Socratic Dialogue as a Way Toward Wonder and Aletheia in Qualitative Research and Action Research

HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 SOCRATIC DIALOGUE AS A WAY TOWARD WONDER AND ALETHEIA IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH AND ACTION RESEARCH EL DIÁLOGO SOCRÁTICO COMO CAMINO HACIA LA ADMIRACIÓN Y LA ALETHEIA DENTRO DE UNA INVESTIGACIÓN-ACCIÓN CUALITATIVA CHRISTINE SORRELL DINKINS Wofford College, Estados Unidos [email protected]du FINN THORBJØRN HANSEN Aalborg University, Dinamarca [email protected] RECIBIDO: 2 DE JULIO DE 2015 ACEPTADO: 23 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 2015 Abstract: In qualitative and action research, through Socratic dialogue, the researcher can help participants past a cognitive approach to the phenomenon, into a community of wonder (thaumazein), past observation of lived experience to foreboding and finally to openness. This openness serves as a ground for truth (aletheia). Researchers who try the Socratic approach may find it rewarding in the journey and in the research produced. Keywords: Socratic, Dialogue, Hermeneutic, Phenomenology, Qualitative Research, Action Research. Resumen: En la investigación-acción de carácter cualitativo el investigador puede, por medio del diálogo socrático, ayudar a los participantes a transitar desde un acercamiento cognitivo a uno fenomenológico si se ubican en el seno de una comunidad de admiración (thaumazein), desde observación de las experiencias de vida a la intuición y al estado de apertura. Esta apertura es la base de la verdad (aletheia). Los investigadores que usen el enfoque socrático encontrarán recompensas tanto en su trabajo como en los resultados de sus indagaciones. Palabras clave: diálogo socrático, hermenéutica, fenomenología, investigación cualitativa, investigación-acción. CHRISTINE SORRELL DIKINS – FINN THORBJØRN HANSEN HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 52 Introduction While qualitative and action research will always vary somewhat in goals, methods, and outcomes, in both kinds of research dialogue between the researcher and participant can be a key part of the research process. Through dialogue, both the researcher and the participants – or co-inquirers – can come together in wonder, opening themselves up to better allow the phenomena under study to reveal themselves. Following up on earlier works on Socratic dialogue in philosophical practice 1 , and after years of working with 1 DINKINS, Christine Sorrell: "Shared Inquiry: Socratic-Hermeneutic Interpreviewing", in: IRONSIDE, Pamela (ed.): Beyond Method: Philosophical Conversations in Healthcare and Scholarship, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2005, pp. 111-147; DINKINS, Christine Sorrell and SORRELL, Jeanne: Our Dissertations, Ourselves: Shared Stories of Women's Dissertation Journeys, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014; SORRELL, Jeanne, CANGELOSI, Pamela and DINKINS, Christine Sorrell: "Dialog on a Country Path: The Qualitative Research Journey", in Nurse Education Today, vol. 34, Philadelphia, PA (USA), 2014, pp. 295-298; HANSEN, HANSEN;Finn Thorbjørn: Den sokratiske dialoggruppe [The Socratic Dialogue Group], Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 2000; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: Det filosofiske liv [The Philosophical Life], Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 2002; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: At stå i det åbne: Dannelse gennem filosofisk undren og nærvær [To Stand in the Openness: Bildung through Philosophical Wonder and Presence], Aalborg University Press, Aalborg, 2008; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: "One Step Further: The Dance Between Poetic Dwelling and Socratic Wonder in Phenomenological Research", in GALVIN, Kathleen (ed.): Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (Special Edition), New York, 2012, pp. 1-20; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: Kan man undre sig uden ord?: Design- og universitetspædagogogik på kreative videregående uddannelser [Can We Wonder without Words? Design and University Pedagogic in Creative Higher Education], Aalborg University Press, Aalborg, 2014; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: "Det sokratiske forskningsinterview [The Socratic Research Interview]", in MUNK, Karen (ed.): Metodefetichisme, kvalitative metode på afveje - ophav, kritik, nye perspektiver, Aarhus University Press, Aarhus, 2015; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: "The Call and Practice of Wonder: How to Evoke a Socratic Community of Wonder in Professional Settings", in WEISS, Michael Noah (ed.): The Socratic SOCRATIC DIALOGUE AS A WAY TOWARD WONDER AND ALETHEIA HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 53 Socratic dialogue in the contexts of qualitative and action research, the authors have observed a consistent pattern of unfolding and opening in these dialogues. Through Socratic dialogue, the researcher helps participants through and past a cognitive approach to the phenomenon, leading to a point of being stuck or puzzled (aporia). Faced with aporia and encouraged to continue reflecting, the participant and the researcher enter together into a community of wonder (thaumazein), moving past mere observation and perception of lived experience to a sense of foreboding (“What is the phenomenon? Why is it hard to grasp? What in the phenomenon seems to call to me?”) and finally to openness. This openness is the comportment necessary for what Heidegger calls the “clearing” or “event” 2 . This openness allows the researcher and participant to serve as a ground for aletheia, allowing the phenomenon to reveal itself. While the authors’ earlier works have focused on aspects of aporia and thaumazein, this article will focus especially on the movement from wonder to foreboding to the open comportment necessary for aletheia. Socrates’ Goals and Method in Plato’s Works Since phenomenological researchers have a variety of established modes of questioning available to them, let us first examine the benefits specifically of Socratic dialogue, or Socratic shared inquiry. Heidegger asserts that in the search for truth, “the wonder Handbook, LIT Verlag, Vienna, 2015; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: "The Philosophical Practitioner as a Co-Researcher", in AMIR, Lydia and FATIC, Aleksandar (eds.): Practicing Philosophy, Cambridge Scholars Press, Cambridge, 2015. 