Did Socrates intend to commit suicide?A rereading of the defense of Socrates in Xenophon's Apology

Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 183-202. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.09 Did Socrates intend to commit suicide? A rereading of the defense of Socrates in Xenophon's Apology ¿Tenía Sócrates la intención de suicidarse? Una relectura de la defensa de Sócrates en la Apología de Jenofonte Louis-André Dorion1 Université de Montréal (Canadá) ORCID: https://orcid.org/ 0000-0001-9443-814X Recibido: 12-06-2024 Aceptado: 10-07-2024 Abstract In recent years, several commentators have argued that Socrates, at the time of his trial, intended to die, and that he therefore used megalêgoria ("boasting") to provoke his judges into condemning him to death. Contrary to this reading of the Apology, I shall endeavor to show that Socrates actually defends himself during his trial, and that the intention behind his choice of megalêgoria is not to provoke his judges into condemning him to death. Keywords: Xenophon, Socrates, Apology of Socrates, Memorabilia, suicide, megalêgoria, trial. Resumen En los últimos años, varios comentaristas han argumentado que Sócrates, en el momento de su juicio, tenía la intención de morir, y que por lo tanto utilizó 1 ([email protected];) Louis-André Dorion is full Professor of ancient philosophy at the Université de Montréal, where he has taught since 1991. His main research interests are dialectics, the theory and practice of refutation (elenchos), the Socratic dialogues of Plato and Xenophon, and the comparative exegesis of Socrates' representations. He has published numerous articles on these subjects, and his main works consist of translations and commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations (Paris, Vrin, 1995), Xenophon's Memorabilia (Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 3 vols., 2000- 2011) and Xenophon's Hiero (Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2021). In 2013 (L'Autre Socrate, Paris, Les Belles Lettres) and 2023 (Etudes socratiques, Paris, Les Belles Lettres), he published collections of his main studies on Socrates. Correspondence address: Université de Montréal, Département de philosophie, Pavillon 2910 Edouard-Montpetit, Montréal, Québec, Canada, H3C 3J7. 184 Louis-André Dorion Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 183-202. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.09 la megalêgoria ("jactancia") para provocar a sus jueces a condenarlo a muerte. En contra de esta lectura de la Apología, me propongo demostrar que Sócrates se defiende a sí mismo durante el proceso, y que la intención de su megalêgoria no es provocar a los jueces para que le condenen a muerte. Palabras-clave: Jenofonte, Sócrates, Apología de Sócrates, Memorabilia, suicidio, megalêgoria, juicio. At the beginning of the Apology, Xenophon states that it is “worth memorializing also how Socrates, on being summoned to trial, deliberated about his defense and about the end of his life (ἄξιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι μεμνῆσθαι καὶ ὡς ἐπειδὴ ἐκλήθη εἰς τὴν δίκην ἐβουλεύσατο περί τε τῆς ἀπολογίας καὶ τῆς τελευτῆς τοῦ βίου)”2. We are now faced with a major paradox: although Xenophon’s stated purpose in the Apology is largely to set out Socrates’ deliberation about his defense and death, it seems, judging by the conflicting interpretations that are put forward regarding Socrates’ intention, that Xenophon did not succeed in clarifying as much as he would have liked the nature of the intention behind Socrates’ defense during his trial. According to recent interpreters3, Socrates deliberately chose to provoke his judges in order to obtain his death sentence. Since Socrates was convinced, even before his trial began, that death was now preferable to life, he chose megalêgoria4 (“boasting”) as an appropriate means5 or instrument to obtain what he wanted from his judges, namely death. For these interpreters, Socrates’ strategy is intentionally suicidal: convinced that death is now preferable to life, Socrates does not take his own life, but his behaviour can nevertheless be described as suicidal insofar as he deliberately provokes his judges to condemn him to death6. In a previous study7, I objected to this reading of the Apology, because this is not, as it seems to me, how we must understand Socrates’ choice of displaying megalêgoria. Allow me to reiterate the essence of my position, as I set it out in 2005. As Socrates has to abandon, due to the intervention of the daimonion, the preparation of his defense in a rhetorical form (cf. Ap. 8), and as he knows full well, moreover, that only the use of rhetoric would allow him to move the judges to pity and to favourably dispose them towards him, there rests only for him an unartificial defense, exalting the ergon of a life that conforms to justice, declaring proudly the virtues and merits that are his own. Megalêgoria, 2 Ap. 1 (tr. Marchant/Henderson). The quotes from the Apology and the Memorabilia all come from the Marchant edition (2013). 