Aristotle on the Demise and Stability of Political Systems

Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 24, nº 49. Primer cuatrimestre de 2022. Pp. 393-412. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2022.i49.19 Aristotle on the Demise and Stability of Political Systems La discusión aristotélica acerca de la destrucción y estabilidad de los sistemas políticos Manuel Knoll1 Turkish-German University Istanbul ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0651-1915 Recibido: 11-07-2021 Aceptado: 01-01-2022 Abstract This article examines Aristotle’s theory of ‘factional conflict’ (stasis) in Book 5 of the Politics and claims that it is mainly directed against the a-historical account of constitutional change Plato develops in the Republic. Aristotle’s investigation of the causes of stasis is oriented towards the normative political goal of stabilizing political orders and preventing their ‘change’ (metabolê) into different ones. This article argues that the constitution Aristotle calls ‘polity’ (politeia) constitutes his solution to the challenge of stabilizing democracies and oligarchies. The paper also aims at elucidating Aristotle’s conception of an empirical political science, his political realism, and the method he applies in conjunction with it in the ‘empirical’ Books of the Politics (Book 4 through 6). Keywords: political injustice, factional conflict (stasis), polity (politeia), political science, political realism, empirical method, Plato. 1 Manuel Knoll ([email protected]) is Professor of Political Theory and Philosophy at Turkish-German University Istanbul, member of Instituto “Lucio Anneo Séneca” of Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, and associate editor of Polis. The Journal for Greek and Roman Political Thought. He has lectured and published widely on topics pertaining to Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Political Philosophy and Ethics, in particular Ancient and Contemporary Theories of Justice, Deep Disagreements on Justice, Values and Morals, Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Nietzsche, Rawls and Walzer, Social Philosophy and Critical Theory. He is author of three books and 70 articles or chapters, co-editor of six volumes, co-editor of book series Collegium Politicum, member of the scientific boards of book series Staatsdiskurse (Franz Steiner), Koinos Logos (Rocco Carabba), and Cultura e Formazione (Bonanno Editore) and of journals ScientiaArte, Sofia Philosophical Review, Arkhe-logos, Kaıge, and Etica e Politica. In 2016, he was awarded Premio Lucio Colletti in the area of philosophy, Rome, Capitoline Hill. Website: www.manuelknoll.eu. 394 Manuel Knoll Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 24, nº 49. Primer cuatrimestre de 2022. Pp. 393-412. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2022.i49.19 Resumen Este artículo analiza la teoría aristotélica del ‘conflicto entre facciones’ (stasis) en el libro 5 de la Política de Aristóteles y afirma que esta misma teoría ataca el relato a-histórico del cambio constitucional que Platón desarrolla en la República. La investigación aristotélica sobre las causas de la stasis tiene como objetivo normativo práctico la estabilización de los regímenes políticos y la prevención contra su ‘cambio’ (metabolê). Este artículo sostiene que la constitución que Aristóteles llama politeia constituye su solución al desafío sobre cómo dar estabilidad a las democracias y las oligarquías. Esta contribución se centra también en presentar la idea aristotélica de una ciencia política empírica, el realismo político de Aristóteles y el método que el filósofo usa en unión con él en los libros ‘empíricos’ de la Política (libros 4-6). Palabras-clave: injusticia política, conflicto entre facciones (stasis), politeia, ciencia política, realismo político, método empírico, Platón. 1. Aristotle and political realism As a political philosopher, Aristotle is primarily known for his normative political thought connected to his virtue ethics and theory of ‘human flourishing’ (eudaimonia). According to it, the ‘goal’ (telos) of the polis is the good and happy life of its citizens, which requires the active and perfect actualization of the virtues of the character and the intellect. Aristotle’s political analyses in the ‘empirical’ Books of the Politics (Pol. Book 4 through 6) show, however, that he was also among the first political realists. The realist tradition goes back to Thucydides and some of the Greek sophists2. One characteristic of this tradition, to