From Kant to Dostoyevsky: Dmytro Čyževs’kyj’s Literary Anthropology

F om Kan o Dos oye sky: Dmy o Čyže s’kyj’s Li e a y An h opology Pa ick Flack Uni e si é de F ibou g [email p o ec ed] SYNOPSIS This pape econs uc s he co e a gumen o Dmy o Čyže s’kyj’s un inished p ojec on o malism in e hics, de eloped in he la e 1920s du ing his exile in P ague. Al hough he planned book ne e ma e ialized, Čyže s’kyj published h ee a icles and ab oade se o ela ed ex s which, aken o- ge he , a icula e adis inc i e and cohe en heo e ical posi ion. A i s cen e lies acompelling in u- i ion: ha li e a u e plays a undamen al ole in he cons i u ion o mo al subjec i i y— wha may be e med Čyže s’kyj’s li e a y an h opology. Čyže s’kyj begins wi h ac i ique o Kan ian o malism, iden i ying i s abs ac ion om he conc e e will o he indi idual subjec as he oo o ab oade c isis in e hical heo y. Ra he han abandoning o malism, howe e , he seeks o econ igu e i , p oposing ha e hical meaning is no logically subsumed bu symbolically embodied. This claim is de eloped bo h philosophically— in a ypology o he o ms o gene ali y— and in e p e i ely, h ough eadings o Dos oye sky’s mo i o he double. Posi ioned alongside con empo a ies such as Bakh in, Lukács, and Kojè e, Čyže s’kyj o e s aunique esponse: no polyphony, bu on ological doubling as he si e o e hical indi idua ion. KEYWORDS Dmy o Čyže s’kyj; Mikhail Bakh in; Fyodo Dos oe sky; philosophical an h opology; li e a y he- o y; Kan ; o malis e hics; double; ecep ion. DOI h ps://doi.o g/10.14712/23366680.2025.1.5 INTRODUCTION In he la e 1920s, while in exile in P ague, Dmy o Čyže s’kyj se abou w i ing abook on he ques ion o o malism in e hics, he ‘ undamen al heme’, acco ding o him, o a‘con empo a y c isis o e hical heo y so ex ao dina ily p o ound and signi ican ha i calls in o ques ion he e y possibili y o e hical heo y in i s adi ional o m’ (Čyže s’kyj 1928a, p.15). While he book ne e ma e ialized as awhole, Čyže s’kyj published h ee a icles p o iding ‘asumma y o i s indi idual chap e s’ (Čyže s’kyj 1931a, p.50): ‘On Fo malism in E hics: Rema ks on he Con empo a y C isis o E hi- cal Theo y’ (Čyže s’kyj 1928a), ‘Logic and E hics: The Ques ion o O e coming E hical OPEN ACCESS PATRICK FLACK 87 “Fo malism”’ (1928/1931, Čyže s’kyj 1931a)1 and ‘On he P oblem o he Double in Dos- oye sky: APhilosophical In e p e a ion’ (Čyže s’kyj 1929a).2 Addi ionally, ab oade body o ela ed w i ings om he 1920s and 30s (e.g. ‘Hegel e Nie zsche’, ‘Schil- le und die B üde Ka amazo ’, ‘Dos oye sky-psycholog’) also deals wi h he main hemes b oached by Čyže s’kyj in he h ee explici ly eclaimed chap e s ‘ om he book on o mal e hics’ (c . Janzen 2008, p.132; Plo niko 2024, p.194). As he i les o Čyže s’kyj’s a ious a icles sugges , hei hema ic ange is s ik- ingly b oad— ex ending om e hics and logic o philosophical an h opology and li - e a y c i icism. Gi en he un inished s a e o his book p ojec , mo eo e , i is no im- media ely appa en whe he hese di e se explo a ions eally cons i u e acohe en whole, o how exac ly hey we e mean o coalesce in o asys ema ic esponse o he ques ion o o malism in e hics. Ne e heless, se e al co e conce ns ecu h ough- ou : he no ion o e hical pe sonali y and i s dual o di ided na u e, he p oblem o he (logical o li e a y) ‘ o m’ o e hical p oposi ions, and he endu ing cen ali y o igu es such as Kan and Dos oye sky, whose p esence emains cons an despi e dis- ciplina y and hema ic shi s. I is also clea ha Čyže s’kyj did a leas ha e ab oad, o e a ching p ojec , and ha hese w i ings amoun o an a emp a ‘sys ema ic phi- losophy’ (c . Janzen 2008, pp.125–127)— a iew a i med by Zenko ’skij (1950, p.460), and mo e ecen ly by Nikolaj Plo niko , who has pe suasi ely p oposed econs uc - ing Čyže s’kyj’s e o as he ‘d a o aphenomenological e hics’ (Plo niko 2024). Ou aim in his s udy, in his con ex , is o con ibu e o sha pening ou unde - s anding o he na u e and impo o Čyže s’kyj’s p ojec on o malism in e