Notas para un análisis del cambio conceptual

NOTES TOWARD AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTUAL CHANGE MARK B Evm Department of Political Science, Universicy of California. Berkeley, CA 94720, USA . mbevir@socrates. berkel ey.edu Abstract: This papcr analyscs conceptual change. A rejccri on of purL' cxpe rience has prornprcd philnsophers of science to adop t a certain pcrspect ive from which to \'iew changes of belief. Popper. Kuhn, and others have analysed concL'ptual change 111 cerms of problems or anomalies. that is . in terms of contingent reasoning abour issues posed in the co ntext of an inhc rit ed web of belief. This pap er exp lo res a more gene ral analysis of concep tual changc in dialogue with thesc philosophers of scien cc . Srill . hecau~e changes of bdid are no t all changes in sc icnlific hdief, we ~eek to unpack concepn1al changc in tc rm s of dilemmas. as opposed to anoma lics or prohlcms. For a Mart. the notion of a dil em ma diffcr has to be bro; 1d cr t han that of an ;momaly ~incc it purports to apply to conceptua l change as a whole. not just th e transition from one era of n ormal science to another. In addition, we ~houl<l derach rhe no tion of ;1 dilemma from the objectivism of Poppl'r's workl-3 prohlems. Key words: concept. change. belid. dilemmJ . Re s umen : Este artículo analiza el cam bio conceptual. tln rechazo de la experiencia pura ha dado lugar a que los filósofos de la ciencia adopten una dete rminada perspectiva desde la cual contemplar los cambi os de neencias. Popper, Kuhn y otros han analizado d camb io conceptual en términos de problemas o anomalías, esto e~. en rérmin os de razonamientos contingentes ace rca <le temas si tuad os en d contexto cll' una red heredada de creencias. F.sra cont ri hucit'>n indaga un análisis nüs ge neral dd cambio conceptual en diálogo con estos ft l!isofos de la ciencia. Teni endo presente que l o.~ ca m bio s de creencias no son todos camb ios en las creencias científicas. tratam os de desa rrollar el camh io co n ce ptu al en tér minos de dilemas. en oposición a anomalías o problemas. Pa ra comenzar. la noción de dilema ha <le se r m ás amplia que la de anoma lía pu esto que ti ene como objetivo aplicarse al camb io concep tual como un todo y no como la transiciún de una era de ciencia n orma l a otra. Adenüs, deberíamos de destacar la noción de dilema a partir dd objetivismo <le los problem as del mundo 3 popper iano. Palabras clave: (·rmcepto, ca mbio, cree ncia , dilema. Ar ~u na :nto~ tle H:tz<m Técnica. n" H. 200~ 14 MARK BEVIR How sho uld we analyse change in beliefs, con cep ts, ideas, or though t? Two sylized vicws stand as extreme answe rs to this question . On t he o ne hand , logi<:al empi ri cists might argue that peoplc test their theoretical beliefs against pure obscrvations, rnodifyi ng any heliefs that are in con fli ct with these observations; so, they might co nclude , we can analy se co nce ptual change by sh ow ing certain observa ti ons falsified old heli efs while providing support for ncw ones. On the other hand , id ea lists might argue that people pursue co nsistency, modifying belie fs th at are in conflict with one an other ; so, they might con dud e, we ca n analyse co ncept ua l c ha nge by sh ow ing old beliefs contai ned two co ntradict ory propositions that che new ones reconc il e in an approp ri ate way. Most phil osophers of science over the last thirty years or so have attempted to analyse scientific change not in terms of expcricnces or inconsistenci es , but in terms of pro bl cms , as with Sir Ka rl Popper , or anomali es , as with Th omas Kuhn 1• The eme rgence of the notions su ch as problem and a nom aly reflect a trend in philosophy away from atomistic em piricism a nd toward meaning holism an d the relat ed notion of the web of beli ef!. Once p hilosophers accept that no experience ca n pro ve conclusively th e truth of any given propositi on , they generally concl ud e th at what we accept as true depends on background theorics, albeit background th eor ies ha rden ed by conven - tio n. Once they conclude that what we acce pt as true d ep ends on backgrou nd theories, moreover, t he y are then pro mpt ed eith er to dismiss rational t hought altogethcr by suggest in g that backgro u nd theories de termine wha t we t ake to he true. or, more plausibly, to equate rational thought wi th attempts to improve background thcories by reflecti ng on ch e difficulties we