaslongbeendiscussedanddisputed,yetthereg‐ ulatorshavehighexpectationsonindependentdirectors,asevidencedintheSarbanes‐ OxleyAct’shighlightingofindependencedirectors’roleintheboardsandauditcommit‐ tees.Inthispaper,wefocusonalternativeownershipconcentrationandauditcommittee variables’relationshipswithagencycostsinarelativelysmallstockmarketinOECD countries—NewZealand,whichisrelativelyunder‐researched,toreinforcingmonitoring andcomplementingtheroleofboardandownershipindeterringagencycosts.Because auditcommitteemembersareindependentoutsidedirectorsandfinanciallyliteratewith auditingknowledge,theyaremorelikelytomakeexpertjudgmentsthanotherboard members.Assuch,anindependentauditcommitteeismorecommittedinrestraining agencycostsandtheirmembersoughttobeaversetounethicalpractices.Inaddition, bothinsiderandoutsiderownershipconcentrationcanplayvitalrolesinrestraining agencycostsfromtheviewpointsofincentivealignmentandmonitoring. Theagencyproblemisunderpinnedbythedivorceofownershipandcontrolwithin firmsandthenon‐alignmentofinterestsbetweencontrollingandnon‐controllingparties. Citation:Farooque,OmarAl.2021. Agency‐LinkedRiskManagement withOwnershipandBoard Sub‐CommitteeGovernance: EvidencefromanOECDEconomy. J ournalofRiskandFinancial M anagement14:472.https://doi.org/ 10.3390/jrfm14100472 AcademicEditor:ThanasisStengos Received:25August2021 Accepted:1October2021 Published:7October2021 Publisher’sNote:MDPIstaysneu‐ tralwithregardtojurisdictional claimsinpublishedmapsandinstitu‐ tionalaffiliations.  Copyright:©2021bytheauthor.Li‐ censeeMDPI,Basel,Switzerland. Thisarticleisanopenaccessarticle distributedunderthetermsandcon‐ ditionsoftheCreativeCommonsAt‐ tribution(CCBY)license(http://crea‐ tivecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). J.RiskFinancialManag.2021,14,4722of16   Avastmajorityofliteraturedocumentsthatagencyproblemsmayarisebetweenprinci‐ pals(owners)andagents(managers)(TypeI)(BerleandMeans1932;JensenandMeckling 1976;FamaandJensen1983),andbetweenprincipals(controllingshareholders)andprin‐ cipals(minorityshareholders)(TypeII)(ShleiferandVishny1986;ShleiferandVishny 1997;LaPortaetal.2000;VillalongaandAmit2006).Bothtypestypicallyincurhugecosts tocorporatefirmsinvolvingthecontroller’sprivatebenefitsthataredetrimentaltothe valueofthefirm.ShleiferandVishny(1997)contendthattheprivatebenefitsfromcontrol right(opportunism)arefrequentmanifestationsoftheagencyproblemthatneedstobe addressed.Tomitigateagencycosts,significantmonitoringmechanisms,suchascorpo‐ rategovernanceinstruments(i.e.,avarietyofinternalandexternalmechanisms)arein‐ stalledwithinthefirm(ShleiferandVishny1986).However,regardlessofstagesofeco‐ nomicdevelopmentinmostofthecountries,firmsrelymoreoninternalgovernance mechanisms(suchasownershipstructure,boardofdirectorsub‐committees,andcom‐ pensation)thanexternalmechanismstodealwithagencycosts. Reflectingontheincreasedroleofinternalcorporategovernance,alargepartoflit‐ eraturecontainsanalysisofcorporateboardandownershipasthedominantmechanisms incontrolling‘direct’measuresofagencycosts(Angetal.2000;Brennan2006;Henry2010; WellalageandLocke2011;Rashid2015;Vijayakumaran2019),whereasotherstudiesre‐ porttherolesofmanagerialcompensation,CEO–chairdualityandtenureandnomination committeeonagencycosts(Henry2010;Florackis2008;McKnightandWeir2009).While onlyalimitednumberofstudieshavepresentedevidenceonthedirecteffectsofowner‐ shipandboardsub‐committeegovernancemechanismsonagencycosts.Thesestudies examinetherelationshipbetweencorporateboard/ownershipanddirectmeasuresof