Contracting and accounting: spanish army expenditure in wardrobe and the General Treasury accounts in eighteenth century

The objective of this study is to examine the funds to purchase clothing for the Spanish Army during the eighteenthcentury and their administration by the General Treasury (from now onward GT) under the authority of the Spanish Royal Finances. We try to establish the relative and absolute importance of the assigned funds under this heading and the diverse means used for contracting, including its legal structure, the payment mechanisms used by the Crown and the accounting control. The data organization of the national archives forces us to assume certain factors in relation to our study. The data related to the GT expenses is located in the Archivo General de Simancas, Dirección General del Tesoro, Inventario 16, Guión 24, bundles 1-3 (from now onward AGS, DGT, Invº 16-24, b. 1-3), in a section so-called “Asientos de lo satisfecho por la Tesorería General a la clase de Menajes y Vestuario (1739-1807)”. Such clase [kind] of equipment and clothing was just one among more than thirty to which the general treasurers distributed the items of their general data during most of the eighteenth century.1Unfortunately, this series does not distinguish between the amounts paid for the wardrobe and other items such as artillery, weapons and ammunition. On the other hand, the contracts for the supply of clothing were kept all together in AGS, DGT, Invº 25-1, b. 17 in another section so-called “Asientos de vestuario y artillería (1740-1790)”. With this information we can choose select examples which refer exclusively to the purchase of clothing. 273 Contracting and Accounting: 14 Spanish Army Expenditure in Wardrobe and the General Treasury Accounts in Eighteenth Century Sergio Solbes Ferri University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria 1 The complete information about all the clases in Jurado Sánchez (2006: 157-9) and its description in Torres Sánchez (printers: 8-11). 266 As a result, the first part of our study includes an analysis of the financial importance of wardrobe and artillery together (from now onward W&A). In the second part, we will focus on the study of the contracts for clothing alone, to establish the evolution of its typologies and its relation with the government institutions that financed them. 1. Evolution of the Expense Consigned on W&A 1.1. Analysis and periodization (absolute terms) The total amount and the evolution of the funds assigned by the Royal Finances to cover our section appear in Table 1. The table shows in absolute terms (in reales de vellón) the total assigned from 1727 to the end of the century.2The global picture demonstrates a certain uniformity because all the amounts are lie between 5 and 15 million, with an annual average of 10,5 million reales for the period under study. We can also see the tendency for a regular increase in value over the period. Table 1. Expenditure in W&A, 1727-1800 (reales de vellón) 274 Sergio Solbes Ferri 2 The figures for 1727-38 period are taken them from Jurado Sanchez (2006: 171) so we have not detailed about the contracts of this period. We do have the data from 1739 included in our documentary series (AGS, DGT, Invº 16-24, b. 1-3). However, the accounts are Source: Jurado Sánchez (2006: 171) for the period 1727-1739 y AGS, DGT, Invº 16-24, b. 1-3. 267 275 Contracting and Accounting… not yearly until 1753, so we apportion the monthly amounts for 1739-1752 period. After issuing the Real Decreto 08/05/1753 to order the GT, the amounts are yearly, compact and homogeneous offering detailed and systematized information. Beginning our series in 1727 is interesting because that is the date in which Great Britain and Spain started a series of military confrontations, mainly related with the control of the American trade which continued until 1748. There was a trivial war between the two nations from 1727 to 1729 which ended with the Treaty of Seville but the situation could only be defined as a “cold war” until 1739 when the conflict broke out again (González Enciso, 2011: 40-45). As we can see in the table, the evolution of the expenses in W&A since 1727 to 1738 was very stable, averaging about 6.8 million per year (below the average of the whole series). It is also opportune that the detailed documentation begins in 1739, just in the beginning of a decade which saw the renewed Anglo-Spanish conflict, popularly called the War of Jenkins’ Ear, which overlapped in 1742 with the War of Austrian Succession. The money assigned to cover this section of expenses increased its absolute importance during 1739-48 period to an average of 8.6 million per year. Both periods could be really be examined together as one, characterized by war or the threat of it, which led to regular increase of expenses from about 6 to 10 million reales per year. The Treaty of Aquisgran, signed in October 1748, ended the War of the Austrian Succession and eventually also ended the conflict with Great Britain. King Felipe V had died in 1746, which brought to an end the vexed Italian question, which had been an obsession for him, but was of much less concern to his successor Fernando VI (see Gonzalez Enciso, 2003). Although everything remained unchanged in Americas and the Italian solution did not live up to Spanish expectations, the new king Fernando VI, with the support of his government, concentrated in the Marquis de la Ensenada hands as a Secretary of Exchequer, War, Navy and Indias, considered it was the time end the era of conflict. A policy of peace and neutrality was imposed, which allowed the beginning an important programme