3 See especially Danzig 2014 and Johnson 2021. 4 On the nature and function of megalêgoria, cf. below, section 4. 5 Danzig (2014: 155) presents megalêgoria as an “effective means” for obtaining death. 6 Cf. Danzig 2014: 155, 156, 166, 175, 179; Johnson 2021: 110. 7 See Dorion 2005. 185 Did Socrates intend to commit suicide? A rereading of the defense of Socrates in Xenophon's Apology Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 183-202. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.09 then, is not one suicidal tactic among others, to which Socrates has recourse, by way of a cynical calculation, to obtain his condemnation to death, but rather the only mode of defense on which can depend one who has abandoned rhetoric, is wary of the elenchus8 and sincerely believes in the exemplary nature of his life9. In 2014, almost ten years after the publication of my study, G. Danzig devoted a long article to Socrates’ megalêgoria, in the Apology, which consists, for the most part, of a critique, if not a refutation, of my position10. Like several interpreters before him11, Danzig maintains that Socrates’ intention is suicidal. Given that this reading of the Apology seems wrong to me, and that it raises an important methodological problem, I think it useful to respond to Danzig, and to those who subscribe to his position, with new arguments and by criticising certain principles of reading which seem to me to be questionable. 1. The defense of Socrates in the Memorabilia In his recent work on Xenophon’s Socratic writings, D. Johnson devotes a long chapter to the Apology12. One of his main theses, which he abundantly repeats13, is that Socrates does not defend himself in the Apology14. Johnson is obviously referring to §§4 and 8, where Socrates reports that the divinity intervened to prevent him from preparing a defense. The reason for this intervention, as Socrates interprets it, is that the god grants him a timely death, since he will escape the procession of ailments that accompany old age. Encouraged by the god, Socrates gives up defending himself, and the megalêgoria he displays during his trial is, according to Johnson15, a deliberate strategy to provoke and alienate the jury so that he gets what he wants, which is a death sentence. 8 See Bandini & Dorion 2000: CXVIII-CLXXXII. It seems revealing to me that Xenophon’s Socrates, unlike his Platonic false twin, does not call upon the elenchus during his exchange with Meletos during the trial (cf. Ap. 19-21). 9 My interpretation was endorsed by Pontier 2015: 70: “and we agree with the position of Louis- André Dorion, who refuses to consider that the megalêgoria of Socrates is a suicidal strategy intended to annoy the judges.” (my translation) Pontier’s study (2015) consolidates my position by providing an important complement that I will present at the end of the present study. 10 Danzig 2014: 158: “In this paper, I will review Dorion’s interpretation, showing why it is not persuasive, and argue that the speech is indeed a provocation aimed at achieving a death-sentence.” 11 According to several commentators (Lacey 1971: 34; Allen 1980: 35; Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 60-62; Vlastos 1991: 292; Azoulay 2004: 272; Waterfield 2012: 270), Socrates would have used the judicial process to commit suicide. These commentators only comment on the suicidal intention of Xenophon’s Socrates. On the question of whether Plato’s Socrates would also have engaged in suicidal behavior during his trial, see Duff 1983, Peterman 1984, Warren 2001. 12 Cf. 2021: 110-146. 13 Cf. 2021: 117 (bis), 118, 124 (“unapologetic Apology”), 128, 134 (“unapologetic Apology”). 14 Cf. also Johnson 2017: 119. 15 Johnson agrees with Danzig on this. 186 Louis-André Dorion Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 183-202. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.09 Unlike Johnson, I do not believe that Socrates gave up his defense. My first argument comes from an important passage in Book 4 of the Memorabilia: As for his claim that he was forewarned by his divine sign what he ought to do and what not to do, some may think that it must have been a delusion because he was condemned to death. But they should remember two facts. First, that he had already reached such an age that had he not died then, death must have come to him soon after. Second, he escaped the most irksome stage of life and the inevitable diminution of mental powers, and instead won glory by the moral strength revealed in the wonderful honesty and frankness and probity of his defense (τήν τε δίκην πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέστατα καὶ ἐλευθεριώτατα καὶ δικαιότατα εἰπών), and in the equanimity and manliness with which he bore the sentence of death. (4.8.1) The end of the passage, in particular the expression τήν τε δίκην πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέστατα καὶ ἐλευθεριώτατα καὶ δικαιότατα εἰπών, deserves detailed