hics by examining mo e p ecisely how his seemingly sca e ed and incomple e in es iga- ions can indeed be unde s ood as a icula ing an o iginal and cohe en posi ion. We ocus on one cen al in ui ion ha appea s o unde lie— o a he o cons i u e he po en ial heo e ical poin o c ys alliza ion o — he en i e p ojec : he c ucial— pe haps e en necessa y— ole o li e a u e in he conc e e p ocess by which mo al, human subjec i i y is cons i u ed o indi idua ed. In his ligh , Iwish speci ically o a gue ha Čyže s’kyj’s w i ings collec i ely ou line a heo y ha , while agmen a y, may jus- i iably be desc ibed as his ‘li e a y an h opology’. Amajo g ound o aking he pe spec i e ou lined in Čyže s’kyj’s w i ings on o malism in e hics se iously as acohe en posi ion is ha i did no exis in a ac- uum, bu clea ly demands o be si ua ed in he discu si e space cons i u ed by e y simila , i much mo e ex ensi e and sys ema ic explo a ions conduc ed by he likes o Mikhail Bakh in, Gyö gy Lukács, and Alexand e Kojè e (c . Tihano 1999, 2000; Jacobs 2023) o , la e , by such hinke s as Jako Goloso ke (Kan iDos oe skij, 1963), Mikhail Li šic (P oblema Dos oe skogo, 2013), and Vale ij Podo oga (Roždenie d ojnika, 2019). All hese au ho s, indeed, ace ab oadly pa allel ajec o y, om ac i ique o Kan , h ough Hegel and Ge man idealism (as well as, mo e o en han no , Neo- Kan ianism and phenomenology), owa ds philosophical an h opology and inally, h ough Dos oye sky, owa ds ali e a y an h opology. The ques ion o he ele ance 1 This a icle is an ex ended e sion o he p o ocol o a alk gi en o he Dos oye sky Soci- e y (‘Rep esen an , Sign, Concep , Symbol’, 1928) and hus comes bo h ch onologically and concep ually be o e he pape on he double. 2 We p o ide he ansla ion o he mo e explici i le o he la e Ge man e sion o 1931. OPEN ACCESS 88 SLOVO A SMYSL 46 and o iginali y o Čyže s’kyj in his ascina ing con ex has ne e been p ope ly add essed,3 and he econs uc ion p oposed he e is mean as a i s s ep owa ds such acompa a i e analysis. Fo wan o space and ime, he aim o his pape will s ic ly consis in econ- s uc ing and leshing ou he basic ou lines o Čyže s’kyj’s li e a y an h opology, wi hou ei he con ex ualising o assessing i s b oade signi icance o his wo k and hough as awhole. I is qui e ob ious, howe e , ha his pa icula ace o episode did play ac ucial ole in Čyže s’kyj’s in ellec ual ansi ion om his ea ly in e es in philosophy o his li e-long ocus on li e a u e (c . Mnich 2021, p.95 ). Much mo e, he li e a y an h opology he de eloped ou o his c i ique o o malism in e hics seems o p o ide an essen ial key o unde s anding he speci ic o ien a ion he ga e owa ds he ques ion o ecep ion in his ma u e app oach o li e a u e i sel (c . ibid., esp. pp.23–50). 1. ‘ON FORMALISM IN ETHICS’: PARADOXES OF KANTIAN ABSTRACTION The s a ing poin o Čyže s’kyj’s heo e ical jou ney owa ds ali e a y an h opol- ogy, b oached in ‘On Fo malism in E hics’, is he pa adoxical na u e o Kan ian e h- ics, which has been widely ecognised— well be o e Čyže s’kyj, by Schille , Fich e, e c.— bo h as ha ing decisi ely con ibu ed o de ining he gene al condi ions o possibili y o a ee mo al human subjec , bu , a he exac same ime, as p ecluding any unde s anding o he p ac ical dimension o ha conc e e mo al subjec ’s in- di idual ac ions. While Čyže s’kyj hus c edi s Kan wi h ha ing o mula ed ‘wi h maximal sha pness he basic p o isions o e hical o malism’ (Čyže s’kyj 1928a, p.197), he also sees his o malism as ha ing c ea ed he condi ions o he con empo- a y c isis o e hical heo y. In ag eemen wi h hinke s such as Max Schele , Geo g Simmel, and Geo ges Gu wi sch— whose own c i iques o o malism he exp essly acknowledges wi hou ho oughly discussing hem—, Čyže s’kyj sees in Kan ’s o malism a ounda ional momen , which no pos -Kan ian philosophy has been able o shake o o e u e (c . Schele 1913, p.405) and whose essen ial p emise, ‘in an unclea and unconscious o m, has been acommon p ope y o almos all