EU-Brazil relations as a developing field of study: state-of-the-art and perspectives on future Research

45 EU–Brazil Relations as a Developing Field of Study: State-of-the-Art and Perspectives on Future Research Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira IntroductIon Brazil’s recent rise in the political, economic and trade spheres has prompted the European Union (EU) to recalibrate its traditional relations with the country so as to match the former’s status as a twenty-first century ‘emerging power’ with international ambitions whilst circumventing the protracted EU–Mercosur free trade agreement. Although the EU–Brazil relationship dates back to the 1980s, when an economic and commercial cooperation agreement was first signed between the two parties, and a third-generation agreement was formally established in 1992, the fact remains that little further progress has been made over the past two decades.1 Novel developments have occurred, however, including the establishment of a formal Strategic Partnership (SP) in 2007 through which the EU has acknowledged Brazil as its main strategic counterpart in South America, with all that this implies for the extension and leverage of the European foreign and security profile. Since then, the EU–Brazilian rapport gained momentum and unfolded in an unprecedented manner towards a more institutionally structured and integrative bilateral rapport. This has been mirrored in the annual summits involving a plethora of actors and institutions (political and social) as well as in the mushrooming of diverse sectorspecific dialogues under the aegis of joint plans that serve as roadmaps for the practical action conducive to the achievement of common objectives and interests. Paralleling the deepening of the EU– Brazil relationship and the advent of a multitude of issues, tools and frameworks that came to substantiate it, there has been a relative expansion in the number of those doing research in this subject area and publishing about it. The academic activity cannot be said to have greatly increased in volume, but there has been a tangible flourishing in the literature specialized in the topic, which has also become more variegated in nature. Taking EU–Brazil relations as a developing field of study against the backdrop of the overall BK-SAGE-JORGENSEN_ETAL_VOL2-150076-Chp45.indd 646 6/26/2015 2:24:58 PM EU–Brazil rElations as a dEvEloping fiEld of stUdy 647 research on European foreign policy, this chapter presents a critical examination of the stateof-the-art, discussing principal developments and debates in the scholarly literature on this specific issue and proposing future directions for the research. To this end, this chapter provides an overview of the state-of-the-art in EU– Brazil relations. This exercise helps illuminate the emergent character of this field of study, which only began to see the light of day in the first decade of the twenty-first century despite the existence of previous scholarly works focused on the rapport between the European Community (EC)/EU and Latin America and Mercosur that this chapter acknowledges for the sake of a better understanding of the issues in question. The chapter will then discuss the challenges and opportunities for studying and researching EU–Brazil relations – which still remain at the margins of European foreign policy studies –, and consider possible avenues of research that could be pursued to advance the current state-of-the-art. In seeking to evaluate what EU–Brazil research has accomplished thus far, where it has lagged and where it may go in the future, this chapter casts light on what makes scholarly study and investigation on EU–Brazil relations interesting, why this subject area matters and how it can make significant advances in the years to come considering the existing opportunities for future research. Although this review does not claim to be exhaustive, it does provide a reasonable amount of insight into the state-of-the-art in giving due consideration to the principal issues and debates that have attracted academic attention. It also paves the way for diagnosing where research remains weak and a proposed research agenda based on fresh perspectives for future areas of research. An overvIew of the stAte-of-the-Art The EU–Brazil relations stricto sensu is a fairly recent field of study and research; therefore, the number of scholarly works devoted exclusively to this bilateral relationship remains limited. As discussed later, there are a number of reasons that account for this, notably the relatively brief relationship between the two actors, which has first developed in earnest after the establishment of a formal SP in 2007 against the backdrop of Brazil’s rising star on the world stage. On both sides of the Atlantic, this innovative and constructive bilateral format has signalled Brazil’s unprecedented international actorness in politics, economic and trade. Over time, this has captured academic attention and moved more scholars to study and write about it. As such, a review of the state-of-the-art in this subject area poses an appreciable intellectual challenge. When scrutinizing the literature on Brazil’s relations with Europe and the EU, one is confronted with a sizeable body