Ψυχή and Bewegtheit: soul as movement in early heideggerian interpretation of Aristotle

145 Di e enz Re is a in e nacional de es udios heidegge ianos y sus de i as con empo áneas AÑO 3, NÚMERO 2: JULIO DE 2016. ISSN 2174-6796 [pp. 145-159] Recibido: 25/05/2016 Acep ado: 14/06/2016 Ψυχή and Beweg hei : soul as mo emen in ea ly heidegge ian in e p e a ion o A is o le Elisa Zocchi (Uni e si à Ca olica del Sac o Cuo e, Milano) Abs ac : In his ea ly hough , Heidegge eads A is o le and ge s om him an impo an idea o moods (S immungen). A i s he denounces he me aphysical in e p e a ion o ψυχή as ουσία, which leads o hink ha moods a e some hing o emo e. Heidegge claims ha soul is ins ead a mo emen - owa ds: human being is mo ed by his πάθη. Mo ili y is no jus a physical p oblem bu an an h opological elemen , gi en by moods. A he beginning o each mo emen he e is a στέρησις, a lack: soul’s limi , human ini ude. Mo emen is he eal essence o ac ici y: S immungen and Beweg hei a e almos he same. Key-Wo ds: Moods; Mo emen ; Pa hos; A is o le; Soul. 1. Heidegge and moods: he pa hical elemen o exis ence A he o igin o Heidegge ’s hough an in e es ing ques ion can be ound, no only in o de o unde s and Heidegge himsel , bu o unde s and ou pe sonal being-in- he- wo ld. Wha a e moods? Which is he ole o a ec i i y, o he pa hical momen , in ou exis ence? We ha e o unde s and i ou being subjec o a ec ions and emo ions is an elemen o closu e and limi o i i is maybe he sign o ou ela ion o Being, as 146 ELISA ZOCCHI ΨΥΧΉ AND BEWEGTHEIT: SOUL AS MOVEMENT IN EARLY HEIDEGGERIAN INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE some hing ha o e lows and cha ac e izes ou humani y and eedom in a posi i e way. I seems o us ha hese “p e-logical” momen s may hide he possibili y o a eal ela ion wi h hings and wi h o he human beings. Be o e gi ing an answe o hese ques ions, we should in oduce he p oblem o emo ions in Heidegge ’s ea ly hough and we mus unde s and he oo s o he wo ld ha in Being and ime exp esses he a ec i e le el o human expe ience – Be indlichkei . The s uc u e o he Dasein in Being and ime is cons i u ed by h ee exis en ial elemen s: Be indlichkei , Ve s ehen and Rede. The i s is he mos impo an in o de o unde s and wha “ o be si ua ed” in he wo ld means, and o gain a deepe insigh we mus ecognise ha his Be indlichkei is no an issue aised in 1927 bu inds i s o igin in Heidegge ’s ea ly hough . The ques ion, inhe i ed by phenomenology, abou he in en ionali y o conscience, inds i s place in he i s lec u es in F eibu g in opposi ion o Husse l’s pa h. Heidegge p esen s a model o expe ience which is no in en ional, bu based on he p e-wo ldly. We can clea ly see i in he cou se o 1919, Die Idee de Philosophie und das Wel anschauungsp oblem ( ha will become amous as K iegsno Semes e ), whe e he i s claims some hing ha will gi e shape o all his u u e hinking-pa h: we should b eak he sup emacy o he heo e ical1. In his lec u es we also ind he ool o his demoli ion: i is he i s and s ill unce ain disco e y o wha is he e called o wel lich, which wha will la e become, in Being and ime, Be indlichkei . A he end o one lesson, Heidegge aces on he boa d a amewo k ha ep esen s he s a i ica ion o ou cogni i e p ocess: Das o heo e ische E was A. B Das o wel liche E was Wel ha es E was (G undmomen des Lebens übe haup ) (G undmomen bes imm e E lebnissphä en) U -e was Genuine E lebniswel We can clea ly unde s and ha be o e he heo e ical we ind wo momen s, no only one (as claimed o example by Husse l, wi h he idea o Lebenswel ). The e is no only he wo ldly p e- heo e ical (B), bu also a mo e o iginal le el, hanks o which we can each he U -e was: ha which makes e e y expe ience possible. This le el is exac ly wha we mean by pa hical, and he aim o Heidegge ’s philosophy is ea down he p imacy o he heo e ical, always p esen in he s o y o Wes e n philosophy. We can ind a con i ma ion ha his le el is he pa hical one no only on he basis o he examples p esen in he lec u e2 bu also hanks o ano he lec u e. In he analysis o Paul’s 1. M. HEIDEGGER, Die Idee de Philosophie und das Wel anschauungsp oblem, in Zu Bes immung de Philosophie, GA Bd. 56/57, h sg. B. Heimbüchel, Klos e mann, F ank u am Main 1987. 