e hical heo ies up un il he end o he 19 h cen u y’ (Čyže s’kyj 1928a, p.196). Al hough Čyže s’kyj ne e qui e s a es his in explici e ms, his assump ion is clea ly ha Kan success ully ede ined he en i e possible heo e ical space o any u u e e hics and ha his o malism hus e - ec i ely cons i u es anecessa y basis o any e lec ion on he condi ions o e hical subjec i i y. A he same ime, Čyže s’kyj also acknowledges a a al law a he e y co e o Kan ’s o malis e hics, namely his adical cha ac e iza ion o ‘e hical will as inde- penden o all subjec i e di e ences o empi ical condi ions, as abs ac om any ma e , and he eby abs ac om any objec o desi e o conc e e goal’ (ibid., p.197). By sepa a ing in his dualis ic way he gene al p inciples o mo al ac ion om he condi ions o hei conc e e, speci ic applica ions, in Čyže s’kyj’s iew, Kan ian o - 3 The only aces o such ac i ical app oach a e o be ound in Bi sili (c . Vasil’e a 2008). OPEN ACCESS PATRICK FLACK 89 malism makes i all bu impossible o add ess he eal ques ion o e hics, i.e. he p ac- ical dilemmas aced by he indi idual in he conc e e de e mina ions o his will: E hical ac ion is only possible i one chooses aside: o e use adecision is o wi hd aw om he e hical sphe e in gene al, o o e use gene ally o be an e hical subjec . This means ha he ocus o e hical ac ion as such lies no in he applica ion o gene al p inciples o he will, bu in he e y ac o he de e mina ion o he will in all i s conc e eness and indi iduali y (ibid., p.201).4 Gi en he c ucial ole o Kan ian o malism in ede ining he ounda ions o e hical heo y in gene al, i s own con adic ions hus seem o p eclude he e y possibil- i y o any e hics wha soe e and he e o e o plunge i in o he p o ound c isis diag- nosed by Čyže s’kyj. As he poin s ou , ‘ou own objec ions agains e hical o malism seem, a i s glance, o unde mine he e y possibili y o e hical heo y in gene al’ (ibid., p.202). While he is no alone in a acking he excessi e abs ac ion and dualism o Kan ’s e hics, Čyže s’kyj p oposes away ou o i s pa adoxes ha se s him dis inc ly apa bo h om he a emp s o ‘ eg ound’ o ‘conc e ise’ Kan made by Schille , Fich e, o Hegel, and om he la e u n by Schele o such no ions as ‘ma e ial alues’. Čyže s’kyj, indeed, sees Kan ’s weakness no in he sel -subsump ion o he e hical subjec o gene al, o mal laws ( h ough he ca ego ical impe a i e)— i.e. in he e y essence o o malism as acommi men o he uni e sali y, a ionali y, and necessi y o mo al laws— bu much mo e echnically, in his speci ic concep ion o he indi- idual subjec ’s ela ion o hese no ms. Čyže s’kyj disc e ely alludes o he speci ic na u e o his c i icism o Kan in a elling oo no e on Schele : We belie e ha he c i ique o Kan , gi en in b oad s okes in Max Schele ’s De Fo malismus in de E hik, is in signi ican ways unjus and oo ha sh. The objec o ou own c i ique is no he his o ical Kan , bu only dis inc elemen s o his heo y (ibid., p.209).5 In his na ow sense, Čyže s’kyj iden i ies wo main p oblema ic poin s in Kan ’s cha ac e iza ion o he indi idual subjec ’s ela ion o e hical law. The i s is o alogical na u e. Fo Čyže s’kyj, an essen ial p emise o Kan ’s o - malism consis s in he ecogni ion ha ‘e hical heo y mus in e p e eali y in he same way and along he same pa h as any “ heo y” in gene al’ (ibid., p.196). I i is o 4 ‘В этическом действовании возможно только стать на одну или другую сторону; от- каз же от решения— есть выпадение из этической сферы вообще, есть вообще отказ быть этическим субъектом.— А это значит, что центр тяжести этического действо- вания как такового— не в приложении к воле общих принципов, а в самом факте определения воли во всей её конкретности и индивидуальности.’ T ansla ions by me unless o he wise no ed— P.F. 5 ‘Мы считаем критику этики Канта, данную в широких рамках цитированной книги М.Шелера, в значительной части несправедливой и слишком суровой. Объектом же нашей критики был не исторический Кант, а только отдельные элементы его теории.’ OPEN ACCESS 90 SLOVO A SMYSL 46 be a heo y a all, e hics mus ollow he same ules as any heo e ical knowledge o o mal logic. Fo Kan , acco ding o Čyže s’kyj, his implies ha e hical heo y canno ocus on con ingen ma e ial o empi ical ac s, bu only on hei mos gene al o m, on he ‘necessa y possibili y’ o wha ‘mus happen, e en i i has ne e happened be o e’ (ibid., p.198). Fu he , [i] necessa ily ollows om his ha he s uc u e o e hical ‘p inciples’, ‘no ms’, ‘laws’ is s ic ly he same as he s uc u e o any o he judgmen : he ela ion o an e hical ‘pa icula case’ o he gene al ule, he conc e e de e mina ion o he will wi h espec o he e hical law is he logical ela ion o ‘subsump ion’ (ibid.).6 The ca ego ical impe a i e ep esen s exhibi numbe one o his logical unde - s anding o he indi idual subjec ’s will and ac ions as being subsumed, as neu al o indi e en ins an ia ions, unde ahomogenous, uni e sal law. Indeed, Kan pos- i s ha he e hical maxims o he will ‘mus be chosen in such away ha hey can be alid as gene al laws o na u e’ (quo ed ibid., p.199) and hus display no indi idual speci ici y wha soe e . Acco ding o Čyže s’kyj, i is p ecisely his dogma ic deci- sion o p i ilege he s ic subsump ion o he indi idual unde he gene al as he only possible ela ion be ween he wo ha ul ima ely leads Kan o he ‘s ange con- clusion ha he e hical cha ac e o an ac ion is linked o i s abs ac edness om he conc e e, ha he ounding ai o he mo al wo ld is i s uni o mi y and mono ony’ (ibid., p.200). O cou se, ‘ he undamen al dogma ic assump ion o Kan ’s logic does no appea o be indispu able’ (ibid.), and Čyže s’kyj hus explici ly decla es ha i needs o be ejec ed in o de o sal age he e y possibili y o e hical heo y (ibid., p.202). In con as o Kan , he o e s o ‘ ecognize he possibili y o knowing an indi idual-con- c e e e hical eali y, which a he same ime does no absolu ely ha e o be empi ico- sensible’ (ibid.). In o he wo ds, Čyže s’kyj pos ula es he necessi y o concei ing ano he kind o logical ela ion be ween indi idual eali y and gene al no m han he un enable o m o logical subsump ion, o example in he ollowing way: The applica ion o an ideal is no he subsump ion o apa icula case unde agen- e al ule bu a he ace ain app oxima ion o he maximum possible ealiza ion o he ideal e hical o m as i appea s o us, in all he inexhaus ible complexi y o i s con en and s uc u e (ibid., p.202–203).7 Wi hou elabo a ing his poin any u he , Čyže s’kyj hen u ns o he second un- damen al p oblem he sees in he abs ac edness o Kan ’s o malism, namely i s e- 6 ‘А отсюда следует с необходимостью, что структура этических «принципов, норм», «законов»— совершенно та же самая, что и структура всяких иных суждений; от- ношение этического «частного случая» к общему правилу, конкретного этического определения воли к этическому закону— есть отношение логического «подчинения».’ 7 ‘«Приложение» идеала— не есть подведение частного случая под общее правило, но известное приближение к максимальной возможной реализации предстоящего эти- ческого «облика» во всей неисчерпаемой сложности его содержания и структуры.’ OPEN ACCESS PATRICK FLACK 91 jec ion ‘o he e hical cha ac e o any de e mina ion o he will ha is in any way o ien ed on he subjec i sel , on his enjoymen , sa is ac ion, pleasu e’ (ibid., p.203). Kan ’s own g ound o his ejec ion is, o cou se, his same ini ial commi men o deal only wi h he gene al condi ions o he de e mina ions o he will, in abs ac- ion o i s conc e e, ma e ial si ua ion. Čyže s’kyj’s coun e -a gumen , simila ly, is hus again di ec ed no agains he main pos ula ion o Kan ’s o malism, bu agains he ‘dogma ic’ exclusion o conc e e, indi idual ac o s in he e y p ocess o being o ien ed o de e mined by a o mal, gene al law. As Čyže s’kyj ies o show by con as ing Kan ’s dismissi e a i ude owa ds he ‘hedonis ic’ p inciples o enjoymen , sa is ac ion, and pleasu e wi h Pla o’s, hese p inciples a e no necessa ily ied o he conc e e, ma e ial (i.e. basely biological and