of academic publications, primarily written for Lusophone audiences. Unsurprisingly, most of these writings have gone unnoticed in Anglo–American academia. Be that as it may, three major streams of literature can be identified. One of these streams focuses on post-Cold War Brazilian foreign policy. Although this is the most voluminous body of scholarly work, it nevertheless takes very marginal interest in the specificities of Brazil’s relations with the EU. For this reason, and due to space limitations that would not permit fully invoking and analyzing the major contributions to this body of literature, this chapter does not provide a comprehensive account. One can say, however, that this literature is predominantly concerned with the Brazilian quest for and maintenance of national autonomy as the top foreign policy priority (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007). The former considers the linkage between foreign policy and development fundamental, whilst placing emphasis on the fact that foreignpolicy making has been traditionally oriented towards the promotion of economic and social development (de Lima and Hirst, 2006). The leading role played by Brazilian heads of state within the realm of foreign policy has resulted in an extensive number of scholarly works BK-SAGE-JORGENSEN_ETAL_VOL2-150076-Chp45.indd 647 6/26/2015 2:24:58 PM The SAGe hAndbook of europeAn foreiGn policy 648 focusing on the so-called presidential foreign policy, that is, the external strategies and doctrines designed by the successive presidents of the Federative Republic of Brazil (alongside their close staffs) (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007; Cervo, 2010). Equally important, much of the academic comment and analysis is devoted to discussing and appraising the country’s regional role against the backdrop of the consolidation of thedemo cratic transition in some Latin American states (including Brazil), which has enabled the launching of the economic integration experiment in the region under the umbrella of Mercosur (Burges, 2008). In connection to this, several works examine Brazil’s relations with its neighbours, most notably Argentina, and its active engagement in the deepening of Mercosur. Academics have also sought to analyze issues and processes that are particularly linked to the country’s position and ambitions within the UN system, the crucial relationship with the US and the evolving bilateral relations with China (de Lima and Hirst, 2006; Hirst et al., 2010). A recent development within this stream of literature, nearer to the heart of what follows, is the analysis of contemporary Brazilian foreign policy from a different perspective, as undertaken by some academics. Rather than highlighting how and the extent to which foreign policymakers have endeavoured to secure and ultimately reinforce national autonomy, they stress Brazil’s evolving global actorness, focusing on explaining the country’s attempts at asserting itself as a player to be taken seriously in the global governance and multilateral structures, namely the EU (de Lima and Hirst, 2006; Saraiva, 2006; Rohter, 2010). More concretely, observers emphasize the shift in how Brazil views its own international status from a second-class to a first-class country and a ‘latecomer to the club of great powers’ (Rohter, 2010, 225); and also Brazil’s diplomatic endeavours towards positioning itself among the global players (Saraiva, 2006). Deepening its relations with the EU became a logical step towards obtaining international respect and credibility. The EU–Mercosur relationship and Brazil’s role A second body of literature has a more specialized character, dedicated specifically to the relations between the EC/EU and Mercosur, and Brazil’s role in the unfolding of this bloc-to-bloc rapport. Academic interest in the issues and problems underlying this interregional dynamic was stimulated by the signing of the EU–Mercosur Framework Cooperation Agreement in 1995. Such interest in what has been considered a landmark in the formal relations between the two regions (Saraiva, 2006; Onuki, 2011; Flôres, 2013) has resulted in an examination of its major drivers, significance and consequences. The literature places emphasis on the nexus between the EC’s Iberian enlargement in 1986 and the improvement of the relations between Europe and Latin America in general and getting Brazil onto the European agenda in particular (Vasconcelos, 2007; Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Roy, 2012). It also acknowledges that the EU–Mercosur Framework Cooperation Agreement of 1995 has strengthened the bonds between the two regions (Lessa, 2010; Lazarou and Fonseca, 2013). Much attention has been paid to the evolution of this relationship throughout the second half of the 1990s. Some studies highlight the emergence of an imbalance in the commercial dynamics since the EU has become the Mercosur’s main commercial partner, but this situation was not reciprocal (Saraiva, 2006; Vasconcelos, 2007; Ceia, 2008). Regardless of the more or less (inter-) institutional approach adopted by scholars to scrutinizing the EU–Mercosur relations, in most of the works (which are authored by Brazilian researchers) the Mercosur tends to be