find in them and in their rela ti onship to our exp erience. Hence, con temporary ph il osophers of science often pose t he question of how we sh ould a nalyse scientific chan ge as one of how to analyse individual reasoning about iss ue s that ari se against the background of an inher it ed body of kn owledge. I want to ex plore conceptual change mo re gene rally thr ough a con si de ration of ch e im p li cations of meaning holism a nd the web of belief. St<e rt<, pectively K. Popper, Ohj ecti1'<1 Kno 1l'i edp,e. Au F.volt ll ionary• Approach !Oxfo rd: Clare nd on Press, 1972): and T. Kuhn. The Stmcture of Sctenlíjic Rem/11tlons <Chicago: University of Chicago Pres.~. 1970). Also sec L. Laudan, Progress and li s Pmbl e ms (llerkcl t<y: Universiry of California Press, 1977); and S. Toulmin, Human Umlerstandt11g: The Cul/ectiue Use and Hvo/lt/ i<m of ()mcepl s (Princeron: l'rinceton University Press, 1972). 1 For an overview of the rr end see E. LePore & ]. Fodor, Hofüm: A Sh opper's Gttíde (Oxfo rd : Blackwell. 1991). An early and trenchant cr itique of pur e t!Xperien ce was W Quine , · Two Dogm as of Emp ric1sm ·. in From a logica/ Point of Vieu• (Cam hr i dg e, MA : Harvard L'níversity Prt!s.- . 196ll . pp . 2046. For the ex te ns ion of me an ing holi•m w theories of txli ef see W. Quinc & ]. Ullían, The Web of Belief (New Yo rk: Random H ou se, 1970). Argumentos de Ra7.ón Técnica, n" 8. 2005 J\OTES TOWARD AN A'.\:ALYSJS OF CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 15 Any attempt to bring an analysis of conceptual change into line with that of scientific changc is likely to face objections to the implicit equation of all concep tu al change with the .. reasonable · process that characterises science. In fact, however, the very developments in the philosophy and history of science to which I havc just refered also have contributed to a broader questioning of the model of scientific change asan inherently "reasonabJe .. proccss. This rethinking of science clearly suggests that we should operate not with a distinction between scientific and non-scientific change, but with one bctween "reasonable· and ·unreasonab[e. change. Although a complete analysis of conceptual change wou ld cover both sides of the latter distinction, we might begin by offering an analysis of · reasonable " change, while also noting that "t mreasonable · change is that motiva ted by rogue pro -attitudes and so best analysed in terms akin to hot irra ti onalities and even weakness of the wi!P. Although the following analysis concerns only .. reasonab[e. conceptual change , this <loes not mean that it applies only to cases in which people clearly strove over a period of time to devise a response to an anomaly, problem, or dilcmma. People often change their beliefs in a flash - the resolution of an issue, the answer to a question , comes to them in a moment. Wh en this happcns they do not seem to arrive at thcir new beliefs as a rcsu lt of a process of deliberation. This does not mean , however, that ·rcasonable" forms of explanatíon are inappropriate to such cases. We can never follow the actual psychological process by which índividuals make any conceptual change. Whenever we unpack such a psychological process, we do so by describing a series of psycho logical states -beliefs, proattitudes, and the like. No matt cr how many psychological states we thus identify. how eve r, wc always come up against the moment when one gives way to another. Wc always come up against the questions of why and how an initial psychological statc gave rise to ano th er . Any attempt to analyse conceptual change solcly in terms of psychological states necessarily runs aground on the rock of the natur e of the connections between such states. ·Reasonable· forms of explanation come into their own in providing us with a means of avoidi ng this rock. They enab le us to traverse those mo - ments when people actually change their beliefs since the concept of ·reasonableness .. provídes us with an account of how one psychologícal state can arise out of another '. See, for ex ample , D. Pears. Motívated In-atio11alitv (Oxford: Clarendon Press , 198-ll. The importance of rational or r ea sonabl e e xplana tions within the hum an sciences Argume ntos de Razón Técnica, nº 8, 2005 16 l\1ARK BEVlR An analysis of -reasonahle· conceptual change might begin from the philosophy of science as it has developcd during the broader philosophica l shift from