2. An impo an example: he sun ising in Thebe in he mo ning o he ic o y compa ed o he sun o 147 EEZ. A 3 ME 2:  E 21. SS 214 PP. 141 le e s and wi h Augus ine’s ex s, we came ac oss exp essions such as « undamen al ac (G undlegende)», « undamen al expe ience (G unde ah ung)», always ela ing o momen s o ac ual li e such as anguish, joy, pain3. As an example, Heidegge de ines he lo e o God o men as “ he undamen al ac (das G undlegende)”, and no as a heo e ische E ken niss. The i s momen , he one ha on ologically comes be o e knowledge, is ou unde s anding o ‘being called’, p eceded by some hing else (in his case, di ine lo e), and his being-p eceded always shows up h ough moods like anguish (Bed ängnis), pain (Leiden), unce ain y (Unsiche hei ), agi a ion (Un uhe) and e en Angs . Tha is why we should conside he Be indlichkei no as a neu al “being- in-a-si ua ion” bu as he p e- heo e ical a ec i e uning. The e m Be indlichkei i sel is ull o meaning: sich be inden means o eel onesel in a ce ain mood, no only ou being-he e; he ac hen ha in he abo e quo ed ex abou Augus ine i is used as a ansla ion o a ec io/a ec iones con i ms ha wha Heidegge means wi h his wo d is clea ly o ien ed owa ds he a ec i e, pa hical aspec o exis ence. A e his sho in oduc ion on Be indlichkei , we can now deal wi h he ques ions ha began ou s udy: which ole do a ec ions ha e in ou e e y day li e? A e hey some hing ha obs uc s ou being ou sel es o a cons i u ional momen o ou psyche? In o de o ind an answe o hese ques ions, Heidegge inds an in e es ing in e locu o , an au ho ha is o en p esen in his lec u es, especially in his i s pe iod: A is o le. Heidegge o en denounces he me aphysical in e p e a ion o A is o le’s hough , which c ea es a dualis ic ision o he human being and his being-in- he-wo ld; he o igin o his misunde s anding is, in his opinion, he classical and me aphysical in e p e a ion o ψυχή as ουσία, as a pe manen essence o which mo emen is some hing «added» a a la e ime, some hing o keep unde con ol. The clea es examples o his in e p e a ion a e emo ions and mood: in a s a ic ision o soul as subs ance, hey a e some hing nega i e, empo a y mo emen s wi h a minimal on ological meaning and no me aphysical meaning. This idea o ψυχή can be e y dange ous: i may b ing us o belie e ha e en s, aumas and emo ions a e some hing o emo e om a «no mal» li e, some hing ha may damage us. Moods, emo ions and eelings should hen be diminished and possibly emo ed. Heidegge ’s in e p e a ion o A is o elian ψυχή b ings us ins ead o a genuine ision o he human being, whe e emo ions and aumas can be help ul in o de o shape a pe sonali y. Ou ac ici y and limi , i.e. ou empo ali y, is no only he p ima y elemen o ou being, bu also he elemen owa ds which i may be possible o es ablish a eal an as onome (Ibídem, p. 74) o he one o he happiness when, in he mo ning, we en e in a oom ull o sunligh (Ibídem, p. 46). 3. M. HEIDEGGER, Einlei ung in die Phänomenologie de Religion, in Phänomenologie des eligiösen Lebens, GA Bd. 60, h sg. M. Jung - T. Regehly - C. S ube, Klos e mann, F ank u am Main 1995. 