libidinal) dimension o he subjec , bu can also be seen as he luid, un eliable e ec s o asubjec ’s wa e ing aims. In o he wo ds, enjoymen , sa is ac ion, pleasu e a e also goal-o ien ed ac ions, ‘ hey g ow ou o se ice’ (ibid.), and could hus po en ially be in eg a ed in o ano he concep ion o o malism ha seeks o g asp no only asub- jec ’s pu e o ien a ion owa ds gene al laws, bu his en i e in en ional in ol emen owa ds hese same e hical p inciples. Fo Čyže s’kyj, p obably ollowing aphenom- enological a gumen in his case (c . Plo niko 2024, p.186), ha in ol emen is no simply acciden al o con ingen , bu happens a an ‘on ological’ le el and in ol es he en i e pe sonali y o he e hical subjec : All he mo e so, he hedonis who has linked he a e o his pleasu e wi h ali ing in- di iduali y, who has allen in lo e, e en i only ca nally, o example Fjodo Pa lo ič Ka amazo , who has allen in lo e egois ically wi h his child, e c., goes beyond he limi s o he hedonis ic wo ld- iew. E e y conc e e elemen o exis ence b ings wi h i he o e coming and disin eg a ion o hedonism. Thus, in his c i icism o hedonism, Kan is comple ely w ong, di ec ing his a acks p ecisely agains he li ing and on o- logically meaning ul elemen s o pleasu e (Čyže s’kyj 1928a, p.207).8 2. ETHICS AND LOGIC In he second ‘chap e ’ o his planned book, ‘E hics and Logic’, Čyže s’kyj u ns his sigh s owa ds add essing he i s o he wo main weaknesses he iden i ied in Kan- ian e hics, namely i s commi men o he abs ac subsump ion o he indi idual unde he gene al (c . Čyže s’kyj 1931a, p.50). In ‘Fo malism in E hics’ Čyže s’kyj’s main ocus had been o c i icise he dogma ic and unsus ainable use o subsump- ion and he only al e na i e o he model o logical subsump ion he pu o wa d, as 8 ‘Тем более выходит из пределов гедонистического мироотношения гедоник, связав- ший судьбу своего наслаждения с живой индивидуальностью, влюбившийся, хотя бы и чисто плотски, Фёдор Павлович Карамазов, эгоистический, но полюбивший своего ребёнка отец и т.п. Всякий конкретный элемент бытия несёт с собою преодо- ление и разложение гедонизма.— Итак, в критике гедонизма сугубо неправ Кант, направляющий удары как раз против живых и онтологически-содержательных эле- ментов наслаждения.’ OPEN ACCESS 92 SLOVO A SMYSL 46 we saw, was he (i sel a he Kan ian) idea o ‘ace ain app oxima ion o he maxi- mum possible ealiza ion’. In ‘E hics and Logic’, he se s ou on adi e en ack, lea - ing al oge he he amewo k o Kan ian philosophy aside o ques ion whe he ‘ he “applica ion” o gene al p inciples o speci ic cases, conside ed om apu ely logical poin o iew, is exhaus ed by he ypes and o ms, which a e adi ionally accep ed in (school!) logic’ (ibid., p.50). His answe , unsu p isingly, is nega i e, leading him o de elop acomple ely di e en concep ion o he logical ela ions be ween he gen- e al and he pa icula . Čyže s’kyj’s e lec ion on he opic, i has o be said, is idiosync a ic. Excep o acouple o quick e e ences o Gessen, Losskij, Webe , Ma bu g Neo-Kan ianism, phenomenology, and his own wo k on logic (ibid., p.53), he chooses no o si ua e his a gumen explici ly in ace ain school o mo emen . He begins ins ead wi h a e y succinc e iew o he impo ance o he heme o he ‘gene al’ (obščee) in he his o y o Wes e n philosophy, which ‘in ace ain sense is e en mo e undamen al, mo e o iginal han, o example, he no o ious “gnoseological” p oblem o he knowledge o he “ex e nal wo ld”’ (ibid., p.51). Ha ing es ablished he ‘o iginal’ impo ance o he p oblem o he gene al, Čyže s’kyj mo es on o he c ux o his a icle, namely ‘ he o ms o gi enness o he gene al’ ( o my dannos i obščego), which he sees no as as ic ly abs ac o concep ual p oblem, bu a he as pe aining mo e la gely and undamen ally o he meaning ul s uc u es o expe ience i sel . As Čyže s’kyj poin s ou : he p oblem o he mul iplici y o o ms o gi enness o he gene al is no exhaus ed by he p oblem o he mul iplici y o aspec s o concep s. The gene al encompasses amuch wide sphe e han ha