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ISHPMIE 2020
Braunschw eig, Germany
13 th International Symposium on
Hazards, Pre v ention and Mitigation
of Industrial Explosions
Proceedings
Physikalisch -Technische Bundesanstalt
Otto von Guericke Universität Magdeburg
13 th Symposium Internatio nal Symposium on Hazar ds,
Prevention and Miti gation o f Industri al Explosions
Proceedings
DOI: 10.7795/81 0.20200724
Citation Templ ate:
Author 1 , Aut hor 2 , ... : " T itle of article ", pp. n1 - n2 . In: "Proceedings of the 13th Internatio nal
Symposium on Hazards, Prev ention and Mitigation of Industrial Explos ions (ISHPMIE 2020)",
Braunschweig, G ermany, 2020. DOI : 1 0.7795/810.2020072 4
Herausgeb er:
Physikalisch- Technisch e Bundesa nstalt
Bundesallee 10 0
38116 Braunsc hweig, G ermany
Dr. Michael Bey er
Dr. Arnas Luca ssen
3.7 | Fundamen tals of Exp losion Protection
phone: +49 531 592- 3700
e-mail: m ichael.beye [email protected]
ishpmie2020. ptb.de
ishpmie2020 @ptb.de
Published unde r CC- BY - ND 4.0
DOI : 10.7795/810.2020072 4
Contents
Message from the President of the Host Organization (Joachim Ulrich)
8
Message from the International Organizing Committee (Try gv e Skjold)
9
Message from the Local Organizing Committee (Michael Beyer)
10
Message from the Program Committee (Holger Großhans)
11
List S ymposiu m Committees
12
Session 01: Advances in explosion protection: Strategies, meas ures, and protective equipm ent (1)
(Trygve Skjold)
Laboratory Development and Pilot-s cale Deploy ment of a Two-part Foamed Rock Dust
Connor B. Brown, Inoka E. Perera, Marcia L. Harris, Linda L. Chasko, James D. Addis & Sc ott Klima (#921)
13
Assessment of Release Mitigation of Water -Reactive Ch emicals by Absorbents
Ting-Jia Kao, Thanh-Trung Nguyen, Yu -Jhen Lin, Zh i-Xuan Lin, Hsiao -Yu n Tsai, Jenq-Renn Chen (#963)
28
Modeling of Explosion Dynamics in Vessel-Pipe Systems to Evaluate Performance L imitations of
Explosion Isolation Systems
Lorenz R. Boeck, C. Regis Bauwens & Sergey B. Dorofeev ( #969)
37
Session 02: Advances in explosion protection: Strategies, meas ures, and protective equipm ent (2)
(Detlev Markus)
CEQAT-DGHS interlaboratory tests for chemical safety: Validation of laboratory test methods by
determining the measurement uncertainty and probabilit y of incorrect classification including so -
called “Shark profiles”
Peter Lüth, Steffen Uhlig, Kirstin Frost, Marcus Malow, Heike M ichael -Schulz, Martin Schmidt & Sabine
Zakel (#994)
50
CEQAT-DGHS Interlaboratory tests for chemical safety – A new gravimetric procedure for the gas
flow measuremen t for flammable and toxic gases
Peter Lüth, Marcus Malow (#1002)
62
On the strength of knowledge in risk assessments for hydrogen systems
Trygve Skjold (#1018)
72
Review of the HySEA project
Trygve Skjold, Melodia Lucas, Helene Hisken, Gordon Atan ga, Sunil Lak shmipathy, Laurence Bernard,
Matthijs van Wingerden, Kees van Wingerden, Jenn ifer X. Wen, Vendra Chandra Madhav Rao, Anubhav
Sinha, Marco Carcassi, Martino Schiavetti, Tommaso Pini, Jef Snoeys, Arve Grøns und Hanssen,
Changjian Wang, Simon Jallais, El ena V yazmina, Derek Miller & Carl Regis Bauwens (#10 22)
85
Session 03: Detonations and DDT (Lore nz Boeck)
Influence of Geometry on Flame Acceleration and DDT in H 2 - CO -Air Mix tures in a Pa rtially
Obstructed Channel
Daniel Heilbronn, Christoph Barfuss & Thomas Sattelmayer (#918)
107
Impact of Local Flame Quenching on the Flame Accelera tion in H 2 - CO -Air Mixtures in Obstructed
Channels
Christoph Barfuss, Daniel Heilbronn & Thoma s Sattelmayer (#919)
119
Observations of DDT in narrow channels
Yves Ballossier, Josué Melguizo-Gavilanes & Florent Virot (#1025)
129
Proceedings of the 13th Symposium International Symposium
on Hazards, Prevention and Mitigation of Industrial Explosions
DOI: 10.7795/810.20200724
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Session 04: Electro-chemical energy carriers (Frank Lienesc h)
Explosibility Properties of Gases from Lithium-Ion Energy Storage Battery Thermal Runaways
Adam Barowy, Pravin Gandhi, Robert Zalosh & Alexandra Klieger (#937)
139
Lithium- I on Energy Storage Battery Explosion Incidents
Robert Zalosh, Pr avinray Gandhi & Adam Barowy (#938)
154
Li -ion batteries: characterization of the thermal runaway reactions using a DSC
Paola Russo, Maria Luisa Mele (#1031)
166
Session 05: Explosion modelli ng and simulation (1) (Ulrich Krause)
Vortex Dynamics and Fractal Structures in Reactive Richtmyer -Meshkov Instabil ity
Maximilian Bambauer, Josef Hasslberger, Nilanjan Chakrabo rty & Markus Klein (#898)
175
Physical and Mathematical Modelling of Intera ction of Detonation Waves with Inert Gas Plugs
Dmitry Tropin & Igor Bedarev (#908)
189
Boundary Conditions and Grid Dependency in CFD Simulation of Atmospheric Flow
Henry Plischka, Johann Turnow & Nikolai Kornev (#1007)
201
Session 06: Explosion modelli ng and simulation (2) (Josué Melguizo-Gavilanes)
Numerical modelling of the effects of vessel length- to -diameter ratio (L=D) on pres sure piling
Damilare Ogungbemide, Martin P. Clouthier, Chris Clone y, Robert G. Zalosh, Robert C. Ripley, & Paul R.
Amyotte (#943)
213
A computational framework for electrification of turbulent liquid flows
Mathieu Calero, Holger Grosshans & Miltiadis V. Papalexan dris (#1027)
226
CFD-based simulation of flammable gas dispersion in a complex geometry
Miroslav Mynarz, Aleš Tulach, Petr Lepík & Milada Koubkov ( #1030)
238
Session 07: Explosion modelli ng and simulation (3) (Holger Großhans)
A Eulerian model for dust deflagrations, including inner particle effects
Christoph Spijker, & Harald Raupenstrauch (#902)
253
CFD Simulation of an Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion through obstacles using OpenFoam®
Cléante Langrée, Erwin Franquet, Julien Reveillon, Guillaume Lecocq & François-Xavier Demoulin (#939)
262
Understanding the role of thermal radiation in dust flame propagation
Christophe Proust & Rim Ben M ouss a (#959)
270
Session 08: Explosion modelli ng and simulation (4) (Paola Russo)
Impact of photovoltaic power plants on far -field effects of UVCEs
Guillaume Lecocq, Antoine Dutertre & Emmanuel Leprette (#912)
284
Influence of Thermal Radiation on Layered Dust Explosi ons
Swagnik Guhathakurta & Ryan W. Houim (#1012)
295
Proceedings of the 13th Symposium International Symposium
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DOI: 10.7795/810.20200724
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Determination of reaction mechanisms for the gasification and explosion of organic powders
Matteo Pietraccini, Eloise Delon, Audrey Santandrea, Stép hanie Pacault, Pierre -Alexandre Glaude,
Anthony Dufour & Olivier Dufaud (#1019)
306
Session 09: Explosion prevention (1) (Han nes Kern)
Effect of multiple vent characteristic parameters on ext ernal explosion induced by in door premixed
methane-air explosion
Lei Pang, Qianran Hu, Yang Hu, Pengfei Lv & Kai Yang ( #933)
317
Keeping the Overview on Surface Resistivity Measurements
Aaron D. Ratschow, Sigrun Stein & Hans-Jürgen Gross (#945)
337
A new technique to produce well controlled electrical sparks. Application to MIE mea surements
Christophe Proust (#960)
348
25 years of ATEX directive: the real role of each Stakehol der
Michał Górny & Xavier Lefebvre (#996)
365
Session 10: Explosion prevention (2) (Pa ul Am yotte)
Inves ti gation on limiting oxygen concentration of combu s tible gas for safety control during air
injection process
Pengliang Li, Zhenyi Liu, Mingzhi Li, Yao Zhao, Xuan Li (#93 2)
377
Measurement of the deposit formation during pneumatic transport of polydispers e PMMA powder
Nuki Susanti, Holger Grosshans (#896)
389
Suppression effect of inert gas on aluminum dust explosion
Shulin Zhang, Mingshu Bi, Haipeng Jiang, Wei Gao (#983)
398
Session 11: Explosion properties of substances and mixtures (1) (Jan Berghmans)
Homogeneity of methane-a ir mixture in devices for the determination of explosion limits
Eliška Fišerová, Jan Karl (#910)
411
Enhanced Friction and Shock Sensitivities of Hexachloro disilane Hydrolyzed Deposit Mixed with
KOH
Thanh - Trung Nguyen, Yu-Jhen Lin, Zhi-Xuan Lin, Hui-Chu Tai, Chun-Yi Lee, Hsiao-Yun Tsai, Jenq -Renn
Chen & Eugene Y. Ngai (#916)
418
Preliminary Study of Lignocellulosic biomass ignition pr operties estimation from
Thermogravimetric Analysis
Blanca Castells, Isabel Ame z, Ljiljana Medic, Nieves Fernandez -Anez & Javier Garcia-Torrent (#941)
434
Burning and explosion behaviour of ethanol/water -sucrose mixtures
Maria Mitu, Thomas Stolz, Elisabeth Brandes & Sabine Zakel (#1005)
446
Session 12: Explosion properties of substances and mixtures (2) (Jenq-Renn Chen)
Flammability characteristics of methane enriched with H 2 using CO 2 in the Spark Test Apparatus
Isabel Amez, Blanca Castells, Ljiljana Medic & Javier Garcia -Torrent (#942)
461
Do nanostructured materials influence the igni t ion behavior of combustible dust?
Susanne Hacke (#955)
478
Proceedings of the 13th Symposium International Symposium
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DOI: 10.7795/810.20200724
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Nex-Hys – Minimum Ignition Temperature of Hybrid Mixt ures
Dieter Gabel, Paul Geoerg, Fabian Franken & Ulrich Krause (#966)
484
A Thermal Model for the Minimum Ignition Energy of Dus ts
Tengfei Chen, Jan Berghmans, Jan Degrève, Filip Verplaets en, Jo Van Caneghem & Maarten Vanierschot
(#988)
494
Session 13: Explosion testing (Robert Zalosh)
Safety Related Properties of Tetrafluoroethylene Researc h on the Explosive Decomposition on an
Industrial Scale
Christian Liebner, Volkmar Schröder & Martyn J. Shenton (# 950)
506
Influence of thermal shock of piezoelectric pressure sensors on the measure ment of explosion
pressures
Tim Krause, Mirko Meier & Jens Brunzendorf (#953)
514
Modifications of the Standard 1m3 Vessel in S earch of Adequate Values of the Maxi mum Rate of
Pressure Rise
Wojciech Adamus, Adrian Toman (#979)
529
Turbulence in real flammable gas releases
Didier Jamois, Christophe Proust, Jérôme Hébrard, Emm anuel Lepre tte, Helene Hisken, L orenzo Mauri,
Gordon Atanga, Melodia Lucas, Kees van Wingerden, Trygve Skjold, Pierre Quillatre, Antoi ne Dutertre,
Thibault Marteau, Andrzej Pekalski, Lorraine Jenney, Dan A llason & Mike Johnson (#1010)
535
Session 14: Explosions of sprays and vapors (Olivier Dufau d)
Charge-separating processes by spraying water under high pressure
Florian Baumann, Matthias Himstedt, Dieter Möckel & Martin Thedens (#905)
550
Presentation of the experimental JIP SPARCLING: Inside and beyond a pressurised LNG release
Lauris Joubert, Guillaume Leroy, Steven Betteridge, Elena Vyazmina, Laurence Bernard, R omain Jambut &
Jérôme Frindel (#934)
562
Hydrocarbon aerosol explosion: towards hazardous area classification
Stephanie El-Zahlanieh, Augustin C harvet, Alexis Vignes, Benoit Tribouilloy & Olivier Dufaud (#1021)
572
Session 15: Flame propagati on and ac celeration (1) (Wookyung Kim)
On an Assessment of Dust Explosion Dynamics in th e Standard 20 -l Sphere
Zdzisław Dyduch (#981)
584
Ignition Temperatures and Flame Velocities of Metallic Nanomaterials
Arne Krietsch, Monica Reyes Rodriguez, Andor Kristen, Dan iel Kadoke, Zaheer Abbas & Ulrich Krause
(#949)
591
A flame propagation model for nanopowders
Audrey Santandrea, David Torrado, Matteo Pietra ccini, Alexis Vignes, Laurent Perrin & Oli vier Dufaud
(#957)
606
Proceedings of the 13th Symposium International Symposium
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DOI: 10.7795/810.20200724
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Session 16: Flame propagation and acceleration (2) (Jennifer Wen)
Construction of a 4 m long test rig for experimental inve stigations on flame propagation in
combustible dust/air mixtures
Katja Hüttenbrenner, Hannes Kern, Florian Toth, Julian Glechner & Harald Raupenstrauch (#956)
618
Self-similar propagation of expanding spherical flames in lean hydrogen -air mixtures
Wookyung Kim, Takumi Namba, Tomoyuki Johzaki & Takuma Endo (#993)
628
Assessing the influence of real releases on explosions: selected results from large -scale
experiments
Helene Hisken, Lorenzo Mauri, Gordon Atanga, Melodia Lucas, Kees van Wingerden, Trygve Skjold, Pierre
Quillatre, Antoine Dutertre, Thibault Marteau, Andrzej Pek alski, Lorraine Jenney, Dan Allason, Mike
Johnson, Emmanuel Leprette, Didier Jamois, Jérôme Hébrar d & Chris to phe Proust (#10 15)
637
Session 17: Gas, dust, and hybrid mixture explosions (1) (Dieter Gabel)
Investigations on the effect of particle size on dust disp ersion in MIKE 3 apparatus
Yangyue Pan, Christoph Spijker, Hannes Kern & Harald Raupenstrauch (#906)
654
Numerical investigation of overdriving in th e 20 -L Siwek chamber
Martin P. Clouthier, Damilare Ogungbemide, Chris Cloney, Robert G. Zalosh, Robert C. Ripley & Paul R.
Amyotte (#909)
663
Prenormative Study on the Safety Characteristics of Ex plosion Protection for Hybrid Mixtures of
Dusts and Vapours
Vanessa Heilmann, Adeyemi Taiwo, Werner Hirsch, Holger Grosshans, Sabine Zakel & Ulrich Krause
(#920)
677
The Explosion of Non-nano Iron Dust Suspension in the 20-l Spherical Bomb
Enrico Danzi, Gianmaria Pio, Luca Marmo & Ernesto Salzano (#947)
688
Session 18: Gas, dust, and hybrid mixture explosions (2) (Jérôme Taveau)
An investigation of micron and nano scale of aluminium dust explosion
Po -Jul Chang, Toshio Mogi & Ritsu Dobashi (#927)
697
Minimum Ignition Energy of Coal Dust Clouds in air an d O 2 /CO 2 Atmos pheres with S mall Amount of
CH 4 /H 2
Dejian Wu, Arne Krietsch, Frederik Norman & Martin Schmid t (#930)
705
Session 19: Gas, dust, and hybrid mixture explosions (3) (W ei Gao)
Modelling of detonation flows in inhomogeneous gas par ticle suspensions within the framework of
the reduced kinetics
Tatyana Khmel & Sergei Lavruk (#971)
716
Numerical investigation of propagation of heterogeneou s detonation in nanodispersed aluminum
particle suspensions in expanding channels
Sergey Lavruk, Tatyana Khmel (#974)
728
A Simple Dust Combustion Model for Characterizing Reactivity in Large -Scale Exper iments
C. Regis L. Bauwens, Lorenz R. Boeck & Sergey B. Dorofee v (#1016)
739
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Quasi-static dispersion of dusts for the determination of lower explosion limits of h ybrid mixtures
Zaheer Abbas, Olivier Dufaud, Dieter Gabel, Arne Krietsch & Ulrich Krause (#1023)
750
Session 20: Gas, dust, and hybrid mixtu re explosions (4) (Ch ristophe Proust)
Testing of dust clouds for the electrostatic -spark ignition hazard in industry. Need for a modified
approach?
Rolf K. Eckhoff (#998)
765
Self-ignition tendency of solid fuels: a gas emissions ap proach for early d etection)
Nieves Fernandez -A nez, Blanca Castells-Somoza, Isabel Amez-Arenillas & Javier Garcia - Torrent (#1000)
779
Behaviour of smouldering fires during periodic refilling of wood pellets into silos
Nieves Fernandez -A nez, Anita Katharina Meyer, Javier Elio M edina, Gisle Kleppe, Bjarne Christian Hagen
& Vidar Frette (#1001)
791
Effect of particle size distribution, drying and milling t echnique on explosibility behaviour of olive
pomace waste
Matteo Pietraccini, Enrico Danzi, Luca Marmo, Albert Addo & Paul Amyotte (#1024)
800
Session 21: Hydrogen safety ( Daniel Banuti)
Pressure peaking phenomena: Large -scale experiments of ignited a nd unignited hydrogen releases
Agnieszka Lach, André Vagner Gaathaug (#892)
813
Investigation of the correlation bet ween the electrical power and flame front of a disc harge caused
by a slow contact opening in a H 2 /air mixture
Carsten Uber, Bogdan Barbu, Michael Hilbert, Frank Berger, Frank Lienesch (#913)
827
Spectroscopic investigations of the correlation between the discharge caused by a sl ow contact
opening and the flame front in a H 2 /air mixture
Carsten Uber, Steffen Franke, Jens Brunzendorf, Mi chael Hilbert, Dirk Uhrlandt, Frank Lienesch (#914)
836
Session 22: Ignition phenomena (1) (Stefan Essmann)
New aspects of the ignition of burnable gas mixtures by low -energy electrical discharges
Stefan Essmann, Johann-Robert Kummer, Holger Grosshans, Detlev Markus & Ulrich Maas (#900)
844
Determination of the ignition temperature of flammable li quids under different initial conditions
Libor Ševčík & Ondřej Suchý (#911)
858
Comparative study on standardized ignition sources used for explosion testing
Stefan Spitzer, Enis Askar, Arne Krietsch & Volkmar S chröder (#925)
864
Spontaneous combustion behaviour of solids: Validation of extrapolation of l aboratory tests by
means of semi technical tests up to 1 m 3 and advanced thermoanalytical methods
Martin Schmidt, René Erdt, Markus Gödde & Steffen Salg (# 936)
876
Low Temperature Autoignition of Jet A and Surrogate Jet Fuels
Conor Martin & Joseph Shepherd (#973)
891
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DOI: 10.7795/810.20200724
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13th International Symposium on Hazards, Prevention, and Mitigat ion of Industrial Explosions
Braunschweig, GERMANY – July 27-31, 2020
Laboratory D evelopment and P ilot -sc ale Deploymen t of
a T wo -part F oamed Rock Dust
Connor B. Brown a , Inoka E. Pere ra a , Marcia L. Harris a , Linda L. Chasko a , James D. Addis a &
Scott Klima a
a National Ins titute for Oc cupat ional Safe ty and Health (NI OSH), Pittsburgh, PA , U SA
E-mail: CBBrow [email protected] ov
Abstract
U.S. Code of Federa l Regulations 30 CFR 75.402 and 75.403 require 80% total incombustibl e conten t
to be maintained within 40 fe et of the coal mine face via the liberal application of rock dust .
Unfortunately, this application of rock dust limits miners’ visi bility down wind and can increase the
miners’ exposures to a re spirable nuisance dust. Wet rock dust applied as a slurry is, at times, used to
negate these negative effects. Although this aids in meeting the tot al incombustible li m its, the slurry
forms a hard cake when dried and no long e r effec tively disperses as needed to suppre ss a coal dust
explosion. As a result, a dry rock dust must be re applied to maintain a dis persible layer. Therefore,
researchers fr om the National I nstitute for Occupational Safety and Health (NI OSH) h ave been
working towa rds finding and testing a foa med rock dust for mulation th at can be applied wet on mine
surfaces and re main dispersible once dried which minimizes the likelihood of mine disasters,
including mine explosions. The initial tests were aimed at discerni ng dis persion characteristics of
three differe nt foamed rock dusts via the NIOSH-developed dispersion chamber and led to
identification of a two-part foam with adequate dispersion characteristics. The cu rre nt study was
conducted to assess the robust ness of the two-part foamed rock dust. Throu gh a series of laboratory-
scale exp eriments using the dispersibility cha mber, the effects o f testing c onditions and produ ct
formulations on the foam’s dispersibili ty was determine d . Some of the tested variables include:
exposing the foam to high humidity, varying the c omponent levels of the foamed rock dust, altering
the roc k dust size distribution, and varying the rock dust types. F urther pilot-scale tests exa mined the
atmospheric concentrati ons of dust via persona l dust monitors downwind of foamed rock dust
production and application. Additionally, product consistency was recorded during pil ot-scale testing
at ke y points in the formulation and a pplication. The results of these experiments will be discussed in
this paper.
Keywords: dust dispersibility, foamed rock dust, coal mining, explosion preve ntion
1. Introduction
The impetus for developi ng a dispe rsible rock dust slurry ca me from the two requirements placed on
underground coal mines. The first r equirement, from 30 C FR § 75.2 (M andatory Safety Standards –
Underground Coa l Mines) a nd 30 CF R § 75.403 (Maintenanc e of incombustible content of rock dus t ),
is the application of dispersible roc k dust in sufficient quantities. The second requirement, 30 CF R §
70.100 (Respirable dust standards), is the time- weighted avera ge li mit of mine workers’ exposure to
airborne dust.
Rock dust acts as a physical heat sink during an explosion (Cybuls ki, 1975 ; Richmond, et al., 1975;
Nagy, 1981) a nd is the pr imary technique used to s upress the re action. Therefore , a pplication of rock
dust in sufficient quantiti es is essential to inert coal dust a nd to pre vent continued flame propa gation.
Current rock dusts wick moisture, forming a nondispersible wet paste tha t sti ffe ns to a cake when
dried, there by significantly reducing or inhibiting the rock dust’s a bility to eff ectively disperse. Coal
dust, due to its hydropho bicity, c an remain dispersibl e under these conditions, thereby permitting its
Proceedings of the 13th Symposium International Symposium
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DOI: 10.7795/810.20200724
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involvement in a propagating dust explosion. Th e pre sence of moisture in the mine can lead to the
condition in which the c oal dust can be dispersed and participate in the expl osion while the rock dust
becomes ineffec tual.
Additionally, there have been continuing concerns of respirable diseases am ong coal miners resulting
in another requirement limiting the total respirable dust to which coal miners are exposed. The
respirable siz e fraction of rock dust used to inert a coa l dust explosion ca n contribute to the tot al dust
being measured. As a re sult, some mines have tu rned to applying a wet r ock dust to minim ize the
miner’s exposure to respirable dust . The wet applica tion of the rock dust all ows the m ine to place
dust in key locations, such as the roof and ribs, and cover the exposed coal without exposing the
workers to r espirable dus t. However, a side effect of the wet applic ation of the rock dust is that the
rock dust no longer is dispersible due to caking and is subsequently ineffective. Currently, MSHA
requires an application o f dry rock dust on top of the wet -applied ro ck du st once the wet rock dust
dries (MSHA, 2015) and becomes cake d.
A possible solution to thi s problem is a foamed rock dust (FRD). The hope is that the FRD h as the
benefits of a normal rock dust slurry while remaining dispersible when dry. Currently, the abilit y of
the FRD to fracture from a passing pre ssure wave and disperse into individu al partic les to inert a dust
explosion is not known. Prior labor atory testing has, however, led to pr omising results showing
favoura ble dispersion characteristics with a few specific formulations. Hierarchically, the resulting
engineering control of respirable dust through the application of foam dust would foster better healt h
for coal miners, while ke eping them safe from coal dust explosions. The F RD also has the potentially
additional benefit of better adherence to elevated surfaces in the mi ne entry leading to increased
effectivene ss of the inert material. Past studies have shown that rock dust located on the roof, ribs and
other elevated surface s is more readily dispersed than dust on the floor (Hartmann, 1957).
To this end, laboratory experiments were con ducted on a previously tested roc k dust which
incorporated a two-part foam (TPF). Past studies showed promising results when c ompared to other
foam products currently on the market (Brown et al., 2018). Howeve r, the unique formulation and
application properties of the TPF with rock d ust are still not understood. Therefore, NIOSH
researchers conducted a series of l aboratory-scale experiments usin g the N IOSH-developed
dispersibility chamber to examine the effects of testing conditions and product formulations on foam
dispersibili ty . The insights gained were then applied during the pilot-scale testing in the Bruceton
Experimental Mine (BEM) at the P ittsburgh Mining Research Center . Again, a se ries of tests were
conducted to investigate the im pact of v arious f actors on the dispersion characteristics of the foam.
Additionally, the airborne dust levels were measured during the production and application of th e
foam dust to confirm the benefits of the wet-applied method.
2. Experiments
Th e test series had two main environments wh ere the s amples were pre pared — in the laboratory at
the benchtop scal e and i n the BEM at the pilot scale. The bulk of the s ample preparations were
conducted under laboratory conditions. The main method of discerning the performance of the rock
dust was it s dispersion performance in the NIOSH dispersion chamber (Perera et al., 2016). The
samples wer e compared on a relative basis to the reference rock dust used by NIOSH at the L ake
Lynn Experiment al Mine (LLEM) in large-scale explosions t esting.
2.1 Experimental materials
This section describes the two experimental materials used in the testing. These materials include th e
various rock dusts and a foam.
2.1.1 Rock dust
Several ro ck dusts were used in these s erie s o f experiments, including the refere nce limestone rock
dust, a set of classified rock dusts that used t he refer enc e rock dust as input, a n d five othe r
Proceedings of the 13th Symposium International Symposium
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DOI: 10.7795/810.20200724
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commercially available rock dusts. The reference rock dust has been extensively used in previous
experiments at the LLEM, most notably in e xperiments which lead to the implementation of the 80%
incombustible rule in the United States ( Cashdollar et al., 2010). The classified rock dust used the
same reference rock dust but was sieved through either a 200-mesh or a 400 -mesh sieve. The resulting
oversized and undersized material wa s later used in the experiments.
2.1.2 Foam
Previous experiments were conducted with v arious commercially available fo ams that could
incorporate rock dust. These tests had the similar aim of cre ating a wet-applied material which whe n
dried was dispe rsible via a “light blast of air” (30 CFR § 75.2). These exp eriments sho wed that the
use of a TP F in this application provide d a promising solution. The TPF used in this series of tests
consisted of water, a foaming agent, and a stabilizing a gent (Brown et al., 2018).
2.2 Experimental apparatus es
This section describes thre e e xperimental apparatuses used d uring in the testing. These apparatuses
allowed re searchers to measure the dispersion characteristics, size distribution and airbor ne dust
concentrations.
2.2.1 Dispersion chamber
The FRD samples p roduced in the lab or in th e BEM we re tested in N I OSH’s dispersion chamber.
The chamber s ends a pulse of air across a sample bed of rock dust , dispersi ng a qu antity of the dust
and sending it across a dust probe a s seen in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Dispersion chamber schematic (Perera et al., 2016)
Passage of the dust across the probe causes the obscuration of a li ght beam whic h is measured and
recorded (Cashdollar, et al., 1981) . The obscuration caused by these entrai ned particles is used as a
means of a ssessing the dispersibility of the sa mple. The pulse of air used to initi ate the test was ba sed
on the dynamic pressure measure ments o f a n ear-limit propagating coal dus t explosion conducted at
LLEM , as shown in Figure 1 and, as such, provide s the rep roducible “light blast of air” descr ibed in
30 CFR § 75.2.
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Fig. 2. Horizontal and vertical components of dust explosion pressures measured during LLEM
shot #517
The test procedure, notably, does not simulate a shockwave but, rather, creates a similar pressure
history per the rapid release of the air pulse. Use of thi s method is described in greater detail by Perera
et al. (2016).