which also Niccolò Machiavelli and Max Weber belong, is a sober and realistic view of political reality, the human being, and its moral defects3. While most political realists reject ‘ideal theory’ and consider only pure factuality, in Books 7 and 8 of the Pol., Aristotle also lays out his conception of an ‘ideal’ political order. According to political realism, power is the central category both in politics and for an understanding of the ‘political’4. While power is an important topic of Aristotle’s political thought, he is equally concerned with normative questions such as political justice and citizen’s good and happy life. It is primarily the realistic aspect of Aristotle’s political thought, which 2 In the volume Frankel 1996, which is devoted to different aspects of realism in international politics, three articles focus on Thucydides and one on the sophists. 3 According to Berg-Schlosser-Stammen 1995: 25-26, a contemporary political science textbook, Machiavelli and Weber are the main representatives of a realist conception of politics. 4 Cf. Berg-Schlosser-Stammen: 25-26. 395 Aristotle on the Demise and Stability of Political Systems Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 24, nº 49. Primer cuatrimestre de 2022. Pp. 393-412. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2022.i49.19 influenced Machiavelli’s political theory. According to Machiavelli’s political realism, it appears “more fitting to go directly to the effectual truth of the thing (verità effettuale della cosa) than to the imagination of it”5. Despite his political realism, Machiavelli, like Aristotle, has a strong normative interest in the preservation and stability of existing political orders6. Machiavelli’s political theory depends in particular on Book 5 of the Pol.; as has been noted more than once, in Il Principe Machiavelli includes several of the advices Aristotle suggests to the tyrant7. Even more important, Machiavelli takes up both Aristotle’s conception of political science as a practical science and his empirical, inductive, and comparative method8. This article aims at elucidating Aristotle’s conception of an empirical political science, his political realism, and the method he applies in conjunction with it in the ‘empirical’ Books of the Pol. In Book 5, Aristotle carries out one of the four different tasks he assigns to constitutional theory at the beginning of Book 4. It requires studying “any given regime […] with a view to determining both how it might arise initially and in what manner it might be preserved for the longest time once in existence” (Pol. 4.1, 1288b 28-30, trans. Lord; cf. NE 10, 1181b 18-19). In Book 5, Aristotle presents his theory of ‘upheaval’, ‘sedition’, ‘faction’, ‘factional conflict’, ‘rebellion’ or ‘revolution’ (stasis9). His investigation of the causes of stasis is oriented towards the normative political goal of stabilizing political orders and preventing their ‘change’ (metabolê) into different ones. This article argues that the constitution Aristotle calls ‘polity’ (politeia) constitutes his solution to the challenge of stabilizing democracies and oligarchies. It examines Aristotle’s theory of stasis and claims that it is mainly directed against the a-historical account of constitutional change Plato develops in Books 8 and 9 of the Republic. In Book 5 of the Pol., Aristotle consistently advocates the preservation of political orders and never their overthrow. One reason for this might be his audience: “the Politics is addressed to those in power, not to those seeking power”10. Another reason might be that Aristotle is a conservative in the truest 5 Machiavelli, Il Principe, XV, trans. H. Mansfield, Italian words inserted by M.K. 6 This normative interest is expressed in phrases such as “mantenere lo stato” and “conservare lo stato”, which Machiavelli holds to be political goals of prime rank; see e.g. Machiavelli, Il Principe, XVIII and XIX. 7 Mehmel 1948; Sternberger 1984: 172ff., confronts several passages from Aristotle’s Politics and Machiavelli’s Il Principe. Ottmann 2004: 149, summarizes some of Aristotle’s advices, assuming that Machiavelli used Bruni’s translation of the Pol. For more literature on Aristotle’s influence on Machiavelli, see Zanzi 1981: 131. 8 Knoll 2010. 9 In her part of the introduction to a recent commentary on Books 5 and 6, De Luna-Zizza-Curnis 2016: 7, Maria Elena De Luna explains that a perfect translation of the term stasis is impossible due to its “densità semantica”; for the terms stasis and metabolê, see also Hatzistavrou 2013: 276-277 and Keyt 1999: 64-66. In this article, the translation mostly used for stasis is “factional conflict”. 