Employers' mutuals and accident insurance scheme in Spain: from rejection to control and collaboration (1966-1990)

Employers’Mutuals and Accident Insurance Scheme in Spain: From Rejection to Control and Collaboration (1966–1990) MARGARITA VILAR-RODRÍGUEZ JERÒNIA PONS-PONS Thisarticlediscussestheroleofemployersandtheirorganizations in promoting or hindering social insurance schemes and, ultimately, the welfare state. Unlike most studies that center on countries in periods of democracy, this research focuses on the role of employers, and specifically employers’mutuals, in the © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Business History Conference. All rights reserved. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. doi:10.1017/eso.2020.71 MARGARITA VILAR-RODRÍGUEZ is an associate professor of Economic History at University of A Coruña. Her main research interests cover the history of social insurance, especially health and industrial accidents, as well as wages and wellbeing. She has published extensively in these fields in a historical perspective in major journals, including Business History,Economic History Review,Social History of Medicine, and International Review of Social History and Labor History. Her most recent book (coedited with Martin Gorsky and Jerònia Pons-Pons) is The Political Economy of the Hospital in History (Queensgate, UK: University of Huddersfield Press, 2020). Contact: University of A Coruña, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Campus de Elviña, s/n, 15071 A Coruña, Spain. E-mail: [email protected]. JERÒNIA PONS-PONS is professor of Economic History at University of Sevilla. Her research focuses on the economic history of insurance, both private and social. With Robin Pearson, she has edited Risk and the Insurance Business in History (Madrid: Fundación MAPFRE, 2020) and with Margarita Vilar-Rodríguez, she has edited Un siglo de hospitales entre lo público y lo privado (Madrid: Marcial Pons Ediciones de Historia, 2018) and several articles in major journals. Together, Pons-Pons and Vilar- Rodrígue have also published a chapter in the anthology edited by Bernard Harris, Welfare and Old Age inEurope and North America (London:Pickering& Chatto,2012). Contact: University of Seville, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, C/Ramón y Cajal, 1, 41018 Andalucía, Sevilla, Spain. E-mail: [email protected] This work was supported by the European Union, the European Regional Development Fund,andSpain’s MinistryofScienceandInnovation—StateResearchAgency—for the project entitled “The historical keys of hospital development in Spain and its international comparison during the twentieth century.”Number RTI2018-094676-B-I00. 1 https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press development of the industrial accident scheme during the Franco dictatorship in Spain. The institutional elimination of the class struggle, by repressing the working class and prohibiting classbasedunions,ledtoanevolutionoftheindustrialaccidentscheme and employers’liabilities that revolved around the interrelationship between employers and the state. While employers tried to keep control of the management and low cost of the insurance, the state maintained significant bureaucratic intervention and increased auditing and control. The democratic period that began in 1977 prolonged the structure fostered during the Franco regime and enhanced the power of the mutuals in managing this insurance. Keywords: Employers; mutuals; industrial accidents; social security; Spain Introduction The classic institutionalist historiography on the construction of the welfare state consolidated the idea that its progress depended on, and was driven by, the struggles of workers and progressive movements. In this process, employers would have maintained a stance, in general, of confrontation and little cooperation in its development. 1 In recent decades, some authors who have reflected on this idea reached the conclusion that it was not so in all cases. Accordingly, there is defense of the thesis that some employers were interested in social reform as a mechanism for directing and controlling the evolution of the labor market and, on occasion, they united with labor leaders to create cross-class alliances and to support the reformers promoting social legislation. 2 This process did not develop uniformly across countries and historical contexts, which led to the existence of different national welfare state models. One important study in this respect analyzed the historical evolution of social insurance policies in Sweden and the United States in the 1930s, a period that corresponded with a phase 1. The concept of welfare state and its different historical manifestations in accordance with countries’socio-cultural conditions are already outlined in Wilensky and Lebeaux, Industrial Society. The best-known classification in the literature on the three basic welfare state models can be found in Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds. With regard to the Spanish case, the particular features of the process of creating a welfare state can be found in Comín Comín, “Los seguros sociales,”and in González Madrid and Ortiz, El estado del bienestar. 2. There are noteworthy works that maintain that many social policies were created through an alliance of class interests. For Sweden and the United States, see Swenson, Capitalists against Markets; for Germany, see Swenson, “Good Distribution.” 2VILAR-RODRÍGUEZ AND PONS-PONS https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press of significant development in the social welfare programs of both countries. This analysis concludes that Swedish employers, in order to address a chronic shortage of labor and also to keep wages low, cooperated with trade union leaders in exchange for achieving greater labor security and maintaining greater unity and a more stable leadership. This alliance was also supported by the Swedish Social Democrats. Americancapitalists, fortheir part,haddifferent labormarketstrategies depending on the economic sector. Thus, employers in monopolistic sectors supported segmentation and used high wages to keep the unions at bay. Simultaneously, they also backed social legislation to counter fierce competition during the Depression. This thesis essentially argues that during the Great Depression, American employers were more willing than their Swedish counterparts to back government reforms to ease stiff competition. However, these roles were reversed in the 1950s. Now it was Swedish employers who backed their government in developing social benefits to counter the growing practice of some private companies stealing workers from employers that continued paying low wages. Peter A. Swenson is working on a theory that moves between the institutionalism that ignores the role of employers and the instrumentalists who consider the role of capitalists to be crucial in this process. Isabela Mares’s work moves along similar lines. 3 She presents theoretical and empirical descriptions of the role of employers in the development of Social Security, especially in schemes such as industrial accidents and unemployment. Mares focuses on an empirical study of cases of social policy reforms in France and Germany and examines theinterests andpreferences of employers in this regard. Shefound that employers do not always act in the same way. Associations dominated by large firms, with more skilled workforces, opt for contributory or private social insurance schemes while those dominated by small enterprises oppose these initiatives. In terms of accident rates, highrisk firms favor highly redistributive social insurance policies while low-risk firms endorse insurance policies based on actuarial criteria. She also writes of the existence of cross-class alliances to promote social legislation, and argues that preexisting social policy structures condition the strategies of employers and unions when it comes to introducing new social policies. However, most of these studies are set within the context of democratic countries, where unions interact more or less freely with employers’associations to create alliances with social reformers. 