148 ELISA ZOCCHI ΨΥΧΉ AND BEWEGTHEIT: SOUL AS MOVEMENT IN EARLY HEIDEGGERIAN INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE ela ionship wi h ou Sel and, also, i is he opening-elemen owa ds anscendence. I will y o ou line his in e p e a ion h ough some wo ks whe e Heidegge eads A is o le, using he S immungen as a ool o ge in o his hough – S immungen, moods, i.e. he a ec i e momen o ou exis ence. 2. Heidegge ’s phenomenological eading o A is o le: πάθος and subs ance The i s momen is he cou se ha Heidegge akes in F eibu g du ing he summe semes e o 1924, G undbeg i e de a is o elischen Philosophie4. The subjec is A is o elian Rhe o ic and hanks o a deep analysis, Heidegge desc ibes he πάθος as he main elemen o he ela ionship be ween he he o ician and he lis ene . Diese πάθη, A ek e, sind nich Zus ände des Seelischen, es handel sich um eine Be indlichkei des Lebenden in seine Wel , in de Weise, wie e ges ell is zu e was, wie e eine Sache sich angehen läss 5. Tha which in he o ic speech has o be aised is no a momen a y emo ion o he soul bu he Be indlichkei des Lebenden in seine Wel : a ec ions a e no only lee ing and supe icial moods – wha is he e in ques ion is he wo ld i sel , in a ela ionship ha is no heo e ical bu pa hical. Heidegge gi es us hen a clea desc ip ion o he soul: «Things (γενόμενον) ha a e ound in he soul a e o h ee kinds - passions (πάθη), acul ies (δύναμις) and s a es o cha ac e (εξις)»6. Heidegge desc ibes he πάθος as a γενόμενον o human soul. γενόμενον is «wha happens o he being», πάθος is hen «das, was in de Seele wi d»7. In his sense, a ec ions and emo ions a e no some hing seconda y ha s ikes a soul ha al eady exis s as a subs ance, bu some hing ha happens inside he soul, an e en ha shapes i s essence. The en i e Heidegge ian eading o A is o elian an h opology will be a ec ed by his s a ing poin , he de ini ion o πάθος as a way o a becoming (Weise des We dens) o he soul – Heidegge will e en claim ha πάθος de e mines ou being- in- he-wo ld in a undamen al way8. I soul de e mines who we a e, πάθος de e mines ou e y being ou sel es: πάθος is he e o e a Seinsbeg i 9. I he soul is an al e able being, we can desc ibe i as a non-s a ic being also om a kine ic poin o iew: πάθος 4. M. Heidegge , G undbeg i e de a is o elischen Philosophie, GA Bd 18, h sg. on M. Michalski, Klos- e mann, F ank u am Main 2002. 5. Ibídem, p. 122. 6. A is o le, Nicomachean e hics, II, 5, 1105b19-21. 7. «Πάθος gehö also zu dem, was in de Seele wi d». G undbeg i e de a is o elischen Philosophie, p. 168. 8. «Wich ig is das Mi gegebensein de πάθη als γινόμενα, Weisen des Seins selbs , so e n wi leben, Weisen des We dens, be e end das Sein-in-eine -Wel »; «...wie das πάθος Bezeichne e das Sein-in- de -Wel in einem undamen alen Sinne bes imm ». Ibídem, p. 169. 9. «Schon dadu ch is πάθος als ein Seinsbeg i angezeig , weil das πασχειν in de Gegenübe s ellung zum ποιειν ein G undmomen das ell ü die Analyse de κίησις, des Seins im Sinne des Beweg seins». Ibídem, p. 172. 149 EEZ. A 3 ME 2:  E 21. SS 214 PP. 141 is hen a undamen al concep in he analysis o κίνησις, o being as Beweg sein, being- in-mo emen . Going on in ou eading, we ind he commen o a passage o he Me aphysic whe e he ou meanings o πάθος a e lis ed. The i s (a ibu e, quali y) speci ies he ulne abili y o a being, he ac ha some hing may happen o i (passie en) and i is igno ed by Heidegge . This is e y impo an : o e use he idea o a ibu e hides implici ly he e usal o he idea o subs an ia, o a pe manen ‘laye ’ – he e we can see he di e ence be ween Heidegge ’s in e p e a ion and he classic one. The second meaning (changing o a cha ac e is ic) speci ies he possibili y o being s uck by some hing ex e nal and change (umschlagenden Mi -einem-Geschehen). The hi d one (pain ul change) is said pain ul only because someone eels i as