comment. The expression δίκην ... λέγειν, which is attested by many authors16, means “to pronounce a defense”17. Now Socrates, according to Xenophon, not only pronounced a defense, but he defended himself in the truest (ἀληθέστατα), freest (ἐλευθεριώτατα) and fairest (δικαιότατα) way. The last two (ἐλευθεριώτατα καὶ δικαιότατα) of the three adverbs Xenophon uses to qualify the way Socrates defended himself correspond to two of the three virtues that the Pythia, in the Apology (14), attributes to Socrates: no one was freer (ἐλευθεριώτερον), nor more just (δικαιότερον) nor more moderate (σωφρονέστερον) than him. The correspondence between these two texts is probably not accidental, and it suggests that Socrates defended himself in the same way that he distinguished himself in his life. If Socrates’ defense was the truest (ἀληθέστατα), this entails that the megalêgoria he displayed, on the occasion of his trial (cf. Ap. 1), was truthful and justified, i.e. that he attributed to himself qualities and virtues that he actually possessed18. Judging by this passage from the Memorabilia, Xenophon has no doubt that Socrates really did defend himself at his trial. If Socrates took pains to defend himself truthfully, freely and justly, it is clearly impossible to argue that he did not defend himself and that he even deliberately chose to provoke his judges in order to obtain his death sentence. Danzig and Johnson have, however, objected that it is not legitimate to interpret the Apology on the basis of the Memorabilia insofar as the perspective of the Apology is not that of the 16 Cf. Αr. Ran. 776-777 (ἢν δίκην λέγῃ μακράν τις); Isea. 3.22 (ὃς ἔλεγε τὴν δίκην ὑπὲρ τούτου); Isoc. Antid. (XV), 40; 47; Plut. Dem. 12.3; Cic. 26.3; Diog. Laert. 1.84, 1.85, 2.38, etc. 17 Cf. LSJ, s.v. δίκη, IV 2b: “δίκην εἰπεῖν, to plead a cause”. Here are some other translations of τήν τε δίκην πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέστατα καὶ ἐλευθεριώτατα καὶ δικαιότατα εἰπὼν: “by pleading his cause with unparalleled veracity, dignity and integrity” (Waterfield 1990); “in making the most honest, dignified, and scrupulously legal speech in his defence” (Hammond 2023). 18 Cf. Dorion 2005: 127-135. 187 Did Socrates intend to commit suicide? A rereading of the defense of Socrates in Xenophon's Apology Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 183-202. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.09 Memorabilia19. Before addressing this objection, I think it relevant to point out that both Danzig and Johnson20 neglect the reference to Socrates’ defense in Mem. 4.8.1. Danzig quotes this passage only once, which he translates21 as follows: Socrates “displayed his strength of spirit and won repute (eukleian) by speaking with great truthfulness, with the dignity of a free man, and with great justice”22. As can be seen, Danzig does not translate the expression δίκην ... εἰπών, since he isolates εἰπών from δίκην by translating the participle as ‘by speaking’ and omitting to translate δίκην. As a result of this faulty translation, Danzig completely overlooks the most explicit mention of Socrates’ defense delivered at his trial. What is more, immediately after quoting this passage from Mem. 4.8.1, Danzig adds: According to Dorion, this makes it clear that Socrates made a serious defense speach rather than a provocation. However, speaking (sic) with truthfulness, dignity and justice is in fact consistent with deliberate provocation23. Danzig attributes to me the interpretation according to which this passage states that Socrates made a serious defense; however, this is not my interpretation (“According to Dorion”), but Xenophon’s own text, which Danzig misrepresents by reporting that Socrates merely “spoke”24. As to whether Socrates’ defense is a “deliberate provocation”, I will deal with that later25. 2. A question of method: can we read the Apology in the light of the Memorabilia? After this clarification concerning the translation of the expression δίκην ... εἰπών in Mem. 4.8.1, let us come to the objection that I would not be justified in interpreting the Apology in the light of the Memorabilia, on the 19 Cf. Danzig 2014 : 162. Johnson 2021: 114: “But Gabriel Danzig (2014) has well shown that Dorion relies too heavily on the Memorabilia to gloss the Apology, as in the later work Socrates’ desire to die does explicitly motivate his manner of speaking, which is not simply forthright and honest but designed to antagonize the jurors (Apol. 32).” On this criticism of Johnson, see also below, p. 7-8. 20 Johnson often refers to the beginning of Mem. 4.8.1 (cf. 2021: 62, 81, 120, 121), but never to the end of the passage, where Xenophon asserts that Socrates has defended himself in the truest, fairest and most moderate way. 21 Danzig points out at the beginning of his article (2014: 156 n.2) that he has translated all the texts cited in his study. 22 2014: 160 n.12. 23 2014: 160 n.12 (my italics). 