of domestic reforms. Table 1 shows that the equipment of the army was not one of the new monarch’s priorities. The Horcasitas account (general treasurer in 1749-50, still biennial) shows signs of the new political circumstances, but the radical transformation came with Nicolas de Francia’s account (general treasurer in 1751-52). It shows a huge contraction of expenditure in W&A continuing after the fall of Ensenada in 1754, the beginning 268 of the Seven Years’ War in 1756 (in which Spain is not involved until 1762) and the death of the king Fernando VI. All the budgets from 1749 to 1761 kept under 5 million per year and, in fact, averaged 3 million for the period as a whole. The period of peace and armed neutrality in Spain had an obvious effect on our series. Only after Carlos III became king in 1759, did the numbers slightly increase and only reached the pre-1748 level when the peaceful period abruptly ended. In August 1761, Carlos III signed the Third Family Compact with France and in January 1762, Great Britain and Spain declared the war each other. Expenditure increased quickly, reaching 10-15 million per year, a level that remained until 1785 as the Spanish Monarchy became involved in the Seven Years’ War (1762-1763), the African wars in 1774-75 and the American War of Independence (1779-83). The average expenditure between 1762 and 1785 was 12.5 million; a noteworthy different from the two previous periods. From 1786 the effects of an economic crisis and continuing warfare, with the Spanish involvement in the War of the Roussillon or War of the French Convention (179395) and later against Great Britain (1796-1802), began to be felt. Our series shows irregularity, but peaking at the highest figure for the series at 16 million per year. The financing of army equipment was sometimes under 10 million and, on other occasions, over 15 million, reaching 30 million at critical moments. These fluctuations probably represent a clash between a political will to reduce the expenses and the persistent reality of an intermittent war which forced essential and improvised financial decisions. In conclusion, we are able to differentiate four periods in our table. A first one from 1727-48 was a time of war, with expenses ranging between 5-10 million reales per year. A second period, the peaceful one from 1749-61, with amounts under 5 million. A third period, from 1762-86, in which expenses are very regular, but with an evident rising trend of consignments up to 10-15 million per annum. Finally, the last period from 1787 to 1800, in which the series shows a clear irregular tendency, but going over 15 million. From this we may conclude that there were quite different choices in the distribution of expenses in the reigns of Felipe V, Fernando VI, Carlos III and Carlos IV. However, the figures discussed above are absolute values at current prices. We have not considered the inflation in Spain during the century, which was quite low between 1748 and 1786, but particularly intense thereafter. Nor have we considered the tax burden nor the tax receipts and, consequently, the wealth availability of the Royal Finances. This is what we must now turn towards. 276 Sergio Solbes Ferri 269 1.2. Analysis and periodization (relative terms) We will now try to establish the relative importance of the funds given in W&A compared to the rest of expenses approved by the GT. Of course, it is not possible to talk about a “National Budget” until nineteenthcentury, but the information from the GT is quite close to the total expenditure of the Royal Finances during the eighteenth century (see Dubet, 2010a: 95-132 and Dubet, 2012). We obtained the total figures from the report of Jurado Sanchez (2006: 155-156) to calculate the percentage representing the data in the previous table.3The result is shown in Table 2. Table 2. Expenditure in W&A based on the GT data, 1727-1800 (percentages) 277 Contracting and Accounting… Source: Jurado Sánchez (2006: 155-6) and figures from Table 1. The expenditure of W&A as a percentage of global GT expenditure averages at 2.2 per cent per year. Although it oscillates, there is also certain regularity in the numbers in that, except in very special occasions, they never go lower than 0.5 per cent nor go over 3.5 per cent. We can assume therefore that there were always, to a greater of lesser degree, contracts in force to supply the army, but also that none of the Spanish 3 Of course, it is not possible to talk about ‘National Budget’ until nineteenth century, but the information from the GT is quite close to the total expenditure of the Royal Finances during the eighteenth century (see Dubet, 2010: 95-132 and Dubet, 2012). 270 Monarchy Governments made them a priority. We could talk about it being mediumhigh level concern under Felipe V, low level with Fernando VI, high level with Carlos III and irregular with Carlos IV. But the most important difference between Table 1 and Table 2 is that the tendency line is slightly decreasing in this second case. In fact, the wealth designed to clothing supplies tends to reduce during the course of the eighteenth century. If we put together the information in Table 2 with the periods before mentioned in Table 1 we can see similar characteristics in the first two periods. However, the third period shows now a progressive decrease and the fourth one lowers its relative importance substantially. From 1727 to 1748, the percentage of the assigned expense to W&A remained between 2-3 per cent of the total: during the conflict years (1739-1748) it was closer to 3 per cent and during the “cold war” closer to 2 per cent, but the average of the period is clearly 2.5 