perceived as an important instrument in Brazil’s pursuit of national autonomy. Indeed, the country’s engagement in the intensification of the relationship between Mercosur and the EU has been interpreted as part of a foreign policy strategy to secure ‘autonomy through diversification’ (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007, 283). BK-SAGE-JORGENSEN_ETAL_VOL2-150076-Chp45.indd 648 6/26/2015 2:24:58 PM EU–Brazil rElations as a dEvEloping fiEld of stUdy 649 The progress made in mutual understanding, political dialogue and, particularly, the increase of commercial exchanges between the two actors eventually led them to engage in negotiations conducive to an association agreement that has not till now seen the light of day. The failure to establish an EU– Mercosur Association Agreement, its reasons and implications, have become the subject of academic enquiry, comment and analysis as evinced by a number of works written mostly by Brazilian scholars during the 2000s or so. In seeking to explain the dismal negotiations outcome, some examine problems originating not only from Mercosur’s internal affairs, but also from Brazil’s domestic and foreign policy issues (Ceia, 2008). Others focus on the difficulties in concluding an agreement in the agricultural sector and the protectionist stance adopted by both Europe and South America (Saraiva, 2006; Onuki, 2011). Despite the ten negotiation rounds held between 1999 and 2003, the conclusion of an association agreement remains an open-ended scenario (Saraiva, 2006; Roy, 2012). Although this agreement is in a state of uncertainty, due to both Argentinean and Venezuelan reluctance to contribute to the end of the process, EU–Mercosur negotiations may continue either on the basis of the different levels of commitment espoused by its member states or informed by an ‘anything but trade’ philosophy (Valladão, 2013, 12). When evaluating the consequences of this unsuccessful negotiation process, some like to emphasize that the failure to sign an association agreement has reduced the commercial exchanges while undermining the conditions to advance regional integration (Vasconcelos, 2007; Valladão, 2008; Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Pino, 2011). Nevertheless, such failure does not obscure the fact that, since the mid-1990s, Mercosur has become one of the most important interlocutors in the EU’s relations with South American countries, and a major ally in the promotion of both regional integration and interregionalism (Ceia, 2008; Flôres, 2013; Valladão, 2013). Not surprisingly, Mercosur also became one of the main targets of the EU’s efforts to diffuse its normative agenda and export through interregional cooperation its model of regional integration (Saraiva, 2006; FerreiraPereira, 2010; Malamud, 2011; Lazarou and Fonseca, 2013). Incidentally, some explorations have focused on the European influence on the Mercosur’s integration design. Although they recognize that the South American common market has fundamentally emulated the European experiment, they always underline the lack of a supranational desideratum (Vasconcelos, 2007; FerreiraPereira, 2010; Saraiva, 2010; Roy, 2012). Analysts consider that the interregional dynamics inaugurated by the EU–Mercosur Framework Cooperation Agreement of 1995 have led the EU to shift its attention gradually to the Southern Common Market to the detriment of Brazil, taken as an individual actor in its own right. This tendency lasted for more than a decade (Lessa, 2010; Lazarou and Fonseca, 2013). At the same time, the protracted crisis in the EU–Mercosur relations leading to negotiation fatigue and a general doubtful mood regarding the viability of a free trade agreement, alongside the international rise of Brazil, has acted as a catalyst in the EU’s endeavours to recalibrate its relations with Brazil in the Mercosur’s (multilateral) realm into a bilateral and structured relationship founded on a SP. In fact, the failure to reach a final agreement during the Rio Group Summit at Santo Domingo in April 2007 left the door open for the EU–Brazil SP to be established the following month. The discussion on this politico-diplomatic milestone, which has signalled a European shift from an exclusively interregional approach to a bilateral formula designed to be explored hand-in-hand with the original interregional dynamics, has attracted academic interest. A number of scholars began paying closer attention to the renewed interest of the EU vis-à-vis Brazil (Saraiva, 2006; Valladão, 2008; Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Silva, 2011; Sousa, 2011; Gratius and Saraiva, 2013; Vaz, 2013). The formal establishment of a SP to BK-SAGE-JORGENSEN_ETAL_VOL2-150076-Chp45.indd 649 6/26/2015 2:24:58 PM The SAGe hAndbook of europeAn foreiGn policy 650 govern the rapport between the two actors would eventually introduce the development of a new issue for European foreign policy studies. This leads to the real world of the study of and debate on contemporary bilateral EU–Brazil relations. eu–BrAzIl relAtIons In the context of the 2007 strAtegIc pArtnershIp The third body of literature being considered features the relations between the EU and Brazil, taken as a single actor and outside the context of