4 3. Her basic ideas can be seen in Mares, Politics of Social Risk; Mares, “Sources of Business”; Mares, “Distributional Conflicts,”70–71. 4. The few works available demonstrate the difficulties that exist to make this comparison and focus on the study of democracies, taking for granted the existence Employers’Mutuals and Accident Insurance Scheme in Spain 3 https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press There is very little literature addressing the role of employers and their associations under dictatorial regimes where free unions are banned, and governments—with objectives of propaganda and social pacification—introduce social insurance schemes as part of their social policies. The current literature on the management of industrial accident insurance focuses on comparing industrial accident rates between countries or the legislation in force in each country. 5 Therefore, our empirical study of the evolution of the industrial accident scheme in the Spanish case contributes to the international debate on the role of employers in the development of social insurances in a little studied context of dictatorship, where workers lack legal mechanisms to exert pressure and where employers influence governments to ensure that their interests prevail. It also demonstrates how such a model can be inherited, perpetuated, and continue to influence society even after a democratic period is initiated. TheLawonIndustrialAccidents—theDatoLaw—passedinSpainin 1900, established the liability of industrial employers for the accidents of their workers. It was passed against a backdrop of social reformism during which tenuous attempts were made to improve the working conditions of employees. 6 Most Spanish employers were reluctant to accept an extension of this law and the establishment compulsory insurance to cover accidents. Employers were also opposed to including occupational diseases within the category of industrial accidents. 7 Several bills were presented in the Spanish Parliament between 1919 and 1921 to extend the law to agricultural workers, but all failed to of basic and labor rights and the fact that workers havea certain negotiating capacity. For more on these aspects and the difficulties to make comparisons in this area, see Philipsen, “Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases,”194–196. 5. In this respect, a legislative summary of different countries can be found at Prevención de Riegos Laborales, “Reino Unido,”https://prl.ceoe.es/informacion/ prl-en-el-mundo/reino-unido/. Also seeFomentdel Treball Nacional, Guía de equivalencias de Prevención de Riesgos Laborales, where the legislation on the prevention of occupational risks can be compared, http://prl.foment.com/admin/uploads/docs/ 20150206100433.pdf. 6. During the first decade of the twentieth century, 531 social regulations were passed, including 20 laws, although they had little impact because they were too difficult to implement. See Cabrera, El poder de los empresarios, 156. The Commission for Social Reforms had been created in 1890, which carried out important statistical work by compiling data on the living conditions of workers and the most vulnerable sectors of the population. It was replaced in 1903 by the Institute of Social Reforms (1903–1924). For further details, see Palacio, La institucionalización. For more on the development of social insurance schemes in Spain, see Cuesta, Los seguros sociales; Montero, Orígenes y antecedentes; Samaniego, La unificación de los seguros; and Pons-Pons and Silvestre, Los orígenes. 7. One of the most controversial issues was considering a hernia as an occupational injury. Bengoechea, Patronal catalana. 4VILAR-RODRÍGUEZ AND PONS-PONS https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press progress. 8 The first significant change took place in 1922 with the passage of Matos Law, with the most notable innovation being a 25 percent increase in the amount of temporary allowances for injured workers. The reform also set up a special guarantee fund, although for budgetary reasons it was not put into force until 1933. 9 Industrial employers agreed to financial responsibility for compensating and paying the healthcare coverage of injured workers but strongly opposed compulsory insurance. Conservative and Liberal governments during the Restoration, and later during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923–1930), gave into pressure from employers, although the politicians encouraged them to voluntarily carry insurance. They promoted the creation of employers’industrial accident mutuals, which, through associationism, helped spread the idea of accident insurance. 10 This was accomplished when private insurers as well as commercial insurance companies started to sell this insurance. In 1910, the market share of employers’mutuals was only 5.67 percent of the entire accident branch, a percentage that gradually increased to 15 percent by 1932. 11 From 1900 to 1936, the mutuals managed this insurance activity in the interests of their members— that is, the employers who made up the mutuals’boards of directors, on which workers had no representation. Under these circumstances, employers met their legal responsibilities at the lowest possible cost by keeping premiums low. On the one hand, this strategy led to confrontations between employers’associations and commercial insurance companies over the offer and pricing of policies. On the other hand, it allowed members to meet a main objective of creating medical, clinical, and hospital infrastructure to treat their injured workers as quickly and cheaply as possible. Moreover, these mutuals had the appeal of providing members with annual rebates in the event of year-end profits (which was almost always the case). It should be noted that the rebates were part of the premium that the insurer (i.e., the mutual) returned to the insured (i.e., the employer who paid the premium). If the mutuals spent little (especially on prevention and coverage), they got back some of the money raised through the premiums; that is, a percentage of this money was reimbursed to employers in the form of these rebates, which effectively reduced the price of the insurance premium. This rebate was quite 8. Conferencia de Seguros Sociales, Conclusiones,60–65. For the presentation of the bill of 1919, see Gazeta de Madrid (1900–1936), February 20, 1919, https:// www.boe.es/buscar/gazeta.php. 9. Jordana, La Caja Nacional, 14. 10. Prat and Molina, “State Corporatism,”208–210. 11. Anuario Guía del Asegurador, 1935, LIX. Employers’Mutuals and Accident Insurance Scheme in Spain 5 https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press common in the leading mutuals of this period, as revealed by their annual reports. 12 For its part, the state carried out inadequate control of safety in the workplace. The Ministry of Labor was created by Royal Decree of May 8, 1920, and incorporated the Institute of Social Reforms and the Labor Inspection Service. This service was structured across twelve regions. However, there were only ten inspectors at the regional level, sixtythree inspectors at the provincial level, andsixty-one ancillary staff and clerks. The extremely limited staff of the Labor Inspection Service in 1923 had to deal with far more serious infringements than violations of safety and hygiene measures in the workplace, such as abuses of child labor, the length of the working day, and not keeping Sunday as a rest day. 13 In 1924, only 7.87 percent of the infractions found by this supervisory body related to noncompliance with safety and hygiene measures in theworkplace. The Spanishpolitical institutions, for their part, collaborated with employers’interests by maintaining lower compensation rates than in neighboring countries and failing to extend liability for workers’accidents to agricultural employers, despite bills presented in Parliament. Under these circumstances, employers’mutuals developed slowly but steadily, especially in the country’s more industrialized regions—such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Madrid —which also had the highest percentage of wage laborers. 