Negotiating with logical-linguistic protocols in a dialogical framework.

Universidad de Sevilla Escuela Internacional de Doctorado DEPARTAMENTO DE FILOSOFÍA Y LÓGICA Y FILOSOFÍA DE LA CIENCIA Línea de investigación: FILOSOFÍA DE LA NATURALEZA Y DEL CONOCIMIENTO Programa de doctorado: SER HUMANO, NATURALEZA Y CULTURA NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK ― Maria Dolors Martínez Cazalla ― Director: Prof. Dr. Ángel Nepomuceno Fernández Tutor período de investigación en la Universidad Tutor: Prof. Dr. Francisco Rodríguez Valls de Lille-3, Francia: Prof. Dr. Shahid Rahman Curso académico 2016/17 PhD thesis sponsored by To my family NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS “They try to kill off competition; Then, bankrupt take an expedition, For, having slashed their prices downward, Their best direction’s out of townward; If one of them won’t cut the price His brothers won’t be overnice, For if the customer is tight, The goods he gets will serve him right; The masters now make shoddy wares: If they can sell’em then who cares? But such a business will not keep: To by stuff dear and sell things cheap; Some tradesmen underestimate A deal, then take the city gate. Whoever loves bargain, he Won’t get much for a guarantee. They makes so much a little cost; They sell it quick and nothing’s lost; They profit from a slick veneer Now honest tradesmen disappear.” 1 I would like to thank all the people who teach me the ‘game’ of negotiations, even when the honest tradesmen disappear. However, he is just a possible (as an option) element of the game. What is really important and exciting is the game itself. I thank my family and my teachers for teaching me how to play, to love the game of Life: the art of ‘trading’ and ‘negotiating’ with Life every moment of my life. Thank you, family and teachers, for teaching me to enjoy Life! 1 BRANT, S. (1494). The Ship of Fools. Quoted by MARSH, P.D.V. 1984: 387. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 5 I would particularly like to say a special word of gratitude to Professor Dr Nepomuceno at the University of Seville and Professor Dr Rahman at the University of Lille-3, who have made possible this work. Without them I could not have done it. Thank you for your trust, support and teachings. Above all, thank you for making me a better person! I would especially like to express a word of gratitude to Ms. Cantarero for being like a ‘personal assistant’ to me. Without her dedication and care I could not have made it. Thank you for walking, even running, up and down for me! Very BIG thanks to my sponsor, Leffe Abbey, for making my last stretch easy and sweet! I would also like to thank my students: Alvi, Andrés, Javi, José Domingo, Marcos, Sebastián and Toño. Their questions improved my reflection. Thank you for challenging me! I would like to thank all my friends too, for their support and for putting up with me during this time. Thank you for being my relief! My most sincere thanks to Dr Asteria Albert. Thank you for your help with English! Lastly, I would to thank all the readers of this work. Thank you for your time! NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 6 Even, What has been, that will be; what has been done, that will be done. Nothing is new under the sun! Ecclesiastes 1, 9 2 There may be other knowledges to acquire, other questions to consider, starting, not from that what others have known, but from what they have ignored MOSCOVICI 3 2 USCCB (2011). The New American Bible, Revised Edition (NABRE). Retrieved from http://www.usccb.org/bible/ecclesiastes/1, checked on April 3, 2017. 3 Our translation for: “Puede que actualmente haya otros conocimientos que adquirir, otras cuestiones que plantearse, partiendo, no de lo que los demás han conocido, sino de lo que han ignorado”. S. MOSCOVICI. Quoted by MORIN, E. 1986: 20. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 7 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 8 ACT I: The Bridge ......................................................................................................... 12 Chapter 1.1: The Bridge. Is it a useful game to make rational decisions in the world of negotiations? ........................................................................................ 17 Chapter 1.2: Bridge application to the 1st Camp David Accords ....................... 25 Chapter 1.3: The Bridge. A bridge toward negotiations. Lights and Shadows .. 36 ACT II: Neuro-Linguistic Patterns (NLP) ..................................................................... 40 Chapter 2.1: Are NLP a useful tool to make rational decisions in the world of negotiations? ....................................................................................................... 42 Chapter 2.3: How do Linguistic Patterns work in our mind? ............................. 44 Chapter 2.3: Shadows under the light of NLP ................................................... 47 ACT III: Cryptic language: Russian Cards ................................................................... 49 Chapter 3.1: Hunting Hackers. Is it useful to think like a ‘mute guest’ to prepare a negotiation talk thoroughly? ............................................................................ 51 Chapter 3.2: Two lessons from the ‘mute guest’ ............................................... 69 Chapter 3.3: Dialogical Framework Pattern. A light in the darkness ................ 71 CONCLUSIONS: Negotiating with logical-linguistic protocols in a dialogical framework ...................................................................................................................... 74 BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................... 80 ANNEX: Study case: 1st Camp David Accords ............................................................. 92 NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 8 INTRODUCTION Even when, “nothing is new under the sun” (Eccl. 1, 9) “There may be other knowledges to acquire, other questions to consider, starting, not from that what others have known, but from what they have ignored” (MOSCOVICI) 4 by choice or by chance, that is not relevant, the question is thinking about something un-thought at the moment. That is the hazardous passion developed here and you are invited to share it. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK is the result of years of reflection. Some time ago, working in commodities we could feel how difficult it was to decide the order of the arguments used during the negotiation process. As in a Bridge game, we translated the arguments according to the rules of Bridge and saw how it worked to deal with them as in a Bridge hand, playing them and seeing what would happen. The results were impressive. We were thrilled about the potential for improvement on the negotiation process. We decided to investigate deeper on the possibility to undertake negotiations applying Bridge rules to organize the order of arguments. This was the subject of a previous paper (2011): The BRIDGE. A bridge TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS 5 . It was the first formal attempt to establish a protocol to know the best order to use the arguments during the negotiation process, by converting them into cards and play a Bridge hand. However, as will be shown later, the study revealed some limitations. This subsequent work is an attempt to reduce these limitations. The new work should be more scientific and precise, so the decision was taken to start a PhD in Logic as the best framework and tool to develop a research on this subject. Following this path, the idea of turning arguments into cards to play a Bridge hand expanded progressively and went one step ahead just exploring: players, cards, 4 Our translation for: “Puede que actualmente haya otros conocimientos que adquirir, otras cuestiones que plantearse, partiendo, no de lo que los demás han conocido, sino de lo que han ignorado”. S. MOSCOVICI (see footnote 3). 5 MARTÍNEZ, M.D. (2011). Master’s thesis available at the Library of Economics, Social, Political and Communication Sciences (BSPO) at the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL). NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 9 deals and the information hidden in the player’s announcements and in the cards and/or in the deals. This new angle brought the research to the neurolinguistics patterns –NLP- and cryptic languages, like Russian Cards (van DITMARSCH, 2008). Finally this PhD thesis is an attempt to think how to create logical dialogues to tackle negotiations, meaning: solving conflicts from basic linguistic structures (conjunctions; disjunctions; conditionals) placed under a dialogue form as a cognitive system which ‘understands’ natural language and where there is a permanent feed-back between both. This paper aims to show and to share just a path, not a conquered territory, to negotiate in a dialogical framework and remain always open to any possible improvement. It will be like a ‘tragedy’ in three ‘acts’. Each ‘Act’ will be a ‘conceptual mimesis’ of the arguments used during the negotiation process to produce a ‘catharsis’, an improvement on the negotiation process. The three ‘acts’ have a spiral form, the first one is the Bridge, the second the Neuro-Linguistic Patterns (hereunder, NLP) and the third is the cryptic language Russian Cards. Therefore, the procedure of this thesis will be to study each part in accordance with its contribution and its limitations. Step by step our task will be to address ourselves to the limitations with the aim to reduce of them. Conclusions will be just to show a possible map, a guide to choose the order of arguments in negotiations. The structure of each ‘Act’, as a step of this path, will be: 1. A presentation on the appropriateness and accommodation of the specific subject in the whole of the research. 2. Application to prepare negotiations. 3. Lights and shadows, or some interesting considerations to keep in mind for planning negotiations. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 16 In this way, our Act I, composed by three chapters, will be the path to discover why the Bridge game is useful to make rational decisions in the world of negotiations and where its limitations are. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 17 Chapter 1.1: The Bridge. Is it a useful game to make rational decisions in the world of negotiations? [This chapter is taken from MARTÍNEZ, M.D., 2011: 28-35. You will find in square brackets the additions and/or alterations to the original text.] We suggest studying the Bridge game because we believe that it is the best to make rational decision in the world of negotiations ‘Why do we believe that?’ Because the Game Theory is based on the analysis of the microcosm of games and the Bridge is a communication strategic game 9 , then, it could be probable the best refection of a negotiation. In order to answer this question it will necessary to analyse the Bridge, following a step by step process, so we can prove the Bridge is a game useful to make rational decisions and more specifically, it is the best illustration about what happen in a negotiation. To do, we will answer three questions: ‘What is its ontology?’; ‘What is its epistemology?’ and ‘How can we say that the Bridge belongs to the Game Theory?’ The Bridge ontology Before starting with the analysis of the Bridge ontology we need to define the concept of ‘ontology’. Ontology is “a branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature and relations of being.” 10 But, in the case of the Bridge game ‘which will be the nature and relations of its being in itself?’ To answer this question we will use a much modern definition of ‘ontology’: “an explicit specification of a conceptualization” 11 Therefore, we need to describe the underlying conceptualization in the explicit Bridge specification. 9 Cf. Robert Kast, opus cit., p. 11. 10 Definition of word ‘Ontology’ in: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1st meaning. Source online: http://www.britannica.com/bps/dictionary?query=ontology Authorized website of the Encyclopædia Britannica. 11 Thomas R. Gruber, “Toward Principles for the Design of Ontologies used for Knowledge Sharing”. In: Formal Ontology in Conceptual Analysis and Knowledge Representation, by Nicola Guarino & Roberto Poli (eds.). Norwell (Massachusetts), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, Source online: http://itee.uq.edu.au/~infs3101/_Readings/OntoEng.pdf Authorized website of the School of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering at the University of Queensland (Australia). NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 18 The explicit Bridge specification responds to its conceptualization. This is the relation by means of a pack of cards equally shared between all players. The nature of relations between beings (players) appears covered behind its conceptualization, the conceptualization of a common language between the players. Therefore, the ontology, which we are talking about, will be a ‘semantic ontology’ since “A semantic ontology is a conceptualization, common to a community of agents that understand natural language, of the categories and relations that pervade the agents’ environment as a whole. It can be used to specify the logical form as the truth-functional meaning of agent messages embedded in natural language. (…)” 12 Then we will analyse the Bridge language to know its ontology, its being. The Bridge language is common to its four players, but the players are divided into two pairs (named: North-South, the host pair, and East-West, the visiting pair). The relation between pairs is non-cooperative, but inside the pair the keep a cooperative relation. Through a conceptualized language, common to the community of players, the players reach an accord about which will be the trumps (not-trumps is other possibility of trumps). The game’s object is to reach the best communication possible between players of the same pair that use a common language, which is also kwon by the other pair. The objective is to reach the maximum of possible tricks from the probabilistic and combinatorial calculus. Apparently, the Bridge is a non-cooperative game in itself, but in the Bridge, the winner is the pair that in more turns has reached the 100% of the possible tricks, for that is strictly necessary a kind of ‘collaboration’ between the pairs. [In an ideal hand, which is quite habitual in Bridge], when a pair [proponent] obtains a trick of surplus is not because it has played very well, it is always because the other pair [opponents] has played wrongly; and when a pair [proponent] don’t obtains all the possible tricks is not because it has played wrong, it is always because the opponents 12 Luc Schneider & Jim Cunningham, “Ontological Foundations of Natural Language. Communication in Multi-agent Systems”. In: Knowledge Based Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems, by V. Palade, R. J. Howlett & L. Jain (eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2003, Vol. 2773, p. 1403- 1410. Source online: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.58.3373&representative Authorized website of the NEC Research Institute, Princeton (New Jersey), it is a scientific literature digital library and search engine that focuses primarily on the literature in computer and information science. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 19 have played very well. Therefore, in the Bridge there is always an intrinsic collaboration process. Every obtained trick on top or below average will be a ‘gift’ (on top average) or a ‘lost’ (below average), but never the game in itself. To understand this apparent paradox it will be necessary to analyse the Bridge epistemology. The Bridge epistemology We will start by offering a definition of 'epistemology’. Epistemology is “the study or a theory of the nature and grounds of knowledge especially with reference to its limits and validity.” 13 If the nature of the Bridge is founded on the mathematical principles, then in order to know the structure of Bridge it will be necessary to apply reasoning in accordance with mathematical logics’ principles, as ‘logic’ is “a science that deals with the principles and criteria of validity of inference and demonstration: the science of the formal principles of reasoning.” 14 Therefore, our mission will be to discover the logic that lies behind its ontology, as “(...) Formally, an ontology is the statement of a logical theory.” 15 Therefore, our question shall be connected with the underlying Bridge logic. This logic will be founded on the probabilistic combinatorial mathematical principles. […] the Bridge is played by four players, and as the pack of cards has 52 cards, and then each player will have 13 cards. This 13 cards are obtained by random distribution (C1352 C1339 C1326 = 52! / 13! 13! 13! 13!) 