agencycostsindifferentjurisdictions,theroleofauditcommitteestructurehasnotyet beenanalysedintheliteratureinaconsistentempiricalfashion.Thecurrentstudyis uniqueinitschoiceofownershipconcentrationaswellasauditcommitteevariablesin contractingagencycostsfromariskmanagementposition.Itaimstofillthisgapinthe empiricalliteratureandcontributetothemanagementliterature. Ourpaperdiffersfrompriorresearchandcontributestoknowledgeinanumberof ways.First,thisstudyisthefirsttomeasure‘direct’agencycostsofNZlistedcompanies thatexamineswhetherownershipconcentrationandauditcommitteestructurevariables aredeterringoraggravatingthiscost.Nopreviousstudyintheliteraturehasattempted toinvestigatetheeffectofalternativeownershipconcentrationandauditcommitteeson thedirectmeasuresofagencycost.Inaddition,nopreviousstudyhasattemptedtomeas‐ ureagencycostsintheNZcontext,althougharecentstudywasconductedintounlisted smallfirms(WellalageandLocke2011).Unlikepriorstudiesondirectmeasurementof agencycosts,thecurrentstudyemploysauditcommitteeindependenceandsizeinorder toobservetheiragencydeterrenteffects.Auditcommitteesizeandcomposition(inde‐ pendence)havenotbeentestedintheliterature1,althoughtheauditcommitteeisactively involvedinoverseeingfinancialreportingandrelatedauditoversightfunctions,rather thantheboard,andmaintainsethicalprinciples.Assuch,itcanbearguedthatauditcom‐ mitteehasanupperhandovertheboardinalleviatingdirectmeasuresofagencycost. Second,NZisanOECDnationwitharelativelysmallstockmarketandsmallnum‐ berofcompanies.AsanAnglo‐Saxonnation,NZ‐basedcompaniesaremoreproneto TypeIagencyproblems,butforahighlevelofownershipconcentration,2theveryexist‐ enceofTypeIIagencyproblemsisalsomorelikelytooccurinNZcompaniesthanin thoseofotherOECDcountries.Todate,muchoftheempiricalresearchon‘direct’meas‐ urementofagencycostsanditsrelationshipwithcorporategovernancehasfocusedon theUS,UKandAustraliancompaniesonly.NZprovidesaninterestingsettingfromthat foundinotherOECDjurisdictions,wherehighlevelsofbothinternalandexternalcon‐ centratedownershipremainsauniquecharacteristicinNZmarket.NZexhibitsadistinc‐ tivenatureofhighownershipcompatibletoAsiancountries,whichprovidestheoppor‐ tunitytotestnewhypothesesthatarenottestableinotherOECDcountries,andthiscould J.RiskFinancialManag.2021,14,4723of16   leadtodifferent,butinteresting,findingsfromthatofthepriorliterature.Again,owner‐ shipconcentrationisthecentralissueinthetheoryofcorporategovernanceaswellas understandingtherootcauseofagencycosts(ShleiferandVishny1997).Therefore,mu‐ tuallyexclusiveinternalandexternalownershipconcentrationvariablesareusedinthis studytoexaminewhethertheycanreduceorexacerbateagencycostswhereregulationis lessstringent,enforcementisweaker,andprotectionofnon‐controllingshareholdersare lessascomparedtootherOECDcountries(Hossainetal.2001). Third,withtheintroductionof‘CorporateGovernanceCodesandPrinciples’and subsequentamendments,followingotherOECDcountries,itisofinteresttoobservethe progressinmitigatingagencycostsinNZcompanies.Especially,theroleofauditcom‐ mitteesandownershipconcentrationindealingwithdirectmeasuresofagencycostalong withotherboardrelatedvariablesisofparticularinterest. Theremainderofthepaperisstructuredasfollows:Section2reviewspriorstudies anddevelopsthehypotheses;Section3specifiesdataandregressionmodelstested;Sec‐ tion4presentstheresultsofempiricaltestingandSection5discussestheseresultsand providesconcludingremarks. 