24 See also p.182, where Danzig paraphrases Mem. 4.8.1: “He gained glory (eukleia) by the truthful and just manner in which he spoke, a manner befitting a free person.” (my italics) As can be seen, Danzig systematically omits the expression δίκην λέγειν, which means that Socrates has made a defense. 25 See below, section 4. 188 Louis-André Dorion Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 183-202. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.09 grounds that I would thereby ignore the fact that these two texts pursue different aims. This objection raises an important methodological question26, namely whether or not one is entitled to interpret a text by Xenophon by drawing on passages from other works in his corpus. I have long been firmly convinced that Xenophon’s thought is remarkably homogeneous throughout his work, so that it is often useful to compare parallel passages from different works, because one passage can provide a complement that enriches the interpretation of another passage. In my view, then, there is no objection in principle to reading a passage from one work in the light of another27. But what about parallel passages that pursue different objectives? In the case of the Memorabilia and the Apology, I would recall that I myself stressed, before Danzig, that these texts each have their own aim: Si l’on prend en considération les trois textes qui traitent du procès de Socrate (Mém. I 1-2, IV 8 et Apologie), on constate qu’ils ont chacun une perspective qui leur est propre : l’Apologie cherche à justifier la μεγαληγορία de Socrate, Mém. I 1-2 a pour objectif de réfuter les accusations « officielles » de 399 et celles contenues dans le pamphlet de Polycrate, alors que Mém. IV 8 cherche à montrer que Socrate n’a pas été abandonné par la divinité à la veille de son procès. Les trois textes ont donc des visées bien précises qui leur sont propres28. The fact that these texts have different aims does not, in my view, in any way prevent us from supplementing one text with another whenever this is relevant. After all, the subject of these texts remains the same, namely the trial and defense of Socrates, and it cannot be argued that Xenophon wrote three texts on the same subject that would be completely impervious to each other and would therefore have to be read in isolation from each other! But what if these three texts had aims that were not only different, but also divergent, as Danzig maintains29? In that case, I readily admit that it would be a methodological error to interpret one text in the light of another text with a divergent aim. But is this really the case with the Apology and the Memorabilia? This is what Danzig asserts, but we must admit he is satisfied with the assertion and does not achieve its demonstration30. As far as I am concerned, I do not see any 26 Cf. Danzig 2014: 162 n.16: “The use of a parallel text to clarify the meaning of Apology raises an important methodological question.” I agree that this is an important methodological question, but my answer to it is the opposite of Danzig’s. 27 It is precisely because of my deep conviction that Xenophon’s various texts illuminate each other that I often introduce, either as appendices to my translations, or within my studies themselves, tables in which I list parallel passages between these different texts. 28 Bandini & Dorion 2011: 243-244. See also Johnson 2021: 121: “The most obvious difference between the accounts of the trial in the Memorabilia and the Apology is that while the Apology is all about boasting (megalegoria), there is no mention of Socrates’ boasting in the Memorabilia.” 29 Cf. 2014: 181, where Danzig twice uses the expression “divergent aims”. The same expression is also used on the following page (182). 30 In an appendix to his article, entitled “Xenophon’s Apologies for Socrates: two texts, two aims”, 189 Did Socrates intend to commit suicide? A rereading of the defense of Socrates in Xenophon's Apology Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 183-202. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.09 discrepancy between the respective aims of the Memorabilia (1.2, 4.8) and the Apology31, so I see no obstacle to reading one text in the light of the other32. Johnson’s position, as far as the legitimacy of a “cross-reading” of the Apology and the Memorabilia is concerned, is closer to mine than to Danzig’s. Although he agrees with Danzig when the latter criticizes my reading of the Apology in the light of the Memorabilia33, he indeed often stresses, in the long chapter he devotes to the Apology, that the text is fundamentally in agreement (cf. above, n.31) with Mem. 4.8. He also devotes a long paragraph to the methodological problem raised by Danzig in his 2014 article. Because of the interest of this paragraph, I reproduce it here in full: Attentive readers will have noticed that I have used Memorabilia 4.8 to gloss the Apology, thus assuming that the two provide a consistent account of Socrates’ death. Danzig (2014), however, is right to note that there is a danger in using the Memorabilia in this way, as the two passages have different rhetorical goals: while the Apology aims to show that Socrates’ boasting was not foolish, the Memorabilia passage aims to show that Socrates’ execution was not due to divine neglect. I will add that here as elsewhere the Memorabilia is more interested in showing Socrates’ benefit to others than the Apology is. But the passages obviously share much of the same language and thought, and Xenophon’s different rhetorical goals do not reflect any change in his understanding of Socrates34. Danzig analyzes the parallel passages in Mem. 4.8 and the Apology (p.181-187). This analysis shows that the two texts have different aims—but we already knew that!