As shown from the aforementioned large-scale tes ting at LLEM in Figure 2, vertical or static forces
are created due to the passing of a shoc k wav e. The static pre ssure in Figure 2 is about three times
greater than the dynamic pressure. I t is reasonable to a ssume that the overpressure may destroy the
cohesive foam matrix, freeing individual particles or particle agglomerations for dispersion.
Computational models h ave observe d these vertical for ces in a ddition to re flected compaction waves
in the dust layer just behind the shockwave ( L ai et al., 2018). As a result o f these findings, samples
were teste d using the additional 45° nozzle or ienta tion (Figure 3). The change in orientation allowed
the researc hers to add a vertical force component.
Fig. 3. 45° nozzle orientation
2.2.2 Particle size
The particle size dist ributions of rock dust s were determined using a Beckman-Coulter LS 13 320
laser scattering size analyser. The Beckman-Coulter instrument measure s the scatte ring of a 780-n m
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6
Pressure, p si
Time, sec
Static Wall Pressure
Dynamic W ind Pressure
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laser beam by the entra ined dust at various a ngles with respect to the bea m direction. The inst rument
returns the particle size dist ribution in terms of the spheric al equivalent via Mie scattering.
2.2.3 Dust concentration monitor
Dust conce ntrations were monitored and mea sured during the produ ction and a pplication of the foam
rock dust in the BEM. The gravimetric samples were colle cted on pre -weighed filters using the
standard Zefon Escort ELF personal air sampl ing pumps after the respirable size fraction was
separa ted from the oversized dust by a 10- mm Dorr- Oliver cyclone. Ad ditionally, a continuous
personal dust monitor from Thermo Scientific , the PDM 3600, was used to monitor dust
concentrations during the test via a tapered eleme nt oscillating microbalance (Page et a l. , 2008).
2.3 Experimental sample preparation
This section describe s the proce ss of sample preparation in the lab and in the pilot -scale test facility.
In addition this section details the changes made to the sample variables.
2.3.1 Laboratory sample prep
The dry rock dust samples, used for th e rel ative c omparison, we re prepared in accordance with the
standard operation procedures of the NI OSH-developed dispersion chamber (Perera et al., 2016). To
prepare the FRD samples, the TPF was prepared first by combining 300 g of water and 15 g o f the
foaming agent. This solution was whipped with a mixer until a consistent foam matrix was
established. A stabilizing agent was then slowl y add ed to th e foam matrix. Once blend ed, the
stabilized TP F was combined with the rock dust. The samples were then placed under two drying
conditions. The f ast-drying condition was the am bient lab environment. The slow-drying condition
placed the samples in se aled chamber s with high humidity a nd no airflow. After a week in th e
chamber, the samples were taken out and allowed to dry under ambient lab conditions. All samples
were dispersed using a 45-degree nozzle.
Initial rounds of testing examined the effects o f changing the amount of stabilizer and the amount of
rock dust used in the formul ation. The a mounts of stabilizer tested w ere 10 g and 21 g. Th e a mounts
of rock dust tested were 600 g, 900 g, and 1,500 g.
Other FRD samples w ere made by adding water to the rock dus t prior to being mixed with a different
blend of foam. The TP F in these ca ses k ept the ratio of st abilizer and foaming agent at 1:1. The
stabilizer levels were 6.5 g, 5 g, and 3.5 g per batch while keeping the rock dust mass at 1,500 g and
the a dditional water a t 400 g. The a mount of pre-wet rock dust also varied, but the ra tios of roc k dust
to water and the amounts of stabilizer a nd foaming agent (5 g) r emain the same.
Five total sa mple sets were run with diff erent commercially available rock dust s using the sa me FRD
formulation. The formulation consisted of 300 g of water , 5 g of foaming agent, 5 g of stabilizer,
1,500 g of rock dust, and 400 g of water to pre-wet the rock dust.
The final sample set produced in the lab used the same previous formu lation except with four
classified batches o f the reference ro ck dust. The r efe rence ro ck dust was si eved through either a 200 -
mesh or a 400-mesh sieve. In both ca ses, 1,500 g of the ove rsized or unde rsized material was used in
the FRD, ke eping all other ingredients the same. Each combination of drying condition and
formulation tested a tot al of five samples. A tabulation of the various sample sets is shown in Table
1 below.
Table 1: Laboratory tests examining the impact of various components on the dispersibility of
foamed rock dust
Sample
set
FOAM
ROCK DUS T
Drying
Conditions
Water
(g)
Foaming
Agent (g)
Stabilizer
(g)
Base rock du st
Amount
(g)
Water
(g)
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1
300
15
10
Reference
600
-
Fast & Slow
2
300
15
21
Reference
600
-
Fast & Slow
3
300
15
10
Reference
900
-
Fast & Slow
4
300
15
21
Reference
900
-
Fast & Slow
5
300
15
10
Reference
1500
-
Fast & Slow
6
300
15
21
Reference
1500
-
Fast & Slow
7
300
6.5
6.5
Reference
1500
400
Fast & Slow
8
300
5
5
Reference
1500
400
Fast & Slow
9
300
3.5
3.5
Reference
1500
400
Fast & Slow
10
300
5
5
Reference
1275
340
Fast & Slow
11
300
5
5
Reference
1725
460
Fast & Slow
12
300
5
5
Commercial R D 1
1500
400
Fast
13
300
5
5
Commercial R D 2
1500
400
Fast
14
300
5
5
Commercial R D 3
1500
400
Fast
15
300
5
5
Commercial R D 4
1500
400
Fast
16
300
5
5
Commercial R D 5
1500
400
Fast
17
300
5
5
- 40 0 mesh Reference
1500
400
Fast
18
300
5
5
- 200 mesh Reference
1500
400
Fast
19
300
5
5
+ 400 mesh R eference
1500
400
Fast
20
300
5
5
+ 2 00 m esh Referenc e
1500
400
Fast
2.3.2 BEM sample preparation
Anemometers we re plac ed upwind and downwind of the test area to m onitor airflow velocities.
Additionally, the dust sampling equipment was pla ced 100 ft downwind of the test are a. The mortar
mixer used to blend and apply the FRD was turned on and allowed to r un to collect a baseline level
of diesel partic ulate matter (DPM). The test matrix is t abulate d in Table 2.
Table 2: Te st matrix for pilot -scale testing two-part foamed rock dust in the BEM
Test Condition s
Test
Number
Dust, kg
Water, l
Amount of fo am
Triplicate
1
45.4
11.4
40 second of foam
Triplicate
2
45.4
11.4
40 second of foam
Triplicate
3
45.4
11.4
40 second of foam
+15% rock du st
4
52.2
11.4
40 second of foam
-15% rock dust
5
38.6
11.4
40 second of foam
-15% water
6
45.4
9.7
40 second of foam
+15% water
7
45.4
13.1
40 second of foam
All the tests used the reference rock dust as the base inert material. The firs t three tests were a s et of
triplicates that emulated the laboratory formulations. The following four tests looked at variations of
th e formulation to see ho w the foam would be impacted if a mine worker would improperly mi x the
inputs to the system. The first two tests changed th e a mount of rock dust by ± 15%, and the other two
tests varie d the w ater use d to pre-we t the roc k dust by ± 15%. The parameters for the fo am generator
would be initially set and not altered by the machine operator. On ce th e inst rumentation was in pla ce,
a premeasured amount of dust was placed into the mixing hopper of the mortar mi xer. The
premeasured amount of wat er was then added to the rock dust and allo we d to mix. At this point, the
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calibrated fo am generator was turned on, and a f oam was added to the sl urry for a predetermined
amount of time. This was mixed until the mixture was homogenous. When the mixer was st opped, a
sample was taken with a 1 -qt container and weighed to get a density measurement. Additi onal
material was taken from the mixer a nd use d to fill trays for late r testing in the dispersion c hamber.
The initial weight of the trays with the f resh sample s was taken at this point for use in later
calculations to de termine the FRD density and measured water content . Once the sa mples we re take n
out of the mixer, th e rest of the material was dumped into the hopper and the auger pump was turned
on. A 1-qt sample was the n taken as the material left the application nozzle. This was then weighed
for a density measurement. Additional material was also taken from the end of the nozzle for the
dispersion trays. These trays also h ad their mass recorded. Once the l ast sam ple of mat erial was taken,
the FRD was a pplied to the roof and ribs of the m ine. This continued until there was no more FRD
left for the pump to move. The are a wa s then marked with spray paint to de note the test number, a nd
the application equipment and dust monitoring equipment were then moved to the next testing
location. The tray samples were kept in the mi ne under the same drying condit ions until the sample
weights stabilized, just over one week. The dispersion testing in the lab bega n about 2 we eks a fter
the application.
3. Results and discussion
3.1 Lab results
3.1.1 Dispersibility of the reference rock dust (dry powder)
The re lative dispersibility of the dry refere nce rock dust wa s tested using the 45° nozzle instead of
the horizontal nozzle. The resulting average (Fi gure 4) was used as a benchmark to compa re th e
relative dispersibilities of the foamed dusts. The avera ge integral optical densities (IOD) of the FRD
is compared to that of the dry rock dust powder. After all data was normalized, the relative IOD for
the refere nce rock dust was 1 ± 0.11.
Fig. 4. Relative average optical density trace of dry reference rock dust
3.1.2 Environmental/testing conditions of the foam
The effec ts of high humidity exposure did show a marke d negative difference in the disp ersibility of
the foams wh en comparing the combined averages from sample sets 1 through 11 (Figure 5).
Although a number of s amples did disperse after be ing plac ed in the humidity ca binets, it was to a
lesser extent than when the samples were dried quickly in the laboratory environment.
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Relative o ptical density
Time, s
R elativ e a ver ag e IO D for re f er enc e r ock du st
disper sed at 45° - 1.00 ± 0.11
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Fig. 5. Relative average IOD of fast and slow-drying FRDs compared to the reference rock dust
In some cases, the bubbles in the slow -drying foam s began to agglomerate, which sti ffene d its lattice.
These resulting agglomerations remained cohesive enough that when the bulk materia l broke , the
agglomerations fell out of suspension very quickly and did not reach the dust probe , resulting in
poorer performa nce.
3.1.3 Variation in formulation
Using sample sets 1 through 6, researchers found that the increased amount of stabilizer, while aiding
in the foam’s rigidity during longer periods of high humidit y, negatively affec ted the dispersion
character istics by reinforcing the c ohesive characteristics of the dust. Converse ly, the lowe r levels of
stabilizer a llowed for a rigid yet friable structure which more readily disperse d. Another important
note was th at few samples collapsed due to insufficient amounts o f mater ial being present as the
samples dried. Conversely, better dispersion characteristics were seen with samples containing 900 g
or 1,500 g of rock dust per batch. Th ese results may be due to the changing ratio of water to ro ck
dust, which, cou ld be aff ecting the ra te of drying per unit volume. The add itional material also coul d
be simply translating to more material being entrained and, therefore, more obscuration at the dust
probe. Lastly, the formu lations which used higher amounts of ro ck dust had a de creased ratio o f
stabilizer in the formulation. All these factors may have led to the increases in performance. The
results of these variations to the formulation under the fast- and slow-dryin g conditions can be seen
in Figure 6 and Figure 7, respec tively.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Fast Slow Reference
R elativ e a ver age IOD f or 45° air je t orient ation of
slow and f ast drying foame d r ock dust
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Fig. 6. Relative average IO D for fast-drying foam formulations fr om sampl es 1-6
Fig. 7. Relative average IO D for slow-drying foam formulations from samples 1 -6
The perf ormance of the f oam see med to be mos t sensitive to levels of stabili zer in the formulation
when considering variations to the components of the FRD. Additional efforts we re made to keep the
amount of ro ck dust hig h while de creasing the l eve ls of stabilizer further without causing advers e
effects to the foam. To achieve these aims, water was added to the rock dust before being blend ed
into the foam. This practice p revented the rock dust from abso rbing to o much water out of the foams ’
lattice, which could have produce d nega tive e ffects. The results fr om sample sets 7 through 11 ca n
be seen in Figure 8 for fast-drying samples and F igure 9 for slow -drying samples.
21
10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
600 900 15 00
Amount of
stabilizer p er
batch, g
Relative average IOD
Amount of rock dust per batch, g
21
10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
600 900 15 00
Amount of
stabilizer p er
batch, g
Relative average IOD
Amount of rock d ust per batch, g
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Fig. 8. Relative average I OD for fast-drying foam formulations from samples 7-11
Fig. 9. Relative average I OD for slow-drying foam formulations from samples 7-11
The most consistent formulation that performed well in both the fast - a nd slow-drying conditions
used 1,500 g of rock dust with 400 g of water, while the stabilizer and foaming agent we re held at 5 g
per b atch. This formulati on was then compared to the origin al dry reference rock dust. Th e
obscuration traces a re shown in Figure 10.
3.5
5
6.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
1275 g rock
dust & 340 g
water
1500 g rock
dust & 400 g
water
1725 g rock
dust & 460 g
water
Amount of
foaming and
stabilizin g agent,
g
Relative average IOD
3.5
5
6.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
1275 g rock
dust & 340 g
water
1500 g rock
dust & 400 g
water
1725 g rock
dust & 460 g
water
Amount of
foaming and
stabilizin g agent,
g
Relative average IOD
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The ASTM F716-09 an d ASTM F726-12 standards have b een developed for absorbe nt/adsorbent
performa nce and upt ake capacity testing. However, the ASTM standa rds have some shortcomings
that make them un attractive for researchers to u se (Bazargan et al., 2015). In particular, th ey all
focused on the uptake capacity testing without reference to vaporization or fuming from the liquid .
It is c lear that there is a lack of studies conducted t o examine the absorbents in suppressing the fumes
genera ted fr om the spill of water-reac ting/fuming liquids which may affect human health. Tests we re
conducted in this study by means of a small -scale evaporating cha mber and real-time FTIR analysis
with the goal of evaluati ng the diffe rent forms of ab sorbents in terms of their capabilit y to suppress
the fuming.
2. Experiments
2.1 Materials
The phosphorous Oxychloride used in this work was obtained from J. T. Baker Chemical Company,
Phillips burg, New Jers ey with a stated purity of greater than 99.97 %. Sorbents with different
properties were used including PetroGua rd ® c hemical spill absorbe nt and T rivore x ® neutra lizing
absorbent. PetroGuard ® is a sponge, soft polymeric materials as shown in Fig. 6 that solidifying
chemical and oil spill. It is also claim ed that with P etroGua rd ® , most common water reactive
chemicals, hazardous hydrocarbons and sil icone-based ch emica ls are absorbed, encapsulated,
solidified, immobilized, and stabili ze d quickly and effectively absorbent (Guardian Environmental
Technologies, 2020). Trivorex ® is a neutralizing absorbent which may ne utralize acids, bases,
oxidizing agents, reducing agents, and solven ts (Prevor, 2020). It is also claimed that the
neutraliza tion process will help to suppress the emission of hazardous gases from corrosive chemicals.
There is however no report with quantifying efficacy on both absorbents.
2.2 Equipment
The experime ntal equipment consisted essentially of e vaporating cha mber and a FTI R spectroscopy.
Fig. 1 shows the configuration of the small-scale evaporating cha mber used in this work to facilitate
the measurement of vap orization and fuming fr om a liquid pan with controlle d ventilation. This
chamber is made of stainless steel and equipped with 3 removable sight glasses to facilitate visual
check. The v entilation rat e was controlled by a mass-flow-controlled air stream to a fixed 20 slm with
a known dew point temperature of 10.2±0.4 °C. A hood was mounted to the exit of the chamber
having an area of 10 0 × 1 00 mm to capture the ve nted gases for subsequent gas treatment.
The stainless-steel evapo rating pan ha d an area of 200 × 200 mm and was 20 mm de ep. During the
test, the weight of the pan containing POCl 3 liquid and sorbent was recorded by using a precision
scale; the temperature was moni tored by means of a type K thermocouple immer se d in the test
substance.
A FT -IR instrument with a 10 cm li ght path gas c ell was employed to measure the concentration of
gasses from th e exit of th e cha mber which was used as the indicator for efficacy of the absorbent to
suppress the fuming. The wave number range considered was from 600 to 4000 cm⁻¹ . S pectra were
obtained every 2 .14 seconds with a resolution of 1 cm⁻¹ .
The chemical functional groups of th e sorbents were determined by a Smiths Ide ntifyIR Attenuated
Total Reflection (ATR) Fourier transform infr ared spectrometer with a scan ra nge of 650 – 4000 cm⁻¹ .
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Fig. 1. Detail drawing of evaporating chamber
2.3 Experime ntal procedure
After the evaporating pan was filled with around 170 g of liquid POCl 3 , the system was then allowed
to come to equilibrium. The time required to come to equilibrium in the first stage was usu ally 10 to
20 minutes. The system was considered to be in equilibrium when the co ncentra tion of the vented
gases stays constant.
Once the equilibrium of the first stage had been established, the top sight glass was dismantled and a
given amount of ab sorbent was then applied and spread evenly over the surface of the liquid POCl 3 .
The sight glass was quickly reassembled. The experiment e nded when the system was in e quilibrium
which took 45 to 230 minutes depending on the testing sorbent.
All tests were performed at room temperature. The temperature and weight of the substance w er e
recorded, along with the concentrations of vented g ases. The identification and quantification of gases
were confirmed by I R spectra of ga seous POCl 3 , HCl and CO 2 .
3. Results and discussion
3.1 The characterization of test sorbents
According to Fingas and Fieldhouse (2011), styrene-butadiene and related polymers have been the
most common materials of polymer sorbents. T he IR spe ctrum of PetroGu ard ® (Fig. 2) i s similar to
that of butadiene styr ene polymer obse rved in several stud ies (Liu et al., 2019; Luna et al., 2020;
Zieba-Palus, 2017) that the band at 697 and 755 cm⁻¹ are attributed to CH deformation vibrations in
styrene aromatic rings ; the weak bands at 1491 and 1599 cm⁻¹ can be assigned to ring vibrations of
styrene; the weak b ands at 745, 963, and 907 cm⁻¹ can be assigned to 1,4 cis-butadiene, 1,4 trans-
butadiene and 1,2-butadiene segment, respectively; the bands at 1377 and 1452 cm⁻¹ can b e
attributable to C H 3 deformation vibrations; the bands at 2848, 2917, and 2955 cm⁻¹ can be assigned
to C-H stretching vibrati ons; and the ba nds a t 291 7 a nd 2848 cm⁻¹ can also be assigned to elongatio n
of C H groups in styrene aromatic rings. The integration of these peaks indicate s that P etroGua rd ®
contains mainly butadiene styre ne polymer.
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Fig. 2 . IR spectrum of PetroGuard ® absorbent
Fig. 3 compares the IR spectrum of Trivorex ® a nd sodium bicarbona te (NaHCO 3 ). As a r esult,
Trivorex ® contains signif icant amount of sodium bicarbonate due to the obvious similarities at 687,
829, 1393, 1609, and 1905 cm⁻¹ . In addition, t he ba nd at 1085 cm⁻¹ may be due to the Si -O-Si
asymmetric vibrational mode of stoichiometric silica (SiO 2 ) (Tolstoy et al., 2003). These observations
are in agreement with Mathilde et al. (2019). These peaks confirm that Trivorex ® contains mainly
NaHCO 3 which is a c ommon neutralizing agent.
Fig. 3. IR spectra of Trivorex ® neutralizing absorbent and sodium bicarbonate (NaHCO 3 )
3.2 The efficacy of PetroGuard ®
The effectiveness of PetroGuard ® applied to POCl 3 was quantitatively judged by perf orming the test
with diffe rent amount of absorbent. In the first test, 129.59 g of PetroGuard ® was applied to 164.92 g
POCl 3 . Fig. 4 shows the concentration of POCl 3 and HCl of the gas es measured at the exit of the
chamber. It shows that after 6 mi nutes P OCl 3 liquid wa s poured into the pan, th e syst em was in
equilibrium with the ave rage POCl 3 and HCl concentra tion of 798.5 and 803. 3 ppm, re spectively an d
the tempera ture of the liquid increase slightly from 30 to 31 .4 °C. During this period, the average
weight loss is 0.311 g/min.
Imme diately after applying the PetroGuard ® , fuming was stopped with no detectable POCl 3 or HCl.
However, HCl appe ared again after 2 min and POCl 3 a lso reappear fo r a nother 2 min utes. After 50
minutes of applying P etroGua rd ® to the pan containing POCl 3 , the concentration of POC l 3 and HCl
were found to be st ea dy at 447.9 ppm and 967.0 ppm, respectively; the temperature slightly increa sed
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from 30.5 to 33.2 ° C. During this period, the average weight loss is 0.166 g/min. According to F ingas
and Fieldhouse (2011), the disadvantage of this type of so li difier, styr ene-butadiene-containing
absorbent, is that the absorbate c an be r elea sed, es pecially under some pr essure. Therefore, right after
coming into contact, POCl 3 was quickly absorbe d by PetroGuard ® that can explain for the period o f
2 minutes without fuming and detectable POCl 3 or HCl. POCl 3 wa s then r eleased slowly and reac ted
with moisture to form HCl leading to a signi ficant decrease of 44% of POCl 3 concentration (from
798.5 to 447.9 ppm) whi le 20% in crease in HCl conce ntration was obs erved (from 803.3 to 967. 0
ppm). Based on the experimental observation, we presumed that the re was no chemical r eaction
between POCl 3 and PetroGuard ® . Therefore, the h ydrolysis reaction of POCl 3 and moisture yielding
HCl is responsible for the temperature rise in this test. Abatement efficiencies based on measured
drops in POCl 3 conce ntration and weight loss rate are 43.3% and 46.6%, respec tively. The same
reduce d weight loss rate and reduced P OCl 3 concentra tion suggests that the PetroGuard ® helps to
suppress the v aporization of POCl 3 liquid through absorbing the liquid. N evertheless, the surface of
the absorbed materials remains continued to emit vapor as well undergo hydrolysis with moi sture.
Fig. 4. Results for suppressing 164.92 g of POCl 3 with 129.59 g of PetroGuard ® absorbent
In the s econd test, 251.5 g of P etroGua rd ® was appli ed to 168.1 g of POCl 3 . Fig. 5 shows that after
35 minutes applying PetroGuard ® to P OCl 3 , the ave rage steady concentrations of POCl 3 and HCl
decreased significantly from 813. 1 ppm to 196. 9 ppm and from 1072. 4 ppm to 558.5 ppm,
respec tively with a higher the aba tement efficiency of 75.3 % c ompared to 43.3 % in the fir st test.
The steady weight loss rate was decreased from 0.322 g/m in to 0.062 g/min, givi ng an abatement
efficie ncy of 80.7% wh ich is comparable to the abatement efficiency based on r educed P OCl 3
concentration. Therefore , with increase quantity the PetroGuard ® may covered and isolated the POCl 3
liquid from evaporation and reacting with moisture. Fig. 8 shows th e POCl 3 liquid, POCl 3 liquid
covere d with PetroGuard ® , and a bsorbed PetroGuard ® . The absorbed PetroGuard ® wa s soft, wet and
still emitting vapor. Thus, P etroGua rd ® may provide a rapid vapor suppres sion of the fuming liquid
right after the spills. The rapid suppression is useful for eva cua ting the nearby communit y but the
complete removal or abatement still requires other response actions a s the absorbed materia ls re main
fuming.
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Fig. 5. Results for suppressing 168.10 g of POCl 3 with 251.1 g of PetroGuard ® absorbent.
3.3 The efficacy of Trivorex ®
In this test, 128.24 g of Trivorex ® was applied into 172.92 g of POCl 3 . In the first stage, the system
was in equilibrium after 15 mi nutes with a steady weight loss ra te of 0.304 g /min . The reaction
behavior between POCl 3 and T rivore x ® , how ever, was much different from that of PetroGuard ® . In
particular, an immediate ly violent reaction with vigorous boiling took pla ce when Trivorex ® and
POCl 3 came into contact. The temperature soared quickly from 32.3 to 108.5 °C in 3 minutes
acc ompanied by a lar ge amount of gaseous POCl 3 , HCl and CO 2 as shown in Fig. 6. After a round
210 minutes applying Trivorex ® , the temperature then gradually dropped to 34.1°C and the POCl 3
concentration wa s found to be less than the limit of de tection of it to F T -I R (50~60 ppm). Sodium
bicarbonate containing in Trivore x ® as a neutralizing agent which may trigger highly exothermic
reac tions and the evolution of CO 2 according to the following schemes:
𝑁𝑎𝐻𝐶𝑂 3 + 𝐻𝐶𝑙 → 𝑁𝑎𝐶𝑙 + 𝐻 2 𝑂 + 𝐶 𝑂 2 (1)
3𝑁𝑎𝐻𝐶𝑂 3 + 𝑃𝑂𝐶 𝑙 3 → 𝐻 3 𝑃 𝑂 4 + 3𝑁𝑎𝐶𝑙 + 3𝐶 𝑂 2 (2)
Fig. 7 shows the real weight of POCl 3 and absorbe nt monitored by the precision scale during the
experiment. It is clear that the real weight loss was divided into two appare nt parts. In the first part,
after 40 seconds applying Trivorex ® , the we ight loss was 71.12 g (decreased fr om 302.62 to 231.5
g). In the second part, the weight loss continued gra dually from 231.5 g to 208.45 g before sli ghtly
increased aga in. The tota l weight loss after a pplying Trivorex ® wa s 94.16 g.
The rapid weight loss is accompanied by spikes in CO 2 and POCl 3 concentration to more th an 60,000
and 30,000 ppm, respectively. The spikes were however dropped quickly in 30 s to less than half of
these peak values. In add ition, CO 2 was completely diminished by 8 min after the application. The
presence of C O 2 is a direct evidence of n eutraliz ation acc ording to scheme (2). The spikes in CO 2 and
POCl 3 concentrations and weight loss confirm that the weight loss is a direct consequence of
neutraliza tion and vaporization of POCl 3 . How ever, the measured c oncentration of CO 2 and POCl 3
are far less than the corresponding weight loss which indi cates that the FT I R concentration
measurement is inc apable to cope with such high concentration. The ratio of measu red peak
concentration of CO 2 and POCl 3 is about 2 which may provide an indication of relative cont ribution
of neutralization and vap orization. The weight fra ction of CO 2 in the total weight loss can thus b e
calculated to around 0.36 based on mol ar ratio of CO 2 to POCl 3 . Thus, approximately 25. 6 g of the
weight loss can be attributed to neutralization reactions while the remaining 45.52 g is a ttributed to
Proceedings of the 13th Symposium International Symposium
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the vaporization of POCl 3 . The second part of the weight loss was purely va porization which is 23.05
g. Total vaporization of POCl 3 is 45.54+23.05 = 68.59 g which accounts for 40% of the total liquid
spilled in the pan. Thu s, an estimation of th e gross efficacy of abatement by Trivorex ® is
approximately 60%.
Fig. 6. Results for suppressing 172.92 g of POCl 3 with 128.24 g of Trivorex ® neutralizing
absorbent
Fig. 7. The weight of liquid POCl 3 and absorbent during the experiment
3.4 Discussions
Fig. 8 shows the photo s of POCl 3 liquid, POCl 3 liquid covered with PetroGuard ® , and absorbed
PetroGuard ® . The abso rbed PetroGua rd ® w as soft , we t a nd sti ll e mitting va por. Thus, PetroGuard ®
may provide a r apid v apor suppression of the fuming li quid right aft er the spil ls. The r apid
suppression is useful for e vacuating the n earby co mmunity but the c omplete re moval or a batement
still requires other re sponse actions as the absorbed materials remain fuming.
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Fig. 8. Photos from left to right: POCl 3 liquid, POCl 3 liquid cov ered with PetroGuard ® , and
absorbed PetroGuard ® .