such, because someone’s S immung is a ec ed. This hi d meaning is he one ela ed o ou co po ali y: we eel some hing because o ou being co po al. A las , πάθος indica e ha some hing s ikes one o a la ge ex en (βλαβεραι αλλοιώσεις και κινήσεις): Heidegge lea es he idea o pain ul a ec ion aside and gene alizes i as «some hing which s ikes me»10. We can see ha Heidegge unde lines, in e e y one o hese meanings, he aspec o mo emen . Πάθος is hen some hing ela ed wi h he li ing being (das Seins des Lebenden), pa icula ly wi h his «being disposed in a ce ain way (Je-und-je-sich- be inden)». The πάθος always s ikes someone (schläg einen ein) and mo es one, pu ing one in a ce ain disposi ion (Be indlichkei ). He e i is whe e he wo d ha will become one o he h ee elemen s o he exis en ial s uc u e in Being and Time appea s o he i s ime. He e i is poin ed ou ha πάθος is no some hing isola ed, a quali a i e mu a ion inside exis ence — a he i de e mines he subjec in his being- disposed in he wo ld, wi hin a con ex , and e e y a ec ion shapes his disposi ion in each and e e y momen . The e o e we could say ha e e y e en , e e y auma, e e y a ec ion shapes he soul. The πάθος is no an isola ed momen o ou cogni i e expe ience, a quali a i e mu a ion in ou exis ence, bu some hing ha can deeply change ou ac i e disposi ion in he wo ld. Die A und Weise des Aus-de -Fassung-Kommens, Aus-de -Fassung- geb ach -We dens is dem Sinn nach so, dass sie wiede ge ass we den kann: Ich kann mich wiede assen, ich bin einen bes imm en Momen , in eine Ge ah , im Momen des Sch eckens, in Fassung. Ich kann die du ch den Sch ecken gekennzeichne e Be indlichkei beziehen au ein mögliches Ge ass sein da ü . So ha also πάθος in sich selbs schon den Bezug au εξις.11 This disposi ion, being disposed in a ce ain way (Je-und-je-sich-Be inden), is no hing 10. «Was mi passie , was mi zuleide geschieh . Wi haben da ü einen en sp echenden Ausd uck: Das und das is ein Schlag ü mich». Ibídem, p. 195. 11. Ibídem, p. 171. 150 ELISA ZOCCHI ΨΥΧΉ AND BEWEGTHEIT: SOUL AS MOVEMENT IN EARLY HEIDEGGERIAN INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE else bu he cons i u ion o he ψυχή, i s being in he wo ld no as a s a ic subs ance bu as a i al essence shaped by ha wha we li e. Heidegge ian in e p e a ion leads o a non-dualis ic ision o A is o le’s hough – he ψυχή is hen conside ed as he p ima y εντελέχεια o man. I is hen clea ha o Heidegge he a ec i e momen is no a s ep o o e look in o de o es ablish a eal ela ionship wi h he wo ld bu i is he beginning o his ela ionship i sel . Only om his being-disposed can ela ions be es ablished, om he a ec i e momen ha opens he man up and disposes him in a ce ain a i ude. Ano he impo an sign o he collapse o e e y dualism on emo ions is he hi d meaning o πάθος in A is o le: he li e o he body wi h his eelings and passions. Heidegge eads he De Anima: «I seems ha all he a ec ions (πάθη) o he soul happen along wi h he body (ειναι μετα σώματος)»12. Heidegge ecognizes ha e e y a ec ion is a ec ion o a body. Again, he looks a a non-dualis ic A is o le: passions and body a e insepa able, he e is no ine ma e bu Leiblichkei : e e y a ec ion is hen an en i e modi ica ion o human li e, o he εντελέχεια ha makes i up and ha goes always oge he wi h his being-a-body (leibmäßig). We ha e o lea e e e y kind o dualism apa : Heidegge in his in e p e a ion o A is o le se s himsel be o e e e y di ision be ween ma e ial and non-ma e ial (di ision ha will anyway be la en in his hough un il he c ea ion o he concep , in his Denkweg, ha will pe ec ly exp ess his kind o uni y – S immung). Bu he πάθη a e now desc ibed as o iginally uni ed phenomena, uni y o which is gi en by he being o man i sel 13. The