16 . This is the first step of the game and the only hazardous. From here, all the others steps will be an application, more or less correct [the correction degree only depends of the player qualities], of the 13 Definition of word ‘Epistemology’ in: Encyclopædia Britannica, 2nd meaning. Source online: http://www.britannica.com/bps/dictionary?query=epistemology Authorized website of the Encyclopædia Britannica. 14 Definition of word ‘Logic’ in: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1st a (1) meaning. Source online: http://www.britannica.com/bps/dictionary?query=logic Authorized website of the Encyclopædia Britannica. 15 Thomas R. Gruber, opus cit. 16 Cf. Émile Borel & André Chéron, Théorie Mathématique du Bridge à la Portée de Tous. Paris, Éditions Jacques Gabay, 2009, p. 38. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 20 probabilistic combinatorial mathematical principles. As the game implies to get the highest number of possible tricks, every time that a player plays a card, the others must play a card too. The played cards will be only those which fulfill the rules of the game: they must always play a card of the same suit. If they don't have any, then there are two possibilities: either they play trumps or they play other suit. The winner of the trick is the one who has played the highest of the played suit or who has played the highest of the trumps, if they are playing trumps. If they are playing not-trumps then, the winner trick will always be the highest of the played suit. We will have always the following situation: whoever starts the game will choose a card (C113), and then the next players will have two possibilities: 1. If they have cards in the played suit, then they will choose from those in the played suit (C1n=number of cards in the played suit). 2. If they don’t have cards in the played suit, then they will choose from others cards. Again, there are two more possibilities: 2.1. If we play at trumps: 2.1.1. Then we can play a trumps card (C1n=number of cards in trumps). 2.1.2. Then we can play a card of other suit (C1n=number of cards in other suit). 2.2. If we play at not-trumps: always we have the possibility to play any card (C113). Evidently, in every game, we have a smaller possibility (C113-n [n=] number of played games, being n according to the chose case (case 1 or case 2 –2.1.1.; 2.1.2. or 2.2–). Therefore, in each trick we have less possibilities of ‘the possible’ cases. This makes very important the choice of the card to play, because once a card has been played, that card will not be available for the next game. This makes really important to choose the card which is in ‘perfect symmetry’. Any card has its value in itself, the value, is the same for each card and we need to know when to play them. This is the explanation of our paradox, this necessity of ‘perfect symmetry’ is the key to obtain the 100% of the possible tricks, and for that is NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 21 strictly necessary that each player plays the ‘symmetric’ card. Because of this we can say that the Bridge is a cooperative game but it is hidden behind a non-cooperative face. Being the Bridge a game with such complexity: non-cooperative between the pairs, but at the same time cooperative between the pairs, ‘can we say that the Bridge belongs to the Game Theory?’ The Bridge belongs to the Game Theory? According to the analysis [of the] […] Game Theory 17 , we can conclude that the Bridge belongs to the Game Theory. Then, it will be a game: non-cooperative/cooperative; two collective parties (two pairs) and one issue (the game in itself). The goal is to achieve a specific effect by applying one strategy, and this achievement will be founded on the probabilistic mathematical calculus. In the Bridge, the hazard is only present at the moment of the distribution of cards, but never during the development of the game. In fact, the Bridge belongs to the category of the ‘ideal games’ 18 , being the characteristics of these games: “(1) Common knowledge. There is full common knowledge of (a) the rationality of both players (whatever that turns out to mean), and (b) the strategy structure of the game for all players, and the preferences that each has with respect outcomes. The force of this condition is that a player ‘i’ knows something that is relevant to a rational resolution of its decision problem, then any other player ‘j’ knows that player ‘i’ has that knowledge. This is a typically taken to imply (among other things) that one player cannot have a conclusive reason, to which no other player has access, for 17 Cf. MARTÍNEZ, M.D., 2011: 20-24. 18 Cf. Edward F. McClennen, “Rational Choice in the Context of Ideal Games”. In: Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, by Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.). New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 47-60. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 22 choosing in a certain manner. That is, there are not hidden arguments for playing one way as opposed to another. In addition, one invariably finds that the analysis proceeds by appeal to the following (at least partial) characterization of rational behaviour for the individual participant. (2) Utility maximization. Each player’s preference ordering over the abstractly conceived space of outcomes and probability distributions over the events that condition such outcomes can be represented by utility function, unique up to positive affine transformations, that satisfies the expected-utility principle. (3) Consequentialism. Choice among available strategies is strictly a function of the preferences the agent has with respect to the outcomes (or disjunctive set of outcomes) associated with each strategy. Following Hammond (1988), condition (3) can be taken to imply that strategies are nothing more than neutral access routes to outcomes (or disjunctions of outcomes); the latter are what preferentially count for the agent. In particular, then, if two strategies yield exactly the same probabilities of the same outcomes occurring, then the agent will be indifferent between those strategies.” 19 We can recognize the Bridge ontology and epistemology in these three characteristics of the ‘ideal games’. Therefore, we can assume the Bridge as belonging to the Game Theory. But then, ‘will it be a useful game to make rational decisions in the world of negotiations?’ It should be noted that the term ‘common knowledge’ as is understood here, does not necessarily have the same meaning as it may have in the context of epistemic logic. 19 Edward F. McClennen, opus cit., p. 47-48. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 23 Is the Bridge a useful game to make rational decisions in the world of negotiations? Following […] [the] Decision Theory 20 , the more rational decision would be found in the intersection point between the ‘f(optimization)’ and ‘f(satisfaction)’. As the satisfaction cannot be objectively calculated (the level of satisfaction is always subjective) the rationality of the decision remains on the side of the objectivity, that is in the optimization, and as in the games both are mixed, and the result of a game speaks about its optimization, then the Game Theory will be useful to find the ‘intersection point’. Furthermore, in accord with […] [the] Negotiation Theory 21 , if the rationality of the decision-making, in the course of a negotiation, can be addressed by the rational study of the ‘game’ that represents the negotiation then we can state that the Bridge is a useful game to make rational decision in the world of negotiations. At this point, it seems that our question is solved; but incisive minds [still] have another question: ‘Why have we chosen the Bridge as game to make rational decisions in the world of negotiations and not any other game?’ There are two answers, one more theoretical and the other one more connected with life. From a theoretical point of view, the Bridge fulfils the characteristics for a game to make rational decision in the world of negotiations. It is a cooperative game with two parties and same issue, but at the same time, the Bridge is a non-cooperative game. In short, even if the ideal game to negotiate is a cooperative game (collaborationcompromise), always the bargaining will be also a competition. In fact, in almost all negotiations, the real situation is a ‘bargaining mix’ 22 ; in the agreement there is a part fruit of the collaboration and another part fruit of the competition. In addition, the Bridge is a non-hazard game. It is a perfect mathematical symmetry; where the use of ‘dialog’ intra-pair and inter-pairs is a ruled system where there is a constant maintenance of common knowledge 23 . Also, the fact that the winner is the pair that in 20 Cf. MARTÍNEZ, M.D., 2011: 15-19. 21 Cf. MARTÍNEZ, M.D., 2011: 25-27. 22 Cf. R. Lewicki, Bruce Barry & David Saunders, opus cit., p. 38. 23 Cf. R. Kiel & M. Schader, “Using Dialog-Controlled Rule Systems in a Maintenance Module for Knowledge Bases”. In: Annals of Operations Research, by Peter L. Hammer (ed.). Basel, J. C. Baltzer NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 24 more turns has reached the 100% of the possible tricks, that entails that the intersection point of optimization and satisfaction is really very near, it is nearly placed on top. From other point of view, the Bridge includes the characteristics of the life itself. If we analyse each instant of our life, we could see that we always have a partner, even hidden, but that provides us with something which we have not but that we really need in that precise moment of our life. At the same time, there is always somebody, even hidden, who doesn’t want that we reach our goal. The elements that we have in favor or against our goal, they are the ‘life’s cards’, it will depend on the way we play them, that will achieve a higher, or lesser, degree of optimization and satisfaction in our own life. If we are strong in one of the elements, we will struggle to lean on it, and consequently will [propose to] play at ‘trumps’; if we are more or less strong in all the elements, we will try to lean on all, and then we shall play at ‘not-trumps’. Therefore we have chosen the Bridge because we believe it is the best to make rational decisions in the world of negotiations and in the sphere of life. The ‘game of Life’: the art of ‘trading’ and ‘negotiating’ with Life at every moment of the life. And the Bridge is the best theoretical representation of the ‘game of Life’. [We will test it in the next chapter.] AG, 1994, Vol. 52 (Decision Theory and Decision Systems by K. Mosler & M. Schader (eds.)), p. 171- 180. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 25 Chapter 1.2: Bridge application to the 1st Camp David Accords [This chapter is taken from MARTÍNEZ, M.D., 2011: 71-81. You will find in square brackets the additions and/or alterations to the original text.] [Before starting this chapter, please allow us to create a scenario for the application] Let us imagine that we are on August 1978. It is summer time, we are enjoying our holydays and the telephone rings. The prestigious editor in chief of a foreign affairs magazine –who knows our great love of the Bridge and our great interest [in] […] negotiationsproposes us the challenge of writing an article for his magazine. This article must be a prediction about what will happen, what will be the possible rational agreement at the next Camp David Accords (scheduled by the next month, September 1978). But this article will have a condition: the prediction can only be based in a virtual Bridge game played among the leaders reunited at the summit (Begin, Sadat and Carter). And we, perhaps because of the heat’s drowsiness, perhaps because we are ‘crazy’ who loves logical challenges, we do accept. (MARTÍNEZ, M.D., 2011: 70). [Remember that the objective information about what happened can be found in the annex document. This information will always be available to corroborate the Bridge application against our study case.] The starting point for this chapter is two questions: ‘Is this Bridge game, the element that bridges both spirals in the specific case of […] negotiations?’ ‘Could it be a tool for a rational analysis of […] negotiations?’ To answer them, as we are proposing […] [during the introductory pages to this ‘Act’], we will apply a hypothetical game’s Bridge on the ‘future’ possible agreement at Camp David Accords. So, they game starts and our only available information is the available literature about the history between their relationships and their preparation for future meetings. Both, information and literature are very weak because at this time (this imaginary NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 32 K: Cultural argument in pro Jerusalem East. Value in itself=3 points. For Sadat (It is the third Muslim Holy City). Q: Cultural argument in pro the Sinai Peninsula. Value in itself=2 points. For Sadat (Is is the memorable territory of Egypt). J: Cultural argument in pro the Sinai Peninsula. Value in itself=2 points. For Sadat (The Sinai is the facto a historical Egyptian territory). 10: Cultural argument in pro the West Bank. Value in itself=0 points. For Sadat (The majority population is Palestine). 9: Cultural argument in pro the West Bank. Value in itself=0 points. For Begin (It is located into the Holy Land’s border). 8: Cultural argument in pro Gaza. Value in itself=0 points. For Sadat (The majority of the population is Egyptian/Palestine. It is an old Egyptian territory previously to the ’67 War). 7: Cultural argument in pro Gaza. Value in itself=0 points. For Begin (It is located into the Holy Land’s border). 6: Cultural argument in pro the Golan Heights. Value in itself=0 points. For Sadat (The majority of the population is Palestine or Muslim). 5: Cultural argument in pro the Golan Heights. Value in itself=0 points. For Begin (It is located into the Holy Land’s border). 4, 3 and 2: The added cultural generic value over the occupied territories. Value in itself=0 points. 4 and 2: to Sadat (The majority of the population on the occupied territories is Egyptian, Palestine and or Muslim, but not Jewish); 3: to Begin (Four out of the five territories are into the Holy Land’s border). Now, we know the options. The result is as follows: For Begin: ♠ As, Q, 10, 8, 6, 4, 2 = 7 cards/6 points in ♠ ♥ As, Q, 10, 9, 8, 6, 5, 4, 2 = 9 cards/6 points in ♥ NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 33 ♦ As, K, J, 9, 7, 5, 2 = 7 cards/8 points in ♦ ♣ As, 9, 7, 5, 3 = 5 cards/4 points in ♣ Total cards: C2852 Total points: P2440 For Sadat: ♠ K, J, 9, 7, 5, 3 = 6 cards/4 points in ♠ ♥ K, J, 7, 3 = 4 cards/4 points in ♥ ♦ Q, 10, 8, 6, 4, 3 = 6 cards/2 points in ♦ ♣ K, Q, J, 10, 8, 6, 4, 2 = 8 cards/6 points in ♣ Total cards: C2452 Total points: P1640 Now it is the moment to kwon ‘which will be the trumps?’ But before, we would like to point out that though the number of cards is not equal in both, this is not a real problem, because the difference can be considered itself negligible, as we are considering a balance of +/- 2 cards [per player] and the score in points represents 24/40=60% for Begin and 16/40=40% for Sadat. This difference is acceptable because we need to have at least one player with the 30% of the points, in our case there are two players (not four), with 60% of points. So, it is evident that Begin will decide on the trumps (he has the majority, 60%, of the points at stake and in this case also the cards, 107.6%). To play a suit trumps is necessary to have at least the half + 1 of possible cards on this suit (13/2=6.5≈7cards) and desirable the half +2 that means 8 cards. Begin would like to play at trumps in hearts, but Sadat would like to play at trumps in clubs. As Begin is stronger at all suits, even in clubs because he has the AS + 4 cards to support this AS, he will decide that the trumps will be not-trumps. Sadat will agree to play at not-trumps. In the Bridge terminology the agreement is expressed as: 1♥ Begin, 2♣ Sadat, 3NT Begin, Pass NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 34 Sadat. The game starts and the promise is: ‘I, Begin, promise that playing at Not- Trumps, I will achieve at least 18 tricks (because they are 9 to 4 players) over the possible 24 (not 26, as it would be, 52/2, because Egypt only has 24 cards)’. We are ready to the crucial moment of our game. Begin ♠ As, Q, 10, 8, 6, 4, 2 ♥ As, Q, 10, 9, 8, 6, 5, 4, 2 ♦ As, K, J, 9, 7, 5, 2 ♣ As, 9, 7, 5, 3 ♠ K, J, 9, 7, 5, 3 ♥ K, J, 7, 3 ♦ Q, 10, 8, 6, 4, 3 ♣K, Q, J, 10, 8, 6,4,2 Sadat Sadat starts the game, at not-trumps is convenient to play the fourth of the long suit, or the highest of the sequence of long suit, in our case is the second. Then Sadat will play K♣, it is the only possibility to reinforce the Q♣ and J♣, because Begin will use the AS in other suits to reinforce his position and if Sadat plays before Begin, he will always lose. The only possibility for Sadat is to agree with everything, although he could remember his political and financial force. But, the only feasible options for Sadat are Q and J in clubs. In a real Bridge game, Sadat could win other tricks because there is a turn to play but being a conversation the turn is not really clear. Therefore, ‘what is the true profit for Sadat?’ The true profit for Sadat is the cultural matter over the Sinai Peninsula (Q and J in clubs). ‘Where cans Sadat put the strength in this negotiation?’ Sadat only can put the strength on the importance of the return to the Sinai Peninsula. He will need to keep the negotiations around this matter all the time. That will be his key point. ‘What is the true profit for Begin?’ The true profit for Begin is to reaffirm his power in the region. At this time, it is the moment to remember the principle shouldn't be forgotten, that is: not condition the game’s result. ‘What happened in Camp David?’ The NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 35 agreement was to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. And the goal, the framework for peace in the Middle East was achieved, and the framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was achieved too. So we can conclude with two remarks: 1. That our forecast on the Camp David Accords has been right. And we can assert, despite that many people thinks that the Camp David Accords were a failure, that the Camp David Accords were a resounding success. According to the previous [reflection], the best rational decision is the intersection point between ‘f(optimization)’ and ‘f(satisfaction). This point will be, at the same time, the fruit of optimizing to maximum our true possibilities and not losing anything that could be lost before the negotiation starts. Herein the satisfaction: obtaining all obtainable and losing only the indispensable. To get more is a ‘gift’ [and to get less is] a ‘loss’ but not the fruit a rational decision because this would be the result of a mistake in any negotiation. Therefore, we can say that the Bridge bridges both spirals in the specific case of […] negotiations, because it mixes the optimization (obtaining all obtainable) and the satisfaction (losing only the indispensable, what has been lost just [to start] the negotiation process) with the implementation. The Bridge is not only a theory; it is a theory that can be implemented in reality. 2. The Bridge game is a good application to analyse the real possibilities in an […] negotiation because it bridges both spirals to these specific cases, and because it mixes the optimization (obtaining all obtainable) and the satisfaction (losing only the indispensable, [that one is already] lost before the negotiation) together with the real implementation. The Bridge is not only a theory, it is a theory that turns the conversion of countless variables (the arguments) in countable variables (the cards and their values), so we can play and we can also make the other way round and seeing what had happened. Therefore the Bridge could be a tool for the rational analysis of […] negotiations. [We have reached the moment to go through the lights and shadows of the Bridge application to negotiations.] NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 36 Chapter 1.3: The Bridge. A bridge toward negotiations. Lights and Shadows [This chapter is taken from MARTÍNEZ, M.D., 2011: 82-84. You will find in square brackets the additions and/or alterations to the original text.] As we announced at the [introductory pages of this ‘Act’], [this chapter is an attempt] to answer to the following questions: ‘To what extent is it possible to consider Bridge as an element for a rational analysis of the […] negotiations?’ ‘What light does it provide to our understanding of the […] negotiations?’ ‘Which are its limitations?’ ‘How could we overcome these limitations?’ About the first question: ‘to what extent is it possible to consider Bridge as an element for a rational analysis of the […] negotiations?’ the answer has already been suggested at the conclusion of the previous chapter. [Firstly,] we would like to clarify the fact that the Bridge is not only a theory but a theory that turns the conversion of countless variables (the arguments) in countable variables (the cards and their values), because of this we can play, but we can also take the other way round and see what had happened. The Bridge connecting the two spirals has become an abducing tool, that is, the Bridge makes possible to propose the following syllogism: we have a great premise and it’s evident, and we have other lesser, which is only evident or only probable, [then Bridge allow us for linking both together]. We have the ‘theoretical spiral’, which starts from a theoretical deductive process, and it is evident; and we have the implementation, the international negotiation in itself, which is starts from an empirical inductive process because not all negotiation details are evident or probable. Finally we need something to bridge, to link, both and that can let us to arrive to a true conclusion. As the Bridge makes possible to turn the negotiation of countless variables (that is, the empirical values) into countable variables (the theoretical values); and we can also do the other way round, then we can find the hidden link between both. We are now ready to arrive to a true conclusion. The Bridge bridges both studies: “(...) prescriptive studies, concerned with procedures for achieving good outcomes, and the descriptive studies, NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 37 focused on understanding how people negotiate.” 25 The creation of the game is founded on the understanding of how people negotiate, and to play it is the research for the best possible outcome. Even if the Bridge belongs to the Game Theory, it offers the possibility of not being only a laboratory analysis. In this way, the Bridge application is a step forward in the Adjusted Winner Procedure 26 (Brams & Taylor 1996) [because] in the Bridge we ascribe a value over the different aspects of the issue, and that’s the same starting point that the Adjusted Winner Procedure, but the Bridge puts these values at risk between themselves and, simultaneously, between the [game] players [...]. The value shifts from virtual to real [and] it is a constant feed-back. In order to answer the question ‘what light does it provide to our understanding of the […] negotiations?’, we think that the Bridge gives us the opportunity to affirm more strongly if a concrete […] negotiation was, or will be, a success or a failure. As ‘linkage’ element it permits us, simultaneously, an overview and an internal detailed vision. We would need to remember now the fact that the winner is the pair that in more turns has reached the 100% of the possible tricks. Therefore, the Bridge application talks us about the degree of true success or true failure. Often we conclude: ‘the negotiation was or will be a success’ or ‘the negotiation was or will be a failure’ but quite often we mistake our wishes and/or fears with our real possibilities and we assess incorrectly events. The right assess over events is the only sure way towards the future, and it is learning to the future. It is the possibility to accept to negotiate or not in function of our cards and real possible tricks with them. 25 Michel Rudnianski & Hélène Bestougeff, “Bridging Games and Diplomacy”. In: Diplomacy Games. Formal Models and International Negotiations, by Rudolf Avenhaus & I. William Zartman (eds.). Berlin, Springer-Verlag Publishers, 2007, p. 150. 26 Cf. Quoted by Rudolf Schüssler, “Adjusted Winner” (AW) Analyses of the 1978 Camp David Accords—Valuable Tools for Negotiatiors?”. In: Diplomacy Games. Formal Models and International Negotiations, by Rudolf Avenhaus & I. William Zartman (eds.). Berlin, Springer-Verlag Publishers, 2007, p. 283-296. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 38 Finally, ‘which are the limits of the Bridge?’ and ‘how could we [overcome] these limitations?’ The Bridge has a big limitation when [there is one or a combination of these reasons:] - The issue for negotiating does not agree with the aim of the negotiation. Application of the Bridge requires that object/s and goal/s share the same internal structure so that their different aspects may be represented by the same suits. - The power is very close to the opponents. In this case probably the best solution would be the Adjusted Winner Procedure, because it calculates issues and not relationships between them and the players. - The control over the time and the space. All change, even if it is very small, will change the game. You can do a very good preparation and an unexpected event at the last minute could change all, even if we have done the calculus of gains and losses in connection with the different combinatorial possibilities ([…] we should make it before getting into the negotiations themselves because it’s the only possibility to know how often the favorable scenario for negotiating take place). This is much more common that we could think, because the negotiations are implemented for individuals, and individuals are always unpredictable at 100%. This could be ‘solved’ with a real good preparation [knowing always remains some incertitude, subjectivity is always on place, it is intrinsic to the players –subjects in themselves-]. Briefly, the Bridge applied [to] […] negotiations is an analysis about ‘when saying what?’ and about ‘if the arguments we have can be tackle in the negotiation’. In case of doubt we could always remember Wittgenstein saying: “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” 27 27 Luwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, § 7. Source online: http://home.umail.ucsb.edu/~luke_manning/tractatus/tractatus-jsnav.html NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 39 […] [Despite all, the GREAT limitation of the Bridge application to negotiations is and will be the ‘true’ subjectivity. It could be named ‘first subjectivity’ because it is present from the beginning of the process and will be liable for two inherent shadows to us and another one, indirect, implied in our interlocutor.] [Direct shadows:] [1. To decide what arguments to choose to be employed during the negotiation.] [2. To assign each argument the right card to symbolise it.] [Indirect shadow:] [1. Even trying to be as good as possible during the negotiation process we cannot guarantee what will be replied to our arguments, we cannot predict it.] [The next pages are meant to throw some light on each of the above shadows. Shadows will definitely persist (negotiator -subject with subjectivityis always one of the necessary elements in a negotiation), but they can be lighter.] NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 40 ACT II: NEURO-LINGUISTIC PATTERNS (NLP) NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 41 Going the next step ahead, as mentioned in the introductory pages each ‘Act’ aims to be a part of a ‘tragedy’: a ‘conceptual mimesis’ of the used arguments, meant to produce a ‘catharsis’, an improvement on the negotiation process. Thus, this ‘Act’ will be our second step where our task will address to the limits, with the purpose to reduce them, to throw some light in the shadows. At this step the tool chosen to try to reduce the limitations has been Neuro- Linguistic Patterns (hereunder, NLP); it will be applied to the previously showed shadows. NLP has been selected because all the flaws in a negotiation process are a product of the negotiator’s weakness shown through his arguments. If we want to study flaws in arguments, we are in the NLP territory. On the next pages we will try to give an answer about to what could NLP do to illuminate the limitations. Firstly, we will introduce NLP in order to decide whether NLP may be considered a useful tool to make rational decisions in the world of negotiations –Chapter 2.1-. Right before we deal with limitations in the light of NLP we will take a look at how are these Patterns working in our mind –Chapter 2.2-. To finish, we will look at the shadows under the light of NLP –Chapter 2.3-. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 48 Regarding the ‘indirect shadow’, that one implied in the subjectivity of our interlocutor, we cannot guarantee what will be replied to our arguments, we cannot predict it. About that no light is coming in from NLP. We could only suspect that replied arguments will probably come from the interlocutor’s beliefs and values, but we cannot be sure about this. Next ‘Act’ will be an attempt to pursue the first ‘direct shadow’ and the ‘indirect shadow’. For both, we will be going deeper in syntax, because syntax is the only rational pattern for an argument, therefore syntax is the only discipline where we should do our best and where we can predict the outcome (knowing that the limit to a right prediction is always the form of expression of beliefs and values). NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 49 ACT III: CRYPTIC LANGUAGE: RUSSIAN CARDS NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 50 As promised at the end of the previous ‘Act’, in this one we will tackle deeper the syntactic patterns as a tool to decide what arguments should be chosen to employ during the negotiation, as well as to predict replies, both still in the darkness. Along the next pages we will try to give an answer to how to create right syntactic patterns which can cause good and predictable replies. Hence, we will analyse a cryptic language: Russian Cards (van DITMARSCH, 2008) –Chapter 3.1-. We will extract two key lessons from it –Chapter 3.2-. Thus, dialogical framework pattern will throw some light in the darkness –Chapter 3.3-. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 51 Chapter 3.1: Hunting Hackers. Is it useful to think like a ‘mute guest’ to prepare a negotiation talk thoroughly? This chapter deals with a cryptic language: Russian Cards. The original problem was proposed at the Moscow Mathematics Olympiad in 2000 31 : From a deck of seven distinct cards, Alice and Bob are each dealt three cards and Cathy is dealt the remaining card. None of the players knows any of the cards of the other players. Describe how, using a series of truthful public announcements, Alice and Bob can exchange information about the hands they hold without Cathy being able to deduce the owner of any card other than her own. (KELLERMAN, R., 2014: 1) Thus we are inside a typical framework for a Dynamic Epistemic Logic (hereunder, DEL). The progress of knowledge depends on the public announcements 32 made by the knowledge subjects involved -for our case: Alice, Bob and Cathy-. We can say Alice and Bob are ‘active’ knowledge subjects and Cathy is just a ‘passive’ subject, like a ‘mute guest’. ‘Is the ‘mute guest’ a true ‘passive’ subject or could be she a ‘disguised hacker’?’ The aim of this chapter is to answer this question. We will analyse the Russian Cards from the dialogical semantics because our interest is to find out what is happening in Cathy’s mind, what is Cathy thinking when she is listening announcements from Alice and Bob (as you can see, we are not using at the moment the word ‘knowledge’ for Cathy because the problem says: “Alice and Bob can exchange information about the hands they hold without Cathy being able to deduce the owner of any card other than her own”) So, our interest is in the field of semantics, what is the 31 Cf. KELLERMAN, R. (2014) 32 Cf. van DITMARSCH, H., van der HOEK, W. & KOOI, B., 2008: 104-107. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 52 meaning of what is being said. Only at the end of this reasoning, we will get to know what has changed in Cathy‘s knowledge. For this analysis we will take the Russian Cards problem developed by van Ditmarsch (2008, pp. 97-104 et 108). First, we will tackle its dialogical semantics form for the general case. Then we will be ready to think what is happening in Cathy’s mind in each case shown. Note that in the van Ditmarsch’s Russian Cards the names of the characters have been changed: Alice is Ann (a), Bob is Bill (b) and Cathy becomes Cath (c). A dialogical semantics 33 for the Russian cards 1. Mathematical rules for the Russian cards: 1.1. Characteristics of the game:  We have three players: a; b; c.  We have a stack with seven different cards. They are numbered: 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6. C={0,1,2,3,4,5,6}  The card deal for player a and for player b are the same: 3 cards each; player c gets only 1 card.  