Fig. 9 shows the photos of POCl 3 liquid before and after neutralized with Trivorex ® . Although the
neutralize d Trivorex ® is no longer fuming with very limited HCl detected, care must be taken due to
the violent exothe rmic reaction with vigo rous boiling leading to a significantly higher evaporation
rate of POCl 3 and e volution of HCl . Without doubt, the vaporization will crea te a large impac t on the
nearby c ommunities. In f act, it will be a challenging task even for e mergency responders in applying
Trivorex ® owing the e xc essive he at.
Fig. 9. Photos from left to right: POCl 3 liquid before and after ne utralized with Trivorex ® .
In comparison of the two absorbents, one be ing temporarily suppressing v aporization while the othe r
one provides ultim ate abatement through neutr alization, both suffer diff erent drawbacks and great
care s are required for applyi ng both a bsorbents. More work is certainly neede d to develop a better
material and/or method f or abating the spill of wa ter-reactive/fuming chemicals. Finally, the current
design of chamber provides a consistent and insightful way to assess the risks associated with the
abatement of chemica l spills.
4. Conclusions
We have d eveloped a chamber method to investigate the eff icacies of different commercial absorbents
including PetroGuard ® and Trivorex ® for suppressing the fuming from P OCl 3 spills. Excessive
amount of PetroG uard ® will absorb and suppress the fuming effectively. In contrast, ne utralization
agent Trivorex ® will react viol ently with POCl 3 relea sing excessive he at leading to the highe r
evapora tion ra te of P OCl 3 a nd the evolution o f H Cl gas. The results a re crucial for dev eloping best
practice s for mitigating the release of water-reacti ve che micals.
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Reference s
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of Testing and Evaluation, 43, 1271-1278.
Fingas, M., Fieldhouse, B ., 2011. R eview of soli difiers. in: Oil spil l science and technology . Elsevier,
2011, pp. 713-733.
Kapias, T., Griffiths, R., Stefanidis, C ., 2001. REA CTPOOL: a code implementing a new multi -
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for styrene – butadiene – st yrene tri-block copolymer with high c is-1, 4 un its via c hanging catalytic
active centres. Roy al Soc iety open sc ience, 6, 190 536.
Luna, C.B.B., Araújo, E.M., Siqueira, D.D., Morais, D.D.d.S., Filho, E.A.d .S., Fook, M.V.L., 2020.
Incorporation of a recycled rubbe r compound from the shoe industry in p olystyrene: effect of
SBS compatibilizer c ontent. Journal of Elastomers & Plastics, 52, 3-28.
Mathilde, N., Mathieu, L., Blomet, J., Meyer, M. -C., 2019. Pollution re moval composit ion and use
thereof. in: Google Pate nts.
Muller, T.L., 2000. Sulfuric acid and sulfur trioxi de. Kirk‐Othmer Encyclopedia of Chemical
Technology .
Pr evor T rivorex®. https://www.prevor.com/us/trivorex.
Tolstoy, V.P., Chernyshova, I ., Skryshevsky, V. A., 2003. Handbook of inf rared spectroscopy of
ultrathin films . John Wiley & Sons.
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Ullmann's encyclopedia of industrial chemistry . VCH publishers.
Zieba-Palus, J., 2017. The usefulness of infrared s pectroscopy in examinations of adhesive tapes fo r
forensic pur poses. Foren sic Sci. Criminol., 2, 1-9.
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13th International Symposium on Hazards, Prevention, and Mitigat ion of Industrial Explosions
Braunschweig, GERMANY – July 27-31, 2020
Modeling of E xplosion Dynam ics in Vessel-Pipe Sys tems
to Evaluate P erformance Limi tations of
Explosion Isol at i on Systems
Lorenz R. Boec k, C. Regis B auwens & Serge y B. Dorofeev
FM Global, Re search D ivision, Norw ood, MA, U SA
E-mail: lorenz.bo ec k@ fmglobal.c om
Abstract
Explosion isolation syste ms provide critical protection for interconnected vessels and work areas,
preventing the spre ad of explosions through interconne cting pipes and ducts. The se syste ms not only
prevent pro pagating events, but also miti gate the elevated e xplosion hazards of interconnected
vessels, caused by pr essure piling and enhanced turbulence. Explosi on isolation systems can ,
however, fail ca tastrophically if they are not prop erly designed f or a use case.
Evaluating the performance limi tations of explosion isolation syst ems includes assessing their
pressure resistance, fla me-barrier eff icacy, and appropriate installation distance s, which typically
requires extensive testin g. To predict th e performance of a system for use cases outside the tested
conditions, models are needed that reliably predict both the explosion dynamics and isolation syste m
response.
In this study, a previou sly developed physics -based model for explosions in vented v essel-pipe
systems is further extended and validated. Large-scale validation experiments were performed at an
8-m 3 vessel with attached pipes, varying the p ipe dimensions, ignition location, and mixture
reac tivity. It is found that the model ca ptures the effects of the expe rimentally va ried parameters , and
accurately predicts the time available for isolation systems to form a flame barrier . These results sho w
how this model can help pre dict installation distances as p art of the overall performance limitations
of explosion isolation systems, extending the range of use c ases and reducing the number of tests
needed for system eva lua tion.
Keywords: experiments, explosion isolation, modeling, vessel-pipe systems
Nomenclature
Symbol
Description
Units
Values
a
Flame cone base radius
(m)
D P
Pipe diameter
(m)
h
Flame cone heig ht
(m)
k V
Calibration p arameter for flame adv ection
(-)
0.35
L P
Pipe leng t h
(m)
p
Vessel pressu re
(Pa)
R
Vessel radius
(m)
r f
Flame radius
(m)
R V
Vent radius
(m)
u x
Advection velocity at the leading flame-tip position
(m/s)
X
Fuel con centration, by volume
(%)
x f
Flame tip position
(m)
x f *
Flame tip position in coordinates of the virtual origin
(m)
α
Flame cone ang le
(rad)
γ V
Ratio of h eat capacities of vented gases
(-)
ρ V
Density o f vented gases
(kg/m 3 )
𝜁
Ignition locatio n param eter
(-)
0.25 ; 1; 2
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1. Introduction
Explosion isolation is a key element of explosion prote ction that mitigates the effec ts of explosions
in interconnected vessels (Hattwig and Steen, 2008). Figure 1 il lustrates an explosion originating in
a primary vessel or piec e of equipment and prop agating through an interconnecting pipe toward a
secondary vessel. Compared to isolated v essels, int erc onnected vessels present a mo re severe
explosion hazard: As combustion occurs in the primary vessel, pressure i ncrea ses in both vessels ;
pressure is elevated in th e secondary vessel when the flame ent ers, and the peak explosion pressure
increases proportional ly . This effect is known as pressure piling. In addition, turbulence is enha nced
in the pipe and in the secondary vessel due to the flow generated ahead of the flame, leading to higher
rates of pressure rise, w hich may overwhelm explosion protection designed to protect indi vidual
vessels. A highl y turbulent flame-jet entering the secondary vessel similarly enhances the rate of
pressure rise. (Bartknecht, 2012; Eckhoff, 2016; Taveau, 2017)
Fig. 1. Illustrati on o f explosion in interconnected vessels. Combustion produces turbulence ahead
of the flame and elev ates pressure, resulting in pressure piling and high rate of pressure rise.
Explosion isolation valve closes pipe c ross-se ction to preve nt flame spread.
To prevent these ha zardous effec ts, and prevent fla me spread, explos ion isolation sys tems are
installed at interconnecting pipes to form a flame barrier in the event of an e xplosion. Both active and
passive systems are co mmonly used, which activate electronically ba sed on pre ssure or fla me
detection, or are triggered by pressure waves and flow ahead of the flame, respectively.
To successful ly isolate an explosion, an isolation device must satisfy three criteria, including:
(i) pressure resistance: the isolation device must withstand the explosion overpressure;
(ii) barrier efficacy: the flame barrier formed by the device must prevent trans mission of flame
and/or hot gases/mater ial that may cause re -ignit ion downstrea m;
(iii) rapid barrier formation: an effective flame ba rrier must be formed before the flame arrives at
the device location and maintained for the duration of the e xplosion.
As all isolation systems require some finite time to respond, t he third requirement translates into a
minimum necessar y installation distance for an isolation system, the distance along the pipe between
vessel and isolation device, which allows time for the barr ier to develop prior to flame arrival . The
installation distance depends on the spe cific use c ase, de termined by p arameters such as vessel an d
pipe dimensions, mixture reactivity, ignition location , and the presence of additional explosion
protection measures suc h as venting or suppression . To determine installation dist anc es, existing
testing standards, such as EN 15089, Explosion I solation Systems , require a significant number of
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Fig. 5. Effect of mixture reactivity (propane concentration X) on pressure (top) and flame arrival
(bottom). Experiments (grey lines and markers) and model predictions (red lines). Dotted lines
mark static vent deployment pressure for each test. L P = 9.75 m, D P = 0.4 m, center ignition.
The pea k pressures at bo th X = 3.0% and X = 3.5 % clearly exceed the static deployment pressure of
the vent, indicated with black dotted lines. This is due to rapid pressure rise in both cases: The pressure
exceedance above the static vent deployment pressure increases as the rate of pressure rise in creas es
with increasing mixture reac tivity. It was observ ed that the pres enc e o f a pipe can lead to higher
dynamic vent deployment pressures compared to s imply vented explosions, without pipes attached to
the vessel.
4.3 Effect of ignition location
Figure 6 shows experimental results and model predictions for dif ferent ig nition locations. For front
ignition, the flame shape inside the vess el is approximately hemispherical, l eading to a mode rate rate
of combustion and pr essure ris e. For this c ase, th e model over -predicts th e early p ressure peak, bu t
still captures flame prop aga tion through the pipe accurately. Cases with front igni tion and lean
mixtures are typically the most challenging from a modeling perspective, as small model deviations
integrate over longer times and flame speeds are highly sensitive to mixture composition. Center
ignition shows faster initi al pressure rise due to a spherica l flame shape and higher rate of combustion.
After flame arrival at the pipe, pressure rises rapi dly, which is attribute d t o higher flow velocity in
the pipe, incr easing the t urbulent burning rate in t he pipe, and a la rger flame surface area insi de the
vessel at thi s time, produ cing faster pressure rise. For back -wall ignition, initial pressure rise is slow
due to the hemispherical flame geometry. As the fla me a rrives at the pipe, higher vessel pressure and
resulting higher flow v elocity in the pipe, c ompared to center ignition, lead to high turbulent burning
rates in the pipe and the sharpest rise in vessel p ressure among t he three tests. Back-wall igni tion
genera lly produces the highest peak pressures and flame speeds in the pipe, unless early vent
deployment mitigates the explosion severity.
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Fig. 6. Effect of ignition location (front; center; back) on pressure (top) and flame arrival (bottom).
Experiments (grey lines and markers) and model predictions (red lines). Dotted lines mark static
vent deployment pressure for each test. L P = 9.75 m, D P = 0.4 m, X = 3.0%.
5. Discussion of predictive model capability
Experiment-model comp arisons in Sec. 4 demonstrated that the model predicts time -resolved vessel
pressure and flame progress well and captures the critical effects of geomet ry and mixture para meters.
For broader validation, a total of 20 experiments with differe nt combinations of para meters are us ed
in the following for comparison against model results. Figure 7 summarizes the various combinations
of para meters covered by t hese tests.
Fig. 7. Matrix of parameters used for model validation in Fig. 8. Marker color indicates pipe
diameter; marker shape indicates pipe length.
Figure 8, upper left panel, compares expe rimental and modeled flame -arrival times (relative to
ignition) for all fl ame de tector posi tions along the pipe. Mode l p redictions capture all experimental
results within an accuracy of ± 10%, which is comparable to the scatter of the experime ntal results.
The next step is to evaluate the predictive capability of the model from the perspe ctive of explosion
isolation. Active explosion isolation systems typica lly activate b ased on a pre ssure measurement
using a set pressure threshold. Once the vessel pressure reaches this threshold, the system control unit
triggers the explosion isolation d evice . Once the device is triggered, it takes a finite time for the device
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to form a n effective flam e ba rrier, i.e., to close the pipe cross-section if the device is a mechanical
valve, or to establish a sufficient concentration o f suppressant in the pipe in the case of chemica l
isolation systems. The explosion dynamics model can be used to predict t he time of flame arrival,
relative to the time of crossing a set vessel-pressure threshold, at various locations along the pipe.
These arrival times can then be c ompared to the time a specific isolation system re quires to form a
barrier, to determine the minimum installation distanc e for the specific system and use case.
Fig. 8. Comparison of experimental and modeled flame-arrival times along the pipe. Top left: time
from ignition; Top right: time from reaching p = 3.5 kPa; Bottom le ft: time from reaching
p = 5.0 kPa; Bottom right: time from reaching p = 10.0 kPa.
Figure 8, upper right and lower p anels, show comp arisons of experimental and modeled flame-arrival
times along the pipe, relative to the time a given ac tivation pressure threshold is reac hed in the vess el
in eac h test. Typi cal activ ation pressure thresholds are evalu ated, i.e., 3.5 kP a, 5.0 kPa , and 10.0 kP a.
For each plot, the mean deviation, m , betw een model and experiments (soli d line), and the stand ard
deviation, s (dashed lines ), are given. Th ese comp arisons show good agreement be tween the model
predictions and experimental results throughout the entire range o f parameters studied . This indicat es
that the model accurately captures both the early phase of flame propa gation within the vessel and it s
associated pressure rise, which would activate th e isolation s ystem, as well as the later high -speed
flame propagation through the pipe . The non-zero mean a nd standard dev iations can be considered
for practica l applications as part of safe ty margins for installation distances. The sli ght over-
prediction of flame -arrival time by 7 – 12 ms relative to pressure-based acti vation, is fairly consistent
between differe nt configurations. This may be a result of the simplified tre atment for flame- entrance
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into the pipe, whe re forward-jetting of the fla me along the ce nterline of the pipe is not considered.
Note, that arrival times for some cases and pipe locations are negative in both experiments and model,
which shows that pressure-ba sed detection cannot detect all explosions before the flames enter the
pipe. This is particularly relevant for front-ignition cases, low mixture reacti vities, and lar ge ratios o f
pipe diameter to vessel volume. Optical flame detection at the pipe entrance or large installation
distances may be neede d to resolve such situations.
For explosion isolation s ystems activating by mea ns other than pre ssure detec tion, the model can
provide similar predictions. Active systems may use flame detectors at the pipe entranc e, which c an
be sim ulated based on th e model predictions fo r flame progr ess. P assive sy stems such as flap or float
valves activa te based on flow velocity in the pipe, which can also be predicted by the model.
While these results can be used to determine the minim um installation di stances, it is important to
mention that installation dist ance s are also bou nded by upper limits t o prevent deflagration- to -
detonation transition (DDT) and excessive ov er-pressure. Model predictions, experimental results,
and literature studies will be used in future wor k to establish such upper limit s, using maximum
permissible values for f la me spee d and pressure buil d-up that elevate the likelihood of DDT.
6. Conclusions and future work
This study validated a physics -based mod el for e xplosion dynamics in vented vessel-pipe system s
using large-scale experimental data. Large-scale explosion tests were per formed in an 8 -m 3 vessel
that provide a wide range of validation cases and varied parameters that govern th e explosion
dynamics, including: pipe lengths of 4.88 m and 9.75 m; pipe diameters of 0.1 m,
0.2 m, and 0.4 m; ignition locations at the center of the vessel, at the back -wall, and at the pipe
entrance; and propane conce ntrations in air of 2.8% ( Φ = 0.69 ), 3.0% ( Φ = 0.74), and
3.5% ( Φ = 0.86).
It was shown that the model predicts pressure transients closely and captures flame -arrival times
along the pipe at an accuracy better th an ±10%, ov er the full range of parameters studied. The model
can be used to predict the time available for an explosion isol ation system to actuate and form a flame
barrier, which can be compared with the activation dynamics of the sp ecific system. The explosio n
dynamics model can support analyses that determine whether isolation systems will perform as
needed in applications, i ncluding the prediction of minimum installation distances, while reducing
the number of tests needed to determine the performance limitations of isolation systems.
Additional work is need ed to develop comprehensive installation guidance for various types of
explosion isolation systems. Practical test methods are currently being developed that determine the
isolation system pressure-resistance a nd flame-bar rier e fficacy, and measure activation dynamics.
Acknowledgements
This work was funded entirely by FM Global and performed within the framework of the F M Global
Strategic Research Program on Explosions and Mater ial Reactivity.
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Boeck, L.R., Bauwens, C.R., & Dorofeev, S.B. (2018). A physics-based model for explosions in
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Boeck, L.R., Bauwens, C.R., & Dorofeev, S.B. (2019). Propane-air explosions i n an 8-m 3 vessel
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13th International Symposium on Hazards, Prevention, and Mitigat ion of Industrial Explosions
Braunschweig, GERMANY – July 27-31, 2020
CEQAT-DG HS interl aboratory tes ts for chemical
safety: V alidation of la boratory tes t metho ds by
determinin g the measureme nt uncert ainty and
probability of incorrect class ificatio n including s o-called
“Shark pr ofiles”
Peter Lüth a , Steffen Uhlig b , Kirstin Frost c , Marcus Malow a , He ike Michael-Schulz a , Martin
Schmidt a & Sabine Zakel d
a Bundesanstal t für Mate rialfo rschung und -prüfung (B AM), Berlin, Germ any
b QuoData G mbH, Berlin, Germany
c QuoData G mbH, Dr esden, Germany
d Physikalisch-Te chnische Bundesanstalt (PTB ), Brau nschweig, Ge rmany
E-mail: peter.l ueth@bam .de
Abstract
Laboratory t est results a re of vital importance for correctly classifying and labelling chemica ls as
“ hazardous ” as de fined in the UN Globally Harmonize d S ystem (GHS) / EC CLP Regulation or as
“ dangerous goods ” as d efined in the UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods .
Interlaboratory tests play a decisive role in assessing the reliability of laboratory test results.
Interlaboratory tests pe rformed over the last 1 0 years have examined different laboratory test
methods. After analysing the results of these int erla boratory tests, the following conclusions can be
drawn:
1. There is a need for improvement and validation fo r all labor atory test methods examined.
2. To avoid any discr epancy concerning the classification and labelling of chemicals , the use o f
validated laboratory test methods should be state of the art, with the result s accompanied by the
measurement uncerta inty and (if applicable) the pr obability of incorre ct classification.
This paper addresses the probability of correct/incorrect classification (for example, as dangerous
goods) on the basis of the measurement deviation obtained fr om interla boratory tests performe d by
the Centre for quality assurance for testing of dangerous goods and hazardous substance s (CEQAT-
DGHS) to validate laboratory test methods. This paper outlines typical results (e.g. so -called “Shark
profiles” – the probability of incorrect classification as a function of the true value estimated from
interlaboratory test data ) as well as general conclusions and steps to be taken to guarantee that
laboratory test results are fit for purpose and of high quality.
Keywords: interlaboratory test, validation, measureme nt uncertainty, incorrect classification
1. Introduction
Accidents such as explosions in chemica l plan ts and fir es on dangerous goods vesse ls can be caused
in several wa ys. Preve ntion starts in the laboratory, where chemicals are tested for their hazardous
properties in order to be able to assess the risks involved in their handling. F or this purpose, laboratory
test methods have be en d eveloped and published (see e.g. laboratory test m ethods published by the
European Union (2008) and by the United Nations (2019 )) ; these methods are currently a pplied
throughout the world. La boratory test results (amongst others) are used to corre ctly classify and label
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chemicals as “ hazardous ” as defined in the UN Globally Harmonized System (GHS) / EC CLP
Regulation or as “ dangerous goods ” as d efined in the UN Recommendations on the Transport of
Dangerous G oods.
Safety experts, manufacturers, suppliers, importers, employers and consumers must be able to rely
on the validit y of sa fety-relate d labora tory test met hods and on the ac curacy of laboratory test re sults
and assessments. I nterlaboratory tests play a decisi ve role in assessing the reliability of laborator y
test results. Pa rticipation in interla boratory tests is a crucial element of t he quality assurance of
laboratories; for this reason, it is explicitly recommended in ISO/IEC 17025 (2017) ( assuming suc h
interlaboratory tests are available). Interlaboratory tests are used in laboratory test method
development a nd validation and ca n be used to determine mea surement un certa inties (Hässelbarth,
2004; ISO 21748:2017-04, 2017).
Over the past 10 years, the Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und - prüfung (BAM) and th e
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB) in cooperation with QuoData GmbH have carried out
interlaboratory comparisons to evaluate various laboratory test methods (Lueth et al., 2019).
Significant differences betwe en the results of the participating laboratories were observed in all
interlaboratory tests. The deviations in the laboratory test results were caused not only b y
malfunctions in the laboratory equipment and labo ratory faults but also by deficiencies in the diff ere nt
laboratory test methods ( see interlaboratory test r eports of the Centre for qu ality assurance for testing
of dangerous goods and hazardous substances (CEQAT-DGHS), www.ceqat-dghs.bam.de ).
After a nalysing the re sults of these interlaboratory tests, the following conclusions ca n be drawn:
• To avoid any discrepancies in the classification and labelling of chemica ls, the use of validated
laboratory t est methods should be state of the art, with the results accompanied by the
measurement uncerta inty and (if applicable) the pr obability of incorre ct classification.
• There is a need for improvement and validation for all laboratory test m ethods examined.
Thus, interlaboratory te sts should initially foc us on the development, improvement and
validation of the laboratory test methods (including the deter mination of the measurement
uncertainty) and not on proficie ncy tests.
• Laboratory management and the practical execution of laboratory tests need to be im proved
in many laboratories.
• The term “ experience of the examiner ” must be seen critically; long-term experience
involving many laboratory tests does not necessarily guarantee correct results.
However, it is not currently clear whether the measurement uncertainty is sufficiently considered in
practice when a chemical is classified as a pa rticular packing group ( PG ) or as a hazard class based
on the measurement results combined with the mea surement uncertainties. Statistical methods and
graphical tools must th ere fore b e developed which will clearly define how the me asurement
uncertainty should be used in prac tice.
This paper addr esses so -calle d “Shark profiles”, graphica l indicato rs of the probability of incor rect
classification of dangerous goods and haz ardous substances on the basis of the measurement
uncertainty obtained from special interlaboratory tests performed by CEQ AT -DGHS to validate
laboratory t est methods . “Shark pro files” we re de veloped to character i ze the quality and suitability
of the laboratory test method(s) with respect to the laboratory test objective, i.e. the classifica tion of
chemicals based on specific classification criteria ( Antoni et al., 2010, Antoni et al., 2011 and Kunath
et a l., 2011). This objective is particularly important whe n there are several classification level s (e .g.
packing groups PG or hazard c lasses ) and th e question of the reliability of the classific ation arises.
The principle of the c alculation of “Shark profiles” for interlaboratory tests is explaine d by means of
quantitative laboratory t est results. This paper outlines typical results as we ll as general conclusions
and steps to be take n to guarantee that laboratory test results are fit for purp ose and of high quality.
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2. Experiments
2.1 CEQAT-DGHS interlaboratory tests and minimum number of participating laboratories
As part of the CEQAT-DGHS programme, int erlaboratory tests were carried out on various
laboratory test methods and either qualitative or qu antitative test results were obtained and evaluated.
An overview of the l aboratory test methods curren tly listed in the CEQAT- DGHS interlaboratory tes t
programme is shown in Fig. 1. This figure also indicates interlaboratory t ests already performed b y
CEQAT-DGHS as well as the number of laboratories interested in taking part in these int erla boratory
tests.
Fig. 1. Laboratory test methods listed in the CEQAT-DGHS interlaboratory test programme,
number of laboratories with interest in participation in CEQAT -DGHS interlaboratory tests and
interlaboratory tests performed by CEQAT-DGHS since 2007 (RR = interlaboratory te st )
Since CEQAT-DGHS was founded in 2007, th e number of laboratorie s interested in taking part i n
interlaboratory tests has steadily increa sed to about 98. The minimum number of participating
laboratories required for statistical ly meaningful interlaboratory tests (i.e. for statisti cal reliability )
has been met for almost all laboratory test metho ds. Hence, int erlaboratory tests can now be carried
out for almost all laboratory test methods listed in in Fig. 1.
2.1.1 Data verification (inspection upon receipt) in interlaboratory tests for method validation
A special feature of the CEQAT-DGHS interlaboratory comparison programme for method
validation is that the data supplied by the laboratories are subjected to a strict verification before being
evaluated. This is necessary to ensure data quality.
The specific re view o f th e data submitted by the laboratories includes the following points (Antoni et
al., 2010, Antoni et al., 2011, Kunath et a l., 2011, Frost et al., 2016 and Lueth et al., 2019) :
• Completeness of the data – check for missing data
• Conformity – check for irregular deviations from the laboratory testing method and/ or from
the interlabora tory test instructions
• Plausibility – check for obvious incorre ctness of the data submitted (e.g. distorted data)
• Consistency – check the c orrectness of the values in the data input for m submitted (e.g. by
comparing them to raw data)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
N u m ber o f l aborat ori es
T es t m eth od
2007
2010
2014
2020
☺ = RR co m pl ete d
= RR current
☺ = RR i n p re para t i o n
☺
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☺ ☺
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☺
☺
☺
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☺
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The data were verified/validated by different exp erts independently directly after rece iving the dat a
from the laboratory and before starting the sta tistical analysis. If necessary and possible, faulty data
were corrected after consulting the respective laboratory; laboratories were also asked to submit any
missing data. A statistical evaluation including the determination of the measurement uncertainty and
the proba bility of incorre ct c lassification with corre sponding “S hark profiles ” was carr ied out on this
specially validated data. The test results constituted an adequate basis for the statistical evaluation
and for reliable c onclusions.
2.2 Probability of incorrect classification and corresponding “Shark profiles”
The probability of incorrect classification of a tested substance , as defined by the European Union
(2008) and by the United Nations (2019), depends on the measurement uncertainty of the test result(s)
and the difference be tween the test result and the classifica tion criterion. However, the pe rcentage of
laboratories which have incorrectly classified the test samples may be only a very rough estimate of
the ac tual probability of the incorrect classification. There fore, statistical methods a nd graphica l
indicators must be developed which can provide the probability of incorrect classification re gardless
of the substance and cha racterize the quality and t he suitability of the laboratory test method(s) with
regard to the test objectiv e (i.e. the classification of chemicals based on spe cial classification criteria).
For this reason, the concept of the proba bility of i ncorr ect classification and the visual shark profiles
explained below w ere developed. The method s and development rel evant to this topic are
demonstrated below using several examples.
During the d evelopment of the “Shark p rofiles” the focus was on laboratory test methods whose
quantitative test results are used to classify substances bas ed on cl assifica tion criteria defined by the
European Union (2008) and the United Nations (2019). The interlaboratory tests evaluated the
laboratory test methods listed in Table 1:
Table 1 : Quantitative laboratory test methods of the CEQAT-DGHS interlaboratory tests,
year in which each interlaboratory test was performed and name of report publi shed
Laborato ry test met hod
Year o f the
interlabora tory test
Report o f the
interlabora tory test
UN Test O.1 “T est for ox idizing solids”
2005 -2006
Anton i et al., (2010)
UN Test N.5 “ Substances which in contact with wate r
emit flamm able gases” /EC A.1 2 “Flam mability (contact
with water)”
2007
Kunath et al., (2011)
UN Test O.2 “T est for ox idizing liquids” /
EC A.21 “Ox idizing Proper tie s (Liquid s)”
2009 -2010
Anton i et al., (2011)
The labor atory test methods shown in Ta ble 1 we re ex amined in interlaboratory tests for the
improvement and v alidation of laboratory test methods (i.e. there were n o proficie ncy tests) . For
reasons of simplifica tion and better re adability, an alterna tive packing group designation – PG 1, PG
2 and PG 3 – is used in the following inst ead of the legally correct designation – PG I, PG II and PG
III.
2.2.1 Measurement uncertainty of laboratory test methods
The measu rement un certainty of the labo ratory test methods can be d etermined eff iciently vi a
interlaboratory tests for method validation (Hä sselbarth, 2004, ISO, 2017-04), and can be expressed
as shown in eq (1).
‘Labora tory result’ = ‘M ea surement result’ ± U,
where U denotes the expanded measurement uncertainty U = k * u with u = s R (1)
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The factor k c orresponds to the coverage factor k defined in GUM (Guide to Uncertainty in
Measurement, Joint Comm ittee for Guides in Metrology, 2008) and the factor s R denotes the
reproduc ibility standard deviation obtained in the interlaboratory tests for method validation.