pa hical momen allows hen an openness, a mo emen - owa ds, because i disposes he Dasein in a ce ain way. This is he eal meaning o Be indlichkei , wi h a huge deb owa ds A is o le: being passi ely s uck means o ind ou sel es disposed in a ce ain way, being a ec i ely in- une o and emain in his ‘being uned in he wo ld’. We a e always disposed, always a ec i ely uned – we mo e om one mood o he o he , om an a ec ion o ano he , bu we canno a oid hem. Bu his limi , ou being always uned, is no a nega i e limi , bu i s and o emos ou g ea es esou ce: ou moods open us, hey a e no momen s o be o e looked bu a he si ua ions ha dispose us in owa ds a ce ain openness, in a mo emen . One impo an elemen o unde line is ha o Heidegge his pa hical aspec o ou exis ence is one capable o opening he Dasein owa d he e hical momen . I we ake he example o A is o le’s Rhe o ic, he he o ician has o pe suade he lis ene ac ing on his διάθεσις, his passi e disposi ion. Fo Heidegge , as we said, e e y mood is di ec ed owa ds he ou side, owa ds he de ini ion o he sel and o he wo ld – and his allows also he possibili y o decision. In Heidegge ’s in e p e a ion, he εξις (ac i e disposi ion) is a pa icula πάθος in which he momen o concen a ion 12. Ibídem, p. 203, eading A is o le, De Anima A.1, 403a16. 13. «Die u sp üngliche Einhei des Phänomens de πάθη lieg im Sein des Menschen als solchen». G un- dbeg i e de a is o elischen Philosophie, p. 177. 151 EEZ. A 3 ME 2:  E 21. SS 214 PP. 141 p e ails o e he endency o dispe sion; i is he « ech e Sichbe inden», some hing like a ha monious si ua ion made possible also by he exe cise o he φρόνησις, ha Heidegge in his ex ansla e wi h Umsich . I is in e es ing o no ice ha , as o en eminded by Gadame , Heidegge was used o ansla e φρόνησις wi h Gewissen, conscience14. I we conside Being and ime, whe e conscience is he c ucial place o he momen o decision, and we compa e i o wha was said abo e abou he ‘ igh Be indlichkei ’ as he eal momen o decision (Augenblick), we can clea ly obse e how he place o conscience is deeply linked o Be indlichkei , e en mo e, o emo ions and he pa hical momen . I seems o us ha he momen o concen a ion, o decision, is made possible by he di ec ion gi en by ha sphe e o human exis ence which man canno con ol, domina e o choose. Some hing comes be o e, some hing which we canno e ase and which allows us o dispe se o o concen a e, o choose ou sel es. The decision o ake can eme ge only ia some hing ha canno be objec i ied. The impossibili y o objec i y he o iginal elemen o pleasu e and pain pu s bo h in he G und o ou exis ence ( ha is why Heidegge will call hem G undbe indlichkei ). The “how” o ou li e ( he εξις, as A is o le would say) can a ise only h ough ha , which we canno possess. Be o e any meaning ha can be gi en o he wo ld, be o e he heo e ical and scien i ic momen , be o e he di ision ‘ a ional/i a ional’, hese G undbe indlichkei show a pa h which open o he de ini ion o he Wie o he human exis ence, o meaning. An impo an di ec ion o li e is al eady hidden wi hin moods, and al eady in i ue o moods we can call ou sel es ‘human’. The possibili y, o he Dasein, o be ully himsel , o s ay in his Da and o gua d i is al eady con ained in he Be indlichkei i sel . 