The language assumes expressions in the form gR(m,n,p), that should be interpreted as player g has the cards m; n; p. More precisely: aR(m, n, p); bR(m', n', p'); cR(m'') where m; n; p; m’; n’; p’; m” are (different) numbers from 0 to 6. In order to the simplify the notation, we will follow the convention used by van Ditmarsch, van der Hoek & Kooi, from whom expressions of the form aR(m, n, p) are taken: mnpa and so on. 33 Cf. for rules of dialogical semantics –points: 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this section- S. RAHMAN & N. CLERBOUT (2015) and J. REDMOND & M. FONTAINE (2011). NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 53 1.2. Objective of the game:  The game has only one objective and it consists in two parts: Part 1: players a and b interchange information about the cards they hold. Part 2: after this sharing, player c must be still ignorant, or in others words, he still knows only his own card and does not know who has what. Hence the objective of the game can be rendered with the following expression [Ka(mnpa)˄Ka(m'n'p'b)]˄[Kb(m'n'p'b)˄Kb(mnpa)]˄[Kc(m''c)˄~Kc(mnpa)˄~Kc(m'n' p'b)] that reads. 1.3. Knowledge stage or terms of the game:  The 3 players (a; b; c) know that 7 cards have been dealt. They are not duplicated and they are numbered 0 to 6: C={0,1, …, 6}  The deal has been: C(a)37*C(b)34*C(c)11= aR(37); bR(34); cR(11)=140 deals are possible.  Player a and player b have to let each other know the cards they hold without discovering it to player c. Player c has to remain ignorant about who has what after their announcements (in accordance with the objective of the game –previous section: 1.2.- and inside the framework of the logic of the public announcements –next section: 1.4.-).  At first, every player knows only his own cards.  After the deal the cards distribution has been: 012a; 345b; 6c. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 54 2. Particle rules: Announcement structure Attack Defence !α˄β The attacker chooses the defence ?L∧ !α ?R∧ !β !α∨β The defender chooses the defence ?∨ !α !β !α→β !α (α is assumed to occur) !β !α !α ---------------------------- !∀xAx ?k (k is chosen by the attacker) !Ak !∃xAx ?∃ (could you show me one, please?) !Ak (k is chosen by the defender) !⎕34Aci ?cj <ciRcj> (cj is chosen by the attacker) !Acj !◊35Aci ?◊ (could you show me a case, please?) !Acj <ciRcj> (cj is chosen by the defender) 3. Structural rules for a game played inside the intuitionistic logic:  Player c always remains as ‘mute guest’.  The game starts with an assertion from player a.  By rotating turns, player a first, then b, and again a and b, make a public announcement, either as an assertion or as a question.  Each announcement -assertion or questionmust be true.  Each announcement produces a new ‘engagement’ that adds to the previous ones, making an ‘engagement’ chain. No player can avoid him ‘engagement chain’. 34 It will be the same in all the cases where there is a modal operator: alethic, deontic, epistemic, doxastic, temporal or a combination of them. 35 Idem. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 55  No player can repeat an argument already attacked. If an argument is repeated it will be because the player arrives to the same argument through a different way (i.e.: from another hypothesis).  Each announcement has to have a reply. It is not possible to leave an announcement without reply. At the end of the game each attack must be completed with its defence unless:  The attack has been against a negation sentence. Then no reply, no defence is possible (it has already been mentioned how our mind reacts to negative sentences –cf. Chapter 2.2, p. 44-). i.e: Cf. S. RAHMAN & N. CLERBOUT, 2015: 68. O P ! AA 0 1 ? [AA] 0 ! A 2 3 ! A 2 -- O Wins  The attack has been a double negative sentence. Negative sentences can only be attacked one at time because, as just seen two points before, no player can avoid his ‘engagement chain’, so no player can say !A when he has already said !A. Therefore, faced with attacks against double negative sentences a double attack will not be possible (being A an elementary proposition). i.e.: Cf. S. RAHMAN & N. CLERBOUT, 2015: 69. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 56 O P ! AA 0 1 ! A 0 -- ! A 2 3 ! A 2 -- O Wins  The attack has been an elementary proposition and the respondent does not have the possibility to reply the same elementary proposition. i.e: Cf. S. RAHMAN & N. CLERBOUT, 2015: 66. O P ! QaQb 0 1 ! Qa 0 3 O Wins  “Attack is the best form of defence”. If we can choose between attacking or defending, in most instances we should attack first.  The game ends when a knows b’s deal and vice versa, and c remains ignorant. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 57 4. Formalisation for the general case: Case 3.1. OPPONENT (b) PROPOSER (a) HYPOTHESIS THESIS H1 g≠g'≠c; g,g'є{a,b} !(012a∨012b)→[(012a∨012b)∧(345a∨ ∨345b)] 0 H2 C={0,1,2,3,4,5,6} H3 mnpg→(∼mnpg'∨∼m'n'm''g'∨ ∨∼n'p'm''g'∨∼m'p'm''g'∨m'n'p'g') H4 {m≠n≠p≠m'≠n'≠p'≠m''}єC H5 m''є{c} then m''c 1 !(012a∨012b) 0 ![(012a∨012b)∧(345a∨345b)] 4 3 !012a 1 ?∨ 2 5 ?L∧ 4 !(012a∨012b) 6 7 ?∨ 6 !012a 8 9 ?R∧ 4 !(345a∨345b) 10 11 ?∨ 10 !345b 20 13 !012g→(∼012g'∨∼346g'∨∼456g'∨ ∨∼356g'∨345g') (3) H3 !m/0;n/1;p/2;m'/3;n'/4;p'/5;m''/6 12 15 !012a→(∼012b∨∼346b∨∼456b∨ ∨∼356b∨345b) (H1) 13 !g/a;g'/b 14 17 !∼012b∨∼346b∨∼456b∨∼356b∨ ∨345b 15 !012a 16 19 !345b (H5) 17 ?∧ 18 Summary for case 3.1: a holds 123 and b holds 456. OR: NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 64 2.3. In the triads where 6 is, there is also a card from b (as seen just above: 2.1.). Thanks to this b knows these triads as not a’s triads. The triads contain also one of a’s cards to guarantee the safety of the announcement (as seen at 2.2.). 2.4. Therefore, if b announces, “Cath has card 6”, a does not have a triad where 6 is. 3. So c removes these triads from a’s announcement, and the result is a ‘new’ a’s announcement: !012a∨034a∨135a 4. c asks herself what is a’s hand? To answer, she will be doing the following reasoning: 4.1. In the triads where 6 is (056; 146; 236), there is also one one card of a and another of b, so: a = 0; 1; 2 then b = 5; 4; 3 a = 5; 4; 3 then b = 0; 1; 2 a = 0; 1; 3 then b = 5; 4; 2 a = 5; 4; 2 then b = 0; 1; 3 a = 0; 3; 4 then b = 1; 2; 5 a = 5; 1; 2 then b = 0; 4; 3 a = 0; 4; 2 then b = 1; 3; 5 a = 1; 3; 5 then b = 0; 4; 2 4.2. Next step in c’s reasoning is comparing the above triads (4.1.) to the three remaining triads (as seen in 3.): 012a∨034a∨135a. The result is that every one of them could be possible because all are compatible with the condition to include one card from a + one card from b + 6. c’s final state of knowledge: 012a∨034a∨135a a = 0; 1; 2 then b = 5; 4; 3. Therefore 012a and 543b or a = 0; 3; 4 then b = 1; 2; 5. Therefore 034a and 125b NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 65 or a = 5; 1; 3 then b = 0; 4; 2. Therefore 135a and 042b As the deal has been: C(a)37*C(b)34*C(c)11= aR(37); bR(34); cR(11)=140 deals are possible. At the beginning, c knows she holds 6, so now the possible deals are only the ones where c holds 6, therefore there are 20 possible deals: C(a)36*C(b)33= aR(36); bR(33)=20. In fact, Cath is only hesitating between three possible deals [(012a∧543b)∨(034a∧125b)∨(135a∧042b)], thus c knows 17 deals are not possible. If 20 unknown mean 100% of c’s ignorance, then 3 unknown will be 15% of c’s ignorance. In this case, Cath has reached knowledge of 85%. In this case c cannot reach more knowledge because no card is common for all three of a’s possible deals. Total c’s knowledge is 85% Total c’s ignorance is 15% Exercise 4.74 (A seven hand solution): Assume deal of cards 012.345.6. Show that the following is a solution: Anne announces: “I have one of {012, 034, 056, 135, 146, 236, 245}” and Bill announces “Cath has card 6”. (van DISTMARCH, 2008: 103) Bill (b) (opponent) Ann (a) (proposer) Cath (c) (‘mute guest’) 2 !6c !012a∨034a∨056a∨135a∨146a∨236a∨245a 1 ??? What is c thinking after a’s and b’s announcements? Now, after doing the previous exercises, c has reached a quite refined method. She knows the procedure is: 1. To take off the triads where her card, 6, is. Then, for this case, the ‘new’ a’s announcement would be: !012a∨034a∨135a∨245a. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 66 2. She also knows it is not necessary to do step 4.3. That has been done during the first exercise and it was decided not to do it again because it was considered as a not reliable way. 3. Once she knows how the ‘new’ a’s announcement looks (an announcement that will not contain her card in any triad), she needs to compare the resultant possible (a-b)’s deals to the announced triads containing 6, her card. a-b possible pairs, according to a’s announcement: a = 0; 1; 2 then b = 3; 4; 5 a = 0; 3; 4 then b = 1; 2; 5 a = 1; 3; 5 then b = 0; 2; 4 a = 2; 4; 5 then b = 0; 1; 3 Final c’s state of knowledge: After comparing a’s possible deals to the triads including 6 (056; 146; 236) no new knowledge is gained, so: 012a∨034a∨135∨245a. a = 0; 1; 2 then b = 5; 4; 3. Therefore 012a and 543b or a = 0; 3; 4 then b = 1; 2; 5. Therefore 034a and 125b or a = 5; 1; 3 then b = 0; 4; 2. Therefore 135a and 042b or a = 2; 4; 5 then b = 0; 1; 3. Therefore 135a and 042b As the deal has been: C(a)37*C(b)34*C(c)11= aR(37); bR(34); cR(11)=140 deals are possible. At the beginning, c knows she holds 6, so now the only possible deals are the ones where c holds 6, therefore there are 20 possible deals: C(a)36*C(b)33= aR(36); bR(33)=20. However, Cath is only hesitating between four possible deals [(012a∧543b)∨(135a∧042b)], thus c knows 16 deals are not possible. If 20 unknown deals mean 100% of c’s ignorance, then 4 unknown deals will be 20% of c’s ignorance. In this case, Cath has reached knowledge of 80%. In this c cannot reach more knowledge because no card is common for all four of a’s possible deals. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 67 Total c’s knowledge is 80% Total c’s ignorance is 20% At this point we can consider ourselves ready to deal with the question about the ‘mute guest’ because, even if we would continue with the rest of the proposed exercises by van Distmarch (2008), we think they are no relevant any more, now that we know the method, so its application will be similar application every time. Thus, is the ‘mute guest’ a true ‘passive’ subject or could he be a ‘disguised hacker’? We think the answer is quite clear. In so far as the ‘mute guest’ is really mute but not deaf, we cannot be so arrogant as to think the ‘mute guest’ is thinking nothing about that he is hearing. We can never asseverate that he is just hearing and not listening. If he is listening, he could be thinking about it. If he is thinking he will reach some ratio of knowledge. So, a ‘mute guest’ is not a ‘passive’ subject for the fact that he is mute, he can be ‘passive’ (hearing and not listening, then not thinking) or not, that is his choice, nothing else. Therefore, the chance to have a ‘disguised hacker’ ‘hidden’ as the ‘mute guest’ could be quite high because hacker’s performance is just to be ‘hidden’; be ‘mute’ while others are talking; listening and not just hearing; keeping information from the others during the information exchanges; thinking why is that said and not something else and/or in another words, where could be the possible ‘gaps’ (‘gaps’ meaning ‘information leaks’, the information which is said –including silencein an unsafe form) and then, if ‘gaps’ are found, he could decide to start the attack or not: professional attacks are not done at random, they are done with some degree of previous knowledge, and knowledge about others is only obtained from themselves. His job is no other than to catch the ‘leaking information’ and to take advantage of it in the way to conduct a more effective attack. We must be careful, since even when information is passed in a safe form, we cannot be sure if some kind of information is being ‘leaked’; information is information anyway, even silence is, as already seen at the previous ‘Act’. Thus, a NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 68 ‘mute guest’ is not the best guest when you want to pass information without being recorded. Anyway, the existence of ‘mute guests’ enhances the argumentative capacities of the negotiator, he is required to do his announcements as good as possible (both in quality and safety). A ‘mute guest’ could be the best coach for a negotiator. In the next chapter we will talk about two relevant lessons learned from the ‘mute guest’, as negotiators. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 69 Chapter 3.2: Two lessons from the ‘mute guest’ As it has been shown just before, being coached as negotiator in the presence of a ‘mute guest’, a ‘potential hacker’, helps us know how and why he is thinking based in our announced arguments; therefore we can enhance our way of communicating, improve the structure of our announcements –their quality and safetyfrom the point of view of a syntactic Pattern where the content is expressed. A ‘potential hacker’ is the best mirror we can have; by observing him we can learn the most about the potential ‘gaps’ we have in the negotiation we are preparing, because a hacker is nothing but the worst opponent. The two great lessons from the ‘mute guest’: 1. He starts thinking ‘hard’ against us when we directly trespass his ‘true zone’ (i.e.: Bill announces: “Cath has card 6”). When anybody feels his ‘true zone’ directly trespassed, the natural reaction is to think ‘why does he say that?’ ‘how can he know?’. Everybody’s ‘true zone’ is the core of his ‘comfort zone’, and nobody likes it to be trespassed, and much less so with a direct allusion. When somebody feels overstepped, he feels in jeopardy. Then there are only two possible reactions: either he fights against this invasion -and the negotiation process is automatically stopped- or he transforms our direct attack into the hardest counterattack we can expect because, as we have seen in the previous chapter, announcing our opponent’s true is the least safe we can do, it is the most revealing we can make, it shows much more our ‘true zone’ than talking about our proper true, like Ann did in her announcement. Thus, first lesson: the ‘mute guest’ says: ‘do not touch me, please, or at least not shamelessly’. 2. His second lesson is in correspondence with the previous. Now we know that it is not safe to trespass directly our opponent’s ‘true zone’, then how will we be able to attack and remain safe. The best plausible way would be to create our replies to NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 70 the opponent’s announcements following a similar pattern to the one that we would use to reply a partner in the presence of a hacker. The question is asking ourselves about how could Bill reply Ann and not increase Cath’s already acquired knowledge (from Ann’s announcement). The way to do it is just the one we use naturally, when we give information not to be understood by a third person: we usually reply repeating the same pattern used before, like ‘going along with the same’ -but it is not quite the same- (i.e.: Ann announces: “I have one of {012, 034, 056, 135, 146, 236, 245}”, then Bill’s reply could be just the inverse of the part of announcement already ‘caught’ by Cath. Thus, Bill’s reply could be: ‘I have one of {345, 543, 056, 042, 146, 236, 013}’). This adds nothing to Cath’s knowledge: a = 0; 1; 2 then b = 5; 4; 3. Therefore 012a and 543b or a = 0; 3; 4 then b = 1; 2; 5. Therefore 034a and 125b or a = 5; 1; 3 then b = 0; 4; 2. Therefore 135a and 042b or a = 2; 4; 5 then b = 0; 1; 3. Therefore 135a and 042b and [Ka(mnpa)˄Ka(m'n'p'b)]˄[Kb(m'n'p'b)˄Kb(mnpa)]˄[Kc(m''c)˄~Kc(mnpa)˄~Kc(m'n'p'b)] --------------------------- This is not exactly so, however Cath has no more knowledge after Ann’s announcement We cannot be so naïve as to believe that we will not touch the ‘true zone’/‘comfort zone’ of our opponent when we are negotiating. We should not undervalue our opponent, and we should prepare the negotiation as if it were a struggle against an intelligent hacker; by doing so, we will do the best we will possibly can. It is time to check if some more light has been thrown into the darkness. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 71 Chapter 3.3: Dialogical Framework Pattern. A light in the darkness As we said in the beginning of this ‘Act’, our aim here is to throw some light into the darkness; maybe part of it could be clarified: - What arguments to choose: we could definitely say that we cannot be totally sure about what arguments, in the meaning of their contents, should be chosen for a negotiation. However, now we know how to choose the best structure (syntactic Pattern) for arguments, since we have learned it from dialogical pattern. - ‘Indirect shadow’, implicit in the subjectivity of our interlocutor: we cannot guarantee what will be replied to our arguments. We cannot predict its content. However, in the light of the dialogical pattern we can now predict the most plausible/logical syntactic structure for each reply. Thus:  If we are in the proposer position, then we will be able to know how the agreement could be, depending on syntactic structure of our first announcement.  