2 HEIDEGGER, Martin: Poetry, Language, Thought, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1975; HEIDEGGER, Martin: Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2012. CHRISTINE SORRELL DIKINS – FINN THORBJØRN HANSEN HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 54 of questioning must be experienced in carrying it out and must be made effective as an awakening and strengthening of the power to question.” 3 Likewise Gadamer, in discussing phenomenological hermeneutic methods, argues, “only the person who knows how to ask questions is able to persist in his questioning, which involves being able to preserve his orientation toward openness. The art of questioning is the art of questioning ever further.” 4 Here, Gadamer’s language points to an advantage in a questioning style that allows for follow-up questions, for digging deeper into an inquiry, moving the inquiry toward openness. Gadamer goes on to say, “the hermeneutic phenomenon… implies the primacy of dialogue.” 5 Dialogue, unlike some sorts of questioning, implies a back-and-forth, a give-and-take. For a conversation or an interview to be a dialogue, the researcher must listen, respond, project an idea forward, listen, and continue this way in a reciprocal process. The Socratic researcher must listen for concepts or ideas that seem to resonate with a “living meaning” as opposed to “the dead trace of meaning.” 6 The researcher can be helped in these goals by having a sort of phenomenological “musicality” 7 for the voice of the subject matter itself (die Sache selbst). If such dialogue is the goal, the ancient expert of philosophical dialogue, Socrates, can still be very relevant for researchers today. Socrates as he appears in Plato’s dialogues is not just a model philosopher but a model philosophical practitioner. Unlike his 3 HEIDEGGER, Martin: Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2012, p. 10 4 GADAMER, Hans-Georg: Truth and Method, Sheed and Ward Ltd., London, 1989, p. 367 5 Ibid, p. 369 6 Ibid, pp. 167 and 164 7 HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: “One Step Further: The Dance Between Poetic Dwelling and Socratic Wonder in Phenomenological Research”, in GALVIN, Kathleen (ed.): Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (Special Edition), New York, 2012, pp. 1-20. SOCRATIC DIALOGUE AS A WAY TOWARD WONDER AND ALETHEIA HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 55 predecessors and the majority of philosophers who came after him, Socrates was no theoretician or arm-chair philosopher, and he did not merely apply his philosophical theories to larger issues. He insisted on practicing his philosophy as a communal activity. 8 In Plato’s Apology, when Socrates is on trial for corrupting the youth, given the option of accepting exile as his sentence, he refuses, saying it would do him no good since then he would be among strangers who would not talk with him, so he would be unable to practice philosophy. 9 Throughout Plato’s dialogues, we see Socrates pursuing philosophical inquiry through friendly, caring conversations with partners or a group. In fact, it is reasonably clear that Socrates was put to death not primarily for his views or for any sacrilege, but because he would not stop engaging in inquiry with the youth and encouraging them to pursue their own questions. Fortunately for modern researchers, Plato’s dialogues provide rich illustrations of Socrates’ mode of inquiry. While this method is not entirely consistent across all the dialogues, certain techniques and principles appear again and again, and these techniques and principles can serve as guides for modern researchers. Socrates tends to start an inquiry by asking for a definition. In the Meno, when Meno abruptly asks Socrates whether or not virtue is teachable, Socrates insists, “I am so far from knowing whether virtue can be taught or not that I do not even have knowledge of what virtue itself is.” 10 In other dialogues, when a friend or person of importance seems to be taking a significant action, Socrates begins an inquiry by asking the person to define the virtue relevant 8 PLATO: Apology, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 29d 9 Ibid, pp. 37c-38a 10 PLATO: Meno, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 71a CHRISTINE SORRELL DIKINS – FINN THORBJØRN HANSEN HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 56 to the situation. 11 Starting with a definition allows both partners in the dialogue to have a foundation to examine, reflect on, and question as they explore their own ideas about the phenomenon under study. To help an inquiry along, Socrates often uses an analogy to help his co-inquirer think through their own ideas and statements. When Euthyphro defines piety as a matter of service to the gods, Socrates asks about shipbuilders and generals to clarify what sort of service Euthyphro means. 12 In a similar way, Socrates uses examples to test out and explore a co-inquirer’s statements. When Menexenus has claimed that two people can be friends when only one of them loves the other, Socrates presents a test example of a man who is hated by his beloved. Reflecting on this example, Menexenus finds that he wants to question his earlier claim, realizing now that neither person in such a case can be called a friend. 13 A typical Socratic dialogue proceeds somewhat along the following pattern: 1. A friend asks Socrates a question or Socrates sees someone performing a significant or questionable act. 2. Socrates asks the person for a definition of the relevant virtue, thus beginning with his dialogue partner a shared inquiry into the nature of that virtue. 3. The co-inquirer offers a definition. 4. Using analogies, examples, and follow-up questions, Socrates prods the co-inquirer to help the co-inquirer find 11 E.g., PLATO: Euthyphro, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 4c-d 12 PLATO: Euthyphro, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, pp. 13e-14a 13 PLATO: Lysis, in REEVE, C.D.C (ed.): Plato on Love: Lysis, Symposium, Phaedrus, Alcibiades, with Selections from Republic and Laws, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2006, p. 212b-c SOCRATIC DIALOGUE AS A WAY TOWARD WONDER AND ALETHEIA HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 57 conflicts in his beliefs or other revelations that make him doubt his definition. 5. The process of #4 leads the co-inquirer to revise or reject his definition of the virtue. 6. Socrates encourages the co-inquirer to try another definition. Steps 3-5 repeat. 