—, not that they are divergent. 31 Johnson is also of the opinion that Socrates’ defense is fundamentally the same in the Memorabilia (4.8) and the Apology, but that the tone is different, which obviously does not mean that the aims of these two texts are divergent. Cf. 2021: 110-111: “I will argue that the Memorabilia account of the trial differs from that in Xenophon’s Apology in tone rather than substance, reflecting Xenophon’s different intent in writing the two works, rather than any substantive change in his view of the trial.” See also p.113: “I will argue below that there is little difference between the substance of the defense of Socrates in the Apology and that in the Memorabilia, though there is a great difference in tone.” Finally, see p.124, where Johnson reaffirms this position. 32 I therefore completely disagree with the conclusion of Danzig’s article (2014: 187): “it would be a mistake to import material from one version to supplement the other. Since Apology focuses on Socrates’ behavior, it would be a mistake to argue that his behavior as portrayed in Apology can be clarified by reference to statements in Memorabilia, where this is not the focus. [...] Similarly, to argue that Socrates’ behavior in court was a serious attempt to win an acquittal because such a conclusion could arguably, if mistakenly, be derived from Memorabilia would be to make the same mistake.” This quotation shows once again the extent to which Danzig misinterprets Mem. 4.8.1 (cf. above, p.5), where Xenophon expressly states that Socrates defended himself (δίκην ... εἰπών) in the truest, freest and fairest manner, not because he was seeking acquittal, but because the god had objected to his uttering a rhetorical defense and the defense he finally uttered—for there is no doubt that he did—was the only one worthy of him. In spite of Danzig, and despite the fact that the Memorabilia and the Apology have different—not divergent—aims, I still believe that Xenophon’s position, as set out in these two texts, is coherent, and that the interpreter of the Apology cannot therefore overlook Mem. 4.8.1. 33 Cf. Johnson 2021: 114 (quoted above, n.19). I will comment on Johnson’s reproach below. 34 2021: 120. 190 Louis-André Dorion Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 183-202. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.09 In short, even if Danzig “is right to note that there is a danger in using the Memorabilia in this way”, i.e. to gloss the Apology, Johnson will nevertheless do so because “the passages [sc. Apology and Mem. 4.8] obviously share much of the same language and thought, and Xenophon’s different rhetorical goals do not reflect any change in his understanding of Socrates”. Let me recall that Danzig is not content with asserting that “the two passages have different rhetorical goals”; indeed, as we have seen, Danzig is in fact arguing that the two texts have “divergent aims”. While he readily acknowledges that the two texts have different rhetorical aims, Johnson would probably not acknowledge that they have divergent aims, since he stresses that the two texts “provide a consistent account of Socrates’ death”. Finally, given that Johnson considers that the two texts “obviously share much of the same language and thought”, and that for this reason he does not refrain from using “Memorabilia 4.8 to gloss the Apology”, why then does he reproach me, following Danzig, for relying “too heavily on the Memorabilia to gloss the Apology”35? Why does he reproach me for doing what he himself allows? Is that not inconsistent? Is it really relying “too heavily” on the Memorabilia to appeal to a single passage in the Memorabilia (4.8.1)—which Danzig and Johnson superbly ignore—where Xenophon reports that Socrates defended himself in the truest, freest and fairest manner? Is it really abusive for me to stress the importance of this passage when dealing with Socrates’ defense in the Apology? If we subscribe to Danzig’s position, the scope of Mem. 4.8.1 is limited to the text of the Memorabilia alone. We can immediately see that this amounts to introducing an unbearable contradiction between the two parallel texts in which Xenophon deals with Socrates’ defense, since he would acknowledge, in the Memorabilia, that Socrates defended himself, whereas he would argue the opposite in the Apology. Personally, I find it hard to believe that Xenophon could have contradicted himself so blatantly between two texts that both deal with the trial of Socrates and between which there are numerous parallels; moreover, there are also passages in the Apology that suggest that Socrates defended himself. That said, even if there is no statement in the Apology as explicit as the one in Mem. 4.8.1 about Socrates’ defense during his trial, the text of the Apology attests that Socrates did not give up defending himself. This is what I shall try to highlight in the next section. 