per cent. However, during the 1730s and 1740s the funds managed by the GT increased progressively because of improvements in tax collection; this fact allowed increasing the expenditure from 260 to 360 million reales. Our clase of W&A was constantly adapting to availability of funds from the GT. The second period, the peaceful one, is, similarly, not difficult to analyse. The funds assigned to the W&A were under 1 per cent of the total, well under the average for the complete period. The funds available to the Royal Finances during this period did not decrease, but actually increased. This was mainly because of the recovery in commercial activity with Indies, so the revenues rose to 400 million reales per year. However, clothing and arming the army were not on the Crown’s list of priorities. The percentages allocated under this heading rose to over 2 per cent again from 1762 and, during the early 1770s, reached the maximum of our series, going over 3 per cent for the first time in a period without military conflicts. So, the period in which the most money was assigned to cloth and arm the Spanish army was one of international stability rather than warfare. Also, the percentages no longer mirror the absolute figures. The average for the period 1762-78 is 2.8 per cent per year, but from 1779-85 it decreased to 1.9 per cent. The beginning of the American War of Independence increased the absolute figures, but decreased the relative proportion of the money assigned. The explanation is clear: the Crown asked its subjects for a new fiscal effort. There was a renewed collection effort, which affected all kind of income. There was a new negotiation of vouchers and bills, which increased the available income for the Monarchy. The budget of the Crown kept growing regularly to go over 400 million and, in the late 1780s, to over 278 Sergio Solbes Ferri 271 500 million. So, the while the funds assigned to W&A remained fairly constant, its relative importance went down. In the year 1786 an era begins in which the expenditure in absolute terms was at its highest level of our series, but not in relative terms. During the war years, the budget assigned to W&A was close to 3 per cent and in peaceful years that followed it went down to the 0.5 per cent, but these 16 million per year are only 1.8 per cent of the total expenditure and thus are under the period average. In conclusion, the funds over the average from the first period 1727-48 gains relative importance, which is also the case in the period 1749-61. The third period 1762-85, must be divided in two parts, separated in the year 1779. The earlier period gaining relative significant, and falling in the second part. This continued into the last period (1786-1800). The difference between the relative and the absolute terms is a consequence of the progressive increase in the tax yield in the eighteenth century Spain, combined with the inflation suffered, especially from the 1780s. However, it is very interesting to emphasize that there was not always a direct relation between war and the importance of our expenses in the budget. The 40s and the 70s are in the top —a time of war and a time of peace—. There are moments of war with efficient financing in clothing and artillery and other moments, also in war and specially at the end of the century, in which this kind of expense was not the state’s top priority. Our kind of expenditure is absolutely determined by the strategic options adopted by different governments and, ultimately, the decision of the monarch himself (Torres Sánchez, 2002a: 487512). 1.3. A distinction between funds for wardrobe and funds for arms Now we will proceed to analyse the basic characteristics of the contracts agreed with the merchants just for supplying clothing to the Spanish army. We need to separate the clothing from arms inside the clase of W&A. We do it in Table 3. 279 Contracting and Accounting… 272 Table 3. Composition of expense in the W&A, 1739-1796 (reales de vellón) 280 Sergio Solbes Ferri Source: AGS, DGT, Invº 16-24, b.1-3. The main conclusion from this table is that the amount for clothing is double of that for arms, albeit with temporary variations. We also can observe that the funds assigned to arms are more regular than the ones for clothing. The third line of the table that appears in 1762 refers to the payments made by the Army Treasuries following the orders and instructions of the general treasurer (Solbes Ferri, 2007a: 187-211 & 2007b: 357-84). Below we have a brief comment relating to the contracts for arms. There was a third part of the funds which were assigned to a contract signed by the Compañía Guipuzcoana de Caracas to supply the army with the arms made in Plasencia; that contract was in force until 1786, when the Guipuzcoana was changed for the Compañía de Filipinas. Together with this contract are another two others related to ammunition from Santander (Liérganes and La Cavada factories) on behalf of the Marques de Villacastel, and ammunition from Navarre (Eugui factory) signed by Francisco de Mendinueta.4In 1768 a new contract for ammunition and transport was signed in favour of Juan de 4 We have checked this information with Merino Navarro (1987: 103-142) and Pieper (1992: 21920). Anyway, we prefer the Jurado Sánchez’s calculations because he marks the difference between the precedent and the successive treasurer. 