7. The dialogue ends, usually with little resolution. A proper definition has not been found, and Socrates and his coinquirer are left to ponder further. Underlying these techniques and patterns, and just as important to his method, are certain principles Socrates seems to hold dear. He considers the inquiry to be a shared inquiry. While he maintains a Socratic veil and rarely shares his own opinion outright, he does participate actively in the dialogue, allowing his own expectations to guide his questioning as he and his partner explore the partner’s beliefs about the phenomenon. Socrates sees this inquiry as a process that guides his partners to “discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things, which they bring forth into the light.” 14 Socrates frequently and explicitly insists that his co-inquirers say what they actually believe, rather than saying the popular view or what they have heard from experts or what they think Socrates wants them to say. Socrates asks Crito, “try to answer what I ask you in the way you think best.” 15 Theaetetus raises this issue explicitly when he says, “if I answer what seems true in relation to the present question, I shall say ‘no, it is not possible;’ but if I consider it in relation to the question that went before, then in order to avoid contradicting myself, I say ‘Yes, it is.’” Socrates asserts that Theaetetus must say what he believes, not just what will allow 14 PLATO: Theaetetus, LEVETT, M.J. and BURNYEAT Miles (trans.), Hackett, Indianapolis, 1990, p. 150d 15 PLATO: Crito, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 49a CHRISTINE SORRELL DIKINS – FINN THORBJØRN HANSEN HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 58 him to avoid contradiction: “if you answer ‘Yes,’… the tongue will be safe from refutation but the mind will not.” 16 Socrates says that he is a midwife like his mother, except that he is a midwife of ideas. Midwives in Ancient Greece helped deliver babies and also were trusted match-makers. For Socrates, this midwife role involves helping his co-inquirer connect (match up) beliefs and ideas, looking to see which ones yield “phantoms” or “fertile truths.” 17 Socrates seems to rely on a connectedness among his partner’s beliefs and an instinct from the partner of which ideas are closer to the truth. Thus, if Socrates can identify a conflict between beliefs, he can press his co-inquirer to choose one over the other – which seems more right? The most dramatic example of this cross-comparison happens when Euthyphro describes care of the gods as giving them what they need. Socrates asks, do we care for the gods in a way that is supposed to make them better? Euthyphro, a good priest, responds “by Zeus, no!” 18 Socrates explains this connecting-and-comparing process in the Theaetetus: “Our first aim will be to look at our thoughts themselves in relation to themselves, and see what they are – whether, in our opinion, they agree with one another or are entirely at variance.” 19 In that same work, Socrates asserts that midwives are “marvelously knowing about the kind of couples whose marriage will produce the best children.” 20 He seems here to suggest that he is an expert in helping his dialogue partners find which ideas to compare to think more deeply and reflect more 16 PLATO: Theaetetus, LEVETT, M.J. and BURNYEAT Miles (trans.), Hackett, Indianapolis, 1990, p. 154d 17 Ibid, p. 150c 18 PLATO: Euthyphro, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 13c 19 PLATO: Theaetetus, LEVETT, M.J. and BURNYEAT Miles (trans.), Hackett, Indianapolis, 1990, p. 154e 20 Ibid, p. 149d SOCRATIC DIALOGUE AS A WAY TOWARD WONDER AND ALETHEIA HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 59 critically on their beliefs about a given phenomenon. This process has no set goal, no assumed outcome, beyond a search for, and love of, wisdom and truth. And with that love of wisdom comes “doric harmony: between logos and ergon. 21 As Socrates describes this beautiful process, “the lover of inquiry must follow his beloved wherever it may lead him.” 22 Together, Socrates and his co-inquirer can check each other’s assumptions and help each other follow genuinely “the beloved” (the call of the inquiry or the phenomenon itself). The process may be largely negative – discovering false assumptions, realizing that perceived aspects of the phenomenon might not be accurate – right up to the end of a dialogue, when almost always the dialogue partner expresses frustration at not having found a definition. The partner, and the dialogue as a whole, are left in aporia. They are stuck, struck dumb by realization of how little they know that they thought they knew. But throughout the dialogues, it is abundantly clear that this aporia is a positive force. The aporia gets interlocutors past the illusion that they know what they do not know. After all, Socrates is the wisest man in Greece not because he knows so much, but because more than anyone else, he knows how little he knows. 23 For some interlocutors, aporia may be where their inquiry ends. Frustrated, they know they do not know, but cannot or will not proceed past that point. For others – those who love wisdom, those who seek truth – aporia creates a sense of wonder, or thaumazein. Famously, in the Theaetetus, Socrates says, “For this is an experience which is characteristic of a philosopher, this 21 PLATO: Laches, in SPRAGUE, Rosamond Kent (trans.): Laches and Charmides, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1992, p. 188d 22 PLATO: Euthyphro, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 14b 23 PLATO: Apology, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 23b CHRISTINE SORRELL DIKINS – FINN THORBJØRN HANSEN HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 66 Heidegger calls “the critical regress from correctness to openness.” 