The reproducibility stan dard deviation s R is determined by means of standardized procedures and
statistical methods (Antoni et al., 2011) . Thes e st andardized statistical cal culations are commonly
used by statistical expert s in proficie ncy testing and therefore do not require any further explanation
at this point. However, detailed information on the calculation methods can be found in the respective
interlaboratory test reports (Antoni et al., 2010, Antoni et al., 2011, Kunath et al., 2011).
2.2.2 Calculation of the probability of incorre ct classification and “Shark profiles”
The procedure used to calculate the probability of incorrect cla ssification and the “Shark profiles” is
similar to statistical testing with a null hypothesis (e.g. the test sample b elongs to PG 1) and with an
alternative hypothesis (e.g. the test sample belong s to PG 2). In g eneral, th e objective of a statistical
test is to kee p the p robability of a false positive re sult (rejection of null hypothesis and acceptance o f
alternative hypothesis) below a certain limit (statistica l significance level), whereas th e probability of
the false n egative error ( acceptance of null hypothesis) can only be controlled with great difficulty .
These probabilities a lways depend on the “true” value of the measurand (e.g. combustion time) for
the specific test sample.
Using int erla boratory test data, the percentage of laboratories which incorrectly classified test samples
provides only a very rough estimate of the ac tua l probability of incorrec t classification. A more
reliable estimation of this probability can be obta ined using the quantitative properties o f the data.
Here, the probability of incorrect classification of the test samples is derived by evaluating the ratios
between the laboratory results of the test sa mple a n d the classification criterion (e.g. a firmly defined
threshold value taken from a legal regulation or a l abora tory test value obt ained by testing a reference
substance whic h characterizes the c lassification criterion (threshold value)). The proce dure is as
follows (and is initially carried out for each PG separately) :
Step 1: Calculation of the cha racteristic statistical values and determination of the true va lue
Based on interlaboratory test data, the mea n value and the standa rd deviation of the laboratory-
specific ra tios between the test results of the test sample and those of the reference sample are
determined using the robust Q/Hampel method (desc ribed e.g. in I SO 13528:2015). Thus, with the
interlaboratory test data, a robust estimate of the “true” ratio value (which is typically not exactly
known) will be obtained as well as the respe ctive reproducibility standard deviation regarding th e
ratios. The advant age of using robust methods is that no special outlier test s are required. Especially
the Hampel estimator is a weighted arithmetic mean, with lower weights for the outlying values.
Obvious “outliers” have a weight of zero and no influence on the mean value.
Step 2: Calculation of the proba bility of incorrect classification
B ased on the “true” rati o value (i.e. the robust mean value), and the corresponding reproducibility
standard deviation obtain ed in Step 1 above), the expected reproducibility standard deviation for the
ratio between the test results of an arbitrary test sample and those of the refere nce sample ( which
character izes the classifi cation li mit) can be estimated. Based on thi s estimation, the probability of
the test sample b eing classified in a P G for more dangerous substances c an be calculated as a function
of the ratio of the “ true” value of the mea surand (see F ig. 2). Here, the “ decision direc tion ” (i.e. from
a PG for less da ngerous substances to a PG for more da ngerous substances ) must be taken int o
account. F or the packaging groups, the orde r fr om PG 3 to P G 2 to P G 1 means a n increase in the
dangerousne ss of th e substance. Once a certain classification threshold value (criterion fo r
classification) has been reac hed, the substance is to be classifie d as a de fined PG and then remains in
this P G until the next higher classification criterion (i.e. for more dangerous substances) has been
reac hed. Once the next higher c riterion value (for the next PG for more dangerous substances ) has
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resources available at the C EQAT-DGHS competence cent re limit the number of interlaboratory tests
that can be offered to approximately one pe r year.
Interested l abora tories can obtain detailed information and register for i nterlaboratory tests at the
CEQAT-DGHS website (www.ceqa t-dghs.b am.de) .
Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge the personnel and financial support provided by the
Bundesanstalt für Materi alforsc hung und -prüf ung (BAM), Physikalisch- Technische Bundesanstalt
(PTB), QuoData GmbH and by the laboratories participating in the interlaboratory tests.
Reference s
Antoni S., Kunath K., Lüth P., Schlage R., S imon K., Uhlig S., W ildner W ., Zimmerma nn C . (2010).
Evaluation of the interlaboratory test on the method UN test O.1 'Test fo r oxidizing solids' with
sodium perborate monohydrate 2005 / 06 Final r eport, BAM, Berlin. ISBN 978-3-9814281-2-4
https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-bam/frontdoor/index/index/docI d/25091 .
Antoni, S., Kunath, K., Lüth, P., Sim on, K., Uhlig, S. (2011). Evaluation of the int erlaboratory tes t
on the method UN O.2 / EC A.21 Test for oxidizing liquids 2009 - 2010 Final report , BAM, Berlin,
ISBN 978-3-9814634-0-8, https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-bam/frontdoor/index/index/docId/25090 .
European Union (2008). Comm ission Regulation (EC) No 440/2008 of 30 May 2008 laying down
test methods pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the Eur opean Parlia ment and of the
Council on the Registrati on, Evaluation, Authorisation and R estriction o f Chemicals (REACH),
OJ L 142, 31.5.2008, p.1.
Frost K., Lüth P., Schmidt M., Sim on K., Uhlig S . (2016). Evaluation of the int erla boratory test 2015-
2016 on the method DIN EN 15188:2007 “Determination of the spontaneous ignition behaviour
of dust accumulations” Final report, BAM, Berlin . I SBN 978-3-9818270-0-2,
https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-bam/frontdoor/index/index/docI d/38734.
Hässelbarth W. (2004). BAM-Leitfaden zur Erm ittlung von Messunsicherheiten bei quantitativen
Prüferge bnissen. Forsch ungsbericht 266. BAM, Berlin. I SBN 3-86509-212 -8.
ISO 13528:2015-08 Statistical methods for use in proficiency testing by interlaboratory comparison,
Internationa l Organization for Standardization, Geneva.
ISO/I EC 17025:2017-11 Gene ral requirements for the competence of testing and calibra tion
laboratories, I nternational O rganiza tion for Standardization, Geneva.
ISO 21748:2017 -04 Gui dance for th e use of repeatability, re producibility and trueness estimates in
measurement uncerta inty evaluation, I nternational Organiza tion for Standardization, Geneva.
Joint Comm ittee for Guid es in Metrology (2008) Evaluation of me asurement data — Guide to the
expression of uncertain ty in measurement (GUM 1995 with minor corrections), B I PM
< www.bipm.org/en/publications/guides/gum.html >, accessed 06.02.2020.
Kunath K., Lüth P., Uhlig S. (2011). Interlaboratory test on the method UN test N.5 / EC A.12
'Substances which, in contact with water , emit flamm able ga ses' 2007 Short report, BAM, Berlin .
ISBN 978-3-9814634-1-5, https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-bam/frontdoor/index/index/docId/25094 .
Lueth P., Frost K., Kurth L., Malow M., Michael-Schulz H., Schmidt M., Schulte P., Uhlig S., Za kel
S. (2019). CE QAT - DGHS Inter laboratory Test Programme for Chemica l Safety - Need o f Test
Methods Validation. CET Chemical Engineering Transactions , 77: 1-6. DOI:
10.3303/CET1977001 .
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York and Geneva, < www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/manual/rev7/manrev7-files_e.html >,
accessed 06.02.2020
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13th International Symposium on Hazards, Prevention, and Mitigat ion of Industrial Explosions
Braunschweig, GERMANY – July 27-31, 2020
CEQAT-DG HS Interla boratory tes ts for chemical
safety – A ne w gravimetric procedure for the gas flo w
measurement fo r fla mmable and toxi c gases
Peter Lüth a , Marc us Malow a
a Bundesanstal t für Mate rialfo rschung und – prüfung (BAM), Ber lin, Germa ny
E-mail: marcus.malow@ba m.de
Abstract
Testing of hazardous m aterials and eva luating their ha zardous properti es concerning tra nsport,
handling or use is essential for the prevention of incidents. For this purpose, test methods h ave been
developed and published that are used worldwide today (European Union, 2008, United Na tions,
2019). For the evaluation of test results their corre ct measurement is of im portance. On basis of the
interlaboratory tests carried out by BAM and P T B within the framework of the CEQAT -DGHS in
the last years, it is shown that there is a need for im provement in all the test methods examined so fa r.
In addition to the interlaboratory tests furth er quality measures are mandatory (ISO, 2017). For
example, methods for verifying the test equipment used in the labora tories should be developed.
The deve lopment of a verification method is demonstrated using the test method UN Test N.5 as an
example. This test method is used to evaluate subs tance s which in c ontact with water emit flammable
gases. The basic principle of the verification method is de monstrated by Lüth et al. (2019).
Requirements and diff iculties during this development are discussed.
This test procedure UN Test N.5 has now been modified at BAM so that it is possible to measure
very small or larg e amo unts of both flammabl e and/or toxic g ases ov er a long period of time in a
validated and verified te st apparatus, utilizing th e principle of a gas colle ctor. This allows us to
determine slow a s we ll as fa st ga s evolution rates. The determina tion of the evolution rates (e.g. total
gas amount or flow rate) of toxic gases is of special interest because of the ongoing discussion how
to evaluate and qua ntify toxic gases which are formed from a substanc e due to c ontact with wa ter.
Up today no validated t est procedure for the m easure ment of evolutio n rates for toxic g ases is
described. I t is shown that the newly modified test method could help to solve this problem.
Keywords: hazardous materials, transport regulations, flammable gases, toxic gases
1. Introduction
The gas flow m ea surement procedure for substances which emit flammable gases in contact wit h
water is described in the UN Test method N.5 (United Nations, 2019). The experiment involves the
determination of the maximum gas evolution rate (GER) by means of a conical flask ( Erlenmeye r
flask) and a dropping funnel. The volume of the g as produced when the chemical come s into contact
with water should be m easured at appropriate time intervals by suitable measures. However, more
precise in formation on measurement technique, how the GER should be determined, and
corre sponding qu ality requirements are not spe cified in th is UN method. On basis of the c alculated
maximum GE R, the dange rous goods classification of the chemica ls is carried out ac cording to the
criteria listed in (United Nations, 2019).
On the c riteria listed in Table 1, it can be stated that a relatively large measuring range must b e
covere d by the test app aratus when determining the GER which is needed for the determination of
the corre sponding Packing Group (PG). It is therefore to be assumed that for this large measuring
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range a r elatively high effort is required in the control of the test quality r ealized with the respective
testing apparatus.
Table 1 : Criteria for Classification in Dangerous Goods Division 4.3 on the basis of the test results
in accordance with UN Test N.5 (maximum G ER), [PG] = Packing Group (United Nations, 2019)
Maximum gas evolution ra te
Dangero us Goods
Division
PG
10 l / (kg *min)
4.3
I
20 l / (kg *h) and not 10 l / (kg *min)
4.3
II
1 l / ( kg*h) an d neither 20 l / ( kg*h) n or 10 l / (kg *min)
4.3
III
≤ 1 l / (kg * h)
not 4 .3
No
For exa mple, the volum e flows ("minute flow" and "hour flow") resulting in the respective PG
decision criterion for a ty pical sample quantity of 10 g for the two evaluation intervals (1 mi nute or
1 hour) are shown in Table 2.
Table 2 : Criteria for Classification in Dangerous Goods Division 4.3 on the basis of the test results
in accordance with UN Test N.5 (maximum G ER), [PG] = Packing Group (United Nations, 2019)
PG
Gas evo lution rate PG -
Decisions criterion
Sample weig ht [g]
"Minute-F low" per
sample weig ht [ml/m in]
"Hour-Flo w" per
sample weig ht [m l/h]
I
10 l / (kg*min)
10
100. 00
6 000
II
20 l / (kg* h)
10
3.33
2 00
III
1 l / (k g* h)
10
0.17
10
An essential question for the acceptance and the t rustworthiness of the test re sults according to UN
test N.5 is the question of the traceability of the test r esults ( I SO, 2017 ). With a gravimetric test
method, the traceability of the results can be de monstrated very easily, especially in the d aily
laboratory routine. For th is reason and because of the simplicity of the procedure, the UN Test N.5 at
BAM is carried out usi ng a gravimetri c test apparatus. The results of the ve rification of this
gravimetric apparatus are explained in (Lüth et al., 2020) and are based on a gravimetric and thus
easily traceable verifica tion process.
1.1 Gas evolution rate and total amount of gas evolution
The GER is an important safety-related parameter for the risk assessment and the selection of
protective me asure s. Acc ording to test method U N N.5, the maximum GER is a measure of the risk
of ignition and is us ed to classify a substance in class 4.3. However, it can b e assumed that th e
maximum GER determi ned over a maximum of 5 days according to UN Test N.5 is no t a safe ty -
relevant parameter in all cases to p revent an a ccident (e.g. long -t erm transport in the container with
the formation of an explosive and / or ga s concentration dangerous for inhalation).
The chemical reaction usually does not run smoothly. Thus, t he gas evolution rate depends on the
duration of the chemical re action with w ater. I t has to be considered that in some case s the maximum
activity of the che mical reaction is only reached after 5 days or even more.
However, i t should be noted that a low ga s formation rate is no guarantee for a safe situation a t the
workplace or during transport. Even a small gas evolut ion rate with a correspondingly long duration
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of re action with water can lead to a dangerous ga s conc entration. The following factors can pl ay a
decisive role here: air exchange r ate, ratio of the amount of substance to the volume of the room ,
chemical r eac tion kinetics / rea ction course, reaction time, type of water (e.g. freshwater, seawater).
The lower the air ex change rate a nd the closer the ratio of substance amount to the ro om volume, the
faster a dangerous gas c oncentration is reac hed. This is problematic in terms of safety, e.g. during the
long transport of reactive subst anc es in containers or in ship holds and other relatively small storage
rooms.
Therefore, in addition to the GER (as a limited para meter for the kinetics, velocity of the ch emical
reac tion process), the a bsolut e amount of gas produced, and the duration of the re action must also be
considered . The absolute amount of evolved gas can also be an imp ortant parameter for ris k
assessment and for the s election of protective measures. A chemical mi xture with only a very small
proportion, but which is a very strongly water- reactive chemical substan ce (with a high chemical
reac tion rate / kinetics with water), can e.g. show a very high maximum gas evolution rate. However,
due to the small amount of substance in the mixture, the tot al amount of gas will tend not to be as
large compared to anoth er che mical mi xture which could react completel y with water, even if thi s
other ch emica l mixture would react with wa ter much more slowly. The amount of gas is also a
question of the duration o f exposure, i. e. how long the che mically reactive mixture has been in contact
with water. In case of co ntact with moisture and water during long-term storage or tr ansport (e.g. in
maritime traffic over seve ral weeks), the question of the tot al amount of gas generated could therefore
be very important and possibly even more important than the gas evolution rate. From the B AM's
perspective, both pa rameters (the maximum gas evolut ion rate and the tot al amount of gas) should
therefore be determined f or the risk assessment and the de finition of protective mea sures. This might
especially be importa nt for toxic gas release.
Taking these aspects into acc ount, we have therefore modified the BAM test system for the UN Test
N.5 syst em, i.e. with the help of a solenoid valve the system automatica lly de gasses the measuring
system de pending on the filling level of the measuring container. The mo de of operation and some
exemplary results are explained below.
2. Experimental
2.1 Modification of the testing ap paratus to d ete rminate both the gas evolution rate and the
total amount of gas evolution
As discussed above , t he GER at BAM is deter mined using a gravimetric ap proach as described in the
following. The basic set -up continues to meet th e requirements of UN T est N.5 ( United Nations,
2019). The functional scheme is il lustrated in F ig. 1. The reaction chamber i s a closed system without
direct cont act to atmosphere and basically c onsists of a conic al flask (1) and a d ropping funnel (2) .
The evolved gas in the conical flask pre ssurizes the water column in the gas-water-displacement tank
(4). This water column is displaced vi a the flexible connecting hose (5) to the water colle ction tank
(6) (open to atmosphere ), located on a balance (7). Essentially the evolved gas is detected as the
corre sponding w eight increase on the balance and can be processed digita lly. One drawback of thi s
system is the discontinue d measuring ra nge. Th at mea ns if all water is displaced into the water
collection tank no additional gas evolution can b e r ec orded. Th erefore, a modi fica tion of this set -up
was implemented, i.e. a solenoid valve (3) wa s introduced into the set-up which opens automatically
when a preset weight on t he balan ce is reached and degasses the system. Aft er deg assing and reaching
a certain mass lev el on the balance, the valve automatically c loses. H ereby the devic e works like a
continuous gas collector, despite the short degassing intervals that must be switched on automatically
when a maximum fill level in the gra vimetric container is reache d.
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Fig. 1. Functional scheme of the modified gravimetric method and photo of the gravimetric test
apparatus and the additional solenoid valve (3) used in the BAM for the determination of the gas
flow according the UN Test N.5 method with:
1 = Erlenmeyer flask with the che mical test sample, 2 = dropping funnel, 3 = solenoid valve
4 = gas-water-displacement tank, 5 = connecting hose, 6 = water-collection tank and 7 = balance
with coupling to a computer
Table 3 summariz es the main parts and important para meters of the modified set-up as shown in Fig.
1.
The changes in weight are recorded every 12 seconds using a computer. For the s et -up standar d
laboratory glassware was use d. The connecting hose (4) was a flexible PVC hose. The balance was
either a Mettler Toledo model B 2002-S or a model ME2992T. The water volume in the system is
about 2 l. Th e solenoid valve (one -way v alve) aut omatically degasses the s ystem when the maximum
load on the balance is reached. Th e degassing stops a nd the system is closed again when th e lower
weight limit on the balance is reac hed.
Based on the gravimetric measurement results, the GER at each ti me point and the maximum is
determined. The GER was calculated using MS Excel.
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Table 3 : Special information abo ut the device s according to Fig. 1 and operating parameters
Number a ccording
to Fig . 1
Device
Description
1
Erlenmey er flask
Holds the chemical test sub stance
2
Dropp ing funnel
By drop ping the water on to the chemical substance, the
reaction is initiated
3
Solenoid valve
Used for short deg assing the system in case of maximum
load o n the balance is rea ched
4
G as -water-d isplacement
tank
Cylindrical* g as-water-d isplacement tank (may also be filled
with oth er appropriate liqu ids)
5
Connectin g hose
Flexible jun ction between the two tank s
6
Water collection tank
Cylindrical* water collection tan k (may also be filled with
other appropriate liquid s)
7
Balance
Mettler Toled o model B 2002 -S or a m odel ME2992 T with
measuring range up to 2 kg with a resolution with 2 decimal
places with d ynamic weig hing
* … the cylindrica l shape allows gas volume correction by calculating the pressure rise in the gas
phase, which arises fr om the changes in the liquid height leve ls (height differe nces) in the cont ainers
4 and 6 according to Fig.1.
2.2 Verification of the modified testing app aratus
The modi fied testing appara tus with the solenoid valve can be verified using t he newly developed
verifica tion procedure (Lüth et al., 2020). This is important in order to also chec k th e suit ability of
the solenoid valve or the gas -tight seal and the gas-tightness of the test system. The experimental
setup for the verifica tion of the apparatus is shown in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. Functional scheme of the ve rification apparatus (left part of scheme) and test apparatus
(right part of scheme) with: 1 = water reservoir, 2 = filter, 3 = nee dle valve, 4 = rotameter, 5 =
water-gas-displacement tank, 6 = balance with coupling to a computer, 7 = Erlenmeye r flask with
pipe connec tion, 8 = dropping funnel, 9 = solenoi d valve; 10 = gas-water-displacement tank, 11 =
connecting hose, 12 = water-collec tion tank, 13 = balance with coupling to a computer
For more details on the v erifica tion procedure and results please see Lüth et al. (2020).
3. Results and discussion
3.1 Results of data acquisition and calculation of gas volume and gas evolution rate s
The results of the data acquisition and calculation of the gas quantity a nd the gas evolution rates as
determined with this ne wly modified set-up a re explained using a test sample, which has been
examined at BAM. The sample wa s an aluminum alloy which was in powder fo rm ( < 500 µ m, i.e.
20-63 µ m) and was examined at BAM without further processing. An amount of about 10 g was
weighed into the fla sk and 30 ml of water were added. The examination time is approx. 333 h, i. e.
almost 15 days, i.e. the time was significa ntly longer than required by UN Test N.5.
The following Fig. 3 shows the increase in mas s on the scale for the test sample with automatic
degassing of the system. In principle, the device works like a continuous gas collector, despite the
short degassing int erva ls that are sta rted automatically when a ce rtain fill le vel (e.g. at mass 1500 g
in Fig. 3 ) in the water-collection tank is reached.
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Fig. 3. Typical weight vs. time diagram of the test sample measured by balance of the test
apparatus with automatic degassing of the system
The strictly vertical lines of the mass- time -curves corr espond to the ope ning and closing of the valve
and thus to the temporary degassing of the system (see marked example in Fig. 3).
3.2 Determination of the cour se of the developing gas volume
The gas volum e is determined on the basis of the mass of the medium dis place d (e.g. water), taking
into account the de nsity of the re spective gravimetric medium (e.g. water) and shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Gas volume vs. time diagram of the test sample measured by balance of the test apparatus
with automatic degassing of the system
open ing of the valve
closing of the valve
Degassing b y opening and
closing of the valve
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As shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 there were 8 automatic switching operations for degassing the syst em
within the testing. Each dega ssing opera tion a ccounts to 9 int erva ls of 12 se conds (da ta acquisition
rate is 12 s p er d ata point), which, given the corresponding rate of increase, means a loss of approx.
3.8 g of the water displaced during this time by further gas formation (approx. 3.8 ml gas). Based on
the 500 g m easuring interval, this is a loss of less than 1% and was th er efore not conside red in Fig.
4.
From Fig. 4 it can be s een that the signal - to - noise ratio in relation to the tota l gas evolution is perfectly
sufficient. The tot al gas evolution measured by this modi fied method can be used as a suffici ent saf ety
parameter for bo th the flamm able a nd the toxic safety questions.
3.3 Determination of the GER
The calculation of the gas flow rate is based on the weight differences between the respective
neighboring 12-second measuring interva ls as shown in Fig. 5, left axis.
Fig. 5. Left axis: Typical gas flow rate vs. time diagram of the test sample measured by balance of
the test apparatus with automatic degassing of the system; right axis: Typical GER (minute volume)
vs. time diagram of the test sample measured by balance of the test apparatus with automati c
degassing of the system
Taking into account the weight of 10 g of test su bstance, we calculated th e normalized GER shown
in Fig. 5, right axis.
From Fig. 5 it c an be seen that the signal- to -noise ratio in relation to the c lassification criteria for PG
I (10 l / (kg*min)) is perfectly sufficient a nd even low va lues of about 0.2 l / (kg*min) can be
ac curately determined whereby the experimental limit of detec tion is not reached yet.
For classifica tion purposes it is also necessar y to calcula te the GER on the hour b asis also. This is
illustrated in Fig. 6.
Degassing b y opening and
closing of the valve
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Fig. 6. Typical GER (hour volume) v s. time diagr am of the test sample measured by balance of the
test apparatus with automatic degassing of the system
The signal- to -noise ratio with re gard to the classification criterion for PG II I of 1 l/ (kg*h) is shown
graphically in Fig. 7:
Fig. 7. Enlarged Fig. 6 with enlarged y-axis to evaluate the signal- to -noise in relation to the
classification criterion of PG III (1 l/(kg*h)
It can be stated that also t he eva luation of the GER on basis of the hour value can be performed with
our modified set -up accurately. From Fig. 7 it can be seen that the signal- to -noise ratio in relation to
the classification criteria for all PG is perfectly sufficient.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0 24 48 72 96 12 0 14 4 16 8 19 2 21 6 24 0 2 6 4 28 8 31 2 33 6
Gas e v olu t io n r a te GER [ l/( kg h ) ]
T i m e [h ]
Degassing b y opening and
closing of the valve
Degassing b y opening and
closing of the valve
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Hydrogen has high specific energy, about 142 and 120 MJ kg -1 for the higher heating value (HHV)
and lower heating value (LHV), respectively, compared to hydrocarbons such as methane (55 and
50 MJ kg -1 ), propane (50 and 46 MJ kg -1 ), as well as diesel and jet fuel (45-46 and 43 MJ kg -1 ).
However, the low density, and hence low en ergy density, implies that compressed hydrogen
(GH2) is stored and transported at considerably higher pressures ( ≈ 700 bar) compared to
conventional energy carriers, such as CNG ( ≈ 260 bar), LPG ( ≈ 30 bar), as well as marine gas oil,
heavy fuel oil, diesel and petr ol (atmospheric pressure in the tank space). As su ch, it is not
straightforward to prevent los s of containm ent. The pressu rised vessels also represent a hazard,
for instance in th e event of m aterial failure or exte rnal loads from im pacts, projectiles, fires, etc.
Furthermore, the low boiling point im plies that li quefied hydrogen (LH2) is stored and transported
at considerably lower temperatures ( ≈ -253 o C) compared to conventional energy carriers,
including LNG ( ≈ -162 o C). This implies cryogenic hazards in the event of loss of containm ent.
Hydrogen is a gas at normal temperatures and pre ssure, but LH2 has very low flashpoint (< -253
o C) compared to conventional fuels such as LNG ( ≈ -188 o C), LPG ( ≈ -104 o C) and marine fuel
oils (flashpo int > 60 o C). Since the flashpoint ind icates the lowest tem perature at which a volatile
substance evaporates to form an ignitable mixtur e with air, a lower flashpoint generally im plies
increased fire and explosion hazard. To this end, the United Nations (U N) classifies flamm able
liquid and vapours according to their flashpoint (UN, 2011):
o Extremely flammable liquid and vapour: flashpoint < 23 o C and initial boiling point ≤ 35 o C
o Highly flammable liquid a nd vapour: flashpoint < 23 o C and initial boiling point > 35 o C
o Flammable liquid and vapour: flashpoint ≥ 35 o C and ≤ 60 o C
o Combustible liquid: flashpoint > 60 o C and ≤ 93 o C
o Non-flammable liquid: flashpoint > 93 o C
Hydrogen-air mixtures are flammable over a consid erably wider range of concentrations (4-75
vol.%), compared to conventional fuels such as methane (5-15 vol.%) and propane (2.1-9.5
vol.%).
Hydrogen has very low m inimum ignition energ y (MIE ≈ 0.017 m J), compared to conventional
fuels such as methane ( ≈ 0.28 mJ) and propane ( ≈ 0.26 m J). This implies that ignition sources that
otherwise do not represent a significant hazard ma y readily ignite hydrogen-air mixtures (Skjold
& van Wingerden, 2010). Further research will presum ably result in better understanding of
ignition phenomena related to el ectrostatic discharges, m echanical impacts and the effect of
external congestion and presence of dust or mist for spontaneous ignition of high-pressure releases
(Wola ń ski & W ojcicki, 1973).
Table 1 summarises the classifi cation of gases and vapours for equipment used in explosive
atmospheres (EN IEC 60079-0, 2018). The classification is based on the param eters maximum
experimental safe gap (MESG), m inimum i gnition curr ent (MIC) and the auto-ignition
temperature (AIT). The AIT of hydrogen ( ≈ 500 o C) is com parable to other conventional fuels in
temperature class T1, su ch as natural gas ( ≈ 640 o C) and propane ( ≈ 466 o C).
Table 1 : Classification of select ed flammable vapours and gases.
Gas group
Temperature class ‒ AIT ( o C)
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
450 > 300 ‒ 450 200 ‒ 300 135 ‒ 200 100 ‒ 135 85 ‒ 100
IIA
MESG > 0.9 mm
Methane
Propane
Ammonia
Methanol
Ethanol
Diesel
Fuel oils
Petrol
‒ ‒ ‒
IIB
0.9 ≥ MESG > 0.5 Coal ga s Ethy lene ‒ Diethyl ether ‒ ‒
IIC
0.5 mm > MESG Hydrogen Acetylene ‒ ‒ ‒ Carbon
disulphide
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The maximum lam inar burning velocity of hydrogen-air m ixtures is significantly higher ( S L ≈ 2.9
m s -1 ) than for most conventional fuels (Konnov et al. , 2018), such as methane ( S L ≈ 0.36 m s -1 )
and propane ( S L ≈ 0.41 m s -1 ). Furthermore, various hydrodynam i c, thermo-diffusive and thermo-
acoustic instabilities may influence the flame pr opagation in hydrogen-air mixtures significantly
(Clavin & Searby, 2016). In partic ular, the role of therm o-diffusive instabilities depends on
mixture composition (Sánchez & W illiams, 2014) ‒ cellular instabilities oc cur at sufficiently fuel-
lean conditions (negative Markstei n lengths), and pulsating instabili ties occur at sufficiently fuel-
rich conditions (posi tive Markstein lengths).