2.LiteratureandHypothesesDevelopment Empiricalstudieshavefocusedondifferentcontrolmechanisms(suchas,ownership andinternalcorporategovernance,financingpolicyandexternalgovernance)andfirm performanceoutcomesincontributingtoloweringagencycosts.Henry(2010)provides thesedifferentapproacheshighlightedintheliteratureasattributabletomitigationof agencycosts.Theagencymodelsidentifiedinthesestudiesadoptanumberofgovernance mechanismstomaximisefirmvaluebyaligningtheinterestsofagentsandprincipalsand reducingagencycosts.Despitevaluableinsights,thesesubsetsofliteraturearenotdi‐ rectlyrelevanttomeasuringtheproxiesforundesirableagencycosts,ortofactorsinflu‐ encingthelevelsofagencycostsincludinginternalmonitoringinstruments.Todate,rel‐ ativelyfewstudiesundertakeadirectmeasurementofagencycostanditsdeterminants inafirm’ssettingfocusingontheroleofownershipconcentration,internalgovernance andfirm‐specificvariables.Eventhoughonlyalimitednumberofstudiesexplorethere‐ lationshipbetweendirectmeasuresofagencycostsandgovernancemechanisms,thereis evidencethatinternalgovernancemechanismsplayasignificanteffectinalleviating agencycosts. Angetal.(2000)undertookthefirststudytodirectlytacklethemeasurement(or proxyfor)ofagencycosts(thatis,totalsalestototalassetsratioandtotaloperatingex‐ pensetototalsales)anddeterminantsofagencycostsinnon‐listedUSsmallfirms.Con‐ sistentwiththeconvergenceofinteresthypothesis(Jensen1993),theyfindapositivere‐ lationshipbetweenmanagerialownershipandassetturnoverratio,andanegativerela‐ tionshipbetweenmanagerialownershipandexpenseratio,thatisinsiderownershipis foundtobeinverselyrelatedtoagencycosts.Theyalsopointoutthatdebtandexternal bankmonitoringplayaroleinalleviatingagencycosts,whilethenumberofshareholders andnon‐ownermanagersplaysanaggravatingrole.Severalstudiesextendtheworkof Angetal.(2000)indifferentcountriesandwithdifferentdataperiods(suchas,(Doukas etal.2000,2005;SinghandDavidsonIII2003;Chenetal.2011)ontheUS,(Florackis2008) and(McKnightandWeir2009)ontheUK,(Flemingetal.2005)and(Henry2010)onAus‐ tralia,(WellalageandLocke2011)onNewZealand,(Moez2018)onFrench,(Noraveshet al.2009)onIran,(IbrahimandSamad2011)onMalaysia,Rashid(2015)onBangladesh and(Vijayakumaran2019)onChina). SinghandDavidsonIII(2003)investigatethesamemeasuresinUSlarge‐listedfirms bymeasuringagencycosts(totalsalestototalassetsratioandselling,generalandadmin‐ istrativeexpensestototalsales)andhighlightingtheroleofownership,boardanddebtin alleviatingagencycosts.Theirevidenceshowsinsiderownershipandsmallboardshelp alleviateagencycosts,whiledebthasanaggravatingrole;outsideblockownershipmay havealimitedeffectandindependentboardmembershavenoeffectonreducingagency J.RiskFinancialManag.2021,14,4724of16   costs.Again,bothDoukasetal.(2000)andDoukasetal.(2005)examineagencycostde‐ terminantsforlistedUSfirmsandfindthatgreateranalystfollowingcanreduceagency costs,butnotinstitutionalownership,whilenon‐linearrelationsexistbetweeninsider ownership,leverageandthelevelsofagencycosts.Florackis(2008)alsoexaminestheim‐ pactofownership,board,managerialcompensationandcapitalstructureonagencycosts (i.e.,totalsalestototalassetsratioandselling,generalandadministrativeexpensesto totalsales)inlargeUK‐listedfirms,payingparticularattentiontotheroleofgrowthop‐ portunities.Findingsofthestudyrevealconsistentresultsinalleviatingagencycostsby managerialownership,concentratedownership,debtandcompensation.Florackis(2008) alsoarguesthattheinfluenceofinternalmechanismsonagencycostsmayvarywithfirm growthopportunitiesintheUK.McKnightandWeir(2009)investigatetheimpactofown‐ ershipandgovernancevariablesonthreeproxiesofagencycosts(totalsalestototalassets ratio,interactionoffreecashflowsandgrowthprospectsandthenumberofacquisitions) inlargeUK‐listedcompanies.Applyingarangeofanalyticaltechniques,theyalsofind consistentresultsacrossdifferentmeasures.Inparticular,boardownershipanddebtratio haveaneffectonreducingagencycosts.However,thevariableofCEOtenure,nomination committeeandmajorityofthecommitteebeingnon‐executivedirectorsshowincreased agencycoststhatraisesquestionsregardingtheadoptionofrecommendedgovernance mechanismsinUK‐listedfirms. Flemingetal.