An essay concerning human understanding. V. II
Full text
cdectibiadinss
en
—
tb
Ee
et
«
aoe
-
ee
$2
eg
**
<
SRAM,
aaa
4
*
|
$
SSS
eee
a
SS
EOP
Wes
Siew
ty
=
Human
Underftanding.
Written
by
JOHN
LOCKE,
Gent.
THE
TWENTIETH
EDITION.
:
TO
WHICH
ARE
Now
ADDED,
I.
An
Analyfis
of
Mr.
Locke’s
Do€trine
of
Ideas,
on
a
large
Sheet.
Il.
A
Defence
of
Mr.
Locke’s
Opinion
concerning
Perfonal
Identity,
with
an
Appendix.
HL,
A
Treatife
on
the
Conduét
of
the
Underftanding,
IV.
Some
Thoughts
concerning
Reading
and
Study
for
a
Gentleman,
V.
Elements
of
Natural
Philofophy,
.
VI,
A
New
Method
of
a
Common-Place-Book,
es
EXTRACTED
FROM
THE
AUTHOR'S
WORKS,
———
ee
Le
ane
SENT
VOL.
UM:
EAT,
vaawne
LONDON;
Printed
for
'T,
Longman,
B,
Law
and
Son,
J.
Johnfon,
C.
Dilly,
G.
G,
J.
and
J,
Robinfon,
T,
Cadell,
W.
Richardfon,
W.
Otridge,
J.
Sewell,
F.
and
Cc,
Rivington,
Ogilvy
and
Speare,
S.
Hayes,
Leigh
and
Sotheby,
T.
Payne,
W,
Lowndes,
R.
Faulder,
B,
and
J.
White,
ates
Vernor
and
Hood,
G.and
T.
Wilkie,
Scatcherd
and
Whitaker,
E.
Jefferey,
i
\p’
%
and
Cadell
and
Davies,
sat
1796,
Qeosk
=
2
ee
ee
caenele
amine
dp
coy
ee!
a
en
So
x
De
Se
a
ee
ace
caeoce
an
and
att
RE
ce
at
A
EE
ae
Sn
accent
eee
The
CON
TEN
TS.
4.
Fourthly,
not
demonftra-
tive
knowledge.
.
5.
Fifthly,
fenfitive
know-
ledge,
narrower
than
ei-
_
ther.
6.
Sixthly,
our
knowledge,
therefore,
narrower
than
our
ideas.
4.
How
far
our
knowledge
~«
oreaches..
’
g.
Firlt,
our
knowledge
of
jdentity
and
diverfity,
as
\
far.as
our
ideas.
g.
Secondly,
of
co-exiftence,
a
very
little
way,
ro.
Becaufe
the
connexion
be-
tween
moft
fimple
ideas
is
unknown.
©
11.
Efpecially
of
fecondary
qualities.
-
gz—14.
And
farther,
becaufe
‘all
connexion
between
any
fecondaty
and
primary
qualities
is
undifcovera-
ble..
BiB
15.
Of
repugnancy
to
co-exift,
2°
deepened
16.
Of
the
co-exiftence
of
powers,
a
very
little
way.
17.
Of
fpirits
yet
narrower.
18.
Thirdly,
ofother
relations,
it
is
not
eafy
to
fay
how
far.
Morality
capable
of
©
--
demonftration.
—
1g,
Two
things:
have
made
moral
ideas
thought
in-
capable
of
demonftration.
_
Vheir-complexednefs
and
want
of
fenfible
reprefen-
tations.
20.
Remedies
of
thofe
difficul-
ties.
‘a1.
Fourthly,
of
real
exift-
ence;
we
have
an
intui-
tive
knowledge
of
our
own,
demonttrative
of
God’s,
fenfitive
of
fome
few
other
things.
22.
Our
ignorance
great.
23,
Firft,
one
caufe
of
it,
want
of
ideas,
either
fuch
as
we
have
no
conception
of,
or
fuch
as
particularly
we
have
not.
-
24.
Becaufe
of
their
remote-
nefs,
or,
25.
Becaufe
of
their
minute-
-nefs.
26.
Hence
no
feience
of
bo-
dies.
27.
Much
lefs
of
fpirits.
28,
Secondly,
want
of
a
dif-
coverable
connexion,
be-
tween
ideas
we
have.
29.
Inftances.
30.
Thirdly,,
want
of
tracing
our
ideas.
31-
Extent
in
refpect
of
uni-
verfality.
Ne UU
EEE
RENEE
CHA
P.-
IV.
>
Of
the
reality
of
our
knowledge.
SEC
T.
“1.
Objection,
knowledge
plac-
ed
in
ideas,
may
be
all.
bare
vifion.
2,
3.
Anfwer,
not
fo,
where
ideas
se
with
things.
4
oe
firit,
all
fimple
ideas
Oor79
»
5.
Secondly,
all
complex
ide-
as,
except
of
fubitances.
6.
Hence
the
reality
of
ma-
thematical
knowledge.
_
7.
And
of
moral.
8,
Exiftence
not
required
to
make
it
real,
g.
Nor
will
it
be
lefs
true,
or
certain,
becaufe
moral:
ideas
are
of
our
own
mak-
ing
and
naming.
ro.
Mif-naming
difturbs
not
the
certainty
of
the
know-
ledge.
ay.
Ideas
of
fubftances
have
their
archetypes
without
us.
12.
So
far
as
they
agree
with
thefe,;
fo
far
our
know-
ledge
concerning
them
is
Feale
13.
In
eet
eae
aig
ERT
RS
PE
IES
oo
os
aya
eh,
erecneey
at
er
=
CR
OTRO
AN”
The
CON
TEN
TS:
13.
In
our
inquiries
about
fub-
ftances,
we
muft
confider
ideas,
and
not
confine
our
thoughts
to
names,
or
fpecies
fuppofed
fet
out
by
names.
.,
|
14,15.
Objection
againft
a
change-
ling
being
fomethin~
be-
‘tween
man.
and:
beait
an-
{wered.
16.
Montters,
17.
Words
and
{pecies.
18.
Recapitulation.
CHARM
Of
truth
in
general,
SEC
T.
x.
What
truth
is.
2.
A
right
joining,
or
fepa-
rating
of
figns;
i.e.
ideas
or
words.
3.
Which
make
mental,
or
-_verbal
propofitions.
Mental
propofitions
are
very
hard
to
be
treated
of.
Being
nothing
but
joining,
or
feparating
ideas,
with-
out
words,
==
6.
When
mental
propofitions
_
contain
real
truth,
and
when
verbal,
Objection
againft
verbal
-
>
truth,
that
the
it
may
be
all
chimerical.
|
8.
Anfwered,
real
truth
is
about
ideas
agreeing
to
'
things.
-g.
Falthood
is
the
joining
of
..
Names,
otherwife
than
their
ideas
agree,
General
propofitions
to
be
.
.
treated
of
more
at
large.
11.
Moral
and
metaphyfical
4
5
e
Sy
50.
truth.
tn
C*HvArPin
Vi:
OF
univerfal.
propofitions,
their
truth
and
certainty.
SECT.
4.
1,
Treating
of
words,
necef-
fary
to
knowledge.
z-
General
truths
hardly
to
be
underftood,
but
in
ver-
bal
propofitions.
3.
Certainty
«two-fold,
of
truth,
and
of
knowledge.
4.
No
propofition
can
be
-
known
to
be
true,
where
the
eflence
of
each
f{pecies
-
mentioned,
is
not
known.
§-
This.
more
particularly
.
concerns
fubftances;
‘The
truth
of
few
univerfal
propofitions
conceraing
fubftanices,
is
to
be
known.
4+
Becaufe
co-exiftence
of
ideas
in
few
cafes
is
to
be
known,
8,
9.
Inftance
in
gold,
40.
As
far
as
any-fuch
co-ex-
~
iftence
can
be
known,
fo
far
univerfal
propofitions
may
be
certain,
But
this
will
go
but.a
little
way,
_»
becanfe,
11,
126°
The
qualities,
which
make
;
our.complex
ideas
of
fub-
ftances,
depend
moftly
on
_
external,
remote,
and
un-
perceived
caufes.
13.
Judgment
may
reach
far-
.
ther,
but
that.isnot
know-
_
ledge.
14.
What
is
requifite
for
our
.
knowledge
of
fubftances.
15.
Whilft
our
ideas
of
fub-
ftances
contain
not
their
real
conftitutions,
we
can
~
make
but
few
general,
cer-
tain
propofitions
concern-"
»
ing
them.
16.
Wherein
lies
the
general
certainty
of
propofitions,.
=
CHA
Poi.
Of
maxims,
SEC
Ave
1.
They
are
felf-evident.
2.
Wherein
that
felf-evidence
confifts.
3.
Self-evidence
not
peculiat
.
to
received
axioms.’
4.
Firft
Hit
i
Gn
tr
me
wt
Hl
.
ii
a
H
ai
i}
:
=
>
ee
rs
oe
CEE
‘th
CON
TEN
PS
4.
Firft,
as
to
identity
and
diverfity,
all
propofitions
are
equally
felt-evident.
g.
Secondly,
in
co-exiftences
owe
have
few
felf-evident
_
-propofitions.
.
i
6.
Thirdly,
in
other
relations
we
may
have,
°
4.
Fourthiy,
concerning
feal
exiftence;
we
have
none.
8.
Thefe
axioms
do
not
much
influence
our
othet
know-
Tedge.
vi
.
Becanfe
they
are
not
the
truths
the
firft
known.
x0.
Becaufe
on
them
the
other
parts
of.
our
knowledge
do
not
depend.
rr.
What
ufe
thefe
general
maxims
have.
a2.
Maxims,
if
care
be
not
taken
in
the
ufe‘of
words,
may
prove
contradi¢tions.
13.
Inftance
in
vacuum.
34.
They
prove
not
the
exift-
ence
of
things
without
us.
15.
Their
application
danger-
ous
about
complex
ideas.
-
36—18.
Inftance
in
mari.
rg.
Little
ufe
of
thefe
maxims;
in
proofs,
where
we
have
clear
and
diftinét
ideas.
20.
Their
ufedangerous,where
our
ideas
are
confufed.
i
N
CHAP.
VII.
|
Of
trifling
propofitions.
SEC
T.
1,
Some
pfopofitions
bring
>
no
increafe
to
our
know-
Tedge.
|
25-3.
As;
firth,
identical
prepof--
tions.
.
4.
Secondly,
when
a
part
of
any
complex
idea
is
pre-
dicated
of
the
whole.
g.
AS
part
of
the
definition
-
-
of
the
term
defined.
6.
Inftance,
man
and
palfry.
9.
For
this
teaches
but
the
fignification-of
words.
-
8.
But
no
real
knowledge.
g.
General
propofitions,
con-
cerning
fubftances;
are
often
trifling:
16.
And
why.
.
i1.
Thirdly;
ufing
words
va-
vrioufly,
is
‘trifling
with
them.
pee
“pa
Marks
of
verbal
propofi-
tions:
Firft,
predication
in
abftraét.
reste
13s
Secondly;
a
part
of
the
definition;
|predicated
of
-
any
term,
CoHPAP:
EX.’
OF
out
knowledgé
of
exiftence.
—
SEO'T.
;
r.
General,
certain
propofi-
tions
concétn
not
exift-
ence.
mee
2.33
2,
A
threefold
knowledge
of
~~
exiftence.
A
3.
Ourknowledge
of
our
own
exiftence,
is
intilitive.
GbdeP
uid
2
Of
the
exiftence
of
a
God.
gE
C
Ti
1,
We
are
capable
of
know-
ing
certainly
that
there
is
ae:
God.
:
z.
Man
knows
that
he
him-
felf
iss.
3.
He
knows
alfo,
that
no-
_
thing
cannot
produce
a
being,
therefore
fome-
thing
eternal,
Re
4.
That
eternal
being
mutt
be-moft
powerful.
>
5.
And
moft
knowing.
6.
And
therefore
Gods
~~
7.
Our
idea
of
a
moft
perfect
being,
not
the
fole
proof
of
a
God,
.
.
Something
from
eternity.
ww
gitative
and
incogitative.
.
10,
In-
.
Two
forts
of
beings,
co--
OT
LE
IATL
ETE
LIS
LEN
NET
tere
——
—
The
CONTENTS.
ro.
Incogitative
being
cannot
produce
a
cogitative,
t1,
12.
Therefore
there
has
been
an
eternal
wifdom.
13
Whether
material,
or
no.
14.
Nog
material,
firft,
becaufe
every
particle
of
matter
is
not
cogitative.
15.
Secondly,
‘one
particle
se
of
matter
cannot
be
itative.
.
16,
Thirdly,
a
fyftem
of
in-
cogitative
matter
cannot
be
cogitative.
17,
Whether
in
motion
or
at
reft.
18,
19,
Matter
not
co-eternal
with
an
eternal
mind.
CHA
Pr
x1.
Of
the
knowledge
of
the
exiftence
|
of
other
things.
SEC
T.
fation.
Ze
Inftance,
whitenefs
of
this
‘paper.
3.
This,
though
not
fo
cer-
|
tain
as
demonftration,
yet
ae
be
called
knowledge,
proves
the
exiftence
;
of
‘things
without
us,
&
\
4.
Firft,
becaufe
we
cannot
!
have
them
but
by
the
in-
Jets
of
the
fenfes.
§.
Secondly,
becaufe
an
idea
from
actual
fenfation,
and
another
from
memory,
are
very
diftinet
perceptions.
'
6.
‘Thirdly,
pleafure
or
pain,
\
which
Ge
ompanies
actual
.
fenfation
accompanies
not
|
y-
Is
to
be
had
only
by
fone
|
°
the
returning
of
thofe
—
ideas,
without
the
external
objects.”
4.
Fourthly,
our
fenfes
affift
~
one
another’s
teftimony
of
the
exiftence
of
outward
things,
;
§.
This
certainty
is
as
great
as
our
condition
needs.
g.
But
reaches
no
farther
than
actual
fenfation.
|
19,
Folly
to
expect
demon-
:
ftration
in
every
thing.
11,
Patt
exiftenge
is
known
by
memory.
~32.-The
exiftence
of
{fpirits
not
knowable.
13.
Particular.
propofitions
concerning
exiftence,
are
knowable.
14-
And
general
propofitions
concerning
abftract
ideas,
I
I
SEC
T.
CHAR:
UL.
Of
the
i
serena)
of
our
knawe
ledge.
is
Knowledge
is
not
from
maxims.
2.
(The
occafion
of
that
opi-
nion.)
3-
But
from
the
comparing
clear
and
diftinét
ideas.
he
Dangerous
to
build
upon
precarious
principles,
5.
This
no
certain
way
to
truth.
6.
But
to
compare
clear,
complete
ideas
under
ftea-
dy
names.
"6
The
true
method
of
ad-
vancing
knowledge,
is
by
confidering
our
abftratt
ideas.
§.
By
which,
morality,
alfo,
may
be
made
clearer.
g.
But
knowledge
of
bodies
is
to
be
improved
only
by
experience.
.
10.
This
may
procure
us
cone
venience,
not
f{cience.
11.
We
are
fitted
for
moral
knowledge,
and
natural
improvements,
12.
But
muft
beware
of
hypo-
|
thefes
and
wrong
princi-
ples,
13.
The
13.
The
true
ufe
of
hypothe-
(ER
ES
is
14.
Clear
and
diftiné,
ideas,
"with
fettled
names,
and
the
finding
of
thofe,
which
fhow
-their
agreement
or
_
difagreement,
are
the
ways
_
.
to
enlarge
our
knowledge.
‘15.,Mathematics
an
inftance
of
it.
i:
CH
Act
ins
cab.
Some
other
confiderations
concern-
“ing
our
knowledge.
»
SE
Cl
eases
a3
1.
Our
knowledge
partly
ne-
ceflary,
partly
voluntary.
2.
The
application
volun-
tary;
but
we
know
as
_
things
are,
not
as
.we
pleafes
-
3.
Anflances
in
number,
and
in
natural
religion,
»
CHAP.
XIV.
Of
judgment.
pd
1
BR
Yh,
r.
Ourknowledge
being
fhort,
we
want
fomething
elfe.
2.
What
ufe
to
be
made
of
this
twilight
eftate.
3.
Judgment
{upplies
the
want
s.
of
knowledge.
|
4.
Judgmentis
the
prefuming
things
to
be
fo,
without
perceiving
it,
CHAT.
XV.
Of
probability.
$B
Oe
es
iG
ance,
of
agreement,
upon
fallible
proofs,
ze
2.
It
is
to
fupply
the
want
of
knowledge,
vesile
=
,
;
:
-
Rone
ee
Probability
is
the
appear;
Ther
GONPEN
TTS
|
3.
Being
that,
which
makes
us
prefume
things
to
be
true,
before
we
know
them
_
tobe
fo.
—
4.
The
grounds
of
probability
are
two;
conformity
with
_
Our
OWN
experience,
or
the
teftimony
of
others
experience.
5»
In
this
all
the
arguments,
pro
and
con,
ought
to
be
examined,
before
we
come
to
a
judgment.
6.
They
being
capable
of
great
variety,
_
CA
Pea
KVL
“Of
the
degrees
of
affent,
SE:C
FT.
1.
Our
affent
ought
to
be
regulated
by
the
grounds
_
of
probability,
2.
Thefe
cannot
be
always
actually
in
view,
and
then
we
muft
content
ourfelves
with
the
remembrance,
that
we
once
faw
ground
for
fuch
a
degree
of
affent.
3.
Theill
confequence
of
this,
if
our
former
judgment
were
not
rightly
made.
4.
The
right
ufe
of
it,
is
mutual
charity
and
for-
bearance.
Probability
is
either
of
matter
of
fac,
or
{pecula-
tion,
6.
‘The
concurrent
experience
of
all
other
men
with
ours
produces
affurance
ap-
proaching
to
knowledge.
7-
Unqueitionable
teftimony
and
experience.
for
the
moft
part
produce
confi-
dence,
8.
Fair
teftimony,
and
the
nature
of
the
thing
indif-
ferent,
produces
alfo
con-
’
fident
belief,
5
g.
Ex-
Se
ee
1
Che.
€. Oe
N
BN,
Las:
g.
Experience
and
teftimo-
nies
clafhing,
infinitely
vary
the
degrees
of
pro-
)
bability.
;
10.
Traditional
teftimonies,
)
the
farther
removed,
the
)
les
their
proof,
:
rr.
Yet
hiftory
is
of
great
ufe.
|
32.
Inthings,
which
fenfe
can-
we
not
difcover,
analogy
is
ae
great
rule
of
probabi-
ity.
|
13.
One
cafe,
where
contrary
|
experience
leffens
not
the
teftimony.
,
14-
The
bare
teftimony
of
re-
|
velation
is
the
higheft
cer-
tainty.
CAH
AGP
icedGVdl.
j
Of
reafon.
S“E-C#I,
1.
Various
fignifications
of
~
the
word
reafon.
—
2.
Wherein
reafoning
con-
RS
Nite,
Its
four
parts.
Syllogifm,
not
the
great
inftrument
of
reafon.
—
5.
Helps
little
in
demonftra-
tion,
lefs
in
probability.
6.
Serves
not
to
increafe
our
knowledge,
-but
fence
with
it.
~
4
Other
helps
fhould
be
fought.
8.
We
reafon
about
particu-
;
lars,
gt
ae
Firft,
reafon
fails
us
for
want
of
ideas.
19.
Sécondly,
becaufe
of
ob-
_
{cure
and
imperfeét
ideas.
11.
Thirdly,
for
want
of
in-
termediate
ideas.
12.
Fourthly,
becaufe
of
wrong
principles,
~
13.
Fifthly,
becaufe
of
doubt-
ful
terms,
14
Our
higheft
degree
of
knowledge
is
intuitive,
without
reafoning.
1
:
3
:
EFF
«
.
9
,)
;
&
a
~.
15.
The
ndxt
is
demonftration
Of
faith
and
reafon,
and
their
dif-
SEC
'T
i).
eee
___
by
reafoning.
16.
‘To
fupply
the
narrownefs
of
this,
we
have
nothing
but
judgment’
upon
pro-
bable
reafoning.
Intuition,
dentonftration,
».
judgment.
18.
Confequences
of
words,
and
confequences
of
ideas,
1g.
Hour
forts
of
arguments:
_
firft,
ad
verecundiam.
20.
Secondly,
ad
ignorantiam,
21.
Thirdly,
ad
hominem.
2.
Fourthly,
ad
judicium.
»
23.
Above,
contrary,
and
ac-
.
cording
to-reafon,
24,
Reafon
and
faith
not
op-
pofite.
£7,
.
CH
AP,
XVIL-
tinct
provinces.
,
ts
Neceffary
to
know.
their
boundaries.
2..
Faith
and
reafon
what,
as
contra-diftinguifhed.:
3
No
new
fimple
idea
can
be
conveyed
by
traditional
~
revelation.
ess
4.
Traditional
revelation
may
make:
us
know
propofi-
tions,
knowable’
alfo
by
reafon,
but
not
with
the
fame
certainty
that
reafon
doth.
eo
Revelation
cannot
be
ad-
mitted,
againft
the
clear
evidence
of
reafon.
~~
6.
Traditional
revelation
much
lefs.
7a:
4.
Things
above
reafon,
8.
Or
not
contrary
to
reafon,
if
revealed,
are
matter
of.
faith,
9.
Revelation
in
matters
where
reafon
cannot
judge,
or
but
probably,
ought
to
be
hearkened
to,
5
10.
In
10,
In
matters,
where
reafon
‘can
afford
certain
know-
‘edge,
that
is
to
be
heark-
ened
to.
11.
1f
the
boundaries
be
not
fet
between
faith
and
rea-
fon,
no
enthufiafm,
or
ex-
travagancy
in
religion,
can
be
contraditted.
eae
eee
een
Cc
HAP.
XIX.
Of
enthufiafm.
S$
ECT.
1.
Love
of
truth
neceffary.
2.
A
forwardnefs
to
dictate,
from
whence.
3.
Force
of
enthufiafm.
4»
Reafon
and
revelation.
5.
Rife
of
enthufiafm.
6,
7.
Enthufiafm.
8,9.
Enthofiafm
miftaken
for
feeing
and
feeling.
10.
Enthufiafm,
how
to
be
dif-.
covered.
az.
Enthufiafm
fails
of
evi-
dence,
that
the
propofi-
tion
is
from
God.
12.
estas
of
perfuafion,
no
roof
that
any
propofition
2
from
God,
eee
13.
Light
in
the
mind,
what.
14.
Revelation
muft
be
judged
_
of
by
reafon.
1,
16.
Belief,
no
proof
of
reve-
:
lation.
/
A
CHAP,
XX.
Of
wrong
affent,
or
etrour.
Sasi
Cel
es
3.
Caufes
of
errour,
The
-(C-O
NPN
TES.
2.
Firft,
want
of
proofs.
3.
Obj.
What
fhall
become
of
thofe
who
want
them,
an{fwered.
4.
People
hindered
from
in«
quiry.
5-
Secondly,
want.of
{kill
ta
ufe
them.
—
6.
Thirdly,
want
of
will
to
ufe
them.
4.
Fourthly,
wrong
meafure
,
of
probability
;
whereof,
8—10.
Firft,doubtful
propofitions,
taken
for
principles.
11..
Secondly,
received
hypo-
thefes.
12.
Thirdly,
predominant
paf-
fions.
’
13.
The
means
of
evading
probabilities,
rf,
fuppof-
ed
fallacy.
14.
2dly,
fuppofed
arguments
for
the
contrary.
15.
What
probabilities
deter-
mine
the
affent.
16,
Where
it is
in
our
power
to
fufpend
it.
é
17.
Fourthly,
authority.
18.
Men
not
in
fo
many
er-
rours,
as
is
imagined.
ce
CHAP.
XXL
_Of
the
divifion
of
the
feiences.
Shae
.
1.
Three
forts
2.
Firft,
Phyfica.
b
3.
Secondly,
Praética.
4.
Thirdly,
Enpewrie
5,
This
is
the
firft
divifion
of.
the
objects
of
knowledge.
oF
:
i
4
>
i>
Human
Underftanding,
i
‘BOOK
Il.
CHAP.
VII,
7
Of
Particles.
§.
1.
BESIDES
words
which
are
names
pariiteg
.
of
ideas
in
the
mind,
there
are
conne
2
great
many
others
there
are
made
ufe
of,
eres
ae
to
fignify
the
connexion
that
the
mind
ny
aves
ri
ee
ges
&1Ves
to
ideas,
or
propofitions,
one
with
an-
ther.
?
other.
The
mind,
in
communicating
its
ates
thought
to
others,
does
not
only
need
figns
of
the
ideas
it
has
then
before
it,
but
others
alfo,
to
fhow
or
intia
mate
fome
patticular
action
of
its
own,
at
that
time,
relating
to
thofe
ideas.
This
it
does
feveral
Ways
;
as
is,
and
is
not,
are
the
general
marks
of
the
mind,
affirming
or
denying.
But
befides
affirmation
or
negation,
without
which
there
is
in
words
no
truth
or
falfhood,
the
mind
does,
in
declaring
its
fentiments
to
others,
connect
not
only
the
parts
of
propofitions,
but
whole
fentences
one
to
another,
with
their
feveral
relations
and
dependen-
cies,
to
make
a
coherent
difcourfe.
.
§.
2.
The
words,
whereby
it
fignifies
4,
them
cons
what
connexion
it
gives
ta
the
feveral
affir-
fiftstheart
of
mations
and
negations,
that
it
unites
in
one
well-fpeake
continued
reafoning
or
narration,
are
gene-
‘8
rally
called
particles;
and
it
is
in
the
right
ufe
of
thefe,
that
more
particularly
confifts
the
clearnefs
and
beauty
of
a
good
ftyle.
To
think
well,
it
is
not
enough
that
a
Yoni.
ae
gee
AR
.
ze
;
;
.
En
ee
er
VT
es
a
ee
2
of
Pariicles.
Book
3.
man
has
ideas
clear
and
diftin&
in
his
thoughts,
nor
that
he
obferves
the
agreement
or
difagreement
of
fome
of
them;
but
he
muft
think
in
train,
and
obferve
the
dependence
of
his
thoughts
and
reafonings
upon
one
another.
And
to.
exprefs
well
fuch
methodical
and
rational
thoughts,
he
muft
have
words
to
fhow
what
connexion,
reftriction,
diftinction,
oppofition,
emphafis,
&c.
he
gives
to.
each
re{pective
part
of
his
difcourfe.
To
miftake
in
any
of
thefe,
1s
to
puzzle,
‘inftead
of
in-
forming
his
hearer;
and
therefore
it
is
that
thofe
words
which
are
not
truly..by.themfelves
the
names
of
any
ideas,
are
of
fuch
conftant
and
indifpenfable
ufe
in
lan--
guage,
and
do
much
contribute
to
men’s
well
expreffing
themfelves.
:
They
show
§.
3.
This
part
of
grammar
has
been
per-
wharrelation
Maps.
as
much
neglected,
as
fome
others
the
mind
over-diligently,
cultivated.
It
is
eafy
for
hee
i
its
men
to
write,
one
after
another,
of
cafes
and
thoughts.
genders,
moods
and
tenfes,
gerunds
and
—-
-fupines:
in
thefe,
and
the.like,
there
has
been
great
diligence
ufed
;
and
particles
themfelves,
in
fome
languages,
have
been,
with
great.
fhow
of
exact-
nefs,
ranked
into
their
feveral
orders.
But
though
pre-
pofitions
and
conjunctions,
&c.
are
names
well
known
in
grammar,
and
the
particles
contained
under
them
‘carefully
ranked
into
their
diftinct
fubdivifions;
yet
he
_who
would
fhow
the
right
ufe
of
particles,
and
what
-
fignificancy
and
force
they
have,
muft
take
a
little
more
ains,
enter
into
his
own
thoughts,
and
obferve
nicely
the
feveral
poftures
of
his
mind
in
difcourfing.
§.
4.
Neither
is
it
enough,
for
the
explaining
of
thefe
‘words,
to
render
them,
as
is
ufual
in
dictionaries,
by,
words
of
another
tongue
which
come
neareft
to
theit
fignification:
for
what
is
meant
by
thei
is
commonly
—
as
hard
to
be
underftood
in
one,
as
another
language.
—
They
are
all
marks
of
fome
action,
or
intimation
of
the
—
wind;
and
therefore
to
underftand
them
rightly,
the”
feveral
views,
poftures,
ftands,
turns,
limitations,
an
exceptions,
and
feveral
other
thoughts
of
the
mind,
for
which
we
have
either
none,
or
very
deficient
names,
are
—
diligently
to
be
ftudied:
Of
thefe
there
is
a
great
va-
‘i
rietys
Ch.
7.
Of
Particles,
a
3
riety,
much
exceeding
the
number
of
particles
that
moft)
languages
have
to
exprefs
them
by;
and
therefore
it
is:
hot
to
be
wondered:
that
moft
of
thefe
particles
have
divers,
and
fometimes
almoft
oppofite
fignifications.
In
the
Hebrew
tongue
there
is
a
particle
confifting
of
but
one
fingle
letter,
of
which
there
are
reckoned
up,
as
f
remember,
feventy,
Iam
fure
above
fifty
feveral
figni-
fications.
—
as
aS
AY
aes
§.
5.
But
is
a
particle,
none
more
fa-
miliar
in
our
language
;
and
he
that
fays
it
is
a
difcretive
conjunction,
and
that
it
an-
{wers
fed
in
Latin,
or
mats
in
French,
thinks
he
has
Inftance
iz
But.
oF
fufficiently
explained
it.
But
it
feems
to
me
to
inti-
teate
feveral
relations
the
mind
gives
to
the
feveral
prof
pofitions
or
parts
of
them,
which
it
joins
by
this
mono-
fyllable.
Firft,
“
but
to:
fay
no
more?”
Hére
cit
intimates.
a
{top
of
the
mind
in
the
courfe
it
wa
going,
before
it
came
quite
to
the
end
of
it.
|
Saat
base
Secondly,
‘*
1
faw
but
two
plants
:’?
here
it
fhows,
that
the
mind
limits
the
fenfe
to
what
is
expreffed,
with,
@
negation
of
all
other,
.
nee
)
Thirdly,
*
you
pray;
but
it
is
not
that
God
would.
bring
you
to:the
true
religion,”
Fourthly,
‘but
that
he
would
confirm
you
in
your:
own.”
The
firft
of
thefe
Buts
intimates
a
fuppofition
in
the
mind
of
fomething
otherwife
than
it
fhould
be's.
_the
latter
fthows,
that
the
mind
makes
a
direct
oppofi~
tion
between
that,
and
what
goes
Heforeiiti:
ta
ite
de
Fifthly,
*
all
animals
have
fenfe;
but
a
dog
is
an
animal
:’?
here
it
fignifies
little
more,
but
that
the
latter
Propofition
is
joined
to
the
former,
as:the
minor
of
a
fyllogifm,
ead
i.
est
—
.§..6.
To
thefe,
I
doubt:
not,
might
be
added
a
great.
many
other
fignifications
of
bat
ight:
this
particle,
if
it
were
my
bufinefs
to
exa-
tonchedhere,
-
Mine
it
in
its
full
latitude,
and
confider
it
pris
in
all
the
places
it is
to
be
found
:
which
if
one
fhould
do,
I
doubt,
whether
in
all
thofe
manners
it
is
made
_
ufe
of,
it
would
deferve
the
title
of
difcretive,
which.
_
Srammagians
give
to
it.
But
Lintend
not.
here
a
full
B2
_expli--
a
&
Abfiraét
and
Concrete
Terms.
Book
3-
explication
of
this
fort
of
figns.
The
inftances
I
have:
given
in
this
one,
may
give
occafion
to
reflect
on
their!
ufe-and
force
in
language,
and
lead
us:
into
the
cOntem-
plation
of
feveral
actions
of
our
minds
in
difcourfing,
which
it
has
found:a
way
to
intimate
to
others
by
thefe’
particles
;
fome
whereof
conftantly,
and:others
in
cer-
tain
conftructions,
have
the:
fenfe
of
a
whole
fentence:
contained
in
them.
caf
an
--€
HAP
VIL
Bou
Se
pars
Of
Abfiratl
and
Concrete
Terms:
nae
Sere
l
‘HE
ordinary
words
of
language,
teimb
ROE:
.
,d&
and
our
common:
ufe
of
them,
predicable
would
have
given
us
light
into
the
nature
of
one.ob
aa:
-our
ideas;
if
they
had
been
but
confidered
pee
swith:
attention:
“Lhe
mind,
as
has:
beer
fhown,
has
a
power.to
abftract
its
ideas,
and
fo
they
become:effences,
general:
eflences,
whereby
the
forts
of
things
are
diftinguithed.
Now
each
ab~
{tract
idea
being
diftinct,
fo
that
of
any
two
the
one
can
never
be
the
other,
the.
mind
will,
by!
its
intuitive
knowledge;
perceive
their
difference;
and
therefore
in
propofitions
no
two
whole
ideas
can
ever
be
affirmed
one
of
another.
‘This
we
fee
inthe
common
ufe
of
language,
which
permits:not
any
two
abftract
words,
or
names
of
abftract
ideas,
to
be
affirmed
one
of
another.
For
how
nearof
kin-foever-they
may
feem
to
be,
and
how
certain,
foever
it
is,
that
man
isan
animal,
or
rational,
or
white,
;
yet
every
oneat
firft
hearing’
perceives:
the
falfhood
of
4
thefé
propofitions
;
humanity
is
animality,
or
rationa~
—
;
lity,
or.
whitenets
and
this
is
as
evident,
as
any
of
the
Lo
ibeeatimreats
All
our
affirmations
then
are
_
only
inconcrete,
which
is
the
affirming,
not
one
abftract
dea
to
be
another,
but
one
abftract
idea
to
be
joined
to”
~
another;
which
abftract
ideas,
in
fubftances,
may
be‘ol
©
‘any
fort;
inall
the
reft,
are
little
elfe
but
of
relations
+
SRE
:
an
Ch,
8.
Abfira®
and
Concrete
Terms,
is
and
in
fubftances,
the
moft
frequent
are
of
powers
;
V.
§+
“a
man
is.
white,”
fignifies,
that
the
thing
that
thas
the
effence
of
a
man,
‘has
alfo
in
it
the
effence
of
Wwhitenefs,
which
is
nothing
but-a
power
to
produce
the
idea
of
whitenefg
jn
one,
awhoke
eyes
can
difcover
ordi_
mary
objects;
or
©
aumam
is
rational,’’
fignifies
that
the
fame
thing
that
hath
the
effence
of
a.man,
hath
alfo
in
it
the
effence
of
rationality,
i.e.
a
power
of
reafoning,
.
§.
2.
This
diftinction
of
names
fhows
us
"They
tho
alfo
the
difference
of
our
ideas:
sfor
if
we
eG.
‘obferve
them,
we
thal]
find
that
our
fimple
of
our
ideas,
ideas
have
all
abftraa,
as
well
as
concrete
_
oes
names;
the
one
whereof
jg
(to
{peak
the
language
of
grammarians)
a
fubftantive;
the
other
an
adjective;
as
whitenefs,
white,
fweetnefs,
fweet.
The
like
alfo
holds
in
our
ideas
of
modes
and
relations
;
as
juftice,
juft
;
quality,
equal
;
‘only
with
this
difference,
that
fome
of
the
concrete
names.
of
rélations,
among{t
men
chiefly,
are
fubftantives;
as
Paternitas,
pater;
whereof
it
were
aly
to
render
a
-reafon,
But
as
to
our
ideas
of
fub-
ftances,
we
have
very
few
or
no-abftra&
names
at
all.
For
though
the
{chools
have
introduced
animalitas,
hu-
manitas,
corporietas,
and
fome
‘others
;
yet
they
hold
no.
Proportion
with
that
infinite
number
of
names
of
fub-
ftances,
to
which
they
never
were
ridiculous
enough
fo
‘attempt
the
coining
of
abftrac
ones:
and
thofe
few
that
..
the
fchools
forged,
and
put
ito
the
mouths
of
their
_
Scholars,
could
never
yet
get
admittance
into
common
ufe,
or
obtain
the
licence
ot
public
approbation.
Which
wvcms
tome
at
Jeaft
to
intimate
the
confeffion
of
-all
anankind,
that
they
have
no
ideas
of
the
teal
effences
of
ubftances,
fince
they
have
not
names
for
fuch
ideas:
h
no
doubt
they
would
have
had,
had
not
their
Ives
of
their
ignorance
of
them
kept
them
from
fo
idle
an
attempt.
And
therefore
though
they
had
ideas
enough
to
diftinguith.
gold
from
a
ftone,
and
metal
from.
wood
;
yet
they
but
timoroufly
ventured
on
fuch
terms,
as
aurietas
and
faxictas,
metal=
Hetas
and
lignietas,
or
the
like
names,
which
fhould
Pretend
to
fignify
the
real
effences
of
thofe
fubftances,
whereof
they
knew
they
had
nosideas.
And
indeed
it
|
|
Br3.2
=
was
t
| |
mae
5
|
»
Imperfettion
of
Words.
Book
3.
was
only
the
doctrine
of
fubftantial
forms,
and
the
con-
fidence
of
miftaken
pretenders
to
a
knowledge
that
they
“Had
not,
which
firft
coined,
and
then
introduced
ani-
-Ynalitas,
and
humanitas,
and
the
like;
which
yet
went
very
little
farther
than
their
own
fchools,
and
could
never
get
to
be
current
amongit
underftanding
men.
Indeed,’
‘umanitas
was
a
word
familiar
amongft
the
Romans,
but
in
a
far
different
fenfe,
and
ftood
not
for
the
abftract
effence
of
any
fubftance
;
but
was
the
abftracted
name
of
4
mode,
and
its
concrete
humanus,
not
homo.
,
Of
the
Imperfettion
of
Words.
Words
are”
§.
1.6.
JZ.ROM
what
has
been
faid
in
the
Ords.
are
Ps”
mre
Higee:
adapted
'.
&
foregoing
chapters,
it
is
eafy
to
cording
and
perceive
what
imperfection
there
is
in
lan-
_,commugicat-
guage,
and
how
the
very
nature
of
words
Tpaphts
makes
it
almoft
unavoidable
for
many
of
~°
"them
to
be
doubtful
and
uncertain
in
their
-
fignifications..
To
examine
the
perfection
or
imperfec-
tion
of
words,
it
is
neceffary
firft
to
confider
their
ufe
and
end:
for
as
they
are
more
or
lefs
fitted
to
attain
that,
fo
they
are
more
or
lefs
perfect.
We
have,
in
the
former
part
of
this
difcourfe,
often
upon
occafion
men-
tioned
a
double
ufe
of
words.
_.
Firft,
one
for
the
recording
of
our
own
thoughts.
|
~
Secondly,
the
other
for
the
communicating
of
our:
thoughts
to
others.
gts
.
es
§.
2.
As
to
the
firft
of
thefe,
for
the
re-
SHilferefor
cording
our
own
thoughts
for
the
help
of
recording.
our
own
memories,
whereby,
as
it
were,
we
talk
to
ourfelves,
any
words
will
ferve
the
|
turn.
For
fince
founds
are
voluntary
and
indifferent
figns
of
any
ideas,
a
man
may
ufe
what
words
he
pleafes,
—
to
fignify
his
own
ideas
to
himfelf:
and
there
will
be
no
imperfection
in
them,
if
he
conftantly:ufe
the
7
;
ign
Ch.
92:
ImperfeBion
of
Words.
|
a
,
fign
for
the
fame
idea
;
for
then
he
cannot
fail
of
having.
‘his
meaning
underftood,
wherein
confifts
the
right
ufe
and
perfection
of
lancuage.
|
§.
3.
Secondly,
as
to
communication
of
Cations
words,
that
too
has
a
double
ufe.
cation
by
~
ees
FP
sh
g3
esr
abe
sy
ote
#ei.
7
.
:
:
or
philofo.
Il.
Philofophical.
plied
ie
As
Firft,
by
their
civil
ufe,
I
mean
fuch
a
.
communication
of
thoughts
and
ideas
by
words,
as
may
ferve
for
the
upholding
common
cénverfation
and
com~
merce,
about
the
ordinary
affairs
and
conveniencies
of
civil
life,
in
the
focieties
of
men’one
amoneft
another.
_
Secondly,
by
the
Philofophical
ufe
of
words,
J
mean
fuch
an
ufe
of
them,
as
may
ferve
to
convey
the
precife
Notions
of
things,
and
to
exprefs,
in
general
propofi-
:
‘tions,
certain
and
undoubted
truths,
which
the
mind
may
reft
upon,
and
be
fatisfied
with,
in
its
fearch
after
true
knowledge.
Thefe
two
ufes
are
very
diftinét
;
and
4
great
deal
lefs
exadtnefs
will
ferve
in
the
one
than
in
the
other,
as
we
fhall
fee
in
what
follows.
eRe
§.
4.
The
chief
end
of
language
in
com-
munication
being
to
be
underftood,
words
sean
a
ferve
not
well
for
that
end,
neither
in
civil
words
is
the
nor
philofophical
difcourfe,
when
any
word
i
ae
does
not
excite
in
the
hearer
the
fame
idea
fon,
So
~
fication,
©
Which
it
ftands
for
in
the
mind
Ofy.thisrics
«
.
{peaker.
Now
fince
founds
have
no
‘natural
connexion
with,
our
ideas,
but
have
all
their
fignification
from
the
arbitrary
impofition
of
men,
the
doubtfulnefs
and
uncertainty
of
their
fignification,
which
is
the
imperfec-
tion
we
here
are
{peaking
of,
has
its
caufe
mare
in
the
ideas
they
ftand
for,
than
in
any
incapacity
there
is
in
one
found
more
than
in
another,
to
fignify
any
idea:
for
in
that
regard
they
are
all
equally
perfect,
|
hat
then
which
makes
doubtfulnefs
and
uncertainty
in
the
fignification
of
fome
more
than
‘other
words,
is
the
difference
of
ideas
they
ftand
for.
{ars
§.
5.
Words
having
naturally
no
fignifica-
Giaati
tion,
the
idea
which
each
ftands
for
mutt
be
erent
learned
and
retained
by
thofe
who
would
fe&ion,
exchange
thoughts,
and
hold
intelligible
Px
dite
_
ee
The
SR
GLE
Pa
a
Ww
So
hate
A
od
ol
oe
id
Se
EA
e
Imperfection
of
Words.
Book
3:
difcourfe
with
others:
in
any
language.
But
this
is
hardeft
to
be
done,
where,
;
~“Firft,
the
ideas
they
ftand
for
are
very
complex,
and
made
up
of
a
great
number
of
ideas
put
together.
we
Secondly,
where
the
ideas
they
ftand
for
have
no
cer-
tain
connexion
in
nature;
and
fo
no
fettled
ftandard,
,
any
where
in
nature
exifting,
to
rectify
and
adjuft
them.
by.
;
'
Thirdly,
when
the
fignification
of
the
word
is
refer-
red
to
a
ftandard,
which
ftandard
is
not
eafy
to
be
known.
$i:
:
Fourthly,
where
the
fignification
of
the
word,
and
the
real
eflence
of
the
thing,
are
not
exactly
the
fame.
*
'Thefe
are
difficulties
that
attend
the
fignification
of
feveral
words
that
are
intelligible.
Thofe
which
are
not
intelligible
at
all,
fuch
as
names
ftanding
for
any
fimple
ideas,
which
another
has
not
organs
or
faculties
to
attain;
as
the
names
of
colours
to
a
blind
man,
or
founds
to
a
deaf
man;
need
not
here
be
mentioned.
~
Tn
all
thefe
cafes
we
fhall
find
an
imperfection
in
words,
which
I
fhall
more
at
large
explain,
in
their
articular
application
to
our
feveral
forts
of
ideas:
for
“if
we
examine
them,
we
fhall
find
that
the
names
of
—
mixed
modes
are
moft
liable
to
doubtfulnefs
and
im-
perfection,
for
the
two
firft
of
thefe
reafons;
and
the
names
of
fubftances
chiefly
for
the’two
latter.
—
The
names
§.
6.
Firft
the
names
of
mixed
modes
are
ofmixed
many
of
them
liable
to
great
uncertainty”
i
and
obfcurity
in
their
fignification.
Gecauie
the
I.
Becaufe
of
that
great
compofition
thefe
ideasthey
complex
ideas
are
often
made
up
of.
‘lo
sear
tate
are
make
words
ferviceable
to
the
end
of
com-
pieX+
munication,
it
is
neceflary
(as
has
been
faid)
that
they
excite
in
the
hearer
exactly
the
fame
idea
they
ftand
for
in
the
m@d
of
the
fpeaker.
Without
this,
men
fill
one
another’s
heads
with
noife
and
founds
;
but
convey
not
thereby
their
thoughts,
and
lay
not
before
one
another
their
ideas,
which
is
the
end
of
difcourfeé
and
language.
But
when
a
word
ftands
for
a
very
com-.
plex
idea
that
is
compounded
and
decompounded,
it
is.
not
eafy
for
men
to
form
and
retain
that
idea
fo
exactly,
as
ee
Ch.-9.
Imperfection
of
Words.
9
as.to
make
the
name
in
common
ufe
ftand
for
the
fame
precife
idea,
without
any
the
leaft
variation.
Hence
it
comes
to
pafs,.that
men’s
names
of.
very
compound
ideas,
fuch
as
for
the
moft
part
are
moral
words,
have
feldom,
in
two
different
men,
the
fame
precife
fignifi-
cation;
fince
one
man’s
complex
idea’
feldom
agrees
with
another’s,
and
often
differs
from
his
own,
from
that
which
he
had
yefterday,
or
will
have
to-morrow.
§.
7.
II.
Becaufe
the
names
of
mixed
Secondly,
modes,
for
the
moft
part,
want
ftandards
in
_
becaufe
they
nature,
whereby
men
may
rectify
and
adjuft
have
no
ftane
their
fignifications
;
therefore
they
are
very
9#t4%
various
and
doubtful.
They
are
affemblages
of
ideas
put
together
at
the
pleafure
of
the
mind,
purfuing
its
own
ends
of
difcourfe,
and
fuited
to
its
own
notions
;
whereby
it
defigns
not
to
copy
any
thing
really
exifting,
but
to
denominate
and
rank
things,
as
they
come
to
agree
with
thofe
archetypés
or
forms
it
has
made.
He
that
firft
brought
the
word
fham,
or
wheedle,
or
banter,
-
in
ufe,
put
together,
as
he
thought
fit,
thofe
ideas
he
made
it
ftand
for:
and
as
it
is
with
any
new
names
of
modes,
that
are
now
brought
into
any
language;
fo
it
was
with
the
old
ones,
when
they
were
firft
made
ufe
of.
Names
therefore
that
ftand
for
collections
of
ideas
which
the
mind
makes
at
pleafure,
muft
needs
be
of
doubtful
fignification,
when
fuch
collections
are
no
where
to
be
found
conftantly
united
in
nature,
nor
any
patterns
to
be
fhown
whereby
men
may
adjuft
them.
What
the
word
murder,
or
facrilege,
&c.
fignifies,
cain
never
be
known
from
things
themfelves:
there
be
many
of
the
parts
of
thofe
complex
ideas,
which
are
not
vifi-
ble
in
the
action
itfelf;
the
intention
of
the
mind,
or
the
relation
of
holy
things,
which
make
a
part
of
mur-
‘Mer
or
facrilege,
have
no
neceffary
connexion
with
the
outward
and
vifible
action
of
him
that
commits
either
:
and
the
pulling
the
trigger
of
the
gun,
with
which
the
murder
is
committed,
and
is
all
the
action
that
perhaps
is
vifible,
has
no
natural
connexion
with
thofe
other
ideas
that
make
up
the
complex
one,
named
murder.
‘They
have
their
union
and
combination
only
from
the
underftanding,
which
unites
them
under
one
name
:
but
2
uniting
ae
Sonam
8
f2
'
—
Amperfection
of
Words.
Book
3.
uniting
them
without
any
rule
or
pattern,
it
cannot
be
but
that
the
fignification
of
the
name
that
ftands
for
fuch
voluntary
collections
fhould
be
often
various’
in
the
minds
of
different
men,
who
have
fcarce
any
ftanding
rule
to
regulate
themfelves
and
their
notions
by,
in
fuch
arbitrary
ideas.
~
Ma
he
§.
8.
It
is
true,
common
ufe,
that
is
the
pds
ee
rule
of
propriety,
may
be
fuppofed
here
to
semedy.
afford
fome
aid,
to
fettle
the
fignification
of
"language
;
and
it
cannot
be
denied,
but
that
in
fome
meafure
it
does.
Common
ufe
regulates
the
meaning
of
words
pretty
well
for
common
converfation;
but
no-body
having
an
authority
to
eftablifh
the
precife
fignification
of
words,
nor
determined
to
what
ideas
any
one
fhall
annex
them,
common
ufe
is
not
fufficient
to
adjuft
them
to
philofophical
difcourfes;
there
being
fearce
any
name
of
any
very
complex
idea
(to
fay
nothing
of
others)
which
in
common
ufe
has
not
a
great
latitude,
_and
which
keeping
within
the
bounds
of
propriety,
may
not
be
made
the
fign
of
far
different
ideas.
Befides,
the
rule
and
meafure
of
propriety
itfelf
being
no
where
eftablifhed,
it
is
often
matter
of
difpute
whether
this
or:
that
way
of
ufing
a
word
be
propriety
of
{peech
or
no.
From
all
which
it
is
evident,
that
the
names
of
fuch
kind
of
very
complex
ideas
are
naturally
liable
to
this
imper-
fection,
to
be
of
doubrful
and
uncertain
fignification
;
and
even
in
men
that
have
a
mind
to
underftand
one
another,
do
not
always
ftand
for
the
fame
idea
in
fpeaker
and
hearer.
Though
the
names
glory
and
gratitude
be
the
fame
in
every
man’s
mouth
through
a
whole
country,
yet
the
complex
collective
idea,
which
every
one
thinks
on,
or
intends
by
that
name,
is
apparently
very
different.
in
men
ufing
the
fame
language.
.