10 See Keyt 1999: xiv-xv, who suggests two other possible reasons why Aristotle consistently advocates the preservation of political systems. 396 Manuel Knoll Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 24, nº 49. Primer cuatrimestre de 2022. Pp. 393-412. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2022.i49.19 sense of the word, which reveals itself in Book 2.1-5 in which he adamantly criticizes the social-revolutionary innovations Plato introduces for his best city. A third reason is that in Greek history the overthrow of a constitution usually went along with distress and bloodshed. Thucydides’ account of the several horrible civil wars that happened during the Peloponnesian War (431- 404 BCE) is among the main historical sources from which Aristotle draws in Book 5. Its main topic is the demise and stability of ‘political systems’ (politeiai). 2. Aristotle’s conception of a ‘political system’ (politeia) and political justice While the different ‘virtues’ (aretai) are the main topic of Aristotle’s writings on ethics, the various politeiai are the central subject of his Pol. The common translation of πολιτεία (politeia) is ‘constitution’. This translation is problematic because Aristotle’s political thought is rooted in the ancient world of the polis and his understanding of a politeia is quite different from the modern comprehension of a ‘constitution’. In contrast to ancient politeiai, modern Western constitutions usually are written documents, which constitute the legal basis of democratic political systems, comprise a catalogue of fundamental rights, and stipulate which parts of the constitution can be altered and which majorities are necessary to do this. Aristotle’s first core definition of a politeia in Book 3 delineates it as an ‘order’ (taxis) that determines who rules in the political community. For example, democracy is the rule of the ‘people’ (demos), oligarchy the rule of the ‘few’ (oligoi) (Pol. 3.6, 1278b 8-13). Aristotle’s narrow definition, which focuses on the various common allocations of political power, further illustrates why the modern and broad term ‘constitution’ is a problematic translation of politeia. A more appropriate rendering, which is in line with the terminology of contemporary political science, would be ‘system of government’, or, defined more broadly, ‘political system’11. In Book 4, Aristotle presents a second and extended definition, “A politeia is the order of a polis in respect to its various offices and the questions of how they are distributed, what the supreme power of the polis is, and what the end of every community is” (Pol. 4.1, 1289a 15-18, my trans.). This definition includes two new determinations of a politeia, which Aristotle discussed both in the chapters of Book 3 that follow his first definition. First, different political systems and their respective ruling groups focus on diverse ends or goals. The three correct political systems aim at the common good, their three deviations at the particular or personal benefit of the rulers. Kingship and aristocracy focus primarily on a good life of its citizens based on ‘virtue’ (aretê), oligarchy mainly aims at safeguarding 11 For partly different criticisms of the translation of politieia as ‘constitution’, see Strauss 1953: 135-37, who translates politeia with ‘regime’. 397 Aristotle on the Demise and Stability of Political Systems Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 24, nº 49. Primer cuatrimestre de 2022. Pp. 393-412. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2022.i49.19 and increasing the fortune of the wealthy, and democracy mostly at the freedom of the poor majority of citizens who want to live as they want12. In contrast to the final or dominant ends of political systems, the second new determination of Aristotle’s extended definition plays an essential role in Aristotle’s theory of the demise and stability of political systems. It concerns the just distribution of political offices and thus of political power. This is not only a disputed political but also a controversial ethical question because the champions of different systems of government justify their specific distribution of power through a corresponding conception of distributive justice. Aristotle usually distinguishes between four conceptions of distributive justice and four groups of citizens; each of those defends one of these four conceptions