If we are in the opponent position, the then we will be able to know how the agreement could be, depending on in syntactic structure of the proposer’s first announcement. It is definitely better to be the proposer, since he holds the reins of the negotiation dialogue. Nevertheless, this is not always the case: when somebody is coming to see you, good manners usually require asking him first. For this case different negotiation scenarios have to be prepared because, if you are able to guess what your opponent will say, you are never sure until he starts the discussion. In any case, it is always better to use the most favourable the dialogical semantical form for us whenever possible. In this case, we will be choosing our defence (structures in green at the table below) and not giving weapons to be attacked with (structures in red at the table below). NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 72 Dialogical semantical form Announcement structure Attack Defence !α˄β The attacker chooses the defence ?L∧ !α ?R∧ !β !α∨β The defender chooses the defence ?∨ !α !β !α→β !α (α is assumed to occur) !β !˥α !α ---------------------------- !∀xAx ?k (k is chosen by the attacker) !Ak !∃xAx ?∃ (could you show me one, please?) !Ak (k is chosen by the defender) !⎕36Aci ?cj <ciRcj> (cj is chosen by the attacker) !Acj !◊37Aci ?◊ (could you show me a case, please?) !Acj <ciRcj> (cj is chosen by the defender) As rule it can be said that it is better to make announcements under either a disjunctive form, a particular form or a possible form, or a combination of them. Moreover, in the particular case of a conditional announcement (when it is not a literal expression: no literal antecedent and no literal consequent, understanding ‘literal’ as an elementary proposition or its negative form), the best choice is to use: - the consequent under one of these forms we mentioned just above because then we will receive a ‘favourable’ attack, since these are the cases where the defender has the choice, and - the antecedent under either an assertion –elementary proposition- a conjunctive form, an universal form or a necessary form, or a combination of them 36 It will be the same in all the cases where there is modal operator: alethic, deontic, epistemic, doxastic, temporal or a combination of them. 37 Idem. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 73 because then we will be able to attack back (once our conditional is attacked) since these are the cases where the attacker has the choice. Finally, it should always be kept in mind that negative assertions are automatically interpreted as positive, and they may have consequences opposite of what should be expected. Be extremely careful about this because no defence is possible after it has been said: the attack will be more than an attack, because it has the opposite effect in our mind. We have gone deeper in syntax and extracted a pattern to make announcements (attacks or defences). Other than that, there is nothing else in a rational framework that may throw light into our shadows. Through this research we have been able to clarify some dark aspects of the negotiation process. Now, in the next section (‘Conclusions’) we will propose a protocol to deal with negotiations. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 80 BIBLIOGRAPHY MANUALS: Émile Borel & André Chéron, Théorie Mathématique du Bridge à la Portée de Tous. Paris, Éditions Jacques Gabay, 2009. CENTRE of EXCELLENCE (2014a): NLP Practitioner Course. Manchester, England: CoE. (ver opción en web) CENTRE of EXCELLENCE (2014b): NLP Study Guide. Manchester, England: CoE. (ver opción en web) Robert Kast, La Théorie de la Décision. Paris, Éditions La Découverte, 1993. R. Lewicki, Bruce Barry & David Saunders, Essentials of Negotiation. New York, McGraw-Hill, 2004. K. LORENZ & P. LORENZEN (1978): Dialogische Logik. Darmstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Miguel Maestranza, Bridge. Cultura, Ciencia y Deporte. Vitoria (España), Galasarguin, S. L., 2007. P. D. V. Marsh, Contract Negotiation Handbook. Hants (England), Grower Publishing Company Limited, 1984. Hans J. M. Peters, Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory. Dordrecht (The Netherlands), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992. USCCB. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (2011): The New American Bible, Revised Edition (NABRE). Retrieved from http:// http://www.usccb.org/bible/index.cfm, checked on April 3, 2017. van DITMARSCH, H., van der HOEK, W. & KOOI, B. (2008): Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer. James A. Wall, Jr., Negotiation: Theory and Practice. Glenview (Illinois), Scott, Foresman and Company, 1985. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 81 D. J. White, Decision Theory. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company, 1970. William Zartman & Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator. New Haven (Connecticut), Yale University Press, 1982. BOOKS: Cristina Bicchieri, Rationality and Coordination. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1993. Colin F. Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton (New Jersey), Princeton University Press, 2003. Habid Chamoun-Nicolás, Negociando como un Fenicio. Kingwood (Texas), Keynegotiations, 2008. COVEY, S.R. (2011): The 3rd Alternative. Solving Life’s Most Difficult Problems. London, England: Simon & Schuster. Douglas R. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher. Bach. Un Eterno y Grácil Bucle. Barcelona, Tusquets Editores, Colección Metatemas, No.14, 1987. JAMES, B. (2011): DO IT! or DITCH IT. England: Ebury Publishing. James M. Joyce, The Foundations of Casual Decision Theory. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. L. T. F. GAMUT (1991): Logic, Language and Meaning (vol. I et II). Chicago, USA: The University of Chicago Press. MORIN, E. (1986): El Método. Tomo I: La naturaleza de la Naturaleza. Madrid, España: Cátedra. PETRUZZI, J. (2012): Going for Gold. Peterborough, England: Fastprint Publishing. RAHMAN, S. & CLERBOUT, N. (2015): Las Raíces Dialógicas de la Teoría Constructiva de Tipos. Retrieved from https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs- 01238172/document, checked on May 26, 2017. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 82 REDMOND, J. & FONTAINE, M. (2011): How to Play Dialogues. An Introduction to Dialogical Logic. In: Dialogues and Games of Logic. 1. College Publications. Howard Raiffa, Analyse de la Décision. Introduction aux Choix en Avenir Incertain. Paris, Dunod, 1973. Howard Raiffa, Lectures on Negotiation Analysis. Cambridge (Massachusetts), PON Books, 1996. Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation. Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press, 2000. van BENTHEM, J. (2011): Logical Dynamics of Information and Interactions. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Luwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Source online: http://home.umail.ucsb.edu/~luke_manning/tractatus/tractatus-jsnav.html ARTICLES: Robert Y. Aumann, "Game Theory". In: The New Palgrave. A Dictionary of Economics, by J. Eatwell, M. Milgate & P. Newman (eds.). London and Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1987, Vol. 2, p. 460-482. Source online: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/raumann/pdf/game%20theory.pdf Rudolf Avenhaus & Thomas Krieger, “Formal Methods for Forecasting Outcomes of Negotiations on Interstate Conflicts”. In: Diplomacy Games. Formal Models and International Negotiations, by Rudolf Avenhaus & I. William Zartman (eds.). Berlin, Springer-Verlag Publishers, 2007, p. 123-148. Rudolf Avenhaus & I. William Zartman, “Introduction: Formal Models of, in, and for International Negotiations”. In: Diplomacy Games. Formal Models and International Negotiations, by Rudolf Avenhaus & I. William Zartman (eds.). Berlin, Springer- Verlag Publishers, 2007, p. 1-22. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 83 Michael Bacharach, “The Acquisition of Common Knowledge”. In: Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, by Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.). New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 285-315. S. J. Brams, “Faith versus Rationality in the Bible: Game Theoretic Interpretations of Sacrifice in the Old Testament”. In: Applied Game Theory, by S. J. Brams, A. Schotter & G. Schwödiauer (eds.). Würzburg (Germany), Physica-Verlag, 1979, p. 430-445. Cristina Bicchieri, “Knowledge-Dependent Games: Backward Induction”. In: Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, by Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.). New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 327-343. Robert L. Bishop, “Game-Theoretic Analyses of Bargaining”. In: Bargaining. Formal Theories of Negotiation, by Oran R. Young (ed.). Urbana (Illinois), University of Illinois Press, 1975, p. 85-128. John G. Cross, “Economic Perspective”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 164-179. Daniel Druckman, “Negotiations Models and Applications”. In: Diplomacy Games. Formal Models and International Negotiations, by Rudolf Avenhaus & I. William Zartman (eds.). Berlin, Springer-Verlag Publishers, 2007, p. 83-96. Chistophe Dupont & Guy-Olivier Faure, “The Negotiation Process”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 40-57. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 84 Daniel Ellsberg, “Theory of the Reluctant Duelist”. In: Bargaining. Formal Theories of Negotiation, by Oran R. Young (ed.). Urbana (Illinois), University of Illinois Press, 1975, p. 38-52. Oliver Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin, “Lessons for Theory and Research”. In: Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes, by Guy Oliver Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.). Newbury Park (California), SAGE Publications, Inc., 1993, p. 209-231. Jean F. Freymond, “Historical Approach”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 121-134. Peter Gärdenfors, “The dynamics of Belief Systems: Foundations versus Coherence Theories”. In: Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, by Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.). New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 377-396. Thomas R. Gruber, “Toward Principles for the Design of Ontologies used for Knowledge Sharing”. In: Formal Ontology in Conceptual Analysis and Knowledge Representation, by Nicola Guarino & Roberto Poli (eds.). Norwell (Massachusetts), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, Source online: http://itee.uq.edu.au/~infs3101/_Readings/OntoEng.pdf Authorized website of the School of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering at the University of Queensland (Australia). GUTÉRREZ, R. & WHITELOCK, D. (2012): Sistemas de creencias en ciencia cognitiva: algunas preguntas a nuestros sistemas de conocimiento. In C. MORANO, J. CAMPOS & M.M. ALCUBILLA (Eds.), Ciencia, Humanismo y Creencia en una Sociedad Plural (pp. 141-149). Oviedo, España: Ediciones de la Universidad de Oviedo y Fundación Castroverde. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 85 John C. Harsanyi, “Approaches to the Bargaining Problem before and after the Game Theory”. In: Bargaining. Formal Theories of Negotiation, by Oran R. Young (ed.). Urbana (Illinois), University of Illinois Press, 1975, p. 253-266. John C. Harsanyi, “Bargaining and Conflict Situations in the Light of a New Approach to Game Theory”. In: Bargaining. Formal Theories of Negotiation, by Oran R. Young (ed.). Urbana (Illinois), University of Illinois Press, 1975, p. 74-84. John C. Harsanyi, “Game Solutions and the Normal Form”. In: Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, by Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.). New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 355-376. J. HINTIKKA & G. SANDU (1997): Game-Theoretical Semantics. In: J. van Benthem & A. Ter Meulen (Eds.), Handbook of Logic and Language (pp. 361-409). The Nederlands: Elsevier Secience B.V. R. Kiel & M. Schader, “Using Dialog-Controlled Rule Systems in a Maintenance Module for Knowledge Bases”. In: Annals of Operations Research, by Peter L. Hammer (ed.). Basel, J. C. Baltzer AG, 1994, Vol. 52 (Decision Theory and Decision Systems by K. Mosler & M. Schader (eds.)), p. 171-180. Victor A. Kremenyuk, “A Pluralistic Viewpoint”. In: Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes, by Guy Oliver Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.). Newbury Park (California), SAGE Publications, Inc., 1993, p. 47-54. Winfried Lang, “A Professional’s View”. In: Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes, by Guy Oliver Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.). Newbury Park (California), SAGE Publications, Inc., 1993, p. 38-46. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 86 P. Levine & J.-P. Ponssard, “Power and Negotiation”. In: Applied Game Theory, by S. J. Brams, A. Schotter & G. Schwödiauer (eds.). Würzburg (Germany), Physica-Verlag, 1979, p. 13-31. Roberto Magari, “Introduction to Metamoral”. In: Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, by Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.). New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 257-274. Edward F. McClennen, “Rational Choice in the Context of Ideal Games”. In: Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, by Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.). New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 47-60. MONTAGUE, R. (1970): Universal grammar. In: Thesis, vol. (36), pp. 373-398. Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1755- 2567.1970.tb00434.x/epdf?r3_referer=wol&tracking_action=preview_click&show_che ckout=1&purchase_referrer=www.google.es&purchase_site_license=LICENSE_DENI ED, checked on May 26, 2017. Daniele Mundici, “The Logic of Ulam’s Games with Lies”. In: Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, by Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.). New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 275-284. John F. Nash, “The Bargaining Problem”. In: Bargaining. Formal Theories of Negotiation, by Oran R. Young (ed.). Urbana (Illinois), University of Illinois Press, 1975, p. 53-60. John F. Nash, “Two-Person Cooperative Games”. In: Bargaining. Formal Theories of Negotiation, by Oran R. Young (ed.). Urbana (Illinois), University of Illinois Press, 1975, p. 61-73. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 87 Dayle E. Powell, “Legal Perspective”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 135-147. Dean G. Pruitt, “Strategy in Negotiation”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 78-89. Clemens Puppe, “Rational Choice based on Vague Preferences” In: Annals of Operations Research, by Peter L. Hammer (ed.). Basel, J. C. Baltzer AG, 1994, Vol. 52 (Decision Theory and Decision Systems by K. Mosler & M. Schader (eds.)), p. 67-81. Howard Raiffa, “Contributions of Applied Systems Analysis to International Negotiation”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 5-21. Am. Rapoport & J. P. Kahan, “Standards of Fairness in 4-Person Monopolistic Cooperative Games”. In: Applied Game Theory, by S. J. Brams, A. Schotter & G. Schwödiauer (eds.). Würzburg (Germany), Physica-Verlag, 1979, p. 74-95. Philip J. Reny, “Common knowledge and Games with Perfect Information”. In: Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, by Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.). New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 345-353. Jeffrey Z. Rubin, “The Actors in Negotiation”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 90-99. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 88 Michel Rudnianski & Hélène Bestougeff, “Bridging Games and Diplomacy”. In: Diplomacy Games. Formal Models and International Negotiations, by Rudolf Avenhaus & I. William Zartman (eds.). Berlin, Springer-Verlag Publishers, 2007, p. 149-179. Jeswald W. Salacuse, “Implications for Practitioners”. In: Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes, by Guy Oliver Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.). Newbury Park (California), SAGE Publications, Inc., 1993, p. 199-208. Luc Schneider & Jim Cunningham, “Ontological Foundations of Natural Language. Communication in Multi-agent Systems”. In: Knowledge Based Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems, by V. Palade, R. J. Howlett & L. Jain (eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2003, Vol. 2773, p. 1403-1410. Source online: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.58.3373&representative Authorized website of the NEC Research Institute, Princeton (New Jersey), it is a scientific literature digital library and search engine that focuses primarily on the literature in computer and information science. Rudolf Schüssler, “Adjusted Winner” (AW) Analyses of the 1978 Camp David Accords—Valuable Tools for Negotiatiors?”