3. Soul as mo emen We ha e o ake in o conside a ion ano he elemen in o de o ully unde s and Heidegge ’s in e p e a ion o A is o elian an h opology. In he lec u es o 1924 he ocus is on he a ec i e aspec , and epu edly he mos impo an aspec o A is o le, he λόγος, may seem o be ha e been o go en. I would be an e o o hink ha Heidegge looks a he human ψυχή as subjec o moods and wi hou a ionali y because o his in e es in Be indlichkei . We mus hen comp ehend which is he ole o λόγος in he de ini ion o ψυχή. The human Wesenbes immung is he λόγος, clea ly as κατηγορείν bu also as 14. An impo an example is Heidegge ’s cou se o 1924 – 1925 on he Sophis s, o which a e e e ed his lines: «E s mals wu de mi da on e was bewuß , als ich Heidegge 1923 – noch in F eibu g – ken- nenle n e und an seinem Semina übe die Nikomachische E hik des A is o eles eilnahm. Wi s udie - en die Analyse de φρόνησις. Heidegge zeig e uns am A iso eles-Tex , dass alle Techne eine inne e G enze besi ze: ih Wissen sei kein olles En be gen, weil das We k, das sie zu e s ellen e s ege, in das Ungewisse eines un e ügba Geb auchs en lassen we de. Und nun s ella e e den Un e schied zu Dis- kussion, de all solches Wissen, insbesonde e auch die bloße δόξα, on de φρόνησις schied (1140 b 29). Als wi an diesem Sa z unsiche und ganz in die g iechischen Beg i e e emde he umin e p e ie en, e klä e e b üsk “Das is das Gewissen!”». H.-G. Gadame , Ma bu ge Teologie, pp. 199- 200, in H.-G. Gadame , Gesammel e We ke, Band 3, J.C.B. Moh (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1987. 152 ELISA ZOCCHI ΨΥΧΉ AND BEWEGTHEIT: SOUL AS MOVEMENT IN EARLY HEIDEGGERIAN INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE απόφαινησται: λόγος doesn’ only mean «wha » — i also means εσχατον, goal, he eleological di ec ion. Λόγος, and no only ψυχή, has o be unde s ood as some hing no al eady on ologically o med, bu especially in i s eleological aspec . Ουσία is a being; e e y being, as a being, is an essence, wi h wo aspec s: υλη and ειδος. The o m de ines he limi o he subs ance and shapes in his way i s singula i y. υλη ep esen s, hen, he in ini e possibili ies o he subs ance, which a e limi ed by he o m. Subs ance (i.e. soul) is hen he mo able, mobile and li ing de e mina ion, he possibili y o aking shape and accep ing a ul ilmen o his shape. This « aking shape» is no hing bu he ic o y o ac on po ency, p ese ing he on ological meaning o εχειν: i is εντελέχεια. Subs ance, o Heidegge , isn’ some hing s a ic and de ini i e bu he i al ac , he incessan ac i e de e mina ion o one possibili y. In a li ing being i is he i s εντελέχεια, he coming o li e i sel . This means ha we ha e o look a he soul no only as a subs ance bu also as he o igin o mo emen and, mos o all, as τέλος, as εσχατον. I is he soul as εντελέχεια ha makes each human being a uni y because o i s mo emen owa d some hing. Tha is why he soul opens up he wo ld, and e e y o gan o li ing being wo ks in o de o make his openness possible. In A is o le he e is no con emp o he senses, because he soul would ha e, wi hou hem, no possibili y o de ine i s τέλος, and i is clea ha he soul, in e e y le el o de elopmen , is di ec ed ou side i sel and owa ds he wo ld. The limi makes possible he mo emen - owa d, he openness o he wo ld gi en by he πάθος o he ψυχή. I is clea he e o e ha he ψυχή is no o be conside ed as some hing concluded bu , ins ead, as some hing cha ac e ised by empo ali y. This means ha a ec ions and moods a e he eal openness and elemen o incessan de ini ion, o mo emen . Man i sel is, he e o e, mo emen : Das in Bewegung Seiende wu de bes imm als Gegenwä igkei des Seienden in seinem Seinkönnen. κίνησις mach also das Da aus des in Bewegung Seienden, des Beweg en. Beweg es is abe ( gl. p os i) Sein im Bezug zu Bewegedem, im Mi dasein eines κινοιν bzw. κινετικόν. Wie is das Da dieses mi dem in Bewegung Seienden als Beweg em Mi daseienden zu bes immen?15. Mo emen is a undamen al elemen in o de o unde s and he being o li e as a sel - ul ilmen o he Sel and he being o he beings as p esence. The ψυχή is an unin e up ed mo emen , as showed by moods whe e we always ind ou sel es. We can he e begin o unde s and Heidegge ’s p ocedu e: wha A is o le would ha e asc ibed o na u e, o he wo ld o physics (whose main objec is he being-in-mo emen ), is o Heidegge also a cha ac e is ic o he human wo ld, i is a undamen al aspec o he Sel , o li e as ac ici y. 15. Ibídem, p. 392. 