Vapour cloud explosions (VCEs) in industry enta il turbulent f lame propagation in premixed fuel-
air mixtures. The positive fee dback mechanism between expa nsion of combustion products,
turbulence generation in the unreacted mixture (e.g. in wakes behind obstacles) , flam e folding
caused by obstacles and/or instabilities, and enhan ced rate of turbulen t co mbustion results in flam e
acceleration and pressure build-up, es pecially in congested and partly conf ined regions. The chain
of events depends on th e reactivity of the m ixture, typica lly quantified by th e lam inar burning
velocity mentioned above, as well as initial a nd boundary co nditions such as the turb ulent flow
conditions, the size of the flammable cloud, and th e degree of congestion and confinem ent. The
extreme reactivity of hydrogen-air m ixtures, relative to conventional fuels, results in a dram atic
increase in flam e acceleration in the pres ence of obstacles and/or initial turbulence, with
significant potential for escalation (Skjold et al. , 2019b; Shirvill et al. , 2019ab).
Hydrogen-air mixtures have a propensity for deflagration-to-detonation-transition (D DT) under
specific conditions (C iccarelli & Dorofeev, 2008). The detonation cell size for stoichiometric
hydrogen-air is about 10 mm, compared to 30 0 mm for methane and 70 mm for propane. This
implies that sm all variations in the initial a nd boundary conditions can have dramatic influence
on the chain of events in hydrogen explosions. Extensive research in the aftermath of the
Buncefield explosion has resulted in increased aw areness of the critica l importance of considering
detonation scenarios in risk assessments and design of industr ial facilities (Oran et al. , 2020).
Hydrogen can cause embrittlement in certain m ateri als, resulting in loss of physical properties,
and possible loss of containment.
Several of the risk-reduc ing m easures frequently employed fo r systems with conventional energy
carriers have limited applicability f or hydrogen, including deflagration venting and autom atic
suppression.
Many application areas for hydrogen involve emerging technologies, and hence inherent
uncertainty associated with the estimation of both event frequencies and consequences.
Hydrogen safety is an area of active res earch, which of ten addresses inh erently complex
phenomena and em erging technologies. As such, th e strength of the knowledge available for risk
assessments is inherently limited.
Many consultants that perform risk assessm en ts do not have specifi c competence on hydrogen
safety, and may apply conventiona l consequence m odels and event frequencies derived from the
hydrocarbon industry. This increases the uncertainty in the risk assessments considerably and can
result in a false impression of safety am ongs t owners and operators of hydrogen systems.
It takes time to build competence on technical safe ty and to develop a hea lthy safety cultur e in an
organisation. Furthermore, experience shows that accidents recur in the sam e industry, and even
in the same organisation (Kletz, 1993).
As mentioned above, there is a fundam ental differ ence betw een the required level of safety for
controlled production and use of hydrogen within industrial facilities, with access control and
trained employees, and widespread us e of hydrogen in the public domain.
There are some favourable features of hydrogen concerning safety, at least for specific conditions:
Buoyancy, due to the low density of hydrogen relative to air at the same tem perature, can prevent
the formation and limit the duration of large fla mmable clouds in unconfined areas. This implies
that natural convection in open geometries is th e preferred approach f or preventing and m itigating
hydrogen explosions. However, in confined geom etries, buoyancy favours the formation of highly
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reactive stra tified layers near the ceiling (Skjold et al. , 2019b). This implies that classical m eans
of explosion protection are inherently difficult to implement for tunnels and parking facilities, as
well as fuel preparation rooms, fuel cell room s and machinery spaces on ships. Furth ermore, in
congested unconfined scenarios, a D DT event in a localis ed congested and/or confined region can
trigger an aboveground detonation in the rising hy drogen-air plum e. The interaction between the
original blast wave and the blast wave reflec ted from the ground m ay result in a Mach stem.
Pure hydrogen flames do not produce soot, which im plies less transport of heat by radiation,
compared to hydrocarbon flames. However, jet flam es in realistic accidents may entrain
components from volatile materials, such as paint, plastic, du st, etc. Without proper barriers in
place, an external fire, e.g. a je t fire from an uncontrolled rel ease of hyd rogen, may com promise
the tanks used for storing the fuel.
Figure 3 illustrates a typ ical event tree f or the initiating event ‘re lease and dispersion ’ (i.e. loss of
containment) of gaseous hydrogen, w ith associated probabilities ( P ) and consequences ( C ) for various
scenarios. A com prehensive QRA will conside r mu ltiple initiating events, repres enting leaks with
different release rates and durations, located in vari ous positions and pointing in different directions,
for different wind conditions and/or with or without fo rced or natural ventilati on. It is essential to
account for the variation in the release rate during the event, as well as the delay between the onset
of the release and igniti on, since these param eters influence the size of the flamm able cloud, and
hence the time-dependant probability of ignition and the consequences of poten tial explosions.
Furthermore, there can b e numerous interm ediate or combined scenario s, such as fires initiated by
explosions or vice versa, structural collapse caused by fires and explosions, blast waves, projectiles,
etc. Nevertheless, the simple event tree in Figure 3 illustra tes the signifi can t challenge of reducing
the risk for hydrogen installations to a level equivalent to or below that of conventional fuels.
Fig. 3. Simplified event tree for loss of containment of hydrogen.
For comparable en ergy systems, i.e. facilities with sim ilar inventory of fuel (chem ical energy), similar
probabilities of initiating events, sim ilar levels of confinem ent and congestion, similar age and level
of maintena nce, etc., the safety- rel ated properties of fuels mentioned above im ply that the overall risk
often will be significantly higher for hydrogen sy st ems, compared to system s based on conventional
fuels. In particu lar, the likely shift towards an increas ed fraction of accident scenarios involvin g
strong deflagrations or detonati ons implies an increased lik elihood of major accid ents, and hence
increased requirements for em ergency preparedness in society. Hence, to achie ve an acceptable level
of safety for systems where hydrogen is the pr imary energy carrier, such as hydrogen refuelling
stations or ferries, the design of the hydrogen systems must differ significantly from that of
contemporary system s using conventional fuels. Furthe rm ore, from the perspect ive of societal safety
it will be increasingly important to develop approp riate infrastructure and procedures for emergency
response. In summ ary, the specific safety-related properties o f hydrogen imply that it often will be
necessary to im plement additional o r specially desi gned safety m easures to reduce the risk to an
acceptable level in systems and infrastructure that use hydrogen as an energy carrier.
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6. Learning from accidents
The accident at a hydrogen refuel ling station in S andvika, Norway, on 10 June 2019 illustrates some
of the challenges associated with the safe in troduction of hydrogen in society (Løkke, 2019). The
accident took place arou nd 17:30 on Pentecost/Whit Monday, a public holiday in Norway. The chain
of events started with a leak from the high-pressure system (about 900 bar) , followed by ignition and
a strong explosions. The initial acci dent investigation did not identif y an obvious ignition source. T he
accident did not resu lt in any fatalities, and only minor injuries to people when the blast wave from
the explosion triggered airbags in car s. Plates of s heet metal c overed the exterior of the fire /pressure
wall surrounding the compound with the process equipm ent for hydrogen production, compression
and storage. Figure 4 illustrates how parts of the wa ll near the high-press ure unit and plates of sheet
metal formed projectiles that landed on the opposite side of a four-lane road and a roundabout, after
passing over a combined sidewalk and bicycle pat h. Hence, under slightly different circum stances
this accident could have resulted in severe injuries a nd even fatalities.
Fig. 4. The hydrogen refuelling station in Norway a fter the explosion on 10 June 2019 (NRK, 2019).
Apart from the considerable m aterial damage to the refuelling station and minor dam age to nearby
buildings, the accident resulted in loss of share holder value and a consid erable setback for the
development of the hydrogen infrastructure, at least in Norway. The operator of the station closed
down all hydrogen refuelling stations in Norway shortly after the acc ident, and put all plans fo r new
stations on hold. It is difficult to predict whethe r this acciden t will influence public perception an d
widespread adoption of hydrogen as an energy carri er in a long-term perspective. However, the
accident demonstrates several important asp ects of hydrogen safety, from an industrial (commercial)
as well as a societal perspective:
Risk assessments involving explosion scenarios are often lim ited to pressure and thermal loads,
combined with sim plified criteria for effects (h arm ) , and do not necessarily cons ider escalating
accident scenarios that may involve structu r al response, fires following explosions or vice versa ,
failure of pressurised vessels due to fire loads, formation of projectiles du e to explosion or blast
loads, etc. Nevertheless, most fire and explosi on accidents that result in considerable dam age
involve one or several of these aspects.
The thresholds for individual risk for members of the public are typically tw o orders of m agnitude
lower than for onsite personnel in industry. As such, it is essential to adopt sufficiently
conservative risk acceptance criteria when memb ers of the public can access the sy stem under
consideration, such as hydrogen refuelling st ations, cars, buses, trains, f erries, etc.
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The risk assessment for a given facility will not n ecessarily consider all th e indirect losses related
to an accident scenario, such as downtim e, loss of production, and delay ed implementation or
termination of emerging technologies. A transiti on towards widespread use of hydrogen as an
energy carrier in indust ry and society will require massive investments in technology and
infrastructure, and the p rospect of se rious accide nts repres ent a significant risk to investors and
insurance companies.
There are several examples of acci d ents that have had widespread and long-lasting im pact on the
development of other industries. Th e Piper Alpha disaster on 6 July 1988 (167 fataliti es) resulted in
significant changes to the safety regulations in the offshore petroleum industry. The explosion and
fire at the drilling rig Deepwater Horizon on 20 Apr il 2010 (11 fatalities) initia ted the largest m arine
oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry, the Macondo bl owout, as well as expensive legal
proceedings and sentencing for owners and operators. The accidents at Three Mile Island on 28 March
1979, Chernobyl on 26 April 1986 (42 acute and delaye d fatalities) and Fukushim a-Daiichi on 11
March 2011 (one delayed fatality ) had severe impact on the devel opment of the nuclear industry.
Regarding hydrogen, events such as the Hindenburg disaster on 6 Ma y 1937 (36 fatalities), the Space
Shuttle Challenger disaster on 28 January 1986 (sev en fatalities), and the hydrogen explosions at
Fukushima-Daiichi influence public percep tion. So me recent accidents involving hyd rogen include:
the explosion and fire at the AB Specialty Sili cones Facility in Waukega n, Illinois, on 3 May 2019
(four fatalities, one injured),
the explosion in the Gangwon Technopark in Gangneung, South Korea, on 23 May 2019 (two
fatalities, six injur ed),
the explosion at the Air Produc ts facility in Santa Clara, California, on 1 June 2019,
the explosion and fire at the Uno-X refuelli ng station in Sandvika, Norway, on 10 June 2019,
the explosion at the Airg as plant in Waukesha, W isconsin, on 12 December 2019,
the explosion at the OneH2 hydrogen plant in Catawba County, North Carolina, on 7 April 2020,
the explosion at the Praxair hydrogen production plant in Texa s City, Texas, on 11 June 2020 .
Although it is not possible to asse ss the level of safety for the emerging hydrogen technologies from
a limited number of accidents, m ostly in industrial f acilities, there is reason for concern regard ing the
prospective increase in exposure to h ydrogen systems for m embers of the public.
7. Conclusions
The inherent complexity of the physical and ch emical phenom ena involved in accidental fires and
explosions represents a significant challeng e for the comm unication of hazards and risks for hydrogen
systems. This has im plications for risk perception, in industry as well as soci ety. The inherent lack of
relevant experience data for the emerging hydrogen technologies implies signi ficant uncertainty in
the estimation of event frequencie s for hydrogen system s with a non-t rivial level of com plexity. The
level of conservatism in the desi gn of hydrogen installations should re flect this uncertainty. However,
optimal design requires reliable and efficient cons equence m odels that reproduce important trends
observed in experiments. To this end, future re search on hydrogen safety should focus on developing
and validation consequence models for industrial applications. Further bl ind-prediction benchmark
studies are arguably the only reliab le way of documenting the pred ic tive capabilities of advanced
model systems, as well as the users of such m odels. Large-scale experiments in realistic g eometries
are essential for model validation, as well as for supporting the blind-predicti on studies. Certification
of modellers can also be an eff ective means of reducing the u ncertain ty in risk assessm ents. A more
holistic approach to risk analysis, risk assessmen t and risk management as tools for decision support
will be required for ‘nourishing ’ of the em erging hydrogen technologies through the rem a ining
technology readiness levels, and even tually towards widespread comm ercial use in society. In its
current state, the developm ent of the ‘hydrogen econo my’ is fragile, and new accidents, especially in
the public domain, m ay delay or term inate further development. It is imperative that all stakeholders
realise that the implications of future severe accidents in hyd roge n system s will not be limited to the
companies that own or o perate the affected installations.
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13th International Symposium on Hazards, Preven tion, and Mitigation of Industr ial Explosions
B
raunschweig, GERMANY – July 27-31, 2020
Review of the HySEA project
Trygve Skjold a,b , Melodia Lucas b , H elene Hisken b , Gordon Atanga b , Sunil Lakshmipathy b,k ,
Laurence Bernard b,h , Matthijs van Wingerden a,b , Kees van Wingerden b , Jennifer X. Wen c ,
Vendra Chandra Madhav Rao c , Anubhav Sinha c,l , Marco Carcassi d , Martino Schiavetti d ,
Tommaso Pini d , Jef Snoeys e , Arve Grønsund Hanssen f , Changjian W ang g ,
Simon Jallais h , Elena Vyazmina h , Derek Miller i , Carl Regis Bauwens j
a University of Bergen, Berg en, Norway
b Gexcon, R&D Department, Bergen, Norway
c University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
d University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
e Fike Europe, Herentals, Belgium
f Impetus Afea, Flekkefjord, Norway
g Hefei University of Technology, Hefei, China
h Air Liquide, R&D, Paris Innovation Cam pus, Paris, France
i Air Products, Central Process Safety Team , Allentown, PA, USA
j FM Global, Research Division, Norwood, MA, USA
k Jensen Hughes, Richmond, BC, USA
l Indian Institute of Technology, Bana ras Hindu University, Varanasi, India
E-mail: [email protected]
Abstract
Explosion protection by venting is a f requently used measure f or mitigating the c onsequences of
deflagrations in confined systems. The overall goal of the project “Improving hydrogen safety for
energy applications through pre-normative research on vented deflagrations” (HySEA) was to
provide recommendations for European and intern ational standards on hydrogen explosion venting
mitigation sy stems. The HySEA project received f unding from the Fuel Cells and Hydrogen 2 Joint
Undertaking (FCH 2 JU) under grant agreemen t No 671461. The official project started on 1
September 2015 and ended on 30 Novem ber 2018. The members of the HySEA consortium were
Gexcon (coordinator), University of Warwick (UWAR) , University of Pisa (UNIPI), Fike Europe
(FIKE), Impetus Afea (IMPETUS) and Hefei Univ ersity of Technology (HFUT). The research
activities in the projec t included developm ent of em pirical and semi-empirical correlations, as w ell
as computational fluid dynam ics (CFD) and fini te element (FE) m odels, and verification and
validation of the various models against data fr om experim ents performed in 20-foot shipping
containers and smaller enclosures with industry-repr esentative obstacles. As foreseen in the project
proposal, the project resulted in a hi erarchy of predictive tools for th e safe design of venting devices
for hydrogen deflagrations. The HySEA project dem onstrated that explosion protection by venting
can be a valuable means of risk reduction for hydr ogen installations, isolated or in combination w ith
measures such as natural ventilation, forced ve ntilation, gas detection and inerting. Projectiles
generated during explosions in we ak enclosures represen t a signi ficant hazard, but adequately
designed venting devices can prevent rupture and fragmentation of contai ners, even for strong
hydrogen deflagrations. This paper reviews the resu lts from the HySEA project, including selected
research activities conduct ed after the official end date of the project. The discussion highlights some
of the practical implications of the pr oject and suggestions for further work.
Keywords: Vented hydrogen deflagrations, maximum reduced explosion pressure, structural
response, pre-normative resear ch, computational fluid dynam ics, empirical correlations
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1. Introduction
It is common practice in the i ndustry to install equipment for hydrogen energy applications in
containers and smaller enclosures. Fires and e xplosions represent a significant hazard for such
installations, and specific measures are generally re quired for reducing the risk to a tolerable level
(Hord, 1976; Strehlow, 1980; Dorofeev et al. , 1994; Cracknel et al. , 2002; Crowl & Jo, 2007; Rigas
& Amyotte, 2013; Skjold et al. , 2017a; Fuster et al. , 2017; S kjold et al. , 2018a; Moradi & Groth,
2019). Explosion venting is a frequently used m easure for mitigating the consequences of hydrogen
deflagrations in confined syst ems. This p aper summ arises the m ain results f rom the pro ject
“Improving hydrogen safety for energy applica tions through pre-normati ve research on vented
deflagrations” (HySEA). The HySEA project received f unding from the Fuel Cells and Hydrogen 2
Joint Undertaking (FCH 2 JU) under grant agreement No 671461. Fi g. 1 shows the logo for the
HySEA project.
Fig. 1. The logo for the HySEA project (www.hysea.eu).
The members of the HySEA consortium were Ge xcon (coordinator), Univ ersity of Warwick
(UWAR), University of Pisa ( UNIPI), Fike Europe (FIKE), Im petus Afea (IMPETUS) and Hefei
University of Technology (HFU T). The project started on 1 Septem ber 2015 and ended on 30
November 2018. The research activities were organised in five work packages (WPs):
WP1 Engineering models and standards
WP2 Experimental campaigns
WP3 Advanced modelling
WP4 Exploitation, dissemination and communication
WP5 Project managem ent
The overall goal of the HySEA project was to c onduct pre-normative research on vented hydrogen
deflagrations with an aim to provide recommenda tions for European and in ternational standards on
hydrogen explosion venting mitigatio n systems. Furt herm ore, the members of the HySEA consortium
developed and validated empirical and semi-empirical correlations, as well as computational fluid
dynamics (CFD) and finite elem ent (FE) models, and verified and validated se lected models against
data from experiments perform ed in containers a nd smaller enclosures with industry-representative
obstacles. Additional objectives of the HySEA project included:
To characterise different venting devices (i.e. co ntainer doors, plastic film and commercial vent
panels), including measurem ents of the structur al response of the wall s of the enclosures.
To broaden the participation in the project by in viting the scie ntific and indus trial co mmunity
engaged in hydrogen safety, and he nce a variety of modellers using different m odels, to participate
in blind-prediction benchmark studies based on full-scale experiments in vented enclosures.
To develop, verify and validate models, including CFD-based tools, for reliable predictions of the
reduced maxim um overpressure in vented hydrogen deflagrations.
To develop and validate empirical and FE-based tools for predicting the structural response of
enclosures during vented hydrogen deflagrations, and derive empi rical pressure-impulse (P-I )
diagrams for typical hydroge n energy applications.
To use the validated CFD models to explore vent ed hydrogen deflagrations in larger enclosures,
such as warehouses with fork lift trucks powered by hydrogen.
To formulate recommendations to the standa rdising comm i ttees for EN 14994 (Europe) and
NFPA 68 (USA), as well as recommendations for a harmonised intern ational standard on
hydrogen explosion vent ing mitigation system s.
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Fig. 7: Maximum explosion pressures for 30 vented de flagration tests in 20-foot containers
(Skjold, 2019) and predictions accordi ng to the UWAR model (Sinha & Wen, 2019) .
Fig. 8: Geometry models from FLACS for a) the bottle basket obstacle,
b) the pipe rack obstacle, and c) the high congestion (HC) geometry.
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Tab. 2. Total external surface area for the obstacle configurations in F ig. 8.
Obstacle Cylinders (m 2 ) Boxes (m 2 ) Total (m 2 )
Bottle basket 18.1 4.9 23.0
Pipe rack 4.8 9.6 14.4
High c ongestio n (HC ) 4.4 3.9 83.0
Unambiguous estimates for the relevant external su rface area of obstacles, or any other parameter
used for representing internal c ongestion, represent a sign ificant source of uncertainty in the semi-
empirical correlations for the reduced explosions pr essure in vented deflagrations. Other lim itations
include reliable prediction of the pressure impulse, as well as realistic rep resentation of the effect of
the static opening pressure P stat of the explosion venting device on the reduced explosion pressure
P red . The latter is particularly im porta nt for weak enclosures, such as buildings, ships and containers,
where even the loading resulting from the opening pr essu re of a commercial vent panel (typically 0.1
bar) may result in perm anent deformation. The UW AR m odel has not been validated for hydrogen
concentrations exceedin g about 25 vol.% in air, and there is significant uncertainty in the estimates
for concentrations exceeding this value in Fig. 7.
Fig. 9 shows examples of empirical pressure-im pulse ( P-I ) diagram s for 20-foot shipping containers,
where the damage criteria, i.e. the P-I curves, are based on specific le vels of permanent deformation,
as well as whether the containers were dam aged beyond repair (Skjold et al. , 2019a). The plot on the
left resembles a class ical P-I diagram for ideal blast waves (Fri edlander, 1946; Krauthammer, 2008;
Dewey, 2010), while the plot on the right illustrates typical P-I curves that account for the effect of
the finite rise time of the pressure loads (Baker et al. , 1983).
Fig. 9: Empirical pressure-impulse diagram s for 20-foot shipping containers.
From the point of view of vented deflagrations, 20-f oot ISO containers are rela tively weak structures,
and the structural response measurem ents reveal significant deflection of the container walls even for
relatively modest pressure loads. Hence, the volume of the enclos ures varied significantly during
some of the tests, especially th e more violent explosions. The vent panels opened simultaneously in
most of the tests with co mmercial panels. The main s tructure of the con tainer remained inta ct in all
tests, except from test 9 where the hinges br oke when the doors opened. One door bounced off the
gravel on the side of the container, hit the hi llside some 10 m above th e ground, and landed about 30
m from the container. This observation dem onstrates the hazard posed by projectiles and highlights
the importance of securing attached structural elem en ts such as doors, louvre panels and ventilators.
The experiments with 20-foot cont ainers included measurements of external blast pressures (Skjo ld
et al. , 2017c; Skjold, 2018b).
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The container doors do not represent prop er expl osion venting devices according to the European
standard (EN 14797, 2006). The containe rs walls ruptured in some of the tests that produced high
overpressures, e.g. test #9 in Fig. 5-7. The smoothi ng frequency used for processing the experimental
pressure-time curves influenced the results (Skjold, 2018ab; Skjold et al. , 2019d), but prim arily for
the maximum rate of pressure rise. The finite rise time of the pressu re lo ads and the high level of
plasticity of the corrugated plates in the walls a nd roof complicate the analysis of the structural
response (Baker et al. , 1983). Furthermore, it was not strai ghtforward to calculate unambiguous
values for pressure im pulse for tests with m ultiple pressure peaks.
Fig. 5-7 illustrates that the ma ximum reduced explosion pressure s increase cons istently with
increasing fuel concentration for all obstacle and vent configurations. This is reason able since most
tests involved lean mixtures, i.e. less than 30 vol.% hydrogen in air. Tests 34 (O) and 69 (P) with rich
mixtures (42 vol.% hydrogen) were included to explore near worst-case conditions for a modest
degree of congestion (P2). The maximum pressures in crease m ore rapidly for tests with internal
congestion, compared to the predictions by EN 14994 (2007). The results for tests 71 and 72
demonstrate the strong ef fect that higher levels of congestion (HC) can have on the m aximum reduced
explosion pressure, even for a modest increase in concentra tion (from 12 to 15 vol.%) for lean
hydrogen-air mixtures. Although no detonations were obser ved in any of the 66 tests, tests with more
reactive mixtures in th e HC geom etry would likely have resulted in deflagration-to-detonation-
transition (DDT).
Loss of containment of gaseous hydrogen in confined spaces will typically result in b uoyant releases
and stratified fuel-air clouds. The significantly higher overpressures obtained for stratified mixtures,
compared to lean homogeneous m ixtures with the same total m ass of fuel, imply that m odels for
vented hydrogen deflagrations should account for the effect of inhom ogeneous fuel-air clouds. The
second blind-prediction benchmark ex ercise in the HySEA project expl ored the predic tive capabilities
of consequence models for sim ulating vented de flagrations resulting fr om stratified hydrogen-air
mixtures ignited to def lagration in 20-foot ISO cont ainers (Skjold et al. , 2018b; Skjold et a l. , 2019b).
Although some of the results were encouraging, especially for the m odelling of release and dispersion
scenarios, there is significant room for improvin g the p redictive capabilitie s of both model systems
and modellers. For well-defined vented deflagration scenarios , the spread in the explosion pressures
predicted by different CFD tools covered two orders of m agnitude, and none of the predictions were
within a factor two of th e experimental values.
Large-scale experiments by HFUT
HFUT designed a test vessel with dimensions 12 .0 m × 2.5 m × 2.5 m, i.e. approximately the sam e
dimensions as a standard 40-foot ISO container (Rui et al. , 2020). The walls of the enclosure were
made from 25 mm steel plates, a nd 20 rectan gular vent panels could be fitted on the roof. To
accommodate tests with inhomogeneous m ixtures, 20 noz zles located near th e ceiling could b e used
for creating well-defined concentration gradients. The experimental setup allowed resea rchers to
study the effect of the internal layout (obstruction s) , structural response, and the effect of m itigating
measures. By July 2019, HFUT has com pleted 92 vent ed deflagration tests in the 40-foot enclosure:
47 tests vented through the opening at the e nd wall, covered by a thin plastic film
45 tests vented through openings in the roof, covered by a thin plastic film
HFUT has also completed 24 vented tests in the 20 -foot enclosure (half of the 40-foot enclosure):
12 tests vented through the opening at the end wall, covered by a thin plastic film
12 tests vented through openings in the roof, covered by a thin plastic film.
Fig. 10 shows selected frames from a test in the 40-foot enclosure, vented through the opening at the
end wall. The experimental m atrix included varia tion in parameters such as hydrogen concentration,
ignition locations, obstacles (tanks), and the number of vent openings on the roof.
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Fig. 10: Vented deflagration test in the 40-foot enclosure .
4. Advanced modelling – CFD and FE (WP3)
This section summarises the research ac tivities in W P3 of the HySEA project.
UWAR (Rao & Wen, 2017ab; Rao & Wen, 2019bcd) , in cooperation with HFUT (Wang & Wen,
2017), developed the in-house CFD solver HyFOAM, based on the open-source solver OpenFOAM.
HFUT developed and validated the CFD code Explosion FOAM, also within the OpenFOAM
framework (Wang & Wen, 2017).
Gexcon (Lakshmipathy et al. , 2017; Lakshmipathy et al. , 2019; Lucas et al. , 2019ab) developed the
CFD solver FLACS™, including the special versi on FLACS-Hydrogen for sim ulating dispersion and
explosion phenomena involving hydrogen. The two vers ions of FLACS-Hydrogen that were released
during the project period for the HySEA project focused on validation of the Flacs-2 solver and did
not include extensive changes to the model system . Lucas et al. (2019a) described th e changes to the
model system for the new CFD so lver developed during the HySEA project (Flacs-3). Fig. 11 shows
selected results f or both solvers for tw o experiments with stratified mixtures.
Fig. 11: Simulated and experimental pressure -time histories for tests 57 and
59 with stratified mixtures and commercia l vent panels (Lucas et al., 2019a).
The new Flacs-3 solver includes se veral fundamental changes (Lucas et al. , 2019a), including a new
two-equation Reynolds-averaged Navier Stokes (RANS) turbulence model (the kskL model), a new
correlation for turbulent burning veloc ity that includes the ef fect of th e stretch-rate Markstein number,
and a transport equation for flame folding. Gexcon and UWAR used the impr oved model system to
simulate vented hydrogen deflagra tions in larger enclosures. Fig. 11 shows the geometry model for a
hypothetical warehouse (Lucas et al ., 2019b).