14 The most significant change during this period took place during the so-calledreformist biennium(1931–1933),after the proclamationof the Second Republic (1931–1936). During the biennium), agricultural employers were made responsible for covering their workers. Therefore, from the reformist biennium forward, both agricultural and industrial employers had to carry insurance policies for their workers. This change had two major consequences. First, employers’mutuals proliferated. Whereas only 42 industrial mutuals had been created and authorized in Spain before 1931, there were 155 by December 1935; and while there were no mutuals in the agricultural sector before 1931, there were 78 by 1935. 15 Local and provincial agricultural employers’ 12. Mutuas 27A y 26B, Dirección General de Previsión, 1885–1963, La Metalúrgica. Informe a la Dirección General de Previsión, 1942, Archivo del Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones y Seguridad Social de España (hereafter MITRAMISS). 13. Cuadro orgánico de Inspectores, Auxiliares y escribientes del Trabajo en 31 de diciembre de 1923. Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Memoria General de la Inspección del Trabajo correspondiente año 1923. 14. For further information on the coefficients of industrialization in the different regions of the country at this time, see Germán Zubero et al., Historia económica regional. Furthermore, the lists of active mutuals published periodically in the Official State Gazette verify this greater concentration. See, for example, Gazeta de Madrid, January 11, 1936. 15. See Pons-Pons, “Employers and Industrial Accident Insurance,”220. 6VILAR-RODRÍGUEZ AND PONS-PONS https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press mutuals were required to directly cover the healthcare of injured agricultural workers. Thus, agricultural insurance companies that could only offer policies that covered compensation were marginalized. The same was true for industrial insurance companies starting in 1932. This rocketed the creation of mutuals linked largely to national and regional employers’associations. Their market share was 19.47 percent in 1933 and 36.08 percent in 1934. 16 This obligation to cover employees was effectively turned into an opportunity. The second consequence was that employers who sat on the boards of directors of these mutuals fully committed to the private insurance business and diversified their activity by adding fire, marine,and life insurance. Thus, employers’mutuals gave rise to large insurance mutuals with significant weight in the insurance industry in the second half of the twentieth century. However, prevention of worker injuries and rehabilitation if they occurred were major issues that were ignored. This is evidenced by the fact there is no trace of investment in these areas in the minutes of board meetings or in memoranda and balances. 17 The political, economic, and social divisions ensuingfrom the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) gave rise to a new historical period for employers’industrial accident mutuals, which continued until 1966. Like many other company and welfare mutuals, boards of directors and management boards were subject to political purges, and were monitored and supervised by the different bodies created by the dictatorship of the new regime. 18 During the period of autarky, there were few changes to insurance practices, the exception being the creation of the obligatory reinsurance of industrial accidents in 1942. The management of insurance continued to be shared between private hands (that is, employers’mutuals and insurance companies) and the Caja Nacional de Accidentes de Trabajo (CNAT; National Industrial AccidentInsurance Fund,founded in1933). The minutes ofthe CNATshow that the obligatory nature of insuring the workers of public bodies, and the legal impossibility of rejecting any policy, made a higher accident claim rate inevitable. Thus, for example, according to data for 1949, the comparison between the claims ratio of the CNAT and the mutuals and private commercial insurance companies was as follows: CNAT, 81.24 percent; L’Abeille, 51.9 percent; Mutua General de Seguros, 45.57 16. Anuario Guía del Asegurador, 1935, LIX. 17. The little importance given to prevention during this period can be seen in the works of Silvestre, “Wage Compensation”; Silvestre, “Workplace Accidents”; Silvestre and Pons-Pons, “El seguro de accidentes.” 18. One example is the Mutua General de Seguros, leader in the industrial accidents branch, which was obliged to purge its managing director and some of the staff. See Libro de actas del Consejo de Administración, núm, 2, Acta de 1 de marzo de 1939, Archivo de Mutua General de Seguros. Employers’Mutuals and Accident Insurance Scheme in Spain 7 https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press percent; and MutuaRegional de Accidentes del Trabajo, 48.8percent. 19 On the one hand, the CNAT had to pay commissions to their agents, as was also true for the private insurance of mutuals and commercial companies, yet it could not apply risk selection, whereas private insurers could. On the other hand, the employers’mutuals intensified a strategy that originated in the market competition of the 1930s. They diversified their activity, as mentioned earlier, by moving into other lines of private insurance, both in the interest of increasing their profits and out of fear of the nationalization of the industrial accident branch. The executives of the mutuals played a key role in this process. It should also be noted that the division between mutuals disappeared in 1955, when many agricultural mutuals were absorbed into industrial mutuals. Collaboration between the mutuals and the state was critical in the phenomenon of diversification. In 1942, the introduction of Seguro Obligatorio de Enfermedad (Compulsory Sickness Insurance) and the state’s lack of medical personnel and clinical infrastructure favored the employers’mutuals,which hadalready created ahealthcare network to deal with workers’accidents. This enabled them to become members of the collaborating bodies of state sickness insurance starting in 1945. This step was taken by the most important employers’mutuals, along with mutuals specifically created by commercial insurance companies to participate in this new business. They were involved in the coverage and management of Compulsory Sickness Insurance until 1955. Nevertheless, their balance sheets suffered from multiple problems, including the progressive reduction of the percentage of premiums they were allowed to discount to cover management costs, the rise in pharmaceutical expenses, and the extension of treatments and specialties covered by insurance. Deficits increased and as a result, after a decade of collaborating with the Compulsory Sickness Insurance, many employers’ mutuals did not renew their agreements. A few continued their collaboration until the passage of the Basic Law on Social Security in 1963, which ended the collaborative management system, but not other types of agreements with the private sector, such as agreements with hospitals (for example, to have a greater number of beds available). 20 During the first period of the Franco dictatorship, employers’ mutuals were subject to extensive bureaucratic control by the Accident Insurance Inspection Service, which demanded continual documentation, such as required monthly fillings of forms at provincial and 19. Ponencia sobre la C.N.S.A.T, Actas 1949, Actas del 10 al 29, Archivo del Instituto Nacional de Gestión Sanitaria, Ministerio de Sanidad. 