. In: Diplomacy Games. Formal Models and International Negotiations, by Rudolf Avenhaus & I. William Zartman (eds.). Berlin, Springer-Verlag Publishers, 2007, p. 283-296. James K. Sebenius, “Negotiation Analysis”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 203-215. Victor M. Sergeev, “Metaphors for Understanding International Negotiation”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 58-64. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 89 Hyun Song Shin, “Counterfactuals and a Theory of Equilibrium in Games”. In: Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, by Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.). New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 397-413. Wilfried Siebe, “Game Theory”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 180-202. Andrzej P. Wierzbicki, “Rationality of Choice versus Rationality of Knowlwdge”. In: Diplomacy Games. Formal Models and International Negotiations, by Rudolf Avenhaus & I. William Zartman (eds.). Berlin, Springer-Verlag Publishers, 2007, p. 69-82. H. P. Young, “Exploitable Surplus in N-Person Games”. In: Applied Game Theory, by S. J. Brams, A. Schotter & G. Schwödiauer (eds.). Würzburg (Germany), Physica- Verlag, 1979, p. 32-38. Oran R. Young, “Strategic Interaction and Bargaining”. In: Bargaining. Formal Theories of Negotiation, by Oran R. Young (ed.). Urbana (Illinois), University of Illinois Press, 1975, p. 3-19. I. William Zartman, “Regional Conflict Resolution”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 302-314. I. William Zartman, “The Structure of Negotiation”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 65-77. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 96 INTRODUCTION This paper has been written thinking of all the people who love logical games, because talking about an international negotiation is keeping in the scene the different elements involved along the study case and finding their relationships. A paper which tries to analyse an international negotiation must give an answer to the question ‘Why were the agreements these, and not others?’ In our specific case, the Fist Camp David, the concrete question could be ‘Why came the Sinai back to Egypt and not the other territories conquered during the ’67 War?’ since this was the direct consequence of the Camp David Accords (Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, Washington, March 26, 1979). Knowing and understanding that is the only possibility to understand the History. When History is understood, then, and only then, it is possible to discuss it. And when we discuss History we are making History. The only aim of analysing an international negotiation is to learn the lessons on which History is daily built. In order to achieve that we need to redo the ‘puzzle’ of the case from the only part that is really known: the final agreement. In the following pages we will try to revive the negotiation held during thirteen days in September 1978 in Camp David, between Israel and Egypt, with the mediation of the US. Therefore, we suggest you to forget the known agreements and to start looking for the pieces involved. Let us start this paper with the key pieces (OCEAN). First will be to answer these questions: - Which is the Object of the negotiation? - Which is the Context of the negotiation? - Which are the Elements of the negotiation? - How is the Asymmetrical relationship of power between the different teams involved? - Who and how are the Negotiators (including the mediator, in this case)? NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 97 Second, we relate these pieces to each other. Our game is started, we have the pieces and now we begin assembling them. To build this will be necessary wondering about the threads which weave together the Object with the Context with the Elements with the Asymmetrical relationship of power and with the Negotiators. Now we need to answer the following questions: - Which is the structure of the negotiation? - The matter of the cultural differences, are they present or not? - How is the relationship between the different actors involved? - Which is the strategy deployed? - How is the process? Once the different pieces and their relationships have been addressed, our ‘puzzle’ seems finished, but is it really finished? This is the moment to remember the agreement forgotten in the former page and try to fit it in our ‘puzzle’, or decide to skip it. The tighter the pieces the more masterly the lesson learned, which will be used to continue building History along future new negotiations. To deal with the questions arisen before, we would normally use specific sources, that is, the official documents of 1st Camp David and the manuals about it or about the international negotiations; the huge amount of literature available –not all of it rigorousmakes it impossible to handle within the scope of this paper. Giving our ‘puzzle’ a logical form required narrowing down the documents from ordinary press sources, as they are usually not specialized. Since the negotiations were held in the most complete privacy, this work has developed starting from the declassified sources, authorized sources and specialized manuals. As with every choice, there are advantages -working with the most accurate sources-, but also disadvantages –skipping the opinions of the world about what happened in Camp David-. ‘What is more real, what the world thinks and believes or what the documents say?’ People would probably say general opinion is more real; however, we believe that working starting from the direct sources NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 98 is better to learn how the negotiation was handled. Another disadvantage of working from the original documents is that not all declassified sources are easily available, e.g.: obtaining the Briefings to prepare The Camp David Accords included in the Annex. Another problem was to contrast with experts the conclusion to our hypothesis (‘Why came the Sinai back to Egypt and not the others territories conquered during the ’67 war?’), because authorized and declassified sources explain what happened, but not WHY -or not so clearly-. Showing the true reasons for the agreement requires us to be logical, to look thoroughly through every piece and to contrast the ‘findings’. We invite you in the next pages to look through the different pieces of the negotiation proposed, and to build your personal puzzle with them. Our puzzle and our conclusion, although well founded, are not the only possible true. This work aims to be just a very modest contribution to the search of key elements that help analyse international negotiations. Please enjoy the paper and remember that the only possible glue for the puzzle pieces is Logic. Good luck in this ‘logical game’!! KEY PIECES (OCEAN) In this chapter we will analyse the key pieces of our ‘puzzle’. Which are they? They are the ones proposed at the introduction of this paper: the Object, the Context, the Elements, the Asymmetrical power and the Negotiators involved (including the mediator) for this study case (1st Camp David). So, we will follow this order; but it has to be remembered at all times that the order proposed is not an order of importance, it is only an order to put forward the pieces involved, as a framework for our work: building the ‘puzzle’ of Camp David Accords. This is why the following questions/pieces will be introduced whit a dash and not with a number. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 99 - Which is the Object of the negotiation? It has to be stated first that the object of a negotiation is not the objective/goal of the negotiation. The goal is always to find an agreement and the object is the matter that we want (more or less willingly) to negotiate. Our object to negotiate is the sovereignty of the territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 War, because this is the main motive for the lack of peace in the Middle East. This peace between Israel and the Arab Countries, more specifically, the peace between Israel and Egypt is our true objective, because after the 1967 War the true peace never came, the conflict became permanent in a higher or lower degree, and the situation in the Middle East is more unstable every day. The world ‘needs’ and ‘wants’ peace in this region, and the region ‘needs’ it too. Eleven years after the 1967 War the Middle East and the Occidental World wished to set the UN SC RES 242 and 338, but each party according to their own interests. Let’s see now where are the key points of this object; therefore we will look at the essential paragraph in those two Resolutions of the UN Security Council, which involve controversial points: UN SC RES 242 (November 22, 1967) “1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 2. Affirms further the necessity NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 100 (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and the political independence of every State in the area through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;” 41 UN SC RES 338 (22 of October 1973) “2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (197) in all of its parts; 3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.” 42 Israel and Egypt will be sitting to negotiate the sovereignty on the territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 War to consolidate the peace in the Middle East, but the controversial point -“(...) from territories occupied in the recent conflict (...)” 43 - will be the ‘sting’ at the before sentence, which are “from territories occupied” Does this mean all territories occupied? or will this sentence be fulfilled if the resolution is applied to just one territory? For the moment, we agree that the Object is negotiating the sovereignty of the territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 War, without going into discussing what is the true meaning of “from”. 41 UN SC RES 242 (1967) Source on line: http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1967/scres67.htm Authorized website of the United Nations Security Council. 42 UN SC RES 338 (1973) Source on line: http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1973/scres73.htm Authorized website of the United Nations Security Council. 43 UN SC RES 242 (1967) Source on line: http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1967/scres67.htm Authorized website of the United Nations Security Council. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 101 - Which is the Context of the negotiation? The context of the negotiation is a regional context, but as the region is the Middle East, region of paramount importance in the world because of its position: capital geographic position (gravity centre between Orient and Occident), capital geopolitical position (directly deriving from the former), capital geological position (because of the riches in its subsoil) and capital geo-economical (consequence of the geological wealth). Anything that happens there will be transcendent to the rest of the world. Therefore, our context is at the same time regional and international. We need to remember that the negotiation occurs in the Cold War era context. The support given by the USSR to the Arab States directly involved in this conflict has been clear and evident since the 1967 War, while the US gave support to Israel. The tension grew higher after the last war, Yom Kippur War (October 1973), and the risk of a new world war increased. The conflict won a true international dimension. The decision of the US to mediate in favour of an accord between the parties involved, specifically between the more powerful parties on the region (Israel and Egypt), is a strategic and diplomatic decision: on the one hand, the US makes an attempt to pacify the region, being peace the best guarantee to assure control of the region and its economics resources; on the other hand, as the US volunteered as mediator, it appears in front of the world as a saviour of the world and not as a threat to its rival, the USSR. Moreover, the US appears in front of the parties (Israel and Egypt) as a potential true mediator, in spite of its interests and preferences, but also as the true power in the world -in the ‘70s the USSR power was already in decadence-. - Which are the Elements of the negotiation? The elements of the negotiation are not always really true, but their importance is that they are true inside the mind which believes in them. What are the elements inside the minds of our negotiators, including our mediator? Answering this question is really difficult because nobody can be into anybody’s mind. In this sense, any answer NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 102 will be a little bit daring. Nevertheless, we’ll try to give a possible answer, based on the background of knowledge that we have about the conflict being negotiated. So, we can think that the elements involved are: - To Israel: Preserving the territories occupied during the 1967 War and consolidating its presence and its power in the world. The territories occupied are at the same time a physical thing and a psychological thing with all elements that the psychological things entail (in terms of power and cultural presence). - To Egypt: Recovering the territories occupied during the 1967 War, and with that, raising its power in the Middle East; physical power, because this means that Egypt will become a powerful State in the Middle East -because it would be the only state that could have won something from Israel, so much as recovering the control on the two banks of the Suez Canal-. - To the US: To the US the element ‘territories occupied’ is a very good pretext, the true element to get involved in the negotiation being its need to ensure peace in the area. The US has great economic, strategical and political interests there: on the one hand, the control of the USSR power, and on the other hand to secure the supply for raw materials to cover its needs. - How is the Asymmetrical relationship of power between the different teams involved? Who the mediator is, determined the degree of power asymmetry in this negotiation. In the context of a bipolar world (Cold War era -US vs. USSR-), in which each of the parties (Israel and Egypt) is supported by one of the power blocks (US and USSR), the power balance shifts toward one side from the beginning, even if it is only a psychological effect, by the fact of the US being the ‘third’ negotiating party (the NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 103 mediator). Moreover, playing at home is always an advantage, and here the negotiation takes place in the US. So, it could be said that Israel starts off as a favourite, since the mediator happens to be Israel’s own protector. However, the US mediation will aim to protect first the US own interests in the Middle East. It is the US who has de facto the power balance in its hands, no wonder they volunteered as mediators, so much for the need to warrant its interests as for the ability to show-off muscle –we are at the end of the ‘70s, still in the Cold War era period, ad the power of the USSR starts showing the large internal fissures that took the USSR to crumbling down a decade later (1989)-. - Who and how are the Negotiators (including the mediator, in this case)? Negotiators are the key piece, they are the subjects of negotiation, therefore they hold the negotiation together. Until now we have looked at the invariable keys, which are independent of the negotiator dealing with them. However, their ‘value’ changes according to the subject who negotiates with them, thus they might increase or diminish their worth. Negotiators are the ‘active’ part in negotiation, and they will provide ‘revenue’ or ‘losses’ in the course of negotiation. Let’s review the main features of the profile of each one of our subjects, in order to understand how our pieces shall be held together. Those features can be found in the personal history that we know of each one of the subjects: - Menachem Begin for Israel: Polish origin (Brest, August 16, 1913). Attached to the Zionist movement in Poland since 12 years of age. Law Degree in 1935 at the Warsaw University. Outstanding student because of his rhetoric and oratory abilities. After the Nazis invasion of Poland he is captured in his flee by the Soviets and is deported to a labour camp in Siberia. After liberation and having lost his family during Holocaust, he moves to Palestine while serving with the British army as an interpreter. He takes advantage of this position to actively collaborate in overthrowing British power from Palestine and in the illegal immigration of Jews. After NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 104 proclamation of the State of Israel he remains very active in the most conservative wing of Judaism, reaching leadership of the Likud bloc (Jewish right party) in 1977. He was the first Israeli Prime Minister to name the Jordan River territories, including the West Bank, using their biblical names (Judea and Samaria). He was also the first Israeli Prime Minister to set foot on Egypt (Ismailia, December 25, 1977), in correspondance to the visit of Sadat, President of Egypt, to Jerusalem one month earlier (November 1977). From the former data we can infer that Begin’s personality will be of the “Extraversion—being sociable, assertive, talkative” 44 type. - Anwar el-Sadat for Egypt: Born in Egypt (December 25, 1918), he went to a British military school in Egypt, however his aim was to overthrow British power from his homeland. After graduating he goes in search of Nasser, and together they start gathering a revolutionary group of military officials. After being in prison for revolutionary activities and for actively collaborating in King Farouk’s deposition –a puppet of the British power-, he finally reaches power in the neibourhood of Nasser –eventually becoming his confidence man-. He was Vicepresident since 1969 to Nasser’s death in 1970; Sadat takes then office as President of Egypt. After their defeat in the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the urgent state of need of the country, Sadat reoriented his Foreign Policy addressing its force towards the Arab League and the fight against the State of Israel seems unwise under the circumstances: their backing power, the USSR is showing increasing signs of decadence; Egypt is going throug a period of need after the two defeats in front of Israel. This situation requires accepting the US help and starting to look towards the West in a more open manner, fighting out suspicion. On November 1977 Sadat, invited by the Israeli Prime Minister Begin, visits Jerusalem with the aim of starting a peace process in the Middle East. 44 Barrick and Mount, 1991. Quoted in: R. Lewicki, Bruce Barry & David Saunders, Essentials of Negotiation. New York, McGraw-Hill, 2004, p. 429. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 105 From the former data we can infer that Sadat’s personality will be of the “Conscientiousness—being responsible, organized, achievement oriented” 45 type. - Jimmy Carter for the US (mediator): Born and raised in the State of Georgia (October 1, 1924), in the South East of the US. The son of farmers and active Christian Baptist througout his life. He got a degree in Science and was a member of the Office of Naval Intelligence, adscribed to submarine missions. He started his political career on the late ’50s. He became President of the US for the Democrat party on January 20, 1977. Among the priorities for his term was the creation of the Departament of Energy Organization and the Energy Security ‘Act’ 46 . He signed a new antiballistic agreement with the USSR (SALT II. Vienna, 1979). He also established diplomatic relations between the US and the Popular Republic of China. From the former data we can infer that Carter’s personality will be of the “Agreeableness—being flexible, cooperative, trusting” 47 type. Once our key pieces have been analysed, in the view of the personalities of the actors in the play, we may start thinking that the negotiation will take place within the tension between competing and collaborating, but with a clear trend towards competing. Carter’s tough work throughout the negotiations is to conduct such tension toward a result of compromising. In fact, Carter is aware of the strong need for compromising in the Briefings to prepare The Camp David Accords: “-- Both master manipulators, utilizing basically two different personality styles in order to achieve power and control. Begin concentrates on tactics and details, broad 45 Ibidem. 46 Source on line: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/keylegis.phtml Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. 47 Barrick and Mount, 1991. Quoted in: R. Lewicki, Bruce Barry & David Saunders, opus cit., p. 429. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 112 moves designed to enact or pursue broad (or higher-level) strategies, which in turn provide stability, continuity, and direction for tactical behaviours.” 57 In our case we can infer that, in the beginning, cause↔effect relationships will be marked by competition. Begin and Sadat both want peace in the Middle East, but their disposition to collaboration is weak. Their strategy will be to try to get as much as possible from their opponent while yielding nothing or as little as possible of their own. Carter’s strategy will be to gently bring them to a position closer to integration-collaboration. Apparently, Carter works from an accommodation plane; thus he prioritizes a good relational outcome over good substantive outcomes, thus securing their very existence. This strategy looks for points of deep connection, in order to build on them an agreement over the differences: “(...) The objective is to minimize their real differences and maximize their apparent similarities.” 58 The mediator’s strategy is necessary to gradually turn the symmetrical cause↔effect relationship between the negotiators into a more constructive, less destructive one. Finally reaching BATNA will be, if not an absolute collaboration at least a bargaining mix because for a constructive relationship “(...) agreement is necessary on several issues: the price, the closing date of (...), renovations to (...)” 59 - How is the process? The negotiation process can be summarized as the development of the ‘transitive property’, since the implementation of the strategy creates not only a ‘symmetry’ relationship, determined by the feed-back of the cause↔effect relationship, but also a yet unaccounted for effect produced by our tactical acts, a sort of ‘third party’. 57 Ibidem, p.110-111. 58 VANCE, C.R., 1978: TAB 4: “Considerations for Conducting the Summit Meetings”, p. 1. 59 R. Lewicki, Bruce Barry & David Saunders, opus cit., p. 38. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 113 Therefore, the process leading to accomplish some type of agreements, of a greater or lesser extent, in accordance with our goals, depends largely on the process development and its effects on all the participating actors. Taking all that into account, together with the negotiation timing, let’s now analyse each one of its phases 60 : - Phase 1: Preparation: (February 14, 1977 to September 5, 1978). On February 14, Carter takes the initiative of writing letters to Sadat and Rabin (Israeli Prime Minister at the time), at the request of his State Secretary -C. Vanceat his return from a mission in the Middle East, urging them to start peace negotiations for the area: “(...) I look forward to meeting whit you personally at the earliest opportunity. I have asked Secretary Vance to discuss when and how our first meeting might be arranged. In view of the importance of Egypt in our common pursuit of peace (...). The growing friendship and cooperation between Egypt and the United States have already brought us some steps along the path to peace” 61 “I am confident that US-Israeli relations will continue on the cordial and sound basis that has characterized the close ties between our countries and peoples for three decades. I look forward to working closely whit you in our common search for a lasting peace settlement in the Middle East.” 62 From that day to the 60 We take up the phases as they are proposed on page 117, figure 4.3. In: R. Lewicki, Bruce Barry & David Saunders, opus cit. 61 Document 1: Letter from President Jimmy Carter to President Anwar Sadat of Egypt. It was written during the first month of President Carter’s administration. Document declassified on October 3, 1997. In: The Camp David Accords after Twenty-Five Years. “Twenty-Five Documents After Twenty- Five Years”. Source on line: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid25/campdavid25_documents.phtml Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. 62 Document 2: Letter from President Jimmy Carter to President Yitzhak Rabin of Israel. It was written during the first month of President Carter’s administration. Document declassified on December 11, 1998. In: The Camp David Accords after Twenty-Five Years. “Twenty-Five Documents After Twenty-Five Years”. Source on line: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid25/campdavid25_documents.phtml Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 114 start of the negotiations in Camp David (September 6, 1978) the countries involved prepared the negotiation meticulously, since the interests at stake were of paramount importance to each one of them, as we have seen already. - Phase 2: Relationship building: The relationships between our actors have been modelled during the Preparation Phase. We should remark here that the position of the US is that of an impartial mediator. For this, Carter has a private meeting with each of the other two negotiators in the morning of September 6, with the aim to create an atmosphere of confidence during the negotiations: “(...) seeking to build a common recognition of the unique opportunity these talks offer, the responsibility to history the three of them share, and the need to grasp the nettle now. He could emphasize that the negotiations have reached a stage where only heads of government can break the impasse, and therefore each side must try understand the other’s political problems. (...) Since each side will have as an objective capturing the US, the President with sympathy for each side’s interests will have to establish the independence of the US position. Each will want a sense of special relationship with us; we will want to be close to each without being in either’s pocket. (...)” 63 - Phase 3: Information gathering: This is the time when all the actors meet to explain to each other what has brought them to this gathering and what do they expect to get from it. This meeting took place in the afternoon of September 6: “Later in the day, the three men used the patio outside Aspen for further discussions. They talked about three issues: 1) the Sinai Peninsula between Egypt and Israel, 2) the ownership of the West Bank and Gaza areas bordering Israel, and 3) the role that Palestinian people would have in governing themselves.” 64 63 VANCE, C.R., 1978: TAB 2: “A scenario for Camp David”, p. 2. 64 September 6. Source on line: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid25/campdavid25_thirteendays.phtml Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency for the Camp David Accords. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 115 - Phase 4: Information using: Here our actors will express themselves with regard to the way in which an agreement will be possible about the three points exposed in the former phase. Along this phase the constraints/preferences for an eventual agreement will become apparent. This is the hardest part of the negotiation: the subjects to be discussed affect Sadat and Begin directly: sovereignty, security and economy (the three pillars of all foreign policy), with the aggravating circumstance of having to talk about Jerusalem, a holy city for Jews and Muslims, and a necessary subject when discussing the territories occupied during the 1967 War. This phase started in the morning of Thursday September 7, and was finished by Carter in the night of Tuesday September 12 when, in view of the sterility of endless discussions, he decides to assertively intervene by choosing the less problematic issue, the Sinai, to set a framework for an agreement: “I decided to work that afternoon on the terms for an Egyptian-Israeli treaty, and spread the Sinai maps out on the dining table to begin this task, writing the proposed agreement on a yellow scratch pad."--Jimmy Carter from Keeping Faith 65 - Phase 5: Bidding: This is the most difficult time of the negotiation. The positions of Sadat and Begin seem irreconcilable and Carter fears not to reach an agreement. But peace in the Middle East is crucial for the US interests and Carter decides to ‘impose’ peace in the region: “Determined to reach agreement on a framework for peace, Carter and Vance spent eleven hours with Aharon Barak from Israel and Osama el-Baz from Egypt to work out the detailed language of the framework proposal. As they hammered out the language of each phrase, both Barak and el-Baz demonstrated their astute legal minds and their excellent knowledge of English. When differences in language stopped progress, President Carter suggested that 65 September 12. Source on line: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid25/campdavid25_thirteendays.phtml Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency for the Camp David Accords. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 116 "West Bank" be used in the English and Arabic texts, while "Judea and Samaria" be used in the Hebrew version; "Palestinians" in the English and Arabic, yet "Palestinian Arabs" in the Hebrew. He would explain the change in a letter to Begin. The letter would be attached to any formal agreement they would reach. The letter exchange idea became a critical factor in making progress toward agreement.” 66 In spite of Carter’s efforts, the negotiation is in a deadlock of bargaining-bargaining: “We can go no further.”- Carter. “I am leaving.”- Sadat. President Sadat could not agree to leave Israeli settlements and airfields in the Sinai Peninsula, and Prime Minister Begin could not agree to remove these settlements. Without agreement on these issues, there did not appear to be any way to continue. Carter had already told the delegations that Sunday, September 17, would be the last day of the meetings. He had requested that all the delegations work on a joint statement about the meetings, emphasizing the positive accomplishments.” 67 In this critical situation, and with only 48 hours left, Carter plays his only winning trick reminding Egypt of the importance of collaborating with Israel and changing their own attitude in order to reach a peace agreement, since future Egypt-US relationships depend on this: "I explained to [Sadat] the extremely serious consequences... that his action would harm the relationship between Egypt and the United States, he would be violating his personal promise to me... [and] damage one of my most precious possessions-- his friendship and our mutual trust." --Jimmy Carter from Keeping Faith 68 . Next morning he addressed Begin’s iron position: “Ultimatum, Excessive Demands, Suicide”-Begin. 66 September 13. Ibidem. 67 September 15. Ibidem. 68 September 15. Source on line: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid25/campdavid25_thirteendays.phtml Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency for the Camp David Accords. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 117 Even though the progress of the talks was faltering, Carter's determination to reach agreement remained strong. In another negotiating session with Begin, Barak, and Dayan, Carter and Vance made a case for peace, going through the Sinai framework and the Framework for Peace line by line.” 69 - Phase 6: Closing de deal: Carter’s words to Sadat had an effect as expected, and next day -September 16- a safe path was tended toward the peace agreement: “Carter explained to Begin that Sadat would not continue negotiations toward a peace treaty until the Israeli settlements in the Sinai region were removed. After a storm of protest, Begin finally agreed to submit the question of settlements to the Israeli Knesset for a decision--If any agreement is reached on all other Sinai issues, will all the settlers be withdrawn? He even promised to allow each Knesset and Cabinet member to vote individually, without the requirements of political party loyalty. This was acceptable to Sadat! Carter explained to Sadat that Begin would not allow the phrase "inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war" to be part of the Framework for Peace. [1967 U.N. Resolution 242, which contains this phrase, is to be found in the annex of the Framework. Begin claimed that it did not apply to Israel because the 1967 War was a defensive war for his country.] Begin insisted that only permanent residents of the West Bank and Gaza areas, not all Palestinians, participate in future peace negotiations. Sadat agreed to write one letter defining Egypt's role in these negotiations and one letter stating his position on an undivided Jerusalem. This was acceptable to Begin! All through the meetings, Carter continued to remind Sadat and Begin how much each had to gain in making peace.” 70 69 September 16. Ibidem. 70 September 16. Ibidem. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 118 In the end, there is a formula, our integral has been defined, a point of convergence has been reached: the incenter of our triangle. - Phase 7: Implementing the agreement: This is the moment to define how, when and where will the agreements be implemented. This is the moment to draw the circumference that circumscribes our encounter point. Thus, on Sunday September 17, 1978, two agreements are reached: a Framework for Peace in the Middle East and a Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. Both were signed by the three leaders -Anwar al-Sadat, Menachem Begin and Jimmy Carterthat same day at the official signing ceremony of the Camp David Accords in Washington. At this point of our analysis, the pieces of the puzzle are already in place. We were able to move from a distributive structure to an integrative one, since an agreement has been reached, meeting our goals. But there is still one more step to go in our analysis process, because, as every ‘integral’, ours will also have a ‘differential coefficient’; what will be ours? This is the question we will address next. THE KEY PIECE: THE AGREEMENT. LEVEL OF ACCOMMODATION Our ‘differential coefficient’ will allow us understand the adjustment/agreement of the negotiation. Our question now should be what has been the ‘differential coefficient’ here, and why this coefficient -and only this onehas made it possible to reach our goal, peace in the Middle East. Ultimately, the ‘differential’ is the crux of the matter, since it is what gives us the key to give a logical answer to the question posed in NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 119 the introduction: ‘Why were the agreements these, and not others?’ Then, let’s analyse the final documents of Camp David Accords: The Camp David Accords The Framework for Peace in the Middle East Preamble “The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:  The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.  After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.  The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.  The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.  To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 120 to negotiate peace and security with it are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.  Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability and in assuring security.  Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring and other arrangements that they agree are useful.” 71 As we see here, the compromise to abide by UN SC RES 242 (1967) and UN SC RES 338 (1973) is to be reached only after previous settlement with each of the concerned States; a negotiation with every one of them is necessary, so that we can give a preliminary answer: after the first document, only one more document, focusing on Egypt, can be issued, for Egypt was the only represented party at the end of the negotiations. That is how the second Camp David document came - Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel-. Let’s find out what this document has to say about our initial question ‘Why were the agreements these, and not others?’: The Camp David Accords Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel 71 The Camp David Accords. The Framework for Peace in the Middle East. Source on line: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/accords.phtml Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 121 “It is agreed that:  The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.  All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.  Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.  The following matters are agreed between the parties: 1. the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine; 2. the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai; 3. the use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Ras en-Naqb, and Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use only by all nations; 4. the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight; 5. the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and 6. the stationing of military forces listed below.” 72 Now we do have all the keys: the presence of Egypt was necessary to create a working agreement in favour of achieving peace, but it was not sufficient to 72 The Camp David Accords. Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. Source on line: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/frame.phtml Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 128 Pierre Razoux, La Guerre des Six Jours (5-10 juin 1967). Du mythe à la réalité. Paris, Éd. Economica, 2006. Samuel Seguev, La Guerre de Six Jours. Opération « Drap Rouge ». Paris, Calmann- Lévy, 1967. ARTICLES: John G. Cross, “Economic Perspective”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 164-179. Chistophe Dupont & Guy-Olivier Faure, “The Negotiation Process”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 40-57. Oliver Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin, “Lessons for Theory and Research”. In: Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes, by Guy Oliver Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.). Newbury Park (California), SAGE Publications, Inc., 1993, p. 209-231. Jean F. Freymond, “Historical Approach”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 121-134. Victor A. Kremenyuk, “A Pluralistic Viewpoint”. In: Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes, by Guy Oliver Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.). Newbury Park (California), SAGE Publications, Inc., 1993, p. 47-54. Winfried Lang, “A Professional’s View”. In: Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes, by Guy Oliver Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.). Newbury Park (California), SAGE Publications, Inc., 1993, p. 38-46. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 129 Dayle E. Powell, “Legal Perspective”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 135-147. Dean G. Pruitt, “Strategy in Negotiation”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 78-89. Jeffrey Z. Rubin, “The Actors in Negotiation”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 90-99. Jeswald W. Salacuse, “Implications for Practitioners”. In: Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes, by Guy Oliver Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.). Newbury Park (California), SAGE Publications, Inc., 1993, p. 199-208. James K. Sebenius, “Negotiation Analysis”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 203-215. Victor M. Sergeev, “Metaphors for Understanding International Negotiation”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 58-64. I. William Zartman, “Regional Conflict Resolution”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey- Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 302-314. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 130 I. William Zartman, “The Structure of Negotiation”. In: International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches Issues, by Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.). San Francisco, Jossey- Bass Inc. Publishers, 1991, p. 65-77. I. William Zartman, “A Skeptic’s View”. In: Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes, by Guy Oliver Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.). Newbury Park (California), SAGE Publications, Inc., 1993, p. 17-21. I. William Zartman, “Conflict Resolution and Negotiation”. In: The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, by Jacob Bercowitch, Victor Kremenyuk & I. William Zartman (eds.). London, SAGE Publications, Ltd., 2009, p. 322-339. DOCUMENTS: Camp David Accords: Jimmy Carter Reflects 25 Years Later. 17 Sep 2003. Source online: http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc1482.html Authorized website of the Jimmy Carter Center. Key Legislation During the Carter’s Administrarion. Source online: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/keylegis.phtml Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. The Camp David Accords after Twenty-Five Years. “Thirteen Days After Twenty- Five Years”. Source online: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid25/campdavid25_thirteenday s.phtml Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. The Camp David Accords. Framework for Peace in the Middle East. Source online: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/accords.phtml Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. The Camp David Accords. Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. Source online: NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 131 http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/frame.phtml Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. The Camp David Accords. Annex to the Framework Agreements. Exchanges of Letters. Source online: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/letters.phtml Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. The Camp David Accords after Twenty-Five Years. “Twenty-Five Documents After Twenty-Five Years”. Source online: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid25/campdavid25_documents. phtmlAuthorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. Document 1 and Document 2: These letters from President Jimmy Carter to President Anwar Sadat of Egypt (February 14, 1977) and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel (February 14, 1977) were written during the first month of President Carter's administration. They indicate President Carter's early personal commitment to the Middle East peace process as well as his eagerness to meet with both Sadat and Rabin. (1) Declassified on October 3, 1997. (2) Declassified on December 11, 1998. Document 3: This letter (June 28, 1977) from nine United States Senators represented the support that President Carter was to have in his quest for Middle East peace. Document 4: There were to be many obstacles to Middle East peace, and President Carter appealed to President Sadat for his support in this letter (October 21, 1977). One month later President Sadat visited Israel for the first time. Declassified on July 14, 1997. Document 5: President Sadat's plan to visit Israel solicited this speech by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (November 11, 1977), who had succeeded Prime Minister Rabin after a surprise election victory. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 132 Document 6: This President Sadat letter to President Carter (April 24, 1978) recognized the international respect that was accorded to President Carter's success in negotiating the Panama Canal treaties. President Sadat also emphasized Israeli activities and negotiating positions that discouraged support of other Arab nations for the peace process. Declassified on June 19, 2002. Document 7: One week later, as President Carter prepared to meet with Prime Minister Begin, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski asserted (May 1, 1978) that a renewed commitment to Israeli security should be coupled with an appeal for Begin recognition of President Sadat's requirements. Declassified on October 20, 1997. Document 8 and Document 9: On August 3, 1978, President Carter wrote private letters to President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to be delivered by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The letters proposed a meeting of Carter, Sadat, and Begin at a time and location to be determined. Both declassified on July 14, 1997. Document 10: President Carter's schedule for September 5, 1978, records the arrival at Camp David of First Lady Rosalynn Carter, President Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin. Document 11: Ten days later (September 15, 1978) President Carter sent this message to Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat to suggest an honorable and respectable closure to what then appeared to be a failed peace effort. Document 12: This is President Carter's draft of what became the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel." Document 13: President Carter's notes indicate the difficulty of the last few hours of negotiations at Camp David. Document 14: President Carter's schedule for September 17, 1978, records the hectic activities that culminated in a signing ceremony in the East Room of the White House late on a Sunday evening. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 133 Document 15: The next day (September 18, 1978) President Carter accepted the congratulations of former National Security Adviser and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Document 16: On Sunday, September 17, 1978, cellist Mstislav Rostropovich had been hosted by First Lady Rosalynn Carter at a White House concert as Carter, Begin, and Sadat wrapped up their Camp David discussions. Document 17: One month later Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Both President Sadat and National Security Adviser Brzezinski believed that President Carter should have been included in the award, an honor that President Carter was eventually accorded in December, 2002. Document 18: As this memo (November 21, 1978) from Brzezinski to the President suggests, tough negotiations continued after the Camp David Accords until March, 1979. Declassified on October 20, 1997. Document 19: On March 7,1979, the President and Mrs. Carter departed for Egypt and Israel to once again bring the President's personal force to bear on the post-Camp David negotiations of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Document 20: This is the President's schedule on March 13, 1979, the day on which he finally nailed down a peace treaty agreement. Document 21: The President and First Lady returned to Andrews Air Force Base shortly after midnight on March 14, 1979, to be welcomed back to the United States by an enthusiastic crowd of approximately one thousand people. Document 22: March 26, 1979, featured the signing ceremony for the Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel in the afternoon on the North Lawn of the White House, followed that evening by a State Dinner on the South Lawn of the White House. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 134 Document 23: President Carter's handwritten editing of his statement delivered at the signing ceremony demonstrates his attention to detail even to the last moment of the peace process. Document 24 (August 20, 1980) and Document 25 (September 3, 1980): Despite the success of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in preserving peace between those two nations, the Middle East continued to be a volatile region throughout the Carter’s Administration and to the present. The NSC Staff and Organisation, 1977-81 (Carter’s Administration). Source online: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/nsc.phtml Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. National Security Council PD/NSC-18 US National Strategy (August 26, 1977) Source online:http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd18.pdf Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. Declassified on June 1, 1992. UN SC RES 242 (1967) Source online: http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1967/scres67.htm Authorized website of the United Nations Security Council. UN SC RES 338 (1973) Source online: http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1973/scres73.htm Authorized website of the United Nations Security Council. VANCE, C.R. (1978). Study Papers for the Camp David Talks [These documents ware declassified on August 13, 2003]. Retrieved from https://www.cartercenter.org/documents/nondatabase/campdavidstudy.pdf, checked on May 3, 2017. Various Authors, “The Egyptian-Israeli Treaty”. In: Basic Documentary Series, No. 13. Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1979. NEGOTIATING with LOGICAL-LINGUISTIC PROTOCOLS in a DIALOGICAL FRAMEWORK MARTÍNEZ CAZALLA, Maria Dolors 135 INTERVIEWS: David L. Aaron ((Deputy, National Security Council), Exit Interview (December 15, 1980). Source online: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/exitInt/Aaron.pdf Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. Declassified on June 15, 1994. Zbigniew Brzezinski (National Security Adviser), Exit Interview (February 20, 1981). Source online: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/exitInt/Brzezinski.pdf Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. Robert J. Lipshutz (Counsel to the President), Exit Interview (September 29, 1979). Source online: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/exitInt/Lipshutz.pdf Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. OTHER WEBSITES: www.cartercenter.org Authorized website of Jimmy Carter Center. www.cidcm.umd.edu Authorized website of the Center for International Developement and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland. www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov Authorized website of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. www.un.org/Docs/sc/ Authorized website of the United Nations Security Council. CARTOGRAPHY: www.bible.ca/archeology/ Website of biblical archaeology and geography. Frédéric Encel, Atlas Géopolitique d’Israël. Aspects d’une démocratie en guerre. Paris, Éd.Autrement, 2008. PRIVATE MEETINGS: Anonymous meeting with Mr. X (high representative of the Jewish religious community in Belgium) on December 13, 2010.