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In connection with the first HySEA blind- prediction study, Gexcon and IMPETUS (Atanga et al. ,
2017; Atanga et al. , 2019) developed a methodology for one-w ay coupling between the CFD solver
FLACS and the Impetus Afea FE solver. The p rimary lim itation of this approach is the inherent
uncertainty in the prediction of the transient press u re loads on the walls of th e enclosure during vented
hydrogen deflagrations (Skjold et al. , 2017b; Skjold et al. , 2018; Skjold et al. , 2019bc).
Fig. 11: Hypothetical warehouse geometry (Lucas et al., 2019b) .
UWAR (Rao & Wen, 2017ab; Ra o & W en, 2019bcd) implem ented several model improvem ents in
HyFOAM during the HySEA project:
Flame wrinkling com puted from an algebrai c m odel or by solving a transport equation.
Lewis number effects for the turbulent burning velocity in lean hydrogen-air m ixtures.
An analytical expression for estim ating the eff ect of the Darrieu s–Landau and thermo-diffusive
instabilities on flame propagati on in lean hydrogen-air mixtures.
Rao & Wen (2018, 2019a) modelled the interaction between the pressure loads predicted by
HyFOAM and the structural response of the container walls computed by fluid-structure interactions
(FSI) for vented hydrogen deflagrations. To evaluate the dynamic displacem ent of the container walls
based on the peak overpressure insi de the container, a single d egr ee of freedom m odel approximated
the structural response obse rved in the experiments.
5. Exploitation, dissemination and communication (WP4)
This section summarises selected activ ities from WP4 of the HySEA project.
The HySEA project included extens ive activitie s related to dissem ination and communication of
results ‒ 33 of the 80 deliverables from the project addressed various aspects of dissemination. The
project website ( www.hysea.eu ) includes a comprehensive list of variou s dissem ination activitie s,
including publications and newsletters. The memb ers of the HySEA consor tium made significant
efforts to involve the intern ational research community on hydrogen safety, including active
interaction with the Internationa l Association f or Hydrogen Safety (IA HySafe) and International
Energy Agency (IEA) Hydrogen Task 37 on Hydr ogen Safety. UNIPI and Gexcon organised two
blind-prediction benchmark exerci ses during the project (Skjold et al. , 2017b; Skjold et al. , 2018;
Skjold et al. , 2019bc). Gexcon Software rel eased an updated version of the CFD tool FLACS for
hydrogen applications in 2017 (F LACS v10.7), and an updated beta version in 2018 (FLACS v10.8
beta). Through the cooperation with UNIPI, IM PETUS and Gexcon, Fike explored innovative
solutions for venting of hydrogen deflagrations in c ontainers and smaller enclosures. UWAR released
two versions of the HyFOAM software. HFUT us ed the network and competence acquired through
the participation in the HySEA consortium to acquire resear ch funding from the Chinese governm ent.
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The final dissemination workshop was organised in cooperation with the Fire and Blast Inform ation
Group (FABIG). Gexcon, UWAR and Air Liquide pres ented results from the HySEA project at the
FABIG technical meetings ‘Developments in Fire & Explosion Engineering towards a Hydrogen
Economy’ in Aberdeen on Wednesday 26 Septembe r and in L ondon on Thursday 27 September 2018.
The ultimate goal of the HySEA projec t was to provide recommendations f or a harmonised
international standard on vented hydrogen deflagrations, and thereby support safe and widespread
introduction of hydrogen as an energy carrier in industry and society. The call explicitly m entioned
the European standard EN 14994 (2007) on “Gas explosion venting protective systems” . To this end,
UWAR and Gexcon communicated relevant results to the European Comm ittee for Standardization
(CEN) Technical Committee 305 (T C305) Working Group 3 (WG3) ad -hoc group on gas explosions.
6. Project management (WP5)
This section summarises selected activ ities in WP5 of the HySEA project.
Gexcon organised the kick-off meeting for the HySEA project in Bergen on 14-16 Septem ber 2015.
The subsequent progress and advi sory board meetings were organi sed by FIKE (Her entals, Fe bruary
2016), Gexcon (Bergen, September 2016), UNIPI (Pis a, February 2017), Gexcon (Bergen, Septem ber
2017), Air Liquide (Paris, April 2018), HFUT (H efei, July 2018), and finally by Gexcon (London,
September 2018). Gexcon presented results from the HySEA project at the FCH 2 JU Programm e
Review Days in Brussels in 2016, 2017 and 2018.
7. Impact
The ultimate goal of the HySEA pr oject was to deliver amendm ents on vented hydrogen deflagrations
to the European standard EN 14994 “Gas explosion venting protective systems” and the American
standard NFPA 68 “Standard on explosion protec tion by deflagration venting” , as well as a potential
new international standard on “Hydrogen explosion venting mitigation systems” from the
International Organization for Sta ndardization (ISO). The relevant results f rom the HySEA project
were not available in tim e to be considered for the latest revision of NFPA 68 (2018). Furthermore,
there was no initiative within ISO for a common international standard on vented deflagrations.
Hence, the efforts towards RCS focused on EN 14994 (2007). As a result of th e constructive dialogue
and exchange of information between members of the HySEA consortium and the ad-hoc group on
gas explosions in CEN TC305 WG3, a version of the semi-em pirical model developed by UWAR
will likely be included as an appendix to the nex t revised version of EN 14994. As such, the HySEA
project achieved its prim ary objective, at least to the extent that m embers of the HySEA consortium
could influence the internal pro cesses of the relevant standardising committee during the projec t
period.
The HySEA project resulted in a hier archy of predictive tools for th e safe design of venting devices
for hydrogen deflagrations. UWAR developed a semi-empirical model for vented hydrogen
deflagrations (Sinha & Wen, 2019a b), and UWAR with support from HFUT developed an improved
version of the CFD solver HyFOAM (Rao & Wen, 2019abcd), Gexcon developed an improved
version of the commercially availa ble software product FLACS (Atanga et al. , 2019; Lakshmipathy
et al. , 2019; Lucas et al. , 2019ab), and IMPETUS validated the co mmercially available Im petus Afea
FE solver for structural response calculations in connection with hydrogen e xplosions in enclosures
(Atanga et a l. , 2019; Pini et al. , 2019; Skjold et al. , 2019c). Although the research activities in the
HySEA project resulted in im prove d models and m odel systems, it is necessary to improve the
predictive capabilities of conseque nce models for vented hydrogen defl agrations further. In particular,
there is a need for empirical and s emi-empirical models that can predict both the maximum pressure
and the impulse of vented hydrogen deflagrations, and at the sam e time acc ount for the effect of
internal congestion and the opening pre ssure of commercial vent panels.
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The experimental data generated in the HySEA project will be of va lue to end-users, as well as
modellers from industry and academ ia. Several mode llers and research groups participated in the
blind-prediction benchmark studies or ganised during the project (Skjold et al. , 2019bc), and the
results from the vented deflag ration experiments have been published extensively (Carcassi et al. ,
2018; Pini et al. , 2019; Schiavetti et al. , 2019; Skjold, 2019; Skjold et al. , 2019abcd). The outcome
of the blind-prediction studies is likely to increa se the awareness amongst developers and users of
consequence models for vented deflagrations concer ning the inherent limita tion and uncertainty of
the model predictions. In a longer pe rspective it is foreseen that th is awareness will result in m odel
improvements, includ ing m ore user-friendly interfaces, as well as updated docum entation and
guidelines, and possibly some kind of certification or appr oval of users of advanced model systems.
In principle, it should be possibl e to com plement the experimental results from the HySEA project
with data from CFD and FE sim ulations of vented deflagrations (Atanga et al. , 2019). However, the
results from the two blind-predic tion benchm ark studies conducted as part of the HySEA project
demonstrate that it is not straightforward to simulate vented hydrogen de flagrations in 20-foot
shipping containers with in ternal congestion (Skjold et al. , 2019ac). Combustion in stratified
hydrogen-air mixtures and vented deflagrations in weak enclos ures are inherently com plex
phenomena. The lam inar burning velocity of hydrogen- air mixtures is signifi cantly higher than for
most conventional and alternative fuels (Astbury, 2008; Konnov et al. , 2018), and various
hydrodynamic, thermo-diffusive and therm o-acoustic instabilities m ay influence the flame (Clavin &
Searby, 2016). To this end, it is nece ssary to further im prove the pred ictive capabilities of advanced
consequence models for vented hydr ogen deflagrations. It is particul arly im portant to improve the
modelling of flam e acceleration in highly congeste d g eom etries and to im plement models that
describe the opening of realistic explosion venting devices with sufficient accuracy.
Safe design of container-based in stallations for hydrogen energy appl ications should consider the
hazard of projectiles generated from vented deflag rations. As such, the experim ents with 20-foot
shipping containers on the HySEA project demonstrated that the container doors do not represent
suitable explosion venting devices (Skjold et al. , 2017c; Skjold et al. , 2019d). Properly installed and
certified explosion venting devices shall not represent a hazard (EN 14797, 2006), but it may be
necessary to secure structural elemen ts such as louvre panels and f ans for natural or f orced ventilation.
The experiments perform ed as part of the Hy SEA project did not resu lt in any DDT events.
Nevertheless, the possibility of DDT and detonati on should be accounted for in risk assessm ents for
systems with significant inventory of hydrogen and high degree of congestion. In general, it can be
difficult to rule out the possibility of detonations for large flamma ble clouds with more than 18-20
vol.% hydrogen in air if the initial and boundary conditions support sign ificant flame acceleration.
The results from the two HC scenarios in Fig. 5-7 demonstrate the extrem e e ffect internal congestion
can have on vented hydrogen deflagrations. In summ ary, it is not straightforward to elim inate the
possibility of DDT for industrial hydrogen systems th at include high levels of congestion inside the
enclosure, especially in the event of hi gh-pressure releases impinging on congestion.
The results from the blind-prediction benchm ark exercises in the HySEA project (Skjold et al . ,
2019bc) demonstrated severe limitati ons in the predictive capabilities of current state-of-the-art
consequence models for vented hydrogen deflagrations. At the sam e time, m odern hydrogen energy
applications represent emerging technologies w here there are limited statistic al data to support the
estimation of event frequencies. In light of the increasing awareness of the importance of reflecting
knowledge and lack of knowledge in the understa nding, assessment and m anagement of risk (Aven
& Kristensen, 2019), the inherent uncertainty in risk assessm ents for hydrogen systems should be
reflected in a conservative approach to both the location and the design/layout of new installations.
In this context it is importan t to keep in mind that th e criteria for tolerable o r acceptable risk for
hydrogen systems located in populated areas is typically two orders of magnitude lower than for
industrial facilities (Paté-Cornell, 1994). As such, robust, or resilient, design based on a credible
worst-case approach should be considered as an alternative to the classica l probabilistic approach.
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The HySEA project demonstrated th at explosion protection by venting can be a valuable addition to
other means of risk reduction for hydrogen installations, such as natural ven tilation, forced
ventilation, gas detection and inerting. Projectiles represent a signifi cant hazard, but adequately
designed venting devices can prevent rupture and fragmentation of contai ners, even for strong
hydrogen deflagrations. For a given mass of hydrogen, stratified mixt ures result in significantly
higher pressures, compared to lean hom ogeneous mixtures. Although it is not straightforward to
predict the maximum reduced explosion pressures in vented hydrogen deflagrati ons, a total vent area
of 8 m 2 on the roof have been show n to give reasona ble protection of 20-foot ISO containers with
limited internal congestion, even for highly reactive m ixtures (Skj old, 2019; Skjold et al. , 2019ad).
To this end, the results from the HySEA project have resulted in significant changes in the approach
to explosion protection in relevant industries.
Acknowledgements
The HySEA project received funding from the Fuel Cells and Hydrogen 2 Joint Undertaking (FCH 2
JU) under grant agreement No 671461. This Joint U ndertaking receives support from the European
Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme and Hydrogen Europe and Hydrogen
Europe Research. The members of the HySEA c onsortium gratefully acknowledge the valuable
contributions from the m embers of the HySEA Advi sory Board: Simon Jallais and Elena Vyazmina
from Air Liquide, Derek Miller from Air Produc ts and Carl Regis Bauwens from FM Global.
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T able 1 : Obstacle configurations of the test rig
Blockage ratio BR in % Spacing s in mm Obstructed part L obs in m Abbre viation
60 100 3.95 BR60S100L
300 3.95 BR60S300L 1
30 100 3.95 BR30S100L
300 3.95 BR30S300L
1 Results for this configuration are only mentioned briefly . A more detailed discussion can be found in Heilbronn et al.
(2019)
unit. Due to a pressure of 8 bar in the fuel supply system, the critical flo w condition in the nozzles
ensures a uniform fuel distrib ution along the explosion channel. The fuel is injected into the test rig
through 27 holes per section in the channel ceiling.
In order to prepare the channel for one shot, the channel is e v acuated to a specific sub-atmospheric
pressure at first. By opening the fuel v alv es for a set injection time, the channel is filled with the
H 2 /CO-mixture until ambient pressure is reached. The inflo wing gas is deflected at deflection plates
which are inte grated in the obstacles in the obstructed part or which are mounted at the ceiling in the
unobstructed of the channel, as sho wn in fig. 2. At the unobstructed part of the channel the deflection
plates induce a BR of about 2 %. Due to the deflection a stratified mixture is established after the
injection. Dif fusion allows the fuel to distrib ute ov er the channel height, mixing with air present in
the channel. Since only homogenous mixtures are in vestigated, the dif fusion time between the end of
injection and ignition is set to t D = 60 s. In vestig ations at a model of the test rig used by V ollmer et al.
(2010) sho wed that a uniform fuel distribution can be achie v ed by setting this dif fusion time. The fuel
content of the channel is measured based on the method of partial pressures by two static pressure
transducers of type SW A09 and WIKA S20. The mixture is ignited using a con ventional spark plug
centred at the end plate of the channel. The spark plug is operated for approximately 15 ms. After
each shot, the channel is flushed with air for 4 min.
t D
H 2 /CO-Mixture
Air
Obstacle
Deflection plate
H = 60 mm
F ig. 2 : Injection mechanism
In order to track the flame trajectory , 36 photodiodes are located in the ceiling of the explosion channel
as indicated by the red dots in fig. 3. The UV -sensiti v e diodes are of type Hamamatsu S1366-18BQ
and are mounted slightly abo v e the centreline. A quarz glass co ver protects each photo diode from
the flame, yielding an 10 ◦ angle of vie w . Kno wing the position and time of arri v al at each diode,
the trajectory of the flame is obtained. The mean flame v elocity u f between two diodes located at
positions x 1 and x 2 is e v aluated from the time of arri v al at each diode t 1 and t 2 :
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u f x 2 − x 1
2 =
∆ x
∆ t
=
x 2 − x 1
t 2 − t 1
(1)
The dynamic pressure is recorded by eight pressure transducers of type Kistler 601A as indicated
by the green squares in fig. 3. Sev en transducers are mounted in the ceiling of the channel, one is
mounted at the end plate. The faces of the transducers are co v ered by a thin layer of silicone in order
to protect the transducers from thermal shocks. The pressure and photo diode signals are recorded by
a data logging system operated at a sample rate of 225 kHz.
Pressure transducer Photo diode
Spark plug
x
F ig. 3 : Con ventional measur ement system
3 Results
In table 2 the desired fuel contents x F as well as the expansion ratios σ for fuel mixtures of 100/0,
75/25 and 50/50 H 2 /CO are listed. The expansion ratios for an adiabatic comb ustion are calculated
with Cantera (Goodwin et al. (2018)). The fuel content x F is gi ven in v ol . -% in air . The fuel injection
mechanism of the channel does not allo w to set an exact fuel content. A v ariance of ∆ x F = ± 0 . 5 v ol . -%
with re gards to the desired fuel content is accepted. The data presented in the follo wing section is
based on the a v erage of at least three e xperiments per fuel and fuel content.
T able 2 : Expansion ratios at the desir ed fuel contents
x F [v ol . -%] 15 17.5 20 22.5 25 27.5 30 35 40
σ 100 / 0 4.64 5.14 5.62 6.06 6.47 6.81 7.02 6.88 6.58
σ 75 / 25 4.73 5.24 5.72 6.16 6.55 6.85 7.02 6.93 6.62
σ 50 / 50 4.82 5.34 5.82 6.25 6.62 6.89 7.04 7.00 6.70
3.1 Relative terminal velocity
The relati ve terminal v elocity ˜ u term is e v aluated by a v eraging the v elocity at the unobstructed part
of the channel for each experiment. The av eraged velocity is normalized by the Chapman-Jouguet
v elocity D CJ for the gi ven fuel and fuel content calculated by the SD-T oolbox (Bro wne et al. (2008)).
The obtained relati ve terminal v elocities are a veraged re garding the fuel and desired fuel content.
The relati ve terminal v elocities ˜ u term plotted ag ainst the fuel content for BR30S100L are sho wn in
fig. 4. T w o re gimes are identified. F or ˜ u term ≈ 1 flames are found in the detonation re gime, while
flames at ˜ u term ≈ 0 . 6 are found in the fast flame re gime. F or BR30S100L all fuels at a fuel content of
x F = 15 vol . -% are found in the f ast flames re gime. If the fuel content is increased the 100/0 H 2 /CO
fuel transits to the detonation re gime at x F = 17 . 5 vol . -%, while fuels of 75/25 and 50/50 H 2 /CO are
still found in the fast flame re gime. If the fuel content is further increased all fuels are found in the
detonation re gime. As soon as the detonation regime is reached, ˜ u term is highgest for 100/0 H 2 /CO
with a slight decrease at the boundaries of the detonation re gime at x F = 17 . 5 and 30 vol . -%. In case
of 75/25 and 50/50 ˜ u term is lo wer than for 100/0 H 2 /CO. For x F ≤ 27 . 5 v ol . -% the highest terminal v e-
locities are found for 100/0 follo wed by 75/25 and 50/50 H 2 /CO. At a fuel content of x F ≥ 30 vol . -%
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transition from the detonation to the fast flame re gime is observ ed for 100/0, while 75/25 and 50/50
H 2 /CO-fuels remain in the detonation re gime. For x F = 40 v ol . -% only 50/50 H 2 /CO-fuels are found
in the detonation re gime. In this case ˜ u term is slightly belo w the unity .
The configuration BR30S100L is similar to the one used by V eser et al. (2002) with regard to blockage
ratio and spacing. As sho wn in fig. 4, ˜ u term for x F = 15 v ol . -% is similar for all fuels. This agrees well
with the findings of V eser et al. (2002). Both studies show similar velocities ( u ≈ 1400 m s − 1 ) in the
obstructed part. The e xperiments conducted by V eser et al. (2002) did not feature an unobstructed
section. T erminal velocities were found to be at u term ≈ 1150 m s − 1 for 100/0, u term ≈ 900 m s − 1 for
75/25 and u term ≈ 800 m s − 1 for 50/50 H 2 /CO. When leaving the obstructed part of the channel, the
v elocities in the present study are decreasing, leading to lo wer terminal velocities, which are in order
of the speed of sound of the products.
15 20 25 30 35 40
0
0 . 2
0 . 4
0 . 6
0 . 8
1
1 . 2
1 . 4
Fuel content x F in v ol.-%
Relati ve terminal v elocity ˜ u t er m
100/0 H 2 /CO
75/25 H 2 /CO
50/50 H 2 /CO
F ig. 4 : Relative terminal velocity ˜ u term over fuel content x F for BR30S100L
The relati ve terminal v elocities for BR30S300L are sho wn in fig. 5. Similar to BR30S100 the fast
flame and the detonation re gime can be distinguished. For 100/0 H 2 /CO ˜ u term is found in the f ast flame
re gime at x F =15 v ol . -%. The transition to the detonation regime is found at x F = 17 . 5 v ol . -%. In case
of 75/25 H 2 /CO the transition is less clear . For x F = 17 . 5 v ol . -% one out of four experiments is found
in the detonation re gime. For x F = 20 v ol . -%, three out of four e xperiments reached the detonation
re gime. For 50/50 H 2 /CO-fuels a clear transition is reached at a fuel content of x F = 22 . 5 v ol . -%. In
the detonation re gime 100/0 H 2 /CO sho ws the highest relati ve terminal v elocity with little v ariation
o v er the fuel content. The relati ve terminal v elocities for 75/25 are found similar to the ones obtained
for 100/0 H 2 /CO. In contrast 50/50 H 2 /CO sho w lower relati ve terminal v elocities in the detonation
re gime. In case of fuel rich mixtures, the transition to a fast flame is found between 35 vol . -% < x F <
40 vol . -% for 100/0 and 75/25 H 2 /CO. For 50/50 H 2 /CO ˜ u term is still found in the detonation re gime
for x F = 40 vol . -% .
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15 20 25 30 35 40
0
0 . 2
0 . 4
0 . 6
0 . 8
1
1 . 2
1 . 4
Fuel content x F in v ol.-%
Relati ve terminal v elocity ˜ u t er m
100/0 H 2 /CO
75/25 H 2 /CO
50/50 H 2 /CO
F ig. 5 : Relative terminal velocity ˜ u term over fuel content x F for BR30S300L
In fig. 6 the relati ve terminal v elocities ˜ u term for the configuration BR60S100L are sho wn. Compared
to BR30S100L and BR30S300L, ˜ u term remains significantly smaller than the Chapman-Jouguet ve-
locities for the gi ven mixtures. In case of BR60S100L, ˜ u term ranges from ˜ u term = 0 . 14 to 0 . 33. The
highest terminal v elocity is found at a fuel content of x F = 25 v ol . -%. A distincti v e influence of the
fuel as sho wn in fig. 4 and 5 is not displayed. When compared to the speed of sound of the products
a Pr , the results show , that almost all e xperiments are found in the fast flame re gime in the obstructed
part of the channel. In the unobstructed part the flame is found belo w a Pr . Hence, the flame is de-
celerating when entering the unobstructed part. This might be linked to reflected w av es from the end
plate. A similar beha viour was observ ed by V ollmer et al. (2011) at a similar obstacle configuration.
15 20 25 30 35 40
0
0 . 2
0 . 4
0 . 6
0 . 8
1
1 . 2
1 . 4
Fuel content x F in v ol.-%
Relati ve terminal v elocity ˜ u t er m
100/0 H 2 /CO
75/25 H 2 /CO
50/50 H 2 /CO
F ig. 6 : Relative terminal velocity ˜ u term over fuel content x F for BR60S100L
3.2 Dynamic pr essur e
Fig. 7 sho ws the maximum dynamic pressure p max for the configuration BR30S100L. The a v er -
age peak pressure for all in v estigated fuel contents is found at ¯ p max = 28 . 16 bar for 100/0, ¯ p max =
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24 . 78 bar for 75/25 and ¯ p max = 26 . 95 bar for 50/50 H 2 /CO. The lo west dynamic pressure is found
at x F = 15 vol . -% for 75/25 H 2 /CO. As the fuel content is increased the peak dynamic pressure in-
creases. When increasing the fuel content to x F = 17 . 5 v ol . -%, the peak pressure for 100/0 H 2 /CO
almost doubles, while the increase for 75/25 and 50/50 H 2 /CO is small. For 75/25 and 50/50 a similar
beha viour is obtained when the fuel content is increased to 20 v ol . -%. The sharp increase in p max
matches well with the transition from fast flames to detonations as described in 3.1. The peak pres-
sure further increases with increasing fuel content. The highest pressure is found at p max = 49 . 46 bar
at x F = 27 . 5 vol . -% for 100/0 H 2 /CO. If the fuel content is further increased the peak pressure de-
creases. Again the transition from detonation to fast flames agress well with the decrease in the peak
pressure. While 75/25 and 50/50 H 2 /CO are still found in the detonation regime at x F = 35 v ol . -%,
100/0 H 2 /CO is in the fast flame re gime. This results in a lo wer dynamic pressure for 100/0 when
compared to 75/25 and 50/50 H 2 /CO. For x F = 40 v ol . -% a similar beha viour is observ ed for 75/25
and 50/50 H 2 /CO.
15 20 25 30 35 40
0
10
20
30
40
50
Fuel content x F in v ol.-%
Maximal pressure p max in bar
100/0 H 2 /CO
75/25 H 2 /CO
50/50 H 2 /CO
F ig. 7 : Maximum dynamic pr essur e p max over fuel content x F for BR30S100L
In fig. 8 the maximum dynamic pressure p max for the configuration BR30S300L is plotted against
the fuel content x F . The a v erage pressure is ¯ p max = 24 . 66 bar for 100/0, ¯ p max = 24 . 17 bar for 75/25
and ¯ p max = 25 . 10 bar for 50/50 H 2 /CO slightly belo w the mean pressures obtained for BR30S100L.
The lo west pressure is obtained for 75/25 H 2 /CO at x F = 15 v ol . -% at p max = 10 . 90 bar. The peak
pressure increases as the fuel content is increased. A high increase is observ ed between x F = 15 vol . -%
and x F = 17 . 5 vol . -% for 100/0 and 75/25, which might be related to the transition from fast flames
to detonations in one of the e xperiments leading to a strong increase in peak pressure. A similar
beha viour is obtained at x F = 20 v ol . -% as the experiments with detona tion increase the peak pressure.
W ithin the detonation regime an increase in fuel content leads to an continuous rise in peak pressure.
Compared to BR30S100L the increase in peak pressure is smaller . The highest peak pressure is found
at a fuel content of x F = 35 vol . -% for 50/50 H 2 /CO. Although all fuels are found at the detonation
re gime at x F = 35 vol . -% (see fig. 5), the peak pressure for 75/25 and 50/50 H 2 /CO is increased
when compared to x F = 30 vol . -%. A similar increase in pressure was observ ed at the configuration
BR60S300L at which a significant increase in dynamic pressure was obtained at x F = 35 v ol . -% for
50/50 H 2 /CO. In this case 50/50 H 2 /COwas the only fuel found at the detonation re gime for x F =
35 vol . -% (Heilbronn et al. (2019)), while for BR30S300L 75/25 H 2 /CO is found in the detonation
re gime too.
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15 20 25 30 35 40
0
10
20
30
40
50
Fuel content x F in v ol.-%
Maximal pressure p max in bar
100/0 H 2 /CO
75/25 H 2 /CO
50/50 H 2 /CO
F ig. 8 : Maximum dynamic pr essur e p max over fuel content x F for BR30S300L
In fig. 9 the maximum dynamic pressure for the configuration BR60S100L is displayed. The av erage
pressure is ¯ p max = 10 . 17 bar for 100/0, ¯ p max = 10 . 06 bar for 75/25 and ¯ p max = 10 . 38 bar for 50/50
H 2 /CO. The lo west peak pressure is found at x F = 15 vol . -% for 100/0 H 2 /CO. When increasing
the fuel content a slight increase in the peak pressure is found. The maximum peak pressure is
obtained at x F = 25 vol . -% for 75/25 H 2 /CO at p max = 12 . 15 bar. Although the flames are found in
the fast flame re gime at short run-up distances, DDT was not observ ed in this configuration (see sec.
3.1). This might be related to the detonation cell width. Due to the high blockage ratio and the lo w
spacing, no detonations are obtained within the obstructed part of the channel. Hence the pressures
obtained at BR60S100L are mainly the result of F A and therefore lo wer compared to BR30S100L
and BR30S300L.