273 Michelena (Villacastel and Mendinueta were then out of business) and, finally, Michelena was replaced in 1786 by his nephew Leguia in contract for the transport of ammunition. Budgets adjustments barely affect the arm expenditure during our time of study because at least two or these three settlements are in force. Just in a paragraph we have analysed the different ways for contracting arms and ammunition. We wanted to include this information to point out the contrast with the wardrobe, completely different, may be because there were not enough blacksmiths and the ones are only working for the Crown. Next, we will try to concentrate on the contracts that the Spanish Crown had with the wardrobe supplies to the royal army. 2. Wardrobe supplies for the Royal Army 2.1. Contracting Models and Accounting Control The contract auctions followed a very precise pattern under the Bourbons throughout the century. Each contract started with the presentation of Pliego de Condiciones [Conditions Form] signed by the merchant or company applying for the contract. It included the number of years that they committed to supply the clothing with fixed prices. In each contract all the conditions were perfectly detailed, sometimes even to the level of the colours, quality of the fabrics, insignias and accessories. The documents included the guilds working for the supplier and also the conditions, deadlines and delivery places. Normally, the suppliers bore the charge of the delivery, which was usually between three and six months after the order was placed to places like Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Cartagena or Cádiz. From there the Royal Finances covered the additional transport to their final destinations. The exemptions and privileges of the suppliers during the settlement period were also detailed. The most important of these related to the exemption of customs rights for their raw materials in transit. The pliego were finally approved by Real Orden. The Finances Council was informed by the Secretary of the Exchequer. The contador de valores signed a copy of the contract to keep in the Contaduría General de Valores. The contract came into force from that moment. The production process really began with the Real Orden de Formalización de Encargo [Royal Order to Make the Settlement Official] communicated by the Secretary of the Exchequer himself or a Quartermaster (as his representative) to the supplier. That 281 Contracting and Accounting… 274 The Crown needed strong suppliers, able to assume big contracts and the suppliers needed the guaranty of a contract and prompt payment. The Royal Finances were now in a few suppliers’ hands for clothing and the same was true for the supply of arms. This was not a solution to the supply problem that was chosen by other European nations in our period of study, but, for Spain, the savings and the security of supply were more important than the advantages of dealing directly with the producers. Looking to the accounting question, there was an administrative innovation in these years related to the appearance in the GT data of the payments by the Army Treasuries. In essence, it is just a way to make easier the accounting and the financing by the Crown, in relation with the phenomenon called by Torres Sanchez ‘expenditure militarisation in the Carlos III’s Spain’ (Torres Sánchez, 2009). As we know, the Army Quartermasters were authorised to order the supplies and the Army Treasuries allowed to make the payments with their available funds; the accountant of the same treasury taking note of all the process. Even though the payments from those local treasuries were of little importance until 1775, it could possibly become very significant the moment that the troops moved to Andalucía in relation to military needs. Meanwhile, it will appear the Army Treasury of Castilla la Vieja and even, the Treasury of Orán, in the African campaigns context. In 1779, when Spain started entered the American Independence War, the Army Treasury of Andalucía appeared very strongly as the main originator of the contracts to supply the troops destined for America. The payments from that moment and until 1785 amounted to 20 per cent of the total budget —Catalonian Treasury had never worked with so much money— and the expenditure decentralization was further enhanced during the following war. e) Last period (1786-96): It remains only one decade of analyse but changes are still waiting for us. The most important event was the end of the general suppliers because the Sierra, Bacardi & Mestres contract finished in 1786 and also the Pons one ended in 1788. The rules of the game have changed again and the alternative were diverse once more. These are the new solutions. –Direct Administration: A new alternative was the National Bank of San Carlos, created in 1782, as clothing supplier for the regiments of local militias all over Spain (Tedde de Lorca, 1988: 154-8). This contract included important innovations. The first was the way they chose to supply these troops, with the resolution of the Real Decreto 20/04/1784 by which the Royal Finances took direct administration 288 Sergio Solbes Ferri 281 of the Spanish Army organization.12 The second was that such contract payments were charged directly to a tax of two reales per salt bushel and not simply charged to the funds managed by the GT. The accounting process was a payment letter from the treasurer of salt rent based on an order made by the Inspector General de Milicias, Juan Jose de Vertiz, in favour of the directors of the Bank. Such a letter was then communicated to the general treasurer to be included in his general data who, in turn, sent a payment letter to the salt taxes collection. The third innovation was that the Bank itself had a credit of 45.5 million for the supplies. These innovations explain the movement to direct administration. According to the legal form of settlement, the general suppliers could