with reasons and arguments: the democratic, the oligarchic, and the aristocratic conception, and an undesignated fourth conception (cf. NE 5.6, 1131a 25-29). In Book 3 of the Pol., Aristotle gives the most detailed account of the respective arguments of all four political groups and advocates his own view. Briefly summarized, the supporters of an oligarchic conception, who Aristotle equates with the rich, argue that because of their unequal contribution to the public they deserve an unequal share in political power. Therefore, they claim that an oligarchy, in which the offices are distributed in proportion to ‘wealth’ (ploutos), is the appropriate system of government (Pol. 3.9, 1280a 25-31; Pol. 3.13, 1283a 31-33). The adherents of a democratic conception argue that all male citizens are equal because they are all born as free men. Because of their equal ‘freedom’ (eleutheria) they hold it to be just if both the poor and the rich get an equal share in political power; hence, they maintain that a democracy is the apposite system of government (Pol. 3.9, 1280a 23-25; Pol. 3.12, 1283a 16-17). Contrary to supporters of both the democratic and the oligarchic conception of distributive justice, the members of the good families refer to their ‘noble birth’ (eugeneia). The better-born argue that because of their qualities and the virtue of their families it is justified that they get a bigger share in political power than the low-born (Pol. 3.13, 1283a 33-37). This brief reconstruction of the arguments of the oligarchs, democrats, and well-born shows that each conception of distributive justice is connected with a corresponding system of government. Aristotle conceives of the different political systems – with the exception of tyranny – as embodiments of different conceptions of distributive justice13. In Book 3, he presents several arguments for his preference for the aristocratic conception that holds ‘political virtue’ (politikê aretê) to be the appropriate measure of merit and the most justified claim for political power. Aristotle’s main reason for this political preference is that political virtue contributes substantially to reaching the good life or ‘human flourishing’ 12 Aristotle’s view of the final or dominant ends of political systems corresponds to Plato’s; cf. Resp. 4, 420b-4, 445d; 8, 555b-c, 557b, 562b-d; 9, 580bff. In Book 5, Aristotle refers back to the goal of oligarchy (Pol. 5.10, 1311a 9-10). In Book 6, he refers back to the goal of democracy (Pol. 6.2, 1317a 40-b17). 13 Cf. Keyt 1991: 238; Miller 1995: 79; Mulgan 1991: 310. 398 Manuel Knoll Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 24, nº 49. Primer cuatrimestre de 2022. Pp. 393-412. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2022.i49.19 (eudaimonia), the true goal of the polis. Several scholars argue that Aristotle was a supporter of aristocracy and that his best political system is a true aristocracy in which the morally and intellectually best men rule14. That Aristotle presents a second and extended definition of a politeia in Book 4 clearly suggests the interpretation that he does this to include the results he gained in Book 3. This is a strong argument for the unity of the Pol.15. First, it shows that there is no rupture between Books 3 and 4, as the supporters of the genetic-analytic interpretation of the Pol. suggest. Second, it indicates that its subjects and arguments are not only coherent and consistent, but build on each other in such a way that later parts implicitly or explicitly refer back to earlier parts, which they presuppose, continue, distinguish, or supplement. This is also true for Book 5, in which Aristotle bases his theory of stasis to a considerable extent on the theory of political justice he had developed in Book 316. 3. Political injustice as general cause of factional conflict The dispute about a just distribution of political power and the appropriate political system is highly significant for Aristotle’s theory of the demise and stability of political systems. Because if a group of citizens judges its particular share in political power to be unjust, it is prone to ‘factional conflict’ (stasis). Aristotle discusses this general cause or motive for ‘faction’ (stasis), which has been adequately denominated as “injustice-induced faction”17, in the crucial first chapter of Book 5 of the Pol. In the chapter, he focuses on democracy and oligarchy, which he recognizes as the prevailing political systems of his time (Pol. 5.1, 1301b 39-40; cf. Pol. 3.15, 1286b 20-22). Already Thucydides informs us of how unstable both of these constitutional types were. During the Peloponnesian War, Athens, the champion of democracy, aimed at constitutional change by supporting democratic parties in oligarchic political systems. While Athens triggered revolutions in order to make Greece ‘safe for democracy’, its rival Sparta destabilized the democratic allies of Athens in order to introduce oligarchic political systems18. 