35 Having moved beyond the merely cognitive, this wonder and awareness of mystery allow participants to focus on their lived experience of and with the phenomenon. How has it actually appeared and been experienced, beyond what we think it is supposed to be? This phase of the qualitative interview, or of the “Wonder Lab” in the action research process, asks participants to relate to the phenomenon in an experiential, existential, even ontological way. What is it to be-with the phenomenon? To be-in- the-world in relation to the phenomenon? Participants are helped to articulate what they have witnessed and experienced, with many of their presuppositions and opinions now cleared away. In focusing on their lived experience, they come closer to their immediate connection with the phenomenon. While lived experience is the focus or even the goal of much qualitative research in current practice, lived experience alone raises concerns about what it does or does not reveal about the phenomenon. Brinkmann 36 argues that limited questioning designed to elicit descriptions of lived experience lets the researcher learn more about the participant than about the phenomenon; he calls these interviews “doxastic,” stating that they reveal primarily the participants’ impressions or opinions about the phenomenon 37 . Van Manen 38 also discusses the limitations of a 35 HEIDEGGER, Martin: Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2012, p. 261 36 BRINKMANN, Svend: “Could Interviews Be Epistemic? An Alternative to Qualitative Opinion Polling”, in Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 13, No. 8 (December), Los Angeles, 2007, pp. 1116-1138. 37 Brinkmann instead suggests that we must go from doxastic intervieweing to ‘epistemic interviewing’, and Brinkmann connects the Socratic dialogue and maeiutics as a model for this epistemic interviewing in qualitative research in order to produce better scientific knowledge. But Hansen (2015a, 2015b) critically discusses this suggestion by Brinkmann and argues for a Socratic SOCRATIC DIALOGUE AS A WAY TOWARD WONDER AND ALETHEIA HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 67 focus on lived experience. Experience, he says, is immediate and elusive; complex enough that it is difficult for any description to capture its essence. Heidegger also explores the limitations of lived experience. In The Origin of the Work of Art, his concerns about experience of art can alert us to concerns about focus on experience overall. He argues, “The way in which man experiences art is supposed to give information about its nature. Experience is the source that is standard … for art appreciation…Everything is an experience. Yet perhaps experience is the element in which art dies.” 39 Heidegger is concerned that by focusing on experience, we Enframe the work of art, filtering and predetermining how it should appear to us. We force it to appear before us, to appear for us. Generalizing from Heidegger’s concerns here about understanding art merely through experience, we can see that focus on lived experience leads participants to ask, “what does the phenomenon mean to me? How does it appear to me?” Focus on lived experience is a very useful step in grasping our direct connections with the phenomenon and beginning to articulate our experiences of the phenomenon. Limiting ourselves to lived experience, however, does an injustice to the phenomenon and fails to lay the groundwork for the process of aletheia. Heidegger voices similar concerns about lived experience in Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event). In that work, he finds that “lived experience promotes and entrenches the anthropological interviewing that goes from doxa over episteme to thaumazein as it is in fact not knowledge, but this special kind of ontological not-knowing; a phenomenological, silent and wondrous seeing into the heart of things that may be the overall purpose of the Socratic maeiutics. 38 VAN MANEN, Max: Researching lived experience: Human science for an action sensitive pedagogy, SUNY, New York, 1997. 39 HEIDEGGER, Martin: Poetry, Language, Thought, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1975, p. 79 CHRISTINE SORRELL DIKINS – FINN THORBJØRN HANSEN HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 68 way of thinking.” 40 He sees the focus on lived experience as linked to machination and our obsessive need to explain (and thereby control) everything, while beyng and truth abandon us. 41 Heidegger thus urges us to reach beyond this anthropocentric view to that which withdraws from us. To put this same idea in Socratic terms, the concern seems to be that even in focusing on lived experience, there is still an illusion of knowing, a blocking out of the notknowing, of the phenomenon and truth that withdraw from us even as we try to grasp them. Of course, in any phenomenological inquiry, we are always examining the phenomenon through experience, because experience is all we have; experience is reality. Nevertheless, addressing the concerns voiced above, we do not have to put ourselves at the center of that experiential truth. A philosophical practitioner can help a research participant move to a more reflective critical mode, looking from outside at this lived experience. The practitioner first can encourage the participants to ‘unfreeze’ the frozen concepts, assumptions, or intuitions which the participant has used to describe this lived experience or which seem to be taken for granted in the description. Next this Socratic practitioner can join the participants in trying to think from within or towards that which seems to emerge when the frozen concepts are opened up and the phenomenon becomes more free to ‘speak back’ in its own voice. To get into a resonance or dialogue with that ‘voice’, the researcher and participants in the dialogue have to move into a more contemplative, wondrous and listening kind of attuned thinking (which the Greeks called the movement of theoria). This critical reflection and wondrous thinking may parallel the journey out of Plato’s cave, a journey researcher and participant make together. 40 HEIDEGGER, Martin: Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2012, p. 104 41 Ibid, pp. 103-104 SOCRATIC DIALOGUE AS A WAY TOWARD WONDER AND ALETHEIA HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 69 Awareness of the limits of lived experience, as this seeming knowing is revealed to be a new stage of not-knowing, can help bring on an uneasiness, a restlessness or anxiety, like what Heidegger calls the foreboding: “In the first beginning: wonder. In the other beginning: foreboding.” 42 Many if not all researchers have experienced this foreboding, even if they have not labelled it in this way. It can be that spine-tingling or eerie sense that something beyond us speaks to us even as it withdraws. Heidegger says it is the “basic disposition” needed for aletheia; a disposition without which “everything is a forced clatter of concepts and of the mere shells of words.” 