(2005)attempttoidentifytherelationshipbetweenagencycostsand ownershipstructureinnon‐listedAustralianfirms,producingsimilarresultstothose foundinAngetal.(2000).Henry(2010)alsoexaminesagencycosts,corporategovernance andownershipstructurerelationshipinlistedAustraliancompaniesforfourdifferent proxiesofagencycosts(thosebeingtotalrevenuetototalassetsratio,sumofcashand marketablesecuritiestototalassetsratio,freecashflowstototalassetsratioandTobin’s Qagencydummy).Theevidencesuggestsanon‐linearrelationshipbetweenboardofdi‐ rector,externalownership,andthelevelofagencycosts;asignificantleadingroleofin‐ stitutionalownershipinreducingagencycosts;amitigatingroleinboardindependence andremuneration;amixedroleinCEO‐chairduality;andlimitedeffectivenessuponfi‐ nancialpolicyvariables.Henry(2010)alsoarguesthatsuperiorinternalgovernancelow‐ erstheextentofagencycosts,whileinternalgovernanceandexternalshareholdinginflu‐ enceslargelysubstituteagency‐mitigatingmechanisms.WellalageandLocke(2011)in‐ vestigatethelinkagebetweenagencycosts,ownershipstructureandcorporategovern‐ anceinunlistedsmallbusinessesinNewZealand.Theirresultsindicatethatownership concentrationhasthemostsignificantgovernanceeffect,withaU‐shaperelationshipbe‐ tweeninternalownershipandagencycosts,whileleveragehasvaryingeffectonagency costsdependingontheproxiesused.Again,usingasampleofFrenchlistedfirms,Moez (2018)findsanegativerelationshipbetweenownershipconcentrationandagencycosts, asmeasuredbyexpenseratio.Almihbash(2021)alsoreportsanegativerelationshipof ownershipconcentrationwithdifferentproxiesofagencycostsmeasures.Inarelated study,ChineloandIyiegbuniwe(2018)andKhanetal.(2020)revealthatadecreasein agencycostsisfollowedbyanincreaseinthelevelofownershipconcentration. Noraveshetal.(2009)examinetheimpactsofgovernancemechanismsonagency costs(inthiscase,interactionofgrowthprospectsandfreecashflows)amongfirmslisted ontheTehranStockExchange,Iran.Theyreportconsistentfindingsofagencycostsmiti‐ gatingeffectsofinstitutionalownershipandpercentageofnon‐executivedirectors,but notfordebtratio.Furthermore,IbrahimandSamad(2011)testagencycosts(totalsalesto totalassetsratioandtotaloperatingexpensetototalsales)andcorporategovernancere‐ lationshipinMalaysianlistedfamilyandnon‐familyfirms.Theirevidencesuggestsasig‐ nificanteffectofboardsizeonbothtypesoffirms,whileindependentdirectorsareeffec‐ tiveinnon‐familyfirmsonlyandCEO‐chairdualitymitigatesagencycostsinfamilyfirms ratherthannon‐familyfirms.Recently,Nguyenetal.(2020)alsoexaminetheeffectof boardsizeontheagencycostsinlistedfirmsinVietnamandfindanegativerelationship J.RiskFinancialManag.2021,14,4725of16   betweenboardsizeandagencycostsasmeasuredbyassetturnoverratio.Inacross‐coun‐ trystudy,GaraninaandKaikova(2016)alsofindthatlargerboardsizeisrelatedtohigher agencycosts. Again,Rashid(2015)examinestheinfluenceofboardindependenceonfirmagency cost(expenseratio,assetutilizationratioandQ‐freecashflowsinteraction)amonglisted firmsinBangladesh.Thestudyfindsthatboardindependencecanreduceagencycost onlyforassetutilizationratioandthusconcludesthatboardindependenceandother boardattributesdonotreduceallfacetsofagencycostsofafirm.Hearguesthatoutside directors’inabilitytomonitormaybecapturedbytheuniqueinstitutionalsettingofin‐ siderownershipandhighrepresentationontheboard.Asimilarnegativeresultisalso foundbyNguyenetal.