14 For reconstructions of Aristotle’s arguments for the conception of distributive justice he favors see Keyt 1991: 247-259, and Knoll 2017a: 95-100; cf. Bertelli 2011 and Miller 1995: 127. For Aristotle’s best political system as a true aristocracy see Bates 2003: 97; Bertelli 2011: 76; Chuska 2000: 322-23; Giorgini 2019: 138; Keyt 1991: 260-270; Keyt 1999: vx; Knoll 2017a: 100-104; Kraut 2002: 232; Langmeier 2018: 317-368; Miller 1995: 192. 15 For more arguments, see Knoll 2011a and Knoll 2011b. 16 For the relation of justice and stability of constitutions, see Langmeier 2018: 261-272. 17 Hatzistavrou 2013: 276, 278, 290. 18 Thuc. 3.82; Pol. 5.7, 1307b 19-24; Bleicken 1994: 58-59. Also after the Peloponnesian War, in the 4th century BCE, several bloody revolutions happened, e.g., in Thebes and Thessalia; cf. Gehrke 1985. 399 Aristotle on the Demise and Stability of Political Systems Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 24, nº 49. Primer cuatrimestre de 2022. Pp. 393-412. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2022.i49.19 Aristotle attributes the origin of democracy and oligarchy to the opposing conceptions of justice of their supporters. While the democrats advocate arithmetic or numerical equality and justice, the oligarchs defend geometric or proportional equality and justice19. Due to their equal freedom, the democrats consider equal political participation, and therefore a democratic system of government, to be just. In contrast, based on their unequal wealth and unequal contribution to the polis, the rich hold an unequal share in the government and an oligarchic political system to be appropriate (Pol. 5.1, 1301a 25-39). Despite the fact that Aristotle concedes both conceptions of justice a limited right, he ultimately assesses them to be mistaken. As origins and causes of their corresponding systems of government, they are both mistaken because they are the reason that democracies and oligarchies are instable and cannot be steadily preserved (Pol. 5.1, 1301a 35-36; 1302a 4-7). The rich citizens strive to overthrow democracies because they retain a distribution of political power, in which every citizen has an equal claim, to be unjust. In contrast, in oligarchies uprisings happen because the poor citizens are excluded from political life, which causes their indignation. As a result, and in line with their conception of justice, they request to participate in government equally (Pol. 5.2, 1302a 22ff.; Pol. 5.3, 1303b 3-7; Pol. 5.12, 1316a 39-b 5). While the rich strive for a form of political participation that is equal in proportion to their wealth and contribution, the poor aspire to partake in the political life equally in a numerical sense20. This is why Aristotle arrives at the overall conclusion that “in general it is equality they seek when they engage in factional conflict”; or, “factional conflict is everywhere the result of inequality” (Pol. 5.1, 1301b 26-29, trans. Lord). However, uprisings each time originate from the citizens, or group of citizens, who are not in power or do not have the amount of power they feel entitled to: “The inferior always seek equality and justice; those who dominate them take no thought for it” (Pol. 6.3, 1318b 4-5, trans. Lord). Aristotle claims that political inequalities only cause factional conflicts if they are not in proportion to citizen’s inequalities. This is, e.g., the case if a “lifelong monarchy […] exists among equal persons”; in this circumstance the king does not stand out among the citizens through extraordinary moral and intellectual virtue and therefore does not deserve to rule (Pol. 5.1, 1301b 27-28, trans. Lord; cf. Pol. 3.13, 1284a 3-11, b 32-34; Pol. 4.2, 1289a 41- 19 Cf. Bertelli 2011; Keyt 1991; Knoll 2017a. 20 In contrast to NE and in line with Plato in the Laws, in the Pol., Aristotle opposes ‘numeric’ or ‘arithmetic’ (arithmô) equality to equality ‘according to merit’ (kat’ axian) (Pol. 5.1, 1301b 29-30; 6.2, 1317b 4; cf. Leg. 751d, 757a-758a). This opposition corresponds to the fundamental antagonism between arithmetic equality and justice, on the one hand, and geometric or proportional equality and justice, on the other. Unlike in NE, in the Pol., democratic justice is no longer presented as one interpretation of justice according to merit, but as an application of ‘numeric’ or ‘arithmetic’ equality (Pol. 6.2, 1317b 4: kata arithmon alla mê kat’ axian; cf. NE 5.6, 1131a 25-29; Pol. 6.2/3, 1318a 3ff.). 