The
way
of
9
S'
9:
Lhe
way
alfo
wherein
the
names
of
ieatilag:
mixed
modes
are
ordinarily
learned,
does
thefe
names
not
a
little
contribute
to
the
doubtfutnefs
of
conttibites
.
their
fignification.
For
if
we
will
obferve
abana
how
children
learn
languages,
we
fhall
find
that
to
make
them
underftand
what
the
—
names
of
fimple
ideas,
or
fubftances,
ftand
for,
people
—
ordinarily
fhow them
the
thing,
whereof
they
would
eS
I
have
Ch.
9,
ImperfeTion
of
Words.
rf
have
them
have
the
idea;
and
then
repeat
to
them
the
name
that
ftands
for
it,
as
white,
fweet,
milk,
fugar,
cat,
dog.
But
as
for
mixed
modes,
efpecially
the
moft
material
of.
them,
moral
words,
the
founds
are
ufually
learned
firft;
and
then
to
know
what
complex
ideas
they
ftand
for,
they
are
either
beholden
to
the
explica-
tion
of
others,
or
(which
happens
for
the
moft
part)
are
left
to
their
own
obfervation
and
induftry
;
which
being
little
laid
out
in
the
fearch
of
the
true
and
precife
mean-
ing
of
names,
thefe
moral
words
are
in
moft
men’s
mouths
little
more
than
bare
founds
;
or
when
they
have
any,
it
is
for
the
moft
part
but
a
very
loofe
and
unde-
termined,
and
‘confequently
obfcure
and
confufed
figni-
fication.
And
even
thofe
themfelves,
who
have
with
more
attention
fettled
their
notions,
do
yet
hardly
avoid
the
mconvenience,
to
have
them
ftand
for
complex
—
ideas,
different
from
thofe
which
other,
even
intelligent
and
ftudious
men,
make
them
the
figns
of.
Where
thal
one
find
any,
either
controverfial
debate,
or
familiar
©
difcourfe,
concerning
honour,
:
faith,
grace,
religion,
church,
&c.
wherein
it
is
not
eafy
to
obferve
the
diffe~
rent
notions
men
have
of
them?
which
is
nothing
but
this,
that
they
are
not
agreed
in
the
fignification
of
thofe
words,
nor
have
in
their
minds
the
fame
complex
ideas
which
they
make
them
ftand
for:
and
fo
all
the
contefts
that
follow
thereupon,
are
only
about
the
meaning
of
a
found.
And
hence
we
fee,
that
in
the
interpretation
of
laws,
whether
divine
or
human,
there
is
no
end;,
comments
beget
comments,
and
explications
make
new
matter
for
explications
;
and
of
limiting,
diftinguifhing,
varying
the
fignification
of
thefe
moral
words,
there
is
noend.
Thefe
ideas
of
men’s
making
are,
by
men
ftill
having
the
fame
power,
multiplied
in
infinitum.
Many
aman
who
was
pretty
well
fatisfied
of
the
meaning
of
a
text
of
{cripture,
or
claufe
in
the
code
at
firft
reading,
has
by
confulting
commentators
quite
loft
the
fenfe
of
it,
and
by
thefe
elucidations
given
rife
or
increafe
to
his
doubts,
and
drawn
obf{curity
upon
the
place.
I
fay
not
this,
that
I
think
commentaries
needlefs;
but
to
fhow
how
uncertain
the
names
of
mixed
modes
naturally
are,
even
in
the
mouths
of
thofe
who
had
both
the
aed
an
Inperfe
ion
of
Words.
Book
4,
and
the
faculty
of
{peaking
as
clearly
as
language
was
capable
to
exprefs
their
thoughts.
|
Hence
una
—-,
&
10
What
obfcurity
this.
has
unavoid-
xoidable.ob-
ably
brought
upon
the
writings
of
men,
whe
fcurityinan-
have
lived
in
remote
ages
and
different
pe
ae
countries,
it
will
be
needle{s
to
take
notices
OTS
fince
the
numerous
volumes
of
Jearned
men,
employing
their
thoughts
that
way,
are
proofs
more
than
enough
to
fhow
what
attention,
ftudy,
fagacity,
and
reafoning
are
required,
to
find
out
the
true
meaning
of
ancient
authors.
But
there
being
no
writings
we
have
any
great
concernment
to
be
very
folicitous
gbout
the
meaning
of,
but
thofe
that
contain
either
truths
we
are
required
to
believe,
or
laws
we
are
to
obey,
and
draw
imconyeniencies
on
us
when
we
miftake
or
tranfgrefs,
we
may
be
lefs
anxious
about
the
fenfe
of
other
authors
;
who
writing
but
their
own
opinions,
we
are
under
ne
greater
neceffity
to
know
them,
than
they
to
know
ours,
Our
good
or
evil
depending
not
on
their
decrees,
we
may
fafely
be
ignorant
of
their
notions:
and
therefore,
in
the
reading
of
them,
if
they
do
not
ufe
their
words
with
a
due
clearnefs
and
perfpicuity,
we
may
lay
them
-
afide,
and,
without
any
injury
done
them,
gefolve
thus
with
ourfelves,
-
=
;
**
Si
non
vis
intelligi,
debes
negligi.”
;
‘Namesof
.-——sS»-—«sA
1.
If
the
fignification
of
the
names
fabftances
of
of
mixed
modes
are
uncertain,
becaufe
there
doubtful
fig-
be
no
real
ftandards
exifting
in
nature,
te
nification,
which
thofe
ideas
are
referred,
and
by
which
they
may
be
adjufted
;
the
names
of
fubftances
are
of
a
doubtful
fignification,
for
a
contrary
reafon,
viz.
becaufe
the
ideas
they
ftand
for
are
fuppofed
conformable
to
the.
reality
of
things,
and
are
referred
to
ftandards
made
by
nature.
In
our
ideas
of
fubftances
we
have
not
the
liberty,
as
in
mixed
modes,
to
frame
what
combinations
we
think
fit,
to
be
the
characteriftical
notes
to
rank
and
denominate
things
by.
In
thefe
we
muft
follow
nature,
{uit
our
complex
ideas
to
real
exiftences,
and
regulate
the
fignification
of
their
names
by
the
things
themfelves,
.
if
we
will
have
our
names
to
be
figns
of
them,
and
ftand
for
them..
Here,
af
is
true,
we
have
patterns
to
follow
;
:
|
but
Ch.
9:
Llmperfeétion
of
Words,
is
not
fo
certain:
and
I
believe
it
in
f{peaker
and
hearer,
collection.
eo
is
very
feldom
that,
they
ftand
for
exactly
the
fame
Which
muft
needs
produce
miftakes
and
'
difputes,
when
they
are
made
ufe
of
in
difcourfes,
*
cially
when
we
Wherein
men
have
to
do
with
univerfal
propofitions,
and
would
fettle
in
their
minds
univerfal
truths,
and
confider
the
confequences
that
follow
from
them.
§.
19.
By
the
fame
rule,
the
names
of
fimple
modes
are,
next
to
thofe
of
fimple
4
ext
to
ideas,
leaft
liable
to
doubt
and
uncertainty,
efpecially
thofe-of
figure
and
number,
of
2
Who
ever,
miftook
the
ordi-~
or
a
triangle?
And
in
general
which
men
have
fo
clear
and
diftiné
ideas.
that
had
a
mind
to
underftand
them,
nary
meaning
of
feven,
them,
fimple
modes,
the
leaft
compounded
ideas
in
every
kind
have
the
leat
dubious
names.
§.
20.
Mixed
modes
therefore,
that
are.
‘The
moft
made
up
but
of
a
few
and
obvious
fimple
doubtful
are
ideas,
have
ufually
names
of
no
very
uncer--
ee
payssok
tain
fignification.
.
But
thé
names
of
mixed
[pounded
‘modes,
which
comprehend
a
great
number
mixed
modes
of
fimple
ideas,
are
commonly,
of
a
very,
and
fub-
doubefal
and
undetermined
meaning,
as
has
*#"°e
been
fhown.
The
names.
of
fubftances,
being
annexed
‘to
ideas
that:
are
sneither
the
real
effences
nor
exact
reprefentations
of
the
patterns
they
are
referred
to,
are
liable
yet
to
greater
imperfection
and
uncertainty,
efpe-
come
to
a
philofophical
ufe
of
them.
§.
21.
The:
great.
diforder
that
happens
‘Why’
this
“a?
Our
names
of
fubftances,
|
proceeding
for
»
imperfeétion
the
moft
part
from
our!
want
of
knowledge,
peated
nppn
and
inability
to
penetrate.
into
their
real
.
¥9%s
conftitutions,
it
may
probably
be
wondered,
why
I
charge
this
as
an
imperfection
rather
upon
our
words
than
un-
derftandings.
|
of
juftice,
~why
Uhave
followed
this
method.
This
exception
has
fo
much
appearance
that
I
think
myfelf
obliged
to
give
a
reafon
I
muft
confefs
then,
that
when
I
firft
began
this
difcourfe
of
the
underftand-
ing,
and.a
good
while
after,
I
had
not
the
leaft
thought
that
any
confideration
of
words
was
at
all
neceffary
to
it.
»
But
when
having
paffed-over
the
original
and
compofi-
C2
|
tion
“
ut
a+
ae
eee
ca
a
————
20
Imperfection
of
Words.
Book
3-
tion
of
our
ideas,
I
began
to
examine
the
extent
and
certainty
of
our
knowledge,
1
found
it
had
fo
near
a
con-
nexion
with
words,
that,
unlefs
their
force
and
manner
of
fignification
were
firft
well
obferved,
there
could
be”
very
little
faid
clearly
and
pertinently
concerning
know-
©
ledge;
which
being
converfant
about
truth,
had
con-
—
{tantly
to
do
with
propofitions.
And
though
it
termi-
—
nated
in
things,
yet
it
was
for
the
moft
part
fo
much
by
the
intervention
of
words,
that
they
feemed
fearce
fepa~
rable
from
our
general
knowledge.
At
leaft
they
inter-
ofe
themfelves
fo
much
between
our
underftandings
and
the
truth
which
it
would
contemplate
and
appre-
|
hend,
that
like
the
medium
through
which
vifible
objects
pafs,
their
obfcurity
and
diforder
do
not
feldom
—
caft
a
mift
before
our
eyes,
and
impofe
upon
our
un-—
derftandings.
If
we
confider,
in
the
fallacies
men
put
upon
themfelves
as
well
as
others,
and
the
miftakes
in
men’s
difputes
and
notions,
how
great
a
part
is
owing
to
words,
and
their
uncertain
or
miftaken
fignifications,
—
we
fhall
have
reafon
to
think
this
no
fmall
obftacle
in
.the
way
to
knowledge
;
which,
I
conclude,
we
are
the
;
;
more
carefully
to
be
warned
of,
becaufe
it
has
been
fo
far
from
being
taken
notice
of
as
an
inconvenience,
that
‘the
arts
of
improving
it
have
been
made
the
buftnefs
of
men’s
ftudy;
and
obtained
the
reputation
of
learning
and
fubtilty,
as
we
fhall
fee
in
the
following
chapter
But
I
am
apt
to
imagine,
that
were
the
imperfections)
of
language,
as
the
inftrument
of
knowledge,
more
thoroughly
weighed,
a
great
many
of
the
controverfics
that
make
fuch
a
noife
in
the
world,
would
of
them-
“felves
ceafe;
and
the
way
to
knowledge,
and
perhap*
peace
too,
lie
a
great
deal
opener
than
it
does.
|
This
froula
S22,
Sure
Fam,
that
the
fignificatiot
juhusme.
of
words
in
all
languages
dependin
very
deration,
in
much
on
the
thoughts,
notions,
ae
ideas
impofing
our
of
him
that
ufes
them,
muft
unavoidably
b¢
own
fenfe
of
:
ae
“Cid
authors,
of
great
uncertainty
to
men
of
the
fame
lan*
"guage
and
country.
This
is
fo
evident
1#
the
Greek
authors,
that
he
that
fhall
perufe
their
writing?
will
find
in
almoft
every
one
of
them
a
difting
languag®’
though
the
fame
words.
But
when
to
this
mar
di
cu
:
Ch.
9:
Inperfedion
of
Words.
|
25
ficulty
in
every
country
there
fhall.be
added
different
countries
and
remote
ages,
wherein
the
{peakers
and
.
Writers
had
very
different
notions,
tempers,
cuftoms,
ornaments
and
figures
of
fpeech,
&c.
every
one
of
which
influenced
the
fignification
of
their
words
then,
though
fo
us
now
they
are
loft
and
unknown;
it
would
become
us
to
be
charitable
one
to
another
in
our
interpretations
or
mifunderftanding
of
thofe
antient
writings:
which
though
of
great
concernment
to
be
underftood,
are
hable
to
the
unavoidable
difficulties
of
{peech,
which
(if
we
except
the
names
of
fimple
ideas,
and
fome
very
obvious
things)
is
not
capable,
without
a
conftant
de-
fining
the
terms,
of
conveying
the
fenfe
and
intention
of
the
{peaker,
without
any
manner
of
doubt
and
un-
certainty,
to
the
hearer.
And
in
difcourfes
of
religion,
law,
and
morality,
as
they
are
matters
of
the
higheft
concernment,
fo
there
will
be
the
greateft
difficulty.
§.
23.
The
volumes
of
interpreters
and
commenta-
tors
on
the
old
and
new
Teftament
are
but
too
manifeft
proofs
of
this.
Though
every
thing
faid
in
the
text
be
infallibly
true,
yet
the
reader
may
be,
nay
cannot
choofe
but
be
very
fallible
in
the
underftanding
of
it.
Nor
is
it
to.be
wondered,
that
the
will
of
God,.
when
cloathed
in
words,
fhould
be
liable
to
that
doubt
and
uncertainty,
which
unavoidably
attends
that
fort
of
conveyance
;
when
even
his
Son,
whilft
cloathed
in
flefh,
was
fubje&
to
all
the
frailties
and
inconveniencies
of
human
nature,
fin
excepted.
And
we
ought
to
magnify
his
goodnefs
.
that
he
hath
fpread
before
all
the
world
fuch
legible
characters
of
his
works
and
providence,
and
given
all
mankind
fo
fufficient
a
light
of
reafon,
that
they
to
whom
this
written
word
never
Came,
could
not
(when=
ever
they
fet
themfelves
to
fearch)
either
doubt
of
the
being
of
a
God,
or
of
the
obedience
due
to
him.
Since
then
the
precepts
of
natural
religion
are
plain,
and
very
intelligible
to
all
mankind,
and
{eldom
come
to
be
con-
_
froverted
;
and
other
revealed
truths,
which
are
con~
veyed
to
us
by
books
and
languages,
are
liable
to
the
common
and
natural
obfcurities
and
difficulties
incident
to
words;
methinks
it
would
become
us
to
be
more
|
C3
..
careful
42
.
Abufe
of
Words.
Book
3.
—
careful
and
diligent
in
obferving
the
former,
and
lefs
—
magifterial,
pofitive,
and
imperious,
in
impofing
our
~
own
fenfe
and
interpretations
of
the
Jatter.
|
|
CE
Bor
Pei
Xs
din
Of
the
Abufe
of
Words.
65%:
ESIDES
the
imperfection
that
is
naturally
in
language,
and
the
obfcurity
and
confufion
that
is
fo
hard
©
to
be
avoided
in
the
ufe
of
words,
there
are
feveral
wilful
faults
and
neglects
which
men
are
guilty
of
in
this
way
of
communication,
whereby
they
render
thefe
figns
lefs
clear
and
diftin¢
in
their
fignification,
than
natu-
rally
they
need
to
be.
see
uae
BE
LAL
|
Firk,
Words
§.
2.
Firft,
in
this
kind,
the
firft
and
without
any,
moft
palpable
abufe
is,
the
ufing
of
‘words
|
er
without
without
clear
and
diftinct
ideas
;
or,
which
clearideas.
=)
ue
AS
be
apg
lacas
ig
worfe,
figns
without
any
thing
fignified.
Of
thefe
there
are
two
forts:
ae:
aE
|
I.
One
may
obferve,
in
all
languages,
certain
words,
—
that
if
they
be
examined,
will
be
found,
in
their
firft
original
and
their
appropriated
ufe,
not
to
ftand
for
any
—
clear
and
diftin
ideas.
Thefe,
for
the
moft
part,
the
a
a
ee
Abufe
of
words.
©
i
ee
en
a
mre
feveral
fects
of
philofophy
and
religion
have
introduced.
|
For
their
authors,
or
promoters,
either
affecting
fome-
|
thing
fingular
and
out
of
the
way
of
common
apprehen-_
fions,
or
to
fupport
‘fome
{trange
opinions,
or
covet
fome
weaknefs
of
their
hypothefis,
feldom
fail
to
coin
new
words,
and
fuch’as,
when
they
come
to
be
examined,
|
-
may
juftly
be
called
infignificant
terms.
For
having:
either
had
no
determinate
collection
of
ideas
annexe
to
them,
when
they
were
firft
invented
;
or
at
leaft
fach
as,
if
well
exarnined,
will
be
found
inconfiftent
;
itis
no
wonder
if
‘afterwards,
in
the
vulgar
ufe
of
the
fame
party,
they
remain
empty
founds,
«with
little
or
no
fig-
ification,
among{t
thofewho
think
it
enough
to
have
3
phen
q
‘Chi
10;
Abufe
of
Words.
23
them
often
in
their
mouths,
as
the
diftinguifhing
cha-
racters
of
their
church,
or
fchool,
without
much
trou-
bling
their
heads
to
examine
what
are
the
precife
ideas
they
ftand
for.
I
fhall
not
need
here
to
heap
up
ine
{tances
;
every
man’s
reading
and
converfation
will
fuf-
ficiently
furnifh
him:
or
if
he
wants
to
be
better
ftored,
the
great
mint-mafters
of
this
kind
of
terms,
I
mean
the
{chool-men
and
metaphyficians
(under
which,
J
think,
the
difputing
natural
and
moral
philofophers
of
thefe
fatter
ages
may
be
comprehended)
have
where-
withal
abundantly
to
content
him.
§,
3.
Il.
Others
there
be,
who
extend
this
abufe
yet
farther,
who
take
fo
little
care
to
lay
by
words,
which
in
their
primary
notation
have
fearce
any
clear
and
dif
tinct
ideas
which
rhey
are
annexed
to,
that
by
an
un-
pardonable
negligence
they
familiarly
ufe
words,
which
the
propriety
of
language
has
affixed
to
very
important
ideas,
without
any
diftinct
meaning
at
all.
Wifdom,
glory,
grace,
&c.
are
words
frequent
enough
in
every.
-
man’s
mouth;
but
if
a
great
many
of
thofe
who
ufe
them,
fhould
be
afked
what
they
mean
by
them,
they
would
be
at
a
ftand,
and
not
know
what
to
an{wer:
a
plain
proof,
that
though
they
have
learned
thofe
founds,
and
have
them
ready
at
their
tongues
end,
yet
there
are
no
determined
ideas
laid
up
in
their
minds,‘
which
are
to
be
expreffed
to
others
by
them,
§.
4.
Men
having
been
accuftomed
from
Gccltaned
their
cradles
to
learn
words,
which
are
ealily
by
learning
got
and
retained,
before
they
knew,
or
had
names
before
‘
framed
the
complex
ideas,
to
which
they
ores
eo
were
annexed,
or
which
were
to
be
found
fee.
s
in
the
things
they
were
thought
to
ftand
for;
they
ufually
continue
to
do
fo
all
their
lives;
and
without
taking
the
pains
neceffary
to
fettle
in
their
minds
determined
ideas,
they
ufe
their
words
for
fuch
unfteady
and
con-
fufed
notions
as
they
have,
contenting
themfclves
with
the
fame
words
other
people
ufe:
as
if
their
very
found
neceflarily
carried
with
it
conftantly
the
fame
meaning.
This,
though
men
make
a
{hift
with,
in
the
ordinary
accurrences
of
life,
where
they
find
it.
neceffary
to
be
underiteod,
and
therefore
they
make
figns
till
they
are
ae
:
eee
O3
ne
24
Abufe
of
Words.
Book
3.
fo;
yet
this
infignificancy
in
their
words,
when
they
come
to
reafon
concerning
either
their
tenets
or
intereft;
ynanifeftly
fills
their
difcourfe
with
abundance
of
empty
unintelligible
noifeand
jargon,
efpecially
in
moral
mat-
ters,
where
the
words
for
the
moft
part
ftanding
for
arbitrary
and
numerous
collections
of
ideas,
not
regu-
larly
and
permanently
united
in
nature,
their
bare
founds:
are
often
only
thought
on,
or
at
leaft
very
obfcure
and
uncertain
notions
annexed
to
them.
Men
take
the
words
they
find
in
ufe
amongft
their
neighbours
;
and
that
they
‘may
not
feem
ignorant
what
they
ftand
for;
ufe
them
confidently,
without
much
troubling
their
heads
about
a
certain
fixed
meaning:
whereby,
befides
the
eafe
of
it,
they
obtain
this
advantage,
that
as
in
fuch
difcourfes
they
feldom
are
in
the
right,
fo
they
are
as
feldom
to
be
convinced
that
they
are
in
the
wrong;
it
‘being
all
one
to
go
about
to
draw
thofe
men
out
of
theif
miftakes,
who
have
no
fettled
notions;
as
to
difpoffefs
4
vagrant
of
his
habitation,
who
has
no
fettled
abode.
This
I
guefs
to
be
fo;
and
every
one
may
obferve
in
|
himfelf
and
others,
whether
it
be
or
no.
;
§.
5.
Secondly,
another
great
abufe
of
©
meshes
Sensor
=
S
oe
it
ew)
are
ry
ee
liad
90
apts
PE OI
6
sey
1
PEL
SS
NEE
Me
NES
Yeas
Pik
TEES
S
1,
seen
aid
words
is
inconftancy
in
the
ule
of
them.
|
of
them.
It
is
hard
to
find
a
difcourfe
written
of
any
i
fubject,
efpecially
of
controverfy,
wherein
—
one
fhall
not
obferve,
if
he
read
with
attention,
the
fame
i!
words
(and
thofe
commonly
the
moft
material
in
the
—
difcourfe,
and
upon
which
the
argument
turns)
ufed
fometimes
for
one
collection
of
fimple
ideas,
and
fome-—
times
for
another:
which
is
a
perfect
abufe
of
language:
—
Words
being
intended
for
figns
of
my
ideas,
to
maken
them
knawn
to
others,
not
by
any
natural
fignificatio,
—
but
by
a
voluntary
impofition,
it is
plain
cheat
and
abufe,
when
I
make
them
ftand
femetimes
for
one
things
;
and
fometimes
for
another;
the
wilful
doing
whereof,
can
be
imputed
to
nothing
but
great
folly,
or
greater
dil-
honefty..
“And
a
man,
in
his
accompts
with
anotheSs—
may,
with
as
much
fairnefs,
make
the
characters
of
num
bers
ftand
fometimes
for
one,
and
fometimes
for
anothet
—
collection
of
units
(v.
g.
this
character
3
ftands
fome<—
times
for
three,
fometimes
for
four,
and
fometimes
fot
eight
Ch?
10;
Abufe
of
Words:
ag
eight)
as
in
his
difcourfe,
or
reafoning,
make
the
fame
words
ftand
for
different
collections
of
fimple
ideas.
If
men
fhould
do
fo
in
their
reckonings,
I
wonder
who
would
have
to
do
with
them?
One
who
would
{peak
thus,
in
the
affairs
and
bufinefs
of
the
world,
and
call
8
fometimes
feven,
and
fometimes
nine,
as
beft
ferved
his
advantage,
would
prefently
have
clapped
upon
him
one
of
the
two
names
men
are
commonly
difgufted
with.
And
yet
in
arguings
and
learned
contefts,
the
fame
fort
of
proceedings
paffes
commonly
for
wit
and
learning
+
but
to
me
it
appears
a
greater
difhonefty,
than
the
mif-
placing
of
counters
in
the
cafting
up
a
debt;
and
the
cheat
the
greater,
by
how
much
truth
is
of
greater
con~
cernment
and
value
than
money.
§.
6.
Thirdly,
another
a
bufe
of
language
3.
Affetted
is
an
affected
obfcurity,
by
either
applying
obfcurity
by
old
words
to
new
and
unufual
fignifications,
Wrong
appli-
or
introducing
new
and
ambiguous
terms,
“0%
without
defining
either;
or
elfe
putting
them
fo
toge-
‘ther,
as
may
confound
their
ordinary
meaning.
Though
the
Peripatetic
philofophy
has
been
moft
eminent
in
this
way,
yet
other
fects
have
not
been
wholly
clear
of
at.
There
are
fearce
any
of
them
that
are
not
cumbered
with
fome
difficulties
(fuch
is
the
imperfection
of
human
knowledge)
which
they
have
been
fain
to
cover
with
ob{curity
of
terms,
and
to
confound
the
fignification
of
words,
which,
like
a
mift
before
people’s
eyes,
might
hinder
their
weak
parts
from
being
difcovered.
That
body
and
extenfion,
in
common
ufe,
ftand
for
two
dif-
tinct
ideas,
is
plain
to
any
one
that
will
but
reflect
a
little.
For
were
their
fignification
precifely
the
fame,
1t
would
be
proper,
and
as
intelligible
to
fay,
the
body
of
an.
extenfion,
as
the
extenfion
of
a
body;
and
yet
there
are
thofe
who
find
it
neceflary
to
confound
their
fignification,
To
this
abufe,
and
the
mifchiefs
of
con-
founding
the
fignification
of
words,
logick
and
the
libe~
Tal
{eiences,
as
they
have
been
handled
in
the
{chools,
Jave
given
reputation
;
and
the
admired
art
of
difput-
ing
hath
added.
much
to
the
natural
imperfection.
of
languages,
whilft
it
has
been
made
ufe
of
and
fitted
to
perplex
the
fignification
of
words,
more
than
to
difcover
the
26
=
Abufe
of
Words.
Book
3.
the
knowledge
and
truth
of
things:
and
he
that
will
Jook
into
that
fort
of
learned
writings,
will
find
the
words
there
much
more
obfcure,
uncertain,
and
unde-_
termined
in
their
meaning,
than
they
are
in
ordinary
—
converfation.
Logick
and
§.
7.
This
is
unavoidably
to
be
fo,
where
difpute
have
men’s
parts
and
learning
are
eftimated
by
zune
conic
their
fkill
in
difputing.
And
if
reputation
buted
tothiss
444
yeward
fhall
attend
thefe
conquefts,
which
depend
moftly
on
the
finenefs
and
niceties
of
words,
it
is
no
wonder
if
the
wit
of
man,
fo
employed,
fhould
perplex,
involve,
and
fubtilize
the
fignification
of
founds,
fo
as
never
to
want
fomething
to
fay,
in
op-
pofing
or
defending
any
queftion
;
the
victory
being
ad-
judged
not
to
him
who
had
truth
on
his
fide,
but
the
laft
word
in
the
difpute.
|
|
Pei
as
§.
8.
This,
though
a
very
ufelefs
fkill,
—
Tabtiley,-
and
that
which
I
think
the
direct
oppofite
TAN
to
the
ways
of
knowledge,
hath
yet
pafied
hitherto
under
the
laudable
and
efteemed
names
of
fub-—
tilty
and
acutenefs:
and
has
had
the
applaufe
of
the
fchools,
and
encouragement
of
one
part
of
the
learned
©
‘men
of
the
world.
And
no
wonder,
fince
the
philofo-
—
-phers
of
old
(the
difputing
and
wrangling
philofophers
‘mean,
fuch
as
Lucian
wittily
and
with
reafon
taxes)
-
and
the
{choolmen
fince,
aiming
at
glory
and
efteem
fot
their
great
and
univerfal
knowledge,
eafier
a
great
deal
to
be
pretended
to,
than
really
acquired,
found
this
4
good
expedient
to
cover
their
ignorance
with
a
curious”
and
inexplicable
web
of
perplexed
words,
and
procufé
f
to
themfelves
the
admiration
of
others
by
unintelligible
terms,
the
apter
to
produce
wonder,
becaufe
they
coula-
not
be
underftood:
whilft
it
appears
in
all
hiftory,
that
thefe
profound
doctors
were
no
wifer,
nor
more
ufefu}
than
their
neighbours
;
and
brought
but
fmall
advan<—
tage
to
human
life,
or
the
focieties
wherein
they
lived?
unlefs
the
coining
of
new
words,
where
they
produce4-
no
new
things
to
apply
them
to,
or
the
perplexing
OF
obfcuring
the
fignification
of
old
ones,
and
fo
bringing
|
all
things
into
queftion
and
difpute,
were
a
thing
Priel
|
|
firabs®
j
A
iy
ae
lee
ej
ee
ee
One
Ee
ee
pi
sel
te
sr
a
Ch.
10.
Abufe
of
Words,
|
27
fitable
to
the
life
of
man,
or
worth
reward.
bite
_§
9.
For
notwithftanding
thefe
learned
*phis
tearn-
difputants,
thefe
all-knowing
-
doctors,
Lt
ing
very
litéle
was
to
the
unfcholaftic
ftatefman,
that
the
enki
governments
of
the
world
owed
their
peace,
SH
'
defence,
and
liberties;
and
from
the
illiterate
and
cons
temned
mechanick
(a
name
of
difgrace)
that
'they
rea
ceived
the
improvements
of
ufeful.afts.
Neverthelefs,
this
artificial
ignorance,
and
learned
sibberith,
prevailed
mightily
in
thefe
laft
ages,
by
the
intereft
and
artifice
of
thofe
who
found
no
eafier
way
to
that
pitch
of
autho.
rity
and
dominion
they
have
attained,
than
by
amufin
the
men
of
bufinefs
and
ignorant
with
hard
words,
or
employing
the
ingenious
and
idle
in
intricate
difputes
about
‘unintelligible
terms,
and:
holding
them
perpetu-
ally
entangled
in
that
endlefs
labyrinth.
Befides,
there
is
no
fuch
way
to
gain
admittance,
or
give
defence
to
ftrange
and
abfurd
doctrines,
as
to
guard
them
round
about
with
legions
of
obfcure,
doubtful,
and
undefined
words:
which
yet
make
thefe
retreats
more
like
the
dens
of
robbers,
or
holes
of
foxes,
than
the
fortreffes
of.
fair
warriors
;
which
if-it
be
hard
to
get
them
out
of,
it
is
not
for
the
ftrength
that
is
in
them,
but
the
briars
and
thorns,
and
the
obfcurity
of
the
thickets
they
are
befet
with.
For
untruth
being
unacceptable
to
the
mind
of
man,
there
is
no
other
defence
left
for
abfurdity,
buviobieurity.0A
eas
Cee
at
Leads
sealant
aoa
Thus
learned
ignorance,
and
this
Bur
deioys
esping»
€ven
inquifitive
men,
from
|
the
inftru-
true
knowledge,
hath
been
propagated
in
ments
of
the
world,
and
hath
much
perplexed
whilft
enowiedge
t
it
pretended
to
inform
the
underftanding.
Ricken
For
we
fee
that
other
well-meaning
and
©
:
wife
men,
whofé
education
and
parts
had
not
acquired
that
acuténefs,
could
intelligibly
exprefs
themfelves
to
one
another
;
and
in
its
plain
ufe
make
a
benefit
of
lan-
guage.
But
though
unlearned
men
well
enough
under
ftood
the
words
white
and
black,
&c.
and
had
conftant
notions
of
the
ideas
{i
gnified
by
thofe
words
;
yet
there
y
commendation
and
Were
philefophers
found,
who
had
learning
and
Det
;
| :
enoug
EEN
TE
ETE
43
‘Abufe
of
Words.
Book
32
enough
to
prove,
that
fnow
was
black;
i.
¢€.
to
prove,
that
white
was
black.
Whereby
they
had
the
advan-—
tage
to
deftroy
the
inftruments
and
means
of
difcourfe,
©
-converfation,
inftruction,
and
fociety
;
whilft
with
great
—
art-and
fubtilty
they
did
no
more
but
perplex
and
con-
—
found
the
fignification
of
words,
and
thereby
render
language
lefs
ufeful,
than
the
real
defects
of
it
had
made
-
it;
a
gift,
which
the
illiterate
had
not
attained
to.
Avifefalaa
4.
Sec34-
Thefe
learned
men
did
equally
in-
—
to
confound
ftruct
men’s
underftandings,
and
profit
theif
—
the
fone
of
ives,
as
he
who
fhould
alter
the
fignifica-—
pew
tion
of
known
characters,
and,
by
a
fubtle
device
of
learning,
far
{urpafling
the
capacity
of
the
illi-
—
terate,
dull,
and
vulgar,
fhould
in
his
writing,
fhow
that
—
he
could
put
A
for
B,
and
D
for
E,
&c.
to
the
no
fmall
admiration
and
benefit
of
his
reader:
it
being
as
fenfe-
lefs
to
put
black,
which
is
a
word
agreed
on
to
ftand
—
for
one
fenfible
idea,
to
put
it,
I
fay,
for
another,
oF
the
contrary
idea,
i.e.
to
call
fnow
black,
as
to
put
this
mark
A,
which
is
a
character
agreed
on
to
ftand
for
—
‘one
modification
of
found;
made
by
a
certain
motion
of
the
organs
of
{peech,
for
B;
which
is
agreed
on
to
ftand
for
another
modification.
of
found,
made
by
another
cer-—
tain
mode
of
the
organs
of
{peech.
i
"This
art
hat
§..
12.
Nor
hath
this
mifchief
{topped
in
pore
re-
logical
niceties,
or
curious
empty
{pecula-—
zion
ee
tions;
it
hath
invaded
the
great
concern<—
cha
ments
of
human
life
and
fociety,
obfcured
—
and
perplexed
the
material
truths
of
law
and
divinity
+»
brought
confufion,
diforder,
and
uncertainty
into
the
—
affairs
of
mankind;
and
if
not
deftroyed,
yet
ina
great
meafure
rendered
ufelefs,
thefe
two
great
rules,
religion
and
juftice.
What
have
the
greateft
part
of
the
come
ments
and
difputes
upon
the
laws
of
God
and
man
ferv-
ed
for,
but
to
make
the
meaning
more
doubtful,
an?¢-
perplex
the
fenfe?
What
have
been
the
effect
of
thole
yuultiplied
curious
diftinctions
and
acute
niceties,
bul
ob{curity
and
uncertainty,
leaving
the
words
more
unr
intelligible,
and
the
reader
more
at
a
lofs?
Haw
elfe
comes
it
to
pafs
that
princes,
{peaking
or
writing
10%
their
fervants,
in
their
ordinary
commands,
are
allt
unacl*
j
Ch.
10.
Abnfe
of
Words.
29
underftood
;
fpeaking
xo
their
people,
in
their
laws,
are
not
fo?
And,
as
I
remarked
before,
doth
it
not
often
happen,
that
a
man
of
an
ordinary
Capacity
very
well
underftands
a
text
or
a
law
that
he
reads,
till
he
cona
fults
an
expofitor,
or
goes
to
counfel;
who,
by
that
time
he
hath
done
explaining
them,
makes
the
words
fignify
either
nothing
atall,
or
what
he
pleafes.
ota
§.
13.
Whether
any
by-interefts
of
thefe
And
ought:
profeffions'
have
occafioned
this,
I
will
not
fr
nel
here
examine;
but
I
leave
it
tobe
confi-
|
dered,
whether
it
would
not
be
well
for
mankind,
whofe
concernment
it
is
to
know
things
as
they
are,
and
to
do
what
they
ought,
and
not
to
{pend
their
lives
in
talking
about
them,
or
tofling
words
to
and
fro;
whe-
ther
it
would
not
be
well,
I
fay,
that
the
ufe
of
words
were
made
plain
and
dire&,
and
that
language,’
which
was
given
us
for
the
improvement
of
knowledge
and
bond
of
fociety,
fhould
not
be
employed
to
darken
truth,
and
unfettle
people’s
rights;
to
raife
mifts,
and
‘render
unintelligible
both
morality
and
religion?
Or
that
ar
leaft,
if
this
will
happen,
it
fhould
not
be
thought
learn»
ing
or
knowledge
to
do
fo?
|
§.
14.
Fourthly,
another
great
abufe
of
4.
Taking
words
is,
the
taking
them
for
things.
This
enn
Nit
though
it
in
fome
degree
concerns
all
names
BS
in
general,
yet
more
particularly
affeéts
thofe
of
fabs
ftances..
To
this
abufe
thofe
men
are
moft
fubject,
who
moft
confine
their
thoughts
to
any
one
fyftem,
and
give
themfelves
up
into
a
firm
belief
of
the
perfection
‘of
any
received
hypothefis;
whereby
they
come
to
be
perfuaded,
that
the
terms
of
that
fect
are
fo
fuited
to
the
nature
of
things,
that
they
perfectly
correfpond
with
their
real
~exiftence.
Whois
there,
that
has
been
bred
up
in:
the
Peripatetic
Philofophy,
who
does
not
think
the
ten
mames,
under:
which
are
ranked
the
ten
predicaments,
to
be
exactly
conformable
to
the
nature
of
things
?;
Who
1s
there
of
that
{Chool,
that
is
not
perfuaded,
that
fubu
ftantial
forms,
vegetative
fouls,
abhorrence
of
a
vacuum,
intentional
f{pecies,
&e.
are
fomething
real?
Thefe
words
men
haye
learned
from
their
very
entrange
upon
-
knowledge,
and
have
found
their.
mafters
and
fyftems
4
tay
30
Abuje
of
Words.
Book
a
lay.
great
ftrefs
upon
them;
and:
therefore
they
cannot
quit
the
opinion,
that
they
are
conformable
to
nature,
and:
are»
the
reprefentations
of
fomething
that
really
exifts..
The
Platonifts
have
their
foul
of
the
world,
and
—
the
Epicuréans
theit
endeavour
towards
motion
in
theif
atoms,
when
at
reft:
.
There
is
fcarce
any
fect
in
philo-
5
ophy
has
not
adiftinét
fet
of
terms,
that
others
under-
—
ftand
not;
but
yet
this
gibberifh,
which,
in
the
weak-
nefs
of
human
underftanding,
ferves
fo
well
to
palliate
—
men’s
ignorance,
and:
cover
their
errors,
comes,
by
—
familiar
ufe
amongft
thofe
of
the
fame
tribe,
to
feem
the
;
moft
important
part
of
language,
and.
of
all
other
the
terms
the
moft
fignificant.
And
fhould
aerial
and
zthe-
—
rial
vehicles
come
once,
by
the
prevalency
of
that
doc-
—
grine;
to
be
generally
received»
any
where,
no
doubt
—
thofe
terms:
would
make
impreffions
on
men’s
minds,
—
fo.as
to
eftablith
them
in
the
perfuafion
of.
the
reality
of
i
fach
things,
as
muchas:
Peripatetic:
forms
and)
inten-
‘
tional
{pecies
have
heretofore:done.
4)
oo)
9)
6
$15:
How
muchnames
taken
for
things
—
Anftance,
in
gre
apt
to
_miflead’
the
underftanding,
the
—
matter.
: :
:
,
ae
|
attentive
reading
of
philofophical
writers
—
would
abundantly
difcover;
and
that,
perhaps,
in
words
i
little
fufpected
‘of
any
fuch
mifufe.
I
fhall
inftance
10
—
one
only,
and=that
a
very
familiar
one:
how'many
in-—
tticate
difputes
have
there
been
about
matter,
as
if
there
—
were
fome’
fuch
thing
really
insnature,
diftinct
from
—
-body
;
as
it
is
evident
the
word
matter
ftands
for
al”
-jdea
diftin®
from
the
idea
of
body?
For
if
the
ideas
|
thefe
two
ternis
ftood
for
were
precifely
the
fame,
they
—
-might
indifferently,
in
all
places,
be
put
for
oneanothel
—
!But:we
fee,
that
though
it
be
proper
to
fay,
there
15
_
conermatter
of’all
bodies,
one
cannot’
fay
there
is
one
—
‘body
of
all
matters:
we
familiarly
fay,
one
body
is
big-
-
.gerthan
another;
but
it
founds
harfh
(and
I
think
never
ufed)
to
fay,
one
matter
is
bigger
than
anothet:
“Whence
comes
this
then?
viz.
from
hence,
that
thoug
-matter'and
body
be
not
really
diftin@,
but
wherevet~
-there
is
theone
there
is
the
other;
yet
matter
and
body
-
Stand-for
two
different
conceptions,
whereof
the
one
B”
aincdmplete,
and=but
a
part
of
the
other.
For
ion
:
“tH
3
ftand?
Chasgr
Abufe
of
Words.
3
ftands
for
a
folid
extended
figured
fubftance,
whereof
matter
is
but
a
partial
and
more
confufed.
conception;
it
feeming'to
me
to
be
ufed
for
the
fubftance
and
foli-
dity
of
body,
without
taking
in
its
extenfion
and
figure
:
and
therefore
it
is
that
{peaking
of
matter,
we
{peak
of
it
always
as
one,
becaufe
in
truth
it
exprefsly
contains
nothing
but
the-ideaof
a
folid
fubftance,
which
is
every
Where
the
fame,
every:where
uniform.
.
This
being
our
idea
of
matter,
we
no
more
conceive
or
{peak
of
diffe
rent
matters
in
the
world,
than
we
do
of
different
foli.
ditics;
though
we
both
conceive
and
{peak
of
different
bodies,
becaufe.
extenfion
and
figure
are
capable
of
»va»
riation.
But
fince
folidity
cannot
exift
without
exten
fion
and.
figure,
the
taking
matter
tobe
the
name.
of
fomething
really
exifting
under
that
precifion,
has
no
doubt
produced
thofe
-obfeure
and-anintelligible
dif.
courfes:
and.
difputes,-
which
haye
filled
the
heads
and
books
of
philofophers
concerning
matériaprima;
which
imperfection,
of
abufe;
how
far
it
May
concern
a
great
many:
other.
general
‘terms,
-]
leave
to
be
confidered.
‘This,
I
think,
I-may.
at
leaft
fay,
that
we
thould
have
a
‘great»many
fewer
difputes:
inthe
world,
if
words
Were
taken
for
what
they
are,
the
fignsiof
our
ideas
‘only,
and
not.
for:
things
themfelves.;
sBom
when
we
argue
about
matter,
or
any
the
like
term;
we
tiuly
argue:
only
about
‘the
idea:
We
exprefs
by
that
found;
whéther:that.-
Precife
idea
agree
to
any
thing
really
exifting.in
nature
‘or
no,
b:And
if
men
would:
tell
what
ideas
they
make
their:words
ftand
for,
there
could
not
be
half.
that!
ob-
{curity
or:
wrangling,
«in-the
fearch
or
fupport
of*truth,
thatitherevshers
yc)
saat
fiend vis
hating
btwusisows
§.
16.
But
whateverinconvenience
fol-.
This
makes
tows
from
this
miftake
of
words,
this
I:am
.
errors
lafte
;
fure,
that
by
conftant
and
familiar-ufe'
they.
™8-....
charm
men
into
notions.
far
remote
from
the
truth
of
things,
Tt
would
be
a
hard
matter
to
perfuade
any
one,
that
‘the
words
which’
his:
father»
or
{choolmafter;:
the
-parfon
of
the
parith,
or
fuch
a
reverend
doctor
ufed,
_
“Bgnified
“nothing:
that
really
exifted
in
nature,
which,
.
<Pethaps,
is.
none
of
the
leaft:
caufes,
that
men
“are:
fo
;
hardly-drawn
to
quit
their
miftakes,
even.
in
opinions
es.
purely
ees
32
Abufe
of
Words.
Book
3+
—
purely
philofophical,
and
where
they
have
no
other
in-
;
tereft
but
truth.
For
the
words
they
have
a
long
time
—
been
ufed
to,
remaining
firm
in
their
minds,
itis
nO
—
wonder
that
the
wrong
notions
annexed
to
them
fhould
—
not
be
removed.
yas
ay
|
g.
Setting
—
§.
17.
Fifthly
another
abufe
of
words,
them
for
is
the
fetting
them
in
the
place
of
things
—
what
they
which
they
do
or
can
by
no
means
fignify-
—
it
fig-
We
may
obferve,
that
in
the
general
names
bas
oe
of
fubftances,
whereof
the
nominal
effences
—
are
only
known
to
us,
when
we
put
them
into
propo+—
fitions,
and
affirm
or
deny
any:
thing
about
them,
we
—
do
moft
commonly
tacitly
fuppofe,
or
intend
they
fhould
ftand:
for
the
real
effence
of
a
certain
fort
of
fubftances.
For
when
a
man
fays
gold
is
‘malleable,
he
means.
and
—
-would
infinuate
fomething
more
than
this,
that
what
i,
call
gold
is
malleable,
(though
truly
it
amounts
to
nO
more)
but
would
have
this
underftood,
viz.
that
gold,
—
i.e.
what
has
the
real
effence
of
gold,
is
malleables
which
amounts
to
thus
much,’
that
malleablenefs:
de=_
pends
on,
and
is
infeparable
from
the
real
effence
0
fe
gold.
But
a
man;
not
knowing
wherein
that
real
effencé
j
confifts,
the
connexion
in
his
mind
of
malleablenefs,
is
not
truly
with
an
effence
he
knows
net,
but
only
with
the
found
gold:he
puts
for
it.
Thus
when
we
fay,
that
©
animal
rationale’’
is,
and
‘‘
animal
implume
bipes
latis
unguibus”’
is
not
a
good
definition
of
a:
man;
it
is
plait
we
fuppofe
the
name
man
in
this
cafe
to
ftand
for
real
eflence
of
a
fpecies,
and
would.
fignify;
that
rational
animal
better
defcribed
that
real
effence
than?
—
tealcgge
animal
with
broad
nails,
and:without’f
f
thers.
For
elfe,
why
might
not
Plato
as
properly
make
the
word
di$pwmos,
or
man,
{tand
for
his
complex
ideas
made
up
of
the
idea
of
a
body,
diftinguithed
from
othe
by
a
certain
fhape
and
other
outward
appearances,
3”
Ariftotle
make
the
complex
idea,
to
which
he
gave
the
name
dv$pwros,
or
man,
of
body
andthe
faculty
of
rea~
foning
joined
together
;
unlefs
the
name
as)pamos,
or
may”
were
{uppofed
to
ftand
for
fomething
elfe
than
what
7
fignifies
;
and
to
be
put
in
the
place
of
fomeother
thing
than.
the
idea
a
man
profeffes
he
would
exprefs
by
it
.
g.
186
Ch.-ro.
Abufe
of
Words.
§.
18.
It
is
true,
the
names
of
fubftances
°
would
be
much
more
ufeful,
and
propofi-
tions”
made
in’
them
much
more
certain,
Were
the
real
effences
of
fubftances
the
ideas
in
our
minds
which’
thofe
words
fignified.:
for'want
of
thofe
real
eflences
that
our
wor
fo
little
knowled
them:
and
th
fection
as:
much
as
it
can,
pofition,
to
ftand
fora:
th
as
if
thereby
it
made
fome
ne:
makes
them,
by
a
of
fubftances
:
yet
there
j
s
fearce
any
body
in
thefe:
words,
but
often
fu
ppofes
each
of
thofe
eal’
effence,
on
w
_
Properties
depend.
Which
is
fo
far
from
di
the
imperfection
of
ouf
words,
adds'to
‘it
when“we
would
make
them
ftand
thing,
which
not
being
in
our
complex
idea,
we
ufe
can
no
ways
be
the
fign
of.
$19.
This
thows
us
the
reafon
why
in
mixed
modes
any
of
the
ideas
that
make
the
Compofition
of
the
complex
one,
being
left
»
it
is
allowed
to
be
another
ng,
of
another
fpecies,
it
is
plain
in
chance-medley,
-man-flauchter,
‘Tourder,;
parricide,
&c;
the
complex
idea
fignifi
well
as
nominal
effence
;
of
that
name
to
any
othe
{tances
it
is
not
fo.
F
Puts
into
his
complex
id
ea
what.
another
leave
S
refer
that
name,
and
33
v.
g.
Putting
het
for
the+
_
Teal
effences
And
it
is
ds
convey
ge
of
certainty
in
our
difcourfes.
about:
erefore'
the
mind,
to
remove)
that
imper-
t
fecret
fup-
ing,
having
that
real
effence,
r
y
nothing
truly
bur
2
complex
idea
of
properties
united
together
in
one
fort
the
ufe
of
names
to
hich
thefe
minifhing
that
by
a
plain:abufe
it
for
fome-
the
name
Hence
we.
think
every
change
of
our
idea
in
fub.
~
ftances
not
to
change
the
f{pecies,
The
reafon
whereof
is,
becaufe
ed
by
that'name
is
the
real
as
and
there-is
no
fecret
reference
reffence
but
that.
But
in
fub-~
or
though
in
that
called
gold
one
s
Out,
and
-.
Yet
men
do
not
ufually
think
that
therefore
caufe
they
fecretly
in’
their
fuppofe
it'annexed-to
a
real
immutable
effence
of
a
thi
ng
exifting,
on
w
Properties
depend.
He
th
hich.
thofe
at
adds
to
his
complex
idea
of.
gold
that
of
fixednefs
which
he
put
not
in
it
bef.
and
folubility’in
aq.
regia,
af
it
not
ore,
is
not
thought’
to
have
changed.
the
fpecies
;
but
Only
to
have
a
more
perfect
\DMon,
I.
D
-
ner.
%
ae
sedi
:
;
acer
z%
a
a
44
:
Abufe
of
Words.
Book
3
idea,
by.
adding
another
fimple
idea,
which
is
always
i
fact
joined
with
thofe
‘other,
‘of
which
bis
former
‘com
lex
idea
confifted.
But
this
reference
of
the’name
to
#
thing,
whereof
we
liad
not
the
idea;
is
forfar-from
help
ing
at
all,
that
it
only.
ferves
the
more
to
involve
us
if
difficulties.
For
by
this
tacit
‘reference
‘to
the,
re
affence
of
that
fpecies
of
bodies,
the
word
gold.
(whi
h
by
fianding
fora
more
or
lefs
perfect
collection
of
fimp™
ideas,
ferves
to
defigiy
that
fort
of
body
{well
enough
JF
civil:
difcourfes)
comes
to
have-no
fignification,
at
@
i
being
put
for
fomewhat,
whereof
we
have
novidea
at
aly
and
fo
can
fignify
nothing
at
all,
when
the
body
itfelf
®
away.