Mercosur. These relations only begun to develop in the sequence of the establishment of the SP since 2007 against the background of the consolidation of the EU’s international persona and posture in a globalized, multilateral world. The end of the Cold War created space for greater European efforts in the domain of foreign and security policy. The post-9/11 context further fuelled these efforts, causing the EU to forge new modes of interaction with major actors, traditional and emerging alike. These new modes of interaction included the establishment of strategic partnerships with pivotal actors, such as Brazil, which gradually attracted academic enquiry. The systematic study of EU–Brazil relations constitutes a twenty-first century phenomenon because it flourished in the late 2000s. In addition to the reasons already mentioned, it should be noted that during the first mandate of President Lula da Silva, especially between 2003 and 2007, the ambition to forge stronger relationships with the emerging powers, including India, China and South Africa, became key to Brazil’s foreign policy inclinations. The deepening Brazilian ties to the EU were therefore eventually overtaken by the politico–diplomatic engagement in the promotion of South–South cooperation (Ceia, 2008). At the time, scholarly work mirrored the paucity of the EU in Brazilian foreignpolicy concerns. The few analysts who have tackled EU–Brazil relations recognize that the SP signed by the EU and Brazil constitutes the most important result of the rapprochement between these two actors, which has transcended the economic and trade spheres to embrace an all-inclusive gamut of issues ranging from security and human rights to science and education (Valladão, 2008; Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Grevi, 2013; Lazarou and Fonseca, 2013). The chronicling and understanding of the SP considers that the strengthening of the relations between Brussels and Brasília, which led to the institutionalization of the SP, received an important stimulus from the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the EU during the second semester of 2007 (Vasconcelos, 2007; Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Roy, 2012). Scholars agree that Brazil has grown into a political and trade actor on the world stage that is essential for the resolution of critical regional and international problems. It is necessary therefore for the EU to engage with Brazil in order to address common problems springing from globalization trends, as well as to foster a multilateral world order. Incidentally, some works underline the EU’s recognition of Brazilian leverage and influence in contemporary international relations against the background of the organization’s evolving global actorness, which calls for a more structured dialogue with pivotal regional and global players (Whitman and Rodt, 2012; Lazarou and Fonseca, 2013). The literature that considers Brazil’s growing international ambitions in connection with the unprecedented interest of the EU with Brazil highlights the main Brazilian initiatives in recent years, such as the creation of G20 at the Cancún Conference in 2003, the country’s candidacy for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and its leading role in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (UNSTAMIH) (Valladão, 2008; Cervo, 2010; Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Hurrell, 2010; Lessa, 2010; Rohter, 2010; Onuki, 2011; Pino, 2011; Sousa, 2011). It also outlines the Brazilian presence in groups such as the Brazil, South BK-SAGE-JORGENSEN_ETAL_VOL2-150076-Chp45.indd 650 6/26/2015 2:24:58 PM EU–Brazil rElations as a dEvEloping fiEld of stUdy 651 Africa, India and China (BASIC) (Husar et al., 2010), the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) dialogue forum (Lessa, 2010) and the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) initiative (Sousa, 2011). These works stress the dividends generated by the SP. While the SP reinforces the country’s capacity for autonomous international action (Lessa, 2010), there is also the increased leverage in international organizations, such as the UN and World Trade Organization (WTO) (Sousa, 2011). On the one hand, the establishment of a SP is generally associated with the existence of shared world views, but on the other hand, the EU is seen as behaving as if its own rules and visions of the world must be universally accepted, something that limits its own understanding of others’ views (Valladão, 2008). Academics have worked to examine the content of the SP. They highlight how this partnership covers a vast array of subjects ranging from the defence of multilateralism to the promotion of human rights (Ceia, 2008; Valladão, 2008; Hurrell, 2010; Whitman and Rodt, 2012; Lazarou and Fonseca, 2013). It also includes cooperation in arms control and disarmament, which is considered an important issue for the two actors (EU and Brazil) that frequently deal with crime and terrorism (Valladão, 2008); and the European and Brazilian commitments towards the success of the Doha Round, which has been identified as one of the reasons behind the establishment of the SP (Ceia, 2008; Lazarou and Fonseca, 2013). Besides the promotion of human