400 Manuel Knoll Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 24, nº 49. Primer cuatrimestre de 2022. Pp. 393-412. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2022.i49.19 b1)21. Aristotle examines the decay and preservation of monarchies (both kingships and tyrannies) in Chapters 10 and 11 of Book 5. He holds kingship and aristocracy to be kindred constitutions because their genuine versions are both based on the moral and intellectual virtues of the rulers (Pol. 4.2, 1289a 30-33). In line with his aristocratic political leanings, Aristotle declares that the best and most virtuous citizens are arguably truly unequal (Pol. 5.1, 1301a 40-b 1). Nevertheless, when they are not in government, they hardly strive to seize political power: “Those who are outstanding in virtue would engage in factional conflict most justifiably, yet they do it the least of all” (Pol. 5.1, 1301a 39-40). Aristotle does not explain whether he holds this to be a good or a bad attitude, but as he nowhere advocates the overthrow of political systems, likely he approves. According to the central argument of Chapter 1 of Book 5, the perception of political injustice is the “general cause” of factional conflict. As repeatedly acknowledged in the literature, this is one of the most important results of Aristotle’s theory of stasis22. The importance he attributes to this result is easily recognized by how often he comes back to it in Book 5 (Pol. 5.2, 1302a 22ff.; Pol. 5.3, 1303b 3-7; Pol. 5.12, 1316a 39-b 5). The perception of political injustice concerns the psychic constitution or mental state of the citizens who engage in factional conflict. Such perceptions cause indignation and anger which in turn can cause an uprising (cf. Aristot. Rhet. 2.2 and 2.9). Their anthropological or psychic fundament is the human sense of justice, which is the bedrock of the opposing and irreconcilable conceptions of political justice. In the context of his famous definition of man as the only living being that possesses logos, speech and reason, Aristotle explains “that he alone has a perception of good and bad and just and unjust and the other things of this sort” (Pol. 1.2, 1253 a 14-18, trans. Lord). The human sense of justice plays an essential role in generating the indignation and moral outrage that motivates faction and rebellion. Aristotle is not only among the pioneers of a theory of moral and political disagreement, but also among the founders of a political psychology of motivation23. 4. The general and particular causes of factional conflict and Aristotle’s empirical, inductive, and comparative method According to Aristotle’s understanding of science, to scientifically explain 21 If one interprets the existing citizens of a polis as its matter and its political system as its form, matter and form have to correspond to prevent factional conflict; cf. Polansky 1991: 326, 335. 22 De Luna-Zizza-Curnis 2016: 7; Gehrke 2001: 143; Hatzistavrou 2013: 278-79, 287-295; Ottmann 2001: 208; Polansky 1991: 327-328, 335; for more literature, see Saxonhouse 2015: 186. 23 For Aristotle’s psychology of faction, see Hatzistavrou 2013: 281-287. 401 Aristotle on the Demise and Stability of Political Systems Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 24, nº 49. Primer cuatrimestre de 2022. Pp. 393-412. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2022.i49.19 something means to acquire knowledge of its ‘origins’ (archai) and ‘causes’ (aitiai) (cf. Metaph. 1.1). Therefore, the question of the different causes of constitutional ‘change’ (metabolê) is at the heart of his theory of the demise and stability of political systems. Aristotle distinguishes between two forms of constitutional change. In the first form, an existing political system is changed into another one, for instance, a democracy is transformed into an oligarchy or vice versa. In the second form, an existing political system remains the same, but a citizen or group of citizens attempts to seize power in it, or to partially change it, e.g., by making an oligarchy more or less oligarchical by reducing or increasing the number of rulers (Pol. 5.1, 1301b 6-25)24. Aristotle’s investigation of the causes