20. For more on the management and funding of the compulsory sickness insurance, see Pons-Pons and Vilar-Rodríguez, El seguro de salud, 119. 8VILAR-RODRÍGUEZ AND PONS-PONS https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press national levels, with consequent penalties for noncompliance. However, state control over the coverage of these mutuals’workers was, in fact, fairly lax. The mutuals still did not invest significantly in prevention or rehabilitation, and the accident figures declared by some mutuals were surprisingly low. Nonetheless, the declared balance sheets of many mutuals show a substantial increase in annual profits that afforded regular rebates of an average of 20–25 percent of premiums collected, even reaching 35 percent in some cases and years. 21 Meanwhile, recognized occupational diseases were limited to silicosis, and the number of afflicted workers compensated was fairly insignificant. Moreover, of the workers who were entitled to a monthly income for permanent incapacity, nearly none had their applications approved for a lump-sum payment instead. This denial occurred even though the workerswereentitledbylaw toreceivealumpsumratherthan monthly income, that latter of which was insufficient to live on. During this period, even though employers’mutuals were subject to exhaustive bureaucratic control, they also faced little effective control concerning their obligations on the safety of their workers and efforts to reduce the accident rate. This ended in the 1960s when questions were raised about their role and the need to incorporate social insurance into a Social Security project, which was being developed. In principle at least, private insurance, both mutuals and commercial insurance companies, were excluded from the project. Fighting for Control of the Industrial Accident Scheme (1966–1975) Implementation of the Basic Law on Social Security, passed in 1963, enabled employers’mutuals to consolidate their business in the industrial accident branch, without competition from the commercial companies. It also ratified their role as private collaborating bodies in state management of Social Security. 22 The new framework did not come into force until April 30, 1966. The commercial companies received what was more or less negotiated compensation with passage of 21. Memorias anuales de La Metalúrgica (ramo de accidentes de trabajo), 27A y 26B, Dirección General de Previsión, Mutuas 1885–1963, La Metalúrgica, 5 legs, MITRAMISS. 22. Full Text I, of Law 193/1963, of December 28, establishing Social Security, (Boletín Oficial del Estado [BOE] Official State Gazette), April 22, 1966, 96, 4784–5. In particular, the collaboration of the employers’industrial accident mutuals in the management of Social Security was stipulated in the General Regulation approved byDecree1563/1967, BOE, July17, 1967, no.169,10101-9, Boletín Oficialdel Estado (1936–1990), https://www.boe.es/. Employers’Mutuals and Accident Insurance Scheme in Spain 9 https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press law. 44 Moreover, the mutuals widely used subsistence expenses to compensate for the legal prohibition against profit sharing. The first wave of closures, takeovers, and mergers of employers’ mutuals occurred in 1966, leading to a reduction in their numbers. Those that could not or did not want to adapt to the new legal requirements disappeared. In 1966 the fragmented sector comprised 292 authorized entities, which plummeted to 181 in 1967 (Table 2). This means that more than one hundred employer mutuals were liquidated in just one year because of their low level of activity or inability or unwillingness to meet the new regulatory requirements. The number stabilized during the 1970s, but via mergers and takeovers. And the registration of new employers’mutuals slowed drastically, with only a dozen new mutuals starting between 1966 and 1973. By 1973, the twenty leading employers’mutuals accounted for more than 60 percent of premiums. The reduction of more than a hundred entities (plus all the mergers and acquisitions) and the elimination of the competition from private insurance enabled the larger employers’mutuals offering industrial accident insurance to increase their revenue. Table 2. Number of employers’mutuals operating in Spain, 1966–2007 Year Number Year Number 1966 292 1988 122 1967 181 1989 113 1968 176 1990 97 1969 192 1991 85 1970 192 1992 59 1971 189 1993 43 1972 186 1994 39 1973 186 1995 36 1976 187 1996 34 1977 185 1997 32 1978 185 1998 30 1979 182 1999 30 1980 177 2000 30 1981 176 2001 29 1982 171 2002 29 1983 168 2003 29 1984 162 2004 29 1985 150 2005 28 1986 136 2006 28 1987 131 2007 22 Sources: Authors’compilation. For 1966–1973, based on números extraordinarios de estadística 1971 and 1974 (extra numbers with statistical data 1971 and 1974), Revista del Sindicato Nacional del Seguro. For 1974–2000, based on Valenzuela, Protagonistas. From 2001–2007, based on the statistical database of the Association of Industrial Accident Mutuals, https://www.amat.es/. 44. Ministerio de Trabajo, Libro Blanco, 448–450. 16 VILAR-RODRÍGUEZ AND PONS-PONS https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press Even with this smaller number, there remained a constellation of entities. Additionally, while employer mutuals resisted state control in order to keep more profits, they proliferated unprofitable or costineffective healthcare facilities and services. Contributions doubled between 1969 and 1973, but so did the payouts of benefits; even so, the ratio remained around 50 percent, which meant ample financial margins (Table 3). In short, in Spain, the progressive incorporation of employers’ industrial accident mutuals as collaborators in Social Security was not a result of hashed-out agreements between employers and workers. This type of working alliance among classes and interests, which is observed in other countries, did not work in Spain because of a dictatorial framework in which workers had no voice while employers had great leeway to act as they wished within a political status quo aligned with their interests. Consequently, the power struggle that ensued was between the state and employers. As the state weaved an ever tighter legislative framework for greater control and oversight, the mutuals fought to keep control of their business for as long as possible. Employers’Mutuals under Democracy (1976–2000) The employers’mutuals had a decision to make: stay in control or keep their business afloat. After Franco’s death in 1975, Spain’s so-called transition to democracy started. The early years were largely dedicated to enacting copious legislation aimed at restoring rights and freedoms after almost forty years of dictatorship. The new general regulation on employers’industrial accident mutuals to collaborate in the management of Social Security, passed in 1976, consolidated the measures established in the legislation of 1963. 45 This new regulation introduced Table 3. Industrial accident insurance, contributions and benefits managed by employers’mutual, 1969–1973 (in millions of pesetas) Year Amount of contributions Benefits Benefits as a % of contributions 1969 10,831.91 5,363.45 49.51 1970 12,399.70 6,320.09 50.96 1971 14,323.13 7,318.92 51.09 1972 17,145.76 8,267.99 48.22 1973 21,230.34 10,532.48 49.61 Source: números extraordinarios de estadística 1974 (extra numbers with statistical data 1974), 12, Revista del Sindicato Nacional del Seguro. 