o abs ac hinking, and has deepe oo s han only in he concep (ibid., p.53).9 Ins ead, E en he mos nai e app oach o being i sel can con ince us ha being is immedi- a ely gi en o us as pe mea ed, in e wined, and in e linked wi h elemen s o he gene al. We do no e en ha e o look o hem, we do no need o ‘ques ion’ being, o i e eals i sel as gene al (ibid.).10 On he basis o his asse ion, Čyže s’kyj p oceeds o dis inguish ou di e en modes o immedia e gi enness o he gene al: epe i ion, concen a ion, conjuga ion, mo emen (ibid., p.56). As he poin s ou : 9 ‘Но ведь проблема многообразия форм данности общего не исчерпывается пробле- мой множественности видов понятия. Общее охватывает более широкую сферу, чем только абстрактное мышление, и коренится глубже, чем только в понятии.’ 10 ‘Уже самый непосредственный, непредвзятый, наивный подход к бытию убеждает нас, что бытие непосредственно предстоит нам пронизанное, оплетённое и связан- ное элементами общего. Их даже не приходится искать, не нужно «вопрошать» бы- тие, ибо оно само раскрывается как общее.’ OPEN ACCESS PATRICK FLACK 93 These ca ego ies do no ake us beyond he bounds o immediacy. They all p o ide us in immedia e, i.e. in undi e en ia ed and un o med being, a ious o ms and ‘s yles’ o he gene al in he indi idual (ibid.).11 Ha ing de ined hese ou gene al modes o gi enness o he gene al, Čyže s’kyj can hen explain wha o m hey ake on conc e ely, a icula ing he eby a ypology ha is no dissimila o ha o Cha les Sande s Pei ce, bo h in i s gene al concep ion o ‘logic’ as essen ially a o mal semio ic and in he speci ic a icula ion i es ablishes be ween he ypes o semio ic unc ions o uni s: The gene al can be gi en ei he as asingle link o he epea ing chain, as apoin o concen a ion o ‘collec ion’, as he cen e o ag oup, o as he o m emb acing ha g oup, o , inally, as amo emen , acons i u ing commonali y. As a esul , we achie e asys em o ou undamen al aspec s o he gi enness o he gene al, which we shall call, in adequa ion wi h hei essence: ep esen a i e, sign, concep , symbol (ibid., p.58).12 The es o he a icle is dedica ed o he de ails o his semio ic ypology, which cons i u es aso o p og ession: while he ep esen a i e cons i u es he mos ab- s ac ela ion be ween he gene al and he singula (by simply epea ing he gen- e al in he singula ), he symbol appea s as aconc e e being ‘exp essing’ ano he be- ing (which can be gene al) in he ullness o i s conc e eness (ibid., p.62). We a e no able, un o una ely, o linge u he on his model, which, as Čyže s’kyj himsel no es, equi es u he de elopmen by adding 4 sub-modes o each main aspec , and wi h which, a he e y ime o w i ing ‘E hics and Logic’, he was al eady ‘no longe sa is ied’ (ibid., p.58). In any case, wha we ha e seen so a is enough o il- lus a e wha Isee as he wo main poin s o Čyže s’kyj’s answe o he abs ac ion o Kan ’s o malism. Fi s ly, on agene al le el, we see ha Čyže s’kyj chooses he somewha su p is- ing pa h o a acking Kan on he echnical e ain o logic: i is nei he Kan ’s con- cep ion o eason (and i s limi s) no o man, much less his deon ology and he o - malism o he ca ego ical impe a i e ha a e he a ge o Čyže s’kyj’s c i ique, bu he a he na ow ques ion o he logical subsump ion o he indi idual unde he gene al. Whe he one wishes o ag ee wi h Čyže s’kyj’s speci ic ypology o no , i is clea ha his is a alid and in e es ing a enue o c i icism, one ha de eloped a app oxima ely he same ime in anumbe o wo ks by o he hinke s (we men ioned 11 ‘Эти категории не выводят нас за границы непосредственности. Все они— в непо- средственности, т.е. в недифференцированном и неоформленном бытии— дают нам в различном виде и «стиле» общее в единичном.’ 12 ‘Общее может быть дано или в одном звене повторяющегося, или как пункт концен- трации, «собирания», как средоточие группы, или как охватывающая группу форма, или, наконец, как движение, конституирующее общность. Таким образом, мы получаем систему четырёх основных видов данности общего, которые мы и назовём— соответственно с их существом: представитель, знак, поня- тие, символ.’ OPEN ACCESS 94 SLOVO A SMYSL 46 he ob ious case o Pei ce, bu one could add he phenomenologis s Husse l and Heidegge , as well as he Neo-Kan ians Cohen and Cassi e ). Secondly, Čyže s’kyj makes adecisi e mo e by u ning away om as a ic, ho- mogenous unde s anding o he subsump ion o he indi idual unde he gene al, p i ileged in he ca ego ies o pu e ep esen a ion, semio ic desc ip ion o concep- ual dis illa ion, owa ds he dynamic, li ing o m o he symbol. The in ima ion o Čyže s’kyj’s ypology, when unde s ood in connec ion wi h his c i icism o Kan , is indeed ha e hical no ms a e ins an ia ed and can be co ec ly unde s ood no as he pu e applica ion o agene al idea o as pu ely applied concep s, bu as conc e e, in ini ely a ying symbols. In o he wo ds, he e hical dimension o he indi idual ac ions o asubjec a e no o be abs ac ed om hei conc e e de e mina ions, bu a e o be seen as being ealized and exp essed symbolically, o in symbolic o m, by he en i e y o he conc e e con ex o he subjec ’s li e and ac i i y. He e again, i is wo h no ing, Čyže s’kyj is no alone in his u n o he symbolic as he locus o he possibili y and ealiza ion o he wo lds o e hics and cul u e in aKan ian pe spec- i e ( he mos e iden poin o e e ence is o cou se Cassi e , c . Mnich 2015). 3. DOSTOYEVSKY’S DOUBLES Ha ing hus ‘ escued’ he e y possibili y o e hical heo y by acing he ou lines o o malism’s escape om he clu ches o logical subsump ion— by demons a ing how he exp ession o gene al e hical laws a ains an inexhaus ible complexi y and a ie y in conc e e, li ing symbolic o ms—, Čyže s’kyj u ns, in he hi d ‘chap e ’ o his book, ‘On he P oblem o The Double’, o ace he second o he wo conund ums he has iden i ied in Kan ’s o malism, namely he dualism i in oduces be ween in- clina ion (Neigung) and du y (P lich ), o mo e gene ally be ween he conc e e de e - mina ions o asubjec ’s will and i s ela ion o he gene al e hical no m. As was he case in ‘E hics and Logic’, Čyže s’kyj’s s a egy is no o y o wo k di ec ly wi hin he amewo k o Kan ’s philosophy ( o example by conside ing his Thi d C i ique o his An h opology), bu a he o a icula e a heo e ical posi ion ha answe s he pa adox i aises while espec ing he gene al p emises o e hical o - malism. Ins ead o de eloping his own heo e ical model, Čyže s’kyj o e s his ime o use he igu e o he double in he wo k o Fyodo Dos oye sky as he basis o his a gumen . While his u n o li e a u e and Dos oye sky migh appea qui e sudden, i is in ac o eshadowed in se e al signi ican ways. In ‘Fo malism in E hics’, o example, Dos oye sky’s Fedo Ka amazo is men ioned as an illus a ion o he ‘on ological’ ( a he han ‘acciden al’ and pu ely ‘empi ical’) dimension o he conc e e elemen s de e mining ape son’s e hical ho izon (Čyže s’kyj 1928a, p.207). In asho au obio- g aphical ex om 1945, Čyže s’kyj e en sugges s ha ‘some o my Dos oye sky-a - icles should be conside ed as p elimina y s udies o my book on o malism in e hics’ (quo ed in Janzen 2008, p.125). As o he u n o li e a u e, i mus be in e p e ed as alogical consequence o Čyže s’kyj’s a gumen in ‘E hics and Logic’: gi en ha e hical no ms mani es hemsel es in indi idual human ac ions in he o m no o abs ac , concep ual judgemen s, bu o complex, li ing symbols, i bea s o eason OPEN ACCESS PATRICK FLACK 101 happened as a esul […]. A he hea o he plo is he e o e Goljadkin’s a emp , ollowing he o al ejec ion o his pe son by o he s, o eplace o he s wi h himsel (Bakh in 1929, p.32). Fa om p o iding acoun e o Čyže s’kyj’s insis ence on he impo ance o he dou- ble and endency on he pa o Dos oye sky’s cha ac e s o mani es schizoph enic inne dialogue, he ob iously Hegelian unde ones o his passage, which sees he Double as an abo ed a emp a dialogical ecogni ion and cons i u ion o he sel , a e p ecisely wha dis inguishes Bakh in om Čyže s’kyj. Fo Čyže s’kyj, indeed, Goljadkin’s schizoph enia and doubling a e