For
however
it
may
be
thought
all
one;
yet
p
well
confidered,
it
will
be
fotind
a'quite
different’
thie
to
argue
about
gold
in
name,
and
about
a
parcel:
in
1%
body
itfelf,
v.
g-
a
piece
of
‘Teafigold
laid
before
0
though
in
difcourfe
we
are
fain
to
fubftitute
the
na
ps
for
the
thing.
oe
Ae
Qo
dace
ae
The
ctufe
of
§..20.
That
which
Jethink.
very
muy
the
sbule,
a
*
difpofes
men
to
fubftitute
their
‘names
¥
gan
the
real
eflences
of
fpecies,
is
the
fupp?
wales
al
tion:
before-mentioned,
that
nature
.
wor
avays
regu
regularly
‘in
the
production
of
things,
4”
larly.
fets
the
boundaries
to
each
of
thofe
fpec™
ce.
‘by
giving
exactly
the
fame
real
internal
¢O”
ftitution
to
each
individual,
which>we
rank
under
0
general
name.’
Whereas
any
one
who
obferves
1
different
qualities,
can
hardly
doubt,
that)
many
of
#
‘individuals,
called
-by
the
fame
name,
are,
in
their
int®
‘nal
conftitution,
as
different
one
from
another
as
fever
-of
thofe
which
are
ranked
under
different
fpecl
‘names.
‘This
fuppofition,
however,
that
the
fame
P’
-cife
and
internal
conftitution
goes
always
with
the
aN
“fpecifick
name,
makes
men
forward
to
take
thofe
nah
‘for
the
reprefentatives
of
thofe
real!
eflences,
thov
‘indeed
they
fignify
nothing
but
the
complex.
ideas
have
in
their
minds
when
they
ufe
them.
So
thah,
‘TL
may
fo
fay,
fignifying
one
thing,
and
being
{upp
for,
or
put
in
the
place
of
another,
they
cannot
bub:
fiich
‘a
kind
of
ule,
‘caufe
a
great
deal
of
suncertain4),
men’s
difcourfes;
‘efpecially”
in
thofe
who:
have
fy
om
5
iL
.xQua:
Gioia
-
Abufe
of
Words,
35
roughly
imbibed
the
doctrine
of
fubftantial
forms,
wheres
by
they.
firmly
imagine
the
feveral
{pecies
of
things
to
be
determined
and
diftinguifhed,
or
§..21.
But
however
prepofterous
and
ab-
pi,
abufe
furd
it
be
to
make
our
names
ftand
for
ideas
contains
twa
we
have
not,
or
(which
is
all
one)
effences
ee
that
we
know
not,
it
being
in
effect
to.
make
Fae
Our
words
the
figns
of
Nothing;
yet
it
is
evident
to
any
one,
who
ever
fo
little
refle@s
on
the
ufe
men
make
of
their
words,
that
there
is
nothing
more
familiar.
When
a
man
afks
whether
this.or
that
thing
he
fees,
let
it
be
-
adrill,-or
a
monftrous
foetus,
be
a
man
or
no;
it
is
evi-
dent,
the
queftion
is
not,
Whether
that
agree
to
his
complex
idea,
but,
whether
.it
has
in
it
th
things,
which
he
fuppofes
hi
'$
Hame,man
to
ftand
for.
“An
which
way
of
ufing
the
names
of
Lubftances,
there
are
thefe
falfe
fuppofitions
contained,
"
Firft,
that
there
are
certain
precife
effences
accord~
ing
to
which
nature
makes
all
particular
things,
and:
by
which
they
are
diftinguithed
into
{pecies.
That
every
ing
has.a
real
conftitution,
whereby
it
is
what
it
is,
mn.
Which
it
€
qualities
depend,
is
paft
doubts,
but
T
think
it
hag
been
proved,
that
this
makes
not
the
diftinction
of
{pecies,
:
as
we
rank
them;
nér
the
boun~
daries
of
their
names,
3
acitly
alfo
infinuates,
as
if
we
had
ideas
of
thefe
Ptopofed
effences.
For
to
what
purpofe
r
that
thing
chave.the
{pecies
man,
if
we
did
not
fuppofe
that
there
were
fuch
a
fhecifick
effence
known?
which
#$,
29.
Sixthly,
-there
remains
yet
another
6..A
fappo-
“More
Seneral,
though
.
perhaps
lefs
obferved,
fition
that
~#
ule
of
words
;
and
that
is,
that
men
bays
Mote
a
ty
ing.b
a
lo
Be
d
f.
ab
:
Peet
sean
certain
a
“
3
by
a]
ne
and
famj
lar
ufe
annexed
{0
evident
fig.
‘them.
certain
ideas,
they
are
apr
fO.imagine
_
nification,’
Ry
|
ve
bose
TES
2
iq
Abufe
of
Words.
Book
$
46
fo‘nedr
and
neceffary
a
connexion
between
the
name
and
the
fignification
they
ufe
them
in,
that
they
fot
wardly
fuppofe
one
cannot
but
underftand
what
thet
qmeaning
is;
and
therefore
one
ought
to
acquiefce
in
tl
|
words
delivered,
as
if
it
were
paft
doubt,
that,
in
il
ufe
of
thofe
common
received
founds,
the
fpeaker
a
Hi
hearer
had
neceffarily
the
fame
precife
ideas.
When
|
prefuming,
that
when
they
have
in
difcourfe
ufed
af)
|
‘term,
they
have
thereby,
as it
were,
fet’before
others
©
very
thing
they
talked
of;
and
fo
likewife
taking
™
words
of
others,
as
naturally
ftanding
for
juft
what
themfelves
have
been
accuftomed
to
apply
them
to,
¢
ne
never
trouble
themfelves
to
explain
their
own,
or
ul
derftand
clearly
others
meaning.
From
whence
cor
monly
proceed
noife
and
wrangling,
without
improv
ment
or
information
;
whilft
men
take
words
to
be
©
“conftant
regular
marks
of
agreed
notions,
which
in
trv"
are
no
more
but
the
voluntary
and
unfteady
figns
,
their
own
ideas.
And
yet
men
think
it
ftrange,
if
©
difcourfe,
or
(where
it
is
often
abfolutely
neceffary)
?
difpute,
one
fometimes
afks
the
meaning
of
their
ter®™
though
the
arguings
one
may
every
day
obferve
in
©
verfation,
make
it
evident,
that
there
are
few
names
‘complex
ideas
which
any
two
men
ufe
for
the
fame),
‘precife
collection.
It
is
hard
to
name
a
word
wht
‘will
not
be
a
clear
inftance
of
this.
Life
isa
term,
BY
more
familiar.
Any
one
almoft
would
take
it
for
‘affront
to
be
afked
what
he
meant
by
it.
And
yet
I,
‘comes
in
queftion,
whether
a
plant,
that
lies
1%
‘formed
in
the
feed,
have
life;
whether
the
embryo
in
egg
before
incubation,
or
a
man
in
a
fwoon
with
‘fenfe
or
motion,
be
alive
or
no;
it
is
eafy
to
perce
“that
a
clear
diftinct
fettled
idea
does
not
always
acc®
‘pany
the
ufe
of
fo
known
a
word
as
that
of
life
is.
7%
‘grofs
and
confufed
conceptions
men
indeed
ordin®
have,
to
which
they
apply
the
common
words
of
language
;
and
fuch
a
loofe
ufe
of
their
words
ferves
~
well
enongh
in
their
ordinary
difcourfes
or
affairs.
—
this
is
not
fufficient
for
philofophical
inquiries.
Ane
ledge
and
reafoning
require
precife
determinate
i!
de
And
though
men
will
not
be
fo
importunately
du’),
Ch.
102
Abufe
of
Words,
Not
to
underftand
what
others
{a
an
explication
of
their
terms
:
tical,
as
to
correct
others
in
Teceive
from
them;
concerned
in
the
cafe,
I
know
not
what
fault
it
can
be
to
defire
the
explication
of
words,
whofe
fenfe
fcéms
ubious
;
or
why
a
man
fhould
be
afhamed
to
own
his
ignorance,
in
what
fenfe
another
man
ufes
his
-words,
fince
he
has
no
other
way
of
certainly
knowing
it,
but
by
being
informed.
This
abufe
of
taking
words
upon
truft
has
no
where
{pread
fo
far,
nor
)
37
y
without.
demanding
nor
fo
troublefomely
cri-
the
ufe
of
the
words
they
yet
where
truth
and
knowledge
are
with
fo
ill
effects,
as
amongft
men
of
letters,
-
The
multiplication
and
obftinacy
of
difputes,
which
have
fo
laid
wafte
the
intel-
lectual
world,
1S
OWing
to
nothing
more,
than
to
this
ill
ufe
of
words.
For
though
it
be
generally
believed
that
there
is
great
dive;
inions
ume
of
different
parties
do,
in
their
arguings
one
with
an.
»
1s,
that
they
fpeak
different
languages.
For
|
8M
apt
to
imagine,
that_
when.
any
of
them
quitting
terms,
think
upon
things,
and
Know
what
they
think;
they
think
al}
the
fame;
though.
perhaps
what
they
Would
have,
be
different.
inary
ag,
a
1
ng
ig
§.
23.
To
Conclude
this
confideration
of
The
ends
of.
:
nguage;
the
lan
wage:
anguage
in
our
difcourfe
with
1
oconvey
others,
being
chiefly
thefe
three:
firft,
to
Ut
ideas.
make
known
one
man’s
thoughts
or
ideas
to
another
;
fecondly,
to
do
it
with
as
much
eafe
and
quicknefs
as
poffible;
and,
thirdly,
thereby
to
convey
the
knowledge
of
things
:
language
is
either
abufed
or
deficient,
when
it
fails
of
any
of
thefe
three,
-
4
Words
fail
in
the
firft
of
thefe
ends,
and
lay
not
N’s
ideas
to
another’s'view:
1,
When
men
,
Dave
names
1n
thei
44
Remedies
of
the
ImperfeZion
Book
5
yet
he
does,
/as.
much
as'in
him
lies,
break
or
{top
thé
ipesy:.
whereby.
it
is
diftributed
to
the)
public
ufe
an@
advantage,
of
mankind.
.He_
that
ufes
words
withow
any
clear
and
fteady
meaning,
what
does
he
but
leat
himfelfahd
others
into
errors?
And
he
that.
defigned!f
does
it,
ought
to
be
looked
on
as.an
enemy
to
truth
ane
Knowledge.
.
And
yet
who
can
‘wonder,
that
all
the
{ciences.
and
parts
of
knowledge
have.
been
fo
ovel#
charged
with
obfcure
and
equivocal
terms,
and
infign!
ficant:.anddoubtful
expreffions,
capable
to
make
tl
moft
attentive
or
quick-fighted
very
little
or
not
at
the
more
knowing
or
orthodox
;
fince
fubtilty,
in
tho#
who
make
profeffion
to
teach
or
defend)
truth,
hat
paffed
fo
much
for
a
virtue:
a
virtue,
indeed,
whic?
confifting
for
the
moft
part
in
nothing,
but
the
falla-
cious
and
illufory
ufe
of
obfcure
or
deceitful
terms,
?
only
fit
to
make
men
more
conceited
in
their
ignoranc#
and
more
obftinate
in
their
errors.
—
ss
§.
6.
Let
us
look
into
the
books
of
com
|
troverfy
of
any
kind;
there
we
fhall
fe
+.
that
the
effect
of
obfcure,
unfteady
or
eque
vocal
terms,
is
nothing
but
noife
and
wrangling
abo
yf
founds,
without
convincing
or
bettering
a,
man’s
unde
ftanding.
;
For
if
the
idea
be
not
agreed
on
betwixt
fpeaker
and
hearer,
for
which
the
words
ftand,
the
4!
gument
is
not
about
things,
but
names.
.
As
often
4
fuch
a
word,
whofe.
fignification
is«not
afcertained
©
twixt
them,
comes
in
ufe,
their
underftandings
have
®©
other
object
wherein
they
agree,
but,
barely
the
foul
the
things
that
they
think
on
at
that
time,
as
expre
by
that
word,
being
quite
different...
Indance!
BAL
Cae
hs
Whether
a
bat
be
a
bird
or
no,
antance,
bat”
not
a
queftion
;
whether’a
bat
be
anoth
A
~°
thing
than
indeed
it
is,
or
have
other
qual”
ties
than
indeed
it
has,
for.
that
would
be
extremely
4)”
furd
to
doubt
of:
but
the
queftionis,
1.
Either
betw
thofe
that
acknowledged
themfelves
to
have
but
im
fect
ideas
of
one
or
both
of
this
fort
of
things,
for
wh
i
ep
ie.
And
wring
ling.
thefe
names
are
fuppofed
to
ftand;
and
then
it
is
a
1@
inquiry
concerning
the
name
of
a
bird
ora
bat,.to
ma?
their
yet
imperfect
ideas
of
it
more
complete,
by
ie
a
Ch.
tr,
~
and
Abufé
of
Words:
mining
whether
all”
bined
together,
be
found
in
a
b
quirers
(not
di
ut
examine.
Or,
tants,
whereof
the
that
a
bat
is
a
bird,
about
the
fignificatio
that
they
not
having
which
they
give
the
45
the
fimple
ideas,
‘to
which,
com
they
both
give
the
name
bird,
be
all
to
at;
but
this
is
a
queftion
only-.of
in-
fputers)
who
neither
affirm,
nor
deny;
2.
It
is
a
queftion
between
difpu=
one
affirms,
and
the
other
denies,
And
then
the
queftion
is
barely
n
of
one
or
both
thefe
words;
in
both
the
fame
complex
ideas,’
t6
fe
two
names,
one
holds,
and
the
other
denies,
that
thefe
two
names
may
be
affirmed
one
of
another,
Were
they
agreed
in
the
fignification:
of
»
It
were
im
€
general
name
bird,
were
found
in
the
complex
idea
of
a
bat,
or
no;
and
fo
there
could
be
no
doubt,
whether
a
bat
were
a
bird
or
no.
And
WW
»
and
reduced
in
their
fi
muft
be
where
the
Collections
of
the
fimple
ideas
they
do
or
‘fhould
ftand
for,
thofe
difputes
would
not
end
of
themfelves,
and
,
immediately
vanifh
what
the
learnin
verfies,
When
I
fhall
fee
any
of
thofe
combatants
ftrit
t
his
terms
of
ambiguity
and
obfcurity
(which
every
-
ve
may
do
j
rds
he
ufes
himfelf)
I
thall
think
‘him
a
champion
for
knowledge,
truth
and
peace,
and
‘Not
the
flave
of
vain-glory,
ambition,
ora
party.
.
ce
ate
O'remedy
the
defects
‘of
{pe
tioned
to
ech
before-men-
ti
fome
degree,
and
to
prevent
the
inconvenien-
‘Cles
that
follow
from,
them,
I
imagine
the
obfervation
of
thefe
following
iiles
may
be
of
ufe,
till
fomebody
Worth
his
while
to
think
more
maturely
4,
“better
able
fhall
judge
it
46
Remedies
of
the
Imperfecion
Book
3
maturely
on
this
matter,
and
oblige:
the
world
with
hit
thoughts
on
it.
. i
a
Remedy,
Firft,
a.man
fhall
take
care
to
ufe
n0
o
NGMECY
9
.
.
.
‘he
toufeno...
word
without
a
fignification,
noname
with”
word
with-
out
an
idea
for
which
he
makes
it
ftan™
out
an
idea.
"This
rule
will/not
feem
altogether
needlels
to.any
one
who
{hail
take
the
pains
to
recollect
ho"
often.
he
has
met
with
fuch
words,
as
inftinct,
fymp’
thy
and
antipathy,
&c.
in
the
difcourfe
of
others,
©
made.ufe
of,.as
he,might
eafily
conclude,
tat
thofe
thf
ufed
them
had
no
ideas
in
their
minds
to
which
th?
applied.them;
but
{poke
them
only
as
founds,
whi@
ufually
ferved
inftead
of
reafons
on
the
like
occafion
Not
but
that.thefe
words,
and
the
like,
have
very
prop?
fignifications
in
which
they
may
be
ufed;
but
the
being
no.natural
connexion
between
any
words
and
40)
adeas,
thefe,
and
any
other,
may
be
learned
by
rote,
aa
pronounced
or
writ.by
men,
who.
have‘no
ideas
jin
the!
minds,
to
which
they.have
annexed
them,
and
for
wits
they
‘make
them
ftand;
which
is
neceflary
they
fhoulé
_df
men
would
fpeak
intelligibly
even'to
themfel
ves
alon®
a.
Tohave
99+
Secondly,
jt
is
not
enough
a.
ue
diftin®ideas
ufes
his
words.as
figns
of
fome
ideas:
tho
annexedto
he
annexes
them
to,
if
they
be
fimple,
mutt
ear
'.
\be.
clear
and
diftinct
;
if
complex,
muft
es.
;
‘ - 2
_
determinate,
i.
¢.
the
precife
collection
©
fimple
ideas
fettled
in
the
mind,
with
that
found
4
snexed
.to.it,
as
the-fign
of
that
precife
determined
Co”
lection,
and
no
other.
This
is
very
neceffary.in
nam©
.of
modes,
and
efpecially
moral
words;
which
havilz
no
fettled
objects
in.nature,
frorn
whence
their
ideas?
‘taken,
.as-from
their
original,
are
apt
to
be
very
CO”,
fufed.
Juftice
isa
word
in
every.man’s
mouth,
?.-
-moft
commonly
with
a
very-undetermined
loofe
Ages
ication:
which
will
always
be
fo,
unlefsaman
has
10?
mind
a
diftinct,
comprehenfion
of
the
component
part
that.
complex
idea
confifts.
of:
and
ifjit
be
decompou
ed,
muft
be
able
to
refolve,
it
ftill
on,
till
heat
laft
com,
-to
the
fimple
ideas
that
make
it
up:
-and
unlefs
‘this
7
done,
a
man:makes:an
ill-ufe
of
the
word,
(let
it
be
JY
«tice,
for
example,
or/any.other,-
Ido
not
fay,
a
nit
Db
‘3
Churrts.
and
Abufe
of
Words.
need
ftand
to.
recollect
and
make
this.
an
every
time
the
word
juftice
comes
in
his
at
leaft
is
neceflary,
that
he
have
fo
examined
the
fication
of
that
name,
and
fettled
the
idea
of
all
it
in
hismind,
that-he
‘c
_
who
makes
his
com
treatment
of
‘the
pe
47
alyfis
-at
large,
way
;.
but
this
figni-
tp
parts
ando
it
when
he
pleafes.
If
one,
plex
idea
of
juftice
to
be
fuch
a
rfon
or
goods
of
another,
as
is
ac.
cording
to
law,
hath
not
a
clear
and
diftin@
idea
what
law
is,
which
makes.a
part
of
his
complex
idea‘of
juf-
tice;
itis
plain
his
idea
of
juttice
itfelf
will.
be
confufed
andimpertect..
This
exa@nefs
will,
perhaps,
-be
judged
yery
troublefome;
and
therefore
mot
men.
will
think
they
may
be
excufed
from
fettling
the
complex
ideas
of
mixed
modes
fo
precifely
in
their
minds.
But
yet
I
muft
fay,
till
this
be
done,.it_muft
not
be
wondered
that
they
have
a
great
deal
of
obfcurity
and
confufion
in
their
own
minds,
and
a
great
deal
of
wrangling
in
their
difcourfe
with
others.
ae,
ee
Gage
SeRN
§.
to.
In
the
names
of
fubftances,
fora
And
difting
right
ufe
of
them,
fomething
more
is
re.
Sah
quired
than
barely
determined
ideasy:
En!
inde
thefe
the
names
mutt
alfo
be
conformable
to
things
as
they
exif:
but
of
this
I
.thall
have
occa-
fion
to
fpeak
more
at
large
by
and
by.
This
exaétnefs
Js
abfolutely
neces
ary
in
inquiries
-after
philofophical
Knowledge,’
and
in
Controverfies,
aboug
.
truth.
“And
though
it
would-be
Well
too,
if
it
extended
itfelf-to
Common
converfation,
and
the
ordinary
affairs
of
life;
yet
I
think
that
is
fearce
to
be
expected.
Vulgar
no-
Uons
fuit
vulgar
difcourfes;
and
both,
though
confufed
‘enough,
y
et
ferve
pretty
well
the
market
andithe
wake.
erchants
and
lovers,
cook
h
their
ordinary
affairs
;,and_
fo,
$s
11.
Thirdly,
it is
nor
enoughthatmen
.....
~have
ideas,
determined
ideas,
far
whic
ee
ee
a
make
thefe
figns
ftand
;
but
they
mutt-alfo
take
care
to.
apply
their
Words,
as
near.
as
may)
be,
to
fuch
ideas
as
Son
aie
has.
anhexed
them
to.
For
words,
efpe-
.€lally
of
languages
already
framed,
being
no
man’s
pri-
~
vate
s
and
taylors,
have
words
-
es
48
Remedies
of
the
Imperfection
Book
D
vate
poffeffion,
but
the
common
meafure
of
commert™
and
communication,
it'
is
not
for
any
one,
at
pleafurt
to
change
the
ftamp
they
are
current
in,
nor
alter
th
ideas
they
are
affixed
to;
or
at
leaft,
when
there
is
a
n©
ceffity
to
do
fo,
he
is
bound
to
give
notice
of
it.
Men:
intentions
in
fpeaking
are,
or
at
leaft
fhould
be,
to
underftood;
which
cannot
be
without
frequent
exp#7
nations,
demands,
and
other
the
like
incommodious
‘terruptions,
where
men
do
not
follow
common
Propriety
of
fpeech
is
that
which
gives
our
thoug!
entrance
into
other:
men’s
minds
with
the
greateft
ea!
and
advantage;
and
therefore
deferves
fome
part
of
oUF
care
and
ftudy,
efpecially
in
the
names
of
moral
wo
‘The
proper
fignification
and
ufe
of
terms
is
beft
to
learned
from
thofe,
who
in
their
writings
and
difcourl®
appear
to
have
had
the
cleareft
notions,
and
applied
©
them
their
terms
withthe
exacteft
choice
and
fitne®
“This
way
of
ufinga
man’s
words,
according
to
the
pro”
‘priety
of
the
language,
though
it
have
not
always
U™
good
fortune
to
be
underftood;
yet
moft
common
leaves
the
blame
of
it
on
him,
who
is
fo
unfkilful
the
language
he
fpeaks,
as
not
to
underftand
it,
whe
made
ufe
of
as
it
ought
to
be.
Ae
8)
§.
12
Fourthly,
but
‘becaufe
comm
Bees
cat
-ufe
has
not
fo
vifibly.
annexed
any
fignific®
meaning,
tioh
to
words,
as
to
make
men
know
alway)
|
~
Certainly
what
they
precifely
ftand
for;
am
becaufe
men,
in
the
improvement
of
their
knowledag
come
to
have
ideas
different
from
the
vulgar
and.
ore”
nary
received
ones,
for
which
they
muft
either
m4*”
new
words
(which
men
feldom
venture
to
do,
for
feat
of
being
thought
guilty
of
affectation
or
novelty)
or
6
muft
ufe
old
ones,
in
a
new
fignification:
therefore
alt
the
obfervation
of
the
foregoing
rules,
it
is
fometim@
‘neceffary,
for
the
afcertaining
the
fignification
of
wore”
‘to
declare
their
meaning;
where
either
common
ufe
left.it
uncertain
and
loofe
(as
it
has
in
moft
names
©
very
complex
ideas)
or’where
the
term,
being
very
™
terial
in
the
difcourfe,
and
that
upon
which
it
chit?
turns,
is
liable
to
any
doubtfulnefs
or
miftake.
|
Ie.
bt
7
:
f
Ch.
'rry
and
Abufe
of
Words.
§.
13.
As
the
ideas,
men’s’
words
ftand
for,
are
of
different
forts
.
fo
the
way
of
eth,
making
known
the
ideas,
they
ftand
for,
;
when
there
js
Occafion,
is
alfo
different.
For
though
defining
be
thought
the
proper
way
to
make
known
the
Proper
fignification
of
words
3
yet
there
are
fome
words
that
will
not
be
defined,
as
there
are
others,
whofe
pre-
cife
meaning
cannot
be
made
known,
but
by
definition
;
a7
the
other,
as
we
fhall
fee
in
the
names
of
{imple
ideas,
'
modes,
and
fubftances.
°
§..
14.
Firft,
when
a
man
makes
ufe
of
the
name
of
any
fimple
idea,
which
he
PEr-
ideas
by
fy-
€eives
is
not
underftood,
or
is
j
honymious
?
;
:
terms,
or
obliged
by
the
laws
of
TNawiny:
fpeech,
to
declare
Own
what
idea
he
makes
it
{tand
for,
This,
as
has
been
fhown,
cannot
be
done
€,
when
a
fynonymous
word
it,
there
is
but
one
of
thefe
ways
left,
Firft,
times
th
ing
the
fubject,
wherein
that
fimplé
idea
is
to
be
found,
will
make
its
name
to
be
underftood
©
acquainted
with
that
fubject,
and
Oo
make
a
countryman
underftand
what
«
feuillemorte”
colony
fignifies,
it
may
fuffice
to
tell
him,
it
18
the
colour
of
withered
leaveg
falling
In
autumn,
Secondly,
but
the
only
fure
way
of
making
known
the
fignification
of
the
name
of
any
fire
ple
idea
ig
by
Prefenting
to
his
fenfes
that
fubject,
which
May
Produce
it
in
his
mm:
S
mind,
and
make
him
actually
have
the
idea
that
word
flands
for.
15.
Secondly,
mixed
modes,
efpecially
2.
In
mixed
thofe
belonging
to
morality,
‘being
moft
of
-
modes,
‘by.
ations,
of
ideas,
as
the
“finition,
1.
In
fimple
cuy
and
exactly
defined.
int
cy
being
combinations
of
fe
:
Natio
veral
ideas,
that
the
=
Of
man
has
arbitrarily
PUC
together,
Without
re-
ot.
H.
E
.
ference
:
>
a
SSS
See
SS
RS
EE
SS
ee
OE
DAG
ERE
AE
LR
AEA
aS
50
Remedies
of
the
Imperfeé?ion
Book.
3
ference
to
any
archetypes,
men
may,
if
they
pleafe,
ex
actly
know
the
ideas
that
go
to
each
compofition,
ane
fo
both
ufe
thefe
words
in
a
certain
and
undoubted
fienification,
and
perfectly
declare,
when
there
is
oct
fion,
what
they
ftand
for.
This,
if
well
confideredy
would
lay
great
blame
on
thofe,
who
make
not
theil
difcourfes
about
moral
things
very
clear
and
diftincly
For
fince
the
precife
fignification
of
the
names
of
mixe?
modes,
or,
which
is
all
one,
the
real
effence
of
eac?.
{pecies
is
to
be
known,
they
being
not
of
nature’s
bub
ynan’s
making,
it
is
a
great
negligence
and
perverfene”
to
difcourfe
of
moral
things
with
uncertainty
and
0?
fearity
;
which
is
more
pardonable
in
treating
of
natul®
fubftances,
where
doubtful
terms
are
hardly
to
be
avoide
ed,
for
a
quite
contrary
reafon,
as
we
fhall
fee
by
and
by’
:
—
§,
£6.
Upon
this
ground
it
is,
that
I
able
of
ba:
bold
to
think,
that
morality
is
capable
®
monttration.
demonftration,
as
well
as
mathematick*!
fince
the
precife
real
effence
of
the
thing
in
moral
words
ftand
for
may
be
perfectly
known
;
an
Mf
the
congruity
and
incongruity
of
the
things
themfel®
be
certainly
difcovered
;
in
which
confifts
perfect
kno¥
ledge.
Nor
let
any
one
object,
that
the
names
of
{uP
{tances
are
often
to
be
made
ufe
of
in
morality,
as
We
as
thofe
of
modes,
from
which
will
arife
obfcurity.
iG
as
to
fubftances,
when
concerned
in
moral
difcouf
an
their
divers
natures
are
not
fo
much
inquired
into,”
fuppofed;
v-g-
when
we
fay
that
man
is
fubject
to
1alt
we
mean
nothing
by
man,
but
a
corporeal
rational
cl¥
ture:
what
the
real
effence
or
other
qualities
of
tH
creature
are,
in
this
cafe,
1s
no
way
confidered...
4)
therefore,
whether
a
child
or
changeling
be
a
map
w,
phyfical
fenfe,
may
among{t
the
naturalifts
be
as
&
putable
as
it
will,
‘+
concerns
not
at
all
the
moral
a
as
1
may
call
him,
which
is
this
immoveable
unchae,
able
idea,
a
corporeal
rational
being.
For
were
the
monkey,
or
any
other
creature
to
be
found,
that
has
|
ufe
of
reafon
to
fucha
degree
as
to
be
able
to
under#¥)
eneral
figns,
and
to
deduce
confequences
about
ge"
ideas,
he
would
no
doubt
be
fubject
to
law,
and
1n*
|
fenfe
be
a
man,
how
much
foever
he
differed
in
2
Chars
and
Abufe
of
Words...
er
from
others
of
that
name.
The
names
of
fubftances,
if
they
be
ufed
in
them
as
they
fhould,
can
no
more
dif.
turb
moral
than
they
do
mathematical
difcourfes
:
where,
if
the
mathematician
{peaks
of
a
cube
or
globe
of
gold,
or
any
other
body,
he
has
his
clear
fettled
idea
which
varies
not,
though
it
may
by
miftake
be
applied
to
a
particular
body
to
which
it
belongs
not.
§.
17.
This
I
have
here
mentioned
by
the.
Definitions
by,
to
fhow
of
what
confequence
it
is
for
can
make
men,
in
their
names
of
mixed
modes,
and
pi
rs
.
2
s
COUuries
Ci€als
confequently
in
all
their
moral
difcourfes,
to
define
their
words
when
there
is
occafion:
fince
thereby
moral
knowledge
may
be
brought
to
fo
great
clearnefs
and
certainty.
And
it
muft
be
great
want
of
ingenuity
(to
fay
no
worfe
of
it)
to
refufe
to
do
it:
fince
a
definition
is
the
only
way
whereby
the
precife
meaning
of
moral
words
can
be
known:
and
yet
a
way
whereby
their
meaning
may
be
known
certainly,
and
without
leaving
any
room
for
any
conteft
about
it.
And
there-
fore
the
negligence
or
perverfenefs
of
mankind
cannot.
be
excufed,
if
their
difcourfes
in
morality
be
not
much
more
clear
than
thofe
in
natural
philofophy
:
fince
they
are
about
ideas
in
the
mind,
which
are
none
of
them
talfe
or
difproportionate
:
they
haying
no
external
be-
ings
for
the
archetypes
which
they
are
referred
to,
and
muft
correfpond
with.
It
is
far
eafier
for
men
to
frame
in
their
minds
an
idea
which
fhall
be
the
ftandard
to
which
they
will
give
the
name
juftice,
with
which
pate
tern
fo
made,
all
actions
that
agree
fhall
pafs
under
that
denomination
;
than,
having
feen
Ariftides,
to
frame
an
idea
that
fhall
in
all
things
be
exactly
like
him;
who
is
as
he
is,
let
men
make
what
idea
they
pleafe
of
him.
For
the
one,
they
need
but
know
the
combination’
of
ideas
that
are
put
together
in
their
own
minds;
for
the
other,
they
muft
inquire
into
the
whole
nature,
and
abftrufé
hidden
conftitution,
and
various
qualities
of
a
thing
exifting
without
them.
:
§.
18.
Another
reafon
that
makes’
the
atdese
defining
of
mixed
modes
fo
neceflary,
efpe-
oly
ite
cially
of
moral
words,
is
what
I
mentioned
are
a
little
before,
viz.
that
it
is
the
only
way
whereby
the
sek
paag!
5
23
=
figni~
a
Ses
el
S
eS
ee
=
cars
=
=
SS
=
=
Soa
Ss
SS
SS
=
=
-
=
We
SSS
=:
=
RSS
SEE
WS
StS
SSE,
oe
ee
SS
SSS
a
ee
OED
a
-
=
=
eapaiecaensneniate
aetna
tae
ss
han
cee
aS
°
=
—
=
rao
SSS
.
;
52
:
Remedies
of
the
Imperfection
Book
a
fienification
of
the
moft
of
them
can
be
known
wil
certainty.
For
the
ideas
they
ftand
for,
being
for
m
foft
part
fuch
whofe
component
parts
no
where
ex!
together,
but
fcattered
and
mingled
with
others,
it}
the
mind
alone
that
collects
them,
and
gives
them
oh
union
of
one
idea:
and
it
is
only
by,
words,
enumeratifl
the
feveral
fimple
ideas
which
the
mind
has
united,
4
we
can
make
known
to
others
what
their
names
{ta?
for;
the.affiftance
of
the
fenfes
in
this
cafe
not
hel
pity.
us,..by
the
propofal
of
fenfible
objects,
to
fhow
the
ides
which
our-names
of
this
kind
ftand
for,
as
it
does
oft
in
the
names
of
fenfible
fimple
ideas,
and
alfo
to
font
degree
in
thofe
of,
fubftances.
nest
ee
3.
Infub-
§.
19.
Thirdly,
for
the
explaining
tances,
by
'
fignification
of
the
names
of fubftance
eS
_
they
{tand
for
the
ideas,
we
have
of
their
ae
tinct
fpecies,
both
the,
ore-mentioned
wa)
viz,
of
fhowing
and
defining,
are
requifite
in
many
to
be
made
ufe
of. For
there
being
ordinarily
in
ca
fort
fome
leading
qualities,
to
which
we
fuppofe
t
other
ideas,
which
make
up
our
complex
idea
of
©
fpecies,
annexed;
we
forwardly
give
the
fpecifick
1
to,
that
thing,
.
wherein
that
chara¢teriftical
mark,
found,
which.
we
take
to
be
the
moft
diftinguifhing
©
of
that
fpecies.
Thefe
leading
or
characteriftical
(®
may.
call
them)
ideas,
in
the
forts
of
animals
and
V&
tables,
are
(as
has
been
before
remarked,
ch.
vi.
$3
and:ch.
ix.
§.
15.)
moftly
figure,
and
in
inanimate
©
dies,
colour,
and
in
tone
be
piers
Now,
F
ee
"6.20.
Thefe
leading
fenfible
qu
ei
ae
ae
are
thofe
which
make
the
chief
ingrredi
ities
of
fub-
of
our
{pecifick
ideas,
and
confequentl)
ftances
are
=
moft
obfervable
and
invariable
part
iD
bet
got-by
—
GeGnitions
of
our
{pecifick
nan
at
faiigs
pecifick
names,
as
buted.to
forts
of
fubftances
coming
—
‘our
knowledge.
For
though
the
found
man,
in
18
nature,
be
as
apt
to
fignify
a
complex
idea
made
4
animality
and
rationality,
united
in
the
fame
1uM)
as
tofignify
any
other
combination;
yet
ufed
as
2
By
to
ftand
for
a
fort
of
creatures
we
count
of
our
own
?y
pahaps,
the
outward
fhape
is
asineceffary
to
be
|
ey
a
Ch.
11.
and
Abufe
of
Words.
§3
into
our
complex
idea,
fignified
by:
the
word
man,
as
any
other
we
find
in
it:
and
therefore
why
Plato’s
“*
animal
implume
bipes
latis
unguibus’’
fhould
not
be
a
good
definition
of
the
name
man,
ftanding
for
that
fort
of
creatures,
will
not
be
eafy
to
fhow:
for
it
is
the
fhape,
as
the
leading
quality,
that
feems
more
to
de-
termine
that
fpecies,
than
a
faculty
of
reafoning,
which
appears
not
at
firft,
and
in
fome
never.
And
if
this
be
not
allowed
to
be
fo,
I
do
not
know
how
they
can
be
exculed
from
murder,
who
kill
monftrous
births,
(as
we.call
them)
becaufe
of
an
unordinary
fhape,
without
knowing
whether
they
have
a
rational
foul
or
no;
which
can
be
no
more
difcerned
in
a
well-formed
than
ill-
thaped
infant,
as
foon
as
born.
And
who
is
it
has
in-
formed
us,
that
a
rational
foul
can
inhabit
no
tenenient,
unlefs
it
has
juft
fuch
a
fort
of
frontifpiece
;
or
can
join
itfelf
to,
and
inform
no
fort
of
body
but
one
that
is
juft
of
fuch
an
outward
ftru@ure
?
cms
RoR
§..21.
Now
thefe
leading
qualities
are
beft
made
known
by
fhowing,
and
can
hardly
be
made
known
otherwife.
‘For
the
fhape
of
an
horfe,
or
caffuary,
will
be
but
rudely
and
imperfectly
imprinted
on
the
mind
by
words;
the
fight
of
the
animals
doth
it
a
thoufand
times
better:
and
the
idea
of
the
particular
colour
of
gold
is
not
to
be
got
by
any
defcription
of
it,
but
only
by
the
frequent
exercife
of
the
eyes
about
it,
as
is
evident
in
thofe
who
are
ufed
to
this
metal,
.who
will
-
frequently
diftinguith
true
from
counterfeit,
pure
from
adulterate,
by
the
fight;
where
others
(who
have
as
good
eyes,
but
yet
by
ufe
have
not
got
the
precife
nice
idea
of
that
peculiar
yellow)
thall
not
perceive
any
dif-
ference.
The
like
may
be
faid
of
thofe
other
fimple
ideas,
peculiar
in
their
kind
to
any
fubftance;
for
which
precife
ideas
there
are
no
peculiar
names.
The
parti-
cular
ringing
fou
nd
there
is
in
gold,
diftiné&
from
the
found
of
other
bodies,
has
no
particular
name
annexed
to
it,
no
more
than
the
particular
yellow
that
belongs
_to
that
metal.
_§.
22.
But
becaufe
many
of
the
fimple
The
ideas
of
ideas
that
make
up
our
fpecifick
ideas
of
their
iene
Aubftances,
are
powers
which
lie
not
ob-
bet
by
defi-
'Vious
to’our-fenfes
in
the
things
as
they
ordi-
:
SS
eee
=
—-
=
SS
=
ae
SS
SaaS
SS
SS
==
SS
eee
a
z
SaaS
SS
~
=
ee
ee
a
=
=a
=
ee
62
:
Remedies
of
the
ImperfeTion
Book
3:
fortification
of
the
moft
of
them
can
be
known
with
certainty.
For
the
ideas
they
ftand
for,
being
for
the
moft
part
fuch
whofe
component
parts
no
where
exit
together,.
but
fcattered
and
mingled
with
others,
it
B
the
“mind
alone
that
collects
them,
and
gives
them
#
a
union
of
one
idea:
and
it
is
only
by
words,
enumerating
the
feveral
fim
le
ideas
which
the
mind
has
united,
chal
we
can
make
N
owh
to
others
what
their
names
tan’
for;
the
affiftance
of
the
fenfes
in
this
cafe
not
hel
pity”
us,
by
the
propofal
of
fenfible
objects,
to
fhow
the
idea
which
our-names
of
this
kind
ftand
for,
as
it
does
oftel
in
the
names_of
fenfible
fimple
ideas,
and
alfo
to
fom
degree
in
thofe
oftubitances.,
©
0:4.
ane
nie.
S49,
Thirdly,
for
the.
explaining
Mf
Rances,
by
_fignification
of
the
names
of
fubftances,
4
OE
ig
they
ftand
for
the
ideas,
we
have
of
their
ji
reget
tinct
fpecies,
both
the
fore-mentioned
way?
viz.
of
fhowing
and
defining,
are
requifite
in
many
ca
to
be
made
ufe
of.
For
there
being
ordinarily
in
cae
fort
fome
leading
qualities,
to
which
we
fuppofe
¥
other
ideas,
which
make
up
our
complex
idea
of
1
fpecies,
annexed;
we
forwardly
give
the
fpecifick
nae
to,
that
thing,
|
wherein
that
chara¢teriftical
mark
©
found,
which.
we
take
to.
be
the
moft
diftinguifhing
id
of
that
fpecies.
Thefe
leading
or
characteriftical
(a5
may.
call.
them)
ideas,
in
the
forts
of
animals
and
veo,
tables,
are
(as
has
been
before
remarked,
ch.
vi.
§.
7
-and-ch.
ix.
§.
15.)
moftly
figure,
and
in
inanimate
7
dies,
colour,
and
in
fome
both
together.
Now,
44
‘Bessiok
the
§.
20.
Thefe
leading
fenfible
quali
leading’
quae
are
thofe
which
make
the
chief
ingredi@)
lities
of
fub-
of
our
fpecifick
ideas,
and
confequently
4
ftances
are
moft
obfervable
and
invariable
part
in®
beft
govby
definitions
of
our
fpecifick
nan
al?
fhowihge
r
fpecifick
names,
as
#
|
buted.to
forts
of
fubftances
coming
U™
‘our
knowledge.
For
though
the
found
man,
in
its
°
nature,
be
as
apt
to
fignify
a
complex
idea
made
UP
animality
and
rationality,
united
in
the
fame
{uD},
as
to
fignify
any
other
combination
;
yet
ufed
as
a
to
ftand
for
a
fort
of
creatures
we
count
of
our
owl
x
pohaps,
the
outward
fhape
is
asnecefiary
to
be
3"
i
ieeeiaiataes
TURE
ATS
Re
NSE
OE
IR
OOS
LS
LTE
EN
PS
RS
AR
¥
otherwife.
‘Fo;
g
frequently
diftinguith
true
from
c
to
that
metal,
Ch.
1
me
and
Abufe
of
Words.
.
63
into
our
complex
idea,
fignified
by
the
word
man,
as
any
other
we
find
in
it:
and
therefore
why
Plato’s
.
animal
implume
bipes
latis
unguibus”’
fhould
not
be
4
good
definition
of
the
name
man,
ftanding
for
that
fort
of
creatures,
will
not
be
eafy
to
fhow:
for
it
is
the
ape,
as
the
leading
quality,
that
feéms
moreté
de-
termine
that
{pecies,
than
a
faculty
of
reafoning,
which
appears
not
at
firft,
and
in
fome
never.
Andi
this
be
not
allowed
to
be
fo,
I
do
not
know
how
they
can
be
excufed
from
murder,
who
kill
monftrous
births,
(as
we
call
them)
becaufe
of
an
unordinary
fhape,
without
knowing
whether
they
have
a
rational
foul
or
no;
which
can
be
no
more
difcerned
in
a
well-formed
than
jll-
thaped
‘infant,
as
foon
as
born.
And
who
is
it
has
in-
formed
us,
that
a
rational
foul
can’inhabit
no
tenement,
tifpiece
;
or
can
join
of
fuch
an
Outward
ftructure
?
mere
Piers
cere
§..21.
Now
thefe
leading
qualities
are
belt
made
known
by
fhowing,
and
can
hardly
be
made
known
the
fhape
of
an
horfe,
or
¢caffuary,
will
but
rudely
and
imperfectly
imprinted
on
the
‘mind
by
words;
the
fight
of
the
animals
doth
it
a
thoufand
times
better:
and
the
idea
of
the
particular
colour
of
gold
is
not
to
be
got
by
any
defcription
of
it,
but
only
by
the
frequent
exercife
of
the
eyes
about
it,
as
is
evident
in
thofe
who
are
ufed
to
this
metal,
who
will
|
ounterfeit,
pure
from
adulterate,
by
the
fight;
where
others’
(who
have
as
S00d
eyes,
but
yet
by
ufe
have
not
got
the
precife
nice
idea
of
that
peculiar
yellow)
fhall
not
perceive
any
dif-
‘erence.
The
like
may
be
faid
of
thofe
other
fimple
ideas,
Peculiar
in
their
kind
to
any
fubftance;
for
which
Precife
ideas
there
are
no
peculiar
names.
The
parti-
cular
ringing
found
there
is
in
gold,
diftiné
from
the
found
of
other
bodies,
has
no
particular
name
annexed
tO
1t,
no
more
than
the
particular
yellow
that
belongs
.,5*
22+
But
becaufe
many
of
the
fimple
The
ideas
of
ideas
that
make
up
our
fpecifick
ideas
of
—
their
powers
Anbfances,
are
powers
which
lie
not
ob~
—
belt
by
defi.
i
erm
~
4
Pe
Se
|
SSOP
ER
.
‘
nition.
vious
to“our-fenfes
in
the
things
as
they
;
E
3
ordi-
es
—
emer
wee
~
——
hee
RN
SE
toe
—————
SSS
=
ES
ordinarily
appear;
therefore
in
the
fignification
©
Jedge
exceeds
our
conceptions.
fos
jl)
3.
54
Remedies
of
the
ImperfeéZton
Book
f
oul
names
of
fubftances,
fome
part
of
the
fignification
will
be
better
made
known
by
enumerating
thofe
fimp
ideas,
than
by
fhowing
the
fubftance
itfelf.
For
ie
that
to
the
yellow
fhining
colour
of
gold
got
by
figh
fhall,
from
my
enumerating
them,
have
the
ideas
“great
ductility,
fufibility,
fixednefs,
and
folubility
in
regia,
will
have
a
perfecter
idea
of
gold,
than
he
¢
‘
tim
for
“have
by
feeing
a
piece
of
gold,
and
thereby
imprin
in
his
mind
only
its
obvious
qualities.
But
if
the
“mal
conftitution
of
this
fhining,
heavy,
ductile
thie
“(from
whence
all
thefe
its
properties
flow)
lay
opel
®
our
fenfes,
as
the
formal
conftitution,
or
effence
%
triangle
does,
the
fignification
of
the
word
gold
mig”
as
eafily
be
afcertained
as
that
of
triangle.
a
|
A
refleétion
§.
23.
Hence
we
may
take
notice
he
on
the
know-
‘much
the
foundation
of
all
our
knowlee
sees
of
fpi-
of
corporeal
things
lies
in
our
fenfes.
*
sites?
2
how
fpirits,
feparate
from
bodies
(whe)
knowledge
and
ideas
of
thefe
things
are
certainly
mu
more
perfect
than
ours)
know
them,
we
have
no
note:
“no
idea
at
all.
The
whole
extent
of
our
knowledg¢”
imagination
reaches
not
beyond
our
own
ideas
lim
to
our
ways
of
perception.
Though
yet
it
be
not
7
doubted
that
fpirits
of
a
higher
rank
than
thofe
imme!
in
flefh,
may
have
as
clear
ideas
of
the
radical
cont
tion
of
fubftances,
as
we
have
of
a
triangle,
and
fo
P
ceive
how all
their
propertics
and
operations
flow
©
thence:
but
the
manner
how
they
come
by
that
ko®
L-
4.
Tdeas
alfo
§.
24.
But
though
definitions
w
+
fabftances
tO
explain
the
names
of
fubftances
a5.)
ee
ag
ftand
for
our
ideas
;
yet
they
leave
them)
onic
to
~—s
without
great
imperfection
as
they
ftand)
ings.
fe
ch
things.
For
our
names
of
fubftances
ofl
“not
put
barely
for
our
ideas,
but
being
made
ufe
of
hy
mately
to
reprefent
things,
and
fo
are
put
}
a
place;
their
fignification
muft
agree
with
the
true
things
as
well
as
with
men’s
ideas.
And
there
Oe
fubftances
we
are
not
always
to
reft
in
the
oF
ee
complex
idea,
commonly
received
as
the
fignific®)
-
Chita
and
Abufe
of
Words.”
35
of
that
word,
but
muft
goa
little
farther,
and
inquire
into
the
nature
and
properties
of
the
things
themfelves,
and
thereby
perfect,
as
much
as
we
can,
our
ideas
of
their
diftinct
{pecies
;
or
elfe
learn
them
from
fuch.
as
are
ufed
to
that
fort.
of
things,
and
are
experienced
in
them.
For
fince
it
is
intended
their
names
fhould
ftand
for
fuch
collections
of
fimple
ideas
as
do
really
exift
in
things
themfelves,
as
well
as
for
the
complex
idea
_in
other
men’s.minds,
which
in
their
ordinary
acceptation
they
ftand
for:
therefore
to
define
their
names
right,
natural
hiftory
is
to
be
inquired
into:
and
their
proper-
ties
are,
with
Care
and
examination,
to
be
found
out.
For
it
is
not
enough,
for
the
avoiding
inconveniencies
in
difcourfe
and
arguings
about
natural
bodies
and
fub..
ftantial
things,
to
hay
€
learned,
from
the
propriety
of
the
language,
the
common,
but
confufed,
or
very
im-
perfect
idea,
to
which
each
word
js
applied,
and
to
Keep
them
to
that
idea
‘in
our
ufe
of
them
:
but
we
muft,
by
acquainting
ourfelves
with
the
hiftory
of
that
fort
of
things,
rectify
and
fettle
our
complex
idea
belonging
to
each
{pecific
name;
and
in
difcourfe
with
others,
(if
we
find
them
miftake
us)
we
ought
to
tell
what
the
complex
idea
is,
that
we
make
fuch
a
name
ftand
for.
is
is
the.
more
neceflary
to
be
done
by
all
thefe
who
fearch
after
knowled
:
ge
and
philofophical
verity,
in
that
children,
being
taught
words
whilft
they
have
but
im-
perfect
notions
of
things,
apply
them
at
random,
and
Without
much
thinking,
and
feldom
frame
determined
ideas.
to
be
fignified
by
them.
Which
cuftom
(it
being
eafy,
and
ferving
well
enough
for
the
ordinary
affairs
of
life
and
converfation)
they
are
apt
to
continue
when
they
are
men:
and
fo
begin
at
the
wrong
end,
learning
words
firft
and
perfectly,
but
make
thé
notions
to
which
they
apply
thofe
words
afterwards
very
overtly.
By
this
means
it
Comes
to
pafs;
that
men
fpeaking
the
Proper
language
of
their
country,
i.e,
according
to
stammiar
rules
of
that
lancuage,
do
yet
{peak
very
im
Properly.
of
things
themfelycs
;
and,
by
their
arguing
one
with
another,
make
but
fmall
progrefs
in
the
dif-
Coveries
of
ufeful
truths,
and
the
knowledge
of
things,
as
they
are
to
be
found
in
themfelyes,
and
not
in
our
Awe
ima-~
’
’
———
==
SSeS
—
Se
‘as
explain
the
fenfe
men
ufethem
in.