of factional conflict is inextricably linked with his normative interest in preventing it. As he explains in a key phrase of his theory, “it is evident that if we know why political systems are destroyed, we also know how they are preserved” (Pol. 5.8, 1307b 27-29, my trans.)25. Therefore, after examining the general causes of constitutional change and the particular causes that lead to uprisings in different systems of government, Aristotle addresses the question of which measures preserve them. The stability and duration of political systems is the normative and practical purpose for which the analysis of the general and particular causes of factional conflict is undertaken. The previous section examined the perception of political injustice as “general cause” of factional conflict. This cause concerns the mental state or psychic motivation of the citizens, which leads them to start an uprising. From this cause, Aristotle distinguishes two further forms of causes of factional conflict (Pol. 5.2, 1302a 16ff.). The second form concerns its final cause. If we know the ‘goal’ (telos) of an uprising, we are able to explain why it happens26. Aristotle holds the two general goals of factional conflict to be profit and ‘honor’ (timê). Those who start an uprising either seek profit and honor, or try to avoid losing these goods “either for themselves or for their friends” (Pol. 5.2, 1302a 31-34)27. The striving of the citizens for honor equals their striving for political power and offices because one achieves honor or recognition by executing political offices28. Like the striving for honor, Aristotle conceives of the striving for profit as a basic human drive. In democracies, this striving motivates the popular leaders to set on the multitude against the wealthy citizens in order to get rich on their fortunes, which in turn leads the rich to overthrow 24 Cf. the four forms of ‘change’ (metabolê, kinesis) Aristoteles distinguishes in Ph. 3, 201a 11-15. 25 In the following phrase, Aristotle justifies this statement: “for opposites produce opposites, and destruction is the opposite of preservation (sôteria)” (Pol. 5.8, 1307b 29-30, my trans.). 26 For Aristotle’s account of a final cause, as one of four causes, see Ph. 2, 194b 32-195a 3; 194b 16-32. 27 For profit and honor as origins or efficient causes of uprisings, see Pol. 5.2, 1302a 34-35, 38- 1302b 2. 28 Aristotle even identifies political offices with honor or recognition, “For we say that offices are honors” (Pol. 3.10, 1281a 31, trans. Lord). 408 Manuel Knoll Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 24, nº 49. Primer cuatrimestre de 2022. Pp. 393-412. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2022.i49.19 the rule of the poor for their own advantage and oligarchy as the government of the rich for their personal benefit (Pol. 3.7-8, 1279b 4-19). As examined in the previous sections, these two political systems were not only the prevailing political systems of Aristotle’s time, but were very unstable and prone to factional conflict. A main reason for this is the antagonism between the poor and the rich citizens, which Aristotle identifies as the two main social classes that usually live together in all cities47. To curb the dangers connected to this “class antagonism”, Aristotle introduces his conception of a ‘polity’ (politeia), a mixed constitution that aims at mediating between the extremes of the poor and the rich. Aristotle develops this conception because of his normative interest in promoting political stability and because his conviction that political science should be useful for political practice. Aristotle was not the first to recognize the political dangers of extreme poverty and wealth and the benefits of a mixed constitution48. The ‘polity’ (politeia) is the main topic of the second half of Book 4. It is a mixed political system composed out of elements of democracy and oligarchy and their respective goals, freedom and wealth (Pol. 4.8-9, 1294a 15-b 41). The polity does not exist, only different mixtures depending on given groups of citizens and features of existing individual democracies and oligarchies. The polity aims at mediating between the claims of the poor and the rich by letting them both participate in political power and by creating a strong middle class. This political system represents Aristotle’s solution to the challenge of improving and re-forming existing democracies and oligarchies and of making them more stable. The conclusion of the crucial Chapter 1 of Book 5 supports this