35 2021: 114. 191 Did Socrates intend to commit suicide? A rereading of the defense of Socrates in Xenophon's Apology Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 183-202. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.09 3.Socrates’ defense in the Apology Let us now turn to the Apology and try to shed some light on the way Socrates defends himself at his trial. The first passage to consider is the following: “But Socrates, shouldn’t you be giving some thought to what defense you’re going to make (Οὐκ ἐχρῆν μέντοι σκοπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ὅ τι ἀπολογήσῃ;)?” He said that Socrates at first replied, “Why, don’t I seem to you to have spent my whole life practicing my defense (ἀπολογεῖσθαι μελετῶν διαβεβιωκέναι)?” Then when he asked, “How so?” Socrates said, “Because I’ve lived a life without wrongdoing (οὐδὲν ἄδικον διαγεγένημαι ποιῶν), and that I consider the finest practice for a defense (νομίζω μελέτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀπολογίας).” (Ap. 3) The best way to prepare one’s defense is not to prepare a speech, but to argue that one’s life is free from injustice and unjust acts. It would be a mistake not to take this passage seriously, since Xenophon expresses the same idea on at least two other occasions36, notably in the Oeconomicus: “As a matter of fact,” I said, “I was meaning to ask you, Ischomachus, whether you include in your system the ability to conduct a prosecution or a defense, in case you have to appear in court?” “Why, Socrates,” he answered, “don’t you realize that this is exactly what I am constantly practicing (διατελεῖν μελετῶν)—proving that I wrong no one (ἀπολογεῖσθαι μὲν ὅτι οὐδένα ἀδικῶ) and do all the good I can to many?” (11.22) Like Socrates in the Apology, Ischomachus continually strives to defend himself by not committing any injustice37. The second passage in which Xenophon expresses the same conviction is in Book 4 of the Memorabilia, in the conversation between Socrates and Hippias on the nature of justice: “But I swear you won’t hear unless you first declare your own opinion about the nature of justice; for it’s enough that you mock others, questioning and examining everybody, and never willing to render an account yourself or to state an opinion about anything.” [10] 36 In addition to the parallel passage from Mem. 4.8.4: “I [sc. Hermogenes] told him that he ought to be thinking about his defense (ὡς χρὴ σκοπεῖν ὅ τι ἀπολογήσεται). His first remark was, ‘Don’t you think that I have been preparing for it all my life? (Οὐ γὰρ δοκῶ σοι τοῦτο μελετῶν διαβεβιωκέναι;)’ And when I asked him how, he said that he had been constantly occupied in the consideration of right and wrong and in doing what was right and avoiding what was wrong, which he regarded as the best preparation for a defense (πράττων δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀπεχόμενος, ἥνπερ νομίζοι καλλίστην μελέτην ἀπολογίας εἶναι).” 37 Unlike Danzig (2010: 118 n.10, 248, 254), I see no significant divergence between Socrates’ and Ischomachus’ positions (cf. Dorion 2018: 533-537). 198 Louis-André Dorion Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 183-202. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.09 he draws from this is that this risk must not make him renounce it, for such a renunciation would force him to adopt an attitude that would be unworthy of him. It’s one of two things: either Socrates proudly asserts the excellence of his life, at the risk of displeasing the judges; or he gives up exalting his life and basely begs to prolong it. Even before the trial begins, Socrates is perfectly aware that his megalêgoria could have the effect of upsetting the judges and encouraging them to condemn him to death57; but just because he is aware of this does not mean that he intends to provoke the judges, as Danzig58 and Johnson maintain. These two commentators reason “backwards”: given that Socrates annoyed the judges, he therefore intended to provoke them; and if he provoked them without intending to, then he didn’t know what he was doing59. Paragraph 9 shows precisely the opposite: Socrates was perfectly aware that his speech could provoke the judges, but he had no intention of doing so. It was a risk that he clearly perceived and which he decided to take with full knowledge of the facts, because he considered the alternative, namely to renounce the megalêgoria and