45. Royal Decree 1509/1976, of May 21, approving the General Regulation on the collaboration of Employers’Industrial Accident Mutuals in the management of Social Security. BOE, July 2, 1976, no. 158, 12941–8. Employers’Mutuals and Accident Insurance Scheme in Spain 17 https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press two important novelties. First, it established a required public accounting system of managing entities and common services in employers’ mutuals. This led to both greater transparency of their accounts and state facility for auditing. Second, workers’representatives were, for the first time, incorporated into the governing bodies of these mutuals (i.e.,managementboards, generalassemblies, andspecialbenefits committees). In 1976, with the transition to democracy in process, Spain signedtheInternational Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights. In1977, compulsory membership in Falange’s vertical “union”was ended— remember, it was the only “union”permitted throughout the dictatorship—and trade unions were legally established. Political parties were also legalized. The Spanish Constitution, approved in 1978, officially incorporated this new democratic reality. 46 However, new unions had to deal with a wide variety of demands during an economic crisis with high inflation and unemployment, which led to workers’loss of purchasing power compared with their counterparts in Western Europe. Furthermore, almost forty years of compulsory membership in the Falange “union”took its toll in terms of trade union culture in the democratic stage. 47 Even with union freedom, in the late 1970s Spain had one the lowest rates of trade union membership of Western European countries (Table 4). With so many societal issues to address, little union pressure was brought to bear on the management of Table 4. Percentage of workers as members of trade unions, 1950–1990 1950 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 Austria 62 67.88 66.16 62.75 58.99 56.72 51.60 46.93 Belgium 41.46 39.86 42.07 51.86 54.10 52.43 53.94 Denmark 56 56.91 58.20 60.30 68.87 78.61 78.16 75.34 France 19.65 19.47 21.69 22.15 18.28 13.61 9.99 West Germany 38 34.67 32.89 32.03 34.58 34.90 34.67 31.22 Ireland 42 43.09 45.83 50.58 52.58 54.28 51.47 48.53 Italy 44 24.68 25.50 36.97 48.05 49.58 42.49 38.81 Netherlands 43 40.02 37.39 36.50 37.76 34.78 27.72 24.57 Spain 18.30 18.70 10.23 12.54 Sweden 67 72.08 66.29 67.75 74.46 77.96 81.29 79.42 United Kingdom 45 38.89 38.72 43.05 42.07 49.74 44.26 38.18 United States 24.2 30.90 28.17 27.43 25.29 22.06 17.45 15.45 Source: Authors’compilation based on Historical Data Visualization,“Trade Union Membership,” Harvard Business School website, https://www.hbs.edu/businesshistory/courses/resources/historicaldata-visualization/Pages/details.aspx?data_id=37 46. BOE, November 18, 1978, no. 276, 26246–9. For more on labor reforms during the transition to democracy, see Vilar-Rodríguez, “El trabajo.” 47. In this regard, there is literature that studies the importance of strong unions in the development of Social Security legislation that looks after workers’interests. See, for example, Van Leewen, “Trade Unions.” 18 VILAR-RODRÍGUEZ AND PONS-PONS https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press industrial accident insurance by the mutuals. Moreover, there were delays in enacting the comprehensive and in-depth analysis of issues affecting the Social Security system (published in Libro Blanco de la Seguridad Social [White Paper on Social Security] in 1977). Instead, temporary remedies and stop-gap solutions were introduced to deal with the problems. 48 The old structures inherited from a long dictatorship ultimately determined the social policy model in the new Spanish democracy. 49 In fact, in Francoist Spain, public social expenditures did not receive the monies necessary because of the traditional tax system and the priority given to balancing the budget, which made it impossible to guarantee access to social coverage equivalent to other Western European countries. As Comín Comín points out, “the regime tried to patch up the system introduced by the Basic Law of 1963, via the Social Security laws of 1972 and 1974. But the situation did not improve.” 50 The Law on the Financing and Improvement of the Protective Action of the General Social Security Scheme, mentioned earlier, offered few improvements, even though the introduction to this law affirmed the desire of the Spanish political class to establish new “criteria generally adopted by the Social Security systems of the countries integrated into the European Economic Community.” 51 It was necessary to wait until the transition to democracy in 1977, when Fernández Ordoñez’s eagerly awaited tax reform was approved, and it modernized the Spanish fiscal system. In the same year, it was agreed that the state contribution to finance the Social Security would be increased by 20 percent of its previous budget. In 1978, rather than opting for full direct state management, the state shared this function with distinct legal entities. Public management of the Social Security administration would predominate, yet private managers were allowed to collaborate in two ways: as mutuals or as individual employers. Thus, employers’industrial accident mutuals affected the Social Security model within the new democratic framework. 52 48. To read more on the historical stages of Social Security development in Spain in the twentieth century, see Comín Comín, “Las fases históricas,”641–694. 49. For further details, see Vilar-Rodríguez and Pons-Pons, “La Ley de Bases de la Seguridad Social,”145. 50. See Comín Comín, “Los seguros sociales.” 51. See Comín Comín, “Las fases históricas.” 52. In particular, Article 2.3 of Royal Decree-Law 38/1978, of November 18, on institutional management of Social Security, Health and Employment: “the present collaboration in the management may be continued by Companies, Employers’ Mutuals and Public and Private Associations, Foundations and Entities, subject to prior registration in a Public Register.”BOE, November 18, 1978, no. 276, 26246–9. Employers’Mutuals and Accident Insurance Scheme in Spain 19 https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press Also in 1978, a single fund designated for the entire Social Security system was introduced via the Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social (General Treasury for Social Security; TGSS), under the principle of financial solidarity. 53 The premiums for industrial accident insurance, which had been Social Security contributions since 1972, were included within this single fund. However, an important change was introduced in 1979: the TGSS assumed responsibility for the collection of these contributions and transferred the corresponding amount to the employers’mutuals every month. This was new, because previously the mutuals’deducted their contributions to the Common and Social Services of the Social Security. 54 This measure, in which the TGSS now collected the contributions of the employers associated with the mutuals, had a major impact on the mutuals’financial and accounting. A further step in this process came in 1980, when the property and assets of the mutuals were differentiated into two lots. 55 In one lot, the mutuals’movable and immovable property related to industrial accident premiums became part of the patrimonio único (exclusive assets) of Social Security, under the ownership and administration of the TGSS. In the second lot, the mutuals’historically accumulated property continued to be administered according to the statutes of each mutual. To incorporate all these changes, in 1984 a new general regulation was passed: On the Collaboration of Employers’Industrial Accident Mutuals in the Management of Social Security. 56 This new regulation was designed to ensure that mutuals were transparent in their dealings with the Social Security system. This legislation expanded the state’s auditing and oversight of the mutuals’property and assets and addressed basic issues (i.e., mutuals’payments to the administration, establishment of statutory deposits, and updating of administrative expenses and reserves). A period of three months was given for mutuals to separate their properties by ownership, and the resulting accounts hadtobesent totheTGSS. Additionally,any excessesinadministrative expenses and any financial penalties imposed on the employers’ mutuals had to be paid out of a mutual’s voluntary reserves or assets. Employers’mutuals’administrative expenses were generally in excess of 10 percent of their total revenues, which was a violation of the 53. BOE, November 18, 1978, no. 276, 26246–9. 