rights, the reinforcement of the powers of the International Criminal Court (ICC) – in order to secure better trials for human rights’ violators – and the promotion of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) feature as SP’s common goals. According to some authors, the EU–Brazil SP therefore evinces the significant role played by the existence of common values in international politics (Ceia, 2008; Valladão, 2008; Onuki, 2011; Gratius and Saraiva, 2013; Grevi, 2013). Despite the prevalence of diverging views on various matters, this common normative dimension is seen as an element favouring closer relations and deeper mutual understanding between the two actors (Valladão, 2008; Grevi, 2013). The specialized literature engages in a discussion of the major significance and implications of the 2007 SP that laid the foundations of a new phase in the EU–Brazilian relationship – one characterized by a more robust bilateral engagement and a political dialogue at the highest level on a gamut of issues of common interest and concern. On Brazil’s side, the SP contributes to its global recognition as a serious country (Lessa, 2010; Rohter, 2010; Saraiva, 2010; Pino, 2011) while acknowledging its status as an emerging pivotal power (Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Malamud, 2011; Grevi, 2013; Smith, 2013). From the perspective of the EU, the SP allows the organization to reaffirm its international actorness and, at the same time, reach out, thereby expanding its network to important countries and improving its influence worldwide. It is also indicative of the EU’s effort to adapt to a rapidly changing world order and its need for indispensable allies for meeting global challenges related to climate change, human rights, intellectual property and other economic and social issues (Cervo, 2010; Gratius, 2013; Grevi, 2013; Lazarou and Fonseca, 2013). It is interesting to note that when discussing and appraising EU–Brazil relations, some tend to emphasize the shift that has taken place in European relations with South America, from a bloc-to-bloc rapport to a bloc-tostate relationship,2 particularly in view of the unsuccessful negotiations conducive to an association agreement with the Mercosur (Ceia, 2008; Pino, 2011; Whitman and Rodt, 2012). It is argued that given the evolving regional and global Brazilian actorness and the protracted negotiations with Mercosur, the EU found it more productive to interact directly with Mercosur’s key player, Brazil (Ceia, 2008; Lazarou and Fonseca, 2013). For this reason, SP presents itself as an attempt to forget the failure of the association agreement with Mercosur and a clear sign of the BK-SAGE-JORGENSEN_ETAL_VOL2-150076-Chp45.indd 651 6/26/2015 2:24:59 PM The SAGe hAndbook of europeAn foreiGn policy 652 abandonment of South American regionalism (Malamud, 2011; Silva, 2011; Roy, 2012). This shift has raised fears and confusion at the heart of South America, something which led academics to reflect on the SP’s effects in the region and, specifically, within the Mercosur area. Generally speaking, tensions between the Mercosur members were expected (Ceia, 2008; Lessa, 2010; Malamud, 2011). More concretely, academics consider fundamental questions regarding the change in the status quo because regional integration in South America has been traditionally structured around the Brazilian recognition of Argentina’s relevance and the mitigation of Argentinean fears of having to coexist with a much-too-strong Brazil in the region (Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Saraiva, 2010; Gratius and Saraiva, 2013; Valladão, 2013). By recognizing Brazil’s global actorness and the uniqueness of this country vis-à-vis other South American partners, notably Argentina, the EU generated a certain malaise between Brasília and Buenos Aires. The establishment of a privileged partnership with Brazil also required clarification on the part of the EU regarding the place of the Mercosur states in the context of the new EU–Brazil rapport (Valladão, 2008). According to some analysts, by singling out Brazil as its main South American interlocutor, the EU has signalled its support of the Brazilian ‘positive leadership’ and its political model vis-à-vis the Venezuelan or Bolivian models, which are considered more radical. This would contribute to preventing and containing the radicalization of South American politics and guarantee democracy as the main pillar of regional integration processes (Ceia, 2008; Valladão, 2008). The eventual reduction of ideological differences would ultimately contribute to strengthening South America as a political and economic region (Ceia, 2008; Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Whitman and Rodt, 2012). Yet another theme regarding the regional implications of the new bilateral relationship between the EU and Brazil is captured by the attention to mutual interests in terms of power balancing. The EU’s acknowledgement of Brazil as a privileged interlocutor in the region allows the country to counterweight the presence of the US in South America (Valladão, 2008; Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Lessa, 2010), whilst enabling Brazil to counterweight the Venezuelan political model (Pino, 