atomistic empiricism ro meaning holism and the web of belief. Meaning holists arguc that a concep t. proposition, or belief gains mt: aning only within the context of a larger language or web of bdie r. One implica - tion of meaning holism thus appears to he that we should reject the possibility of pure experience or pun: reason as a hasis for belief formation . We can not attach meaning to cxperienccs. or begin to r eason . save in the context of an existing web of beliefs, which thus influences the co nt ent of our experiences and reasoning. J'vlea ning holism, in implyin g that t here are neith er pure observations nor self-supporting beliefs. also suggests that no single ohse rvation or logical principie provides a suffic ient analysis of concep tual change. Ce11ai nly people want their webs of bclief to coincide with their expe rien ce of real ity . hut their expcrie nce of reality is theory-laden, so an ohservati on alone can not require th em to change their beliefs. Hen ce. we can not analyse changes of belicf solely in terms of ohse r vations or experiences. Certainly too people seck lO make their webs of belief consistent. hut their beliefs refer to an externa! world, so rhc consist enc y they seek is consistency in terms of their understanding of the world. Thus, we can not analyse changes of helief so lcly by refen: nce to the in ner logic of a tradition or we b of belids. Recause webs of belief are networks of interconnected concepts mapping onto reality ar various points , we cm analyse con ceptual ch ange on ly hy exp loring the multiple ways in \Vhich a new undcrstancling interacts with an old web of heliefs. Sometimes we \Vil! have to show how a new experience promoted a new view of ol d theories. Ar other times we will luve ro shm v h ow a new theory promoced a new inter - pr etation of old exper iences. No single starti ng point underlies ali changes of be lief. Rather. be li efs develop in a lluctuating process wiú1 ali sons of heli ef-; pushing and pulling eme another in ali sorts of \vays. Meaning holisrn encourages us to locate conceptual change at the 1110menl when agents modify an inherited web of beliefs in response to ano ma li es , pro blems. or dilemmas. To l ocar<.: conceptual ch ange at this point is to suggest that it is a more or less ubiquitous feature of human li fe. People are always co nfronting slightly novel circumstances that require them to apply ha ~ long hecn rer ognise<l. See frum among man y R. Collingw0<x.I, 7bl! ld l!a of History. ed. T. Knox (Oxford: Clan: n<lon Prt:"-'· 19·1 <». pp . .20 5 -2:11 ; \V Dray. l.au-,; muf E\plmwti<lll 111 fl i story (C)xlord: Oxford l 'nin: risty Press. 1957> : l\1 . Oakeshott, ·H1swnrnl Event~ · . in On /li,rmy aJI(/ Other Essays COxf11rd : Ul ackwdl. 198:\l. pp · l~-96: and G. von Wrigh1 , F.\'fJ/mul/i<111 011<i r·1ul. ! 1~ttmdin¡; CLondon: Routledge. 1971 l See footnole 2 abo\·e. Argumcnws de Razlin TécniGt. n" 8. 2005 NOTES TOWARD AN A1'ALYSIS OF CONCEPTUAL CHANCE 17 anew the beliefs tbey inherítecl. Moreover, because the beliefs th at people inherit can not fix the critcria of their own application, when people confront novel circumstances, they have to develop their inheritance in what is thus a continua! process of conceptua l change. \Vhenever people confr ont a new situation, they must extend their inherited concepts to encompass it. Even if a tradition, paradigm, or discourse appears to tell people how they shoulcl do so, it actually can provide them at most with a guide to what they might do, not a rnle decicling what they must do . A tradition or paradigm can point peopk in a given di rection, but the only way t hey have of checking whether they have been true to it is by asking whether thcy and their fellow adherents are content with what they eventually decide to do. Thus, change occurs even on those occasions when people think they are aclhering strictly to a tradition the y regarcl as sacrosanct. The ubiquity of change also reflects the fact that people always think about . ancl perhaps try to improve upon , th ei r inheritance. Every time any - cme reflects on the concepts they inherit, they are li able to become aware of difficulties with those concep ts. and their concern to resol ve these difficulties typically \vi ll then prompt them to modify the concepts. Even if people think they are strivi ng only to unclerstand correctly a tradition they regard as sacrosanct, their effon to do so will involve