43 Heidegger says the term “foreboding” will not always capture this disposition, which might also be called “shock” or “restraint.” In whatever form it takes, it is the “sheltering of the unconcealment of the concealed”, 44 i.e. it is the ground for aletheia. In Socratic interviewing and the action-in-the-field done by the ‘Wonder Lab’ of Socratic action research (see later), as the researcher guides participants past the cognitive and any “clatter of concepts” or “mere shells of words” to aporia to a state of wonder and then a realization of the limitations of lived experience, the Socratic questioning provides a consistent reminder of the notknowing. It brings on the vulnerability experienced in foreboding in order to make way for aletheia. Returning to the interpretation of Plato’s thaumazein as a philosopher’s response to aporia, Socratic questioning maintains the acceptance – even the embrace - of the not-knowing. It preserves the choice to inquire, to listen, to wonder, rather than to admit defeat or to declare a question decided. Heidegger calls for this same sort of attitude when he declares, 42 Ibid, p. 18 43 HEIDEGGER, Martin: Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2012, p. 19 44 Ibid, p. 19 CHRISTINE SORRELL DIKINS – FINN THORBJØRN HANSEN HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 70 “The questioners have broken the habit of curiosity; their seeking loves the abyss, in which they know the oldest ground.” 45 Socratic questioning thus prepares the way for aletheia by establishing and preserving the proper comportment for the grounding of aletheia. Truth as aletheia is an event, a clearing. This clearing, Heidegger says, is the clearing “for concealment (truth as un-truth), in itself conflictual.” Truth, he says, is “the clearing for self-concealing.” 46 On this understanding of truth, one cannot have truth (unconcealment) without concealment. Socratic inquiry’s preservation of the not-knowing acts as a concealment – a shutting down of assumptions and of demands projected at the phenomenon, with a resulting protecting concealment to allow for the phenomenon’s unconcealment. Heidegger makes the importance of this knowing-we-do-not-know clear in his insistence that the clearing, the potential unfolding of aletheia, must not become “an emptiness in which everything simply presents itself as equally easy to ‘understand’ and master.” 47 Socratic questioning, among all forms of dialogue, has perhaps the unique ability to maintain concealment – this awareness of notknowing – while preparing the ground for unconcealment. Heidegger argues: The self-concealing protrudes through the clearing, and only if that happens, i.e. only if the conflictual in its intimacy reigns throughout the ‘there,’ can the dislodgement from the indeterminate (and, as such, not at all grasped) domain of representation and lived experience succeed and can steadfastness in Da-sein be attempted… Therefore truth is never merely clearing; it essentially occurs as concealment just as originarily and intimately along with the clearing. These, clearing and 45 Ibid, p. 13 46 Ibid, p. 273 47 Ibid, p. 276 SOCRATIC DIALOGUE AS A WAY TOWARD WONDER AND ALETHEIA HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 71 concealment, are not two; instead they constitute the essential occurrence of the one truth itself. 48 Thus, Socratic dialogue’s reciprocal relationship between notknowing and the love of wisdom and inquiry, between thaumazein and aletheia, may suit it perfectly for preserving and following this conflictual yet necessary relationship between concealment and unconcealment. The Socratic researcher’s goal to help participants live philosophically, to live an examined life, also fits well with what Heidegger views as the authentic life for Da-sein. He worries that we have lost the ability to be Da-sein as we fall prey to belief in our own knowledge and the control and power over the world that come with that knowledge. He urges that we must “let Da-sein arise out of … the essential occurrence of truth in order to ground therein beings as a whole and as such and, in the midst of them, to ground the human being.” 49 Our calling, Heidegger believes, our role as Da-sein if we are to live authentically, happens only “in the modes in which truth is sheltered out of the securing of the clearedconcealed event.” 50 Thus, to pursue Socratic inquiry, to remain in wonder with a preservation of the not-knowing, is to live authentically, to live philosophically; to resist being curious for answers and instead remain open to being a ground for truth to reveal itself. When researcher and participant become, together, a ground for the clearing that is aletheia, the researcher is helping the participant to live authentically. There is a vulnerability in this process for both researcher and participant; they are allowing themselves to be thrown, unprotected, into the happening of the clearing. 51 This 48 Ibid, p. 276 49 Ibid, p. 9 50 Ibid, p. 26 51 HEIDEGGER, Martin: Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event), Indiana CHRISTINE SORRELL DIKINS – FINN THORBJØRN HANSEN HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 72 vulnerability requires the care, trust, and respect that Socrates so often models in Plato’s dialogues. Socratic Dialogue in Practice – Qualitative Research and Action Research A qualitative or action researcher who wishes to guide participants through this process from a cognitive to a more ontological approach to the phenomenon, seeking an openness as a grounding for aletheia, will be served well by a Socratic shared inquiry approach. Just as importantly, this approach enables the researcher herself to remain open, as the dialogue tests her own assumptions as well, avoiding what Gadamer calls “the tyranny of hidden prejudices that [make] us deaf to what speaks to us.” 52 In addition to the benefits of the dialogue itself, beginning with a definitional question allows the researcher to start at a neutral point so that interview participants can take the conversation in their own direction. Participants are likely to introduce ideas the researcher may not have anticipated. Following are specific examples from qualitative and action research to help give a more thorough picture of how this method unfolds in both of these contexts. In both qualitative one-on-one interviews and in action research in a group practice setting, it is best to explain to participants a bit about the method, so that participants will not be caught off guard by the questioning, nor mistake it as meant to challenge in an unfriendly way. The researcher might say, “I may press you a bit, and that is so we can both work to understand the implications of what you are saying.” The researcher should make explicit that this is a shared inquiry: “I University Press, Bloomington, 2012, p. 260 52 GADAMER, Hans-Georg: Truth and Method, Sheed and Ward Ltd., London, 1989, p. 270 SOCRATIC DIALOGUE AS A WAY TOWARD WONDER AND ALETHEIA HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 73 don’t know the answers either – I want to learn from you,” an echo of what Socrates tells his dialogue partners in almost every Platonic dialogue. 