And
it
would?
fig
nifications
of
common
words
are
certainly
eftablith
‘and
the
precife
ideas
they
ftand
for
perfectly
know’.
56
Remedies
of
the
Imperfettion
Book
3:
imaginations;
and
it
matters
not
much,
for
the
im
provement
of
our
knowledge,
how
they
are
called.
.
25.
It
were
therefore
to
be
withedy
Not
eafyto
that
men,
verfed
in
phyfical
inquiries,
a™
.
bas
acquainted
with
the
feveral
forts
of
natul
f
bodies,
would
fet
down
thofe
fimple
ideas,
wherein
the)
obferve
the
individuals
of
each
fort
conftantly
to
agree
This
would
remedy
a
great
deal
of
that
confufion
wht
comes
from
feveral
perfons
applying
the
fame
name
|
a
collection
of
a
fmaller
or
greater
number
of
fenfible
qualities,
proportionably
as
they
have
been
more
a
lefs
acquainted
with,
or
accurate
in
examining
the
qua
lities
of
any
fort
of
things
which
come
under
one
den”
mination.
But
a
dictionary
of
this
fort
containing,
©
‘it
were,
a
natural
hiftory,
requires
too
many
hands,
*
‘well
as
too
much
time,
coft,
pains,
and
fagacity,
€Y
‘to
be
hoped.
for
;
and
till
that
be
done,
we
muft
contel
ourfelves
with
fuch
definitions
of
the
names‘of
fubftan®
‘well
~
where
there
is
occafion,
if
they
would
afford
us”
‘much.
,
This
yet
is
not
ufually
done;
but
men
talk
t
‘one
another,
and
difpute
in
words,
whofe
meaning
Hot
agreed
between
them,
out
of
a
miftake,
that
%
and
that
it
is
a
fhame
to
be
ignorant
of
them.
which
fuppofitions
are
falfe
:
no
names
of
complex!
having
fo
fettled
determined
fignifications,
that
are
conftantly
ufed
for
the
fame
precife
ideas.
N
ita
fhame
for
a
man
not
to
have
a
certain
knowledge
any
thing,
but
by
the
neceffary
ways
of
attaining
and
fo
it
is
no
difcredit
not
to
know
what
precife
®%
any
found
ftands
for
in
another
man’s
mind,
‘without
declare
it
to
me
by
fome
other
way
than
barely
Wy)
‘that
found;
there
being
no
ether
way,
without
{uG,
declaration,
certainly
to
know
it.
Indeed
the
nece™
of
communication
by
language
brings
men
to
an
a5.
.
ment
in
the
fignification
of
common
words,
within
#@,
tolerable
latitude,
that
may
ferve
for
ordinary
co?’
fation:
and
fo
a
man
cannot
be
fuppofed
wholly
12
rant
of
the
ideas
which
are
annexed
to
words
by
’
Ch,
fe
mon
ufe,
and
Abufe
of
Words.
57
in
a
language
familiar
to
him,
But
common
ufe,
being
but
a
very
uncertain
rule,
which
reduces
itfelf
at
laft
to
the
ideas
of
particular
men,
proves
often
ut
a
very
variable
ftandard.
But
though
fuch
a
dic-
tionary,
as
I
have
above-mentioned,
will
require
too
much
time,
coft,
and
pains,
to
be
hoped
for
in
this
age;
yet
methinks
it
is
not
unreafonable
to
propofe,
that
words
ftanding
for
things,
which
are
Known
and
diftin-
-guithed
by
their
outward
fhapes,
fhould
be
expreffed
by
little
draughts
and
Prints
made
of
them.
A
vocabulary
-made
after
this
fathion
would
perhaps,
with
more
cafe,
and
in
lefs
time,
teach
the
true
fignification
of
many
things,
whereof
we
rea
-1€nt
autho
than
all
the
large
and
laborious
comments
of
learned
Criticks.
Naturalifts,
that
treat
of
plants
and
‘animals,
have
found
the
benefit
of
this
way:
and
he'that
has
had
occafion
to
confult
them,
will
have
reafon
to
confefs,
that
he
has
a
clearer
idea
of
apium
or
ibex,
from
a
little
print
of
that
herb
or
beaft,
than
he
could’have
from
a
long
definition
of
the
names
of
either
of
them.
And
?
no
doubt
he
would
have
of
{tri
il
and
fiftrum,
if
in-
ftead
of
curry-comb
and
eae
which
are
the
Eng-
lith
names
dictionaries
render
them
by,
he
could
fee
ftamped
in
the
margin
fmall
pictures
of
thefe
inftru_
ments,
as
they
were
in
ufe
amongft
the
ancients.
**
Toga,
funica,
pallium,”
are
words
eafily
tranflated
by
gown,
Coat,
and-cloak;
but
we
have
th
faces
of
the
taylors
who
made
them.
Such
things
as
thefe,
which
the
eye
diftinguifhes
by
their
thapes,
would
be
beft
Jet
into
the
mind
by
draughts
made
of
them,
and
more
determine
the
fignification
of
fuch
words
than
any
other
words
fet
for
them,
or
made
ufe
of
to
define
them.
But
this
only
by
the
by.
§.
26.
Fifthly,
if
men
will
not
be
at
the
Tei,
Pains
to
declare
the
meaning
of
their
words,
Hans
in,
and
definitions
of
their
terms
are
not
to
be
their
fignifi-
had;
yet
thig
is
the
leaft
that
can
be
ex.
cation.
Pected,
that
in
all
difcourles,
wherein
one
man.
pretends
to
53
Knowledge.
Book
#
to
inftrué
or
convince
another,
he
fhould
ufe
the
fame
word
conftantly
in
the
fame
fenfe:
if
this
were
done
(which
no
body
can
refufe
without
great
difingenuity/
many
of
the
books
extant
might
be
fpared;
many
of
the
controyerfies
in
difpute
would
be
at
an
end;
feveral
thofe
great
volumes,
{woln
with
ambiguous
words,
now
ufed
in
one
fenfe,
and
by
and
by
in
another,
would
fhrink
into
a
very
narrow
compafs;
and
many
of
the
philofophers
(to
mention
no
other)
as
well
as
poe
works,
might
be
contained
in
a
nutthell.
a
~—
€.
27.
But
after
all,
the.
provifion
7
Whenthe,
9,
*°)
7/7"
100
a
variation
is
Words
is
fo
fcanty
in
refpect
of
that
infinit’
tobeex-
variety
of
thoughts,
that
men,
wanting
plained.
terms
to
fuit
their
precife
notions,
will,
not
withftanding
their
utmoft
caution, be
forced.
often
@
ufe
the
fame
word
in
fomewhat
different
fenfes.
And
though
in
the
continuation
of
a
difcourfe,
or
the
pul
fuit
of
an
argument,
there
can
be
hardly
room
to
digre#_
“into
particular
definition,
as
often
as
a
man
varies
Uh
fignification
of
any
term;
yet
the
import
of
the
dik
-courfe
will,
for
the
moft
part,
if
there
be
no
defign®
fallacy,
fufficiently
lead
candid
and
intelligent
reade
into
the
true
meaning
of
it:
but
where
there
is
not
fu
ficient
to
guide
the
reader,
there
it
concerns
the
writ?!
to
explain
his
meaning,
and
fhow
in
what
fenfe
he
chet
ufes
that
term.
Pa
pete
:
y¥
us
‘
BOSOM
IV
oe
:
ey
asalipt
ey,
‘
OF
Knowledge
in
General.
*
Olies
etek
ce
ena
ledgeconver-
“=
—S—=—s—s
KY
and
reafonings,
hath
noother
fant
about
mediate
object
but
its
own
ideas;
which
*
our
ideas.”
~
alone
does
or
can
contemplate;
it
is
evide™
that
our
Knowledge
is
only
converfant
about
them.
|
Ch,
1.
|
Knowledge,
__
§.
2.
Knowledge
then
feems
to
me
to
be
Kiowledge
}
nothing
but
the
perceptionof
theconnexion
;
is
the
per-
and
agreement,
or
difagreement
and
repug-
ceptionof
the
nancy,
of
any
of
our
ideas.
In
this
alone
abirtenene
it
confifts.
Where
this
perception
is,
there
of
two
ideas.
is
knowledge;
and
where
it
is
not,
there,
though
we
may
fancy,
guefs,
or
believe,
yet
we
always
come
fhort
of
knowledge.
For.
when
we
know
that
white
is
not
black,
what
do
we
elfe
but
perceive
that
thefe
two
ideas
do
not
agree?
When
we
poffefs
ourfelves
with
the
utmoft
fecurity
of
the
demonftration,
that
the
three
angles
of
a
triangle
are
equal
to
two
right
ones,
what
do
we
more
but
perceive,
that
equality
to
two
right
ones
does
neceflarily
ag
ree
to,
and
is
infeparable
from
the
three
angles
of
a
triangle
*
?
$3
3.
*’
The
placing
of
certainty,
as
Mr.
Locke’
does,
in
the
tception
of
the
agreement
or
difagreement
of
our
ideas,
the
bifhop
of
Worcefter
fuf-
pects
may
be
of
dangerous
confequence
to
that
article
of
faith
which
he
has
endeavoured
to
defend
;
to
which
Mr.
Locke
anfwers,
+
fince
your
lordthip
hath
not,
as
I
remember,
fhown,
or
gone
about
to
fhow,
how
this
Propofition,
viz.
that
certainty
confifts
in
the
perception
of
the
agree-
ment
or
difagreement
of
two
ideas,
is
oppofite
or
inconfiftent
with
that
_
article
of
faith
which
your
lordfhip
has
endeavoured
to
defend
;
it
is
plain,
it
is
but
your
lordthi
’s
fear,
that
it
may
be
of
dangerous
confequence
to
it,
which,
as
1
hum
ly
conceive,
‘is
no’
proof
that
it
is
any
way
incon-
fiftent
with
that
article,
PF
.
iigiks
-eaaetig
No
body,
1
think,
can
blame
your
lordthip,
or
any
one
elfe,
for
bein
concerned
for
any
articleof
the
chriftian
faith
;
but
if
that
concern
(asit
may,
and
as
we
know
it
has
done)
makes
any
one
apprehend
danger,
where
no
danger
is,
“are
we,
therefore,
to
give
up'and
condemn
any
pro-
Pofition,
becanfe
any
one,
though
of
the
fet
rank
and
magnitude,
fears
Hay
be
of
dangerous
confequence
to
any
truth
of
religion,
without
“owing
that
it
is
fo?
Lf
fuch
fears
be
the
meafures
whereby
to
judge
of
truth
and
falfaood,
the
affirming
t
i
h
g
that
there
are
antipodes
would
be
{till
@
herefy
;
and
the
do€trine
of
the
motion
of
the
earth
muft
be
rejected,
as
overthrowing
the
truth
of
the
{c
:
ripture;
for
of
that
dangerous
confequence
.
ety,
been
apprehended
°
to
be,
b
of
thei
y
many
learned
‘and
pious
divines,
out
T
great
concern
for
religion.
And
yet,
notwithftanding
thofe
great
Serous
confequence
it
might
be,
itis
now
uni-
;
ed
men,
as
an
undoubted
truth
3
and
writ
for
by
fome,
whofe
belief
of
the
fcripture
is
not
at
all
queftioned
;
and
particu-
larly,
very
lately,
by
adivine
of
the
church
of
England,
with
great
ftrength
$f
reafon,
in
his
wonderful
ingenious
New
Theory
of
the
Earth,
‘
:
:
5
*
’
tT
Inhis
2d
letter
to
the
bifhop
of
Worcefter,
at
“
¢
a
nse
ee
60
Knowledge.
Book
4
_,§.
3.
But
to
underftand
a,
little
more
dite
This
agrees
tinctly
wherein
this
agreement
or
difagret-_
ih
ee
Tah:
wy
ment
four-
fine
83
Sin
fold,
.....
ment
confifts,
I
think
we
may
reduce
it
4
to
thefe
four
forts:
»
oy.
Identity,
or
diverfity.
|
,
ah
SER
CTALION
geese
ro
fu:
=
¢
|
3-
Co-exiftence,
or
neceflary
connexion.
ae
4.
Realexiftence.
rig
ae
|
ae
ee"
-§,
4,
Fitft,
as‘
to
the
frit
fort
of
agree
1.
OP
iden-
on,
r
difavreement,
viz.
identi
r
dic
aneeers
‘ment
or
difagreement,
viz.
identity
or
dh
Sitye
i)
in
NORALY,....
Ut.
is
the
firft
act-of
the
mind,
whet
sie
pees
->
At
Das
Ay
fentiments
oF
ideas
at
all,
to
pete
“ceive
its
ideas;-and
fo
far
as
it
perceives
them,
to
knoW
_-each
what
it
is,
and
thereby
alfo
to
perceive
their
dil
:
ference,
and
that
one
is
not
another.
This
is
fo
abfo-_
ithe
|
ii,
GS
ESR
gaara
lutely
i
~—“"The
veafon
your
lordihip
sives
of
your
fears,-that
it-may
be
of
fue)
~
dangerons,confequence
to,
that
article/of
faith.which
your
lordship
ende
“vours)to.defend,
though.
it
occur;
in
more;places
than.
one,
is
only.
Un
-
viz.
‘Khatit
i
made-ufe.of
by
dll.men.to
do
mifchief,
i,
e.
to
oppole
tht
article
of
£ajtb-which,your
lordihip,
hath
endeavoured
‘to,
defend...
B09
camy
lordsif
it
be'a
seafon.to
lay,
by
any
thing.
as
bad,
becanfe
it
is,
0
_tpay.
be
nfed
to;
an,ill,purpofe,,
Lyknow
not
what
will.be
innocent
enoug’
>to.
be
kept,...
Arms,
.which,
were;
made
for
our
defence,
are
fometime
_tnade
uft
of,
to.do
mifchief;.and
yet
they
are
not,
thought
of
dangero¥
_
COX
e
forall
that,
Nobody
lays
by
his
{word
and
pittols,
©
thinks
them
of
fuch
dangerous
confequence
as
to,
beneglocted,
or
thsov
away,
becaufe
robbers,
and
the
worlt
of
men,
,fometimes,
make
ay
_
them,
to,
take-away
honeft.
men’s
lives
or-goods.,
And
the
reafon.is;
PY
caufethey,
were
defigned,.and
-will
ferve
to
preferve
them,
—And..w?
_knows
but
this,
may
be,
the.prefent.
cafe?
If
your
lordfhip
thinks,
0)
placing
of
certainty
in
the
perception.
of
the
agreement.or
difagreem®
of
ideas
be
to,
be,
rejected:
as
falfe,
becaufe
you
apprehend
it
maybe
dangerous,confequence
to
that
article
of
faith:
on
the-
other
fide,
pert;
—
others,
with
me,
may
think
it
a
defence
againft
error,
and
fo
(as
being
good
ufe)
to
be
received
andadheredito,
=)
esr
yor
I
would
not,
my-lord,,
be
hereby
thought
to
fet
up
my
own,
of
aay
_
one’s
judgment
againft
your
lordfhip’s...
But-I
have
-faid
this.
only
He
fhow,.
whilft
the
argument
lies
for
or
againft
the
trath
of
any
propofi0®?
barely
in}an
imagination
that
it-may
be
of
confequence
to
the
fuppor’)
or
overthtowing
of
any
remote.truth;
it
will
be
impoflible,
that.
way
ae
_
determine
of
the
truth
or
falfhood-of
that
propofition.
Kor
imaginal
willbe
fet
up.
again
imagination,
and
the
ftronger
probably
will
%
againft
your
lordihip;
the
ftrongeft
imaginations
being
ufually
in”)
weaket
heads...‘The
only
way,”
in
this
eafe,
to
put
it
pait-doubt,
is”)
fhow
the
inconfiftency
of
the
two
propofitions;
and
then
it
will
be
{ey
that
ove
overthrows
the
other;
the
true,
the
falfe
one,
4
Chi/te-
Knowledge.
67
§.
9.
Of
habitual
knowledge,
there
are.
Habitual
aio,
vulgarly
{peaking,
two
degrees
:
._
knowledge
-
irft,
the
one
is
of
fuch
truths
laid
UP
IN
twofold,
the
memory,
as
whenever
they
occur
to
the
mind,
it
actually
perceives
the
relation
is
between
thofe
ideas.
And
this
is
in
all
thofe
truths,
whereof
we
have
an
intuitive
Knowledge;
where
the
ideas
themfelves,
y
an
immediate
view,
difcover
their
agreement
or
dif
4gtecment
one
with
another.
.
ree
ccondly,
the
other
is
of
fuch
truths,
whereof
the
mind
having
been
Convinced,
it
retains
the
memory
of
the
conviGion,
without
the
Proofs.
Thus
a-man-that
remembers
certainly
that
he
once
perceived
the
demon-
{tration,
that
the
three
angles
of
a
triangle
are
equal
to
Dri
is
Certain
that
he
knows
it,
becaufe:he
it.
In
his
adherence
to
a
y
which
it
was
at-firft
may
be
thought
rather
to
believe
his
memory
than
really
to
know,
and
this
way
fomething
between
opinion.
and
knowledge;
afort
of
-
affurance
Which
exceeds:
bare
belief,
for
that
relies:
on
the
teftimony
,
:
upon
a
due
examination
nd
it
comes
not
thort_
of
perfea
certainty,
and
is
in
,
which
ds
apt
to.
miflead
our
firft
thoughts
int
i
in
thi
matter,
is,
that
the
as
in
this:
cafe
is
>»
aS
it
was
at
firft,
by-an.
a@ual
view
-of
all
the
intermediate
Ideas,
whereby
the
agreement
or
difagreement
of
thofe
in
the
Propofition
was
at
firft
per
y
other.
intermediate
ideas,
that
fhow
the
8reement
or
difagreement
of
the
ideas
contained
in
the
Propofition
whofe
Certainty
we
remember.
For
exam-
ple,
in
this
Propofition,
th
recollected:
but
he
knows
it
in
‘rent
way
from
what
he
did
before.
The
agree.
Ment
of
the
two
ideas
joined
in
that
Propofition
is
per-
3.3
‘
ceived,
63
|
Knowledge.
Book
#
ceived,
but
it
is
by
the
intervention
of
other
ideas
tha®
thofe
which
at
firft
produced
that
perception.
He
©
members,
i.e.
he
knows
(for
remembrance
is
but
reviving
of
fome
paft
Knowledge)
that
he
was
once
cl
tain
of
the
truth
of
this
propofition,
that
the
thiv
angles
of
a
triangle
are
equal
to
two
right
ones.
—
immutability
of
the
fame
telations
between
the
fa
immutable
thitigs;
ts
now
the
idea
that
fhows
him,
t
if
the
three
angles
of
a
triangle
were
once
equal
to
‘right
ones,
tliey
will
always
be
equal
to
two
right
0
‘And
hence
he
comes
to
be
certain,
that
what
was
6
true
in
the
cafe,
is
always
true
;
what
idéas
once
agr
-will
always
agtee
;
and
confequently
what
he
once
k
to
be
true,
he
will
always
know
to
be
true,
as
lon
‘Be
can
remember
that
he
once
knew
it.
Upon
®
ground
it
is,
that
particular
demonftrations
in
matt)
maticks
afford
general
knowledge.
If
then
the
perC&,
tion
that
the
fame
ideas
will
eternally
have
the
‘habitudes
and
relations,
be
not
a
fufficient
ground”
knowledge,
there
could
be
rio
knowledge
of
general
pt
‘pofitions
in
mathematicks;
for
no
mathematical
©
‘monftration
would
be
any
other
than
particular:
#
when
a
man
had
demonftrated
any
propofition
conc!
ing
one
triangle
or
Circle,
his
knowledge
would
0
_lreach
beyond
that
particular
diagtam.
If
he
would
©,
tend
it
further,
he
muft
renew
his
demonftratio
vanother
inftance,
before
he
could
know
it
to
be
tr
‘another
like
triangle,
and
fo
on:
by
which
means
‘could
never
come
to
the
knowledge
of
any
general
»
pofitions:
Nobody,
Ithink,
can
deny
that
Mr.
©)
-ton
certainly
knows
any
propofition,
that
he
now
at
©
time
reads
in
his
book,
to
be
true;
though
he
has?)
in
atual
view
that
admirable
chain
of
interme?"
ideas,
whereby
he
at
firft
difcovered
it
to
be
true.
’a
meméry
as
that,
able
to
retain
fuch
a
train
of
P®
-culars,
may
be
well
thought
beyond
the
reach
of
hut
“faculties;
when
the
very
difcovery,
perception,
and
}
ing
together
that
wonderful
connexion
of
ideas,
is
for"
to
furpafs
moft
readers
comprehenfion.
But
yet
“y
‘evident,
the
author
himfelf
knows
the
propofition
©
true,
remembering
he
once
faw
the
connexion
of
|
A
Riad
V4
hy
2,
Degrees
of
Knowledge.
69
ideas,
as
certainly
as
he
knows
fuch
a
man
wounded
an-
other,
femembering
that
he
faw
him
run
him
through.
ut
becaufe
the
memory
is
not
always
fo
clear
as
acual
Perception,
and
does
in
all
men
more.
or.
lefs
decay,
in,
length
of
time,
this
amongtt
other.
differences
1S
one,
Which,
fhews
that
demonttrative
knowledge
is
Touch,
more
imperfed:
than
intuitive,
as
we
fhall
fec,
inthe
following
chapter,
Of
the
Degrees
of
our
Knowledge.
§.
1.
LL
our
knowledge
Confifting,
as
oe
'
ave
faid,
“in
the’
view
21
AIRE
mind
has
of
its
own
ideas,
which
is
the
utmoft
Night
and
greateft
Certainty
we,
with
our
faculties,
and
in
our
Way
of
knowledge,
are
capable
of;
it
may
not
be
amifg
f0
confider
a
little
the
Megrees
of
Its
evidence.
The’
lifferent
Clearnefs
of
o
nhowledge
Intuitive,
|”
“nt
way
of.
perception.
the
tind
has
of
the
agreement
or
difagreement
of
any
of
its
ideas.
For
if
we
will
reflect
on
our
own
Ways
of.
thinking,
we
fhall
find
that
fometimes
the
min
erceives
the
agreement
or
difagreement.
of
two
ideas
immediately
by
themfelves,
without
the
intervention
of
any
other:
and
this,
I
think,
We
may
call
intuitive
knowledge.
For
in
this
the
mind
’
pains
of
proving
oy
examining,
but
perceives
©.
the
truth,
as
the
eye
doth
light,
only
by
being
directed
rowards
ir.
‘T
S
the
mind
perceives,
that
white
fs
not
lack,
that
a
circle
is
not
q
triangle,
that
three
are
more
than
fwo,
and
equal
to
one
and
two,
Such
Kind
of
Stuths
the
min
Perceives
at
the
firt
fight
of
the
ideas
together,
by
bare
intuition,
without
the
intervention
of
#ny
other
idea
;
‘and
this
kind
of
Knowledge
is
the
Cleareft
and
moft
certain,
that
human
frailty
is
Capable
of,
This
part
of
‘nowledge
is
irrefiftible,
and
like
bright
fun-thine
forces
itfelf
immediately
to
be
perceiv-
ed,
as
foon
as
ever
the
mind
turns
its
view
that
way
;
BR
ee
and
i
A
40
Degrees
of
Knowledge.
Book
#
:
and
leaves
ho
room
for
hefitation,
doubt,
or
exariiia
tion,
but
the
mind
is
prefently
filled
with
the
cleat
light
of
it.
It
is
on
this
intuition
that
depends
all
tht”
certainty
and
evidence
of
all
our
knowledge
;
which
cel
tainty
every
one
finds
to
be
fo
great,
that
he
cannot
im#
gine,
and
therefore
not
require
a
greater:
for
a
man
cannot
conceive
himfelf
capable
of
a
greater
certainty
than
to
know
that
any
idea
in
his
mind
is
fuch
as
perceives
it
to
be;
and
that
two
ideas,
wherein
he
pet
ceives
a
difference,
are
different
and
not
precifely
fame.
He
that
demands
a
greater
certainty
than
this
demands
he
knows
not
what,
and
fhows
only
that
gh
has
a
mind
to
be
a
f{ceptick,
without
being
able
to.
me
fo.
Certainty
depends
fo
wholly
on
this
intuition,
ti®
in
the
next
degree
of
knowledge,
which
I
call
demo®
ftrative,
this
intuition.-is
necefiary
in
all
the
connexi0o®
of
the
intermediate
ideas,
without
which
we
caf
HG
attain
knowledge
and
certainty.
oa
arta
gee
Fe
The
next
degree
of
knowledge
™
ue
fae
where
the
mind
perceives
the
agreement
©
“+.
difagreement
of
any
ideas,
but
not
jimmy
diately.
Though
wherever
the
mind
perceives
agreement
or
difagreement
of
any
‘of
its
ideas,
there
certain
knowledge;
yet
it
does
not
always
happen,
Lo
|
the
mind
fees
that
agreement
or
difagreement
wht
there
is
between
them,
even
where
it
is
difcovera?
28
and
in
that
cafe
remains
in
ignorance,
and
at
moft
gf
o
farther
than
a
probable
conjecture.
“The
reafon
Wi
“the
mind
cannot
always
perceive
‘prefently
the
agi,
sit
Te
eee
“ent
or
difagreement
of
two
ideas,
is,
becaufe
thd
ideas,
concerning
whofe
agreement
or
difagreement
inquiry
is
made,
cannot
by
the
mind
be
fo
put
roge
as
to
fhow
it.
In
this
cafe
then,
when
the
mind
C#
not
fo
bring
its
ideas
together,
as
by
their
imme
i
comparifon,
and
as
it
were
juxta-pofition
or
applicall,
one
to
another,
to.
perccive
their
agreement,
or
©
greement,
it
is
fain,
by
the
intervention
of
other
10%,
(one
or
more,
as
it
happens)
to
difcover
the
agree)
or
difagreement
which
it
fearches;
and
this
is
"ae
which
we
call
reafoning.
‘Thus
the
mind
being
wie
¥i
aay
a
to
know
the
agreement
or
difagreement
in
bignefs,
eo
ive
j
if
Ch.
¢.°
Degrees
of
Knowledge.
7%
tween
the
three
angles
of
a.triangle
and
two
right
ones,
cannot
by
an
immediate
view
and
comparing
them
do
it:
becaufe
the
three
angles
of
a
triangle
cannot
be
brought
at
once,
and
be
compared
with
any
one
or
two
angles
;
and
fo
of
this
the
mind
has
no
immediate,
no
intuitive
knowledge.
In
this
cafe
the
Mind
is
fain.
to
find
out
fome
other
angles,
to
which
the
three
angles.o}
a
triangle
have
an
equality
;
and,
finding
thofe
equal
to
two
right
ones,
comes
to
know
their
equality
to
two
MANE
ANG
eects
-§.
3.
Thofe
intervening
ideas
which
ferve
Sree
bo
ebay
i”
sf
ae
Depends
on’
to
fhow
the
agreement
of
any
two
others,
sede
=A
are
called
proofs
;
and
Where
the
agreement
~
and
difagreement
is.
by
this
means
plainly.
and
clearly
perceived,
it
is
called
demonftration,
it
being
fhown.to
the
underftanding,
and
the
mind
made
to
fee
that
it
is
fo.
A
quicknefs
in
the
mind
to
find
out
thefe
interme-
diate
ideas
(that
fhall
difcover
the
agreement
or
difa-
Sreement
of
any
other)
and
to
apply
them
right,
is,
J
*Hppole,
that
which
A
Sale
fagacity.
ae
§.4.
This
knowledge
*
nh
re
sot
his
Moowledge
by
inervebiag.
9
Proofs,
th
ugh
it
be
certain,
yet
the
eyi-
cence
of
sit
-i
|
ealy.
99
as
in
intuitive
know-
ough,
in
demonftration,
the
mind
does
at
he
agreement-or
difagreement
of
the
ideas
yet
it
is
not
without
pains
and.attention
:
a6
€
more
than
one
tranfient
view.
to
find.
it.
A
fteady
application
and
purfuit
are
required
to
nei
den)
and
there
muft
be
a
progreftion
by
fteps_an
degrees,
before
the
mind
can
in
this
way
arrive
at
cer-
runtYs
and
come
to
percelye.
the
agreement
or
repig-
nancy
between
two
ideas
that
need
proofs
and
the,
ufe
of
SPUN
Cortes
aac
ee
eee
ive
and
deomet,
difference
between
iatui~
Nor
without
though
samMontrative
Knowledge,
is,
that”
preeeden
though
in
in
3
;
+
_
—
:
4
b
:
ae
PON
th
The.
latter
all
do
t
be
removed,
dow
t
when
by
th
me
ee
ee
a
Y
Bus
igh
oe
&
ape.
S
not
altogether
fo
clear
and
bright,
nor
the
affent
a
ready,
ci
ledge.
For
th
|
laft_
perceive
t
it
confiders
;
there
muft
b
.
not
happen
to
the
mind,
that
has
its
icy
Uae
'
faculty
“.
“agreement
it
feeks
with
the
next
inter,
42
Degrees
of
Knowledge.
Book
#
facuity
of
perception
left
to
a
degree
capable
of
diftiae
ideas,
no
more
than
it
can
be
a
doubt
to
the
eye
(
ha
ean
diftinély
fee
white
and
black)
whether
this
ink
amt
this
paper
be
all
of
a
colour.
If
there
be
fight
in
™
eyes,
it
will
at
firft
glimpfe,
without
hefitation,
perce!
the
words
printed
on
this
paper
different
from
©
colour
of
the
paper:
and
fo
if
the
mind
have
the
fa
cull]
of
diftinct
perceptions,
it
will
perceive
the
agreem@”
or
difagreement
of
thofe
ideas
that
produce’
intuit
knowledge.
If
the
eyes
have
loft
the
faculty
of
fee
ng
;
er
the
mind
of
perceiving,
we
in
vain
inquite
after
quicknefs
of
fight
in
one,
or
clearnefs
of
perception
©
P
shajcairencestte
ON
Pact
ot
Vane,
Va
Not
fo
clear,
.
§:
6
It
is
true,
the
perception
produ
~_*_
by
demonftration
‘s
alfo
very
clear,
yet
1
often
with
a
great
abatement
of
that
evident‘luftre
ay
full
affurance,
that
always
accompany
that’
which
1
@
intuitive;
like
a
face
reflected
by
feveral
mirrors
one
§
another,
where
as
long
as
it
retains
the
fimilitude
#
agreement
with
the
object,
it
produces
a
_knowleag
|
but
it
is
ftill
in
every
fucceflive
reflection
with
a
leffente
of
that
perfect
clearnefs
and
dittin@tnefs,
which
is'in
§
firft,
till
at
laft,
after
many
removes,
it
has
a
great
™
ture
of
dimnéfs,
and
is
not
at
firft
fight
fo
knowabe
efpécially
to
weak
eyes.
This
it
is
with
Knowledle
ynade
out
by
a
long
train
of
proof.
+
oa
Fachilep
$s
7
Now,
in
every
ftep
réafon.
malt
SO,
eon
nonin
Senay
lee
a
ae
ain
Io
:
+a4a]%
uitive
knowledge
of
that
agreement
of
at
|
diate
idea,
which
it
ufes
as
a
proof:
for
if
it
were
fo,
that
yet
would
need
a
ptoof;
fince
without
the
ception
of
fuch
agreement
or
difagreement,
there
J
‘knowledge
produced.”
if
it
be
perceived
by
itfelf,
hy
intuitive
knowledge
:,
if
it
cannot
be
perceived
by
i#©
there
is
need
of
fome
intervening
idea,
as
a
comm),
meafure
to
{how
their
agreement
or
difagreement.
”
which
it-is
plain,
that
every
ftep
in
reafoning
that
PP
‘duces
knowledge
has:
intuitive
certainty
;
‘which
W
‘the
mind
perceives,
there
is
no
more
required,
bu
remember
it'to
make
the
agreement
or
difagreemeM,
Se
ite
adatida.
oe
oa
ae
3
;
Ce
TRIE
al
iD
77
™
é
me
é
Fi
Cy
a8
_
Degrees
of
Knowledge,
|
73
the
ideas,
concerning
which
we
inquire,
vifible
and
cer-
tain.
So
that
to
make
any
thing
a
demonftration,
it
is
neceflary
to
perceive
the
immediate
agreement
of
the
in-
tervening
ideas,
whereby
the
agreement
or
difagreement
of
the
two
ideas
under
examination
(
whereof
the
one
is
always
the
firft,
and
the
other
the
laft
In
the
account)
is
found,.
This
intuitive
perception
of
the
agreement
or
difagreement
of
the
intermediate
ideas,
in
each
ftey
and
progreffion
of
the
demonftration,
muft
alfo
be
car-
ried
exactly
in
the
mind,
anda
man
muft’be
fure
that
no
part
is
left
gut:
which
becaufe
in
long
deductions,
and
the
ufe
of
many
proofs,
the
memory
doés
not
always
fo
readily
and
exactly
retain
;
therefore
it
comes
to
pafs,
‘that
this
is
more
j
>
me
mperfect
than
intuitive
knowledge,
and
men
embrace
of,
ten
falfhood
for
demonftrations.
§.
8.
The
neceffity
of
this
intuitive
know-
Hidiob
the
ledge,
in
each
ftep
of
{cientifical
or
demon-
{trative
reafoning,
gave
occafion,
1
imagine,
“ex
precog.
to
that
miftaken
axiom,
that
all
reafoning
pred
-€¢
ai
fs
Diibe
3
.
was
**
ex
precognitis
&
preeconceffis
;7?
which
how
far
it is
miftaken,
I
fhall
have
occafion
to
flow
more
at
large,
when
I
come
to
Ga
ee
ons,
and
particularly
thofe
propofitions
which
are
maxims
;
and
to
fhaw
that
it
ig
by
a
miftake,
that
they
are
fy
foundations
of
all
our
t
I
pofed
to
be
the
Knowledge
and
Fedbiinge
_
§-
9.
It
has
‘been
generally
taken
for
Déniuhia’,
granted,
that
™Mathematicks
alone
are
Capa-
tion
not
li-
ble
of
demonftrative
certainty:
but
to
have
mired
to
fuch
an
agreement
or
difagreement,
as
may
quantity,
7
Intuitively"
be
perceived,
being,
as
I
imagine,
not
the
=
Privilege
of
the
ideas
of
number,
extenfion,
and
figure
:
alone,
‘It
may
poffibly
be
the
want
of
due
method
and
Application
in
us,
and
not
of
fufficient
evidence
in
things,
that
demanftration
has
been
thought
to
have
fo
little
to
do
in
other
parts
of
knowledge,
and
been
{carce
fo
much
a8
aimed
at
by
any
but
mathematicians.
For
whatever
-
ideas
we
have,
Wherein
the
mind
can
perceive
the
Immediate
agreement
or
difagreement
that
is
between
them,
there
the
mind
is
capable
of
intuitive
knowledge;
and
where
it
can
perceive
the
agreement
or
difagree-
.
:
ment
,
ee
7A
a
eee
stint
pa
eiene
SE
ee
Eee
a
Up
PL
OI
ET
Ns
We
rN
0
UE
Ba
Sr
ole
ecm
da
aS
LN
SAIS
ae
ee
‘enf
ri)
|
a
|
Degrees
of
Knowledge.
Book
#
ie
apreement
or
difagreement
they
have
with
any
interme
diate
ideas,
there
the
mind
is
capable
of
demonftratio”
which
is
not
limited
to
ideas
of
extenfion,
figure,
nui”
ber,
and
their
modes.
+
-
aes
A
§.
10.
The
reafon
why
it
has
been
get
Why
ithas
rally
fought
for,
and
fuppofed
to
be
only?
|
|
been
fo
—
:
5
.
z
|
itt
thofe,
I
imagine
has
been
not
only
the
a
|
.
ef
+f
|
}
!
|
‘
t
.
*
o
Oy
OER
°
*")
ment
of
any
two
ideas,
by
an
intuitive
perception
of
t
|
|
|
i
|
+f
ay
asd
:
'neral
ufefulnefs
of
thofe
fciences;
but
97
caufe,
incomparing
their
equality
or
excefs,
the
moe
of
numbers
have
every
the
leaft
difference
very
clear
perceivable;
and
though
in
extenfion,
every
the
}
cat
excefs
is
not
fo
perceptible,
yet
the
mind
has
found
ways
to
examine
and
difcover
demonftratively
the
J¥
;
equality
of
two
angles,
or
extenfions,
or
figures:
4%
both
thefe,
i.
e.
numbers
and
figures,
can
be
fet
do¥
by
vifiblé
and
lafting
marks,
wherein
the
ideas
unde
confideration
are
perfectly
determined
;
which
for
moft
part
they
are
not,
where
they
are
marked
only
namesand.words-
-§.
11.
But
in
other
fimple
ideas,
whofe
modes
4?
differences
are
made
and
counted
by
degrees,
and
|
quantity,
we
have
not
fo
nice
and
accurate
a
diftinci®
i
of
their
differences,
as
to
perceive
and
find
way%.
i
meature
their
juft
equality,
or
the
leaft
differences.
|
*
thofe
other
fimple
ideas,
being
appearances
of
fen
tions,
‘produced
in
us
by
the
fize,
figure,
number,
4,
motion
of
minute
corputcles
fingly
infenfible;
thei
@
=n
A
ry
ay
ye
<i
:
=
oe
ferent
degrees
alfo
depend
upen
the
variation
of
for!
or
of
all
thofe
caufes:
which
fince
it
cannot
be
obferyy,
‘by
us
in
particles
of
matter,
‘whereof,
each
is
too
fudky
to
be
perceived,
it
is
impoffible
for
us
to
have
any
eM
meafures
of
the
different
degrees
of
thefe
fimple
ide?
"
For
fuppofing
the
fenfation
or
idea
we
name
whit¢t
be
produced
in
us
by
a
certain
number
of
globuy
which,
having
a
verticity
about
their
own
centres,
fi”
upon
the
retina
of
the
eye,
with
a
certain
degree
0
iy
tation,
as
well
as
progreflive
fwiftnefs;
ir
will
bO
:
eafily
follow,
that
the
more
the
pia
parts
of
*%
body
are
fo
ordered,
as
to
reflect
the
greater
numbe
globules
of
light,
and
to
give
them
the
proper
Os
oe
:
—
==
SS
=
==
=
SSS
SS
as
SSS
SS
SS
SS
Ss
Ch.
2.
Degrees
of
Knowledge.
75
which
is
fit
to
produce
this
fenfation
of
white
in
us,
the
more
white
will
that
body
appear,
that
from
an
equal
{pace
fends
to
the
retina'the
greater
number
of
fuch
cor-
pufcles,
with
that
peculiar
fort
of
motion.
I
do
not
fay,
that
the
nature
of
light
confifts
in
very
fmall
round
glo-
bules,
nor
of
whitenefs
in
fuch
a
texture
of
parts,
as
gives
a
certain
rotation
to
thefe
globules,
when
It
reflects
them;
for
I
am
not
now
treating
phyfically
of
light
or
colours.
But
this,
I
think,
I
may
fay,
that
I
cannot
(and
I
would
be
glad
any
one
would
make
intelligible
that
he
did)
conceiy
how
bodies
without
us
can
any
ways
affect
our
fenfes,
but
by
the
immediate
contact
of
the
fenfible
bodies
themfelves,
as
in
tafting
and
feeling,
or
the
impulfe
of
fome
infenfible
particles
coming
from
them,
as
in
feeing,
d
fmelling;
by
the
diffe-
rent
impulfe
of
w
caufed
by
their
different
fize,
figure,
ariety
of
fenfations
is
Pro-
uced
in
us.
eo
xeh
_
§.
12.
Whether
then
.
they
be
globules,
or
no;
or
whe-
ther
they
have
a
verticity
ab
their
hearing,
an
hich
parts,
and
motion,
the
y
ed
froma
body,
fitted
to
give
them
that
peculiar
motion,
which.
pro~
:
the
fenfation
of
whitenefs
in
us;
and
poffibly
too,
the
quicker
that
peculiar
motion
is;
the
whiter
does’the
body
appear,
from
which
the
greater
number
are
reflect.
|
ed,
‘as
is
evident
in
the
fame
piece
of
paper
put
in
the
fun-beams,
in
the
fhade,
and
ina
dark
hole;
in
each
Of
which
it
will
produce
in
us
the
idea
of
whitenefs
in
far
different
degrees,
ed
|
$93."
Not
Knowing
therefore
what
number
of
par-
ticles,
nor
what
motion
of
them
is
fit
to
produce
any
Precife
degree
of
Whitenefs,
we
cannot
demonftrate
the
Certain
equality
of
any
two
degrees
of
whitenefs,
becaufe
we
have
no
certain
ftandard
to
meafure
them
by,
nor
means
to
diftinguith
every
the
leaft
rea]
difference,
the
only
help
we
have
being
from
our
fenfes,
which
in
this
point
fail
us.
But
where
the
difference
is
fo
great,
as
¢0
produce
in
the
mind
clearly
diftinct
ideas,
whofe
dif-
erences
can
Tetained,
there
thefe
ideas
or
:
1
be
perfectly
_
Cclours,
as
we
fee
in
different
Kinds,
as
blue
and
red,
;
as
are
Bg
wie
Bay
xe
PR,
ey
ee
ea
PR
AA
TOT.
nis
eT
LP
eR
i
a
—
wae
RA
.
a
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
a
i
A
a
ee
i
ee
.
76
Degrees
of
Knowledge,
Book
4
are
as
capable
of
demonftration,
as
ideas
of
number
aft
extenfion.
What
I
have
here
faid
of
whitenefs
an?
colours,
I
think,
holds
true
in
all
fecondary
qualiti¢
and
their
modes.
,
Be
ees
Senfitive
§,
14.
Thefe
two,
viz-intuition
and
knowledge
monftration,
are
the
degrees
of
our
kno
of
pen
ledge;
whatever
comes
fhort
of
one
of
the
exience.
__-with
what
affurance
foever
embraced,
is
DU
faith,
or
opinion,
but
not
knowledge,
at
leaft
in
all
gen@
ral
truths.
There
is,
indeed,
another
perception
of
Ut
mind,
employed
about
the
particular
exiftence
of
fini’
beings
without
us;
which
going
beyond
bare
probabl
lity,
and
yet
not
reaching
perfectly
to
either
of
the
for
going
degrees
of
certainty,
paffes
under
the
name
®
nowledge.
There
can
be
nothing
more
certain,
tha?
that
the
idea
we
receive
from
an
external
object
is
our
minds;
this
is
intuitive
knowledge.
But
wheth@-
there
be
any
thing
more
than
barely
that
idea
in
OV
minds,
whether
we
can
thence
certainly
infer
the
exi®
ence
of
any
thing
without
us,
which
correfponds
to
th
idea,
is
that,
whereof
fome
men
think
there
may
be"
queftion
made;
becaufe
men
may
have
fuch
ideas
their
minds,
when
no
fuch
thing
exifts,
no
fuch
obj
affects
their
fenfes.
But
yet
here,
think,
we
are
pi?
vided
with
an
evidence,
that
puts
us
paft
doubting:
Y
afk
any
one,
whether
he
be
not
invincibly
con{e
to
himfelf
of
a
different
perception,
when
he
loak:
the
fun
by
day,
and
thinks
on
it
by
night;
when
he
tually
taftes
wormwéod,
or
fmells
a
rofe,
or
only
thin?
on
that
favour
or
odour?
We
as
plainly
find
the
dif”
rence
there
is
between
an
idea
revived
in
our
minds
?
our
own
memory,
and
actually
coming
into
our
nif
by
our
fenfes,
as
we
do
between
any
two
diftinét
ide@
If
any
one
fay,
a
dream
may
do
the
fame
thing,
and
4!
thefe
ideas
may
be
produced
in
us
without
any
exte
objects
;
he
may
pleafe
to
dream
that
I
make
him
1
an{fwer;
1.
That
it
is
no
great
matter,
whether
I
rem?
this
{cruple,
or
no:
where
all
is
but
dream,
reafoni#e
and
arguments
are
of
no
ufe,
truth
and
knowledge
®
thing.
2.
That
I
believe
he
will
allow
a
very
manile,
difference
between
dreaming
of
being
in
the
fire,
7)
pel
i
Ch.
2,
Degrees
of
Knowledge.
77
being
actually
init.
But
©
fceptical,
as
to
maintai
tually
in
the
fire
is
nothin
‘Thereby
certainly
know,
tually
exifts
without
us
;
ding
that
pleafure
or
tion
of
certain
objects
Ceive,
or
dream
that
yet
if
he
be
refolved
to
appear
n,
that
what
I
call
being
ac-
g
but
a
dream;
and
we
cannot
that
any
fuch
thing
as
fire
ac-
_
I
anfwer,
that
we
certainly
pain
follows
upon
the
applica
to
us,
whofe
exiftence
we
per-
We
perceive,
by
our
fenfes;
this
tual
deas
from
them,
and
allow
thefe
three
degrees
of
knowledge,
ViZ.
intuitive,
demonftra-
tive,
and
fenfitive:
jn
cach
of
which
there
are
different
evidence
and
certainty.
§.
15.
But
fince
our
knowledge
is
found.
Knowledge
oyed
about,
our
ideas
only,
not
always
from
thence,
that
it
is
-
clear,
where
S
:
ideas;
and
that
where
theideas
are
Our
ideas
are
clear
and
diftine,
or
obfcure
°*
»
Our
knowledge
will
be
{0
too?
To
which
anfwer,
no:
for
our
knowledge
confifting
in
the
per
3;
V.
g.a
man
that
ngle,
and
of
equa-
‘ity
to
two
right
ones,
as
any
mathematician
in
the
rid,
may-yet
have
but
a
very
obf{cure
perception
of
their.
agreement,
and
fo
have
but
a
very
obfcure
know.
ledge
of
it.
Butideas,
which
by
reafon
of
their
obfcy-
TARE
OF
otherwife,
are
confufed,
cannot
produceany
clear
or
difting
knowledge
;
becaufe
as
far
as
any
ideas
are
>
40
far
the
mind
cannot
perceive
clearly,
whe-
pret
Bree
or
difagree.
Or
to
exprefs
the
fame
thing
In
a
Way
lefgs
apt
to
be
mifunderftood
;
he
that
hath
not
det
€
words
he
ufes,
cannot
ermined
ideas
to
th
m
ke
Propofitions
of
them,
of
Whofe
truth
he
can
be
tain
;
‘eertal
:
CHAP,
78
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
Book
:
"
Can
ar
Pe
|
Ue
gn
Of
the
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
ee
ST
Pak
RNAS
oh
oem
§.sip
K
NOwLEncE,
as
has
been
faid,
lying
int
he
&.
perception
of
theagreement
or
difagreememt
©
of
any
of
our
ideas,
it
follows
from
hence,
that,
|
Nofarther
.
Firft,
we
can
have
knowledge
no_
farth¢
than
wehave.
than
we
have
ideas.
|...
a
ideas.
§.
2.
Secondly,
that
we
have
no
know,
2.
No
farther
ledge
farther
than
we
can
have
perception?
than
we
can
mee
peceivetheir
their
agreement
or
difagreement.
Whicl”
‘agreement
or
perception
being,
1.
Either
by
intuition,
®
~
difagree-
the
immediate
comparing
any
two
ideas?
ey:
or,
2.
By
reafon,
examining
the
agreeme®,
or
difagreement
of
two
ideas,
by
the
intervention
%
—
fome
others;
or,
3.
By
fenfation,
perceiving
the
exit
encé
of
particular
things:
hence
it
alfo
follows,
=
papier
nate
iy
Thirdly,
that
we
cannot
have
4
fe
knowledge
Intuitive
knowledge,
that
fhall
extend
itfe}
extends
itfel€
to
all
our
ideas,
and
all
that
we
would
kno¥
—
es)
are}
about
them;
becaufe
we
cannot
exami”
all
our
ideas,
29d
perccive
all
the
relations
they
have
oP
—
;
to
another
by
juxta-pofition,
or
an
imme
diate
comparifon
one
with
another.
Thus.
having
thee
ideas
of
an
obtufe
and
an
acute
angled
triangle,
bol
—
drawn
from
equal
bafes,
and
between
parallels,
I
can,
2?
—
intuitive
knowledge,
perceive
the
one
not
to
be
th”
other,
but
cannot
that
way
know
whether
they
be
equ?
or
no;
becaufe
their
agreement
or
difagreement.
in
eque
—
lity
can
never
be
perceived
by
an
immediate
compari”
them:
the
difference.
of
figure
makes
their
parts
inc®
pable
of
an
exact
immediate
application
;
and
therefo%
there
is
need
of
fome
intervening
qualities
to:
meafu
them
by,
which
is
demonftration,
or
rational
knowledg”
sat
i"
§.
4.
Fourthly,
it
follows
alfo,
from
w”
—
ey
is
above
obferved,
that
our
rational
kno¥e
knowledge,
~
ledge
cannot
reach
to
the
whole
extent
af
our
ideas:
becaufe
between
two
di
ae
.
i
:
eo
Ch.
3.
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
79
ideas
we
would
examine,
we
Cannot
always
find
fuch
mediums,
as
we
can
connect
one
to
another
With
intuitive
knowledge,
and
wherever
that
fai
and
demontftration,
BP
§.
5.
Fifthly,
fenfitive
knowledge
reach-
ing
no
farther
than
the
exiftence
of
things
knowledge
:
actually
prefent
to
our
fenfes,
is
yet
much
machin
narrower
than
either
of
the
former.
:
§.
6.
From
all
which
it
is
evident,
that
6.
Ouslatetys
the
extent
of
our
knowledge
comes
notonly
_
ledge
there-
fhort
of
the
reality
of
things,
but
even
of
forenarrower
the
extent
of
our
own
ideas.