their exercising their reason, which, in turn, \Vill entail their develop i ng the traclition. No doubt some traditions, such as one based on a single divine revelati on, encourage their adherents to describe the results of the ir reasoning as eluciclations, not inno\'ations. No doubt , moreover. some traditions, sueh as modern science, encourage their adherents actively to seek innovations. In both cases, how - ever, innovation necessarily occurs if only as a result of the humble effort to unde rstand what has gone before . Conceptual change doe s not occur as a series of ranclom fluctuations totally unrelated to human agency , nor is it exclusively the result of the se lf-conscious attempts of a few thinkers to devise a more coherent set of beliefs; rather, it occurs bec ause \Ve are agents who reflect on the traditio ns we in herit in the light of our own experiences ami the re by alter these traditions in accord with our own reasoning. l\.Ieaning holism provicles us \Vith the impe tous to search for a general analysis of ubiquitous conceptual change along the p ath already trodden by philosophers of science. Nonethdess, we hav e to modify the theories of Kuhn and Po pper if we are to make them serve us beyoncl the confines of scienc e - we have to rethink ,a nomalies .. and · problems • as ·dilernmas•. Kuhn in particular is le d by his focus on science to take for granted thin gs Argumentos <l e Ra7.<in T~cnica. n" 8. 2005 18 MARK BEVIR such as che predominantly empiri ca l nature of beliefs, a high leve! of agreement abo ut background theories, and a share <l com rnitment to advancing knowledge througb experimentacion. E ve n if these as su mptions are appropriate when one explores the sociology of conce ptual chang e in sci ence, they have no pla ce in an analysis of conceptual change more generall y. Not eve 1 yone rea sons in the ways that characterise the scientific community, so w t: can not ex plain ali changes in a ll webs of belief in the ways we might ex plain the changing conte nt of scicnti fic know ledge. Much of ou r an alysis of the co ncept of a dile mma , therefore, will consist of an emphasis on the neecl to ensure that it remains broader than che a lt ernatives deployed by philosophers of science. A dilemma is a ncw belief which merely by virtue of the fact that one ac ce pts it as tme poses a qu estion of one's existi ng belief s. It is import ant to recognise her e that we can not ident ify dilemmas ex clusively with fact s. Philoso phe rs of science are incline<l to clis cuss a nom a li es, problems, and the like as if they are typically factual beliefs gener at ed by expe riment s6. Even if th ey reasonably can do so in so far as they r es trict their attenti on to the case of science, once we l oo k beyond science we c an no longer do so. A fact can constitute a dilemma: for example, the <lis covery by Victorian geo logists that many rocks were far t oo old to fit into the cosmology that theologians h ad derived from the Bible constituted a dilemma for Chr istians who helieved Gencsis r eq uired the world to be ab out fi ve thousand years ole!. However, theories that are quite clistant from observations al so can constitute dilemmas: f or example, the theory of evolution proved an even greater stumbling-bl ock than geology for man y Victorian Christians. Even moral be li efs with little observational content can act as dilemmas: for exa mple , Vic t or ian Christians often reacted strongly ag ainst talk of he ll -fire an d eternal damnati on precisely because they believed these theological doctrines were immorar. So, a new understanding can constitue a dilemma wherever it mi ght lie on the spectrum that passes from exempla1y perce ptions with li ttle th eore tical content to comp lex th eo retical constructions with only a distant basis in perceptions. What turns an understanding int o a clilemma is the authority it pos seses for thc person for whom it consti tutes a d il emma , and it acquires this autho rity simply bec au se that pe r so n acOne notable excepcion is Kuhn's ad m1rnhle co ncern to a ll ow for ·inventions, or novclties of theory,· as we ll as ·discovc ri es of fact,. an <l his e4ually adm irable r ewgn ition of t he -excee<l in gly anificial· nature of the distinclion between the twu. Ku hn. Stmctttr<! of Scümtific Rec 10 /utions. p. 52. - J. Altholz. ·The Warfare of Consci ence wi rh Th eo logy·. in .J. Altholz, e<l .. 