53 A researcher using Socratic dialogue makes herself more vulnerable than one who is using a more structured approach to interviewing, for instance one with largely pre-determined questions. She must be ready to expose her own doubts and prejudices and also to think on her feet. Because the dialogue can be challenging for the researcher and participants, it is all the more important for the researcher to model clearly the virtues of friendship, love, humility, patience, humor, and courage. The researcher thereby can invite the participants to practice these same virtues: the courage to put oneself at play, to take a stand; the patience to wait for the phenomenon’s call; the humility in accepting, without being too discouraged, our own lack of knowledge. Socratic one-on-one interviews in qualitative research In one-on-one interviews in qualitative research, after setting the stage and explaining the method, the researcher starts by asking for a definition of the phenomenon in question. Most likely, the participants have been chosen because of some significant connection with the phenomenon, so they will expect that they know a fair amount about it. In a recent study on women’s experiences writing a dissertation, 54 the researcher started with the 53 See, e.g., PLATO: Euthyphro, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 16a; PLATO: Meno, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 70b-70c 54 DINKINS, Christine Sorrell and SORRELL, Jeanne: Our Dissertations, Ourselves: Shared Stories of Women's Dissertation Journeys, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014. CHRISTINE SORRELL DIKINS – FINN THORBJØRN HANSEN HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 74 question, “what is a dissertation?” Some participants tried definitions that were ultimately abandoned or heavily revised, while others were stuck from the very start, realizing they had written an entire dissertation but still could not say what one is. When Eleanor was asked, “what is a dissertation?” she said: “When I started thinking about that question, I had trouble separating it from what I believe other people think it should be . . . and it’s kind of funny because one of the things I think a dissertation is means our making that separation, and figuring out what we really do believe.” 55 Here, we see Eleanor catching herself tempted to violate the “say what you believe” principle. It is often easier to articulate what we know others say of the phenomenon – what it is supposed to be – than what we think it is ourselves. Alecia found she could best express her definition of a dissertation through an analogy: The whole idea is very pregnancy-like, it’s very much your baby that you create, but… it’s totally you and I guess what people are able to do is to say, okay, this is my genes, and I want this, this, this, this, this, and this… having this huge project that looms ahead of you that you’ve spent all this time working in this area, developing this thing, you have some definite ideas about how this is, and then you’re creating this kinda baby of yours. 56 Many of the participants found that their understanding of a dissertation had changed as they had progressed in the writing process. Mary said, “When you start you think, oh, I’m going to answer an enormous question and make such a difference. But that’s just not true. You’re going to answer maybe a part of a question, or you’re going to add to the body of knowledge about a 55 DINKINS, Christine Sorrell and SORRELL, Jeanne: Our Dissertations, Ourselves: Shared Stories of Women's Dissertation Journeys, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014, p. 3 56 Ibid, p. 4 SOCRATIC DIALOGUE AS A WAY TOWARD WONDER AND ALETHEIA HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 75 question that others are working on. But that kept me up at night, you know?” 57 In all of these interviews, the definition or the attempt at a definition is never a conclusive answer. Instead, the attempt at the definition opens up the participant’s thinking, exposing assumptions, forcing a comparison of beliefs with each other and with actual experience, opening up the inquiry for genuine curiosity and wonder. Examples and analogies help a participant in one-on-one interviews explore and test their beliefs and statements about the phenomenon. In a research study on the value of a face-to-face liberal arts education, 58 several students were asked the initial question, “What is X College to you?” The students explained that faculty and staff at their college “cared” about them as people, not just students. The concept of care can mean many things, and therefore examples and analogies were necessary to examine these statements further. How is this care the same or different as the care you would expect from a professional to a client, from a doctor to a patient? How is it the same or different from the care of a family member? One student explained that caring from faculty is unique: When you know that you are going to be asked to be engaged personally, there is an accountability there. It’s like the professor says, “I care about you and I'm invested in you” - holding me accountable - I have to perform to get the most out of that relationship, and in the freshman year, we might not do that, but when you finally do that, the rewards are out of this world. Another student responded, “it's more of a mentor/protégé sort of thing and that's been vitally important towards development of what I believe and my approach to my academics.” This response, 57 Ibid, p. 6 58 DINKINS, Christine Sorrell: “Articulating the Value of a Face-to-Face Liberal Arts Education,” unpublished study. CHRISTINE SORRELL DIKINS – FINN THORBJØRN HANSEN HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 82 worthy as such in being in and doing this praxis. So, the question the Socratic action researcher raises with his co-inquirers from the profession or organization is: How can we better connect with those enigmatic sources or life phenomena in daily life and professional and organizational work and living from where a deeper experience of meaning, beauty, and goodness is experienced? So, in order to awaken a growing sense for the “…regions where meanings and understanding originate, well up, and percolate, infect, touch, stir us, and exercise a formative and affective effect on our being…” 64 the Socratic action research that Hansen 65 has facilitated was typically built up around a Wonder Lab. This lab was a serial workshop of different exercises in phenomenological, hermeneutic, Socratic-dialectical, existentialcontemplative and phronetic reflections and dialogue forms. 