(2020)inVietnamforassetutilizationratio.Further,Vijayakuma‐ ran(2019)findthatmanagerialownershipanddebtfinancingworkaseffectivegovern‐ ancemechanismsinmitigatingagencycosts(assetutilizationratioandexpenseratio)in Chineselistedfirms,i.e.,highermanagerialownershipanddebtcanreducetheagency costsofthefirms. Finally,withadifferentfocus,Chenetal.(2011)predictasignificantassociationbe‐ tweenagencyproblemsandcostasymmetry,andthatcorporategovernancemitigatesthe positiveassociationbetweenagencyproblemsandcostasymmetry.Theyfindevidence thatselling,generalandadministrative(SG&A)costasymmetryispositivelyrelatedto themanager’sempirebuildingagencyproblemasmeasuredbyfreecashflow,CEO‐hori‐ zon,CEO‐tenureandcompensationstructure.Theirevidencesuggeststhatcorporategov‐ ernancemechanismsplayanimportantroleinmitigatingtheeffectofagencyproblems onthemanager’scostadjustmentdecisions,asthepositiveassociationbetweenagency problemsandSG&Acostasymmetryismorepronouncedunderaweakcorporategov‐ ernanceenvironment. Hypotheses Theabovestudiessuggestthatcorporategovernancemechanismsplayanimportant roleinmitigatingtheeffectoftheagencyproblemwheredifferentproxiesareusedas directmeasurementofagencycosts.Thecurrentstudy,bycontrast,isuniqueinexamin‐ ingwhetherauditcommitteecharacteristics,alternativeownershipconcentrationand otherboardattributescanreducetheagencycostsofNZlistedfirms. Auditcommitteesareindependentcommitteesassignedtooverseeingacompany’s financialreportingprocess,protectingtheinterestofthefirmanditsvalue.Anauditcom‐ mitteethatiswellstructured,activeandfunctionalcanpreventmanipulationofaccount‐ ingnumbersundertakenbymanagementintheinterestofowners(Xieetal.2003). MangenaandPike(2005)documentthatauditcommitteecharacteristicshaveapositive impactinimprovingthedisclosureprocessandmonitoringeffectivenessofthefirm.In recentyears,auditcommitteeindependencehasbeenseenasoneofthevitalattributesof aneffectivecorporategovernancesystem.Amoreindependentauditcommitteewould beabletoprovidemoreobjectivemonitoringofthecompany’sinternalcontrolsystem. Giventheexistenceofinformationasymmetriesandthepotentialforconflictofinterest betweenmanagersandshareholders,anindependentauditcommitteeoffersvitalgov‐ ernanceinensuringtheintegrityoffinancialstatements,inadditiontothatprovidedby externalauditors.Amoreindependentauditcommitteeislinkedtobettermonitoring (Abbottetal.2004).Eachindependentdirectorintheauditcommitteewillbemotivated toprovidebettermonitoringinordertopreserveanddeveloptheirreputation(Abbottet al.2004).Beasleyetal.(2000)andPersons(2005)findthatauditcommitteeindependence isnegativelyrelatedtothelikelihoodofcommittingfinancialreportingfraudonthepart ofthemanagementtodeceiveshareholders.Amoreindependentauditcommitteeap‐ pearstobemoreeffectiveinperformingitsoversightroleinreducingagencycosts. Again,itisalsoarguedthatalargerauditcommitteeprovidesbettergovernancethan asmallerone,byensuringthereliabilityoffinancialstatements.Alargerauditcommittee hasmoreresourcesandexpertisetooverseethefinancialreportingandinternalcontrol J.RiskFinancialManag.2021,14,4726of16   systems(Andersonetal.2004),andthuswouldbemoreeffectiveinuncoveringfraud, manipulationandearningsmanagementinthefinancialreportingprocess.Thisinturn leadstothefollowinghypotheses: H1a:Auditcommitteeindependenceisnegativelyassociatedwithagencycosts. H1b:Auditcommitteesizeisnegativelyassociatedwithagencycosts. Ownershipremainsattherootofagencyconflictbetweencontrollingandnon‐con‐ trollingparties(i.e.,betweenmanagersandowners,betweendirectorsandshareholders, andbetweenmajorandminorshareholders)formisalignmentoftheirinterestsandthe presenceofinformationasymmetry.Farooqueetal.