'fbe M ind ami Art of l'icto rian E11gla11d (Minneapolis: University of Mi nnesOla Press, 1976) , pp. 58-7 7. Argument os de Razón Técnica, n" 8, 2005 NOTES TOW AHD AN ANALY SIS OF CONCEPTl JA L CJ-JANGE 19 cepts it as trne. When p eop le acce pt an understanding as true, they c ome to beli eve it, so they incorpora te it into the ir existing webs of be lief, and they th er eby necessari ly e xtend or oth e1wise modify their helicfs. Whenever \ Ve come to believe something ne w, we confront tht: dilemma of how we are going to inco rporate it wit hin our existing web of be li efs. Here too we have a contrast between th e concep t of a dilemma and sitnila r con cep ts found in th e philosophy of s cience . The stab ili ty of science - the fact tha t most changes in scientific beliefs extend existing theories rather tha n ov erturning them - encourages phil os o phers of science, notably Kuhn, to focus on the rare anomalics that l ead scien ti sts to renounce a number of entrenched thcories. Anomalies are the rare pieces of factual evidence or theo retical innovations that co nflict with t he t hen established paracligm. In Kulm's vie'N. then, anoma li es are responsible only for t he occasional, revolutionary transformation: most conceptua l change occurs when .scientists extend a ruling paradigm. He says, " res istance guarantees that scientis ts will not be li ghtly distract ed and that the anomalies that le ad to parad igm change will penetrate existing knowledge to the core·". Dilemmas, in contrast, arise a li the time, for they include no t on ly the rare anomalies that prompt scicntists to make drastic changes to their wcb s of belief. but also the concerns that prompt scientists to e xtend pre vai li ng theo ries during a period of normal science, a mi even the trivial puzzles that lead ali of u.s to aclopt new be liefs ali the time in our eve ryday existence. An analysis of dilemmas sh ou ld distinguish them not only fr om Kuhn's anoma lies, but also from the more objectivist prob l ems invoked by Po pper. Although philo soph ers of science, induding Kuhn, sometimes ap pe ar to ascr ibe to anomalies or proh l ems an ex i stence independent of indivi duals, we can of ten un pack th eir concepts as int er -subjective emes; we ca n say that the strong con sensu s among scientists means an a nom aly or prob l em in science usua lly afflicts a numb er of scientists who share the beliefs that give it its char acter''. Poppe r, in contras c, explicitly rejects any such intersu bjcctive acco unt of problems in favour of objectivism. He claims that pmblems exist in depcndent ly of the be lief s of every ind ivi dua l subject. He writes, for e xam ple, that prob lems " need not have their con scious co unt er - pa 1t " and even · where th ey havc their cons cious coun terpart, the conscious Kuhn, S ci<! nlijic Remlutwns, p. 65 Kuhn, for ex ample , rath er surpri singly talks of anomalies appe aring bc: ca use of a •r c:c:og ni tion that naturc h;ts so mehow vJ ulated the paradigminduc ed expecta t ion s that govern norm al science • Ihid.. pp . 52-3. Surely, however. it h peopl e" s inter-subjcctive beli efa a bout nature. not nature itsel f. which c:hallcnge par.id igrns. Arg umentos de H¡ tzcín Técnica, n" 8. 200~ 20 MARK BEVI R prohlem m:ed nor co incide with the objective prohlem . 10 . Popper reaches his ohjectivist vi ew of prohlems hecause he regards them as cl ifficulties in rheories 1ha1 themselvcs ex ist ind epende ntly of eve1y individual sub j ec t in World-thr ee . According to Popper , \Vurld-one is the ph ysical world of particles, waves. a ncl the like: \X'o rld-t wo is the mental one of sta te s of con sciou sness, including beliefs. emotions. an d the li ke: a nd World-three consists of the products of conscious ncss. such as t he or etical systems, cri!ical arguments , and prob lems. World-three consists of objectivc rhoughts that posse ss an aut onomo us exist cn ce quite apa rt from the actual beliefa of individuals: it contai ns !he i ntended and un inrend e<l prod ucts of i ndi vi dual min ds in so far as thcy persis! inde pen<lently of a ll minds in thin gs such as biological organs. language. ami books. TI1e we akness of Pop¡ x: r's posi!ion ap pe ars in thc no tion that th e theories. arguments, ancl problems puhlish ed in jo urna ls ::.md books are mere marks on pages apart fr om when particular indivi<luals attach meanings to them. As marks on pages. mo r eove r. th ey are mean ingless, an<l so do not cons titute