Though
our
oe
wis
knowledge
be
limited
to
our
id
Data
a
mor
exceed
them
either
in
extent
or
perfection;
and
though
thefe
be
very
narrow
bounds,
in
refpect
of
the
extent
of
al]
being,
and
far
fhort
of
what
we
may
;
Imagine
to.be
in
fome
even
created
underftandings,
not
tied
down
to
the
dull
and
narrow
information
which
is
to
©
received
from
fome
few,
and
not
very
acute
ways
of
Perception,
fuch
as
are
our
fenfes
;
yet
it
would
be
well
with
us
if
our
knowledge
were
but
as
large
as
our
ideas,
and
there
were
hot
many
doubts
and
inquiries
concern
S
we
have,
whereof
We
are
not,
nor
I
believe
avd
De
in
this
world
tefolved.
Neverthelefs
I
do.
Hot
queftion
but
that
human
knowledge,
under
the
pre-
Nees
of
our
beings
and
conftitutions,
may
.
er
than
it
has
hitherto
been,
if
and
with
freedom
of
mind,
employ
and
labour
of
thought,
in
improvin
:
ailcovering
truth,
which
they
do
for
the
+
wounng
or
lupport
of
falthood,
to
maintain
a
fyftem,
an,
in
all
the
parts
of
the
deduction
;
ls,
we
come
fhort
of
knowledge
aie
5+
Senfitive
iNtereft
>
OF
Party,
they
are
once
engaged
in.
But
yet
faction
"be
pie
I
may,
without
injury
to
human
per-
onfident,
that
our
knowledge
would
never
Wwe
might
defj
¢
might
arife’
con.
ave
the
ideas
of
a
{quare,
a
ct,
perhaps,
fhall
never
be
toa
fquare,
and
Certainly
.
Know
cerning
any
of
them,
Weh
Circle,
and
equality
;
and
y
@ble
to
fing
3
circle
equal
_
upon
my
principles
it
cannot
be
proved
that
there
is
a
fpiritual
fub
B>
:
_
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
Book
4
know
that
it
is
fo.
We
have
the
ideas
of
matter
al
thinking
*;
but
poffibly
fhall
never
be
able
to
know,
wh@
ther
any
mete
material
being
thinks,
or
no;
it
b
ele
eT
py
a
.
~
ee
‘*
Againft
that
affertion
of
Mr.
Locke,
that
poffibly
we
fhall
never’
able
to
know
whether
any
mere
material
being
thinks
or
no,
&c.
bifhop
of
Worcefter
argues
thus
if
this
be
true;
then,
for
all
that
w
Know
by
our
ideas
of
matter
and
thinking,
matter
may
have
a
powel
|
thinking:
and,
if
this
hold,
then
it
is
impoffible
to
prove
a
fpiritual
3
ftance
in
us
from
the
idea
of
thinking:
for
how
can
we
be
affured
by
%
ideas,
that
God
hath
not
given
fuch
a
power
of
thinking
to
mattet]
Gifpofed
as
our
bodies
are?
efpecially
fince
it
is
faid
+,
<*
That,
in
rep®
**
of
our
notions,
it is
not
much
more
remote
from
our
comprehenfio?
©
“*
conceive
that
God
can,
if
he
pleafes,
fuperadd
to
our
idea
of
matte
*«
faculty
of
thinking,
than
that
he
fhould
fuperadd
to
it
another
**
flance,
with
a
faculty
of
thinking.”
Whoever
afferts
this
can
0
prove
a
fpiritual
fubftance
in
us
from
a
faculty
of
thinking,
becaule
cannot
know,
from
the
idea
of
matter
and
thinking,
that
matter
fo
pofed
cannot
think:
and
he
cannot
be
certain,
that
God
hath
not
fra
be
the
matter
of
our
bodies
fo
as
to
be
capable
of
it.
.
ae
To
which
Mr.
Locke
£
anfwers
thus:
here
your
lordfhip
argues,
os
in
us.
‘Io
which,
give
me
leave,
with
fubmiffion,
to
fay,
that
I
thiske
may
be
proved
from
my
principles,
and
I
think
J
have
done
it;
and
@
proof
in
my
book
ftands
this:
rit,
we
experiment
in
ourfelves
thin
‘The
idea
of
this
aétion
or
mode
of
thinking
is
inconfiftent
with
the
04
of
felf-fubfiftence,
and
therefore
has
a
neceffary
connexion
with
a
fupP™
or
fubje&t
of
inhefion:
the
idea
of
that
fupport
is
what
we
call
fubstan@
and
fo
from
thinking
experimented
in
us,
we
have
a
proof
of
a
think?”
fubitance
in
us,
which
in
my
fenfe
is
a
fpirit.
Againft
this
your
lf
fhip
will
argue,
that,
by
what
I
have
faid
of
the
poffibility
that
God
m4!
if
he
pleafes,
fuperadd
to
matter
a
faculty
of
thinking,
it
can
nevel
|”
proved
that
there
is
a
fpiritual
fubfance
in
us,
becaufe,
upon
that
1%
pofition,
it
is
poflible
it
may
be
a
material
fubftance
that
thinks
in
us
_
grantit;
but
add,
that
the
general
idea
of
fubftance
being
the
fame
€
6”
where,
the
modification
of
thinking,
or
the
power
of
thinking,
joined
makes
it
a
fpirit,
without
confidering
what
other
modifications
it
has.
47”
whether
it
has
the
modification
of
folidity,
orno.
As,
on
the
other
#73”
fubftance,
that
has
the
modification
of
folidity,
is
matter,
whether
1%
‘
the
modification
of
thinking,
or
no.
And
therefore,
if
your
lord#y”
means
by
a
{piritual,
an
immaterial
fubftance}
I
grant
I
have
not
pro
ye
rs
nor
upon
my
principles
can
it
be
proved,
(your
loradhip
meaning,
%),
think
you
do,
demonftratively
proved)
that
there
is
an
immateria
ae
fiance
in
us
that
thinks.
‘Though
I
prefume;
from
what
J
have
4),
about
this
fuppofition
of
a
fyftem
of
matter,
thinking
|}
(which
there
monftrates
that
God
is
immaterial)
will
prove
ic
in
the
higheft
d@
+
Effay
of
Human
Underftanding.
B.
4.°C.
3.
§.
6.
a
ft
In
hisfirft
letter
to
the
bifhop
ot
Worcetter,
.
~"s
|
B.
4.
C.
10,
§.
16,
én
prove
“probable,
that
the
thinkin
Vou,
H,
Ch.
3.
Extent
of
Human
K
norwledge.
81
g
fubftance
in
us
is
immaterial,
But
your
lords
1p
thinks
not
probability
enough,
and
by
charging
the
want
of
demon-
ftration
upon
my
principle,
that
the
thinking
thing
in
us
js
immaterial,
Your
lordthip
fee
ms
to
conclude
it
demonttrable
from
had
of
philo-
phys
That
demonftration
|
thould
with
joy
receive
from
your
lordthip,
ty
and
religion
aré
ithout
it,
as
I
have
fhown
*,
yet
it
would
be
a
owledge
in
nature
and
philofophy.
To
what
I
have
faid
in
my
book,
to
fhow
that
all
the
gteat
ends
of
Te.
igion
and
morality
are
fecured
barely
by
thedammortality
of
the
foul,
with.
Out
a
neceflary
fuppofition
that
the
foul
is
immaterial,
I
crave
leave
to
add,
that
immertality
may
and
fhall
be
annexed
to
that,
Nature
is
neither
immaterial
nor
immortal,
as
the
apoftle
exprefly
declares
1n
thefe
words,
+
For
this
corruptible
mult
put
on
incorruption,
and
this
mortal
muft
put
on
immortality,
.
Ung
the
word
{pirit
for
a
thinking
fubftance,
without
€X«
cluding
materiality
out
of
it,
will
be
thought
ton
gteat
a
liberty,
and
fuch
as
deferves
cenfure,
becanfe
]
leave
immateriality
out
of
the
idea
I
make
Ita
fign
of,
J
readily
Own,
that
words
fhould
be
{paringly
ventured
On
in
a
fenfe
Wholly
new;
and
nothing
but
abfolute
neceflit
we
can
produce
no
ex-
which
in
its
own.
ie
J
:
ve
great
authorities
to
juftify
me,
-
¢
foul
is
agreed,
on
all
hands
to
4
that
in
us
which
thinks.
;
00k
into
the
firh
book
of
Cicero’s
Tufculan
queftions,
and
into
the
fixth
book
of
Virgil’s
neid,
will
find,
that
thefe
two
great
men,
who
of
all
the
Romans
beft
underftood
philofophy,
thought,
or
at
leat
did
not
deny
the
fou]
to
be
a
fubtile
matter,
which
might
come
under
the
name
of
Abra,
Orignis,
or
:
ether,
and
this
foul
they
both
of
them
called
Piritus:
in
the
not
ich.
;
»
It
is
plain,
they
included
only
thought
total
exclufion
of
matter,
Whether
they
ay;
that
is
not
the
queftion
;
but
whether
ey
called
an
active,
thinking,
fubtile
fub-
£y
excluded
only
8tofs
and.
palpable
matter,
fpi-
1K
that
nobody
wil]
deny,
that
i
any
among
the
Ro-
Mans
can
be
allowed
to
{peak
Properly,
Tully
and
Virgil
are
the
two
who
may
moft
fecurely
be
depended
on
for
its
and
one
of
them
{peaking
of
Un
Teget
artus;
and
the
other,
Vita
contine-
tur
corpore
&
{pirity,
Where
it is
plain,
rally
ever
Where)
only
grofs
matter
that
may
be
fe!
Pears
by
thefe
Words,
Si
cor,
aut
fangnis,
aut
cereby
pret
eft
Corpus,
interibit
cum
reliquo
corpore;
fi
anima
eft,
forte
om
3
fi
Ignis,
extin
vetur,
Tufe,
net.
lore.
ry,
Here
Cicero
ae
cs
fae
to
1gnis
and
anima,
i.
e,
aura,
or
breath,
And-the
foun-
ne
3
0
‘
at
his
dikingtion
of
the
foul,
from
that
which
he
calls
corpus
fastiy
fe:
ic
oe
4
little
lower
in
thefe
words,
‘Tanta
ejus
tenuitas
ur
thi.
nation
,
wine
te
:
Or
Was
it
the
heathen
world
alone
that
had
2d,
Solomon
himfelf,
aks
after
the
falleth
the
fons
9
men,
befallerk
beatts;
as
the
one
dieth,
{>
dieth
t
and'handled,
as
ap-
-B44C,
3+
§.
6.
t
1
Cor,
xy,
$3.
t
Eccl,
iii,
19,
G
~
tranflate
Y
Corpus,
he
means
(as
gene-
um
eft
animus;
certe,
aa
aa
a
en
‘Means
a
thinking
fubftance,
I
muft
diffent
from
your
lordfhip,
and
#7”
é
82
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
Book
4
tranflate
the
Hebrew
word
nvm
here,
for
fo
I
find
it
tranflated
the
vel
next
verfe
but
one*;
who
knoweth
the
fpirit
of
man
that
goeth
upware
and
the
fpirit
of
the
beaft
that
goeth
down
to
the
earth?
In
which
places!
is
plain,
that
Solomon
applies
the
word
ny,
and
our
tranflators
of
hi@
the
word
{pirit,
to
a
fubftance,
out
of
which
materiality
was
not
w
ony
excluded,
unlefs
the
fpirit
of
a
beatt
that
goeth
downwards
to
the
ear
be
immaterial.
Nor
did
the
way
of
{peaking
in
our
Saviour’s
time
val)
from
this:
St.
Luke
tells
us
+,
that
when
our
Saviour,
after
his
refurrettio’
ftood
in
the
midi
of
them,
they
were
affrighted,
and
fuppofed
that
th
had
feen
metus,
the
Greek
word
which
always
anfwers
fpirit
in
Englilli
and
{fo
the
tranflators
of
the
Bible
render
it
here,
they
fuppofed
that
the)
had.feen
a
fpirit.
But
our
Saviour
fays
to’them,
behold
my
hands
at
my
feet,
that
it
is
I
myfelf;
handle
me
and
fee;
for
a
fpirit
hath
not
fe
and
bones,
as
you
fee
me
have.
Which
words
of
our
Saviour
put
fame
diftinétion
between
body
and
fpirit,
that
Cicer
did
in
the
plae
above-cited,
viz.
That
the
one was
a
grofs
compages
that
could
be
#7
and
handled;
and
the
ether
fuch
as
Virgil
defcribes
the
ghoft
or
foul
¢
Anchifes,
|
o
F
sa
cg
Ter
conatus
ibi
collo
darebrachia
circum,
-
‘Ter
fruftra
comprenfa
manus
effugit
imago,
a
:
Par
levibus
ventis
volucrique
fimillima
fumno
t..
.
a
I
would
not
be
thought
hereby
to
fay,
that
fpirit
never
does
fignily®
purely
immaterial
fubftance.
In
that
fenfe
the
feripture,
Drake
it,
{pea
when
it
fays
Godisa
fpirit;
and
in
that
fenfe
I
have
ufed
it;
and
in
th
fenfe
I
have
proved
from
my
principles
that
there
is
a
fpiritual
fubstancty
and
am
certain
that
there
is
a
{piritual
immaterial
fubftance:
which
i
”
humbly
conceive,
a
diret
anfwer
to
your
‘lordfhip’s
queftion
in
the
PY
ginning
of
this
argument,
viz.
How
we
come
to
be
certain
that
there
4
{piritual
fubftances,
fuppofing
this
principle
to
be
true,
that
the
fimpe
ideas
by
fenfation
and
reflection
are
the
fole
matter
and
foundation
of
#
our
reafoning?
But
this
hinders
not,-but
that
if
God,
that
infinite,
™
‘nipotent,
and
perfectly
immaterial
Spirit,
fhould
pleafe
to
give
to
a
bh:
A
of
very
fubtile
matter,
fenfe
and
motion,
it
might
with
propriety
of
{pect
be
called
f{pirit,
though
materiality
were
not
excluded
out
of
its
comple
idea.
Your
lordfhip
1g,
ie
It
is
faid
indeed
elfewhere|],
that
it
i8
T
pugnant
to
the
idea
of
fenfelefs
matter,
that
it
{hould
put
into
itfelf
fen
perception,
and
knowledge.
But
this
doth
not
reach
the
prefent
ca?
which
isnot
what
matter
can
do
of
itfelf,
but
what
matter
prepared
by
®
omnipotent
hand
can
do.
And
what
certainty
can
we
have
that
he
}
fe
not
done
it?
We
can
have
none
from
the
ideas,
for
thofe
are
given
up
this
cafe,
and
confequently
we
can
have
no
certainty,
upon
thefe
prin®™
ples,
whether
we
have
any
fpiritual
fubftance
within
us
or
not.
a
Your
lordfhip
in
this
paragraph
proves,
that,
from
what
I
fay,
we
©
have
no
certainty
whether
we
have
any
fpiritual
fubftance
in
us
or
OG
Tf
by
fpiritual
fubftance
your
lordthip
means
ani
immaterial
fubftance
us,
as
you
ipeak,
I
grant
what
your
lordfhip
fays
is
true,
that
it
a
not
upon
thefe
principles
be
demonttrated.
But
I
muft
crave
leave
©
fay
at
the
fame
time,
that
upon
thefe
principles
it
can
be
proved,
to"
higheft
degree
of
probability.
If
by
{piritual
fabftance
your
lordht
*
Eccl,
iii,
ar.
+
Che
xxiv.
37.
$
Lib,
VIL
|)
B,
4.C.
10
65
Ch.
gu
Extént
of
Human
Knowledge.
,
—
83
that
we
cant
have
4
certainty,
upon
my
principles,
that
there
is
a
{piritual
vOKance
in
us,
In
fhort,
my
lord,
upon
my
principles,
i.e,
from
the
idea
of
thinki
i
UDitance,
This
thinking
fubftance,
which
has
been
from
Preved
to
be
immateria).
=
I
thinking
fabftance,
which,
whethe
2
ance,
cannot.
be
infallibly
demonftrated
from
our
ideas
;
iit
may
be
proved,
that
it
is
to
the
higheft
degree
pro-
able
that
it
is
immaterial,
;
-
Again,
the
bifhop
of
Worcetter
undertakes
to
prove
from
Mr,
Locke’s
Principles,
that
ye
may:
be
certain,
«©
That
the
firft
eternal
thinking
Be-
**
ing,
Or
omnipotent
Spirit.cannot,
if
he
would,
give
to
certain
fyftems
**
of
‘created
fenfible
matter,
Put
together
as
he
fees
fit,
fome
degrees
of
;
**
fenfe,
Perception,
and
thought.”
>
.
To
which
Mr,
Locke
has
made
the
following
anfwer
in his
third
letter.
Our
firlt
argument
T
take
to
be
this;
that
according
to
me,
the
know-
ledge
we
have
being
by
our
ideas,
and
our
idea
of
matter
in
general
bein
afolid
fubftance,
and
Our
idea
of
body
a
folid
extended
figured
fubitance;
:
inking,
J
confound
the
idea
of
matter
with
the
idea
of
a
fpirit
-
ich
|.
niwer,
0,.n0
more
than
I
con.
f
an
horfe,'
when
I
fay
that
matter
3
and
that
an.
horfe
js
a
material
ce
With
fenfe
and
{pontaneous
motion.
(|
Uheidea
of
matter
33
‘
a
folid
fubftance;
wherever
there
is
<
fuch
afubttance,
here
j
the
eflence
of
mnatter,
whatever
other
~
Qualities,
not
Contained
in
that
eflence,
it
thal]
pleafe
God
to
fuperadd
to
&xa
od
creates
an
extended
folid
fubftance,
without
the
fuperadding:
any
thing
§
it,
and
fo
we
may
confider
it
at
reff:
to
+
Dut
it
has
{till
the
effence
of
matter
:
ants,
with
all.
the
excellencies
of
vegtta-
d
beauty,
Which
is
to
found
ina
rofe
or
peach
tree,
&c,
above
the
effence
of
matter,
in-general,
but
it
is
fill
but
matter:
to
other’
Parts
he
adds
fenfe
and
fpontaneons
Motion,
and
thofe
other
properties
that
are
to
be
found
in
an
elephant,
.
Hitherto
jt
is
not
doubted
but
the
Power
of
G
may
go,
and
that
the
pro
a
peach
or
an
clephane,
fuperadded
to
Matter,
change
not
the’
Properties
of
matter;
but
Matter
js
in
sthefe
things
Matter
fill,
But
if
one
venture
to
go
one
flep
arther
and
fay,
G
»
and
volition,
»
“70d
may:
five
to
matter
thought,
reafon
,
a8
Well
as
fenfa
and
{pontaneous
Motion,
there
are
men
ready
prefently
to:
imit
the
Power
of
the
omnipotent
Creator,
-and
tell
us
he
cannot
do
it;
€caufe
it
deftroys
the
effence,
or
changes
the
effential
Pp
i
ter.
'To
ake
good
which
aflertion
,
they
have
ng
More
to
fay,
but
that
'
thought
ang
teafon
are
not
included
j
I
grant
it
;
it€ver
exe
Hency,
not
contained
in
its
eflence,
be
fuperadded
to
Matter,
it
doe
not
ves
it
an
extended
;
;
of
matter:
and.if
Sreater
Perfection,
fuperadded
to
fuch
a
fubftance,
dettroys
the
effence
of
matter,
What
will
be
the
effence
of
matter
in-a
plant
!y
wh
Properties
far
exceed
thofe
of
a
mere
extended
folid
ubftance
?
But
it
ig
fa
Stant
it;
b
Perties
of
a
rofe,
tther
urged,
that
We
cannot
concejye
how
matter
can
think,
BE
to
argue
from
thence,
that
God
therefore
Cannot
give-to
G
2
matter
84.
_
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
Book
#
matter
a
faculty
of
thinking,
is
to
fay
God’s
omnipotency
is
limited
©)
narrow
compafs,
becaufe
man’s
underftanding
is
fo;
and
brings
0°)
God’s
infinite
power
to
the
fize
of
our
capacities.
If
God
can
give
power
to
any
parts
of
matter,
but
what
men
can
account
for
from”
effence
of
matter
in
general;
if
all
fuch
qualities
and
properties
mutt
ce™
theeffence,
or
change
the
effential
properties
of
matter,
which
are
(0!
conceptions
above
it,
and
we
cannot
conceive
to
be
the
natural
©
quence
of
that
effence
;
it
is
plain,
that
the
effence
of
matter
is
deftroy
and
its
effential
properties
changed,
in
moft
of
the
fenfible
parts
of
our
fyftem.
For
it
is
vifible,
that
all
the
planets
have
revolutions
9
certaim
remote
centres,
which
1
would
have
any
one
explain,
or
ma
ceivable
by
the
bare
effence,
or
natural
powers
depending
on
the
of
matter
in
general,
without
fomething
added
to
that
eflence,
w
cannot
conceive
;
for
the
moving
of
matter
in
a
crooked
line,
or
H°™
tration
of
matter
by
matter,
is
all
that
can
be
faid
in
the
cafe;
eith®
‘which
itis
above
our
reach
to
derive
from
the
eflence
of
matter
of
in
general
;
though
one
of
thefe
two
muft
unavoidably
be
allo
ved
©
fuperadded
in
this
inflance
to
the
eflence
of
matter
in’general.
The
5
nipotent
Creator
advifed
not
with
usin
the
making
of
the
world,
a°%—
ways
are
not
the
lefs
excellent,
becaufe
they
are
paft
finding
out.
In
the
next
place,
the
vegetable
part
of
the
creation
is
not
dow
be
wholly
material;
and
yet
he
that
will
look
into
it,
will
obferve
lencies
and
operations
in
this
part
of
matter,
which
he
will
not
fin
tained
in
the
effence
of
matter
in
general,
nor
be
able
ta
concei¥
they
can
be
produced
by
it,
And
will
he
therefore
fay,
that
the
_
of
matter
is
dedvoyed
in
them,
becaufe
they
have
properties
and
opel”
not
contained
in
the
effential
properties
of
matter
as
matter,
nor
e%p?”
by
the
effence
of
matter
in
general?
|
oF
Let
us
advance
one
ftep
farther,
and
we
fhall
in
the
animal
worl?”
with
yet
greater
perfections
and
properties,
no
ways
explicable)
effence
of
matter
in
general.
If
the
omnipotent
Creator
had
not?
%y
aided
to
the
earth,
which
produced
the
irrational
animals,
quality
{urpafling
thofe
of
the
dull
dead
earth,
out
of
which
they
were
made
fenfe,
and
fpontaneous
motion,
nobler
qualities
than
were
before
had
{till
remained
rude
fenfelefs
matter;
and
if
to
the
individuals
®
«4
fpecies
he
had
not
fuperadded
a
power
of
propagation,
the
fpecies
oy”
rifhed
with
thofe
individuals:
but
by
thefe
effences
or
properties
©
.
fpecies,
fuperadded
to
the
matter
which
they
were
made
of,
the
cH"
properties
of
matter
in
general
were
not
deftroyed
or
changed,
4”
than
any
thing
that
was
in
the
individuals
before
was
deitroyed
of
aj
by
the
power
of
generation,
fuperadded
to
them
by
the
firft
bene”
of
the
Almighty.
|
ge
In
all
fuch
cafes,
thd
faperinducement
of
greater
perfettions
an®
yg
qualities
deftroys
nothing
of
the
effence
or
perfe€tions
that
wel
i
before;
unlefs
there
can
be
fhowed
a
manifeft
repugnancy
berwee™
but
ali
the
proof
offered
for
that,
is
only,
that-we
cannot
concel
matter,
without
fuch
fuperadded
perfections,
can
produce
fuch
©)
which
is,
in
truth,
no
more
than
to
fay,
matter
in
general,
or
€Y°"G
of
matter,
as
matter,
has
them
not;
but
is
no
reafon
to
prove,
1
»
if
he
pleafes,
cannot
{uperadd
them
to
fome
parts
of
matter,
U
f
f
be
proved
to
be
a
¢ontradi¢tion,
that
God
thould
give
to
fome
Pay
_
matter
qualities
and
perfeétions,
which
matter
in
general
has
not}
we
cannot
conceive
how
matter
is
invelled
with
them,
or
how
Jt"!
7
-
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
ae
j
ell
as
philofophy
;
y
can
advance
any
thing
more
in
favour
of
{ce
ticifm,
>.
n
the
prefent
fubjeét
of
the
power
of
thinking
and
felf-motion,
beftowed
by
Omnipotent
power
in
fome
parts
of
matter.
the
objection
to
this
is,
I
cannot
conceive
how
matter
thould
think,
What
is
the
confequence?
Ey
©»
God
cannot
give
it
a
power
to
think,"
Let
this
ftand
for
a
good
reafon,
and
then
Proceed
in
other
cafes
by
the
fame.
ou
cannot
conceive
how
matter
can
attract
matter
at
any
diftance,
much
lefs
at
the
diftance
of
1,000,000
miles
;
ergo,
God
cannot
give
itfuch
a
Powers
you
cannot
Conceive
how
matter
fhould
feel,
or
move
itfelf,
or
affet
an
immaterial
being,
it;
ergo,
God
cannot
give
it
fach
powers
:
which
is
ineffeg
to
deny
Stavity,
and
the
revolution
of
the
Planets
about
the
fan;
to
make
brutes
mere
machines,
without
fenfe
or
*POntaneous
Motion;
and
to
allow
man
neither
fenfe
nor
voluntary
motion,
tus
apply
this
rule
one
degree
farther,
ou
cannot
conceive
how
an
extended
folid
fubftance
thould
think,
therefore
God
cannot
make
it
unk
:
can-you
conceive
how
your
own
foul,
or
any
fubftance,
thinks?
You
find
indeed
that
you
do
think,
and
fo
do
I;
but
1
want
to
be
told
how
the
action
of
thi
8,
I
confefs,
is
beyond
my
:
inking
is
performed:
thi
Conception
;
and
J
Would
be
glad
any
one,
who
cenceives
it,
would
ex.
Plain
it
to
me,
God,
I
find,
has
given
me
this
faculty;
and
fince
I
can-
not
but
be
cony}
nced
of
his
power
in
this
inftance,
which
though
I
every
ronraht
€Xperiment
inmyfelf,
yet
I
cannot
Conceive
the
manner
of
;
what
Would
it
be
Tefs
than
an
‘j
: :
beh
ite
cafes,
onky
fea
an
infolent
abfurdity,
to
deny
his
power
in
other
ro
ays
ells
reafon, becaufe
I
cannot
conceive
the
manner
how
?
>
°
€xplain
this
Matter
a
little
farther:
God
has
created
a
fubitance
.
:
:
>
4
Lolid
extended
fubitance.
Is
God
bound
to
give
it,
befides
being,
4
power
of
ation?
that,
1
thin
body
will
fay
:
he
therefore
may
leave
it
in
a
ftate
of
inattivity,
me
a
be
_neverthelefs
a
fubftance
;
for
a@ion
js
Not
neceffary
to
the
being
of
any
fubftance
that
od
does
Create,
God
i
de
to
exift,
de
novo,
an
Immaterial
fubftance,
Which
wil]
not
lofe
its
being
ofa
fubftance,
though
God
fheuld
beftow’
on
ir
nothing
more
but
this
bare
being,
with.
any.activity
at
all,
Here
are
now
two
diftinae
fabitances,
Now
»
the
other
immaterial
;
and
if
it
be
without
giving
tis
plain,
that
nei.
}
“an
move
itfelf-
how,
I
would
afk,
why
Omnipotency
can-
NOt
give
C0
either’
of
thefe
fubftances,
which
are
equally
in
a
ftate
of
per-
fect
Inactivity,
the
fame
power
that
it
can
8ive
to
the
other?
Let
it
be,
“*0F
example,
that
of
fpontaneous
or
felf-motion,
which
is
aypower
that
it
Ww
¥
the
fame
reafon
j
believed?
It
is
very
fit
and
credible
to
be
believed,
if
reafon
can
d
letter
*
made
ufe
of
again,
and
ferioufly
enlarged
as
an
argue
2
Extent
of
Human
Kuowledge.
Book
#
believe
that
T
have
leffened
the
credibility
of
the
immortality
of
the
8
and
the
refurrection,
by
faying,
that
though
it
be
mof
highly
proba”
that
the
foul
is
immaterial,
yet
upon
my
principles
it
cannot
be
dem
{trated
;
becaufe
it
is
not
impoflible
to
Gad’s
omnipotency,
if
he
plea
to
beftow
upon
fome
parcels
of
matter,
difpofed
as
he
fees
fit,
a
facultf
thinking?
age
iiawons
accufation
of
my
leflefling
the
credibility
of
thefe
articl®
faith,
is
founded
on
this,
that
the
article
of
the
immortality
of
the
abates
of
its
credibility,
if
it
be
allowed,
that
its
immateriality
(whi
the
fuppofed
proof
from
reafon
and
philofophy
of
its
immortality)
ca
be
demonttrated
from
natural
reafon
:
which-argument
of
your
lordfhipy
bottoms,
as
I
humbly
conceive,
on
this,
that
divine
revelation
abate?”
its
credibility
in
all
thofe
articles
it
propofes,
proportionably
as
hum
reafon
fails
to
fupport
the
teftimony
of
God.
And
all
that
your
Jord!”
in
thofe
paffages
has
faid,
when
examined,
will,
I
fuppofe,
be
fou
import
thus
much,
viz.
Does
God
propofe
any
thing
to
mankin
ftrate
it
to
be
true,
But
if
human
reafon
come
fhort
in
the
cafe,
cannot
make
it
out,
its
credibility
is
thereby
leffened
;
which
is
in
to
fay,
that
the
veracity
of
God
is
not
a
firm
and
fure
foundation
of
to
rely
upon,
without
the
concurrent
teftimony
of
reafon;
i,
e.
with
©
rence
be
it
fpoken,
God
is
not:
to
be
believed
on
his
own
word,
UM
what
he
reveals
be
in
itfelf
credible,
and
might
be
believed
without
7”
If
this
be
a
way
to
promote
religion,
the
chriftian
religion,
in
articles,
am
not
forry
that
it
is
not
a
way
to
be
found
in
any
of
my,@y
ings;
for
I
imagine
any
thing
like
this
would
(and
I
should
think
def
to)
have
other
titles
than
bare
fcepticifm
beftowed
upon
it,
and
¥
have
raifed
no
{mall
outcry
againft
any
one,
who
is
not
to
be
fuppo
he
in
the
right
in
all
that
he
days,
and
fo
may
fecurely
fay
what
he
ple
Such
as
I,
the
profanum
vulgus,
who
take
too
much
upon
us,
if
we
¥
examine,
have
nothing
to
do
but
to
hearken
and
believe,
though
what
faid
fhould
fubvert
the
very
foundations
of
the
chriftian
faith,
~
Cae
What
I
have
above
obferved,
is
fo
vifibly
cantained
in
your
Jord,
argument,
that
when
I
met
with
it
in
your
anfwer
to
my
firlt
letter
feemed
fo
ftrange
for
a
man
of
your
lotdthip’s
chara@er,
and
in
a@
“ff
in
defence
of
the
doétrine
of
the
Trinity,
that
I
could
hardly
perM
myfelf,
but
it
was
a
flip
of
your
pen:
but
when
I
found
it
in
your
fe”
weight
to
be
infifted
upon,
I
was
convinced,
that
it
was
a
principlé
you
heartily
embraced,
how
little
favourable
foever
it
was
to
the
af
y
of
ths
chriftian
religion,
and
particularly
thofe
which
you
underto™
defend,
ya
I
defire
my
reader
to
perufe
the
paffages
as
they
ftand
in
your
themfelves,
and
fee
whether
what
you
fay
in
them
does
not
amou”
i
this
that
a
revelation
from
God
is
more
or
lefs
credible,
according
~
has
a
ftronger
or
weaker
confirmation
from
human
reafon..
For,
-
ed
1.
Your
lordthip
fays,
t+
you
do
not
quettion
whether
God
ca?
64
immortality
to
a
material
fubftance;
but
you
fay
it
takes
off
very
ih
from
the
evidence
of
immortality,
if
it
depends
wholly
upon
God's
that,
which
of
its
own
nature
it
is
not
capable
of,
a
*
od
Anfwer,
woe
ah
Anteer.
Ch.
3.
Extent
of
Human
hotcledgé.
93
To
which
T
reply,
any
one’s
not
being
able
to
demonitrate
=
ot
2
immaterial,
takes
off
pot
very
much,
nor
at
all,
from
the
.
essary
its
immortality,
if
God
has
revealed
that
it
thall
be
oe
5B
“=H
the
veracity
of
God
is
a
demonftration
of
the
truth
of
what
:
as
ate
af
and
the
want
of
‘another
demonftration
of
a
propofition,
se
a
a
;
ttratively
trie,
takes
not
off
from
the
evidence
of
it.
For
w
rss
the
vo
Clear
demonitration,
there
is
as
much
evidence
as
any
trath
can
hes
1d
that
is
not
felf-evident,
God
has
revealed
that
the
fouls
of
eta
Wve
forever,
But,
fays
your
lordthip,
from
this
apr
aes
of
its
very
much,
if
it
depends’
wholly
upon
God’s
giving
t
ie
Seal
Own
nature
it
is
not
capable
of,
i.e.
The
revelation
and
te
Becks
"son
o-*s
much
of
its
evidence,
if
this
depends
wholly
upon
the
goo
a
sik
of
God,
and
cannot
be
demonttratively
made
out
by
natural
rea
os
Fox
the
foul
is
immaterial,
and
Confequently
in’its
own
nature
immortal,
i
©
meant
by
thefe
words,
which
of
its
ia
pable
of,
to
make
them
to
the
purpofe.
For
the
who
“i
of
your
lordthip’s
difcourfe
here,
is
to
prove,
that
the
foul
cannot
material,
becaufe
then
the
evid
énce
of
its
being
immortal
would
be
very
much
leffened,
Which
is
to
fay,
that
it
is
not
as
credible
upon
divine’
revelation,
that
a
material
fubflance
fhould
be
immortal,
as
aa
immate-
tial;
or
which
is
all
one,
that
God
is
hot
equally
to
be
he
declares,
that
a
material
fubftance
fh:
i
clares,
that
an
i
i
€
after
the
refurrection,
as
well
as
es
your
lordthi
believe
the
eternal
thefe
more
than
of
the
other,
beeain
you
think
you
can
Prove
it
of
one
of
fon,
and
of
the
other
not?
Or
can
Wine
revelation
in.
the
cafe,
doubt
of
one
of
an
the
other
f
think
this
ropofition
lefs
credible,
that
“men,
after
the
refurreétion,
gall
live
for
ever;
than
this,
the
fouls
of
men
fhall,
after
the
refurreétion,
live
for
ever?
Kor
that
€
muft
do,
if
he
thinks
;
$
either
of
them
is
lefs
credible
than
the
other,
If
9,
reafon
is
to
be
1
confulted
how
far
Credit
of
divine
teftim
God
is
to
be
believed,
and
the
‘
ony
muft
receive
its
force
tron
the
evidence
of
rea
-
fon;
which
is
evidently
to
take
in
all
away
the
credibility
of
divine
revelation
at
2
evidence
of
a
a
fails.
‘And
how
mach
fach
a
principle
as
this
tend#*to
the
fupport
of
the
doétrine
of
the
mnity,
or
the
Promoting
the
chriftian
religion,
I
thall
leave
it
to
oom
lordthip
to
confider,
wis
Lam
yt
fy
Well
read
in
were
their
Spinions
in
this
Hobbes
or
Spinofa,
ast
think
your
lordthip’
Matter.
Burt
offibly
there
be.thofe;
who
will
S
authority
of
more
ifs
to
them
in
the
cafe,
than
thofe
jutly
decried
names;
and
be
glad
to
find
your
lordthip
a
epaita
of
the
Pracles
of
re
afon,
{0
little
to
the
advantage
of
the
oracles
of
divine.
reye.
lation.
This
at
leat,
I
think
tom
of
th
»
May
be
fubjoined
to
the
Words
at
the
bot.
bite,
wcxt
page*,
Thar
thofe
who
have
"Credibility
of
th
gone
about:
to
leff=q
the
©
alfticles:
of
faith,
which
evi
they
are
Jef;
credible,
idently:
they.
do,
who
fay
annot
be
made
out
demonttratively
¥
Natural
reafon,
h
ght
to
fecure
feveral
of
thesarticles
*
at
Anfwer,
0
be
able
to
fay,
what
‘«
of
|
parable
unien
of
foul
and
body
to
eternity:
and
I
perfuade
my
.
difeover
in
the
nature
of
things
how
it
is,
be
that
which,
your
lore®
ag
-lordfhip
as’
firmly
believes
the
imimortality
of
the
body
after
the
rely
94
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
Book*
‘of
the
chriftian
faith,
efpecially
thofe
of
the
trifity,
incarriation,
20
furre&tion
of
the
body,
which
are
thofe
upon
the
account
of
which*"
‘prought
by
your
lordfhip
into
this
difputes
2
Boe!
{
fhall
not
trouble
the
reader
with
your
lordfhip’s
endeavours,
following
words,
to
prove,
that
if
the
foul
be
not.an:
immaterial
fub
ips
itcan
be
nothing
but
life;
your
very
firlt
words
vifibly
confuting
a?”
‘you
alledge
to
that
purpofe,
they
are,
*
If
the
foul
be
a
material
fubfta™
it
is
really
nothing
but
life;
which
is
to
fay,
That
if
the
foul
be
fubftance,
it
is
‘not
really
a
fubftance,
but’
really
nothing
elfe
DY
‘affeGtion
of
a
fubftance;
for
the
life,
whether
of
a
material
or
imma
fubftance,
is
not
the
fubftance
itfelf,
but
an
affection
of
it.
Be
|
2.
You
fay,
t+
Although
we
think
the
feparate
ftate
of
the
foul
#
‘death,
is
fufficiently
revealed
in
the
feripture;
yet
it
creates
a
grea®
|
ficulty
in
underftanding
it,
if
the
foul
be
nothing
but
life,
or
a
may
‘fubftance,
which
muft
be
diffolved'
when
life
is
ended.
For,
if me
be
a
material
fubftance,
it
muft
be
made
up,
as
others
are,
of
the
com,
‘of
folid
and
feparate
parts,
how
minute
and
invifible
foever
they
be-_
what
is
it
which
fhould
keep
them
together,
when
life
is
gone?
it
is
no
eafy
matter
to
give
an
account
how
the
foul
fhould
be
cap?”
4
‘immortality,
unlefs
it
be
an
immaterial
fubftance;
and
then
we
kno”
4
folution
and
‘texture
of
bodies
cannot
reach
the
foul,
being
of
a
CH
‘nature.
*
.
:
pies
.
Let
it
be
as
hard
a
matter
as
it
will,
to
give
an
account
what
ite
fhould
keep
the-parts
of
a
material
foul
together,
after
it
is
feparate@”
=
‘the
body
;
yet
it
will
be
always
as
eafy
to
give
an
account
of
it,
as
2
an
account
what
it
is
that
fhall
keep
together
a
material
and
im
fubftance.
And
yet
the
difficulty
that
there
is
to
give
an
account
I
hope,
does
not,
with
your
lordfhip,
weaken
the
credibility
of
af
{0¥
ee
uae
the
men
of
fenfe,
to
whom
your
lordthip
appeals
in
the
cafe,
do
their
belief
of
this
fundamental
point
much
weakened
by
that
d
I
thought
heretofore
(and
by
your
lordthip’s
permiffion
would
1"
ftill)
that
the
union
of
the
parts
of
matter,
one
with
another,
15
35°
9
in
the
hands
of
God,
as
the
union
of
a
material
and
immaterial
fubi
BS
and
that
it
does
not
take
off
very
much,
or
at
all,
from
the
evide™™
4.
immortality,
which
depends
on
that
union,
that
it
is
no
eafy
man
|
give
an
account
what
it
is
that
fhould
keep
them
together:
though
™
y
pending
wholly
upon
the
gift
and-good
pleafure
of
God,
where
the’
ner
creates
great
difficulty
in
the
ufderftanding,
and
our
reafon
|
pofitively
fays,
leffens
the
credibility
of
the
fundainental
articles
refurrection
and
immortality.
i
But,
my
lord,
to
remove
this
objection
a
little,-and
to
fhow
®
{mall
force
it
is
even
with
yourfelf;
give
me
leave
to
prefuime,
1
tion,
as
any
other
article
of
faith;
if
fo,
then
it
being
no
caly
OW
ivean’account
what
it
is
that
fhall
keep
together
the
parts
of
2
™
i
oul,
to
one:that’
believes
it
is
material,
can
no.more
weaken
the
(ad
lity
of
its
immortality,
than
the
like
difficulty
weakens
the
credibly
the
immortality
of
the
body.
For,
when
your
lordhhip
thall
find
eh
eafy
matter
to
give
an
account
what
it
is,
befides
the
good
pleaf
*
ht
Anfwer,
+
Ibid.
Ch.
3,
God,
Which
fhal]
keep
together
th
parts
of
our
material
bédies
to
ctet..
nity,
or
even
foul
and
body,
I
doubt
not
but
a
Exiey
ere
it
not
that
the
w
{he
warmth
of
controverfy
up
thofe
Principles
themfelves
(when
th
t
of
Human.
Knowledge.
9§
ny
one
who
fhall
think
the
nd
it
as
eafy
to
give
an
account
what
it
is
thac
“
Matter
alfo
together
to
eternity,
1S
apt
to
make
men
fo
far
ey
will
ferve
in
others,
I
thould
wonder
ty
to
underftand
inute
parts
of
a
material
foul,
when
life
is
Not
an
_eafy
matter
to
give
an
account
how
the
foul
thall
be
Capable
of
i;
i
.
Natural
teafon,
1
courfe
tends,
as
is
evide
hat
is
already
fet
down;
and
will
be»
more
fully
made
‘out
‘by
what
your
Io
there
needs
no
fuch
proof
Other
fenfe,
I
thought
this
truth,
th
think
it
will:
and
is
it
f,
again
to
light
thr
h
heen
teafon
with
"he
foul
;
how
the
foul
thoura
wor
ates.
That
tubftanc
anpaae
of
thofe
q
Ulties,
¢},
Ut
crave
]
n
be
Pre
ofthe
body,
"Mortal,
which
But,
if
jt
Were
not.
reach
othe
taly
to
accordin
9
Your
Principles,
mutt
:
at
Create
lefs
difficuls
;
O,
how
it
wae
ee
eXPlained,
an
it.
was
thow
it
Was,
i
:
ile,
that
yon
thoy
make
ufe
of
it
here
ft
the
article
of
life
imm
ShtQe
Lam
Ture thee
octets
eet
sa
ip’s
would.
r
articles
of
eae
cca
Principle
of
your
lordthip’s
won
ve
a
account
ho
unlefs
it
be
an
immaterial
fubfante
3}
as
if
it
were
ealy
to
give
an
Account
by
AOW
it
could
be.
Fo,
to
this
it
is
that
all
this
your
dif
is
evident
by
w
i
tdthip
fays
in
other
Places,
though
—
»
fince
it
would
all
be
nothing
againft
me
in
any
other
places
afferted,
and
infifted
on
of
divine
revel
ates
ation
was
the
lef
to
be-believed,
ng
itfelf
Created
great
dj
culty
in
the
underftanding,
and
1d,
no
ealy,
matter
tg
us,
as
I
take
jt»
i
that
were
mere
matters
of
faith,
as
F
your~
an
immortality,
that.
Chriit
hath
broughe
ough
the
Sofpel,
and
heither
Was,
nor
could
be
made
out
by
n
Out
revelation
>
i
Ou
wall
fay,
you
{peak
only
of
.
It
is
No.eafy
matter
to
givean
account
A
=
ould
be
capable
of
i;
i
;
Tr
it
be
an
immaterial
ere
is
not
any
one
»
Out
the
manner
how
4
ma-
,
Well
reach
the.
immortality.
fave
to
fay,
that
th
Cc
o
not
as
i
Our-natural
reafon
finds
«it.
not-fo.«
thole
myfteries
ate;
and
which
therefore,
.
h
be
lefs
credible
than
other
articles,
that
yo
y
€
underft.
ding.
For
your
Jordfhip
fays,:
by
his
y
+7
at
any
man
of
fenfe,
Whether
to
a
man,
who
thoughe
tality
oe
ae
he
eould
from
atural
grounds
demonftrate
the
immor-«
pont
‘a
ye
the
finding
the
"Ncertainty
of
thofe
Principles
he.
went
by
natuiat
rent
on,
1.e.
the
Nding
he
coul
ot
certainly
prove
i¢
article,
x
seat
doth
not
caken
the
credibility
of
that
fundamental
humbly
Sones
re
ulidered
a8
a
matter
of
faith
?
Which,
in
effea
that
cannog
Be
Ye,
amounts
to
this,
that
a
Propofition
divinely
fevealed
an:
which
fe
Y
Natural
reafon,
is
lefs
Credible
than
one
lat
Fence
be
jr
fae
=?
come
very
lite
thort
of
this,
with
due
reve.
Polition
the
Po
ee
God
is
lefs
to
be
believed
when
he
affirms
a
pros
|
what
¢
be
ve
bi
eae
Patural
reafon,
than
when
he
Propofes
-:
irect
Contrary
to
which
is
my
opinion,
*
2d
Anfwer,
@
z
‘though
did
demonttratively
lead
us
to
the
certain
knowledge
of
the
ex¥
a5
96
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
Books
though
you
endeavour
to
make
it
good
by
thefe
following
wordsi
|
the
evidence
of
faith
fall
fo
much
fhort
of
that
of
reafon
it
mul
have
lefs
effet
upon
men’s
minds,
when
the
fubferviency
of
reale”
taken
away;
as
it
muft
be
when
the
grounds
of
certainty
by
reafon
vanifhed,
"Is
it
at
all
probable,
that
he
who
finds
his
reafon
deceive
—
in
fach
fundamental
points,
fhould
have
his
faith
ftand
firm
and
un)
able
on
tHe
account
of
tevelation?
Than
which
I
think
there
are
2
plainer
words
to
be
found
out
to
declare,
that
the
credibility
of
4a
teftimony
depends
on
the
natural
evidence
of
probability
of
the
ching”
receive
‘eit
revelation,
and
rifes
and
falls
with
it;
and
that
the
trub™
God,
or
the
atticles
of
mere
faith,
lofe
fo
much
of
their
credibility
they
want
proof
from
reafon:
which
if
true,
revelation
may
come
07,
no
credibility
at
all.
For
if,
in
this
prefent
cafe,
the
credibilit
ropofition,
the
fouls
of
men
fhall
live
for
ever,
révedled
in
the
fonP,,
be
leflened
by
confeffing
it
cannot
be
demonftratively
proved
from
1%,
though
it
be
afferted
to
be
moft
highly
probable:
muft
not,
by
the,
rule,
its
credibility
dwindle
away
to
nothing,
if
natural
reafon
fhowe
be
able
to
make
it
out
to
be
fo
much
as
probable,
or
fhould
place
t™!
bability
from
natural
principles
on
the
other
fide?
For,
if
mere
W7
4)
demonttration
leffens
the
credibility
of
any
propofition
divinely
1&Y"
muft
not
want
of
probability,
or
contrary
probability
from
natural
1
quite
take
away
its
credibility?
Here
at
Jatt
ir
muft
end,
if
in
any
cafe
the
veracity
of
God,
and
the
credibility
of
the
truths
we
recetv®
him
by.
revelation,
be
fubjeéted
to
the
verdiéts
of
human
reafon,
“
allowed
to
receive
any
acceflion
or
diminution
from
other
proofs,
F
of
other
proofs
of
its
certainty
or
probability.
_
acl
If
this
be
your
lordfhip’s
way
to
promote
religion,
or
defend
its
4
I
know
not
what
argument
the
greateft
enemies
of
it
could
We
4
effe€tual
for
the
fubverfion
of
thofe
you
have
undertaken
to
def
being
to
refolve
all
revelation
perfectly
and
purely
into
natural
reals,
bound
its
credibility
by
that,
and
leave
no
room
for
faith
in
other
than
what
can
be
accounted
for
by
ratural
reafon
without
revelatio™
Your
lordfhip
+
infifts
much
upon
it,
as
if
I
had
contradicted
Wj
have
faid
in
my
eflay,
by
faying
}
that
upon
my
principles
it
ca”)
demonftratively
proved,
that
it
is
an
immaterial
{ubitance
in
us
that
ft
however
probable
it
be,
He
that
will
be
at
the
pains
to
read
that
9
of
mine,
and
confider
it,
will
find,
that
my
bufinefs
there
was
€)
that
it
was
no
harder
to
conceive
an
immaterial
than
a
material
{UP
ig
and
that
from
the
ideas
of
thought,
and
a
power
of
moving
of
&
which
we
experienced
in
ourfelves,
(ideas
originally
not
belo?
matter
as
matter)
there
was
no
more
difficulty
to
conclude
ther?
immaterial
fubftance
in
us,
than
that
we
had
material
parts.
voit
of
thinking,
and
power
of
moving
of
matter,
1
in
another
place
|e
an
immaterial
thinking
being,
in
whom
we
have
the
idea
of
{pitt
se
ftriételt
fenfe;
in
which
fenfe
{
alfo
applied
it
to’
the
foul,
in
the
234
of.my
eflay.;
the
eafily
conceivable
pofiibility,
nay
great
probabil
0!
the
thinking
fubitance
in
us
is
immaterial,
giving
me
fufficient
for
it:
in
which
fenfe
I
fhall
think
I
may
fafely
attribute
it
to
*
Py
ing
fubftance
in
us,
till
your
mpm
Siti
have
better
proved
i
words,
thatt
is
impoffible
it
fhould
be
immaterial,
For
|
only
M0
*
ad
Anfwer,
+
ak
Anfwer,
=f
-By
ay
Co
23"
Ch.
33
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
itis
poffible,
;,
}
&.
involves.
no
‘ContradiGtion,
that
immaterial
{pirit,
fhould,
if
he
pleafes,
Zive
to
fo
S
he
thinks
97
God,
the
omnipotent
me
‘parcels
of
matter,
s
4
power
of
thinking
and
moving
;
ic
:
dued
with
a
power
of
thinking
and
motion,
might
Perly
be
Called
{pirits.
j i
»
1
ContradiftinGion
to
unthinkin
7.