54. By Royal Decree 1245/1979, of May 25, Article 2.1, BOE, May 29, 1979, no. 128, 11845–6. 55. By Royal Decree 255/1980, of February 1, BOE, February 12, 1980, no. 37, 3340–1. 56. Order of April 22, 1984, On the Collaboration of Employers’Industrial Accident Mutuals in the Social Security System, BOE, April 12, 1984, no. 88, 10414–6. 20 VILAR-RODRÍGUEZ AND PONS-PONS https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press established legal limits (Table 5). In some cases, this excess reached 114 percent of declared revenue. 57 It seems clear that the legislative steps taken early in Spain’s democracy were to reinforce the integration of the mutuals into the Social Security organizational scheme and to continue government supervision without affecting the mutuals’nature, organization, or functioning. However, legislation was not enough to achieve the expected results in terms of either greater transparency or more efficient managementoftheseentities. Thefinancialandaccountingsystems ofsome mutuals were so chaotic that the Ministry of Labor and Social Security implemented an audit plan in the early 1980s. These audits detected Table 5. Contributions and administrative expenses of the employers’mutuals, 1966–1986 Year Contributions (millions of pesetas) Administrative Expenses (millions of pesetas) Administrative Expenses as % of Contributions 1966 8,920.73 1,226.4 13.75 1967 9,168.42 1,017.0 11.09 1968 9,185.37 961.3 10.47 1969 10,831.91 1,030.8 9.52 1970 12,399.70 1,146.7 9.25 1971 14,323.13 1,266.7 8.84 1972 17,145.76 1,461.4 8.52 1973 21,230.34 1,661.7 7.83 1974 —1,995.3 n.a. 1975 —3,090.3 n.a. 1976 36,318.7 3,920.2 10.79 1977 46,939.6 4,882.8 10.40 1978 59,540.7 5,927.2 9.95 1979 68,311.0 —n.a. 1980 81,038.0 —n.a. 1981 86,297.0 9,182.0 10.64 1982 97,822.0 10,396.0 10.63 1983 115,043.0 11,632.0 10.11 1984 121,590.0 12,982.0 10.68 1985 120,747.3 13,819.0 11.44 1986 142,154.0 15,276.0 10.75 Source: Authors’compilations. For 1969–1973 contributions, see números extraordinarios de estadística 1974 (extra numbers with statistical data 1974), 12, Revista del Sindicato Nacional del Seguro. For 1966–1975administrative expenses,seedatos delascuentas degestiónde lasMutualidadesLaborales y las Mutuas Patronales (data from the management accounts of the Labor Mutualities and the Employers’ Mutual Societies), Ministerio de Trabajo, Libro Blanco, 447–449. All three columns for 1975–1986 are from Ministerio de Trabajo ySeguridad Social (Ministry of Labor andSocial Security), Memoria económico financiera de las Mutuas Patronales de Accidentes del Trabajo (Financial Economic Report of the Employers’Mutual), cited in Serrano and Colmenar, in Las Mutuas Patronales, 166. 57. These excesses were frequent, according to the data compiled by the Court of Auditors and the Labor Inspection Service. See Martín and Colmenar, Las Mutuas Patronales, 161. Employers’Mutuals and Accident Insurance Scheme in Spain 21 https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press accounting and management irregularities in several employers’ mutual, amounting to 185 million pesetas. For example, in September 1983 five employers’mutuals—El Fénix Mutuo, Mutua General Agropecuaria, El Porvenir, La Metalúrgica, and La Ibérica—were audited by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Some of these mutuals had been created in the 1930s and had a long history in Spain. Alleged fraud included wrongful receipt of unemployment insurance; falsification of medical reports; irregularities in the processing of disability claims; defrauding the Social Security system and private individuals in relationtothe paymentofcontributions; and“systematic errors,”including amounts of money from unknown origins and unauthorized deductions. 58 Many smaller employers’mutuals went out of business because of the increase in state control of their property, assets, and accounts, and with the disappearance of some allowances or subsidies related to premiums. Even the establishment of rescue or reorganization plans to help with financial difficulties could not save them. The total number of mutuals rose to 162 in 1984 from fewer than 25 in 1976 (see Table2), but by the end of 1987, after the first restructuring of the sector, the number fell to 130. Nearly all of the mutuals operating at the local or district level had disappeared, with only five remaining. Sixty-three surviving mutuals operated at the provincial level, while 36 were interprovincial, 19 were national (i.e., active in the 50 Spanish provinces and in two autonomous cities), and seven were regional. 59 The state then promoted concentration at the start of the 1990s. 60 There were only 97 employers’mutuals in January 1990, and 16 more disappeared that year. Twelve more were gone in 1991; 26 in 1992; and 16 in 1993, equaling a total of 70 fewer entities between 1990 and 1993 (see the Appendix). This reduction facilitated greater state control over the mutuals, improved the bookkeeping of mutuals’accounts, and allowed for better coordination of the needed services, care, and attention of protected workers. These changes took place after the aforementioned auditplanimplemented by theMinistryof Laborintheearly1980s. The restructuring also changed the average scale of the industrial accident mutuals. In 1987, at the start of this restructuring process, the leading 58. Rodolfo Serrano, “Cinco mutuas patronales, intervenidas por el Ministerio de Trabajo al haberse detectado irregularidades contables,”Hemeroteca El País, August 30, 1983, https://elpais.com/diario/1983/08/30/economia/431042402_ 850215.html. 59. These data come from Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Employers' Mutual Insurance Companies. Social Balance and Economic-Financial Report, 1987, MITRAMISS. 60. Law 4/1990 of June 29 on the General State Budget for 1990. BOE, June 30, 1990, no. 156, 18669–710. 22 VILAR-RODRÍGUEZ AND PONS-PONS https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press twenty mutuals accounted for 77.38 percent of total premiums; by 2006 just five of these mutuals accounted for 67 percent of premiums. The mutuals did receive some recompense in return for greater state intervention. First, the prohibition on covering the risks of accidents of state companies and public agencies was removed (under the supposition that it was necessary for mutuals to make better use of their available resources). Second, their geographical scope was made wider, which facilitated mergers and fostered greater concentration of the sector. Thus, the minimum number of companies required to establish a mutual increased, along with the required number of workers needed to run operations. Specifically, the number rose from ten employers and two thousand workers per mutual to fifty employers and thirty thousand workers. Simultaneously, legislation modified the official name of employers’mutuals to Mutuas de Accidentes de Trabajo y Enfermedades Profesionales de la Seguridad Social (Mutual Insurance Companies of the Social Security for Work-related Accidents and Occupational Diseases). Moreover, as noted above, starting in 1990 the Ministry of Labor and Social Security tightened control over the mutuals through annual audits (carried out by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Social Security) and made it illegal for someone to hold a managerial or executive position in a mutual and also be on the board of directors of any associated company. In the final decades of the twentieth century, the mutuals assumed greater power within Social Security. 