theories. arguments, and prohlems at ali. A theory is a theory on ly if it is held hy somco ne. What is more. hecause th ere are no theor ies in a Poppe ri an Wo rl d-rh n.:e. there can not be objective prohlcms afl1i cting them. Heca use any theory must be a suhjective or inrersubjective one held by panicular in<l ivid ua ls. problems nrnst be suhjective or i nt ersub j ect ivc dilemmas. Imagine that Popper reconstructed an ohjective World-three prob l ems it uation as X, where X makes it ra ti onal for sci ent ists to he li e\'e Y. so that Pop per could explains a scicntist believing Y by saying it was the rational thing to do in the situation X. Imagi ne now, h owe ver , th at the scientist's suhjecti\'e understan<ling of the prohlcm-siluation in \Xforld -t wo was Z, not X. Surcly 've cm n ot accept Popper's analysis that the scien ti st hdiev cd Y because the pr o blem -situation was X? Surcly we must ana lyse thc rel evant concep mal c hang e in tcr ms of the scicnrist com ín g to be li eve Y in the context of his or her suhjectivc unclerstan<ling Z? Le t us t urn n ow fr om the dil emmas that i nsp ire c han ge s of belief to the nature of the c hanges they inspire. The way peop le res pond to any gin :n dilcmma r dlects hoth the character of the cl ilemma and the conte nt of their existing wehs of b did . Consi der the influe nce of the cha racter of a 1" P opper, OIHecfire Km nrleJRe. p. 2~2. Ar gumt · ntos de Ra zcin T.:cnica. n" H. 2005 NOTES TOWARD A':\ A:\Al.YS!S OF CONCEl'TlJAl. CHAl\:GE 21 dilemma on the changes people make in response to it. When confro nted with a new understanding , peo ple must eith er reject it or develop the ir existing beliefa to a cco mmodate it. If they rej ec t ir , their beliefs wi ll re main un cha n ged. If they de\ ·elop the ir beliefs to accommodate ir, they mus t do so in a way that makes room for it, so t hc m od ifications they make to thei r belids must rdkct its character. To face a dilemma is to ask what an aut ho ritativc un der standing says about how the world is, an d. of course, to ask a qucstion is always to adopt a persp ec ti ve from whic: h to look for an a nsw er. Every dilemma thus points us to ways in whic h we might resolve it. For example, se\·eral Victorians resolved the conflict they percei ved be - 1\ vee n faith al1(1 the theory of evo lu tion by arguing that Go d is irnmanent in the evolution: ll y process -God worked through natural processes in the \vorld, rath er tban inteffcning miraculously from beyond. They recunciled t he thco1y of evo lut ion with a belief in God by presenting the eYolutionary process as itself a manifcstation of God's wi ll. Their new web of beliefs induded a n. :ligious rendition of the new unde rst:rnding th:.ll constilu te d a dilemma for them . Consider now the infl ue n ce of people·s exL~ting we bs of belief on the nature uf the cha n ges the y make in r es ponse 10 a dilemma. lf peoplc are tu acconunodate a new u nde rstanding, th ey must h oo k it on to aspects of their existing belicfs, whcrc the co nt ent uf the ir existing beliefs makes certain hooks ava il able to them. To find a home for a new be li ef among the ir existing emes, they have to connect the two, and the conne cti ons they ca n make clepend on th e na t ur e uf their existing be li efs. When we r eac t to a clilemma. we do so by drawing on themes a lr eady present in our beliefs , and this means that th ese t he mes necessarily infl uence the way in which o ur be li efs change. For cxamp le, thc p amh eis ti c heliefs associa te d with t he romantics provicled s orne Victorians \Vith a hook on which to han g a theory of evolution. Th ey moved from a pan theistic faith in nature as a mude of Gocl's being by way uf the theory of evo luti on to an im mane nti st fa ith according to which God worked bis wi ll through natural processes in the world. They reconcil ed the theory of evo lution with faith in God by hooking the former on to panthe istic themes in their existing beliefs. Their new web of he liefs incorporat ed an cvolutionary rendition of them es dr awn from their ol cl one. Af ter people find hooks in their existi ng we hs of beli ef on which ro hang the unde rsta nding co nstitutive of a dilemma, they ha ve to go on to modify severa! m ore uf t heir existi ng be liefa. To see why th is is so, we need to remem h cr that meaning holism implies that our bel iefs m ap onto A r gu nH ~ nto~ de Haz <" in Té rnka. n" 8. 200~