2011). More recently, the debate has taken a different twist, with much attention being paid to the gap between expectations and achievements against the backdrop of the seven years of existence of the EU–Brazil SP. This focus has resulted in studies that make an evaluation of this period and also look towards the future at the same time. Some of these works underline how the EU–Brazil SP has not matched expectations on important accounts, such as trade and the signing of the Mercosur association agreement (Grevi, 2013; Lazarou and Fonseca, 2013; Smith, 2013; Valladão 2013). These failed expectations have been generated by intricate disputes over trade and agriculture, chronic disagreements over sanitary and phytosanitary rules and measures, cleavages about the use of natural resources and divergences about the reconciliation of food, energy and environmental security (Ceia, 2008; Valladão, 2008; Vaz, 2013). Most analyses emphasize the positive changes of the EU–Brazil rapport under the umbrella of the 2007 SP. This new bilateral format has changed the terms of engagement between the two parties by substantiating a more institutionalized and comprehensive framework that transcends the economic and trade to embrace the security and culture (Ceia, 2008; Valladão, 2008; Silva, 2011; Whitman and Rodt, 2012). There has been convergence concerning the defence of respect for human rights and multilateralism, but also regarding the conclusion of the Doha Round and the promotion of the environment and ecological consciousness through the RIO+20 Conference (Ferreira-Pereira, 2010, Gratius, 2013; Lazarou and Fonseca, 2013). Another converging aspect is linked to the triangular cooperation with African countries (Valladão, 2008; Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Pino, 2011; Sousa, 2011). The fact that there BK-SAGE-JORGENSEN_ETAL_VOL2-150076-Chp45.indd 652 6/26/2015 2:24:59 PM EU–Brazil rElations as a dEvEloping fiEld of stUdy 653 are certain areas that hold great potential for the deepening of cooperation, notably renewable energy, the fight against illegal migration and the promotion of multilateralism fosters optimism regarding future prospects (Ceia, 2008; Valladão, 2008; Lazarou and Fonseca, 2013). The adherence of both Brazil and the EU to the same community of values also allowed the parties involved to expect more from their strategic rapport when compared to the existing bilateral partnerships with China and Russia (Valladão, 2008) in the framework where normative affinity is limited or nonexistent. That said, despite it being acknowledged that the two parties share a normative agenda that comprises democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, the defence of international law and peaceful resolution of conflicts, diverging views do recur – and shall continue to occur – as to how these principles should be translated in practice (Grevi, 2013; Gratius and Saraiva, 2013). The EU’s continued alignment with US interests and priorities, together with reliance on the US and NATO to counter threats to its own security, triggers contending views at the political dialogue level – which will also be the case in the future (Vaz, 2013). The same applies to matters linked to international trade, food and energy security, and environmental sustainability (Ceia, 2008; Valladão, 2008; Vaz, 2013). The diversification strategy in the framework of Brazilian foreign policy as reflected in its growing engagement with international coalitions, such as the BRICS, IBSA and WTO G20, presents itself as a challenge for the reinforcement of bilateral relations. In that sense, it is important to take measures in the near future to advance political dialogue in contending issues in the framework of global governance and multilateral structures so that the bilateral partnership will not be watered down (Vaz, 2013). By identifying where understanding is lacking in EU–Brazil relations, the next section proposes new directions for the study of this emerging field. future (dIrectIons for) reseArch on eu–BrAzIl relAtIons: proposAls And chAllenges for A reseArch AgendA In recent years, the EU–Brazil rapport has grown stronger, founded on a wide range of topics involving various institutions, actors and policies that remain open to theoretical, empirical and methodological approaches to be explored in depth. The continued deepening of the relationship between the two actors carries with it the potential for increased complexity and density, which call for much further academic enquiry; therefore, there is a somewhat whole ‘new world’ of research to be undertaken with respect to this subject. This is particularly the case when considering that, given the recent nature of the issue area, the academic study of its scope, significance and implications has not achieved a great deal, as demonstrated in the review of the state-ofthe-art presented in previous sections. Despite this, in the sequence of the establishment of the 2007 SP, academics have displayed an increasing interest in the strengthening of EU–Brazil relations, as the literature review undertaken in the previous sections has shown. Such interest is expected to further increase and involve the production of scientific knowledge, if one considers