153 EEZ. A 3 ME 2:  E 21. SS 214 PP. 141 We can now ake ano he s ep ha allows o ully unde s and he meaning o soul as mo emen . We ha e o de ine he ψυχή no mo e only ia nega ionis, knowing ha i is no s a ic subs ance, and ins ead mo e o disco e he eal meaning o soul as mo emen . In o de o do his we ha e o look a he p og amma ic ex , in which Heidegge summa ises his in e es owa d A is o le. In Au umn 1922 Heidegge sends his candidacy o a place as ex a-o dina y p o esso a he Philosophy Facul y o Ma bu g and Gö ingen. The deans o he wo uni e si ies, Paul Na o p and Geo g Misch, asked Heidegge ’s p o esso Edmund Husse l o a summa y o he academic ac i i ies o his pupil – o whom Husse l asks in u n o a sho ex abou his own esea ch due o he poo amoun o publica ions. Tha is he o igin o Phänomenologische In e p e a ionen zu A is o eles. Anzeige de he meneu ischen Si ua ion, be e known as Na o p Be ich 16. Pa o his ex will eappea in he lec u es on A is o le o 1924 (which we analysed), bu lo s o aspec s will be o go en o le aside by Heidegge . I is in e es ing o show how he subjec o his ex may gi e us an impo an key in o de o unde s and he ψυχή and his ela ion wi h empo ali y. This is clea ly isible in a sen ence p esen in he ex : «Die philosophische Fo schung is de explizi e Vollzug eine G undbeweg hei des ak ischen Lebens und häl sich s ändig inne halb desselben»17. Li e o ac ici y ( ak ischen Leben) is he a ec i e le el o exis ence, he le el uned by he S immungen, which in Being and ime is he le el o Be indlichkei . This is he undamen al le el o human ψυχή, he one ha shapes i , he one o he e en s ha e e y day open i up owa ds exis ence and owa ds ha ela ion wi h hings, ela ion ha Heidegge calls Umgang o , e en be e , So ge. This ψυχή, claims Heidegge , is cha ac e ised by a undamen al mo ili y (G undbeweg hei ) ha philosophy has o in es iga e. Philosophy (and in a ce ain way also psychia y) has o be he ul ilmen o li e’s endency o explain i sel , a na u al and inna e endency. This is also he explana ion o he o e used quo a ion o 1924 whe e Heidegge speaks abou he Da o Dasein as a κίνησις – human being is i s o all mo ili y, Beweg hei . His being is unceasing openness, mo emen - owa d – no only he mo emen o philosophical esea ch bu also and especially o ou e e yday dwelling (wohnen) he wo ld and ela ionships, a dwelling ha is no al eady gi en and buil , a sense ha is no gi en by someone else bu ha , p ecisely because soul is Beweg hei , and he e o e has o be w i en and chosen s ep by s ep. 16. This wo k has h ee edi ions. The i s one, based on he ex sen o Gö ingen, published in 1989: Phänomenologische In e p e a ionen zu A is o eles. Anzeige de he meneu ischen Si ua ion, h sg. on H.-U. Lesung, Dil hey Jah buch, 6 (1989), pp 237-69. The second is based on Heidegge ’s ypew i en documen : Phänomenologische In e p e a ionen zu A is o eles. Ausa bei ung ü die Ma bu ge und die Gö inge Philosophische Fakul ä (1922), h sg. on V. G. Neumann, Reclam, S u ga 2003. The hi d one appea s in he Gesam ausgabe, and i con ains a comple e e ision o sou ces and adds impo an elemen s in he no es: Phänomenologische In e p e a ionen zu A is o eles (Anzeige de he - meneu ischen Si ua ion). Ausa bei ung ü die Ma bu ge und die Gö inge Philosophische Fakul ä (He bs 1922), in M. Heidegge , Phänomenologische In e p e a ionen ausgewähl e Abhandlunden des A is o eles zu On ologie und Logik, GA Bd. 62, Klos e mann, F ank u am Main 2005, pp. 341-419. 17. Ibídem, p. 351.