66 By going together as travel companions through these different forms of wonder-based reflections and actions the participants and the action researcher got – over due time – into a deeper dialogue with the praxis and the life phenomenon in this praxis which seems to call their attention. In the Wonder Lab they did not start up with a 64 VAN MANEN, Max: Phenomenology of Practice. Meaning-giving methods in phenomenological research and writing. Left Coast Press, Walnut Creek, CA (USA), 2014, p. 26-27 65 HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: Kan man under sig uden ord? Design- og universitetspædagogik på kreative videregående uddannelser [Can We Wonder without Words? Design and University Pedagogic in Creative Higher Education]. Aalborg Universitetsforlag, Aalborg, 2014. ; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: At undre sig ved livets afslutning: Om brugen af filosofiske samtaler i palliativt arbejde [To Wonder at the End of Life: About the use of philosophical conversations in palliative care], Akademisk Forlag, Copenhagen, forthcoming. 66 For a more detailed and step-by-step-description of these five momentums in the Wonder Lab, please read HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: “The Call and Practice of Wonder: How to Evoke a Socratic Community of Wonder in Professional Settings”, in WEISS, Michael Noah (ed.): The Socratic Handbook, LIT Verlag, Vienna, 2015. SOCRATIC DIALOGUE AS A WAY TOWARD WONDER AND ALETHEIA HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 83 clear and chosen question or clarification of a definition as in a Socratic one-on-one interview. They typically started out with a story and lived experience of ‘something’ (they did not know what is was from the beginning), that seems to have made a great impression on them when working or being in their daily work life at the organization. The researcher first facilitates the wonder lab, but then the practitioners themselves will make their own kind of wonder labs (and experiments of wonder-based reflections) within their own profession with colleagues that are not in the pilot group of the action research project. This is to see how they will change and find new and better ways to create wonder-based reflections and dialogues in their own context. And when that happens - about half in the 2 or 3 year project – then and only then the action researcher might follow the co-inquirers more as a Socratic qualitative researcher - interviewing and observing them in the Socratic way that Dinkins does in her research. 4) To encourage the practitioners to live a philosophical life in their own praxis: At last note on the feature of the Socratic action research is the ambition to train the practitioners to become Socratic researchers in their own praxis. Through the exercises and training in Socratic dialogue groups 67 and Wonder Labs they will acquire a growing phenomenological sensitivity as well as a Socratic musicality for hearing and seeing the wonders and mysteries in their daily work life and life as such. This will help them also after the Socratic action researcher has ‘left the ship’ to take over and start taking ‘phenomenological snapshots’ from their life-worlds as practitioners in their field as well as creating Socratic communities of wonder on their own. This was indeed what happed for the staff of the Danish hospice when the action research project 67 HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: Den sokratiske dialoggruppe [The Socratic Dialogue Group], Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 2000. CHRISTINE SORRELL DIKINS – FINN THORBJØRN HANSEN HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 84 was over. Today they have a continuous wonder lab each second week on equal basis as the psychological supervision group which also is held with the staff every second week. Conclusion While the techniques and principles discussed in this article are a helpful base for Socratic interviewing or Socratic action research through wonder labs, a researcher wishing to try them out should not let herself become too tied to the specifics of these techniques. Certainly, they are important, and Plato in his illustration of Socrates’ dialogues employed them for a reason. Also important, though, is the dialogue itself. A dialogue between researcher and participants must be authentic, a genuine interaction in which the researcher listens carefully and respectfully and responds and questions honestly and openly. After years of conducting qualitative and action research using Socratic shared inquiry, both authors have found it fruitful and rewarding for researcher and participants alike. Participants in oneon-one interviews tend to report them being “cathartic” or “fun.” Participants find the interviews to be revelatory, and they seem to enjoy reflecting on and questioning their own beliefs. In action research there seems to follow a kind of philosophical lifestyle and Bildung process among the practitioner in the aftermath of a Socratic action research. And when evaluating the whole process many of the practitioners comment on the new kind of slowness and careful awareness in their thinking, that makes them able to ‘stand in the openness’ without rushing to find an answer or find a quick solution. At the Danish Hospice one of the older and very experienced palliative nurses said that one of the greatest things she learned for the action research project was the possibility as a professional to “become small together around the Big Questions”. SOCRATIC DIALOGUE AS A WAY TOWARD WONDER AND ALETHEIA HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 85 This experience had taught her how not to try to act (seemingly professionally) as if one knows things – when in fact we in the encounter with the big question of life and death are all equals as fellow human beings, whether a patient, a