15 20 25 30 35 40
0
10
20
30
40
50
Fuel content x F in v ol.-%
Maximal pressure p max in bar
100/0 H 2 /CO
75/25 H 2 /CO
50/50 H 2 /CO
F ig. 9 : Maximum dynamic pr essur e p max over fuel content x F for BR60S100L
3.3 Run-up distance
Since reaching the speed of sound of the isobaric comb ustion products a pr is one of the critical condi-
tions for DDT , the run-up distance is a k ey parameter for safety applications (Ciccarelli & Dorofee v
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(2008)). Fig. 10 displays the run-up distance for the BR30S100L configuration. The mean run-up
distance is ¯ x a pr = 1 . 00 m for 100/0, ¯ x a pr = 1 . 20 m for 75/25 and ¯ x a pr = 1 . 18 m for 50/50 H 2 /CO. For
v ery lean mixtures of x F = 15-17 . 5 vol . -% the run-up distance for 75/25 and 50/50 fuels is shorter than
for 100/0 H 2 /CO. This trend is rev ersed as soon as a fuel content of x F = 20 v ol . -% is reached. W ithin
the range of x F = 20-27 . 5 vol . -% the run-up distances of 75/25 and 50/50 H 2 /CO are v ery similar and
about 0 . 4 m longer than for 100/0 H 2 /CO. For fuel rich mixtures another beha viour is observed. While
for x F = 30-35 vol . -% all fuels beha ve quite similar , the gap between the run-up distance increases at
40 vol . -%. When compared to the results obtained by V eser et al. (2002), a shorter run-up distance is
obtained. While V eser found a run-up distance of x a pr ≈ 1 . 5 m for 100/0, 2 m for 75/25 and 2 . 6 m for
50/50 H 2 /CO the run-up distances for the GraV ent configuration are shorter . This might be related to
a slightly dif ferent geometry . The tube used by V eser used orifice plates of BR = 30 %. In contrast, the
obstacles in the GraV ent configuration allow the flame to transit through the obstructed part through
the whole channel width.
15 20 25 30 35 40
0
0 . 5
1
1 . 5
2
2 . 5
3
3 . 5
Fuel content x F in v ol.-%
Run-up distance x a pr in m
100/0 H 2 /CO
75/25 H 2 /CO
50/50 H 2 /CO
F ig. 10 : Run-up distance x a pr to speed of sound of the pr oducts a Pr over fuel content x F for BR30S100L
The run-up distance for BR30S300L is sho wn in fig 11. The mean run-up distance is ¯ x a pr = 1 . 42 m for
100/0, ¯ x a pr = 1 . 30 m for 75/25 and ¯ x a pr = 1 . 38 m for 50/50 H 2 /CO. Similar to BR30S100L a shorter
run-up distance compared to 100/0 is found for x F = 15 v ol . -% for 75/25 and 50/50 H 2 /CO. The run-
up distance for 75/25 and 50/50 H 2 /COincreases significantly if the fuel content is increased to x F =
17 . 5 vol . -%. F or 100/0 H 2 /COthe run-up distance in a range of x F = 15-30 vol . -% sho w only v ery little
v ariation. A similar trend can be observ ed for 75/25 and 50/50 in an range of x F = 22 . 5-27 . 5 vol . -%.
In the fuel rich range of x F = 30-35 vol . -% an increase in the run-up distance is observ ed. This trend
is re versed when the fuel content is further increased to x F = 40 v ol . -%. In total the run-up distance
for BR30S300L is slightly longer than for BR30S100L, which might be related to less turbulence due
to fe wer obstacles. The influence of the fuel is less clear .
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15 20 25 30 35 40
0
0 . 5
1
1 . 5
2
2 . 5
3
3 . 5
Fuel content x F in v ol.-%
Run-up distance x a pr in m
100/0 H 2 /CO
75/25 H 2 /CO
50/50 H 2 /CO
F ig. 11 : Run-up distance x a pr to speed of sound of the pr oducts a Pr over fuel content x F for BR30S300L
Fig 12 displays the run-up distance for BR60S100L. The mean run-up distance is ¯ x a pr = 0 . 80 m for
100/0, ¯ x a pr = 0 . 73 m for 75/25 and ¯ x a pr = 0 . 78 m for 50/50 H 2 /CO. At x F = 15 v ol . -% the shortest
run-up distance is found for 100/0 H 2 /CO at x a pr = 0 . 41 m. When the fuel content is increased the
run-up distance for 100/0 increases to x a pr = 0 . 90 m at x F = 27 . 5 v ol . -%. In fuel rich mixtures x a pr
slightly decreases before increasing sharply at x F = 40 vol . -%. A similar trend is observed at 75/25
H 2 /CO. The slope of the run-up distance ov er the fuel content seems to be slightly shifted to higher
fuel contents as the local maximum of the run-up distance is observed at x F = 30 v ol . -%. In contrast
to 100/0 a short run-up distance is found at x F = 40 vol . -%.
15 20 25 30 35 40
0
0 . 5
1
1 . 5
2
2 . 5
3
3 . 5
Fuel content x F in v ol.-%
Run-up distance x a pr in m
100/0 H 2 /CO
75/25 H 2 /CO
50/50 H 2 /CO
F ig. 12 : Run-up distance x a pr to speed of sound of the pr oducts a Pr over fuel content x F for BR60S100L
F or 50/50 the slope of the run-up distance is dif ferent than for 100/0 and 75/25 H 2 /CO. A local min-
imum is observ ed at x F = 17 . 5 vol . -%. If the fuel content is increased, a marginal increase in x a pr is
observ ed. In the range between x F = 17 . 5-27 . 5 vol . -%, 50/50 H 2 /CO-fuels ha v e the shortest run-up
distances for the in vestigated fuels. A sharp increase is observ ed at x F = 30 vol . -%. By further increas-
ing the fuel content, x a pr decreases and is shorter than for 100/0 H 2 /CO at x F = 40 v ol . -%. Compared
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to BR30S100L and BR30S300L the run-up distances at BR60S100L are the shortest, due to the high
blockage ratio and the lo w spacing.
In general the trends of the run-up distance are dif ferent between the in vestig ated fuels. This is true
especially for v ery lean mixtures of x F = 15-17 . 5 vol . -% at which 75/25 and 50/50 sho w shorter run-
up distances than 100/0 H 2 /CO. This can not directly be explained by thermodynamic properties of
the mixtures. The Le wis-Numbers are well belo w unity for all in vestigated fuels at lean fuel con-
tents. Hence thermo-dif fusi ve instabilities, which lead to a higher inte gral fuel consumption should
be present in all lean mixtures (Katzy et al., 2017). Furthermore, the total energy content as well as
the e xpansion ratios σ are similar for each fuel at a gi ven fuel content (compare table 2). Hence,
the dif ferent behaviour might be link ed to flow phenomena induced by the higher momentum of jets
passing through obstacles in CO containing fuels.
4 Conclusion and Outlook
Results of e xperimental studies on F A and DDT in homogenous H 2 -CO-air mixtures in a partially ob-
structed channel ha v e been presented. Three different obstacle configurations ha ve been in v estigated:
a lo w obstruction (30 %) at a small (100 mm) and lar ge spacing (300 mm), a high obstruction (60 %)
at a small spacing in addition to the high obstruction and lar ge spacing which was published in Heil-
bronn et al. (2019). Each obstacle configuration featured a 3 . 95 m long obstructed and a 2 . 05 m long
unobstructed section in a rectangular e xplosion channel. The fuel was v aried between 100/0, 75/25
and 50/50 H 2 /CO. The fuel content was v aried from x F =15-40 v ol . -% in air . The experiments were
analysed with re gard to terminal v elocity , peak pressure and run-up distance to the speed of sound of
the products.
Whether detonations occur depends on the obstacle configuration, the fuel and the fuel content in air .
F or high obstruction and small spacing, detonations are not observed. For a lo wer obstruction detona-
tions occur at slightly leaner conditions at 100/0 compared to 75/25 and 50/50 H 2 /CO. A similar trend
is observ ed at a less frequently obstructed geometry . A significant change in the detonation limits is
found in fuel rich mixtures. In lo w obstructed obstacle configurations fuels of 75/25 and 50/50 are
found in the detonation regime, while 100/0 H 2 /CO remain in the fast flame re gime. This supports the
findings in Heilbronn et al. (2019), sho wing that H 2 /CO-fuels show a dif ferent behaviour than 100/0
H 2 /CO in fuel rich mixtures. In addition to V eser et al. (2002) it can be concluded that CO addition
can ha v e an impact in fuel rich mixtures.
The highest peak pressures are found at a lo w obstruction and a small spacing. For rich fuel mixtures,
peak pressures of 75/25 and 50/50 H 2 /COin lo w obstructed configurations are higher than the ones
observ ed for the same fuel contents of 100/0 H 2 /CO, hence leading to a higher potential damage. On
a v erage, peak pressures at lo w obstructions are slightly lo wer for a lar ger spacing. Since DDT was
not observ ed a high obstruction and a small spacing, the measured peak pressures are very similar for
all fuels and contents. Compared to a lo wer obstruction, the peak pressures are found to be lo wer .
The longest run-up distances to the speed of sound of the products were found at a lo w obstruction
and a lar ge spacing. In this case, all fuels sho wed a similar run-up distance. For a smaller spacing,
run-up distances for 75/25 and 50/50 were slightly shorter than for 100/0 H 2 /CO. The shortest run-up
distances were found for a high obstruction and a small spacing. The influence of the CO-content
in the fuel on the run-up distance could not be identified by the measurement systems used for the
present study . Hence are more detailed in vestigation of the early stages of flame propag ation using
shado wgraphy and OH-PLIF will be used in order to gain further insights.
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Acknowledgements
This project is funded by the German Federal Ministry of Economics and T echnology (BMW i) on the
basis of a decision by the German Bundestag (project no. 1504545A) which is gratefully acknowl-
edged.
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Independent whether the flame under goes DDT or remains in the chocked flame re gime, the flame
accelerates to the maximum v elocity possible in a deflagrati ve comb ustion, i.e. Chapman-Jouguet
condition behind the flame. The flame tip velocity in this state is close to the speed of sound in the
comb ustion products a pr (Lee, 2008). The run-up distance to the speed of sound in the products x a pr
is characteristic for the flame acceleration phase (Ciccarelli and Dorofee v, 2008). It also represents
the intensity of acceleration and, hence, gi ves an idea of the DDT probability . If the distance is
shorter , w a ves are emitted from the flame at a higher rate and stronger accumulated pressure wa ves
e volv e leading to an earlier onset of detonation. While flame trajectory results hav e been reported
pre viously for the GraV ent test rig (Barfuss et al., 2019), here, the influence of v arying blockage
ratios and spacings shall be easily apparent. Therefore, the characteristic x a pr is used for comparison
of numerical and e xperimental results.
In table 3 the run-up distances of the dif ferent quenching limit treatments are listed together with
e xperimental findings from the GraV ent e xperiments. Additionally , a relati v e de viation of the two
approaches, dimensional term and interpolation table, is presented. The de viation is normalized by
the the e xperimental v alue.
T able 3 : Simulated run-up distances x a pr of dif fer ent strain limit tr eatments and experimental values
for 22.5 vol.-% fuel in air .
T est rig
configuration
Dimensional
term
Interpolation
table
Quenching
neglected
Rel. deviation
g cr , Dim − g cr , 1D
Experiment
BR60S100L 1.012 0.9319 0.9297 10.73 % 0.7464
BR60S300L 1.133 0.9523 0.9523 17.82 % 1.0139
BR30S100L 1.252 1.2510 1,2510 0.08 % 1.3215
BR30S300L 1.280 1.3430 1.3700 4.62 % 1.3645
The e xperimental results in table 3 are a v eraged v alues of three repetitions with the same experimen-
tal setup (Heilbronn et al., 2020). All numerical results remain within the confidence range of the
e xperimental findings. The run-up distances obtained with the interpolation table approach and with
ne glected quenching are almost identical for all obstacle configurations. This suggests that flame
stretch limits from 1D simulations are almost ne ver reached. This is due to the much coarser grid in
the RANS based simulations in comparison to the DNS simulation of figure 3. In contrast, suf ficient
strain e xists for the smaller limit from the dimensional quenching term resulting in a generally fur -
ther do wnstream position to reach a pr . As an exception, the flame tip velocity in the configuration
BR30S300L rises abo v e a pr in the jet passing an obstacle, but drops noticeable belo w a pr during the ex-
pansion after the obstacle. Hence, a Chapman-Jouguet deflagration has not been reached sustainably
and further acceleration due to increasing heat release is still possible.
Results from v arying quenching limit approaches differ most at lar ge blockage ratios. V ariation of
obstacle spacing has a smaller impact on the contrib ution of quenching in comparison to blockage
ratio v ariations. Since numerical results without quenching or with interpolation tables better match
the e xperiments, it is concluded, that flame quenching can be neglected in small scale geometries.
Due to the greater de viation from experiments, the e v aluation of g cr with the dimensional term is not
considered suitable for accelerating H 2 -CO-air flames with a Le wis number less than unity . The ac-
celerating and, hence, stabilizing ef fects on a flame by a Le wis number less than unity are not captured
suf ficiently by the v ariables of the dimensional approach (Poinsot and V eynante, 2005). In contrast
the interpolation table approach can be used, in order to maintain a threshold of maximum turb ulence
intensity leading to quenching, which is almost ne ver reached in the RANS based simulations in ves-
tigated in this study . Application of ef ficienc y functions correcting for the spectrum contrib uting to
flame stretch do not appear to be useful, because in general coarse meshes are used in safety analysis
in vestigations (Mene v eau and Poinsot, 1991).
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2.2.2 Impact of geometry dimensions
Realistic accident scenarios often happen on much lar ger geometrical dimensions than the GraV ent
test rig. The impact of quenching has to be in v estigated on medium-scale or lar ge-scale geometries
also. Therefore, the GraV ent configuration BR60S100L has been scaled-up by the factor ten in its
geometrical dimensions with respect to the cross section. The dimensional scale-up is denoted with
the abbre viation BR60S1000 in the follo wing. The length of the channel is 9 m and the obstructed
section at 5.5 m. Hence, the number of obstacles reduces to 6. Simulations with the two quenching
limit treatments, the dimensional term approach and the interpolation table, ha ve been conducted
with the same gas mixture of 22.5 v ol.-% fuel in air (75/25 H 2 /CO). The initial mesh of the scale-up
consists of cubic cells with a cell size of ∆ x cell = 40 mm. This roughly relates to the initial mesh of
the small-scale GraV ent in vestigation after adapti ve mesh refinement is applied twice.
T able 4 presents the e v aluated run-up distances x a pr . In Case BR60S1000 , both simulations e xpe-
rienced a subsequent DDT after reaching a pr . Because there is no experimental v erification in the
scale-up geometry , only the relati ve deri v ation can be discussed. The de viation is normalized here
with the run-up distance obtained from the interpolation table approach.
T able 4 : Run-up distances x a pr in the generic Gr aV ent BR60S1000 scale-up.
T est rig configuration Dimensional term Interpolation table Relativ e deviation
BR60S100L 1.012 0.932 8.69 %
BR60S1000 4.055 4.005 1.25 %
The relati ve de viation is se ven times smaller in the scale-up than in the original configuration. The
smaller de viation in comparison to the original GraV ent experiment can be e xplained by the lar ger
a v eraged cell size relating to lo wer strain rates. Because turbulence does not scale linearly with the
geometrical dimension, it can be assumed that volumes of unb urned gas behind obstacles isolated
by potential shear layers do not scale linearly either . According to this assumption, the impact of
quenching on the flame trajectory decreases in lar ger geometries. The smaller de viation between the
two stretch limit treatments in the scale-up is proof of that beha vior . Strain rates from both modeling
approaches are not high enough to result in significant flame quenching here.
3 Conclusions
In this study , the presence of local flame extinction by flame stretch has been presented for H 2 -CO-air
mixtures under going flame acceleration to fast flames. DNS simulations hav e been carried out for
22.5 v ol.-% H 2 in air as well as for 75/25 v ol.-% H 2 /CO in air . The simulation results sho w ho w
v ortices, shedding from the obstacle edges, stretch the flame and separate sections of the flame from
the b ulk flame. The strain rate gro ws in smaller vortices leading to strong stretching of the flame.
Locally the flame’ s reacti vity is reduced or it e ven e xtinguishes. Starting from flame tip velocities of
300 m/s, first vortices were observ ed, which ef ficiently quench the flame. W ith increasing velocities
the intensity of said v ortices is assumed to gro w . Furthermore, in CO containing fuels the momentum
of the jet passing the same obstacles is higher than in pure H 2 fuels. The increased momentum allo ws
for equally strong strain as in H 2 fuels at lo wer flame tip velocity . As a consequence, the observ ed
impingement depth of v ortices shedding from the rear edge of the obstacle is larger in comparison to
pure H 2 fuel. The ef fect of isolating a fresh gas in a pocket behind obstacles is therefore stronger in
CO containing fuel.
F or the purpose of an application oriented modeling approach for safety analysis, three dif ferent
approaches for e v aluating critical stretch rates are in vestigated in an RANS based compressible CFD
solv er . The CFD solv er has already been v alidated for subsequent F A and DDT of H 2 -CO-air mixtures
in one geometry configuration (Barfuss et al., 2019). A variation of obstacle spacing and blockage ra-
tio allo ws for a more general statement on the necessity to consider quenching in ef ficient comb ustion
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modeling approaches.
Simulated run-up distances to the speed of sound in the comb ustion products hav e been compared
with e xperiments. Simulations neglecting quenching sho w better agreement than simulations with
Zimont’ s dimensional term for the flame stretch limit. While run-up distances of the different g cr
approaches significantly de viate in small-scale geometries with high blockage ratios, the differences
become irrele v ant on medium to lar ge-scale geometries. Therefore, the combustion phenomenon
of partial flame quenching does not need to be taken into account in TFC comb ustion models for
accelerating H 2 -CO-air flames in obstructed channels. Even though it can be ne glected, the authors
suggest to still apply a quenching term to maintain an upper limit of turb ulent intensity as DNS data
has sho wn general presence of partial quenching. A good practice for H 2 -CO-air flames appears to
be using strain rate limits of flame extinction from 1D counter -flo w flame simulations with detailed
chemistry , which take the increasing pressure of transient flame acceleration into account.
Acknowledgements
The presented work is funded by the German Federal Ministry of Economic Af fairs and Ener gy
(BMW i) on the basis of a decision by the German Bundestag (project no 1501545A) which is grate-
fully ackno wledged.
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Obser vations of DDT in narr o w channels
Yv es Ballossier , Josué Melguizo-Gavilanes & Florent V irot
Institut Pprime, UPR 3346 CNRS, ISAE–ENSMA, Futuroscope Chasseneuil, France
E-mail: [email protected]
Abstract
Experiments are conducted in a smooth 10 × 10 mm square cross-section, 1-m long channel, closed at
the ignition end and open at the other end. Simultaneous two-direction schlieren visualization is used
to in vestigate the three-dimensional dynamics of transition to detonation for a stoichiometric H 2 -O 2
mixture. Results sho w the e xistence of two distinct structures before detonation onset: (i) asymmetric,
composed of an oblique shock trailed by a flame, that runs preferentially along the wall, and seems
to get ignited inside the boundary layer de veloped by the precursor shock; (ii) symmetric, referred
to as str ange wave in literature, propagating at the speed of sound in comb ustion products. The
combined ef fect of shock induced preheating and viscous heating near walls seem to be responsible
for the formation of the complex flame-shock interactions observ ed. Furthermore, simultaneous two-
direction optical access allo ws to map the exact location of detonation onset, sho wing that 78 % of
cases e xploded in corners, highlighting the role of corner flows and boundary layers in transition to
detonation at this scale.
K eywords: DDT , narr ow smooth channels, hydr o gen safety , flow visualization, strang e wave
1 Intr oduction
T o comply with international agreements limiting CO 2 emissions, dif ferent solutions hav e been pro-
posed to reduce the share of fossil fuels in electricity generation and transportation (Masson-Delmotte
et al., 2018). The increased used of rene wable (e.g. wind, solar) requires efficient/lasting storage so-
lutions due to its intermittent nature. Among them battery banks or electrolyzers to produce hydrogen
(H 2 ). H 2 has the potential to be a ke y player in enabling a sustainable ener gy transition. Its widespread
use in transportation, for instance, poses risks due to leaks in refueling stations for vehicles (such as
the recent accident in Sandvika, Norway) or in fuel cell/battery enclosures that can lead to strong
e xplosions via deflagration-to-detonation transition (DDT). Note that the typical gaps in these com-
partments are of the order of millimeters, therefore understanding of DDT at this scale is needed to
mitigate the aforementioned hazards through impro v ed, research-based design.
T o wards that goal, in general, we focus on a canonical configuration, namely a 1-m long, optically
accessible, square cross-section channel (10 mm × 10 mm) to study all stages of DDT : from ignition,
flame propagation and acceleration, to transition to detonation. Ho we v er , here, we are only interested
in characterizing the dynamics before and during detonation onset (i.e. formation of flame-shock
comple x es) and re vealing their three dimensional structure. Studying this stage is essential to under -
stand ho w to promote/mitigate DDT in narro w channels. Pre vious numerical and experimental work
on flame-shock interaction by (Khokhlo v et al., 1999, Thomas et al., 2001) ha v e identified interesting
structures that lead to DDT ; Y anez and Kuznetso v (2016) also observed similar structures b ut using
narro w channels in which very wrinkled funnel-shape flames trail behind planar shocks. These quasi-
steady flame-shock comple xes propag ate at speeds of the order of the speed of sound in comb ustion
products; the authors called this re gime str ange wave .
In the present work, tw o channels are used to study the formation of strange w a ves. They allo w one-
and two-direction simultaneous schlieren visualization, respecti v ely .
13 t h International Symposium on Hazar ds, Pr evention and Mitigation of Industrial Explosions
Braunsc hweig, GERMANY - J uly 27-31, 2020
ISHPMIE 2020
Braunschweig, Germany
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2 Experiments
2.1 Apparatus and pr ocedur e
The e xperimental apparatus was designed to allo w fle xibility re garding optical access. Its total length
is 1030 mm; 91 % of which is optically accessible. T o switch from one-direction (1-D V) to two-
direction visualization (2-D V) only the center piece of the channel needs being interchanged (see
cross sectionals vie w in Fig. 1). In both configurations, 15-mm thick polycarbonate plates are used as
windo ws. Aluminum flanges on top and bottom a v oid bending of the polycarbonate during detonation
propagation. For the tw o direction configuration, spacers pre vent bending on the sides (one of them is
visible in Fig. 8 bottom vie w). None of the tests performed sho wed signs of deformation. Structural
inte grity is ensured with bolts scre wed on the aluminum in a "sandwich" configuration.
The e xperiments were conducted as follo ws: (i) the channel was v acuumed to an absolute pressure
belo w 1 mbar (controlled by a MKS 220D A pressure sensor); (ii) a plastic cap, held on a serv o motor’ s
arm, sealed the open end of the channel; (iii) subsequently , the reacti v e mixture (stoichiometric H 2 -
O 2 ) was fed into the channel until it reached atmospheric pressure. (i v) At this point, the plastic cap
was automatically remo ved by the serv o motor; one second later the mixture is ignited ( E ign < 1 mJ) at
the closed end by the electric arc that forms between the electrodes. This procedure ensured adequate
control of the mixture composition ( Φ = 1 ± 0 . 01). The waiting time between filling and ignition w as
also carefully controlled; 15 s were found suf ficient to a void an y impact of initial flo w unsteadiness
on early stages of flame propagation. After each test, the channel was v acuumed for a fe w minutes to
remo v e visible condensation from b urned gases.
Closed end (igniti on) Open end
10 mm
10 mm
10 mm
10 mm
Aluminum fl anges
Electrodes sup port
Center piece aluminum part
Polycarbonate optical access
F ig. 1 : Schematic of narr ow channel (top) and cr oss-sections for 1-D V (bottom left) and 2-D V (bottom
right). Red squar es indicate ef fective section of the c hannel; white spaces optically accessible .
2.2 Flow visualization
Schlieren visualization (SV) is performed on both channels. T wo sets of cameras were used:
(i) T w o black and white Photron F ASTCAM SA-Z set at 140k frame per second (fps) (158 ns e xpo-
sure), together with (248 ns exposure) for 2-D V ; (ii) Shimadzu HPVX camera, with acquisition rates
of 1 million (500 ns e xposure) to 10 million fps (100 ns e xposure), together with a Shimadzu HPV2
camera set at 1 million fps (500 ns e xposure) for 2-D V .
Dif ferent light sources were utilized, two 100-mm diameter collimated LED, and a mercury light,
coupled with a collimating mirror also of 100 mm in diameter . While the collimated LED of fers
compactness, the use of a mercury light pro vides a smaller focal point that results in a lar ger range
of observ able gradients (the side vie w in Fig. 8 is the only case using the latter). For the remaining
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cases sho wn, the collimated LED set-up is used with a razor blade occulting 50 % of the light to
highlight gradients in the direction of flame propagation. Our schlieren set-up allo ws to visualize a
section up to 100 mm; 2-D V is performed on the same section when done simultaneously . Figure 2
sho ws a simplified schematic of the global optical set-up. T o trigger high speed camera(s), a BPW34
photo-diode, placed before the section of interest detects the arri v al of the flame.
Collimated whit e LED/ Mercury li ght
Lens
Filter
45 ° mirror
Side view
Bottom view Channel
F ig. 2 : Schematic of global optical set-up for one- and two-dir ection visualisation.
3 Results and discussion
F or the sake of clarity in the presentation of the results that follo w , Fig. 3 presents a schematic of
the visualization orientations. Note that “Bottom” and “Side” faces refers to the relati ve position of
the cameras; the actual position of the bottom face along the z − axis (or side face along y − axis) is
arbitrary , as SV only provides inte grated information along the line of visualization. The chosen rep-
resentation is con venient when interesting dynamics occur in the lo wer right corner as seen from the
ignition end. Post-processing typically consists of contrast adjustment, and sometimes, background
subtraction to highlight important flo w features. A total of 56 tests were performed of which 26 used
1-D V and 30 used 2-D V .
Propagation direction
Bottom face
Side face
y
z
x
Ignition end
F ig. 3 : Schematic of the visualization dir ections. “Side” and “Bottom” faces r efer to the camera
position.
3.1 Strang e wave dynamics
3.1.1 Early stages and formation
Figure 4 sho ws the structure observed during formation of the strange wa ve using 1-D V . T ime 0 µ s
is arbitrary , and simply represents the first instance in the sequence. The tip of a very corrugated
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flame (A) is seen to propagate from left to right at t = 0 µ s. Expansion of b urned products and the
acceleration of the flame itself, generate perturbations within the fresh but shock ed mixture ahead of
the flame (weak (B) and strong (C) pressures wa ves are visible in this frame). At 27.5 µ s, strength-
ening of flame acceleration and successi ve preheating from precursor shocks/pressure w a ves result
in ne w , stronger shocks, forming closer to the flame. The flame starts to show a rather symmetric
shape, preferentially b urning near walls, resembling a funnel-shape (D) presumably filled with un-
b urned mixture, finally , the flame catches up with the shock at 55 µ s (not sho wn as it is outside of
the vie wing windo w). Note that an e xplosion emanating some where on the bottom face is observ ed,
remnants of which are visible as a discontinuity tra v eling left (E). Not enough information is a v ailable
to tell whether this local e xplosion lead to DDT . Front speeds computed from the images v ary from
1200 − 1500 m/s for the corrugated flame, and from 700 − 1000 m/s, for the precursor shock.
t = 0 µ s
Side
x
z
t = 27.5 µ s
Side
x
z
t = 55 µ s
Side
x
z
F ig. 4 : 1-D V : symmetric formation of strang e wave; section 454 to 544 mm fr om ignition; conditions:
stoic hiometric H 2 -O 2 at p 0 = 100 kP a, and T 0 = 290 K. Raw imag es. A: corrugated fr ont; B: weak
pr essur e waves; C: pr ecursor shoc k; D: funnel-shaped flame surface; E: left moving discontinuity .
t = 0 µ s
Side
x
z
t = 28 µ s
Side
x
z
t = 55 µ s
Side
x
z
F ig. 5 : 1-D V : asymmetric formation of strange wave; section 454 to 544 mm fr om ignition; condi-
tions: stoichiometric H 2 -O 2 at p 0 = 100 kP a, and T 0 = 290 K. Raw ima ges. F: oblique shoc k; G:
second ignition.
Interestingly , in some cases using the same configuration and vie wing section, another structure was
observ ed (see Fig. 5). In this case no perturbations seem to be visible ahead of the flame, instead,
a front propagating within the boundary layer at the bottom w all forms an oblique shock (F). Upon
reflection from the top wall, a second ignition within the boundary layer tak es place (G). On the last
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frame, at 55 µ s, a symmetric shape starts to form. This shape is very similar to that observ ed experi-
mentally by Thomas et al. (2001) and numerically by Khokhlov et al. (1999), and Oran et al. (2002)
when the y studied shock-flame interactions. The precursor shock in this case propagates at the same
speed as that reported abo v e.
t = 0 µ s
Bottom
x
y
Side
x
z
t = 7.1 µ s
Bottom
x
y
Side
x
z
t = 14.2 µ s
Bottom
x
y
Side
x
z
F ig. 6 : Simultaneous 2-D V of the formation of strang e wave; section 281 to 353 mm fr om ignition;
conditions: stoichiometric H 2 -O 2 at p 0 = 100 kP a, and T 0 = 290 K. Backgr ound substracted to
highlight important flow featur es. H: left mo ving discontinuity .