Prefume;
there
is
no
manner
of
contradi€tion,
Juttified
my
ufe
of
the
Word
fpirit,
in
that
fenfe,
fro
©f
Cicero
and
Virgil,
applying
the
Latin
word
fpiritus,
from
whence
dpirit
is
derived,
to
the
foul
as
a
thinking
thing,
without
excluding
ma.
UEOtit,
bes
whic
your
lordthip
replies,
*
That
Cicero,
in
18
Pufculan
Queftions,
fuppofes
the
foul
not
to
be
a
finer
fort
of
body,
dy——That
he
calls
the
body
the
t
nd
fays,
that
wife
man’s
bufinefs
is
to
draw
off
's
foul
from
his
body.
An
then
your
lordthip
concludes,
as
js
ufual,
$
it
poflible
now
to
think
fo
reat
a
man.
looked
on
the
nodification
of
the
»
Which
mutt’
be
at
an
end
with
life?
48
impoffible
that
a
m
of
fo
800d
fenfe
as
Tully,
when
he
©tpus
or
body
for
the
g
i
C
m
the
authorities
a
endeavouring
to
perfuade
oO
Knowled
ged
that,
truly
great
he
was,
are
not
Wont
fo
manifettly
ty
Contradiét
themfelyes,
ett
i
ification
of
the
body
of
to
examine,
whether
the
«
a
man
was
immortal,
when
that
body
itfelf
-
Was
Mortal:
and
therefore,
that
which
he
Teports
as
|
icwarchtis’s
Opinion,
Ne
difmiffes
j
th
°ginning
without
any
more
ado,
c,
ry,
But
Cicero’s
wit
‘s
direa,
Plain,
and
feng
le
luquiry,
viz,
What
the
foul
Was?
to
fee
ether
thence
he
Could
difcover
its
immortality,
_
But
in
all
that
Neourfe
is
firft
1:
much
of
his
E
K
of
Vafeulan
Queftions,
where
he
lays
out
fo
|
'S
Teading
ang
reafo
:
thought
thar
€
foul
ns
there
is
nor
one
fyllable
fhowing
the
leat
.
u
;
; t
a
.
direéily
to
ihe
contrary,
a8
an
immaterial
fubftance;
but
many
things
nfes
he
ufes
+
corpus
rts
of
aman;
and
js
pofitive
that
CY
In
this
fenfe,
taken
‘for
the
human
body,
he
©
prifon
of
the
foul:
an
an,
j
:
ays:
an,
inftancing
in
Socrates
Sec
8
glad
of
a
fair
PPortunity
to
Set
out
of
it.
But
he
no
where
YS
anyfach
thing
a
Calls
not
matter
in
general
the
prifon
2
Word
of
being
feparate
from
it.
i
foul
js
hot,
like
other
things
here
below,
dee
tion
of
the
elements,
ch
St
WO
grofs
elements,
¢
+3
arth
and
water,
from
being
—
“ar
and
pofitive
:
but
b
Of
Bet:
for
in
fome
places
he
{peaks
doubtful
Ot
air
or
fire,
ima
fit
animus,
ignifve,
nefcio,
agtees
with
Pa
ius,
thar,
if
it
be
at
all
ef
1t;
Inflammata
an;
i
8
in;
beyond
ly,
whether
©
25.
And
“mentary,
it
is,
“+
Inflamed
air;
and
for
this
he
gives
feven
*10,
19.
And
though
he
thinks
it
to
be
of
4
peculiar
nature
t
ift
Anfwer,
Che
19,
22,
30,
31,
&¢,
Vou,
If,
1
pep
-
anim
of
98
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
Book
4
of
its
own,
yet
he
is
fo
far
from
thinking
it
immaterial,
that
he
fays,
c.
19
‘that
the
admitting
it
to
be
of
an
aerial
or
igneous
nature,
will
not
bé
|
inconfiftent
with
any
thing
he
had
faid.
.
a
.
That
which
he
feems
moft
to
incline
to
is,
that
the
foul
was
not
at
all
elementary,
but
was
of
the
fame
fubftance
with
the
heavens;
which
Anh
|
totle,
to
diftinguith
from
the
four
elements,
and
the
changeable
bodie®
|
here
below,
which
he
fuppofed
made
up
of
them,
called
quinta
effenti:
—
That
this
was
Tully’s
opinion
is
plain
from
thefe
words,
Ergo
animus
—
"
(qui,
ut
ego
dico,
divinus)
eft,
ut
Euripides
audet
dicere,
Deus:
&
quh
dem,
fi
Deus
aut
anima
aut
ignis
eft,
idem
eft
animus
hominis.
Nam
ub
illa
natura
cceleftis
et
terra
vacat
&
humore;
fic
utriufque
harum
rerum
humanus
animus
eft
expers.
Sin
autem
eft
quinta
quedam
natura
ab
Arie
totele
indu@a;
primum
hec
&
deorum
eft
&
animorum.
Hanc
nos
fe
tentiam
fecuti,
his
ipfis
verbis
in
confolatione
hac
expreffimus,
ch.
29?
—
And
then
he
goes
on,
c.
27.
to
repeat
thofe
his
own
words,
which
your
—
lordfhip
has
quoted
out
of
him,
wherein
he
had
affirmed,
in
his
treatife
De
Confolatione,
the
foul
not
to
have
its
original
from
the
earth,
or
—
be
mixed
or.made
of
any
thing
earthly
;
but
had
faid,
fingularis
eft
igitul
quedam
natura
&
vis
animi,
fejun¢ta
ab
his
ufitatis
notifque
naturis
—
whereby
he
tells
us,
he
meant
nothing
bat
Ariftotle’s
quinta
effentia’
_which
being
unmixed,
being
that
of
which
the
gods
and
fouls
confifteds
I
he
calls
it
divinum
coélefte,
and
concludes
it
eternal;
it
being,
as
™
fpeaks,
fejunéta
ab
omni
mortali
concretione.
From
which
it
is
cleal
that
in
ali
his
inquiry
about
the
fubftance
of
the
foul,
his
thoughts
we?
—
not
beyond
the
four
elements,
or
Ariftotle’s
quinta
eflentia,
to
look
for
In
all
which
there
is
nothing
of
immateriality,
but
quite
the
contrary.
|
He
was
willing
to
believe
(as
good
and
wife
men
have
always
bee™,
—
that
the
foul
was
immortal
;
but
for
that,
it
is
plain,
he
never
thought?
’
its
immateriality,
but
as
the
eaftern
people
do,
who
believe
the
foul
to
be
immortal,
but
have
neverthelefs
no
thought,
no
conception
of
its
imma
—
teriality.
It
is
remarkable
what
a
very
confiderable
and
judicious
authOl
—
fays
*
in
the
cafe.
No
opinion,
fays
he, has
been
fo
univerfally
received
as
that
of
the
immortality
of
the
foul;
but
its
immateriality
is
a
trutl?
—
the
knowledge
whereof
has
not:
fpread
fo
far.
And
indeed
it
is
extremely
.
difficult
to
let
inco
the
mind
of
a
Siamite
the
idea
of
a
pure
fpirit.
‘I?
the
miflionaries
who
have
been
longeft
among
them,
are
pofitive
3%
—
All
the
pagans
of
the
eaft
do
truly
believe,
that
there
remains
fomethiNd
-
of
a
man
after
his
death,
which
fubfifts
independently
and
feparately
{10%
—
his
body.
But
they
give
extenfion
and
figure
to
that
which
remains;
aot
attribute
to
it
all
the
fame
members,
all
the
fame
fubftances,
both
folil@
—
and
liquid,
which
our
bodies
are
compofed
of.
They
only
fuppofe
haf
the
fouls
are
of
a
matter
fubtile
enough
to
efcape
being
feen
or
handled
Such
were
the
thades
and
manes
of
the
Greeks
and
the
Romans.
And
#
4
is
by
thefe
figures
of
the
fouls,
anfwerable
to
thofe
of
the
bodies,
in
ph
fuppofed
Aineas
knew
Palinurus,
Dido,
and
Anchifes,
in
the
ot
a
world.
Pa
This
gentleman
was
not
a
man
that
travelled
into
thofe
parts
for
bY
pleafure,
and
to
have
the
opportunity
to
tell
ftrange
ftories,
collecte¢
chance,
when
he
returned:
but
one
chofen
on
purpofe
(and
he
feems
a
chofen
for
the
purpofe)
to
inquire
into
the
fingularities
of
Siam.
And
P
has
fo
well
acquitted
himfelf
of
the
commiffion,
which
his
epiftle
dedic®
-
‘a
®
Loubere
du
Royaume
de
Siam,
T.
1;
c.1g.
§.
4.
of
‘
:
,
6
Chay
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
49
tory
tells
us
he
had,
to
inform
himfelf
exactly
of
what
was
moft
remarkable
there,
that
had
we
but
fuch
an
account
of
other
countries
of
the
eaft,
as
he
1a
‘given
us
of
this
kingdom,
which
he
was
an
envoy
to,
we
fhould
be
much
better
acquainted
than
we
are,
with
the
manners,
notions,
and
res
ligions
of
that
part
of
the
world
inhabited
by
civilized
nations,
who
want
Neither
good
fenfe
nor
acutenefs
of
reafon,
though
not
caft
into
the
mould.
Of
the
logick
and
Philofophy
of
our
{chools.
to
Cicero:
it
js
plain,
that
in
his
inquiries
about
the
foul,
his
thoughts
went
ot
at
all
beyond
matter.
This
the
expreflions
top
from
him
in
feveral
places
of
this
book
evidently
fhow.
For
€xample,
that
the
fouls
of
excellent
men
and
women
afcended
into
hea-
that
they
remained
here
on
earth,
c,
12.
That
the
foul
is
lot,
and
warms
the
body:
that,
at
its
leaving
the
body,
it
penetrates,
idés,
and
breaks
through
our
thick,
cloudy,
moift
air:.
that
it
ftops
in
the
Tegion
of
fire,
and
afcends
no
farther,
the
equality
of
warmth
and
weight
makin
that
its
Pfoper
place,
where
it
is
nourifhed
and
fut
tained,
with
the
Bie
things
wherewith
the
ftars
are
nourifhed
and
fufs
tained,
and
that
by
the
convenience
of
its
neighbourhood
it
fhall
there
have
a
clearer
view
and
fuller
knowledge
of
the
heavenly
bodies,
c.
1ge
That
the
foul
alfo
from
this
height
fhall
have
a
pleafant
and
fairer
pees
of
the
globe
of
the
earth,
the
difofition
of
whofe
parts
will
then
lie
before
i
tin
one
view,
c.
20,
That
it is
hatd
to
detefmine
what
conformation,
ze,
and
place;
the
foul
has
in
the
body
:
that
it
is
too
fubtile
to
be
feen
:
that
it
is
in
the
human
body
asin
a
houfe,
ora
veffel,
or
a
receptacle,
€.22.
All
which
are
€xpreflions
that
fufficiently
evidence,
that
he
who
Pe
them
had
not
in
his
mind
feparated
materiality
from
the
idea’
of
the
oul,
«Tt
may
pee
be
replied,
that
@
great
part
of
this
which
we
find
in
Chap.
19,
is
faid
upon
the
tinciples
of
thofe
who
would
have
the
foul
to
©
atlima
inflammata,
in
amed
air,
I
grant
it.
But
it is
alfo
to
be
obferved,
that
in
this
rgth,
and
the
two
following
chapters,
he
does
not
.
Only
not
de
sy?
Dut
even
admits,
that
fo
material
a
thing
as
inflamed
air
tay
think,
.
The
truth
of
the
cafe
in
fhort
is
this:
Cicero
was
willing
to
believe
2,
>
when
he
fought
in
the
nature
of
the
foul
itfelf
rans
to
eftablith
this
his
belief
into
acertainty
of
it,
he
found
him-
elf
at
a
lofs.
He
confeffed
he
knew
not
what
the
foul
was;
but
the
not
22.
was
no
reafon
to
conclude
it
was
the
repetition
of
what
he
had
faid
in
pia
€pub.
Concerning
the
foul.
The
argument,
which,
Srrowed
from
Plat
0,
he
there
makes
ufe
of,
if
it
have
any
force
in
it,
-Y
Proves
the
fonl
to
be
i
b¢
immortal,
but
-more
than,
I
think,
your
+
for
it
proves
it
to
be
eternal,
and
without
Shae
a8
well
as
without
end:
Neque
nata
certe
eft,
&
zterna
eft,
=
tom
the
faculties
of
the
foul
he
c
Original
:
but
as
to
the
fubftance
of
th
“icourfe
Concerning
its
faculties,
c,
2
5.
38
It;
©)
22.
js
not
afham
animus,
j
.
Indeed
from
oncludes
right,
that
it
is
of
ne
e
foul,
he
at
the
end
of
this
well
as
at
this
beginning
of
‘
ned
to
own
his
ignorance
of
what
it
is;
Anima
fit
Gian
Theat”
nefcio
;
nec
me
pudet,
ut
iftos,
fateri
nefcire
quod
nef=
ipnis
ft
Od
fi
ulla
alia
de
re
obicura
affirmare
poflem,
five
anima,
five
ting
ums,
cum
jurarem
effe
divinum,
c.
25.
So
that
all
the
cer-
ainty
he
could.
attain
to
about
the
foul,
was,
that
he
was
confident
there
Hz
was
100
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
Book
ft
was
fomething
divine
in
it,
i.e,
there
were
faculties
in
the
foul
that
co”
hot
refult
from
the
nature
of
matter,
but
muft
have
their
original
from’
divine
power;
but
yet
thofe
qualities,
as
divine
as
they
were,
he
acknY
ledged
might
be
placed
in
breath
or
fire,
which,
I
think,
your
lord
will
not
deny
to
be
material
fubftances.
So
that
all
thofe
divine
qualif®
which
he
fo
much
and
fo
juftly
extols
in
the
foul,
led
him
not,
as
ap
fo
much
as
to
any
the
leaft
thought
of
immateriality.
This
is
demon”
tion,
that
he
built
them
not
upon
an
exclufion
of
materiality
out
of
™
foul;
for
he
avowedly
profefies
he
does
not
know,
but
breath
of
!
might
be
this
thinking
thing
in
us:
and
in
all
his
confiderations
about!
fubftance
of
the
foul
itfelf,
he
ftuck
in
air,
or
fire,
or
Ariftotle’s
qui”
effentia;
for
beyond
thofe
it
is
evident
he
went
not.
ee
-
But
with
all
his
proofs
out
of
Plato,
to
whofe
authority
he
defefs,
much,
with
all
the
arguments
his
vaft
reading
and
great
parts
could
fu
him
with
for
the
immortality
of
the
foul,
he
was
fo
little
fatisfied,
{
from
being
certain,
fo
far
from
any
thought
that
he
had,
or
could
P.
it,
that
he
over
and
over
again
profefles
his
ignorance
and
doubt
0
In
the
beginning
he
enumerates
the
feveral
opinions
of
the
philofop
which
he
had
well
ftudied,
about
it:
and
then,
full
of
uncertainty,
Harum
fententiarum
que
vera
fit,
Deus
aliquis
viderit
;
que
verifimilli®
magna
queftio,
c.
t1.
And
towards
the
latter
end,
having
gone
#
all
over
again,
and
one
after
another
examined
them,
he
profeffes
hi
fill
at
a
lofs,
not
knowing
on
which
to
pitch,
nor
what
to
determ
Mentis
acies,
fays
he,
feipfam
intuens,
nonnunquam
hebefcit,
ob
ea
caufam
contemplandi
diligentiam
amittimus.
Itaque
dubitans,
cif¢
Spefans,
hzfitans,
multa
adverfa
revertens,
tanquam
in
rate
in
mani”
menfo,
noftra
vehitur
oratio,
c.
30.
And
to
conclude
this
argum™,
when
the
perfon
he
introduces
as
difcourfing
with
him,
tells
him
refolved
to
keep
firm
to
the
belief
of
immortality;
Tully
anfwers,
©
9)
Laudo
id
quidem,
etfi
nihil
animis
oportet
confidere
:
movemur
enim
"4,
aliguo
acute
conclufo;
labamus,
mutamufque
fententiam
clarioribus
¢*
in
rebus;
in
his
eft
enim
aligua
obfcuritas.
i’;
So
unmoveable
is
that
truth
delivered
by
the
fpirit
of
truth,
that
tho?
the
light
of
nature
gave
fome
obfcure
glimmering,
fome
uncertain
of
a
future
flate;
yet
human
reafon
could
attain
to
no
clearnefs,
10%
tainty
about
it,
but
that
ic
was
JESUS
CHRIST
alone,
who
had
brous
|
life
and
immortality
to
light
through
the
gofpel*.
‘Though
we
are
told,
that
to
own
the
inability
of
natural
reafon
to
bring
immortal
light,
or,
which
paffes
for
the
fame,
to
own
principles
upon
which
immateriality
of
the
foul
(and,
as
it
is
urged,
confequently
its
imme?
lity)
cannot be
demonftratively
proved,
does
leffen
the
belief
of
this
4
of
revelation,
which
JESUS
CHRIST
alone
has
brought
to
light,
which
confequently
the
fcripture
affures
us
is
eftablifhed
and
made
¢é
only
by
revelation.
‘This
would
not
perhaps
have
feemed
ftrangés
thofé
who
are
juftly
complained
of
for
flighting
the
revelation
of
the
8,
pel,
and
theretore
would
not
be
much
regarded,
if
they
fhould
contrat
fo
plain
a
text
of
{cripture,
in
favour
of
their
all-fufficient
reafon*
4
what
ufe
the
promoters
of
fcepticifm
and
infidelity,
in
an
age
fo
®
fufpected
by
your
lordfhip,
may
make
of
what
comes
from
one
Qf
Y
gteat
authority
and
learning,
may
deferve
your
confideration.
¥
ai
noes
*
2
Tim,
i.
10,
‘lee
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
101
And
thus,
m
lord,
I
hope,
Ihave
fatisfied
you
concerning
Cicero’s
opinion
about.
the
foul,
in
his
firft
book
of
Tufculan
queftions
;
which,
though
I
eafily
believe,
as
your
lordfhip
fays,
you
are
no
ftranger
to,
veh
umbly
conceive
you
have
not
fhown,
(and,
upon
a
careful
perufal
o
that
treatife
again,
I
think
I
may
boldly
fay
you
cannot
fhow)
one
word
1n
it,
that
expreffes
any
thing
like
a
notion
in
Tully
of
the
foul’s
imma;
terality,
or
its
being
an
immaterial
fubftance,
:
ashes
Tom
what
you
bring
ont
of
Virgil,
your
lordfhip
concludes,
at
he,
no
More
than
Cicero,
q
oes
me
any
kindnefg
in
this
matter,
being
both
afferters
of
the
foul’s
immortality,
My
lord,
were
not
the
queftion
of
the
foul’s
immateriality,
according
to
cuftom,
changed
here
into
that
o
its
immortality,
which
I
am
no
lefs
an
afferter
of
than
either
of
them,
‘cero
and
Virgil
do
me
all
the
kindnefs
I
ters
and
that
was
to
fhow,
that
th
i
n,
without
any
thought
of
its
immateriality
3
and
this
the
yerfes
you
yourfelf
bring
out
of
Virgil
+,
’
ot
cum
frigida
mors
anim
feduxerit
artus,
mnibus
umbra
locis
adero;
dabis,
improbe,
poenass
confirm,
as
well
as
thofe
I
quoted
out
of
his
6th
book
:
and
for
this
mone
fieur
dé
la
Loubere
thall
be
my
witnefs
in
the
words
above
fet
down
out
of
him;
where
‘he
thows,
that
there
be
thofe
amongft
the
heathens
of
our
i
fts
of
men
departed
did
not
die
with
the
body,
‘
Without
thinkin
them
to
be
perfectly
immaterial
;
the
latter
being
much
more
*ncomprehenfible
to
them
than
the
former,
And
what
Virgil’s
no-
fan
Of
the
foul
is,
and
that
i
u
Corpus,
when
put
in
contradiftin@ion
to
the
a?
onifies
nothing
but
the
grofs
tenement
of
dent
from
flefh
and
bones,
As
evi-
ory
ais
verte
of
his
neti
6.
where
he
calls
the
fouls
which
yet
Were
Vifible,
ere
oats
Tenu
‘
:
Your
lordthip’s
ane
cOtpore
vitas
t
anfwer
concerning
what
is
faid
Ecclef.
xii.
turns
wholly
8Pon
Solomon's
taking
the
foul
to
be
immortal,
which
was
not
what
T
queftioned
:
all
that
J
guoted
that
place
for,
was
to
fhow,
that
fpirit
in
Englifh
might
Properly
be
applied
to
the
for
»
without
any
nos
page
te
immateriality,
ag
n
was.
by
Solomonic,
hts
he
thought
the
fouls
of
men
to
be
immaterial,
does
little
appear
in
that
paf-
age,
where
he
fpeaks
of
the
fouls
of
men
and
beafts
together,
as
he
does,
Bat
farther,
what
I
contended
for
is
evident
from
that
place,
in
that
the
Word
fpirit
is
there
applied
by
our
tranflators,
to
the
fouls
of
beatts,
which
Your
lordthip,
|
think,
does
‘not
rank
amongft
the
immaterial,
and
confe~
quently
immortal
{pirits,
though
they
have
fenfe
and
{pontaneous
motion,
-
eeu
fay,
Il
If
the
fo
ul
be
not
of
itfelf
a
free
thinking
fubftance,
you
-
Ant.
Thoug
at
foundation
there
is
in
nature
for
a
day
of
judgment.
old,
‘nor
do
to
this
day,
fee
;
fora
day
of
judgment
;
yet
in
revelation,
if
thar
fy,
your
lordthip,
every
one
may
fee
a
foundation
for
a
day
of
;
as
politively
declared
it;
though
God
has
not
Y
wat
tevelation
taught
ys,
what
the
fubftance
of
the
foul
is:
nor
has
te
faid,
that
the
foul
cf
itfelf
is
a
free
agent,
Whatfoever
any
“treated
fubftance
is,
ing
itfelf,
but
is
by
the
good
pleafure
of
its
+
Mneid,
4.
38
5.
+
uit
Anfwer,
{|
Ibid.
Creator:
102
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge,
Book
Creator:
whatever
degrees
of
perfection
it
has,
it
has
from
the
bout
hand
of
its
maker.
Foy
it
is
true
in
a
natural)
as
well
as
a
fpiritual
!°
what
St.
Paul
fays,
*
Not
that
we
are
fafficient
of
ourfelves
to
think!
thing
as
of
ourfelves,
but
our
fufficiency*is
of
God,
ae
But
your
lordfhip,
as
I
guefs
by
your
following
words,
woul
that
a
material
fubftance
cannot
be
a
ftee
agent;
whereby
I
fupp?
only
mean,
that
you
cannot
fee
or
conceive
how
a
folid
fubftanc
begin,
ftop,
or
change
its
own
motion.’
To
which
give
me
leav'
fwer,
that
when
you
can
make
it
conceivable,
how
any
created,
fi
endant
fubftance
can
move
itfelf,
or
alter
or
ftop
its'own
motion
it
muft
to
be
a
free
agent;
I
fuppofe
you
will
find
it
no
hardeg
for
beftow
this
power
on
q
folid
than
an
unfolid
created
fubftance,
T
the
place
above
quoted,
+
could
not
conceive
this
power
to
be
thing
but
what
was
from
eternity;
Cum
pateat
igitur
eternum
Gtat
feipfum
moveat,
quis
eft
qui
hanc’naturam
animis
effe
t
neget?
But
though
you
cannot
fee
how
any
Created
fubftance,
not
folid,
can
be
a
free
agent,
(pardon
me,
my
lord,
‘if
I
put
in
till
your
lordthip
pleafe
to
explain
it
of
either,
and
fhow
the
mannet™
either
of
them
can,
of
itfelf;:move
itfelf
or'
any
thing
elfe)
yet
1
dor
think
you
will
fo
far
deny
men
to
be
free
agents,
from
the
difficulty
ad
is
to
fee
how
they
are
free
agents,
as
to
doubt
whether
there
be
founa®™”
enough
for
a
day
of
judgment.
=
|
*
*
an
It
is
not
for
‘me
to
judge
how
far
your
lordthip’s
fpeculations
but
finding
in
myielf
nothing
to
be
truer
than
what
the
wife
Solomo?
™
me,
}
As
thou
‘knoweft
not
what
is
the
way
of
the
{pirit,
not
how
'
bones
do
grow
in
thé
womb
of
her
that
is
with
child
;
even’
fo
thou
ka?”
hot
the
works
of
God,
who
maketh
all
things;
I
gratefully
receive
t
rejoice
in
the
light
of
revelation,
which
féts
me
at'reft
in
many
A
the
manner
wher¢of
my
poor
reafon
can
by
no
means
make
out
to
me
nipotency,
I
know,
can
do
any
thing
that
contains
in
it’
no
contradit®),
fo
that
|
readily
believe
whatever'Godhas
declared,
though
my
find
difficulties
in
it
which
it
canst
mafter,
As
in
the
prefer
God
having
revealed
that
there
fhall
be
a’day
of
judgment,
I
thi
foundation
enough
to
conclude
men
are
free
enough
to
be
made
anit
for
their
ations,
and
to
teceive
according
to
what
they
have
done;
aa
_
How
man
is
a
free
agent,
furpaffes
my
explication
of
comprehenfiol:
4
‘In
anfwer
to
the
place
I
brought
out
of
St.
Luke'l},
your
lord{hip
a
**
Whether
from
thefe
words
of
our
Saviour
it
follows,’
that
‘a
{pi
only
an
appearance?
I
anfwer,’No;
nor
do
I
know
who:
drew
1
inference
from
them
:
but
it
follows,
that
in
apparitions
there
is
forme
that
appears,
and
that
which
appears
is
not’
wholly
immaterial
;
42
“this
was
properly
called
ms:d.«,
and
was
often
looked
upon,
by
‘th
called
it
mvde'in
Greek,
and
now
call
it
fpirit
in
Englifh,
to
©
ghott
or
foul
of
one
departed;
which
I
humbly
conceive
juftifies
1
of
of
the
word
{pirit,
for
a
thinking
voluntary
agent,
whether
mate
immaterial,
Agnes,
ek
aa
Your
lordfhip
fays,
t+
That
I
grant,
that
it
cannot
upon
thefe
igh
ciples
be
demonftrated,
that
the
ipiritual
fubftance
in
us
is
imma
of
from
whence
you
concludé,
‘That
then
my
grounds
of
certainty
ideas
are
plainly
given
up.
‘This:
being
a
way
of
arguing
that
you
*
2Cor.
iii.
5.
+
Tufculan,
Queft.
L.
1.
¢.
23,
Ecclef
yc.
a
Ve
39,
=
¥*
yf
Anfwer,
tt
Ibid,
}
5
Ch.
3:
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge,
impoflible
for
us,
ideas,
Without
reve
103
by
thé
contemplation
of
our
own
lation,
to
difcover,
whether
omni-
Potency
has
not
given
to
fome
fyftems
of
matter
fitly
difpofed
a
power
to
perceive
and
think,
or
elfe
joined
and
fixed
to
matter
fo
difpofed
a
thinking
immaterial
fubftance
:
it
being,
in
refpect
of
our
notions,
hot
much
more
remote
from
our
comprehenfion
to
conceive,
that
od
can,
if
he
pleafes,
fuperadd
to
matter
a
faculty
of
thinking,
than
that
he
fhould
fuperadd
to
it
another
fubftance,
with
a
faculty
of
thinking
;
fince
we
know
not
wherein
thinking
confifts,
nor
to
what
fort
of
fub-
ftances
the
Almi
ghty
has
be
power,
which
cann
i
»
that
the
firft
eternal
think-
»
if
he
pleafed,
Give
to
certain
fyftems
efs
matter,
put
together
as
he
thinks
fit,
fome
degrees
of
fenfe,
Perception,
and
thought:
though,
as
I
think,
I
have
Proved,
lib.
iv.
ch.
ro.
§.
14,
&c.
it
is
no
lefs
than
a
contradi@ion
to
fuppofe
matter
(which
js
evidently
in
its
own
nature
void
of
fenfe
and
thought)
fhould
be
that
eternal
firft-thinking
being.
at
Certainty
of
knowle
dge
can
any
one
have
that
tome
Perceptions,
fuch
as,
V.
8.
~pleafure
and
pain,
fhould
not
be
in
fome
bodies
the
mfelves,
after
a
certain
manner
modified
an
Thoved,
as
well
as
that
they
fhould
€
In
an
immaterial
fubftance,
upon
the
motion
of
the
parts
of
body?
Bo
Y,
as
far
as
we
can
conceive,
being
able
only
to
ftrike
and
affect
body
;
and
motion,
accord-
Ing
to
the
utmoft
react
being
able
to
pro-
‘hen
we
allow
it
to
dea
of
a
colour
or
Our
reafon,
go
beyond
our
ly
to
the
good
pleafure
of
produce
pleafure
or
found,
we
are
fain
to
quit
ideas,
and
attribut
€
it’
whol
make
ufe
of,
I
hay
all
fee
the
force
o
©
often
had
occafion
to
confider
it
f
this
argument,
I
acknowled
:
P
principles
be
demonftr
Propofition
to
be
£
Ife,
that
certainty
confifts
agreement
or
di
»
and
cannot
after
ge
that
this
or
that
pro-
ated
;
ergo,
I
grant
this
in‘
the
perception
of
the
meat
or
difagreement
of
ideas,
For
that
i
-
and
till
that
be
:
$
my
ground
of
certainty,
siven
up,
my
grounds
of
Certainty
are
not
given
up,
Hg
our
104
Extent
of
Human
Kuowledge,
_
'
Book™
our
Maker.
For
fince
we
reuft
allow
he
has
annem
effects
to
motion,
which
we
can.no
way
conceive
mM
tion able
to
produce,
what
reafon
have
we
to
conc
ue’
that
he
could
not
order
them
as
well
to
be
produced
™
a
fubjeét
we
cannot
conceive
capable
of
them,
as
as
in
a
fubject
we
cannot
conceive
the
motion
of
ma
|
can
any
way
operate
upon?
I
fay
not
this,
that
I
wovk
any
way
leffen
the
belief
of
the
foul’s
immateriality#?
am.not
here
{peaking
of
probability,
but
knowled
and
I
think
not
only,
that
it
becomes
the
mode
philofophy
not
to
pronounce
magifterially,
where
©
want
that
evidence
that
can
produce
Knowledges
™
alfo,
that
it
is
of
ufe
to
us
to
difcern
how
far
our
k
ledge
does
reach:
for
the
ftate
we
are
at
prefent
in,
being
that
of
vifion,
we
muft,
in
many
things,
co
ourlelves
with
faith
and
probability
;
and
in
the
prelt
queftion,
about
the
immateriality
of
the
foul,
if
faculties
cannot
arrive
at
demonftrative.
certainty
need
not
think
it
ftrange.
All
the
great
ends,
of
mol
lity
and
religion
are
well
enough
fecured,
without
‘7
lofophical
proofs
of
the
foul’s
immateriality
;
fince
evident,
that
he
who
made
us
at
the
beginning
to
fu
here,
fenfible
intelligent
beings,
and
for
feveral
continued
us
in
fuch
a
ftate,
can
and
will
reftore
U
the
like
ftate
of
fenfibility
in
another
world,
and
ma™
us
capable
there
to
receive
the
retribution
he
has
defi
ed
to
men,
according
to
their
doings
in
this
life.
therefore
it
is
not
of
fuch
mighty
neceflity
to
deter
one
way
or
the
other,
as
fome,
over-zealous
fo
againft
the
immateriality
of
the
foul,
have
been
for
to
make
the
world
believe.
Who,
either
on
the
¢
ls
fide,
indulging
too
much
their
thoughts
immerfed
alto”
“gether
in
matter,
can
allow
no
exiftence
to
what
is
2
material:
or
who,
on
the
other
fide,
finding
not
c0S),
tation
within
the
natural
powers
of
matter,
examn
over
and
over
again
by
the
utmoftt
intention
of
mile
have
the
confidence
to
conclude,
that
omnipotency
It
cannot
give
perception
and
thought
to
a
fubfta
which
has
the
modification
of
folidity.
He
that
con
ders
how
hardly
fenfation
is,
in
our
thoughts,
rec?”
cileable
to
extended
matter;
or
exiftence
to
any
Oe
¥
+
Chiig,
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge,
that
has
no
exiftence
at
all;
will
confefs
e
TOS
,
that
he
is
very
foul
is.
It
isa
me
to
be
put
out
‘of
the
reach
of
ur
knowledge:
and
he
who
will
give
himfélf
leave
to
confider
freely,
and
look
into
the
dark
and
intricate
part
of
each
hypothefis,
will
fcarce
find
his
reafon
able
to
determine
him
fixedly
for
or
againft
the
foul’s
mate-
riality.
Since
on
which
fide
foever
he
views
it,
either
#S
an
unextended
fubftance,
or
as
a
thinking
extended
Matter;
the
difficulty
to
-c
Onceive
either
will,
whilft
either
alone
is
in
his
thoughts,
ftill
drive
him
to
the
contrary
fide.
An
unfair
way
which
fome
men
take
with
themfelyes;
who,
becaufe
of
the
inconceiveable-~
nefs:
of
fomething
they
find
in
one,
throw
themfelves
violently
into
the
contrary
hypothefis,
though
altoge-
ther
as
unintelligible
to
an
unbiaffed
underftanding.
This
ferves
not
only
to
fhew
the
weaknefs
and
the
{can_
tinefs
of
our
knowledge,
but
the
infignificant
triumph
arguments,
ur
from
certainly
knowing
what
his
point
which
feems
to
of
fuch
fort
of
which,
drawn
from
our
own
Views,
may
fatisfy
us
that
we
can
find
no
certainty
on
One
fide
of
the
queftion;
but
do
not
at
all
thereby
help
Us
to
truth
by
running
into
the
oppofite
opinion,
which,
©n
examination,
will
be
found
clogged
with
equal
diffi-
culties.
For
what
fafety;
what
advantage
to
any
one
is
it,
for
the
avoiding
the
feeming
abfurdities,
and
to
him
ntable
rubs
he
meets
with
in
one
opinion,
to
S¢
In
the
contrary,
which
is
built
on
fomething
“r as
inexplicable,
and
as
far.
remote
from
his
comprehenfion
?
It
is
paft
controverfy,
that
we
have
in
us
fomething
that
thinks;
our
very
doubts
about
what
iC
is
Confirm
the
Certainty
of
its
being,
though
we
muft
content
ourfelves
in'the
ignorance
of
what
kind
of
bein
1
18st
vatidsit
isvinvainsto
go
about
to
be
{ceptical
in
this,
as
it
j
A
moft
other
cafes
to
be
pofi-
it
Is
unreafonable
j
tive
againft
the
being
of
any
thing,
becaufe
we
cannot
its
nature,
take
refu
altogeth
comprehend
:
For
I
would
fain
know
what
ftance
exifts;
that
has
not
fomething
in
it
which
ma-
i
Other
fpirits,
who
rd
conftitution
of
us
in
knowledge?
enfion,
which
ena
bles
fh
_how
much
mutt
they
exceed
To
which
if
we
add
larger
compreh
r06
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
Book
#
bles
them
at
one
glance
to
fee
the
connexion
and
agrt
ment
of
very
many
ideas,
and
readily
fupplies
to-
thet
the
intermediate
‘proofs,
which
we
by
fingle
and
flow
fteps,
and
long
poring
in
the
dark,
hardly
at
lait
mi
out,
and
are
often
ready
to
forget
one
before
we
have
hunted
out
another;
we
may
guefs
at
fome
part
of
happinefs
of
fuperior
ranks
of
fpirits,
who
have
a
quick
and
more
penetrating
fight,
as
well
as
a
larger
field
®
knowledge.
But
to
return
to
the
argument
in
haley
our
knowledge,
I
fay,
is
not
only
limited
to
the
pate
city
and
imperfections
of
the
ideas
we
have,
and
whic!
_
we
employ
it
about,
but
even
comes
fhort
of
that
£00
But
how
far
it
reaches,
let
us
now
inquire.
She
How
far
our
~§-
17.
“The
affirmations
or
negations
iy:
knowledge
make
concerning
the
ideas
we
have,
m
seaches,
as
I
have
before
intimated
in
general,
:
reduced
to
thefe
four
forts,
viz.
identit)
co-exiftence,
relation,
and
real
exiftence.
I
fhall
©
amine
how
far
our
knowledge
extends
in
each
of
thele
__
€.
8.
Firft,:as
to
identity
and
diverfitfr
ieee
in
this
way
of
agreement
or
difagreeme?”
identity
and
Of
our
ideas,
our
intuitive
knowledge
is
*,
diverfity,
as
far
extended
as
our
ideas
themfelves:
al”
°
uF,
there
can
be
no
idea
in
the
mind,
which
eis
does
not
prefently,
by
an
intuitive
know"
ledge,
perceive
tq
be
what
it
is,
and
to
be
differel
:
from
any
other,
;
“a
3°
Of
co.
Ԥ.
9.
Secondly,
as
to
the
fecond
fo
ee
exiftence,
a
which
is
the
agreement
or
difagreement
%
very
little
our
ideas
in
co-exiftence
;
in
this
our
know"
war
ledge
is
very
fhort,
thovgh
in
this
confi!’
the
greateft
and
moft
material
part
of
our
knowledge
¢oncerning
fubftances,
For
our
ideas
of
the
fpecies
if
fubftances
being,
as
I
have
fhowed,
nothing
but
Ce
)
collections
of
fimple
ideas
united
in
one
fubject,
and
7
€o-exifting
together;
v.g.
our
idea
of
flame
is
a
b
2
hot,
luminous,
and
moving
upward;
of
gold,
a
body
heavy
to
a
certain
degree,
yellow,
malleable,
and
full
a
ble:
thefe,
or
fome
fuch
complex
ideas
as
thefe
in
me?”
minds,
do
thefe
two
names
of
the
different
fubftance®
flame
and
gold,
ftand
for,
When
we
would
know
3
)
Ch,
3.
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
107
thing
farther
concerning
thefe,
or
any
other
fort
of
fub-
)
ftances,
what
do
we
inquire,
but
what
other
qualities
)
or
power
thefe
fubftances
have
or
have
not?
ma
hich
is
nothing
elfe
but
to
know
what
other
fimple
ideas
do
or
:
do
not
co-exift’
with
thofe
that
make
up
that
complex
)
ddday
lot
E
|
)
~
§.
10.
This,
how
weighty
and
confidera-
Becaufe
the
ble
a
part
foever
of
human
{cience,
1S
yet
connexion
very
narrow,
and
fcarce
any
at
all.
‘The
rattoey
teafon
whereof
is,
that
the
fimple
ideas,
$5
ankAOwi,
whereof
our
complex
ideas
of
fubftances
are
ion
made
up,
are,
for
the
moft
part,
fuch
as
carry
with
them,
in
their
own
nature,
no
vifible
neceflary
con-
Nexion
or
inconfiftency
with
any
other
fimple
ideas,
whofe
co-exiftence
with
them
we
would
inform
our-
{elves
about.*
Sf
ee
OEE
ER
es
AES
ip
The
ideas
that
our
complex
pnes
Efpecially
of
of
fubftances
are
made
up
of,
and
about
Pomeny
NL
ai
ee:
‘
ualities.
which
our
knowledge
Concerning
fubftances
#0
is
moft
employed,
are
thofe
of
their
fecondary
quali.
ties:
which
depending
all
(as
has
been
fhown)
upon
the
Primary
Qualities
of
their
minute
and
infenfible
parts
5
2
't
not
upon
them,
upon
fomething
yet
more
remote
from
our
comprehenfion;
it
is
impoffible
we
fhould
know
Which
have
a
neceflary
union
or
inconfiftency
one
with
another
:
for
not
knowing
the
root
they
{pring
from,
not
knowiy
‘what
fize,
figure,
and
texture
of
parts
they
are,
on
w
ich
depend,
and
from
which
refult,
thofe
qualities
which
make
our
complex
idea
of
gold
;
it
is
impoffible
we
fhould
know
what
other
qualities:
Te€~
‘ult
from,
or
are
incompatible
with,
the
fame
conftitu~
tion
of
the
infenfible
parts
of
gold,
and
fo
confequently
muft
always
co-exift
with
that
complex
idea
we
have
of
i,
Or
elfe
are
inconfiftent
WIPO
TES
a
§.
12.
Befides
this
ignorance
of
the
PTi-
Recanfe
all
mary
qualities
of
‘the
infenfible’
parts
of
connexion
bodies,
on
which
depend
all
their
fecondary
perce
oy.
Qualities,
there
js
yet
another
and
more
ondary
incurable
part
of
j
:
and
primary
Bhorance,,
which
fets
us
»
qualities
is
More
remote
from
a
certain
knowledge
of
undifcover-
the
co-existence
or
in-co-exiftence
(if
Ymay
#lee
..
fa
a
a
|
ence
of
any
other
quality
whatfoever,
Our
knowledge
—
108
Extent
of
Haman
Knowledge.
Book
#
fo
fay)
of
different
ideas
in
the
fame
fubje@
;
and
tha
is,
that
there
is
no.difcoverable
connexion
between
any
fecondary
quality
and
thofe
primary
qualities
which
#
depends
on.
ee
a
gti
-
.
§.
13.
That
the
fize,
figure,
and
motion
of
one
body
fhould
caufe
a
change
in
the
fize,
figure,
and
motion
another
body,
is
not
beyond
our
conception
;
the
fepa,
ration
of
the
parts
of
one
body
upon
the
intrufion
©
another
;
and
the
change
from
reft
to
motion
upon
ims
pulfe;
thefeand
the
like
feem
to
have
fome
connexl
one
with
another.
And
if
we
knew
thefe
primary
qu
lities
of
bodies,
we
might
have
reafon
to
hope
we
mig
be
able
to
know
a
great
deal
more
of
thefe
operations
OF
them
one
with
another:
but
our
minds
not
being
able
to
difcover
any
connexion
betwixt
thefe
primary
qua
ties
of
bodies
and
the
fenfations
that
are
produced
in
i
by
them,
we
can
never
be
able
to
eftablith
certain
ane”
ee
undoubted
rules
of
the
confequences
or
co-exiftence
.
a
3
i
%
any
fecondary
qualities,
though
we
could
difcover
che
fize,
figure,
or
motion
of
thofe
invifible
parts
which”
immediately
produce
them.
Weare
fo
far
from
know=
ing
what
figure,
fize,
or
motion
of
parts
produce
a
yele
low
colour,
a
fweet
tafte,
or
a
fharp
found,
that
we
ca
4
by
no
means
conceive
how
any
fize,
figure,
or
motio®
of
any
particles,
can
poflibly
produce
in
us
the
idea
0
any
colour,
tafte,
or
found
whatfoever;
there
is
no
con
ceivable
connexion
betwixt
the
one
and
the
other.
«pil
§.
14.
In
vain
therefore
fhall
we
endeavour
to
iy
j
te
i
cover
by
our
ideas
(the
only
true
way
of
certain
and
univerfal
knowledge)
what
other
ideaé
are
to
be
found
—
conftantly
joined
with
that
of
our
complex
idea
of
any
fubftance:
fince
we
neither
know
the
real
conftitutio
of
the
minute
parts
on
which
their
qualities
do
depend
nor,
did
we
know
them,
could
we
difcover
any
necel<
—
fary
connexion
between
them
and
any
of
the
fecondaty
—
qualities:
which
is
neceflary
to
be
done
before
we
call
—
certainly
know
their
neceflary
co-exiftence.
So
that
Jet
our
complex
idea
of
any
{pecies
of
fubftances
bee
what
it
will,
we
can
hardly,
from
the
fimple
ideas
con=
tained
in
it,
certainly
determine
the
neceflary
co-exift=
—
Mh
Th.
3.
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
109
in
all
thefe
inquiries
reaches
very
little
farther
than
our
experience.
Indeed,
fome
few
of
the
primary
qualities
ave
a
neceflary
dependence
and
vifible
connexion.
one
With
another,
as
figure
neceflarily
fuppofes
extenfion
;
Teceiving.
or
communicating
motion.
by
impulfe,
fup-
pofes
folidity.
But
though
thefe
and
perhaps
fome
other
of
our
ideas
have,
yet
there
are
fo
few
of
them,
|
that
have
a
vifible
connexion
one
with
another,
that
we
can
by
intuition
or
demonftration
difcover
the
co-
exiftence
of
very
few
of
the
qualities
are
to
be
found
united
in
fubftances:
and
we
are
left
only
to
the
affift.
ance
of
our
fenfes,
to
make
known
to
us
what
qualities
they
contain.
For
of
all
the
qualities
that
are
co-exift~
ent
in
any
fubject,
without
this
dependence
and.
evident
Connexion
of
their
ideas
one
with
another,
we
cannot
know
certainly
any
two
to
co-exift
any
farther
than
ex-
perience,
by
our
fenfes,
informs
us.
Thus
though
we
fee
the
yellow
colour,
and
upon
trial
find
the
weight,
malleablenefs,
fufibility,
and
fixednefs,
that
are
united
-
in
a
piece
of
gold;
yet
becaufe
no
one
of
thefe
ideas
has
any
evident
dependence,
or
neceflary
connexion
with
the
other,
we
cannot
certainly
know,
that
where
any
Our
of
thefe
are,
the
fifth
will
be
there
alfo,
how
highly
probable
foever
it
may
be;
becaufe
the
higheft
proba-
bility
amounts
Hot
to
certainty,
without.
which
there
can
be
no
true
Knowledge.
For
this
co-exiftence
can
be
no
farther
known
than
it
is
perceived;
and
it
cannot
c
ppctceived
but
either
in
particular
fubjects,
by
the
obfervation
of
our
fenfes,
or,
in
general,
by
the
necef.
fary
connexion
of
the
ideas
themfelves.
|
§-
15.
As
to
the
incompatibility
or
re.
Pugnancy
to
co-exiftence
we
may
know,
ancy
to
co.
that
any
fubject
may
have
of
each
fort
of
its
larger.
Primary
qualities
but
one
particular
at
once;.
v.
g.
each
particular
extenfion,
figure,
number
of
parts,
motion,
excludes
all
other
of
each
kind.
The
like
alfo
is
cera
tain
of
all
fenfible
ideas
peculiar
to
each
fenfe;
for
what
€ver
of
each
kind
is
prefent
in
any
fubjeét,
excludes
all
other
of
that
fort;
vy.
g.
nO
one fubject
can
have
two
fells
or
two
colours
at
the
fame
time.
To
this
per=
haps
will
be
faid,
Has
not
an
opal,
or
the
infufion
of
2
lignum
Of
repug.
lignum
nephriticum,
two
colours
at
the
fame
time?
1
at
the
fame
time
appears
both
yellow
and
azure.
Fob
‘110
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
Book
#
which
I
anfwets
that
thefe
bodies,
to
eyes
different
placed,
may
at
the
fame
time
afford
different
colours:
but
I
take
liberty
alfo
to
fay,
that
to
eyes
different)
placed,
it
is
differerit
parts
of
the
object
that
reflec
tt
:
particles
of
light:
and
therefore
it
is
not
the
fame
pat
of
the
objec,
‘and
fo
not
the
very
fame
fubject,
which
it
is
as
impoffible
that
the
very
fame
particle
of
any
bod
fhould
at
the
fame
time
differently
modify
or
reflect
rays
of
light,
as
that
it
fhould
have
two
different
figute
i
and
textures
at
the
fame
time.
|
}
4
Oftheco-.
§.
16.
But
as
to
the
powers
of
fubftanc™
exiftence
of
to
change
the
fenfible
qualities
of
other
DO”
powers,
a
dies,
which
make
a
great
part
of
our
ing
oy
very
little
ries
about
them,
and
is
no_inconfiderablé
2
Bralich
6f
eae
knowledge
;
I
doubt,
as
@
thefe,
whether
our
Knowledge
reaches
much
farther
that
our
experience;
or
whether
we
can
come
to
the
difco-
very
of
moft
of
thefe‘powers,
and
be
certain
that
they
are
in
any
fubject,
by
the
connexion
with
any
of
tholé
ideas
which
to
us
make
its
effence:
Bécaufe
the
active
and
paffive
powers
of
bodies,
and
their
ways
of
operat
ing,
confifting
in
a
texture
and
motion
of
parts,
whi
se
we
cannot
by
any
means
come
to
difcover;
it
is
but
18
very
few
cafes,
we
can
be
able
to
perceive
their
dépe”
dence
on,
or
repugnance
to,
any
of
thofe
ideas
which”
make
our
complex
one
of
that
fort
of
things.
I
have
here
inftanced
in
the
corpufcularian
hypothefis,
as
thes
which
is
thought
to
go
fartheft
in
an
intelligible
expli-
cation
of
thofe
qualities
of
bodies
;
and
I
fear
the
weake
nefs
of
human
underftanding
is
fcarce
able
to
fubftitult
another,
which
will
afford
us
a
fuller
and
clearer
di
ie
covery
of
the
neceffary
connexion
and
co-exiftence
¢
the
powers
which
are
to
be
obferved
united
in
fevelae
forts
of
them.
This
at
leatt
is
certain,
that
which-ev@
hypothefis
be
clearett
and
trueft,
(for
of
that
it
is
a
my
bufinefs
to
determine)
our
Knowledge
concernilS
corporeal
fubftances
will
be
very
little
advanced
by
aby
3
of
them,
till
we
are
made
to
fee
What
qualities
an©
—
powers
of
bodies
have
a
neceflary
connexion
or
repug*
nancy
—
f
t
\
Ch.
3.
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
_
Secondly,
wan
the
ideas
we
have.
Thirdly,
want
of
tracin
§.
23.
Firft,.
there
are
-
thofe
not
a
few,
tha
Or
want
of
ideas.
Fir;
all
the
117
t
of
a:difcoverable
connexion
between
g
and
examining
our
ideas.
fome
things,
and
:
Firft,
one
t
we
are
ignorant
of,
caufe
of
it
want
of
fimple
ideas
we
have,
are
ee
ale
Confined
(as
I
have
fhown)
to
thofe
we
re-
have
no
con-
Ceive
from
‘corporeal
objects
by
fenfation,
ception
of,
—
and
from
the
o
f
our
own
minds
oF
fuch
as
as
the
objects
of
reflection.
ae,
particularly
:
But
how
much
we
have
not.
thefe
few
and
Narrow
inlets
tionate
to
the
y
aft
whole
extent
of
all
beings,
will
not
be
hard
to
perfuade
thofe,
who
are
not
{
foolifh
as
to
think
their
fpan
the
meafure
of
al]
things.