(2007)documentthatthealignment ofcontrollingandminorityshareholdersmaynotbecompletelyachieved.Opportunistic behaviourbycontrollingpartiescouldbeminimizedbyaligningtheirworkloadandmo‐ tivationandshareholders’interestmaximization(Jensen1993).AccordingtoBurkartet al.(2003),ownershipstructureisanimportantfactorforalleviatingtheagencyproblems. Outsideownershipconcentrationoflargeshareholdersprovidesincentivestoeffectively monitorfirmbehaviourtomaximisethevalueofshareholdings(ShleiferandVishny1986, 1997;Farooqueetal.2010).Suchincentive‐monitoringaspectstendtoreducetheextent ofagencycosts.Weiretal.(2002)provideevidenceofmonitoringincentivesbyblock holdersforthefirmstoperformbetter.BothFlorackis(2008)andAllam(2018)reportsthat ownershipconcentrationhasastrongeffectinreducingagencycosts. Again,itisarguedintheliteraturethatagencyconflictbetweenmanagersandshare‐ holderscouldbereducedthroughmanagerialownership.Managersowningalargerper‐ centageofshareshavemoreincentivetoaligntheirinterestwithshareholders.Rashid (2016)findsthatmanagerialownershipreducesfirmagencycost,whichisinlinewiththe predictionofagencytheorythathigherinsiderownershipcouldreduceagencycostsand improveperformance(CrutchleyandHansen1989).O’Callaghan(2015)contendsthat thereislimitedevidencetosupportthenotionthatmanagerialownershiphasapositive influenceonagencycosts.Hence,thefollowinghypothesesareexpected: H2a:Boardownershipisnegativelyassociatedwithagencycosts. H2b:Top‐20shareholders’ownershipisnegativelyassociatedwithagencycosts. 3.MethodologyandData 3.1.DataandSample ThisstudyusessecondarydatafromthegovernancestructureofNZlistedcompa‐ nies,includingownershipandfinancialindicatorsfortheperiod2012to2018.Thedata werecollectedfromcompanyannualreportsandDataStreamandOsirisdatabases.Cor‐ porategovernancevariablesweregatheredmanuallyfromcompanyannualreports.The populationofmorethan250companieslistedintheNZStockExchange(NZX)inarange ofindustriesexcludingfinancialfirmsformsanunbalancedpanel.Basedontheavailabil‐ ityofannualreportsandrequireddata,atotalof466observationsweremadewiththe numberofcompaniesrangingfrom46to82overthesevenyearsperiod.Thesefirmsare affiliatedinsixmajorindustrysectors,alongwithonemiscellaneousexample.Tobese‐ lectedasasample,thecompanymusthavebeenactiveduringthesampleperiod;how‐ ever,itisnotnecessaryforacompanytobeincludedacrosstheentireseven‐yearperiod. Table1highlightsbothyear‐wiseandindustry‐wisepercentagedistributionofthesample size.Althoughyear‐wisedistributionseemsequitableovertheperiodexaminedinpar‐ ticularthelateryears,industryconcentrationisevidentwithhighestdominanceinthe servicesector(36.5%)followedbymiscellaneous(18.9%)andprimary(13.5%).  J.RiskFinancialManag.2021,14,4727of16   Table1.Distributionofsamplesize. YearWiseFrequencyPercentageIndustryWiseFrequencyPercentage 2012469.9Energy316.7 20135311.4Goods5612 20145511.8Investment449.4 20157215.5Primary6313.5 20167816.7Property143 20178017.2Service17036.5 20188217.6Miscellaneous8818.9 Total466100Total466100 3.2.MeasurementofAgencyCosts Thisstudyoperationalisesdirectmeasurementofagencycostsasdependentvaria‐ ble,insteadofusingtraditionalbackward‐lookingaccountingperformancemeasures.In theliterature,differentmeasuresofagencycostsareused,suchasassetutilisation/turno‐ verratio(totalsalesorrevenuetototalassetsratio),expenseratio(totaloperatingexpense tototalsalesratio,SG&Atosalesratio),assetliquidityratio(sumofcashandmarketable securitiestototalassetsratio),freecashflowtoassetsratio,Tobin’sQasgrowthprospect, interactionoffreecashflowandgrowthprospects,andnumberofacquisitions.These measuresareeitherbackward‐looking(assetutilisation/turnoverratio,expenseratio)or forward‐looking(freecashflow,Tobin’sQasgrowthprospect)andtherearepotential drawbacksintheformermeasures(see(McKnightandWeir2009)).Moreover,becauseof theasymmetricnature,expenseandcostratiosarelabelledas‘coststickiness’(Chenetal. 2011). Ontheotherhand,forward‐lookingmeasuresareregardedasmoreeffectiveones fordetectingagencycosts.OplerandTitman(1993)arguethatfirmswithhighgrowth prospectsarelesslikelytohaveexcessfreecashflowsbecausetheavailablecashwillbe spentonpositivenetpresentvalueprojects.Doukasetal.(2000)contendthatagencycosts maybeconsideredasafunctionoftheinteractionofgrowthopportunitiesandfreecash flowandfirmsthatcombinelowgrowthprospectsandhighfreecashflowcan,therefore, beregardedassufferingfromhighagencycosts.Because,greaterretentionoffreecash flowswithinthefirmenvisagesasbeingindicativeofpotentialagencyproblemsandthe existenceofagencycosts.Freecashflowisacommonlyusedproxyfortheagencyprob‐ lemandtheresulting‘empirebuilding’incentives(managers’personalutilityfromstatus, power,compensation,andprestige)thatariseswhenthereisamismatchbetweenavaila‐ blecashandgrowthprospects(Jensen1986).Jensen(1986)proposesthatagencycostsare highwhenhighfreecashflowsarecombinedwithpoorgrowthopportunities.Whenfree cashflowishigh,managershavegreateropportunityforoverinvestinginoperationsor negativenetpresentvalueprojects.Bycontrast,whenfreecashflowislow,managers havelessopportunityforempirebuildingandtheyaremorelikelytoavoidnegativeca‐ reerconsequences.Hence,largefreecashflowssuggestgreatermanagerialdiscretionand higheragencycosts. Followingpriorstudies(McKnightandWeir2009;Henry2010;Chenetal.2011),this studyusestwomeasuresofagencycostsfocusingonfirm’sgrowthopportunities:(1) growthprospect(Tobin’sQDummy)and(2)interactionoffreecashflowsandTobin’sQ (FCF*QDUMMY). Thefirstagencycostisthegrowthprospectorindicatorofforward‐lookingfirmper‐ formance(Tobin’sQ),followingHenry(2010).FirmswithTobin’sQratiosgreaterthan 1.00areperceivedaswell‐managedfirmsthatarecreatingvalueforshareholders, whereasfirmswithTobin’sQratioslessthanunityaredestroyingshareholdervaluethat isassociatedwithagencycosts.ItiscalculatedwhereQratioshigherthan1.00identifyas highgrowthfirmsandlowerthan1.00identifylowgrowthfirms.Thisindicatorvariable isassignedavalueofoneifthefirm’sTobin’sQratioisgreaterthan1.00,andisgivena J.RiskFinancialManag.2021,14,4728of16   valueofzeroiftheTobin’sQratioislessthanorequalto1.00.Thelowergrowthfirms havepoorperformingmanagers,withwastageofresourcesgivingrisetoagencycosts. Thesecondagencycostproxyusedisthe‘interactions’offreecashflowandgrowth prospects(FCF*QDUMMY),followingMcKnightandWeir(2009)andNoraveshetal. (2009).Firmswithloworpoorgrowthprospectscannotutilisetheirfreecashflowsand areexpectedtohavegreatermanagerialdiscretionandhigheragencycosts(Jensen1986). Inotherwords,agencycostsaremorepersistentinfirmswithahighlevelofliquidassets andfreecashflow.Tocapturethiscost,firstly,Qiscalculatedforeachfirmaswellasthe medianvalueforthetotalsamplefirms,followingNoraveshetal.