relative, a nurse, or a philosopher. The hope of the authors is that researchers who find their goals aligned with those outlined here will try out the Socratic approach in their research. Because of its flexibility and responsiveness, it can lead to wonderful connections between researcher and participant, and thus is rewarding not just in the research produced but in the journey to get there. References BRADBURY, Hilary (ed.): The SAGE Handbook of Action Research, 3rd Edition, SAGE Publications, Los Angeles, 2015. BRINKMANN, Svend: “Could Interviews Be Epistemic? An Alternative to Qualitative Opinion Polling”, in Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 13, No. 8 (December), Los Angeles, 2007, pp. 1116-1138. DINKINS, Christine Sorrell: “Articulating the Value of a Face-to- Face Liberal Arts Education,” unpublished study. DINKINS, Christine Sorrell: “Shared Inquiry: Socratic- Hermeneutic Interpre-viewing”, in: IRONSIDE, Pamela (ed.): Beyond Method: Philosophical Conversations in Healthcare and Scholarship, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2005, pp. 111-147. DINKINS, Christine Sorrell and SORRELL, Jeanne: Our Dissertations, Ourselves: Shared Stories of Women's Dissertation Journeys, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014. EIKELAND, Olav: “Action Research – Applied Research, Intervention Research, Collaborative Research, Practitioner CHRISTINE SORRELL DIKINS – FINN THORBJØRN HANSEN HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 86 Research, or Praxis Research?”, in International Journal of Action Research. Vol. 8, No. 1, São Leopoldo-RS, Brazil, 2012, pp. 9-44. EIKELAND, Olav: “Phronesis, Aristotle, and Action Research”, in International Journal of Action Research, Vol. 2, No. 1, São Leopoldo-RS, Brazil, 2008, pp. 5-53. GADAMER, Hans-Georg: Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, SMITH, P. Christopher (trans.), Yale University Press, New Haven, 1980. GADAMER, Hans-Georg: Truth and Method, Sheed and Ward Ltd., London, 1989. HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: At stå i det åbne: Dannelse gennem filosofisk undren og nærvær [To Stand in the Openness: Bildung through Philosophical Wonder and Presence], Aalborg University Press, Aalborg, 2008. HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: At undre sig ved livets afslutning: Om brugen af filosofiske samtaler i palliativt arbejde [To Wonder at the End of Life: About the use of philosophical conversations in palliative care], Akademisk Forlag, Copenhagen, forthcoming. HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: Den sokratiske dialoggruppe [The Socratic Dialogue Group], Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 2000. HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: Det filosofiske liv [The Philosophical Life], Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 2002. HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: “Det sokratiske forskningsinterview [The Socratic Research Interview]”, in MUNK, Karen (ed.): Metodefetichisme, kvalitative metode på afveje - ophav, kritik, nye perspektiver, Aarhus University Press, Aarhus, 2015. HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: Kan man undre sig uden ord? Design- og universitetspædagogik på kreative videregående uddannelser [Can We Wonder without Words? Design and University Pedagogic in Creative Higher Education]. Aalborg Universitetsforlag, Aalborg, 2014. HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: “One Step Further: The Dance Between Poetic Dwelling and Socratic Wonder in SOCRATIC DIALOGUE AS A WAY TOWARD WONDER AND ALETHEIA HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 87 Phenomenological Research”, in GALVIN, Kathleen (ed.): Indo- Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (Special Edition), New York, 2012, pp. 1-20. HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: “The Call and Practice of Wonder: How to Evoke a Socratic Community of Wonder in Professional Settings”, in WEISS, Michael Noah (ed.): The Socratic Handbook, LIT Verlag, Vienna, 2015. HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: “The Philosophical Practitioner as a Co-Researcher”, in AMIR, Lydia and FATIC, Aleksandar (eds.): Practicing Philosophy, Cambridge Scholars Press, Cambridge, 2015. HEIDEGGER, Martin: Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic”, ROJCEWICZA, Richard and SCHUWER, Andre (trans.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994. HEIDEGGER, Martin: Being and Time, MACQUARRIE, J. and ROBINSON, E. (trans.), Harper & Row, New York, 1962. HEIDEGGER, Martin: Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2012. HEIDEGGER, Martin: Discourse on Thinking, ANDERSON, J.M. and FREUND, E.H. (trans.), Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1969. HEIDEGGER, Martin: Poetry, Language, Thought, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1975. PLATO: Apology, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002. PLATO: Crito, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002. PLATO: Euthyphro, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002. PLATO: Laches, in SPRAGUE, Rosamond Kent (trans.): Laches and Charmides, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1992. CHRISTINE SORRELL DIKINS – FINN THORBJØRN HANSEN HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 51-88 88 PLATO: Lysis, in REEVE, C.D.C (ed.): Plato on Love: Lysis, Symposium, Phaedrus, Alcibiades, with Selections from Republic and Laws, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2006. PLATO: Meno, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): Five Dialogues, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002. PLATO: Republic, GRUBE, G.M.A and REEVE, C.D.C. (trans), Hackett, Indianapolis, 1992. PLATO: Theaetetus, LEVETT, M.J. and BURNYEAT Miles (trans.), Hackett, Indianapolis, 1990. RANNER, Oliver: “Plato and Aristotle on the Origin of Philosophy”, available in http://www.apaclassics.org/AnnualMeeting/03mtg/abstracts/ranner. html (last access September 30, 2015), 2003. SORRELL, Jeanne, CANGELOSI, Pamela and DINKINS, Christine Sorrell: “Dialog on a Country Path: The Qualitative Research Journey”, in Nurse Education Today, vol. 34, Philadelphia, PA (USA), 2014, pp. 295-298. VAN MANEN, Max: Phenomenology of Practice. Meaning-giving methods in phenomenological research and writing. Left Coast Press, Walnut Creek, CA (USA), 2014. VAN MANEN, Max: Researching lived experience: Human science for an action sensitive pedagogy, SUNY, New York, 1997.