What
other
imple
ideas
it
ig
poflible
the
creatures
in
other
parts
of
the
univerfe
may
have,
b
y
the
affiftance.
of
fenfes
and
aculties
more,
or
perfecter,
than
we
have,
or
different
from
ours,
it
is
hot
for
us
to
determine.
.
But
to
fay,
or
think
there
are
no
fuch,
becaufe
we
conceive
nothing
of
them,
is
no
better
an
argument,
than
if
a
blind
man
-fhould
be
POfitive
in
it,
that
there
was
no
fuch
thing
as
fight
and
Colours;
becaufe
he
had
no
manner
of
idea
of
any
{uch
thing,
nor
ould:
by
any
means
frame
to-him-
felf
any
Notions
about
feeing.
The
ignorance
and
dark-
4S,
NO
more
hinders
nor
confings
the
.
nefs
that
is
in
Knowledge
that
is
in
Others,
than
the
blindnefs
of
a
mole
sument
againtt
the
quickfightednefs
of
an
eagle,
Is
an
ar
€
infinite
power,
wifdom,
and
S0odnefs
of
the
Creator
‘of
all
things,
will
find
reafon
to
think
it
was
not
all
laid
out
upon
fo
inconfiderable,
mean,
and
impotent
a
creature,
as
he
will
find
man
to
be;
Who,
in
all
Probability,
is
one
of
the
loweft
of
al]
Intellectual
be;
beings.
.
What
faculties
therefore
other
f{pe-
Cles
of
creatures
have,
to
penetrate
into
the
nature
and
Mmoft
conftitutions
of
things;
what
ideas
they
ney
Teceive
of
them,
far
different
from
Ours;
we
know
not.
»
that
we
want
feveral
»
befides
thofe
we
have,
to
make
them
more
perfect.
“And
we
may
be
con-
can
attain
to
by
our
faculties,
I
3
r18
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
_
are%ery
difproportionate
to
things
themfelyes,
wi!
.
pofitive,
clear,
diftinét
one
of
fubftance
itfelf,
whi,
_
the
foundation
of
all
the
reft,
is
concealed
from
us
~
want
of
ideas
of
this
kind
being
a
part,
as
well
as
@
of
our
ignorance,
cannot
be
defcribed.
Only
think,
I
may
confidently
fay
of
it,
that
the
intellee,
and
fenfible
world
are
in
this
perfectly
alike
;
that?
part,
which
we
fee
of
either
of
them,
holds
no
pro
tion
with
what
we
fee
not
;
and
whatfoever
we
can
1
‘with
our
eyes,
or
our
thoughts,
of
either
of
them,
9
~
a
point,
almoft
nothing
in
comparifon
of
the
reft-
4
ey:
§.
24.
Secondly;
another
great
cau™
their
remote.
ignorance
is
the
want
of
idéas
we-are
©}
nefs;
or,
ble
of.
As
the
want
of
ideas,
which
°
faculties
are
not
able
to
give
us,
we
wholly
from
thofe
views
of
things,
which
it
is
re
i
able
to
think
other
beings,
perfecter
than
we,
hav
e
which
we
know
nothing
;
fo
the
want
of
ideas
+™
fpeak
of
keeps
us
in
ignorance
of
things
we
cone
capable
of
being
known
to
us.
Bulk,
figure,
and.
tion,
we
have
ideas
of.
But
though.we
are
not
W
ideas
of
thefe
primary
qualities
of
bodies
in
generals
|
}
not
knowing
what
is
the
particular
bulk,
figure
®
motion,
of
the
greateft
part
of
the
bodies
of
the
©
verfe
;
we
are
ignorant
of
the
feveral
powers,
€
.
and
ways
of
operation,
whereby
the
effects,
whic?
|
daily
fee,
are
produced.
Thefe
are
hid
from
us
10
things,
by
being
too
remote;
and
in
others,
by
too
minute.
When
we
confider
the
vaft
diftance
known
and
vifible
parts
of
the
world,
and
the
f
we
have
to
think,
that
what
lies
wide
our
as
but
a
{mall
part
of
the
univerfe,
we
fhall
then
©
ver
4n
huge
abyfs
of
ignorance.
What
are
the
Po)
cular
fabricks
of
the
great
maffes
of
matter,
which
up
the
whole
ftupendous
frame
of
corporeal
beings
|
f
far
they
are
extended,
what
is
their
motion,
229
4
continued
or
communicated,
and
what
influence
.
have
one
upon
another,
are
contemplations
that
at
of
glimpfe
our
thoughts
lofe
themfelves
in.
If
we
a
‘
our
contemplations,
and
confine
our
thoughts
10,
ad
little
canton,
|
mean
this
fyftem
of
our
fun,
a
to
Che
3.
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
groffer
maffes
of
matter,
that
vifibly
hove
about
it
;
what
feveral
forts
of
vegetables,
animals,
and
intellectual’
Corporeal
beings,
infinitely
different
from
thofe
of’
our
Tittle
{pot
of
earth,
may
there
probably
be
in
the
other
planets,
to
the
knowledge
of
which,
even
of
their
out-
‘Ward
figures
and
parts,
we
can
no
way
attain,
whilft
we
are
confined
to
this
earth:
there
being
no
natural
Means,
either
by
fenfation
or
reflection,
to
convey
their
Certain
ideas
into
our
minds?
‘They
are
out
of
the
reach
of
thofe
inlets
of
all
our
‘knowledge:
and
what
forts
of
furniture
and
inhabitants
thofe
manfions
contain
IT
them,
we
cannot
fo
much
as
gues,
much
lefs
have
clear
and
diftinc
ideas
of
them.
|
§.
25.
Ifa
grear,
n
part
of
the
feveral
ra
univerfe,
efcape
our
n
nefs,
there
are
other
us
by
their
minute
being
‘t
119
ay,
far
the
greateft
‘Becaufe
of
nks
of
bodies:
jn
the
oe
minutes
otice
by
their
remote
:
s
that
are
no
lef{s
concealed
from
nefs.
Thefe
infenfible
corpufcles
he
active
parts
of
matter,
and
the
great
inftru-
Ments
of
nature,
on
whi
ch
depend
‘not
only
all
their
fecondary
qualities,
but
alfo
moft
of
their
natural
ope-
Fations
;
our
want
of
precife
diftin&
ideas
of
their
pri-
mary
qualit;
ualities,
Keeps
us
in
an
incurable
ignorance
of
What
we
def
I
doubt
not
but
‘G
ducover
the
figure,
fize,
textur
e,
and
motion
of
the
minute
parts
of
any
two
bodies,
we
fhould
know
without
trial
feveral
of
their
operations
ve
Upon
another,
as
we
do
now
the
properties
of
a
{quare
ora
triangle.
Did
we
know
the
mechanical
affections
_
Of
the
particles
of
rhubarb
gure
of
any
of
the
wheels;
we
ould
be
able
to
tel]
before-hand,
that
rhubarb
will
purge,
hemlock
kill,
and
opium
make
a
man
fleep;
ag
Well
as
a
Watch-maker
can,
that
a
little
piece
of
paper
laid
on
the
balance
wil]
keep
the
watch
from
going,
till
It
be
removed
fmall
part
of
it
being
rub_
ed
by
a
file,
the
machine
would
quite
lofe
its
motion,
and
the
watch
go
no
more.
The
diffolving
of
filver
in
*qua
fortis,
and
gold
in
aqua
regia,
and
not
vice
verfa,
.
if
4
would
‘complete
ideas
of.
Diftin®
ideas
of
the
feveral
fo
_
Parts
of
either
of
thefe
plants,
nor
of
other
bodies
W
they
will’
produce;
nor
when
we
fee
thote
effects
120
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge:
Book
1,
would
be
then
perhaps
no
more
difficult
to
know;
g
itis
to.a
fimith
to
underftand
why
the
turning
of
®
Key
will
open
a
lock,
and
not
the
turning
of
a
But
whilit
we
are
deftitute
of
fenfes
acute
enoug?
difcover
the
minute
particles
of
bodies,
and
to
giv®
ideas
of
their
mechanical
affections,
we
muft
be
conl@
to
be
ignorant
of
their
properties
and
ways
of
op™
tion;
nor
can
we
be
aflured
about
them
any
fart
than
fome
few
trials
we
make
are
able
to
reach.
©
whether
they
will
fucceed
again
another
time,
w
not
be
certain.
This hinders
our
certain
knowle
univerfal
truths
concerning
natural
bodies:
a
Lag
reafon
carries
us
herein
very
lictle
beyond
partic®
matter
of
fact.
.
|
oy
eee
§.
26.
And
therefore
Tam
apt
to:
{cence
of
that
how
far
foever
human
induftry
af
bodies,
advance
ufeful
and
experimental
philofoP,
ig
in
phyfical
things,
fcientifical
will
fill
out
of
our
reach;
becaufe
we
want
perfect
and
ade
ideas
of
thofe
very
bodies
which
are
neareft
to
us
moft
under
our
command.
Thofe
which
we
haver
into
clafles
under
names,
“and
we
think
ourfelve
acquainted
with,
we
have
but
very
imperfect
and
i)
bodies
that
‘fall
under
the
examination
of
our
perhaps
we
may
have:
but
adequate
ideas,
I
fufpecs
have
not
of
any
one
amongft
them.
And
thoug?
s¢
former
of
thefe
will
ferve
us
for
common
ufe
ane,
courfe,
yet
whilft
we
want
the
latter,
we
are
not
@F,
ble
of
fcientifical
knowledge;
nor
thall
ever
be
able.
difcover
general,
inftructive,
unqueftionable
truths.
cerning
them.
Certainty
and
demontftration
are
tl
we
mutt
not,
in
thefe
matters,
pretend
to,
colour,
figure,
tafte,
and
fimell,
and
other
fenfible
tes,
we
have
as
clear
and
diftinct
ideas
of
fage
and
lock,
as
we
have
of
a
circle
and
a
triangle:
but
h
no
ideas
of
the
particular
primary
qualities
of
the
™!
we
would
apply
them
to,
we
cannot
tell
what
€
we
fo
much
as
guefs,
much
lefs
know,
their
man
Ch.
3.
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
121
production.
Thus
having
no.
ideas
of
the
particular
mechanical
affections
of
the
minute
parts
of
bodies
that
are
within
our
view
and
reach,
we
are
ignorant
of
their
Conftitutions,
powers,
and
operations:
and
of
«
bodies
more
remote
we
are
yet
more
ignorant,
not
knowing
fo
much
as
their
very
outward
fhapes,
or
the
fenfible
and
grofler
parts
of
their
conftitutions.
§.
27.
This,
at
firft,
will
fhow
us
how
Meee
fete
difproportionate
‘our
knowledge
is
to
the
Spirits,
whole
extent
even
of
material
beings;
to.
*
-
Which
if
we
add
the
confid
ber
of
{pirits
that
ma
yet
more
remote
fro
Ho
cognizance,
nor
can
frame
to.
ourfelves
any
difting
ideas
of
their
feveral
ranks
and
forts,
we
fhall
find
this
.
caufe
of
ignorance
conceal
from
us
»
In
an
impenetrable
obfcurity,
almoft
the
whole
intelle
ctual
world;
a
greater
certainly,
and
more
beautiful
world
than
the
material.
or
bating
fome
very
few,
and
thofe,
if
I
may
fo
call
them,
fuperficial
ideas
of
{pirit,
which
by
reflection
we
ct
of
our
own,
and
from
thence
the
beft
we
can
collect
of
the
father
of
all
{pirits,
the
eternal
independent
au-
d
us
and
all
things;
we
have
no
certain
»
0
much
as
of
the
exiftence
of
other
{pirits,
eration
of
that
infinite
num-
y
be,
and
probably
are,
which
are
m
our
knowledge,
whereof
we
have
ut
by
revelation,
Angels
of
all
forts
are
naturally
be-
yond
our
difcovery
;
and
all
thofe
intelligences
whereof
it
1s
likely
there
are
more
orders
tha
{tances,
are
things
whereof
our
nat
no
certain
account
at
all.
-
That
there
are
minds
and
thinking
beings
in
oth
:
|
other
men
as
well
as
himfelf,
every
man
has
a
reafon,
from
their
words
and
a&io
ural
faculties
give
us
ns,
to
be
{atisfied:
and
the
Knowledge
of
his
own
mind
cannot
fu
er
aman,
that
confiders,
to
be
ignorant,
that
there
isa
God.
But
tha
t
there
are
degrees
of
{piritual
beings
nd
the
great
God,
who
is
there
that
by
his
own
fearch
and
ability
can
come
to
know?
Much
lefs
have
We
difting
ideas
of
their
different
natures,
condi-
ons,
ftates,
po
,
OWers,
and
feveral
conftitutions,
wherein
they
agree
or
differ
from
one
another,
and
from
us.
And
therefore
in
what
concerns
their
different
fpecies
and
Properties,
we
are
under
an
abfolute
ignorance.
§.
28,.
ee
ae
a
“a
ua
F272
Extent
of
Himan
Knowledge.
Book
‘-
(
:
od
Sale:
§.
28.
Secondly,
what
a
fmall-part
wart
of
3
fubftantial
beings
that
are
in
the
unt
;
difeoverable
the
want
of
ideas
leavés
open
to
our
kid!
hoe.
ledge,
we
have
feen.
In
the
next
pla@
between,
,
.
ait
bs
aera
another
caufe
of
ignorance,
of
no
lefs
™
have.
ment,
is
a
want
of
a
difcoverable
cont
Be
|
between
thofe
ideas
we
have.
For
whett™
‘we
want
thar,
we
are
utterly
incapable
of
univerial
@
certain
knowledge;
and
are,
in
the
former
cal,
*
only
to
obfervation
and
experiment:
which,
how™
row
and
confined
it
is,
how
far
from
general
knowl
we
need
not
be
told.
I
hall
give
fome
few
inftances
this
caufe
of
our
ignorance,
and
fo
leave
it,
Te
188
dent
that
the
bulk,
figure,
and
motion
of
{everal
bot
about
us,
produce
in
us
feveral
fenfations,
as
of
coloul
founds,
taftes,
{mells,
pleafure
and
pain,
&c.
4%
mechanical
affections
of
bodies
having
no
affinity
att
with
thofe
ideas
they
produce
in
us
(there
being
no
©”
ceivable
connexion
between
any
impulfe
of
any
fol
‘a
body
and
any
perception
of
a
colour
or
fmel],
which!
find
in
our
minds)
we
can
have
no
diftinét
knowle
of
fuch
operations
beyond
our
experience
;
and
can
fon
no
otherwife
about
them,
than
as
effects
produG,
by
the
appointment
of
an
infinitely
wife
agent,
Wo
perfectly
furpafs
our
comprehenfions.
As
the
ide,
fenfible
fecondary
qualities
which
we
have
in
our
mi
can
by
us
be
no
way
deduced
from
bodily
cavfes
™
any
correfpondence
or
connexion
be
found
betW
a
them
and
thofe
primary
qualities
which
(expe),
fhows
us)
produce
them
in
us;
fo
on
the
other
fid®
|
operation
of
our
minds
upon
our
bodies
is
as
incon’,
able.
How
any
thought
fhould
produce
a
mote’
body
is
as
remote
from
the
nature
of
our
ideas,
25%,
any
body
fhould
produce
any
thought
in
the
mind.
—
it
is
fo,
if
experience
did
not
convince
us,
the
ce
ration
of
the
things
themfelves
would
never
be
@
the
leaft
to
difcover
to
us.
Thefe,
and
the
like,
u
they
have
a
conftant
and
regular
connexion,
A
ordinary
courfe
of
things
;
yet
that
connexion
bel
difcoverable
in
the
ideas
themfelves,
which
app@
to
have
no
neceflary
dependence
one
on
anothel
4
Chiige
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
123
canattribute.
their
connexion
to
nothing
elfe
but
the
arbitrary
determination
of
that
all-wife
agent,
who
hag
made
them
to
be,
and
to
operate
as
they
do,
in
a
way
Wholly
above
Our
weak
underftandings
to
conceive.
~
$629.
In
fome
of
our
ideas
there
are
cer-
Tnftances;
tain
relations,
habitudes,
and
connexions,
ace
fo
vifibly
included
in
the
nature
of
the
ideas
themfelves,
"hat
we
cannot
conceive
them
feparable
from
them
by
any
power
whatfoever.
And
in
thefe
only
we
are
capa~
i
univerfal
knowledge.
Thus
the
idea
of
a
right-lined
triangle
neceffarily
carries
with
it
an
gles
to
twa
right
ones.
Nor
can
we
Conceive
this
relation,
this
connexion
of
thefe
two
ideas,
to
be
poffibly
mutable,
or
to
depend
on
any
arbitrary
power,
which
of
choice
made
it
thus,
or
could
make
it
otherwife,
But
the
coherence
and
continuity
of
the
parts
of
matter;
the
production
of
fenfation
in
us
of
Colours
and
founds,
&
y
impulfe
and
motion;
nay,
e.h
the
original
rules
and
com
munication
of
motion
being:
ucn,
wherein
we
can
dif
»
here
mention
the
refurrec-
»
the
future
ftate
of
this
globe
of
earth,
hings,
which
are
by
every
one
acknow-
ledged
to
depend
wholly
on
the
determination
of
a
free
agent.
The
things
that,
as
far
as
our
obfervation
Teaches,
we
Conttantly
find
to
Proceed
regularly,
we
may
con
law
fet
them;
but
yet
by
a
clude
do
a@
by
a
aw,
that
we
know
not
:
whereby,
though
caufes
work
Readily,
antly
flow
and
effeds
conft
from
them,
yet
their
Connexions
and
dependencies
being
not
difcoverable
in
Our
ideas,
we
can
have
but
an
experimental
knowledge
of
them.
ae
.
hodieg
”
ae
-
ter
about,
or
ftick
only
in
founds
of
doubtful
and
¥
Certain
fignifications.
‘Mathematicians
abftracting
th
“Stick
in
words
of
undetermined
and
uncertain
fignific?”
124
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
Books
bodies
that
are
about
us,
and
make
a
part
of
us:
col
cerning
their
fecondary
qualities,
powers,
and
op
tions,
we.can
have
no
univerfal
certainty,
Several
eft
yh
come
every
day
within
the
notice
of
our
fenfes,
©
which
we
have
fo
far
fenfitive
knowledge;
but
the
caules
manner,
and
certainty
of
their
production,
for
the
t
foregoing
reafons,
we
muft
be
content
to
be
very
ig
rant
of.
In
thefe
we
can
80
no
farther
than.
partic
experience
informs
us
of
matter
of
fact,
and
by
analo
to
guefs
what
effects
the
like
bodies
are,
upon
ot
trials,
like
to
produce.
But
as.
to
a
perfect
{cienceé
natural
bodies
(not
to
mention
fpiritua]
beings)
we
4
I
think,
fo
far
from
being
capable
of
any
{uch
th
that
I
conclude
it
loft
labour
to
{eek
after
it.
$e
od
oes
§.
30.
Thirdly,
where
we
have
adeq
Thirdly,
. ;
:
dj
want
of
trace
Ideas,
and
where
there
is
a
certain
and
ing
ourideas,
Coverable
connexion
between
them,
ye
are
often
ignorant,
for
want
of
tracing
t
ideas
which
we
have,
or
may
have;
and
for
wan
finding
out
thofe
intermediate
ideas,
which
may
ih
us
what
habitude
of
agreement
or
difagreement.
tht
haveone
with
another.
And
thus
many
are
ignorant‘
mathematical
truths,
not
out
of
any.
imperfection
their
faculties,
or
uncertainty
in
the
things
themfelves}
but
for
want
of
application
in
acquiring,
examining,
480
|
by
due
ways
comparing
thofe
ideas.
That
whic
ue
moft
contributed
to
hinder
the
due
tracing
of
our
va
and
finding
out
their
relations,
and
agreements
or
dir
agrcements
one
with
another;
has
been,
I
fuppofe,
1
E
ill-ufe
of
words.
It
is
impoflible
that
men
fhould
yy,
truly
feek,
or
certainly
difcover
the
agreement
or
di
greement
of
ideas
themfelves,
whilft
their
thoughts
flu
thoughts
from
names,
and
accuftoming
themfelves
!
{et
before
their
minds
the
ideas
themfelves
that
thé
would
confider,
and
not
founds
inftead.
of
them,
hav
Ve
avoided
thereby
a
Sreat
part
of
that
perplexity,
puddet
ing,
and
confufion,
which
has
fo
much
hindered
men®
—
progres
in
other
parts
of
knowledge.
For
whilft
they
t10Da
CC
OSEEESST~S
TT
‘Ch,
3.
Extent
of
Human
Knowledge.
125
tion,
they
are
unable
to
diftin
tain
from
probable,
confiftent
©wn
opinions.
This
hav
Ola
great
part
of
men
guifh
true
from
falfe,
cers
|
from
inconfiftent,
in
their
ing
been
the
fate
or
misfortune
of
letters,
the
increafe
brought
nto
the
flock
of
real
knowledge,
has
been
very
little,
ih
proportion
to
the
{chools,
difputes;
and
writings,
the
World
has
been
filled
with;
whilft
ftudents
being
loft
in
the
great
wood
of
words,
knew
not
whereabout
they
were,
how
far
their
difcoveries
were
advanced,
or
what
Was
wanting
in
their
own-or
the
general
ftock
of
know-
ledge.
Hed
men,
in
the
difcoveries
of
the
material,
done
as
they
have
in
thofe
of
the
intellectual
world,
in-
volved
all
in
the
obfcurity
of
uncertain
and
doubtful
ways
of
talking,
v
olumes
writ
of
navigation
and
voyages,
theories
and
{tories
of
zone
8
and
tides,
multiplied
and
difputed
;
nay,
fhips
built,
and
fleets
fent
out;
would
never
have
taught
us
the
Way
beyond
the
line;
and
the
Anti.
_
‘podes
would
be
ftill
as
much
unknown,
as
when
it
was
to
hold
there
were
any.
But
having
{poken
fufficiently
of
words,-and
the
ill
or
carelefs
ufe
that
is
commonly
made
of
them,
I
fhall
not
fay
any
thing
more
of
it
here.
.
$031.
Hitherto.
we
have
examined
the
Extent
in
re-
fever
fs
ai
lef
the
fi
Deings
that-ares:
There
is
|
another
extent
of
it,
in
refpect
of
univerfality,
which
will'alfo
‘deferve
to
be
confidered;
and
in
this
regard,
our
knowledge.
follows
the
nature
of
our
idéas.
If
the
ideas
are
abftract,
whofe
agreement
or
difagreement
we
perceive,
our-Knowledze
‘is;
Univerfal,
For
what
is
Known
of
fuch
general
ideas,
will
be
true
of
every
par-
ticular
thing,
-in
whom
that
eflence,
i.e.
that
abftraét
idea
is
to.
be
found
;
and’
what
is
once
known
of
fuch
ideas,
will.
be
perpetually
and
for
ever
true.
So
that
sey
o
all
general
knowledge,
we
mutt
fearch
and
find
it
anly
1
Our
minds,
and
it
is
only
the
examining
of
our
Own
ideas,
that
furnifheth
us
with
that..
Truths
be.
longing
to
effences
of
things,
(that
is,
to
abftract
ideas)
are
eternal,
and
are
to
be
found
out
by
the
contempla-
“on
only
of
thofe
effences:
as
the
exiftences
of
things
are
to
be
knows
only
from.
experience,
But
having
=~
.
,
more
ie
126
_
Reality
of
Knowledge.
Book’
more
to
fay
of
this
in
the
chapters
where
I
hall
§
pt
‘of
general
and
real
‘knowledge,
this
may
here
fi
nee
to
the
univerfality
of
our
knowledge
in
general.
e
3
MW
pl
opt
Of
the
Reality
of
Knowledge.
:
‘
Grats
DOUBT
not
but
my
read
Sagteace
I
this
time
may
be
apt
to
think,
~
placed
in
I
have
been
all
this
while
only
build
|
abe
a
rails
in
the
air;
a
ot
ready
to
po
|
eiGont
©
o
what
purpofe
all
this
ftir?
**
ledge,’
fay
you,
is
only
the
percepue
i
**
the
agreement
or
difagreement
of
our
own
ideas
““
who
knows
what
thofe
ideas
may
be?
Is
ther
i
“thing
fo
‘extravagant,
as
the
imaginations
of
t
'
“brains?
Where
is
the
head
that
has
no
chimef
|
~
“it?
Or
if
there
be
a
fober
and
a
wife
man,
wha
“ti
*
ference
will
there
be,
by
your
rules,
betwee?
*
Knowledge
and
that
of
the
moft
extravagant
fan,
|
**
the
world?
They
both
have
their
ideas,
and
p@
if
their'agreementand
difagreement.
one
with
ane
If
there
be
any
difference
between
them,
the
adv
“*
tage
will
be
on
the
warm-headed
man’s
fide,
ae
|
|
‘ing
the
more
ideas,
and
the
more
lively:
and
10
%
**
yourvrules,
he
will
be
the
more
knowing.
i
|
“true,
that
all
knowledge
lies
only
in
the
per¢
‘of
the
agreement
or
difagreement
of
our
owl?
**
the
vifions
of
anventhufiaft,
and
the
reafoning$
**
fober
man,
will
be
equally
certain.
“It
is
no
*
how
things
are;
foa
man
obferve
but
the
agree
*
of
his
own
imaginations,
and
talk
conformably
s*
all
truth,
‘all
certainty.
Such
caftles
in
the
4
**
be
as
ftrong
holds
of
truth,
as
the
demonftrat
**'Euclid.
That
an
harpyis»not
a
éentaur
is
p
**
way
as
certain
knowledge,
and
as
much
atrull
*
that
a
fquare
is
notacircle.
a
Ch.
4.
Reality
of
Knowledge.
T29
“*
But
Of
what
ufe
is
all
this
fine
knowledge
of
men’s
own
imaginations,
té’a
man
that
inquires
after
the
reality
of
things?
Tt
matters
not
what
men
s
seid
are,
it
is
the
knowledge
of
things
that
is
only
‘to
‘be
prized;
it
is
this
alone
gives
a
value
to
our
reafon-
ings,
and
preference
to
one
man’s
knowledge
over
‘-another’s,
that
it
is
of
things
as
they
really
are,
and
““
not-of
dreams
and
fancies.”
Bre
eo
on
Which
T
anfwer,
that
if
our
Anfw.
‘Not
knowledge
of
Jour
ideas’
terminate
in'them,
fo,
where
‘and
reach
no
farther,
where
there
is
fome-
si
ance
thing
farther
intended,
“our
moft
ferious
sale
ufe,
than
the
reveries
of
ee
eS
oie
*
a
a
4
of
&'man,
who
fees
things
twith
great
affurance
utters
them.
But,
Thope,
he,
to
make
it
evident,
that
‘this
way
of
certainty,
by
the
Knowledge
of
our
own
ideas,
‘Goes
a
little
-frther
than
‘bare’
imagination:
and
4
believe
je-wil]
appear,
that-all
the
certainty
of
general
truths
a'man
‘has,
Jies
in
nothing
elfe,
>.
§.°3.
Ip.
isievident,
the
mind
knows
‘not
things
im-
“mediately,
but
‘only“by
the
intervention
of
the
ideas
it
has
of
‘them,
Knowledge
therefore
is:seal,
only
fo
far
as
there
js
9
‘Conformity
between
ourideas
and.
the
‘Yeality
of
things,
But
what
fhall
be:
here
the
criterion?
‘How
fhall
the
mind,
when
it
perceives
nothing
but
its
‘own
‘ideas,
“know
that
they
‘agree
with
‘things:
them-
‘felves?
This;
though
it
teens
HOt
to'want
diffieulty,
yer,
‘TU
think,
the
of
‘ideas,
that,
(we
may
be
red,
agree
with
things.
“4.
Kirt,
«the
firft
vare
fimple
ideas,
As
1.
All
Which
‘fince
the
mind,
ag
has
been
thowed,
“dimple
ideas
an
by
noawneais
‘Make
to’
itfelf,
muft
ne.
4
ceffarily
be'the-proda@
of
things
operating:
on
the
mind
in
a
natural
way,
and
Producing
therein
thofe
percep
fons
which»
by
the
wifdom
and
will
of
our
‘maker
they
‘are
Ordained:and
adapted
fo.
“From
whence
it
follows,
‘that!
fimple
ideas
are
not
fictions
of
our
fancies,
“but
the
‘Natural
and
regular
Productions
of
things
without
us,
‘really
Operating
upon
us,
and:
fo-carry
with
them
all
‘the
certain
and
undoubted
reality.
thematical
‘
kn
owledge,
-yifion
of
-yain
infignificant
chimeras
of
the
brat.
a
a
a
iL,
tn
bape
Aa
ce
ee
na
en
128
Reality
of
Knowledge.
Book
conformity
which
is
intended,
or
which
out
ft
quires:
for
they
reprefent
to.
iis
things
under
tho
pearances
which
they
are
fitted
to
produce
in
us;
by
we
are
enabled
to
diflinguifh
the
forts
of
pa
fubftances,
to
difcern
the
ftates
they
are
in,.
anc
take
them
for
our
neceffities,
and
to
apply
them
©,
ufes.
Thiis-the
idea
of
whitenefs,
or
bitternefs,
4%
in
the
mind,
exaétly
anfwering
that
power
which
®
any
body
to
produce
it
there,
has
all
the
real
confor”
it-can,
or
ought
to
have,
with
things
without
us
ih
this
conformity
between
our
fimple
ideas,
and
the
™
ence
of
things,
is
fufficient
for
real
knowledge.
1
Al
cod
§.
5.
Secondly,
all
our
complex
plex
ideas,
except
thofe
of
fubftances,
being
arc
fine
of
the
mind’s.own
making,
not
inten
fubftances,
b
h
:
of
hi
“,
efe
€
the
copies
of
any
thing,
nor
refe
the
exiftence
of
any
thing,
as
to
their
originals.
want
any
conformity
neceflary
to
real
knowledge
that
which
is
not
defigned
to
reprefent
any
thi
itfelf,
cam
never
be
capable
of.a
wrong
reprefent4
nor
miflead
us
from
the
true
apprehenfion
of
any
by
its
diflikenefs
to
it;
and
fuch,
excepting
tho!
fubftances,
are-all
our
complex
ideas:
which,
as
|
fhowed
in
another
place,
are
combinations
of
which
the
mind,
by
its
free
choice,
puts
together,
out
confidering
any
connexion
they
have
in
0%
And
hence
it.
is,
that
in
all
thefe
forts
the
ideas
J
felves
are
confidered
as
the
archetypes,
and
thine
otherwife
regarded,
but
as
they
are
conform
them.
So
that
we
cannot
but
be
infallibly
ce?
that
all
the
knowledge
we
attain
concerning
thefe}
is
real,
and
reaches
things
‘themfelves;
becaufe
our
thoughts,
.reafonings,
and
difcourfes
of
this’
Wwe
intend
things
no
farther
than
as
they
are
com!
able
to
our
ideas.
So
that
in
thefe
we
cannot
m
:
eH)
Hencethetee
—
§.
6.
I
doubt
not
but
it
will
be
ality
of
ma-;
granted,
that
the
knowledge
we
ha
.
mathematical
truths,
is.
not
only
but
real
knowledge;
and
not
the
bare
‘
a
et,
if
we
will
mi
Own
ideas,
T
“mathematician
confiders
the
truth
and
properties
belon
'$
they
are
in
idea
in
his
©
never
found
either
of
le.
Precifely
true,
in
his
life.
fa
€
has
of
any
truths
or
Properties
belonging
toa
circ
e,
r
any
other
mathemati
and
Certain,
even
of
idea
of
a
triangle,
th
tight
ones?
Te
ig
true
alfo
of
a
trian
really
exifts.
What
Ore
he
js
certain
al]
his
kno
€as
is
real
knowled
arther
than
t
what
he
kno
res,
when
they
have
arely
an
ideal
exit
in
his
mj
them
alfo
:
: :
ral,
‘8
_mathematicks.
‘OF
Certainty
being
but
the
perception
of
the
|
produce
real
Kn
Well
as
in
mat
Reality
of
Knowledge,
129
confider,
we
fhall
find
that
it
is
only
of
ing
to
a
rectangle,
ér
circle,
only
ehirore
aoe
For
it
is
poffible
them
exifting
mathematical]
But
yet
the
knowledge
ical
ficure,
are
neverthelefs
true
Opofitions,
than
as
things
really
Pes
in
his
mind.
Is
it
true
of
the
at
its
three
angles
are
equal
to
two
gle,
wherever
it
hey
agree
With
thofe
}
»
When
th
48
Capable
of
rea]
Certainty,
Abd
of
mo-
asteement
or
dj
{agreement
of
our
;
and
demonttration
hothin
ch
i
or
medi
being
archetypes
themfelves
plete
ideas;
all
the
agreement
or
difacreem
Wwe
thall
find
;
i
ut
the
perception
on
of
other
ideas,
»
aS
Well
as
mathematical,
»
and
fo
adequate
and
com~
ent,
which
owledge,
as
hematical
figures.
UMS;
Our
moral
ideas
In
them,
wij]
Se
and
Exiftencenot
have
de.
quired
to
;
and
make
it
real,
»
tO
make
our
know-
Cdge
rea]
deas
an{wer
their
ar~
ed,
that
J
place
the
cer~
bal
onder
“io
Reality
of
Knowledge.
Book
4
certainty
of
our
knowledge
in
the
confideration
of
ouf
‘ideas,
with
fo
little
care
and
regard
(as
it
may
feem)
t?
the
real
exiftence
of
things:
fince
moft
of
thofe
dif-
“courfes,
which
take
up
the
thoughts,
and
engage
the
‘difputes
of
thofe
who
pretend
to
make
it
their
bufinels
fo
inquire
‘after
truth
and
certainty,
will,
I
prefume
upon
examination
be
found
to
be
general
propofition’s
“and
notions
in
which
exiftence
is
not
at
all
concerned:
‘All'the
difcourfes
of
the
mathematicians
about
the
{quar
ing
of
a
circle;
conick
fections,
or
any
other
part
©
mathematicks,
concern
not
the
exiftence
of
any
of
thofe
“figures;
but
their
demonftrations,
which
depend
of
“their
ideas,
are
the
fame,
whether
there
be
any
fquaré
or
Circle
exifting
in
the
world,
or
no.
In
the
fame
manner,
the
truth
and
certainty
of
moral
difcourfes
ab-
{tracts
from
the
lives
of
men,
and
the
exiftence
of
thole
|
virtues
in
the
world
whereof
‘they
treat.
Nor
are
Tully’
offices
lefs
true,
becaufe
there
is
no-body
in
the
wor
that
exactly
practifes
his
rules,
and
lives
up
to
that
pat
“tern
of
a
virtuous
man
which
he
has
given
us,
a?
which
exifted
no
where,
when
he
writ,
but
inidea.
f
it
be
true
in
fpeculation,
i.e.
in
idea,
that
murder
de
ferves
death,
it
will
alfo
be
true
in
reality
of
any
actio?
‘that
exifts
conformable
to
that
idea
of
murder.
As
fo!
other
actions,
the
truth
of
that’
propofition
concer?
them
not.
And
thus
it
is
of
all
other
{pecies
of
thing®
which
have
no
other
effences
but
thofe
ideas,
which
a!
in
the
minds
of
men.
;
an
9:
But
it
will
here
be
faid,
that
if
leh
trae.
moral
knowledge
be
placed
in
the
contem
:
or
cértain,
plation
of
our
own
moral
ideas,
and
those
<becaufemo-
as
other
modes,
be
of
our
own
making
ral
ideas
are
What
{trange
notions
will
there
be
of
justice
of
our
Di
i
>
Wh
fui
f
vi
rues
making
and
and
temperance:
at
confufion
of
virtt!
‘
naming,
and
vices,
if
every
one
may
make
what
ideas
°
ne
eae
them
he
pleafes?
No
confufion
or
diforeé
in
the
things
themfelves,
nor
the
reafonings
‘about
them?
no
more
than
(in
mathematicks)
there
would
be
a
dif
turbance
in
the
demonftration,
or
a
change
in
the
pr
perties
of
figures,
and
their
relations
one
to
another,
2
@man,fhould
make
a
triangle
with
four
corners,
vie
,
trae
5
—
Pa
eae
Stee
Oe
Ch.
4.
Reality
of
Knowledge.
131
trapezium
with
four
right
angles:
that
is,
in
plain
Eng-
lifh,
change
the
names
of
the
figures,
and
call
that
by
One
name,
which
mathematicians
call
ordinarily
by
an-
Other.
For
let
a
man
make
to
himfelf
the
idea
of
a
Sure
with
three
angles,
whereof
one
is
a
right
one,
and
Call
it,
if
he
pleafe,
equilaterum
or
trapezium,
or
any
Ming
elfe,
the
properties
of
and
demonftrations
about
Mat
idea
will
be
the
fame,
as
if
he
called
ita
rectangular
Tangle.
I
confefs
the
change
of
the
name,
by
the
im-
Propriety
of
fj
peech,
willat
firft
difturb
him,
who
knows
jot
What
idea
it
ftands
for;
but
as
foon
as
the
figure
is
,
“Wn,
the
confequences
and
demonftration
are
plain
and
clear,
Juft
the
fame
is
it
in
moral
knowledge,
let
“man
have
the
idea
of
taking
from
others,
without
their
Sonfent,
what
their
honeft
induftry
has
poffeffed
them
_
Of
and
call
this
juftice,
if
he
pleafe.
He
that
takes
the
name
here
without
the
idea
put
to
it,
will
be
miftaken,
Y
Joining
another
idea
of
his
ewn
to
that
name:
but
trip
the
idea
of
that
name,
or
take
it
fuch
as
it
is
in
the
Peaker’s
mind,
and
the
fame
things
will
agree
to
it,
as
You
called
it
injuftice.
Indeed
wrong
names
in
moral
difcourfes
breed
ufually
more
diforder,
becaufe
they
are
of
fo
eafily
rectified
as
in
mathematicks,
where
the
Sure,
once
drawn
and
feen,
makes
the
name
ufelefs
“hd
of
no
force.
For
what
necd
of
a
fign,
when
the
Ing
fignified
is
prefent
and
in
view?
But
in
‘moral
¢s
that
cannot
be
fo
eafily
and
fhortly
done,
becaufe
th
the
many
decompofitions
that
go
to
the
making
up
complex
ideas
ef
thofe
modes.
But
yer
for
all
this,
futcalling
of
any
of
thofe
ideas,
contrary
to
the
ufual
‘SNification
of
the
words
of
that
language,
hinders.
not
fea
that
we
may
have
certain
and
demonftrative
know-
Woe
of
their
feveral
agreements
and
difagreements,
if
rity
will
carefully,
as
in
mathematicks,
keep
to
the
fame
Precife
ideas,
and
trace
them
in
their
feveral
relations
€to
another,
without
being
led
away
by
their
names.
{i
We
but
feparate
the
idea
under
confideration
from
the
hs
t
at
flands
for
it,
our
knowledge
goes
equally
on
fonts
difcovery
of
real
truth
and
certainty,
whatever.
nds
we
make
ufe
of
K
2 ‘
Ҥ.
10,
¥
32
‘Reality
of
Knowledge.
Book
4
Mifnaming
§.
10.
One
thing
more
we
are
to
take
diflurbs
not
notice
of,
that
where
God,
or
any
other
de
ete
Jaw-maker,
hath
defined
any
moral
name
ledge.
there
they
have
made
the
effence
of
that
fpecies
to
which
that
name
belongs;
an
there
it
is
not
fafe
to
apply
or
ufe
them
otherwife:
but
in
other
cafes
it
is
bare
impropriety
of
{peech
to
apply
them
contrary
to
the
common
ufage
of
the
country:
But
yet
even
this
too
difturbs
not
the
certainty
of
that
knowledge,
which
is
{till
to
be
had
by
a
due
contem=
-
plation,
and
comparing
of
thofe
even
nick-named
ideas."
Ideds
of
fab-
§.
11.
Thirdly,
there
is
another
fort
?
ftances
have
complex
ideas,
which
being
referred
to
at-
per
arche-
—
chetypes
without
us,
may
differ
from
them,
ypes
with-
A
e
out
iat.
and
fo
our
knowledge
about
them
may
co™
fhort
of
being
real.
Such
are
our
ideas
of
fubftances,
which
confifting
of
a
collection
of
fimple
ideas,
fuppofed
taken
from
the
works
of
nature,
ma
yet
vary
from
them,
by
having
more
or
different
ideas
united
in
them,
than
are
to
be
found
united
in
the
thing’
themfelves.
From
whence
it
comes
to
pafs,
that
they
may,
and
often
do,
fail
of
being
exactly
conformable
©
things
themfelves.
So
nies
ake
fubftances,
which,
by
being
conformable
t
thofe,
fo
far
things,
may
afford
us
real
knowledge,
de
tes
a
not
enough,
as
in
modes,
to
put
togethe!
cerningthem
{uch
ideas
as
have
no
inconfiftence,
thoug
is
real.
they
did
never
before
fo
exift:
v.g-
™
ideas
of
facrilege
or
perjury,
&c.
were
#
real
and
true
ideas
before,
as
after
the
exiftence
of
4?
(ed
fuch
fact.
But
our
ideas
of
fubftances
being
fuppoe
gill
copies,
and
referred
to
archetypes
without
us,
muft
#4
be
taken
from
fomething
that-does
or
has
exifteds
they
rouft
not
confift
of
ideas
put
together
at
the
pleafure
of
our
thoughts,
without
any
real
pattern
they
were
t
ce
from,
though
we
can
perceive
no
inconfiftence
in
{uc
combination.
The
reafon
whereof
is,
becaufe
we
know
ing
not
what
real
conf{titution
it
is
of
fubftances,
where?
our
fimple
ideas
depend,
and
which
really
is
the
caule
of
the
{trict
union
of
fome
of
them
one
with
ance
as
-
§.
12.
I
fay
then,
that
to
have
ideas
of
i
__ccecnamteincaenc
eta
ee
TL
CELLO:
Ch,
4.
Reality
of
Knowledge.
133
and
the
exclufion
of
others;
there
are
very
few
of
them,
that
we
can
be
fure
are,
or
are
not,
inconfiftent
in
na-
ture,
any
farther
than
experience
and
fenfible
obferva-
tion
reach.
Herein
therefore
is
founded
the
reality
of
Sur
knowledge
conterning
fubftances,
that
all
our
com-
Plex
ideas
of
them
mutt
be
fuch,
and
fuch
only,
as
are
made
up
of
fuch
fimple
ones,
as
have
been
difcovered
to
Co-exift
in
nature.
And
our
ideas
being
thus
true:
though
not,
perhaps,
very
exact
copies,
are
yet
the
fub-
Jects
of
real
(as
far
as
we
have
any)
knowledge
of
them.
hich
(as
has
been
already
fhown)
will
not
be
found
to
Feach
very
far:
but
fo
far
as
it
does,
it
will
till
be
real
Nowledge.
Whatever
ideas
we
have,
the
agreement
We
find
they
have
with
others,
will
ftill
be
knowledge.
thofe
ideas
be
abftract,
it
will
be
general
knowledge.
But,
to’:
make
it
real
concerning
fubftances,
the
ideas
muft
be
taken
from
the
real
exiftence
of
things.
What-
fVer
fimple
ideas
have:
been
found
to
co-exift
in
any
ubftance,
thefe
we
may
with
confidence
join
together
Again,
and
fo
make
abitract
ideas
of
fubftances.
For
i
atever
have
once
had
an
union
in
nature,
may
be
Nited
again.
oe
:
a
13.
This,
if
we
rightly
confider,
and
a
eins
te
ne
not
our
thoughts
and
abftract
ideas
fyhfances,
a
cones
as
if
there
were,
OF
could
be
no
‘we
muft
con-
nites
forts
of
things
than
what
known
ee
ideas,
Re
es
had
already
determined,
and
as
it
pi
ow
con-
ues
fet
out;
we
fhould
think
of
things
¢houghts
to
Ith
greater
freedom
and
lefs
confufion
than
_
names,
or
:
vaps
we
do.
It
would
poflibly
be
thought
Species
fop-
Sra
aradox,:
if
not
a
very
dangerous
fy
names.
if
chood,
if
I
fhould
fay,
that
fome
change-_
4
8s,
who
have
lived
forty
years
together
without
any
PPearance
of
reafon,
are
fomething
between
a
man
and
4
ee
which
prejudice
is
founded
upon
nothing
elfe
but
€
fuppofition,
that
thefe
two
names,
man
and
beaft,
sed
for
diftinct
fpecies
fo
fet
out
by
real
effences,
that
-“€re
can
come
no
other
fpecies
between
them
:
whereas
uae
will
abftract
from
thofe
names,
and
the
fuppofi-
all
¢
of
fuch
fpecifick
effences
made
by
nature,
wherein
hings
of
the
fame
denominations
did
exactly
and
K
3
equally
134
Reality
of
Knowledge.
Book
4-
equally
partake;
if
we
would
not
fancy
that
there
were
a
certain
number
of
thefe
effences,
wherein
al]
things,
as
in
moulds,
were
caft
and
formed:
we
fhould
find
that
the
idea
of
the
fhape,
motion,
and
life
of
2
man
without
reafon,
is
as
much
a
diftinct
idea,
and
makes
as
much
a
diftinc
fort
of
things
from
man
and
beaft,
as
the
idea
of
the
fhape
of
an
afs
with
reafon
would
be
different
from
either
that
of
man
or
beaft,
and
be
a
{pecies
of
an
animal
between,
or
diftinct
from
both.
care
_§.
14.
Here
every
body
will
be
ready
to
oon,
afk,
If
changelings
may
be
fuppofed
fome-
changeling
thing
between
man
and
beaft,
pray
what
being
fome-
are
they?
I
anfwer,
changelings,
which
15
thing
be-
tweet
atinent
good
a
word
to
fignify
fomething
diffe-
—
and
beat,
|
Tent
from
the
fignification
of
man
or
beats
anfwered.
as
the
names
man
and
beatt
are
to
have
fig-
nifications
different
one
from
the
other:
This,
well
confidered,
would
refolve
this
matter,
an
fhow
my
meaning
without
any
more
ado.
But
1
am
not
fo
unacquainted
with
the
zeal
of
fome
men,,
which
enables
them
to
{pin
confequences,
and
to
fee
religioD
threatened
whenever
any
one
ventures
to
quit
theif
forms
of
{peaking
as
not
to
forefee
what
names
fuch
4
propofition
as
this
is
like
to
be
charged
with:
and
with-,
out
doubt
it
will
be
afked,
If
changelings
are
fomething
between
man
and
beaft,
what
will
become
of
them
i
the
other
world?
To
which
J
anfwer,
1.
It
concerns
me
not
to
Know
or
inquire.
To
their
own
mafter
they
‘ftand
or
fall.
It
‘will
make
their
ftate
neither
better
nor
worfe,
whether
we
determine
any
thing
of
it
or
10
They
are
in
the
hands
of
a
faithful
creator
and
a
boun-
tiful
father,
who
difpofes
not
of
his
creatures
accordidg
to
our
narrow
thoughts
or
Opinions,
nor
diftinguifhes
them
according
to
names
and
{pecies
of
our
contrivance
And
we
that
know
f
!
0
little
of
this
prefent
world
we
are
in,
may,
I
think,
content
ourfelves
without
being
pe
remptory
in
defining
the
different
ftates,
which
creat
tures
fhall
come
into,
when
they
go
off
this
ftage.
may
fuffice
us,
that
he
hath
made
known
to
all
tholes
who
are
capable
of
inftruction,
difcourfing,
‘and
reafon-
’
5
y
ings
*
Ch.
4.
Reality
of
Knowledges
135.
ing,
that
they
fhall
come
to
an
account,
and
receive
ac-
Cording
to
what
they
have
done
in
this
body.
.
§.
15.
But,
fecondly,
I
anfwer,
the
force
of
thefe
Men’s
queftion
(viz.
will
you
deprive
changelings
of
a
future
ftate?)
is
founded
on
one
of
thefe
two
fuppoli-
.
tions,
which
are
both
falfe.
The
firft
is,
that
all
things
_
that
have
the
outward
fhape
and
appearance
of
a
man
muft
neceffarily
be
defigned
to
an
immortal
future
being
after
this
life:
or,
fecondly,
that
whatever
is
of
human
itth
muft
be
fo.
Take
away
thefe
imaginations,
and
Uch
queftions
will
be
groundlefs
and
ridiculous.
I
de-
fire
then
thofe
who
think
there
is
no
more
but
an
acci-
ental
difference
between
themfelvesand
changelings,
the
Cilence
in
both
being
exactly
the
fame,
to
confider
whe-
ther
they
can
imagine
immortality
annexed
to
any
out-
Ward
fhape
of
the
body?
the
very
propofing
it,
is,
I
fup-
Pofe,
enough
to
make
them
difown
it.
No-one
yet,
that
ever
I
heard
of,
how
much
foever
immerfed
in
mat--
ter,
allowed
that
excellency
to
any
figure
of
the
grofs
‘Chfible
outward
parts,
as
to-affirm
eternal
life
due
to
—*,
ora
neceffary
confequence
of
it;
or
that
any
mafs
of
Matter
fhould,
after
its
diffolution
here,
be
again
re-
‘Ored
hereafter
to
an
everlafting
ftate
of
fenfe,
percep-
4on,
and
knowledge,
only
becaufe
it
was
moulded
into
this
or
that
figure,
and
had
fuch
a
particular
frame
of
M8
vifible
parts.
Such
an
opinion
as
this,
placing
im-
Mortality
in
a
certain
fuperficial
figure,
turns
out
of
‘ors
all
confideration
of
foul
or
fpirit,
upon
whofe
“count
alone
fome
corporeal
beings
have
hitherto
been
“oncluded
immortal,
and
others
not.