beg for an extension of his life, to be unworthy of him. Socrates therefore knew perfectly well what he was doing: if the consequence of the megalêgoria is his death sentence, he will nonetheless choose to die (αἱρήσομαι τελευτᾶν) because it is better to die after having loudly proclaimed the exceptionality of his life, than to remain silent and basely beg for the prolongation of his existence. The choice of death is therefore not, as Danzig and Johnson maintain, an intention that presides over the decision to display his merits and virtues (pace Dorion 2005: 132 = 2013: 309) but by recounting the good things he has gotten from gods and men and the high opinion he has of himself, subjects that seem more appropriate to an effort of provocation than to an honest effort to recount his own just way of life.” Danzig’s distinction between, on the one hand, Socrates’ merits and virtues, and, on the other, the good things he got from gods and men, seems to me to be false and completely artificial, insofar as it is precisely thanks to his merits and virtues that Socrates got good things from gods and men. 57 Danzig (2014: 161) offers the following criticism: “But Dorion denies this connection between the megalêgoria and the preferability of death”. For Danzig, the only possible connection between the megalêgoria and the conviction that death is preferable is that Socrates chose the former in order to realize the latter. Paragraph 9 shows that the link between the two is of a different nature: Socrates chose megalêgoria not to be condemned to death, but rather despite his presentiment that this choice might irritate the judges and prompt them to do so. 58 Curiously enough, Danzig (2014: 166) sees in §9 an “indication of suicidal intention”. I see no such indication. For the expression “suicidal intention”, see also 165 (quoted below, n.59) and 168. 59 After reporting my interpretation, according to which “Socrates can be offensive without meaning to be. That would eliminate the suicidal intention even while acknowledging that the speech was offensive”, Danzig (2014: 165) exclaims: “However, it would make Socrates into an incompetent and foolish speaker, exactly what Xenophon wishes to deny!” In the same vein, see Johnson 2021: 114 (quoted above, 195) — §9 is precisely intended to overcome the objection raised by Danzig and Johnson. Indeed, §9 reveals that Socrates did not intend to provoke the judges by displaying megalêgoria, but that he was aware that his megalêgoria could have this consequence. Is Socrates therefore “an incompetent and foolish speaker”? I don’t think so. On the contrary, it shows that Socrates foresaw exactly what the consequences of his speech might be—so he was not incompetent—and that consideration of these consequences did not make him back down or give up his choice to be megalêgoros, because the alternative before him was unworthy of him and the life he had led. He thus demonstrates nobility, dignity and contempt for death (he is not a “foolish speaker”). 199 Did Socrates intend to commit suicide? A rereading of the defense of Socrates in Xenophon's Apology Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 183-202. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.09 megalêgoria, but an hypothesis that results from consideration of the risks he runs if he does display it60. In other words, Socrates first chooses megalêgoria and then considers the risks that this choice entails for him; the fact that he risks death does not make him renounce the choice of megalêgoria, because the alternative before him—keeping silent about the exemplary nature of his life and basely begging for his life to be extended—is unworthy of him. In short, it is not the intention to die that presides over megalêgoria, but only the desire to exalt the life he has led, at the risk of provoking his judges and incurring a death sentence61. In his long chapter on the Apology62, Johnson mentions §9 only once (p.116), to point out that it would be unworthy of Socrates to beg the judges to grant him the grace to live again. Johnson has therefore failed to grasp the importance of this paragraph, which establishes beyond any doubt that Socrates did not choose megalêgoria as a means of provoking his judges into condemning him to death. Johnson, on the other hand, attaches great importance to §32: Σωκράτης δὲ διὰ τὸ μεγαλύνειν ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ φθόνον ἐπαγόμενος μᾶλλον καταψηφίσασθαι ἑαυτοῦ ἐποίησε τοὺς δικαστάς. And as for Socrates, by magnyfiing himself in court he brought ill will upon himself and thus made his conviction by the jury all the more certain. (Ap. 32) Unlike §9, which he neglects, Johnson often refers to §3263 and sees in it a confirmation of his position64. Johnson’s conclusion from this passage seems to me to be abusive. The fact that Socrates’ self-celebratory speech had the consequence of arousing the jealousy of the judges and inciting them even more (μᾶλλον) to condemn him does not entail that Socrates had this intention from the outset65. For my part, I read §32 in the light of §9, i.e. 60 Before quoting §9, Danzig states that “Socrates affirms his intention of speaking in a way he knows will be fatally offensive” (2014: 166; my italics). In presenting §9 in this way, Danzig misunderstands the deliberative aspect of this passage: far from asserting that he intends to speak in such a way that he will inevitably provoke the judges, Socrates rather envisages the hypothesis that he might irritate the judges (εἰ βαρυνῶ, future deliberative) by displaying megalêgoria, demonstrating that the choice of megalêgoria is prior to and independent of consideration of the consequences of that choice. 