thesis. There Aristotle argues that democratic (or arithmetic) and oligarchic (or proportional) equality and justice have to be mixed. Such a mixture creates a polity, “the most stable of regimes” (Pol. 5.1, 1302a 15, trans. Lord)49. Despite being a mixture of elements of democracy and oligarchy, the polity is closer to the former than to latter; in general, “democracy is more stable and freer from factional conflicts than oligarchy” (Pol. 5.1, 1302a 8-9, trans. Lord). Later in Book 5, Aristotle recommends that one should “endeavour either to mingle together the multitude of the poor and that of the wealthy or to increase the middle class (for this dissolves party factions due to inequality)” (Pol. 5.8, 1308b 28-31, trans. Rackham)50. 47 De Ste. Croix 1997, suggests a Marxist interpretation of the dispute between the rich and the poor citizens. 48 In Plato’s Laws, the Athenian outlines a mixed constitution and gives a law that forbids extreme wealth and poverty because both leads to civil war (Leg. 5, 744; cf. Resp. 4, 421d-423a and Knoll 2017b). Thucydides praises the new order of the 5000, which was created after the deposition of the 400 in Athens in 411 BCE, as a “moderate blending (metria) of the few and the many” (Thuc. 8.97, trans. Smith). 49 Cf. Knoll 2009: 111-115, 181-190. 50 For good reasons, Sternberger 1984: 127, 147, distinguishes between the ‘middle constitution’ (“der ‘Mittleren Verfassung’”) and the ‘mixed constitution’ (“der ‘Gemischten Verfassung’”). He is aware that Aristotle does not use the latter term. 409 Aristotle on the Demise and Stability of Political Systems Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 24, nº 49. Primer cuatrimestre de 2022. Pp. 393-412. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2022.i49.19 As previously mentioned, with his theory of political stability Aristotle carries out one of the four different tasks he assigns to constitutional theory. It is closely linked to a different task which requires a political theorist to “ascertain the political system most suited to all cities” (Pol. 4.1, 1288b 33-35, my trans.). The polity is most suited to all cities because at Aristotle’s time most ‘city-states’ (poleis) were either democracies or oligarchies and the polity is a stable mix of elements of these two unstable political systems. These two tasks constitute the core of Aristotle’s political realism. The polity is not his ‘ideal’ political order as some interpreters hold51. Aristotle conceives of the task to study “the best constitution” as a separate undertaking (Pol. 4.1, 1288 b 21-24; Pol. 4.11, 1295a 25-29). Aristotle’s best political system is a ‘true aristocracy”, which he examines in Books 7 and 852. 7. Conclusion As a political realist, Aristotle develops a conception of political science that applies an empirical, inductive, and comparative method. Such a method is only rudimentarily observable in Plato’s dialogues. In Book 3 of the Laws, Plato analyzes the reasons why of the original three kingships Argos, Messene, and Sparta only the political order of the latter remained stable (Leg. 3, 685a). As causes of the corruption of the political systems and laws of Argos and Messene, he mentions the greed, the arrogance, the discord, and the ignorance of the kings (Leg. 3, 690d-691a). As reason of Sparta’s stability and longevity, he recognizes its mixed political system, which limits and moderates the kingly power. The mixed constitution that Plato drafts for the polis he outlines in the Laws embodies several insights that he achieved from analyzing Sparta’s political system53. According to the most important of these insights, to preserve a political system and to keep it stable, political power has to be divided, and thus limited (Leg. 3, 691d-692c). There are no indications that the empirical, inductive, and comparative method, which Aristotle uses to analyse political reality, was applied before by the sophists or other political thinkers. Therefore, Aristotle needs to be acknowledged not only as the founder of a realistic theory of factional conflict and political stability, but of empirical political science. 51 Bien 1980: 315ff.; Nussbaum 1990; Ottmann 2001: 210; Sternberger 1984: 119, 127, 156. For criticisms of the interpretations that hold the polity to be Aristotle’s ideal city, see Knoll 2009: 100- 111, 187-210; Knoll 2017a, Langmeier 2018: 376-382, and Schütrumpf 1980: 159. 52 Cf. footnote 14 of this article. 53 Cf. Knoll 2017b. 410 Manuel Knoll Araucaria. 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