This
is
to
attri-
Ute
more
to
the
outfide
than
infide
of
things;
and
to
P
‘ace
the
excellency
of
a
man
more
in
the
external
fhape
«his
body,
than
internal
perfections
of
his
foul:
which
's
but
little
better
than
to
annex
the
great
and
ineftima-
©
advantage
of
immortality
and
life
everlafting,
which
©
has
above
other
material
beings,
to
annex
it,
|
©
»
to'the
cut
of
his
beard,
or
the
fafhion
of
his
coat.
'Or
this
or
that
outward
mark
of
our
bodics
no
more
ritics
with
ir
the
hope
of
an
eternal
duration,
than
the
'hion
of
a
man’s
fuit
gives
him
reafonable
grounds
to
‘Magine
it
will
never
wear
out,
or
that
it
will
make
him
K
4
im
142
Truth
in
General.
Book
4.
‘that
thisit
if
truth
be
nothing
but
the
joining
and
may
all
be
feparating
of
words
in
propofitions,
.as
the
etnias
Gderg
they
ftand
for
agree
or
difagree
in
men’s
minds,
the
knowledge
of
tfuth
is
not
fo
valuable
a
thing,
as
it
is
taken
to
be,
nor
worth
the
pains
and
time
men
employ
in
the
fearch
of
it;
fince
by
this
account
it
amounts
to
no
more
than
the
conformity
of
words
to,
the
chimeras
of
men’s
brains.
Who
knows
not
what
odd
notions
many
men’s
heads
are
filled
with,
and
what
ftrange
ideas
all
men’s
brains
‘are
capable
of?
But
if
we
th
ee;
we
know
the
truth
of
nothing
by
this
rule,
but
of
the
vifionary
words
in
our
own
imagi-
nations;
nor
have
other
truth,
but
what
as
much
con-
cerns
harpies
and
centaurs,
as
men
‘and
horfes.
For
thofe,
and
the
like,
may
be
ideas
in
our
heads,
and
have
their
agreement
and
difacreenient
there,
as
well
as
the
ideas
of
real
beings,
and'fo
have
as
true
propofitions
made
about
them.
And
it
will
be
altogether
as
true
a
Propofition
to
fay
all
centaurs
are
animals,
as
that
all
men
are
animals;
and
the
certainty
of
one
as
great
as
the
other.
For
in
both
the
propofitions,
the
words
are
put
together
according
to
the
agreement
of
the
ideas
in
our
minds:
and
the
agreement
of
the
idea
of
animal
with
that
of
centaur
is
as
clear
and
vifible
to
the
mind,
as
the
agreement
of
the
idea
of
animal
with
that
of
man;
and
fo
thefe
two
propofitions
are
equally
true,
equally
certain.
But
of
what
ufe
is
all
fuch
truth
to
ue?
‘Anfaertt,
§.
8.
Though
what
has
been
faid
in
the
real
truth
is
foregoing
chapter,
to
diftinguith
real
from
about
ideas
imaginary
knowledge,
might
.
fuffice:
here,
a
ehh
in
anfwer
to
this
doubt,
to
diftinguifh
real
st
truth
from
chimerical,
or
(if
you
pleafe)
barely
nominal,
they
depending
both
on
the
fame
foun-
dation;
yet
it
may
not
be
amifs
here
again
to
confi-
der,
that
though
our
words
fignify
nothing
but
our
ideas,
yet
being
defigned
by
them
to
fignify
things,
the
truth
they
contain
when
put
into
propofitions,
will
be
only
verbal,
when
they
ftand
for
ideas
in
the
mind,
that
have
not
an
agreement
with
the
reality
of
things.
And
therefore
truth,
as
Well
as
knowledge,
may
well
come
under
the
diftin@ion
of
verbal
and
real
;
that
being
only
fs
,
&8
the
great
conduits
of
‘truth
and
know-
Chis.
o<
Ypath
in
General.
143
only
verbal
truth,
wherein
terms
are
joined
according
to
the
agreement
or
difagreement
of
the
ideas
they
ftand
“for,
without
regarding
whether
our
ideas
are
fuch
as
‘Yeally
have,
or
are
capable
of
having
an
exiftence
in
‘Nature.
But
then
ic
is
they
contain
real
truth,
when
thefe
figns
are
joined,
as
our
ideas
agree;
and
when
our
ideas
are
fuch
as
we
know
are
capable
of
having
an
exiftence
in
nature:
which
in
fubftances
we
cannot
know,
but
by
knowing
thatfuch
have
exifted.
§.
9,
Truth
is
the
marking
down
in
words
»
patmood
is
the
agreement
or
difagreement
of
ideas
as
it
thejoining
of
is.
Falfhood
is
the
marking
down
in
words
—
names
other
the
agreement
or
difagreement
of
ideas
ye
ve
‘otherwife-than~it-is»
-And-
fo:
far-as
thefe
ee
a
ideas,
thus
marked
by
founds,
agree
to
their
|
archetypes,
fo
far
only
is.the:truth
real.
The
knowledge
of
this
truth
confifts
in
knowing
what
ideas
the
words
ftand
for,
and
the
perception
of
the
agreement
or
difa-
greement
of
thofe
ideas,
according
as
it
is
marked
by
thofe
words
9
|
ba
guest
§.
10.
But
becaufe
words
are
Iooked
on
Génerat
pro-
pofitions
to
ledge,
and
that
in
conveying
and
receiving
be
treated
of
of
truth,
and°commonly
in
reafoning
about
rhe
at
it,
we
make
ufe
of
words
and.
propofitions
;
»
ast
s
prop
;
I
fhall
more
‘at
large
inquire,
wherein
the
certainty
of
real
truths,
contained
in
propofitions,
confifts,
and
_
Where
it
is
to
be
had;
and
endeavour
to
fhow
in
what
fort
of
univerfal
propofitions
we
are
capable
of
being
Certain
of
their
réal
truth
or
falfhood.
~
I
fhall
Begin
with
general
propofitions,
as
thofe
which
moft
employ
our
thoughts,
and
exercife
our
contem-
Plation.
General
truths
are
moft
looked
after
by
the
©
tind,
as
thofe
that
moft
enlarge
our
knowledge;
and
y
‘their
comprehenfivenefs,:
fatisfying
us
at
once
0
Many
«particulars,
enlarge
our
view,
and
fhorten
our
Way
to
knowledge.
|
S
§.
rr.
Befides
truth
taken
‘in
the
ftrict
“Moral
and
fenfe
before-mentioned,
there
are
other
forts
metaphyfical
Of
truth
;
as,
1.
Moral
truth,
whichis
fpeak-
ing
of
things
according
to
the-perfuafion
of
our
own”
-
minds,
ee
Univerfal
Propofitions,
Book
4
minds,
though
the
propofition
we
fpeak
agree
not
to
the
reality
of
things.
2.
Metaphyfical
truth,
which
is
nothing
but
the
real
exiftence
of
things,
conformable
to
the
ideas
to
which
we
have
annexed
their
names.
This;
though
it
feems
to
confift
in
the
very
beings
of
thingss
yet,
when
confidered
a
little
nearly,
will
appear
to
include
a
tacit
propofition,
whereby
the
mind
joins
that
particular
thing
to
the
idea
it
had
before
fettled
with
2
name
to
it.
But
thefe
confiderations
of
truth,
either
having
been
before
taken
notice
of,
or
not
being
much
to
our
prefent
purpofe,
it
may
fuffice
here
only
to
have
mentioned
them.
:
C
HAP,
VI
:
Of
Univerfal
Propofitions,
their
Truth
and
Certainty
Treating
of
Ԥ.
1.
HOUGH
the
examining
and
words
necef-
_
judging
of
ideas
by
themfelves,
iarytoknow-
their
names
being
quite
laid
afide,
be
the
edge.
Knowledge;
yet,
through
the
prevailing
cuftom
of
ufing
founds
for
ideas,
I
think
it is
very
feldom
practifed.
Every
one
may
obferve
how
common
it
is
for
names
to
be
made
ufe
of,
inftead
of
the
ideas
themfelves,
eve?
when
men
think
and
reafon
within
their
own
breatts
3
efpecially
if
the
ideas
be
very
complex,
and
made
up
2
a
great
collection
of
fimple
ones.
This
makes
the
con-
fideration
of
words
and
propofitions
fo
neceflary
a
part
of
the
treatife
of
knowledge,
that
it
is
very
hard
to
{Peal
intelligibly
of
the
one,
without
explaining
the
other.
Geizis
§.
2.
All
the
knowledge
we
have,
being
traths
hardly
only
of
particular
or
general
truths,
it
15
tobeunder-
evident
that
whatever
may
be
done
in
the
hope
but
in
former
of
thefe,
the
latter,
which
is
that
pofitios,
Which
with
reafon
is
moft
fought
after,
ca0
ots
never
be
well
made
known,
and
is
very
fel-
dom
apprehended,
but
as
conceived
and
expreffed
es
in
words,
_
beft
and
fureft
way
to
clear
and
diftinét
+
Ch.
6:
their
Lrath
and
Certainty.
B45
Words!
Itis
not
‘therefore
out
of
our
way,
iri
the
exa-
Mination
of
our
knowledge,
to
inquire
into-tHe
truth
and
certainty
of
univerfal
propofitions::
3
%o
<s\seq)
xt
§.
3:
But
that
we
may
not
‘be
mifledin
i
cevetheytot
this
cafe,‘
by
that
which
is
the
danger
every;
»
two-fokis
of
Where,
I
mean
by
the
doubtfalnefs,of
terms,
truth
anduefi
it
is’
ft
to’
obferve,’
that
certainty
is
two-
SS
ar
PS>
old
;-certainty
of
truth,
and
certainty
of
knowledge.
Certainty
of
truth
is,
whem
words-arc:
fo.
put,
togethet
IN
propofitions,
as’exactly
to
exprefs
the.
agreemenbor
Wfagreement
of
the
ideas
they
ftandi
for;
as
reallyitass
“ertainty
of
knowledge
is
to
perceive,
the
agreement
of
ifagreement
ofvideas;
as.
expreffed.in
any-propelitions
his
we
wfually
call
knowing;
ors
bemg
certain
of
the
"
Wuth
lof
any
ipropofitionoi
(sig
yas
terete
lnuoI
8s
§.04.
Now
becaufe
we
cannot:
be
certain,
.
No
propofi«
Of
the
truth
of
any
general
propofition,
un=»
Homcan,
be)
ewe
know
th
ifert
|
ina
tones
fs
we
know
the
precifecbounds
and-extent:
«jie:
whe
Of
the
fpecies
its
terms
ftand
for,
it.1s
ne-.
the
efendeéiof
Ceflary
we
fhould
know
the
effence
of
each»
cach
fpecies
fpeciés,
which
is
that'which
conftitutes
and.
,
mentioned
is
i
a
ae
not
knowns
Ounds
it,
This,
in
all
fimple
ideascand
CRE
“SLs
Modes,
ig
not
hard
‘todo.
For
in
thefe,
the
real
and
Nominal
effence:
being
the
fame;
or,
which.
is
all.one,
the
abftract
idea
which
the
general
term
ftands
for,
.
be-
Ing
the
fole
effence
ahd
boundary
that
is
or
canbe
fup-
Pofed
of
the
fpecies;'there
can
be:
no
doubt,
how,
far
©
fpecies
extends,
or
what
things
are,comprehended.
Pt
each
term:
which,
it
is
evident,
are
all.that
haye
wt
exact
conformity
with
the
idea
at
ftands
for,
‘and
no
ther:
But‘in
fubftances
wherein
a
real,eflence
diftingt
0m
the
nominal
is.
fuppofed
to
conftitute,'
determine,
“nd
bound
the
fpecies,
the
extent:
of
the
general,
word
Goa
uncertain
:
becaufé
not
knowing,
this
real
effence,
‘
¢
Cannot
know
what
is}:
or
what
is.
not,of
that
{pecies
;
St
Confequently
what'may,
orimay
not
with.
certain!
éa
affirmed!
of
it.
And
thus
frie
ooh
aman,
orgald,
er
anyother
fpecies
of
natural
{ubftances,
as
fuppofed
Snftituted’
by
a
precife
and:
real
effence,
-which
nature
Weary
imparts
to
every
individual
of
that
kind,
reby
it
ig
made
to
be
of
that
fpecies,
we
cannot
be
Vox.
II,
xs
seats’
1
-
cern
146
Univerfal
Propofitions,.
_
Book
4
certain
of
the
truth
of
any
affirmation
or
negation
mad¢
of
it.
For
man,
or
gold,
taken
in
this
fenfe,
and
ufe
for
fpecies
of
things
conftituted
by
real
effences,
diffe-
rent
from
the
complex
idea
in
the
mind
of
the
fpeaker;
ftand
for
we
know
not
what:
and
the
extent
of
thefe
fpecies,
with
fuch
boundaries,
are
fo
unknown
and
un-
determined,
that
it
is
impoffible
with
any
cerfainty
£
affirm,
that
all
men
are
rational,
of
that
all
gold
is
yel-
low.
But
where
the
nominal
effence
is
kept
to,
as
the
boundary
of
each
fpecies,
and
men
extend
the
applica-
tion
of
any
general
term
no
farther
than
to
the
particu-
lar
things,
in
which
the
complex
idea
it
ftands
for
is
be
found,
there
they
are
in
no
danger
to
miftake
the
bounds
of
each
fpecies,
nor can
be
in
doubt,
on.
this
account,
whether
any
propofition
be
true
or
no.
I
havé
chofen
to
explain
this
uncertainty
of
propofitions
in
this
fcholaftic
way,
and
have
made
ufe
of
the
terms
°
effences
and
{pecies,
on
purpofe
to
fhow
the
abfurdity
and
inconvenience
there
is
to
think
of
them,
as
of
aDY
other
fort
of
realities,
than
barely
abftract
ideas:
with
names
to
them.
To
fuppofe
that
the
fpecies
of
thing’
are
any
thing
but
the
forting
of
them
under
gener
names,
according
as
they
agree
to
feveral
abftract
ideas
of
which
we
make
thofe
names
the
figns,
is
to
confoun
‘truth,
and
introduce
uncertainty
into
all
general
prop9-
fitions
that
can
be»
made
about
them...
Though
there
fore
thefe
things
might,
to
people
not
poffeffed
wi!
{cholaftic
learning,
be
treated
of
in
a
better
and
cleare!
‘way;
yet
thofe
wrong:
notions,
of
effences.
or,
fpeci®
having
got
root
in
moft
people’s
minds,
who.
havé
received
any
tincture
from
the
learning
which
has
pr
vailed
in
this
part
of
the
world,
are
to
be
difcover™
and
removed,
‘to
make
way
for
that
ufe
of
words
which
fhould
convey
certainty
with
it.
This
mote
§.
5.
The
names;
of
fubftances
the?)
particularly
©
whenever
made
to
ftand
for
f{pecies,
which
eoncerns
are
fu
O
:
:
I
ef
fabRaness,
ppofed
to
be
conftituted
by
rea
fences,
which
we
know
not,
are
not
cap4
“ble
to
convey
certainty
to
the
underftanding:
of
¢
f;
truth
of
general
propofitions
made
up
of
fuch
terms;
we
“eannot
be
fure..
The
reafon
whereof
is.
plain:
for
be
3
g
Car.
Ch.
6,
their
Truth
‘and
Certainty.
“TAT
tan
we
be
fure
that
this
or
that
quality
isin
gold,
when
We
know
not
what
is
or
is
not
gold?
«
Since
in
this.
way
of
{peaking
nothing
is
gold,
but
what
partakes
of
an
effence;
which
we
not
knowing,
cannot
know
where
it
is
or
is
not,
and
:fo
cannot
be
fure
that
any
parcel
of
Matter
in
the
world
is
or
is
not
in
this
fenfe
gold
;
being
incurably
ignorant,
whether
it
has
or
has
not
that
which
makes
any
thing
to
be
called
gold,
i.e.
that
real
effence
of
gold
whereof
we
have
no
idea
at
all:
this
being
as
impoffible
for
us
to
know,
as
it
is
for
a
blind
man
to
tell
in
what’
Aower
thé
colour
of
a
panfie
is,
or
is
not
to
be
found,
whilft
he
has
no
idea
of
the
colour
of
a
pan-
fieat
all:
Or
if
we
could
(which
1s
impoffible)
certainly
know
where
a
real
eflence,
which
we
know
not,
is;
Vv.
g:
Mm
what
parcels:
of.
matter
the
real
efferice
of
gold
is;
yet'could
we
not
be
fure,
that
this
or-that
quality
could
With
truth
be
affirmed
of
gold:
fince.it
is
impoffible
for
Us
to
know,
that
this
or
that
quality
or
idea
has
a
necef-
ary
connexion
with
a
real
effence,
of
which
we
have
ho
idea
at
all,
whatever
fpecies
that
fuppofed
real
eflence
may
be
imagined
to
conftitute;
Mis
6.
On
the
other
fide,
the
names
of
‘The
trath
of
ftances,-
when
made
ufe
of
as
they
fhould
few
univerfal
€,
for
the
ideas
men
have
in
their
minds,
.
propofitions
though
they
carry
a
clear
and
determinate
fibtanees
ignification
with
them,
will
not
yet
ferve
bg
se
5
detained
Bm
orereey
hh
to
be
known.
o
make
many
univerfal
propofitions,
of
Whofe
truth
we
can
be
certain.
Nor
becaufe
in
this
ufe
Of
them
we
are
uncertain
what
things
are
fignified
by
them,
but
becaufe
the
complex
ideas
they
ftand
for
are
fuch
combinations
of
fimple
ones,
as
carry
not
with
them
any
difcoverable
connexion
or
repugnancy,
but
With
a
very
few
other
ideas.
Mie
leaat
complex
ideas,
that
our
naMES
—
Becaufe
co-
pecies
of
fubftances
properly
ftand
—
exiftence
of
Or,
are
collections
of
fuch
qualities
as
have
ideas
in
few
ce
obferved
to-co-exift
in
an
unknown
Seccithe
sey
‘ubftratum,
which
we
call
fubftance:
but
hat
other
qualities
neceffarily
co-exift
with
fuch
com-
“Dinations,
we
cannot
certainly
know,
unlefs
we
can
dif-
eapWer
their
natural
dependence
;-
which
in
their
primary
L
2
3
‘qua-
x48
Univerfal
Propofitions,
Book
4:
qualities,
we
can
go
but
a
very
little
way
in;
and
in
all
—
their
fecondary
qualities,
we
can
difcover
no
connexion
at
all,
for
the
reafons
mentioned,
chap.
iii.
viz.
1.
Be-
eaufe
we
know
not
the
real
conftitutions
of
fubftancess
on
which
each*fecondary
quality
particularly
depends.
2.
Did
we
know
that,
it
would
ferve
us
only
for.expe-
|
rimental
(not:
univerfal)
knowledge;
and
reach
with
certainty
no
farther,
than
that
bare
inftance
:
becaufe
out
underftandings:
Can
difcover
no
conceivable
connexion
between
any
fecondary
quality
and
any
modification
whatfoever
of
any
of
the
primary
ones.
And
therefore
there
are
very
few
general
propofitions
to
be
made.con-
cerning
fubftances,
which»
tan
carry
with
them
un+
doubted
certainty.
©
5
0
ooh
Shy
;
Sis
§.
8.
All
gold
is
fixed,
is
a
propofitiod
whofe
truth
we
cannot
be
certain
of,
how
univerfally
foever
‘it
be
believed!
For
if,
according
tothe
ufelefs
imagination
of
the
fchoolsy
any.
one
fuppofes
the
term
gold
to
ftand
for
a
fpecies
things
fet
out
by
nature,
by
a
real
effence
belonging
t?
it,
itis
evident
he
knows
not
what
particular
fubftances
are
of
that
fpecies;
and
fo
cannot,
with
certainty,
affirm
any
thing
univerfally
of
gold.
But:
if
he
makes
gold
ftand
for
a
fpecies
determined
by
its
nominal
effence,
Jet
the
nominal
effence,
for
example,
be
the:
complex
idea
of
2
body
of
a
certain
yellow
colour,
malleable,
fufible,
and
heavier
than
any
other-known;
inthis
pro-
per
ufe
of
the
word
gold,
there
is
no
difficulty
to
know
‘what
is
or
is-not
gold.
But
yet
no
other
quality
cat
with
certainty
be
univerfally
afirmed
or
denied
of
gold,
but
what
hath
a
difcoverable
connexion
or
inconfiftency
“with
that
nominal
effence.
Fixednefs,
for
examplés«
having
no
neceffary’
connexion,
that
we
can
difcovers.
with
the
colour,
weight,
or
any
other
fimple
idea
©
our
complex
one,
or
with
the
whole
combination
toge-
ther;
it
1s
impoffible
that
we
fhould
certainly
know
the
inftance
in:
Zokts;
‘truth
of
this
propofitiog,
that
all
gold
is
fixed.
/
§.
g.
As
there
is
no
difcoverable
connexion:
betwee”
fixednefs.and
the
colour,
weight,
and
other
fimple
ideas
of
that
nominal
effence
of
gold;
fo
if
we
make
our
com-
plex
idea
of
gold
a
body
yellow,
fufible,
ductile,
weighty;
re
Ch.
6.
their
Truth
and
Certainly.
149
and
fixed,
we
fhall
be
at,
the
fame
uncertainty
concern=
ing
folubility
in
aq.
regia,
and
for
the
fame
reafon
:
ince
we
can’
never,
from
confideration
of
the
ideas
themfelves;
with
certainty
affirm
or
deny
of
a
body,
‘Whofe
complex
idea
is
made
up
of
yellow,
very
weighty,
ductile,
futible,
and
fixed,
that
it
is
foluble
in
aqua:
regia
;
and
fo
on,
of
the
reft
of
its
qualities.
I
would
gladly
meet
with
one
general
affirmation
concerning
any
quality
of
gold,
that
any
one
can
certainly
know
is
true.
t
will,
no
doubt,
be
prefently
objected,
is
not
this
an
Univerfal
propofition,
“all
gold
is
malleable
?”’
To
which
I
anfwer,
it
is
a
very
certain
propofition,
if
mal-
leablenefs
be
a
part
of
the
complex
idea
the
word
gold
ftands
for.
.
But
then
here
is
nothing
affirmed
of
gold,
but
that
that
found.
ftands,
for
an
idea
in
which
mallea-
Dlenefs
is
contained:
and
fuch
a
fort
of
truth
and
cer-
tainty
as
this,
it
is
to
fay
a
centaur
is
four-footed.
But
if
malleablenefs
makes,
not
a
part
of
the
f{pecific
effence
the
name
of
gold
ftands
for,
it
is
plain,
‘‘
all
gold
is
Malleable”?
is
not
a
certain
propofition.
Becaufe
let
thecomplex
idea
of
gold
be
made
up
of
which
foever
of
its
other
qualities
you
pleafe,
malleablenefs
will
not
ap-
pear
to-depend
on
that
complex
idea,
nor
follow
from
any
fimple
one
contained
in
it:
the
connexion
that
Malleablenefs
has
(if
it
has
any)
with
thofe
other
quali-
ties,
being
only
by
the
intervention
of
the
real
conftitu-
tlon.of
its
infenfible
parts
;
which,
fince
we
know
not,
x
is
impoffible
we
fhould
perceive
that.connexion,
un-
lefs.weicould
difcover
that
which
ties
them
together.
.
—
§.10..
The
more;,
indeed,
of
thefe
co-
4
¢
|
‘exifting
qualities
we
unite
into
one
complex
Ea
idea,
under
one
name,
the
more
precife.and
ence
can
be
cterminate,
we
make.
the
fignification.
of
,
known,(o
far
that
word;
but
never
yet
make,it
thereby
es
More
capable
of
univerfal
certainty,
in
Tes
|
sa
ga
:
ALY.
th
nay
be
cere
Ha
of
other
qualities
not
contained
in.our
tain,
But
-
mplex,
idea;
fince
we
perceive
not.
their
a
yon
g
.
onhexion
or
dependence
on
one
another,
ae
gia
’
‘ing
ignorant
both
of
that
real
.conftitu-
gb
*
‘ton
iny
which
they
are
all
founded,
and
alfo
how
they
How
from
it.
For
the
chief
part
of
our
knowledge
con-
1.3
3
cerning
ade.
-
Univerfal
Propofitions,
Book
4
cerning
fubftances
is
not,
as
in
other
things,
barcly
of
the
relation
of
two
ideas
that
may
exift
feparately
;
but
is
of
the
neceffary
connexion
and
co-exiftence
of
feveral
diftinct
ideas
in
the
fame
fubjéct,
or
of
their
repugnancy
fo'to
co-exift..
Could
we
begin
at
the
other
end,
and
difcover
what
it
was,
wherein
that
colour
confifted,
what
made
a
body
lighter
or
heavier,
what
texture
of
parts
made
it
malleable,
fufible,
and
fixed,
and
fit
to
be
dif-
folved
in
this
fort
of
liquor,
and
not
in
another;
if
(i
fay)
we
had
fuch
an
idea
as
this
of
bodics,
and
could
perceive
wherein
all
fenfible
qualities
originally
confift,
and
how
they
are
produced
;
we
might
frame
fuch
ideas
of
them,
as
would
furnifh
us
with
matter
of
more
gene
ral
knowledge,
and
enable
us
to
make
univerfal
propo-
fitions,
that
fhould
carry
general
truth
and
certainty
with
them.
But
whilft
our
complex
ideas
of
the
forts
of
fubftances
are
fo
remote
from
that
internal
real
con-
ftitution,
on
which
their
fenfible
qualities
depend,
and
are
made
up
of
nothing
but
an
imperfect
collection
of
thofe
apparent
qualities
our
fenfes
can
difcover;
there
can
be
few
general
propofitions
concerning
fubftances,
of
whofe
real
truth
we
can
be
certainly
affured:
fince
there
are
but
few
fimple
ideas,
of
whofe
connexion
and
neceffary
co-exiftence
we
can
have
certain
and
undoubt-
ed
SRA
'T
imagine,
amongft
all
the
fecondary
qualities
of
fub{tances,
and
the
powers
relating
to
them,
there
cannot
any
two
be
named,
whofe
neceflary
co-ex-
iftence,
or
repugnance
to
co-exift,
can
certainly
bé
known,
unlefs
in
thofe
of
the
fame
fenfe,
which
necef-
farily
exclude
ane
another,
‘gs
I
have
elfewhere
fhowed-
No
one,
J
think,
by
the
colour
that
is
in
any
body,
can
certainly
know
what
fmell,
tafte,
found,
or
tangible
qualities
it
has,
nor
what
alterations
it
is
capable
to
make
or
receive,
on
or
from
other
badies.
The
fame
-may
be
faid
of
the
found
or
tafte,
&c.°
Our
fpecific
names
of
fubftances
ftanding
for
any
colle@iéns
of
fuch
ideas,
it
is
not
to
be
wondered,
that
we
can
with
them
make
very
few
general
propofitions
of
undoubted
real
certainty.
But
yet
fo
far
as
any
complex
idea,
of
any
fort
of
fubftances,
contains
in
it
any
fimple
idea,
whofe
ncceflary
co-exiftence
with
any
other
may
be
difcovered,
Ch.
6.
their
Truth
and
Certainty.
Igt
fo
far
univerfal
propofitions
may
with
certainty
be
made
-
Concerningit:
v.g.could
any
one
difcover
a
neceflary
con-
Nexion
between
malleablenefs,
and
the
colour
or
weight
of
gold,
or
any
other
part
of
the
complex
idea
fignified
by
that
name,
he
might
make
a
certain
univerfal
pro-
Pofition
concerning
gold
in
this
refpect;
and
the
real
truth
of
this
propofition,
‘
that
all
gold
is
malleable,”’
Would
be
as
certain
as
of
this,
‘*
the
three
angles
of
all
‘
right-lined
triangles
are
all
equal
to
two
right
ones.”’
-§,
11,
Had
we
fuch
ideas
of
fubftances,
Phe
qualities
as
to
know
what
real
conftitutions
produce
—
which
make
thofe
fenfible
qualities
we
find
in
them,
and
out
cannes
ow
thofe
qualitics
flowed
from
thence,
we
Sane
de
could
b
4
id
if
th
.
l
ances,
Ce
,
by
the
fpecific
ideas
of
their
rea)
pend
moftly
efiences
in
qur
own
minds,
more
certainly
on
external,
find
out
their
properties,
and
difcovyer
what
pea
Qualities
they
had
or
had
not,
than
we
can
es
;
caufes.
Now
by
our
fenfes:
and
to
know
the
pro-
-Perties
of
gold,
it
would
be
no
more
neceflary
that
gold
thould
exift,
and
that
we
fhould
make
experiments
upon
it,
than
it
is
neceflary
for
the
knowing
the
properties
of
4
triangle,
that
a
triangle
fhould
exift
in
any
matter;
the
idea
in
our
minds would
ferve
for
the
one
as
well
as
the
other.
But
we
are
fo
far
from
being
admitted
into
the
fecrets
of
nature,
that
we
{carce
fo
much
as
ever
approach
the
firft
entrance
towards
them.
For
we
are
Wont
to
confider
the
fubftances
we
meet
with,
each
of
them
as
an
entire
thing
by
itfelf,
having
all
its
qualities
1)
itfelf,
and
independent
of
other
things
;
aver
anins-
for
the
moft
part;
the
operations
of
thofe
invifible
fluids
they
are
encompaffed
with,
and
ypon
whofe
motions
_
nd
operations
depend
the.
greateft
part
of
thofe
quali-
ties
which
are
taken
notice
of
in
them,
and
are
made
by
Us
the
inherent
marks
of
diftinction
whereby
we
know
and
denominate
them.
Put
a
piece
of
gold
any
where
|
oa
itfelf,
feparate
from
the
reach
and
influence
of
all
other
bodies,
it
will
immediately
lofe
all
its
colour
an
Weight,
and
perhaps
malleablenefs
too;
which,
for
aught
W
now,
would
be
changed
into
a
perfect
friability-
|
ie
in
which
to
us
fluidity
is
an
effential
quality,
‘Sit
to
itfelf,
would
ceafe
to
be
fluid,
But
if
inanimate.
|
|
ie
abet
=
bodies
152
-
Univerfal
Propofitions,
Book
4-
bodies
owe
fo
much
of
their
prefent
ftate
to
other
bodies
Without
them,
that
they
would
not
be
what
they
appear
is
yet’
more
fo
in
vegetables,
which
are
nourithed,
grow,
and
produce:
ledves,
flowers,
and
feeds,
in’a
con-
Htant
fucceffion:
“And
if
we
look
a
littlé
nearer
into
the
ftate
of
animals,
we
fhall
find
that
their
dependence,
8
to
life,
motion,
and
the
moft
confiderable
qualities
to
be
obferved
in
them,
is
fo
wholly
on
extrinfical
caufes
and
qualities
of
other
bodies
that
make
no
part
of
them,
that
they
cannot
fubfitt
a
moment
without
them’:
thoug!
yet
thofe
bodies
‘on
which
they
depend,
are
little
taken
notice
of;
and
make
no
part
of
the
complex
ideas
we
frame’ofithofe
animals.
Take
the
air
but
for
a
minute
from
the
greateft
part
of
living
creatures,
and
they.
pre-
tently
lofe
fenfe,
life,
and
motion.
This
the
neceffity
of
breathing
has
forced
into
our
knowledge.
Bur
how
-many
other
extrinfical,
and
poffibly
very
remote
bodies,
do
the
fprings
of
thefe
admirable
machines
depen
<on,
which
are
not
vulgarly
obferved,
or
fo
much
4s
thought
on;
and
how
many
are
there,
which
the
fevereft
Inquiry
can
never
difcover?
The
inhabitants
of
this
{pot
foie
were
thofe
bodies
that
environ
them
removed+
of
the
univerfe,
though
removed
fo
many
millions
of
“miles
from
the
fun,
yet
depend
fo
much
on
the
duly
‘tempered
motion
of
particles
coming
from,
or
agitate
_
by
it,
that
were
this
earth
removed
but
a
{mall
part
©
the
diftance
out
of
its
prefent
fituation,
arid
placed
2
little
farther
or
nearer
that
fource
of
heat,
it
is
more
than’probable
that
the
greatef{t
part
of
the
animals
in
it
would
immediately
perifh:
fince
we
find
them
fo
often
“deftroyed
by
an
excefs
or
defect
of
the
fun’s
warmth,
—
‘which
an
accidental
pofition,
in
fome
parts
of
this
our
‘little’
globe,
expofes
them
to.
The
qualities
obferved
“ina
loadftone
muft
needs
have
their
fource
far
beyon
the
confines
of
that
body
;
and
the
ravage
made
often
'
on
feveral
forts
of
animals
by
invifible
caufes,
the
cer-
tain
death
(as
we
are
told)
of
fome
of
them,
by
barely
paffing
the
line,
or,
as
it
#s
certain
of
other,
by
being
removed
into
a
neighbouring
country
;
evidently
fhow
that
the
concurrence
and
operations
of
feveral
bodies:
with
which
‘they
are
feldom
thotight
to
“have
any
BIE
-
we
¥
4
t
Ch.
6."
their
Truth
and
Certainty.
.
*
533
to
do,
is
abfolutely
neceffary
to
make
them
abe
“what
they
appear
tous,
and
to
preferve
thofe’
qualities
by
which
we
know
and
diftinguifh
them.
“Weare
then
quite
our
of
the
way,
when
we
think
that
things
contain
|
Within
themfelves
the
qualities
that
appear
to
-us
an
them
and
we
in
vain
fearch
for
that
conftitution
within
the
body
of
-a
fly,
‘or
an
elephant,
upon
which
depend
thofe:
qualities
and
powers'we
obferve
in
them.
For
which
perhaps,
tounderftand
them
ari¢ht,
we
ought
to
look
‘not
only
beyond
this
our
earth
and
atmofphere,
but
even
beyond
the
fun,
or
remoteft
ftar
our
eyes
have
yet
difcovered.
For
how
much
the
being
and
opera-
tion
of
particular
fubftances
in
this
our
globe
depends
On
caufes
utterly
beyond
our
view,
is
impoffible
for
‘us
to
determine.
We
fee
and
perceive
fome
of
the
motions
and
groffer
operations
of
things
here
about
uss
but
-
Whence
the
ftreams
come
that
keep
all
thefe
curious
ma-
Chines
in
motion
and
repair,
how
conveyed
and
modi-
fied,
is
beyond
our
notice
and
apprehenfion
:
and
the
Sreat
parts
and
wheels,
as
I
may
fo
fay,
of
this
ftupen+
ous
ftrucure
of
the
univerfe,
may,
for
aught
we
know,
ave
fuch
a
connexion
and
dependence
‘in’
their’
influ-
€nces
and
operations
one
upon
another,
that
perhaps
things
in
this
our
manfion
would
put
on
quite
another
face,
and
ceafe
to
be
what
they
are,
if
fome
one
of
the
frars
or
great
bodies,
incomprehenfibly
remote
from-us,
ould
ceafe
to
be
or
move
as
it
does.
This‘is
certain,
things
however
abfolute
and
entire
they
feem
in
them-
fives,
are
but
retainers
to
other
parts
of
nature,
forthat
Which
they
are
moft
taken
notice
of
by
us.
Their
ob-~
7&tvable
qualities,
actions,
and
powers,
are
owing’
to
fomething
without
them;
and
there
is
not
fo
complete
and
perfect
a
part
that
we
know
of
nature,
which
does
Not
owe'the
being
it
has,
and
the
excellencies
of
it,
to
Its
‘neighbours;
and
we
muft
not
confine
our
thoughts
Within
the
furface
of
any
body,
but
look
a
great
deal
Hera
to
comprehend
perfectly
thofe
qualities
that/are
At.
,
eiateh.
~
§0
42,
If
this
‘be
fo,
it
is
not’
to
be
wondered,
that
cae
have
very
imperfect
ideas
of
fubftances;
and
that
the
real
effences,
on
which
depend
their
properties
and
.
)
“TS4
Univerfal.
Propofitionsy
Bog
4
operations
are
unknown
to
us...
We’
cannot.difcover
{0
much
as
that
fize,
figure,
and
texture
of
their
minute
—
and
active
parts,
which
is
really
in
them;
much
les
—
the
different
motions
and
impulfes
made
in
and
upon
them
by,
bodies
from
without,
upon
which
depends,
and
by
which
is
formed,
the
greateft
and
moft
remarkable
part
éf
thofe
qualities
we
obferve
in
them,
and-of
which
.
our
complex
ideas
of
them
are
made
up,
This
confi-
deration
alone
is
enough
to
put
an
end
to
all
our
hopes
of
ever
having
the
ideas
of
their
real.
effences
;-
which
whilft-we
want,
the
nominal
effences
we
make
ufe
of
in-
{tead
of
them
will
be
able
to
furnifh
us
but
very
fpa-
singly
with
any
general
knowledge,
or
univerfal
propo-
fitions
capable
of
real
certainty.
. |
yoaguent
»
$13.
We
are
not
therefore
to
wonders
may
reach
if
Certainty
be
to
be
found
in
very
few
ge-
farther,
but...
neral
propofitions.
made.
cancerning
fub-
ha
6
Hot.
ftances:
our,
knowledge
of
their
qualities
owledge.
‘
ve
>
sand
properties
goes
very
feldom
farther
than
our
fenfes.reach
and
inform
us.
Poffibly
inquifitives
and
obferving
men
may,
by
ftrength
of
judgment,
pe-
nétrate,
farther,
and
on
probabilities
taken
from
wary
-obfervation;
and
hints
well
laid
together,
often
guels
right
at
what
experience
has
not
yet
difcovered
to
them
“But
thisis
but
gueffing
ftill;
it
amounts
only
to
opi-
nion,
and:
has
not
that
certainty
which
is
requifite
tO
knowledge.
For
all
general
knowledge
lics
only
in
ov!
own
thoughts,
and
confifts
barely
in
the
contemplation
of
our
own
abjftract
ideas.
Wherever
we
perceive
any
agreement
or
difagreement
amoneft
them,
there
we
havé
general
knowledge;
and,
by
putting
the
names
of
thof¢
ideas
together:
accordingly.
in
propofitions,
can
with
.certainty
pronounce.
general
truths...
But
becayfe
the
abftract
ideas
of
fubftances,
for
which
their
fpecific
names
‘ftand,
whenever
they
have
any
diftinét
and
detef-
minate
fignification,
have
a
difcoverable
connexion
oF
inconfiftency
with
but
avery
few
other
ideas;
the
cef-
tainty
of
univerfal
propofitions
concerning
fubftances
}§
)véry
narrow
and
fcanty
in
that
part,
which
is
our
prif-
cipal
inquiry
concerning
them:
and
there
are
fcarc¢
_
any
of
the
names
of
fubftances,
.let
the
idea
i,
is
applic’
te
Ch.
6.
their
Truth-and»
Certainty.
155
to
be
what
it
will,
of
which
we
can-generally
and
with
certainty
pronounce,
that
it
has
or
has
not
this
or
that
other
quality
belonging
to
it,
and
conftantly
co-exifting
or
inconfiftent
with
that
idea,
wherever
it
is
to
be
found.
§..14.
Before
we
can
have
any
tolerable
what
is
re.
Snowledge
of
this
kind,
we
muft
firft
—
quifite
for
that
changes
the
primary
qualities
of
one
our
know-
body.
do
antes
vente
in
the
primary
eee:
Qualities
of
another,
and
how.
Secondly,
~~
We
mutt
know
what
primary
qualities
of
any
body
pro-
duce
certain
fenfations
or
ideas
in
us.
This
is
in
truth
ho
lefs
than
to
know
all
the
effects
of
matter,
under
its
ivers
modifications
of
bulk,
figure,
cohefion
of
parts,
Motion
and
reft.
Which,
I
think
every
body
will
allow,
S
utterly
impoffible
to
be
known
by
us
without
revela-
tion.
Nor
if
it
were
revealed
to
us,
what
fort
of
figure,
ulk,
and
motion
of
corpufcles,
would
produce
in
us
the
fenfation
of
a
yellow
colour,
and
what
fort
of
figure,
ulk,
and
texture
of
parts,
in
the
fuperficies
of
any
Ys
were
fit
to
give
fuch
corpufcles
their
due
motion,
'0
produce
that
colour;
would
that
be
enough
to
make
Uiverfal
propofitions
with
certainty,
concerning
the
feveral
forts
of
them,
unlefs
we
had
faculties
acute
‘ough
to
perceive
the
precife
bulk,
figure,
texture,
4nd
motian
of
bodies
in
thofe
minute
parts,
by
which
cy
operate
on
our
fenfes,
fo
that
we
might
by
thofe
rame
our
abftract
ideas
of
them.
I
have
mentioned
cre
only
corporeal
fubftances,
whofe
operations
feem
'0
lie
more
level
to
our
underftandings:
for
as
to
the
°Perations
of
f{pirits,
both
their
thinking
and
moving
bodies,
we
at
firft
fight
find
ourfelves
at
a
lofs
;
though
perhaps,
when
we
have
applied
our
thoughts
a
little
nearer
to
the
confideration
of
bodies,
and
their
Perations,
and
examined
how
far
our
notions,
even
1n
hefe,
reach,
with
any
clearnefs,
beyond
fenfible
matter
l
fad,
we
thall
be
bound
to
confefs,
that
even
in
thefe
C00
our
difcoveries
amount
to
very
little
beyond
perfect
‘SNorance
and
incapacity.
ip
Bed
-
15.
This
is
evident,
the
abftract
com-
Whilft
ym
Plex
ideas
of
fub{tances,
for
which
their
ge-
rete
a
ral
names
ftand,
not
comprehending
their
-
rea
156
Univerfal
Propofitions,
©
Book
4
tip
fol
tdi
‘real
conftitutions,
can
afford
us
very
little
real
confitu-'’
wniverfali
certainty.
Becaufe
our
ideas
°
tiens,wecan
them
are
not
made
up
of
that,
on
which
makebutfew.
:
shofe
qualities’
we
obferve
in
themy
a?
Bente
cae
q
obferve
in
them,
tain
propo.
would
inform
ourfelves
about,
do
depen
tionscons
or
With
which
they.-have
any
certain
cop-
fen.
Bexion:
v..gs
det
the
ideas.
to:
which
We
~*~
give
the
nameiman,
be,
as‘it
commonly
15
a
body
of
the
ordinary
fhape,
with
fenfe,
voluntary
m0-
«ion,
and
reafon
joined
to
it.
This
being
the
abftra
idea,
andiconfequently
the
effence
of
our
{pecies
ma”
we'can
make*but
very
few
generalicertain
propofitio®
«oncerning
‘man,
ftanding
for
fuch
an
idea.
Becaulé
not
knowing
the
real
conftitution
on
which
fenfatio™
power
of
motion,
and/reafoning,
with
that
peculias
dhape,
depend,
and
whereby
they
are
united
together
8
the
fame
fubject,
there
are
very.
few
other
qualities:
with
which
we
can
perceive
them
to
have
a_neceflaty
‘connexion:
and
therefore
we
cannot’with
certainty
4°
‘firm,
‘thatall
men
fleep
by
intervals;
that
no
man
¢48
be
nourifhed
by
wood
or
ftones;
that
all
men
will
b¢
spoifoned
‘by
hemlock:
‘becaufe
thefe
ideas
have
no
co?
mexion°nor
‘repugnancy
with
this
our
nominal
eflen
‘of
‘man,
owith
this
abftract
idea
that.
name
ftands
for
‘We
muft,
in
*thefe
and
the
like,
appeal
to
trial
in
pa!
ticular
fubjedts,
which
can.reach
butva
little
way.
We
‘muft-content
ourfelves
with
‘probability
in
the
reft;
bu!
‘can
haveno
general
certainty,
whilftour-fpecific
i
‘of
man
contains
notthav
real
conftitution,
«which
is
th¢
root,
wherein
all
his
infeparable
qualities
are
unites
-and
from
whence
they
flow.
‘Whilft
oursidea,
the
w0
smamftands
for,
is
only-an
imperfe@
colledion
of
fom?
ifenfiblesqualities
and
powers
in
him,
there
isino
dil
‘¢ernible*¢onnexion
orrepugnance
bet
wéen
our
fpeci
C
‘jdea,
and
the
operation
of
either
the
parts.
of
hemlo¢
»or
tones,
‘upon
his
conftitution.
©
There
are
anima
ithat
ately
eat
“hemlock,
“and
others
that
are
nourifhe
by
wood
and
ftones:
but
as
long
as
we
want
ideas
©
thofe
‘real
conftitutions
of
different
forts
of
animal’
“wherein.
thefe
and
thelike
qualities
and
powers
depen’
we
muft
not:
hope
to
reach
certainty
in
suniverfal
pre"
2
pofition®
Ch.
pais
Maxims.
157
Pofitions
concerning
them:
Thofe
few
.
ideas,,only,
Which
havea
difcernible
connexion
with
our;nominal
tHence,
or
any
part
of
it,
can’
afford
us,
fuch
propoli-
tions.
But
thefe
are
fo
few,
and
of
fo
little,
moment,
that
we,
may
juftly-look
on:
our
certain
general
knowe
ledge-of
fubftantes)
as
almioft
none
atall.
9}
ton
8
§.16.
‘To-conclude,
general
propofitions,
,
Wherein
Ties
of
what
kind
foever,
are
then
only
capable
«the
general
of
certainty,
when
the
terms-ufed
in
them.
cerrainle
A
and
for
fuch
ideas,
whofe
agreement,
of
B
iteat
Ors
difagreement,
-as
there
exprefied,'
is
capable
to
be
dif
Covered
by
us.
(And
we
are
then
certain
of
their
truth
or
falfhood,
when
we
perceive
the
ideas
the
terms
ftand
OF
to
agree
or
not.agree,
according.
as
they
are
affirmed
Or
denied
one.
of
another.
.
Whence
we
may,
take
notice,
that:
general
certainty
is
neyer
to,
be
found
but,19
,our
ideas).
Whenever
we
go
to:feck
it
elfewhere,an
experl-
Ment,
‘or
obfervations
without
us,
our
knowledge
goes
Not
beyond
particulars.
‘It,is
the
contemplation
of
our
own
abftract
ideas
that
alone
is
able
to
afford
us
general
ROB
ede
sito
ay
air
cr
TOS
OT?
te,
Loon
Th
pyrt
.
r
;*
shes
ssi
tien
TES
eR
DO
*
Of
Maxims.
a3
ease
«
"
ii
.
1,
PIAHERE
are
a
fort
of
propofitions,
aie
a
-)
di
which
under
the
name.of
maxims
—
feif-evident-
8nd:
axioms”
have
pafled.
for,
principles
of...
ert
“lence;
and
becaufe
they,
are
felf-evident,
|
have
been
YPpofed
innate,
although
no-body
(that
|
know)
ever
Went
about
to
fhow
the
réafon
and
foundation
of
their”
c
farnefs
or
cogency.
It
may
however
be
worth
while
ms
Mquire
into
the
reafon
of
‘their
evidence,
and
fee
ether
it
be
peculiar
to
them
alone,
and
alfo
examine
“Ow
'far
they
influence
and
govern
our
other
knowledge-
ee
Knowledge,
as
has
been
fhown,
|
Whereinthat
SOnfifts:in
the
perception
of
the
agreement
_felf-evidence
’
ay
¥
nits.
t
idifégreement
of
ideas:
now
where
thdt.,
tem:
oa
agrec-
is
|
|
Maxims.
Book
4/
‘agreement
or
difagreement
is
perceived
immediately
by
itfelf,
without
the
intervention
or
help
of
any
others
_
there
our
knowledge
is
felf-evident...
This
will
appeat
to
be
fo
to
any
one,
who
will
but
confidet
any
of
thol¢
Le
A
AC
i
any
proof,
‘he
affents
to
a
irft
fight:
for
in
all
of
thett
he
will
find,
that
the
reafon
of
his
affent’is
from
that
agreement
‘or
difagreemen’
which
the
mind,
by
an
immediate
comparing
them
finds
in
thofe
ideas
anfwering
the
affirmation
or
neg?”
tion
in
the
propofition.
‘eno
|
Sih
Selfevidence
§.
3.
This
being
fos
ia
the:
next
place
not
peculiar
‘let
us
confider,
whether/this
felf-evidenC
toreceived
be
peculiar
only
to
thofe:propofitions,
whic
aXlOMS.
'
é
ig
?
:
;
si
:
commonly
pafs
under
the
name
of
maxim
and
have
the
dignity
of
axioms
allowed
them.
And
her
it
is
plain,
that
feveral
other
truths;:
not
allowed
to
be
axioms,
partake
equally
with
them
in
this
felf-evidenc™.
This
we
fhall
fee,
if
we
go
over
thefe
feverab
forts
agreement
or
difagreement
of
ideas,
which
I
have
abov
mentioned,
viz.
identity,
relation,
co-exiftence,
and
ree
exiftence;
which
will
difcover
to
us,
that
not
only
tho”
few
propofitions,
which
have
had
the
credit
of
maxim®
are
felf-evident,
but
a
great
many,-
even-almoft-an
ini’
-
nite
number
of
other
propofitions
are
fuch.
ek
1.Astoiden.
9:
4»
For,
firftthe
immediate
petceptiO”
tity
and
di-
of
the
agreement
or
difagreement
of
iden
verfity,
all
tity,
being’
founded
in
the
mind’s
havid§
esis
diftinet
ideas,
this
affords
us
as
many
felf-
felf-evident,
€Vident propofitions,
as
we
have
diftin
ideas.
Every
one
that
has
any
knowledge
all,
has,
as
the
foundation
of
it,
various
and
‘diftine
ideas:
and
it
is
the
firft
a&
of
the
mind
(without
whick
it
can
never
‘be
capable
of
any
knowledge)
to
knoW
~
every
one
of,
its
ideas
by
itfelf,
and
diftinguifh
it
from
others.
Every
one
finds
in
himfelf,
that
he
knows
the
ideas
he
has;
that
he
knows
alfo,
when
any
one
is
1
his
underftanding,
and
what
it
is;
and
that
when
mor
than
one
are
there,
he
knows
them
diftinétly
and
ul
confufedly
one
from
another.
“Which
always
being
!°
(it
being
impoffible
but
that
he
thould
perceive
wh?
he
perceives)
he
can
never
be
in
doubt
when
any
ay
[Document text truncated for crawler view.]