61 My analysis of §9 develops this observation by Pontier (2015: 64): “This is a particular form of defense [sc. megalêgoria], which is apt to indispose the judges, which Socrates senses even before the trial (§9).” (my translation) 62 2021: 110-146. 63 Cf. 2021: 39, 115, 118-119. 64 Cf. Johnson 2017: 120: « Xenophon’s Socrates makes no effort to avoid the death penalty, and indeed provokes it through his boasting (Apology 32), but his Apology does not only show Socrates committing suicide by jury. » 65 Immediately after quoting §32, Shero (1927: 109) states: “There is no suggestion of deliberate provocation of the jury.” — The expression διὰ τὸ μεγαλύνειν certainly suggests causality—it was because he delivered his own eulogy that Socrates aroused the jealousy of the judges and incited them to condemn him—but by no means intentionality. In other words, it was the fact of delivering his own 200 Louis-André Dorion Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 183-202. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.09 §32 confirms that the possibility raised in §9, namely that the megalêgoria could have the consequence of annoying the judges, did indeed come true, but that does not entail that Socrates initially had this intention. The mistake in Danzig’s and Johnson’s readings is to attribute to Socrates an intention that seems to correspond to the effect of his speech on the judges: since they were indisposed by Socrates’ speech, and their negative reaction seems justified, Socrates therefore intended to provoke them by displaying his megalêgoria. Moreover, Danzig and Johnson never question the judges’ reaction to Socrates’ megalêgoria, as if they were fully justified in feeling irritated and offended by Socrates’ praise of himself. Now Pontier is right to point out that the jealousy (φθόνος) that the judges feel, according to Ap. 32, turns against them in so far as only fools, according to Mem. 3.9.8, experience jealousy66. By pointing out that Socrates’ self-praise aroused the jealousy of the judges, Xenophon is not implying that Socrates deliberately provoked his judges and that their reaction was fully justified, but is instead trying to draw the reader’s attention to the mediocrity of the judges67. The mistake made by Danzig and Johnson is akin to the paralogism of the false cause (post hoc ergo propter hoc): from the fact that the megalêgoria irritated the judges, they conclude that Socrates had intended from the outset to provoke them by displaying his megalêgoria, and that it was therefore the intentional cause of the judges’ irritation. But the megalêgoria obeys another requirement and another intention: given that the gods have intervened to prevent him from preparing a rhetorical logos, but that he must nevertheless speak during his trial and that he is indeed defending himself, all that remains for Socrates to do is to proudly claim the superiority of his existence, at the risk of provoking his judges and inciting them to condemn him to death. eulogy that indisposed the judges, but this does not imply that Socrates intended to provoke them. Indeed, §9 reveals that Socrates foresaw this consequence, without intending to provoke it. 66 “Considering the nature of envy (Φθόνον δὲ σκοπῶν), he found it to be a kind of pain, not, however, at a friend’s misfortune nor at an enemy’s good fortune, but the envious are those only (ἀλλὰ μόνους ἔφη φθονεῖν) who are annoyed at their friends’ successes. (…) they cannot disregard them in time of trouble but aid them in their misfortune, and yet they are pained to see them prospering. This, however, could not happen to a man of sense but is always the case with fools (τοὺς ἠλιθίους δὲ ἀεὶ πάσχειν αὐτό).” 67 Pontier 2015: 69: “Insofar as jealousy is considered the prerogative of fools, we can infer that the Apology’s narrator openly holds the Apology’s judges to be such.” See also p.71: “Xenophon highlights the limitations of Athenian judicial institutions and the negative reactions of an audience driven by its jealousy and mediocrity.” (my translations) In the same vein, see Pontier 2018: 443. 201 Did Socrates intend to commit suicide? A rereading of the defense of Socrates in Xenophon's Apology Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 183-202. 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