(2009).Thesampleme‐ dianvalue(0.885)isthensubtractedfromtheindividualQratioofeachfirmandaQ indicativevariableisconstructedwithavalueofoneiffirms’Qratiosarelessthansample means(1.345),andavalueofzeroifabovethemean.Secondly,FollowingDoukasetal. (2000)andMcKnightandWeir(2009)freecashflowsaremeasuredasoperatingincome beforedepreciationminustaxesplusinterestanddividendspaidandthenscaledbytotal assets.Finally,aninteractionvariableiscreatedthroughmultiplicationoffreecashflow andQindicativevariables,whichthusbecomesacontinuousvariableshowingfreecash flowvaluesforlowgrowthfirmsandzerovaluesforhighgrowthfirms.Thelowgrowth firmsorhighvalueoftheinteractivevariableisindicativeofhighagencycosts(Florackis 2008).Firmsthatcombinelowgrowthopportunitiesandhighfreecashflowaremore likelytosufferfromhighagencycosts. 3.3.RegressionModel Totestthehypothesesofthestudy,thefollowingregressionmodelisdeveloped: AGENCYCOSTSit=α+β1ACINDit+β2ACSIZEit+β3BSHAREitorTOP‐20SHAREit+ β4BSIZEit+β5BINDit+β6DUALITYit+β7DEBTRATIOit+β8ROAit+β9INV‐RECRATIOit+ β10LNSALEit+IND‐DUM+YEAR‐DUM+εit Table2outlinesthemeasurementtechniqueofthedependentandindependentand controlvariablesintheregressionmodel.Inthecurrentstudy,themainvariableofinter‐ estisauditcommitteeindependenceandsize,followedbyboardshareholdingsandtop‐ 20shareholdings.Top‐20ownershipconcentrationexceedsmorethan50%ownershipof thefirm,whileboardownershipremainsbelow50%level,indicatinghighandlowlevels ofconcentration,respectively.Anumberofcontrolvariablesconsistentwithpriorlitera‐ turehavebeenusedandindustryandyeardummyvariablesareincorporatedinthere‐ gressionmodeltocopewithunobservedheterogeneitymentionedearlier. Table2.Variabledescription. VariableDescription Dependentmeasures: TOBIN’SQDUMMY Qisthemarketcapitalisationplustotaldebtdividedbytotalassets.Qdummyisdenotedas value1ifafirm’sQratioishigherthan1.00indicatingawell‐managedcompanyand0when theratioisequaltoorlowerthan1.00.(Henry2010) FCF*QDUMMY Freecashflow(FCF)istheoperatingincomebeforedepreciationminustaxesplusinterest anddividendspaidscaledbytotalassets.Qdummyisconstructedwithavalueof1ifa firm’sQratioislessthansamplemeans(1.345)indicatingapoorlymanagedcompany,and0 ifabovethemean.InteractionvariableiscreatedthroughmultiplicationofFCFandQ dummyvariables.(Doukasetal.2000;McKnightandWeir2009) Independentmeasures: ACIND Percentageofindependentdirectorstothetotalnumberofdirectorsontheauditcommittee. ACSIZETotalnumberofdirectorsontheauditcommittee. BSHAREBoardshareholdingasapercentageoftotaloutstandingshares,indicatinglowconcentration. (Angetal.2000) J.RiskFinancialManag.2021,14,47215of16   havenotconsideredotherfirm‐specificpoliciessuchasdividendpolicies,executivecom‐ pensation,etc.Futureresearchcouldincludesuchspecificpoliciestoexamineandcapture therelationshipsinOECDcountriesfrombroaderperspectives. Funding:Thisresearchreceivednoexternalfunding. InstitutionalReviewBoardStatement:Notapplicable. InformedConsentStatement:Notapplicable. ConflictsofInterest:Theauthordeclaresnoconflictofinterest. Notes 1 Existingliteraturemainlyfocusesonboardandownership‐relatedvariablesindealingwithdirectmeasuresofagencycosts. 2 Hossainetal.(2001)reporttheaverageofthe‘Top‐20shareholdings’inNZis73%,whilethisstudyfoundthemeanproportion tobe66%duringthe2001–2007period.ICANZ(2003)contendsthatfinancialinstitutionsarethemainplayerinthestock market,whileindividualinvestorsaccountforlessthanaquarter.Bycontrast,DemsetzandLehn(1985)showthesameat 37.66%intheUS. 3 VIFvaluesarenotreportedinthepaperforbrevity,butareavailablefromtheauthoruponrequest. 4 Forbrevity,theseresultsarenottabulatedhere,butareavailablefromtheauthoruponrequest. References 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