the current research initiatives related to the studies of Brazil’s contemporary international relations emerging from various universities and think tanks. One initiative to stand out is the European Strategic Partnerships Observatory (ESPO),3 which is a joint project between the Egmont Institute4 and the Foundation for International Relations and Foreign Dialogue (FRIDE).5 Equally important are the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)6 and the Institute of Latin American Studies of the German Institute on Global and Area Studies (GIGA),7 who are also carrying out research in this area. On the other side of the Atlantic, the Brazil Institute of the Wilson Center8 and the Brazil Initiative at George Washington University,9 both based in Washington DC, BK-SAGE-JORGENSEN_ETAL_VOL2-150076-Chp45.indd 653 6/26/2015 2:24:59 PM The SAGe hAndbook of europeAn foreiGn policy 654 are increasing the visibility of EU–Brazil studies. In Canada, several universities, including the Centre d’Études et de Recherches sur le Brésil (CERB)10 at the Université du Québec à Montreal, are undertaking joint research programmes focusing on Latin America and, more specifically, Brazil’s international relations. Despite the existing research initiatives, the scientific outputs of which shall promote tangible advances to the study of the subject in the near future, EU–Brazil expertise remains limited. This can be seen not only in the dearth of explanations of the EU–Brazil relationship based on theoretical contributions, but also in the relative lack of solid empirical accounts and insights into the unfolding of the relations between the two parties since the creation of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, particularly under the umbrella of SP, which has been encompassing multiple actors, structures, rules, procedures, norms and interests. The thinness of the literature on the various dimensions and levels of EU–Brazil cooperation evinces how the scientific study of the EU–Brazil relationship remains on the margins of European foreign policy studies. This results largely from two major weakening factors that are worth noting. First, there is the scarce attention displayed within Brazilian academia to the operation of the EU on the international scene.11 In fact, there is limited academic expertise with respect to the EU in Brazil, with few universities having specialists in this area. Generally speaking, the study of contemporary Brazilian foreign policy tends to place emphasis on the relations with the neighbouring states, notably Argentina, and the US. Recently, much of the scholarly interest has focused on explaining Brazil’s rapport with Russia and, albeit less so, with China. The study of European integration therefore tends to be neglected, something that has been impacting upon the understanding of the nature, intersections and interaction between EU and Brazil. A number of reasons may account for this. First, the little attention given by Brazilian academics to the EU may be associated with priorities of national funding agencies, such as the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) and the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq), on whose financial support the national scholars in the domains of Political Science and International Relations rely heavily for advancing their research agendas. The second factor is linked to the fact that most of the works on contemporary Brazilian foreign policy, including those on the national perspective of the European integration process – not to mention primary sources such as political declarations and official documents – are written in Portuguese. This calls for a requisite linguistic basis to access sources, which tends to render the research on EU–Brazil relations less attractive and accessible to most of the European and North American specialists in the field of EU studies. The subject is therefore still Lusophone, although some Anglo–American scholars are starting to have the requisite linguistic skills to undertake research on this subject matter. For all these reasons, EU–Brazil relations as a field of study remains somewhat underresearched and underdeveloped, something which calls for further scientific investigation and scholarly analysis. Indeed, there are relevant and topical issues that can be identified as blind spots and may well be included in a research agenda. One of these is the impact that the developing EU–Brazil relations under the umbrella of the 2007 SP has upon the established practices and patterns that characterize the existing regional processes in South America, notably Mercosur and Unasur. Considering the all-inclusive and institutionalized nature of this SP, new avenues for investigation could include the European and Brazilian cooperative strategies in critical issues such as maritime security and food security. The same can be said regarding the collaboration between the two parties in environmental and energy issues that remain open to explorations. There is a dearth of analyses on EU–Brazilian cooperation on global governance in the financial, health and Internet spheres. Other fresh perspectives for future BK-SAGE-JORGENSEN_ETAL_VOL2-150076-Chp45.indd 654 6/26/2015 2:24:59 PM