61 New legislation allowed employers belonging to a mutual for coverage of workers’industrial accidents and occupational diseases to manage the economic benefits of workers’temporary incapacity arising from common contingencies with the same entity. 62 Here, common contingency refers a situation in which a worker—injured during an accident or diagnosed with a nonoccupational illness—is unable to work and receives health care from the Public Health System. The same entity refers to the same mutual. Likewise, the mutuals could also manage the economic benefits related to the temporary incapacity of self-employed workers and those employed under the special Social Security scheme for agricultural workers. These extensions were included in the new regulation on the collaboration of mutuals in the management of Social Security, approved by Royal Decree 1993/1995, December 7, 1995. This regulation combined previously incorporated key elements regarding the role of mutuals in the Social Security scheme and consolidated their 61. Law 22/1993, of December 19, on the General State Budget for 1994 and Law 42/1994 of December 30 on Fiscal, Administrative and Social Measures, BOE, December 31, 1994, no. 313, 39458–504. 62. For further comments in this respect, see Sempere, Hacia un nuevo modelo. Employers’Mutuals and Accident Insurance Scheme in Spain 23 https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press function via new competencies. 63 Consequently, at the turn of the century, even as mergers and acquisitions continued, the mutuals had an active role in managing industrial accident and occupational disease insurance. From 1977 to 1987, the employers’industrial accident mutuals increased the number of workers protected against occupational risks as compared to other systems of protection (Table 6). In 1977, the mutuals protected 37 percent of the total number of workers insured by the system as a whole. 64 By 1987 this had increased to 76 percent. This percentage continued rising over the following years, reaching 91.6 percent in 1999. Table 6. Workers protected against industrial accidents and occupational diseases, 1977–1999 Year Total Mutuals Total National Social Security Institute* Total System Mutuals as % of total system 1977 3,294,617 5,597,680 8,889,297 37.0 1978 3,695,542 5,222,028 8,917,570 41.4 1979 3,839,286 5,100,277 8,939,563 42.9 1980 3,869,964 5,120,142 8,990,106 43.0 1981 4,858,140 4,037,042 8,895,182 54.6 1982 5,038,027 3,040,498 8,078,525 62.4 1983 5,163,521 2,955,601 8,119,122 63.6 1984 5,260,504 2,598,100 7,858,604 66.9 1985 5,690,053 2,592,100 8,282,153 68.7 1986 5,658,178 2,417,227 8,075,405 70.1 1987 6,582,736 1,998,472 8,581,208 76.7 1988 7,136,620 2,081,709 9,218,329 77.4 1989 7,710,477 2,112,190 9,822,667 78.5 1990 8,360,891 1,869,142 10,230,033 81.7 1991 8,961,028 1,305,826 10,266,854 87.3 1992 9,236,278 681,169 9,917,447 93.1 1993 8,806,376 791,663 9,598,039 91.8 1994 8,953,347 761,932 9,717,279 92.2 1995 9,117,305 743,149 9,860,454 92.5 1996 9,308,750 756,424 10,065,174 92.5 1997 9,645,756 874,965 10,520,721 91.7 1998 10,171,040 1,029,683 11,200,723 90.8 1999 10,900,000 998,617 11,898,617 91.6 Note: * The National Social Security Institute (INSS) was formed after the former managing body, the National Welfare Institute, was eliminated in 1978. The INSS was a managing body of Social Security, with its own legal personality. It was associated with the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration via the Secretariat of State for Social Security and Pensions. It was entrusted with a large segment of the management and administration of the economic benefits of the Social Security in Spain. Source: Authors’own preparation based on Valenzuela, Protagonistas, 41. 63. BOE, December 12, 1995, 296, 35584–613. 64. Valenzuela, Protagonistas, 41. 24 VILAR-RODRÍGUEZ AND PONS-PONS https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press The legislative changes made at the end of the twentieth century in relation to the mutuals have been widely questioned in the literature in two fundamental respects, especially by specialists in law: a lack of legislative clarity, and a lack of parliamentary debate on the role of the employers’mutuals within the Social Security system in Spain. With regard to the first point, criticism started with the “imprecision”of the official name they were given in Law 4/1990, on General State Budgets: Mutuas de Accidentes de Trabajo y Enfermedades Profesionales de la SeguridadSocial. This designation omits theexplicit term “employers” (although they are still employers’mutuals), and it only mentions some coverage (i.e., occupational diseases and temporary incapacity from common risks). At the same time it fails to make any reference to preventing occupational risks, which also falls within their competencies. 65 Even after the frenzy of legislative changes passed in recent decades, there are aspects of the Mutual Insurance Companies of the Social Security for Work-related Accidents and Occupational Diseases that remain problematic. 66 First, they are employers’associations that operate within the sphere of Social Security, but despite the name they are not part of the public structure as determined by the Law on the Prevention of Occupational Risks. Second, they not only manage occupational accidents and diseases but also common risks when these result in temporary incapacity. On the lack of parliamentary debate on the role of the employers’mutuals in Spain, García Jiménez has criticized the existence of an “overlapping and reiterative legislative framework that lacks rigor and is full of increasing legal complexity and uncertainty.” 67 Within this line of argument, Sempere has noted that the essential legislative changes concerning the role of the mutuals have taken place with “excessive haste, a total mix of matters and an absence of calm and measured debate.” 68 Consequently, this author concludes that the system has drifted toward a contradictory model in which, first, the privatization of the management of Social Security has been fostered (given that mutuals are private legal entities that acquired increasing powers), and second, these same entities have been made more public by increasing the supervision of their day-to-day management by the public authorities. The many legislative actions passed in the first years of the twentyfirst century has strengthened both the role played by the mutuals in the current Social Security system and this contradictory model. These mutuals now carry out a multitude of functions while being 65. Sempere, “La incesante metamorfosis.” 66. Also in line with Sempere, “La incesante metamorfosis,”10. 67. García Jiménez, Las mutuas, 133. 68. Sempere, “La incesante metamorfosis,”11. Employers’Mutuals and Accident Insurance Scheme in Spain 25 https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press Appendix: Concentration of employers‘industrial accident mutuals, 1980–2019 Entity registered with Ministry of Labor (year) Resulting merger or acquisition (year) Merger/acquisition (year) 1. MCMUTUAL Barcelona (2006) 126. Mutual Cyclops 001. † Previsión-Equidad (1993). Previously called Equidad (1988) 005. Mutua Catalana de Accidentes (1989). Previously called Asociación Vilmar (1986) 027. Mutua Hoste (1993). Result of the merger of Vinos y Aguardientes and Pescadores “a la parte”de Vizcaya (1992) 084. Mutua Panadera (A.S.P.A.) (1985) 097. Mutua Panadera (1985) 157. Alianza de Previsión Social (1986) 184. Metalúrgica de Levante (1990) 186. Mutua Pesquera de Vigo (1983) 194. Mutua Ntra. Sra. Del Carme (1992) 004. Midat Mutua 102. La Metalúrgica (1992) 260. COPA (1993). Previously called Rio Magro (1991) 2. MUTALIA Bilbao (2007) 002. Mutua Previsora 020. Mutua Vizcaya Industrial (2006) 083. Comercial 48. Pakea (2006) 033. Mutua La Guipuzcoana (1977) 32 VILAR-RODRÍGUEZ AND PONS-PONS https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press 3. ACTIVA MUTUA (2008)* REDDISMATT Tarragona (2007) 019. Reddis-Unión Mutual 003. Reddismat (1988). Result of the merger of Mutua Cerrajera (1995) and USIL (1986) 109. Patronos Tocineros (1985) 226. Mutua Aseguradora del campo (1989) 038. MATT 014. Mutua del Centro de carpinteros Matriculados de Barcelona (1987) 186. Mutua Comarcal contra Accidentes del trabajo en el ramo construcción (1992) 202. Mutua Agrícola de la comarca de Tortosa (1992). Previously called Mutualidad Roquetense de seguros contra acc. De trabajo agrícola 213. Mutua Patronal arrocera de Acc. Trab. Agricultura (1991) 215. Mutua Patronal Agrícola d’Amposta (1990) 234. Mutua Bisbalenca contra accidents de treball (1993) 25.MUPA Lleida (1993) 025. Mutua Lleiditana 028. Mutua Igualadina 35. FIMAC Barcelona 245. Seguros Porvenir (1982) (Continued) (Continued) Employers’Mutuals and Accident Insurance Scheme in Spain 33 https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press 7. MUTUA MONTAÑESA Santander 069. La Providencia (1993) 105. Mutua Harinera (1990) 188 Mutua Gerundense de Acc. De trab. (1990) 203. Mutua Agraria Abulense (1986) 204. Palentina (1984) 212. Mutualidad Prov. Agraria de Palencia. Previously called Mutualidad de Patronos Agrícolas de la comarca de frechilla de Campos 265. Mutua Patronal del Oeste (1991) 10. MUTUA UNIVERSAL Barcelona 008. Mutua Asturiana de Accidentes (1989) 031. Mutua del Penedés y Barcelona (1986). Previously called Mutua Patronal de Barcelona 087. Mutua de las Fabricas de explosivos, productos químicos y minas (1989) 193. Leonesa de la Industria y del comercio (1989) 254. Mutua Patronal de Accidentes de trabajo de Béjar 11. MAZ Zaragoza 044. Comercial Aragonesa (1986) 046. Mutua Ilicitana (1996) 129. Mutua de la Industria y Comercio de Aragón (1991) 139. MUSAP (1993) 152. Mutual Flequera de Catalunya (1993) 181. Mutua Panadera de Zaragoza y Prov.(1988) 251. Guadalquivir-Costa del Sol (1994). Previously called Costal del Sol (1988) (Continued) 34 VILAR-RODRÍGUEZ AND PONS-PONS https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press 15. UMIVALE Valencia (2006) 015. MUVALE 107. Levante Mediterránea (1993). Result of the merger of Mutua sobre Acc. De trab. De la industria panadera provincia de Valencia (1992), M de la sociedad de Maestros y patrones carpinteros de Valencia (1992), and Unión Mediterránea (1991) 198. La Alianza (1990) 219. Mutua Patronal Accidentes de trabajo de Sueca (1990) 221. Mutua Agraria Valenciana (1992) 248. Mutua Patronal de Plateros, joyeros, orfebres (1992) 271. UNION MUSEBA-IBESVICO 009. LABMAR (1995). Result of the merger of La Alianza Mataronense (1992) and LABORUM (1994) 037. Unión Mutua (1994) 104. MUSEBA, Mutua de Banca (1992). Previously called Mutua Perpetuo Socorro (1985) 106. IBEVISCO (1992) (Continued) (Continued) Employers’Mutuals and Accident Insurance Scheme in Spain 35 https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press 21. MUTUA NAVARRA Pamplona 199. Caja Navarra contra Accidentes Agropecuarios (1992) 39. Mutua Intercomarcal Barcelona (1993) 098. Mutua Manresana 089. Mutua de Tárrega (1985) 137. Mutualidad de Patronos del Ramo de la madera de Manresa (1963) 177. MAPA (1991). Previously called Asistencia y Previsión IBERIA (1980) 261. Mutua d’Accidents de treball del Valles 61. FREMAP Madrid 042. Mutua Empresarial Catalana (1984) 062. Mutua General Agropecuaria (1989) 081. Jucar (1989) 200. La Arrocera, Mutua de Accidentes de trabajo 082. Carbonera del Norte (1986) 086. Mutua Pesquera de Vigo (1983) 117. Regional Gallega 120. La Segoviana (1985) 146. Mutua de Brurriana (1988) (Continued) 36 VILAR-RODRÍGUEZ AND PONS-PONS https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press 72. SOLIMAT Toledo (1997) 072. Soliss UMAP (1992) 12. Artes del Libro (1992) 170. Madrileña de Taxis (1992) 51. Mutua Gremio de Carbonerías de Madrid (1993) 113. Mutua Industrial y Mercantil de Ávila (1993) 115. CESMA Ceuta Mutua de Ceuta. Previously called denominada S.M.A.T. (1991) 151. ASEPEYO Barcelona 070. Mutua San Fermín (1986) 141. Mutua Melillense (1987) 153. Ibérica (1985) 160. AMICAL, Mutua patronal accidentes Menoría (1992) 163. Catalunya (1995) 060. Mutua de Accidentes en hoteles, cafés, restaurantes y similares (A.H.C.R.Y.S.) (1986) 180. Mutua Industrial y comarcal Accidentes de Trabajo (1984) 197. Mutua Mineros Industria Leonesa (1984) (Continued) (Continued) Employers’Mutuals and Accident Insurance Scheme in Spain 37 https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press 183. MUTUA BALEAR Palma de Mallorca 095. Mutua Felanigense (1991) 121. Mutua de Seguros de Llucmajor 125. Mutua Guanarteme (1996) 209. Mutua de Accidentes Agrícolas Balear 267. Unión de Mutuas UNIMAT Castellón (1990) 108. Mutua Patronal Sergobina 195. MUPATCHE, Mutua Patronal de Cheste 214. Unión gremial valentina 236. Mutua Industrial Castellonense 239. Mutua Patronal Accidentes Trabajo en agricultura Villareal de los Infantes (1989) 242. Mutua de Azulejeros 165. Manises (1986) 182. La Senyera (1985) 196. AMAT (1986) 252. Unión de empresas industriales 256. Mutua Patronal Saguntina 272. MAC Santa Cruz de Tenerife (1992) 079. Unión Tinerfeña 207. MUPATE (Continued) 38 VILAR-RODRÍGUEZ AND PONS-PONS https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press IBER-MUTAMUR Madrid 273. Ibermutua 158. Castilla (1995) 268. MUP (1993) 047.MutuadelPuertodeValencia(1991) Merger Ibermutua and Mutuamur (1997) Merger with Mutua Gallega (2018)** 114. MUP (1991) 270. Fénix Castellana (1993) 032. Mutua Castellana (1992) 091. Mutua Granadina (1992) 140. El Fénix Mutuo (1992) 167. Asistencia Médica (1992) 249. Asociación Andaluza de Acc. de Taxis (1992) 244. Mutuamur 073. La Legal (1991) 161. Panadera Industrial y Comercial Prov. Murcia (1974) 253. Mutua Sevillana de construcciones y obras (1983) 263. Madin (2002) 068. Empresarios minero e industriales asturianos 162. Mutua General Panadera 179. Madin 201 Mutua Gallega. La Coruña (2018) 018. La Naviera (1993) 257. Mutua Patronal Coruñesa (1986) (Continued) (Continued) Employers’Mutuals and Accident Insurance Scheme in Spain 39 https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press 275. FRATENIDAD-MUPRESPA Madrid (1999) 166. LA FRATERNIDAD 013. La Única, mutua filantrópico (1990) 040. Federación Madrileña industrias de carnes (1990) 057. Mutua de Industrias minero-metalúrgicas (1988) 065. Mutua Almanseña (1988) 066. MUDESPA (1991) 093. La Seguridad Mutua (1985) 123. PACI, Mutua General industrial y agrícola (1960) 127. M.E.M.I. Mutua empresas mineras e industriales (1987) 134. GUREARTE (1992) 156. Mutua Española de Previsión (1983) 185. Mutua Cerealista de Cáceres (1990) 222. Mutua Rural (1993). Previously called Mutua Provincial Agraria e Industrial de Burgos 240. La mecánica (1990) 255. Barcino Industrial y Comercial (1989) 259. Mutua de Accidentes Azucareros (1989) (Continued) 40 VILAR-RODRÍGUEZ AND PONS-PONS https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press 269. MUPRESPA-MUPAG- PREVISIÓN 045. Mutua Patronal de las Industrial del pescado y derivados (1992) 103. Mutua de Fabricantes de Papel (1985). 217. PELAYO (1987) 266. Asociación Mutual Industrial A.M.I. (1993) 276. EGARSAT (2007) 16. S.A.T 085. Mutua Egara (1985) Note: † Official registration number assigned by the Ministry of Labor. * BOE (Official State Gazette) No. 56, March 5, 2008, p. 13518. ** BOE No. 1, 1 January 1, 2019, pp. 134–135. The names of the entities and localities are exactly as they appear in the original list. The employers’industrial accident mutuals in bold were in existence as of December 31, 2019. Source: Authors’preparation based on Associació Catalana De Mútues d’accidents de Treball (Catalan Association of Employers´Industrial Accident Mutuals), http://www.acmat.org/dir1.htm (last consulted on December, 2019). (Continued) Employers’Mutuals and Accident Insurance Scheme in Spain 41 https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.71 Published online by Cambridge University Press