no in e - p e ed as a ailing o symp om o his unsuccess ul a emp owa ds aHegelian con- s i u ion o he sel h ough ecogni ion and dialogue, bu as acons i u i e momen in he c ea ion o any mo al subjec . As we ha e seen, some o he s onges o Dos- oye sky’s cha ac e s seem o be cons uc ed almos solely h ough aschizoph enic de-doubling in o o he cha ac e s, and no h ough an ‘in e nalized dialogue’. This is he case mos spec acula ly wi h S a ogin, who seems o in o m he cons uc ion o all he o he cha ac e s in Demons, bu also wi h I an Ka amazo , who engages bo h in ‘ eal’ dialogues, o example wi h his b o he s, bu who also has apowe ul double in he igu e o Sme djako . Again, he e is no ho izon he e o o e coming he schizoph enic spli o he subjec h ough a adical opening o dialogue and po- lyphony. Schizoph enic doubling o Čyže s’kyj is an una oidable momen o i e o passage in he cons i u ion o he e hical subjec bo h in Dos oye sky, and mo e gene ally. Asubjec i i y ha does no go h ough he con on a ion wi h i s semi- ex e io ized sel emains abs ac , and can ha e no claim o be cons i u ed as a ull, in eg al, mo al subjec . This o cou se aises wi h ex eme acui y one u he p oblem, which Bakh in’s polyphony had seemingly add essed: namely ha o he s a us o he wo k o a i sel , and he au ho ’s posi ion is-à- is he wo k.21 I one ejec s he Bakh inian idea ha an au ho can di es himsel o his own posi ion, and le he o he speak in his wo k, hen he wo k i sel mus be conside ed as aschizoph enic ope a ion o exe cise o de-doubling: in his sense, hey a e only abs ac , in ellec ual p oduc s ha do no e eal he ull pe sonali y ei he o hei au ho o o he cha ac e s he has c ea ed. This ac ualiza ion can in e ene only h ough he ‘comple ion’ o he ex in he ac o i s eading: he p oduc i e, mo al ension o he double ha is awo k o li e a u e in ela ion o i s au ho s mus be enli ened and ealized in a ecep i e ho izon by a eade , who will ul ima ely decide and esol e ( o himsel ) he ensions be ween he eal and an as ical, abs ac and conc e e. The main p oblem o o mal- ism in e hics hus appea s o be, and was indeed ea ed as such by Čyže s’kyj, he ques ion o eade - esponse and ecep ion. 21 As belie es Zenkin, ha p oblem is in ac al eady p esen in Bakh in himsel : ‘The p ob- lem o he an as ic in li e a u e, as shown by Dos oe sky’s The Double, lies no only in he e bal economy o a ex bu also, and pe haps p ima ily, in i s ecep i e s uc u e, whe e he “a chi ec onic” o de imposed by he au ho is o e u ned. Bakh in’s me alinguis ic analysis p o es alid in i s essen ials, bu i mus be aken u he —beyond he au ho ial ac i i y— owa d he expe ience o he eade ’ (Zenkin 2021, p.534). OPEN ACCESS 102 SLOVO A SMYSL 46 LITERATURE Bakh in, Mikhail: P oblemy o čes a Dos oe skogo. P iboj, Lening ad 1929. Bakh in, Mikhail: Filoso skaja ės e ika 1920-ch godo . Russkie slo a i, Moscow 2003. Che kaso a, E genia: Dos oe sky and Kan : Dialogues on E hics. Rodopi, Ams e dam 2009. Čyže skij, Dmy o I ano yč: Tju če und die deu sche Roman ik. Zei sch i ü Sla ische Philologie 4, 1927, pp.299–323. Čyže skij, Dmy o I ano yč: O o malizme e ike: Zame ki oso emennom k izise e ičeskoj eo ii. Naučnyje udy Russkogo Na odnogo Uni e si e a 1, 1928a, pp.195–209. Čyže skij, Dmy o I ano yč: ‘P eds a i el’, znak, ponja ie, sim ol (iz knigi o o mal’noj e ike). In: Filoso skoe obščes o P age. Filoso skoe obščes o, P ague, 1928b, pp.20–24. Čyže skij, Dmy o I ano yč: Kp obleme d ojnika: (iz knigi o o malizme e ike). 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Tihano , Galin: The Mas e and he Sla e: Lukács, Bakh in, and he Ideas o Thei Time. Ox o d Uni e si y P ess, Ox o d 2000. Vasil’e a, M.A.: P.M.Bicilli iD.I.Čiže skij: kis o ii odnogo zaočnogo dialoga. Ves nik VGU 5, 2008, no.1, pp.18–24. Zenkin, Se gey: Dos oïe ski, Bax in e le an as ique: No es su le Double. Re ue des é udes sla es 92, 2021, no.3–4, pp.525–534. Zenko skij, Vasilij: Is o ija usskoj iloso ii. YMCA, Pa is 1950. OPEN ACCESS