stop delivery if they did not receive payments punctually. At this time, the first economic difficulties were appearing for the Royal Finances and recourse to a finance institution with its own credit was an attractive solution, easing the pressure on royal credit. The contract with this institution was a temporal solution just for 1785-90 and finished in the latter year. From then on, the clothing for the regiments of local militias was managed directly by the Inspector General Vertiz, using the money collected from the salt taxes. There was no private contract for clothing. –Five Guild of Madrid: According to the Real Orden 11/09/1788, this company got the contract for the guardias de corps and all servants of the Royal Household for the next ten years (1789-99). It was the traditional way, but using a semi-official organization in the place of the suppliers. We do not know if it was an action against the private suppliers or the way of getting more control over the production. The first seems more probable, given the financial situation of the moment, but it is not a definitive answer. –Improve the role of Army Treasuries: Since 1789 there was a major quantitative change related to the Army Treasuries. In this year the Andalusia treasurer managed 4.3 million; more than the 3.5 of the National Bank. This was because following an order from the Quartermaster of the Andalusia Army, the provincial treasurer contracted with Marcos de Andueza for the supply of clothing of the American troops. Such supplier has a similar duty as the general suppliers but, in this case, 289 Contracting and Accounting… 12 The period accounts detailed the amount of fabrics acquired in Navas del Marques, Villoslada, Lumbreras, Anguiano, Pedroso, Cabeza del Rey, Olmeda, Nuevo Bazán and Teruel. We can also see the amount paid to several dyers and tailors, the contracted by the chair makers guild, leather craftsmen, esparto workers, shoe makers, and all the artisans related to the army goods making. 282 he received the payments directly from the Andalusia Treasury —Bacardi and Mestres never had had that possibility—. In a similar way, the payments made by the rest of the army treasuries were also increasing, especially on the head of giving companies funds to supply their own clothing. With the beginning of the War of Roussillon, the general budget assigned to clothing rose to 25 million in 1794 and 30 million in 1795. The charges on the Catalonian Treasury rose from 10 and 15 million respectively as a consequence of the Real Orden 31/07/1794. According to this, the king Carlos IV assigned that the army clothing contracts to be made either by the current Quartermasters or their commissioners. Therefore, the Catalonia Treasury made payments of the clothing contracts managed by the troops themselves. There was no longer any recourse to private contractors. In conclusion, at this time the militias made their own contracts. The traditional contract was signed by the Five Guilds of Madrid, the only supplier (Andueza) was working with the Andalusia Treasury and the Army Treasury of Catalonia used the largest part of the clothing budget. During this decade the Crown tried to dress the troops without recourse to private contractors: why? Was it the royal wish or was it the impossibility of finding private contractors willing to cooperate with the Crown on clothing supplies? In 1797, after the war with France had ended, the Royal Finances were exhausted, and in an attempt to resolve the supply problem in a time of terrible financial difficulties, it was suddenly decided to go back to a traditional contracting method —direct agreements with private producers if they could be found—. The GT accounts show once again show a large number of entries related to completely unknown merchants. 3. Conclusions In the first part of our study we have observed that the funds assigned to our clase of spending increases in absolute terms but decreases in relative ones. Furthermore, we found a direct relation between the different reigns, and different government funding for clothing and arms. The second part confirmed that the politics of Felipe V, Fernando VI, Carlos III and Carlos IV in that matter are not the same. When the funds assigned for clothing increased relatively (Felipe V and Carlos III) the tendency was always to concentrate the demand in the hands of a monopolistic private supplier, such as the company of Vicente Puyol or Sierra, Bacardi & Mestres. But this solution 290 Sergio Solbes Ferri 283 could be changed at any moment by the king, as happened with policies of Fernando VI and the financial difficulties of Carlos IV. These financial difficulties of the Bourbon Monarchy in mobilizing the means to supply the Spanish army were obvious throughout the eighteenth century. This was the necessary consequence of absolute military priorities within the current administrative system. It kept private groups specialized in collecting rents and managing of the king’s needs, giving them large amounts of power and influence (Torres Sánchez, 1999: 289). This solution appeared very clearly during the Habsburgs Dynasty but it was the same during the Bourbons period. The contracts signed with private merchants continued throughout century, but in several different forms, which are reflected in this study. Whether it was impossible to replace them or because the business was good for both parties, the Spanish army’s supply of clothing kept to these traditional methods. Accepting the situation, the Crown tried to increase the accounting control of the General Treasury over these contracts. 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