Figure 6 sho ws 2-D V during formation of the strange wa ve. Note that in this channel this stage of
DDT occurred in a dif ferent section, 281 mm ≤ x ≤ 383 mm, instead of 454 mm ≤ x ≤ 544 mm. At
t = 0 µ s, this configuration sho ws a similar structure as in Fig. 4 preceded by a succession of pressure
wa ves. The main dif ference lies on the fact that the corrugated flame does not catch up with the pertur -
bations, instead the mixture seems to ignite within the boundary layer , likely due to a flame-boundary
layer interaction, resulting in a front that propagates near the wall (similar to that seen in Fig. 5). Si-
multaneous SV allo ws to pinpoint the exact location in the channel cross-section where ignition takes
place (bottom right corner looking from the ignition end). At 7.1 µ s, the front in the boundary layer
propagates f aster than the corrugated flame ( ∼ 3000 m/s), subsequently it decelerates to 2400 m/s,
between 7.1 and 14.2 µ s. In the side view , at 14.2 µ s, another fast front starts to propagate within
the boundary layer at the lo wer edge of this frame. The ignition of this front seems to be the result
of an oblique shock-boundary layer interaction. Ho we v er , based on a preliminary surve y of all the
results collected, ignition within the boundary layers arise more frequently due to flame-boundary
layer interactions. The exact reason of spontaneous ignition within the corner is not clear , additional
tests and analysis are currently being carried out to rule out uncertainties concerning manufacturing
imperfections. The DNS of Dziemi ´
nska and Hayashi (2013) and LES of Zhao et al. (2017) present
a similar scenario of DDT , b ut in our case, the flame-shock complex propagates more than 100 mm
before it actually transits to detonation. A discontinuity (H), similar to that seen in Fig. 4 at 55 µ s, is
also visible at 7.1 and 14.2 µ s. The ov erall dynamics obtained closely resembles that for 1-D V .
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3.1.2 Quasi-steady pr opagation
t = 0 µ s
Side
x
z
t = 10 µ s
Side
x
z
t = 20 µ s
Side
x
z
F ig. 7 : 1-D V of strang e wave; section 454 to 544 mm fr om ignition; conditions: stoichiometric H 2 -O 2
at p 0 = 100 kP a, and T 0 = 290 K. Raw images.
The structure of the strange wa ve is visible in Fig. 7. It is very similar to that observ ed by Y anez and
K uznetso v (2016), except that in our case it propagates at a speed ∼ 29% higher ( ∼ 1800 m/s). As
mentioned abo ve, it is composed of a flat shock with a very wrinkled funnel-shaped flame surface
responsible for sustaining the very high b urning rates observed. The 2-D V shown in Fig. 8, re veals
additional information. At 0 µ s, the Bottom vie w and Side vie w e xhibit v ery dif ferent shapes. From
the side, a similar shape as that observed in the first configuration, with a planar shock ahead of a
funnel-shaped flame, whereas from the bottom, only a planar shock is visible, just before the black
spacer . Even though this flame-shock comple x is supersonic with respect to reactants ahead, it is not
the quasi-steady strange wa ve observ ed by Y anez and Kuznetso v (2016). The planar shock propagates
around 1200 m/s and it is quickly caught up by the funnel-shaped flame. When the y mer ge near the
center , at 18 µ s, the comple x accelerates to ∼ 1500-1600 m/s and starts to flatten, sometimes staying
curv ed in one corner until detonation onset. The Bottom vie w at 18 µ s, is evidence of the con v oluted
three-dimensional structure that forms when both oblique flame-shock comple x es mer ge.
3.1.3 Detonation onset
T ransition to detonation systematically occurs follo wing the strange wa ve structure described abo v e.
Figure 9 sho ws the results obtained using the 1-D V configuration. An ignition kernel de velops at the
bottom wall at t = 0 µ s. The initially planar shock becomes curv ed, as the shock generated from
the e xplosion tra v els to wards the top wall, consumi ng the fresh shocked mixture present do wnstream
of it. Finally , the frame at 3.2 µ s, sho ws a quasi-planar shock of an incipient detonation. Run-up
distances computed from the schlieren images (i.e. DDT location) lied between 38 - 67% of the total
length of the channel (sample size: 14 tests). The high temporal resolution used allo wed us to resolve
the detonation onset in great detail (5 million fps).
Figure 10 sho ws the results obtained with 2-D V configuration, follo wing the flattening of the comple x
described in Fig. 8, whose propagation speed is ∼ 2000 m/s, a strong explosion tak es place. Note that
to be consistent with the schematic in Fig. 3, the planes x − y and x − z were translated, and subse-
quently rotated o ver the x − axis; the DDT point is actually in the top left corner . Run-up distances
lied between 42-47% of total length (sample size: 20 tests).
SV performed on the same section for 1-D V configuration (454-544 mm) include four dif ferent struc-
tures (Figures 4, 5, 7 and 9); fully de veloped detonations, as well as slo wer deflagrations were also
observ ed b ut not included here. The 2-D V channel, on the other hand, provided repeatable results
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Figure 2 . Li -ion cell physical formats.
Energy storag e speci fic l i-ion cells tend to be phy sically larger than consumer cells because th eir
size is not limited by the need to fit within consumer product enclosures, though there a re
manufacturers who do develop ene rgy storage systems (ESS) from cells used in consumer
products. The fiv e materi al components of a common li -ion cell consist of a cathode material, an
anode material, a separa tor material between the two electrodes, an electrolyte, and an outer case.
To manufacture a cell, cathode, separ ator, an d anode mate rials are e ither wound together
simultaneously or a re as sembled in a stack of alternating layers (Schröder et al., 2017). This
“winding” or “jellyroll” is inserted into a case manufactured from aluminium or steel, or int o
metallicized polymer pouch, depending on the cell format. I n orde r to ena ble winding or stacking,
cathode and anode m ater ials are coated onto substra tes of alumini um and copper foil, respectively
(Warner, 2015). Electrol ytes are injected into any of these formats at the conclusion of assembly
(Schröder et al., 2017).
(a)
(b)
Figure 3. a) Cells enclosed within a module housing, b) open and enclosed ESS units.
Cells are electrically inte rconnec ted in series and parallel from s everal cells to thousands of cells
to achieve increases in v oltage and output current. A manufactured group of cells that are hous ed
within an enclosure that typically includes hardware (e.g., fuses) and s oftware (e.g., battery
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management) electrical s afety fe atures is referred to as a module. Modules c ontain tens to hundr eds
of kilograms of cells and may or may not have th erma l runaway propagation mitigating features.
Figure 3 (a) shows a schematic of a module with cylindrical cells designed by UL to demonstrate
the potential for cell- to -cell propagation of thermal runaway, off-gassing and flaming beha viour
of li-ion modules.
Complete residential ES S typically do not exceed the module scale and m ay include all ancillary
equipment within a single housing. I n commercial and industrial applications, modules are
typically installed within racking physically similar to data systems a nd telecommunications
equipment. Bus bars co nnect modules, to meet volt age and current design objectives. B us bar
voltage ranges fr om hundreds of volts DC to more than 1000 VDC. Complete racks ar e defined as
“units” and may be unenclosed or h ave enclosures that aid in me eting thermal management,
electrical and mech anica l safety, and visual appearance objectives. Units typically weigh from tens
to thousands of kilograms. Rack arrange ments are shown in Figure 3 (b).
An ESS installation can consist of a single unit , especially in r esidences, and may b e installed
indoors or outdoors. Co mmerc ial and industrial i nstallations can scale from single to hundreds o f
ESS units. I t is common for ESS units to be installed in an inte rmodal ship ping c ontainer which
contains ancillary ESS equipment and a complete fire protection system (e.g., detection, alarm,
and extinguishing systems), which enables manuf acturers/installers to perform some pre -assembly
before shipping. Similarly, custom large weather p roof enclosures are built to house one more ESS
units. Dedicated ESS buildings constructed on -site are similar in layout to intermodal containe rs.
Figure 4 shows the basic layout of ESS equipment commonly found at installations.
Figure 4. Examples of outdoor ESS installations.
The layout of ESS unit s in installations is like the layout of data and telecommunications
equipment racking. The installation volume may be orders of magnitude larger than outdoor ESS
enclosures. Indoor ESS installations are not com mon in North America, as codes and standards
curre ntly r equire indoor equipment configurations to be first tested to develo p fire and explosion
safety performance data using UL 9540A before a n Authority Having Ju risdiction (AHJ) approves
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a specific installation (NFPA 855, 2019; Internationa l Code Council, 2018; Underwrite rs
Laboratorie s, Inc., 2019).
1.2 Phenomenological description of li -ion cell thermal runaway and cell materials
The basic design of a li -i on cell is uniqu e in t erms of fire and e xplosion hazards in that a single
product can possess all of the elements necessary to ini tiate and sustain the process of combustion:
fuel, heat, and some of the oxygen needed for partial oxidation of combusti ble cell materials .
Thermal runaway occurs when a li-ion cell incre ases it s own temperature through self-heating,
uncontrollably, until the rate of heat gen era tion exceeds the ra te o f heat dissipation. Th e thermal
runaway proce ss often initiates in response to an abuse mechanism that destabilizes electrical and
chemical potential energy stored by the cell. Abuse mechanisms can be thermal (e.g., external heat
exposure), me chanical (e.g., crushing, penetration), electric al ( e.g., external short circuit,
overcharge, over dischar ge), or inte rnal short c ircuits ( e.g., fo rmation of int erna l growths that
compromise the separator, manufacturing defects, and contamination).
Electrica l potential energy is released as part of thermal runaway when a los s of separator integrity
results in an internal short circuit and Joule heating. The contribution of electrical potential e nergy
to thermal runawa y severity and heat release rate has been documented by Golubkov, et al., (2015),
Said, et al. (2018), and others.
Chemical potential ener gy is released as part of thermal runaway wh en cell materials are
sufficiently heated to initiate exothermic decomposit ion reactions, which lead to further heating
and additional exothermic decomposition reactions. Feng, et al. (2018) identified six re actions that
occur during a thermal runawa y pro cess. All but the separator melting are exother mic r eactions.
Although some reac tions occur in parallel, the following order is given:
1. Decomposition of the solid-electrolyte inte rphase, which can happen as low as 57 °C.
2. Melting of the separator.
3. Further decomposition and regenera tion of the sol id-electrolyte interphase.
4. Cathode decomposition.
5. Electrolyte dec ompositio n.
6. Decomposition of the graphite/carbon anode with elec trolyte.
In terms of mate rials, li -ion cells used in commercial and residential e nergy storage applications
are effectively the same as those used consumer products (Warner, 201 5). Comm on cathode
materials are: Lithium Cobalt Oxide (LCO), Lithium I ron Phosphate (L FP), Lithium Manganese
Oxide (LMO), Lithi um Nickel Cobalt Aluminum Oxide (NCA), Lithium Nickel Manganese
Cobalt Oxide (NMC), and Lithium Titanate (LTO). Anodes typi cally consist of graphitic carbons,
although newer anode ma terials now include li thium alloyed metals. (Me konnen et al., 2016; Nitta
et al., 2015; Doughty et al., 2012; Warner, 2015) . Within the first f ew charge cycles, a coating
referre d to as the solid -electrolyte interphase forms on the anode surface by reactions with th e
electrolyte. S eparator materials are made fro m polyethylene, polypropylene and ceramic-
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polyolefin composite membr anes (Orendorff, 2012; Baldwin, 2009; Ya ng et al., 2012; Zhang et
al., 2016). The thickne ss is t ypically on the order of 25 μ m but may be less.
Electrolytes can be aqueous, non-aqueous, ionic li quids (salts with low boiling points), gel and
solid polymers, or hybrid elec trolytes. Most electrolytes used in commercial cells are non -aqueous
and consist of a solution of dis sociated lithium sa lt (LiPF 6 ) in hydroc arbon solvents (D oughty et
al., 2012; Mekonnen et al., 2016). The hydrocarbon solvents are typically mixtures of ethylene
carbona te, dimethyl carb onate, propylen e c arbonate, diethyl carbonate, an d ethyl methyl carbonate
(Li, et al., 2016; Aurbach, et al., 2004).
Table 1, summarize d from Somandepalli et al., shows an example of the material composition of
an LCO cell by mass ra tio (Somandepa lli et al., 2014).
Table 1. Materials used in a lithium cobalt oxide pouch cell.
Chemical Comp ound
Molecular
Formula
∆ H c (kJ · g -1 )
Mass %
Purpose
Lithium Cobalt Oxide
LiCoO 2
Inorganic
42.5
Cathode
Lithium-interca lated Graphite
LiC 6
Inorganic
34.9
Anode
Diethyl Carbon ate
C 5 H 10 O 3
21.15
7.2
Electrolyte
Nylon 6
(C 6 H 11 NO) n
28.74
2.2
Case material
Ethylene Carb onate
C 3 H 4 O 3
12.3
1.1
Electrolyte
Propylene Carbon ate
C 4 H 6 O 3
15.53
0.9
Electrolyte
Polyprop ylene
(C 3 H 6 ) n
42.66
9.0
Separator
Dimethyl Carbonat e
C 3 H 6 O 3
13.4
0.3
Electrolyte
Polyester Tereph thalate
(C 10 H 8 O 4 ) n
22
2.0
Case material
Table 1 demonstrates that material composition deter mines cell stability and the severity of thermal
runaway. For example, the temperature of int ernal short circuit c an be increased selecting a
separa tor material with a higher transition temperature, which can prevent breaching and
distortion. A polyethylene separa tor m aterial h as a tra nsition temperature of 135 ° C , whereas
composite separators ma y have transition tempe ratures in ex cess of 220 ° C (Ore ndorff, 2012) .
Cathode selection can affect th ermal run awa y s everity. Less heat is released du ring thermal
runaway with an LFP cathode than with an LCO cathode (Feng, et al., 2018).
Material composition a lso de termines the off -gassing constituents o nce the rmal runaway o ccurs .
The thermal energy generation of thermal runaway results in dissociation and vaporization of
nearly all cell materials, typically leaving only r esidual soot , metals used for the cell case, and
anode and ca thode substr ates. The g aseous/vapor products of thermal runaway are oft en r elea sed
through the safety v ent. The safety vent may or may not pr event catastrophic rupture of the cell
case during thermal runa way. With higher energy density cell chemistries , cell material surface
temperatures achieved d uring thermal runa way can ignite the mixture, bu t off-gassing can occur
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entirely without flaming, especially when thermal runaway occurs in confined volume such as in
a module, unit or in a battery room/outdoor container.
1.3 Thermal runaway vent gas composition and release volume
UL 9540A has standardized a methodology for deter mining the thermal runaway gas composition
by applying an abuse me chanism to a cell contained in an 82 L nitrogen-inerted pressure vessel,
shown in Figure 5. This approac h was developed from that used by Somandepalli et al. (2014) .
Figure 5. 82-Liter gas composition test apparatus at UL.
Application of thermal energy to the external cell surface by flexible film heater at 4 °C/min to 7
°C/min is one of the abuse mecha nisms used, as the results of the thermal abuse provide data which
quantifies the surface t emperature at which the cell safety vent operates, and the surface
temperature of the onse t of thermal runaway.
The inert environment inside the test appara tus prevents combustion durin g thermal runawa y off-
gassing, and facilitates collection of unreacted thermal runaway g ases 1 . The accumulated gas es are
identified and quantified by gas chromatogra phy. Table 2 provides a typical makeup of thermal
runaway off-gas compositi on for common li -ion c hemistries. The gas composition results is used
to de velop the synthesis of thermal runaway gas for follow -on explosibility testing, described in
section 2. The volume of gas released by a cell thermal runaway in the test apparatus , assumed to
follow the ideal-ga s law, is given by:
(1)
(2)
1 exclud ing reaction of th e rmal runaway gas components with an y cathode -bound oxygen.
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Where :
V is gas volum e in m 3 , n BVG is the number of moles of battery vent gas, R is the universal gas
constant in J/mol· K , P is pressure in P a, T is temperature in °K, ⱷ O2 is the oxygen volume fraction
in the test chamber prior to testing, and the subscripts “i”, “f”, and “∞” denote test apparatus initi al,
final and ambient conditions at Normal Temperature and Pressure (NTP), respectively.
UL 9540A standard requires testing of energy storage modules if a cell demonstrates thermal
runaway and releases flamm able gas. P ropagation of thermal runaway in a m odule testing may
result in a larger release of thermal runaway ve nt gas. Testing of energy storage units is necessary
if modu le level testing demonstrates that module to module thermal ru nawa y propagation is
possible. Quantifica tion of thermal runaway g as volume release at both module and unit level
testing is achieved by col lecting the offgas and tot alizing the product of the exhaust flow rate and
concentration measure ments of CO, CO 2 , tot al hy drocarbons, and hydrogen.
1.4 Propagation of thermal runaway within ESS
The thermal exposure imposed on a djacent cells by cells in ther mal runaway is often enough to
start the decomposition reactions described by Feng et . al ., cause an I SC and induce a cascading
event. Figure 6 shows the time evolution for propagation of thermal runaway in a non-electrically
interconnec ted array o f twenty-five 18650 cylindrical li-ion cells. One cell i n the bottom layer w as
heated with a flexible film heater until thermal runaway. Within 1.5 s, thermal runaway occurred
in adjac ent cells and the velocity of gas release was fast e nough to ca use jetting and fla me lift-off.
After 8.5 s thermal runaway propagated to a ll cells in the array. From 11.5 s until after 22 seconds,
the surface temperatures of the cell array a re at a high enough temperature t o emit visible light.
Within 65 s the arra y was exhausted of thermal r unaway gases and residual combustible material.
The gas composition obtained by testing one o f the c ells from Figure 6 with the 82-L gas
composition test apparatus using the UL 9540A cell level test methodology is shown in Table 2.
Values h ave b een rounded to the nearest int eger and correspond well wi th values tabulat ed by
Baird et al. (2019).
Table 2.: Repre sentative gas composition f rom ce ll level thermal runaway tests
Gas
Percent
Carbon Dioxide
36
Carbon Monoxide
22
Hydro carbons
10
Hydro gen
32
Others
< 1%
Similar thermal runaway propagation spe ed and severity results for 18650 cells in air have been
measured by (Said et al., 2019). Said e t. al. showed that the int ensity of cell to c ell he at transfer in
arra ys can support thermal runaway propagation even without flaming in a nitrogen environment.
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Figure 6. Propagation of thermal runaway from one to 24 adjacent 18650 cells.
The thermal energy gen era ted by cell to cell thermal runa way prop agation, as well as high
momentum flaming combustion of thermal runawa y can enable module to module thermal
runaway propagation. Figure 7 shows a UL 9540 A module level test demonstration conducted at
UL based on the module design shown in Figure 3 a. The module contain ed 27.2 kg of cells, with
a capacity of approximately 3.2 kWh. The pressure generated within the module enclosure was
high enough to vent flaming gases more than 1 m, as shown in Figure 7c.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 7. Demonstration of module (a) at t = 0 (b) during a 20-min period of off-gassing without
flaming (c) immediate ly after igniti on of thermal runaway gas.
Figure 3b shows that typical rack configurations tend to have minimal air gaps between modules,
which may not provide insulation enough to inhibit heat transfer and pre vent propagation between
adjace nt modules in a unit. Propagation of thermal runaway is also possible between nearby units
if spacing is not ade quate to li mit heat transfer from unit to unit , particularly considering the
potential for jet flaming fr om modul es in ther mal runaway. Without sprinkler prote ction, FM
Global recommends spa cing unit s a minimum of 1.8 m – 2.7 m apart b ased on full-scale tests of
LFP and NMC ESS units, respec tively (Ditch, 2019) .
1.5 Deve lopment of an explosi on hazard from accumulated battery gas
Explosion hazards can de velop where unbu rned thermal runaway vent gas a ccumulate in a
confined volume. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show confined volumes defined by the module, unit and
0 s
< 0.5 s
1.5 s
5 s
8.5 s
15 s
22 s
65 s
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battery room enclosures. Therefore, deflagration hazards can occ ur at sev era l different produc t
levels. Figure 8 shows the volume flow rates me asured during the UL 9540A modul e level test
demonstration. Volume flow rates were determin ed by measuring gas con centra tions within the
ductwork of an oxygen consumpti on calorimeter t hat collect ed the gases released by the module.
CO and CO 2 were measu red by nondispe rsive infr are d gas analysis and total hydrocarbons were
measured using flame ion ization detection. The mo dule relea sed a total of 1 m 3 of thermal runaway
gas before flaming.
The demonstra tion also showed that the module enclosure forced under -ventilated conditions in
which the gases were rel ease d without flaming. A re lease volume of 1 m 3 volume is a dequate to
crea te a mixture a bove the lo wer flammability limit (LFL) in volumes up to approxima tely 16 m 3 ,
based upon a range of LFLs fr om 6.1 v% to 11.8 v% calculated for thermal runa way gas by B aird
et al. (2019). The severity of the deflagration hazards are g reater for smaller volumes, as the fuel
concentration can reach a worse-c ase scenario n ear stoichiometric fuel -air conditions. The gas
composition data of the cell are used to dev elop the deflagration parameters lower fl ammability
limit (ASTM E-918), laminar burning velocity (ASHRAE 34), and P max (EN 15967)
Figure 8. Volume flow rates of thermal runaway off gas.
2. Explosibility parameter values for thermal runaway gases
The gas explosibility parameters needed for e xplosion protection design depend on the protection
method and associated d esign standard. The pri mary parameters for N FPA 68 (2018) e xplosion
vent sizing are the gas mixture closed vessel deflagration pressure, P max , the gas mixture laminar
burning ve locity, S u , a nd the ratio of the gas mixture volume, V mix , to the enclosure volume. The
European normative standard for gas explosion ve nting, EN 14494 (2007), uses these parameters
plus the gas mixture normalized rate-of-pressure rise, K G .
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In applying these explosion venting standards, th e protection design is usually based on a worse -
case, near- stoichiometric, gas mixture. Therefore, determina tions of P max and S u require testing or
calculations over a range of gas conce ntrations. UL 9540A testing requires determination of P max
and S u over a range of fuel concentrations for the thermal runaway vent ga s mixture measured at
the cell level in the ine rte d environment.
An exa mple of P max test data obtaine d over a range of fu el c oncentrations is shown in F igure 9.
Thermal runaway vent gases c orrespond to the mixture documented in Ta ble 2. P m ax data for the
thermal runaway gas es was obtained in a spherical 5 L test vessel using a 10 -15 joul e squib igni ter.
A P max of 6.4 bar-g was measured at a fuel concentration of 2 9 vol%. Data from Somandepalli et
al. (2014) obtained for thermal runaway vent gases from 7.7 Wh ce lls at 100% SOC are also shown.
The Somandepalli et al. tests were conducted in a 20 L test vessel using a 250 J chemic al igniter.
The Somandepa lli et al. data show a P max of 7.0 bar-g at a fuel concentration of about 15 vol%.
The slightly higher P m ax for the smaller cell thermal runaway gases may be due to larger test vessel
and more energe tic igniter since the gas compositions were similar.
Figure 9. Closed vessel pressure versus concentration for two different size c ells.
Gas mixture bu rning velociti es for the UL 9540A thermal runaway ga ses were obtained by
measuring flame propag ation speeds and flame f ront surface areas in a 4-cm diameter, 150 cm
long glass tube and a djusting the flame speed by the ratio of the fla me base cross-sec tional area to
the flame surface area per Jabbour (2004 ). Data obtained for the same thermal runawa y gases as
used to obtain the Figure 9 data show a maximum burning ve locity of roughly 35 cm/s at a fue l
concentration of 26 v%, with burning velocities decreasing to about 20 cm/s at a concentration of
17 v% on the le an side and about 38 v% on the fuel rich side of the worst- case conc entra tion. This
data is not necessarily representative of results for other UL 9540A runa way ga s samples, some of
which have produce d significantly higher burning velocities.
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Johnsplass e t a l. (2017) have c alculated burning velocities using measured thermal runa w ay gas
compositions and widely used open-source softw are for chemical reactions and burning velocities.
Their results for diffe rent lithium ion electrolytes show peak values of S u in t he range 35-50 cm/s
at equivalence ratios of 1.1 to 1.2. The lower end of this range is about 10% higher than the peak
S u for the gas fr om Table 2, while the uppe r end of that ra nge is roughly comparable to the highe r
values of S u measure d from gases produced in U L 9540A tests.
Since laminar burning velocities increase rapidly with increasing gas mi xture temperature, the
room-tempera ture measured v alues of S u need to be adjusted upward for ES S explosion venting
applications in which the thermal runaway produ ces elevated gas temperat ures. Fernandes et al.
(2018) have calculated values of S u for gas compositions formed from vented Li -ion cell
overcharge tests. They show the value of S u for s toichiometric mixtures increasing from 30 cm/s
to almost 110 cm/s as the gas mixture initial tempera ture increases from 300 K to 600 K.
Normalized rate- of - pressure rise, K G , data are als o obtained for the UL 9540A thermal runaway
gases using the same test method as for P max values. Data for the T able 2 ga s mixtures resulted in
a K G of 84 bar-m/s at a fuel c oncentra tion of 2 9 v%. This is 29% gre ater than the K G value
measured by Somandepalli et al. of 65 bar-m/s for their tests with 100% SOC thermal run awa y
gases. Ho wever, the use of the 5 -L and 20- L test vessels for this data may limit its applicability
because of the well-kno wn test -vessel large-volume flame acceleration effects mentioned by
Somandepalli et al.
The gas mixture volume to be use d for explosi on v enting applications can be either the entire ES S
enclosure volume for wo rse-case scenarios, or a smaller volume for performance-b ased scenarios
involving thermal runaway conditions represented by UL 9540A testing. In the latter case,
calculations can be based on the volumes o f the thermal runa way gases measured in module o r
larger scale UL 9540A t esting. Usually, thi s wou ld entail assuming the measured gas volumes
from worse-case near-stoichiometric mixtures with enclosure air.
If N FPA 69 (2019) or another explosion pre venti on standard is to be used, the applic able
explosibility parameters are either the gas mixture LFL to a chieve prevention by combustible
concentration reduction or the Limiting Oxygen Con centra tion (LOC) to achieve prevention by
inerting. LFL data are obt ained with gas samples from UL 9540A thermal runawa y tests. An LFL
value of 8.9 v% was obtained for the ga s shown in Table 2, as determined us ing ASTM E918 with
an electric arc ignition. Baird et al. (2020) report LFL values in th e range 6.1% to 11.8% for g as
compositions obtained from diffe rent cell chemistries and SOCs.
Thermal run away g as L OC data are not routinely measured because they depend on the inert gas
used and, so f ar, the re have been f ew, if any, ESS inerting applications. C alculation methods to
estimate fuel gas mixture LOC values from the gas composition and LOC va lues of the constituent
gases a re described by Britton et al. (2016) and summarized in Ann ex B of NFPA 69 -2019.
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13th International Symposium on Hazards, Prevention, and Mitigation of Industrial Explosions
Braunschweig, GERMANY – July 27-31, 2020
A Eulerian m odel for dust defla grations, i ncluding inne r
particle effec ts
Christoph Spijker a , & Harald Raupe nstrauch a
a Ch air of Ther mal Pr oces si ng Tec hno logy ( Mon tanun iv ersi ta e t Le obe n, Leobe n, A ust ria )
E-mail: [email protected]
Abstract
Previous studies (Spijker 2017) h ave show n that t he oil evaporation rate of Lycopodium particles is
dependent on the resistance for diffusive and conv ective transport through the pores. Based on these
studies a simplified inner particle transport model w as created. The model assumes that the
evapora tion of the oil oc curs in a layer. The species and energy transport between this layer and the
particle surface are mod elled by algebraic e quations assuming a momentary ste ady state condition.
The evapo ration rates calculated by this approach achieve similar results to the 3D fully resolve d
particles. In the dust d eflagration of Lycopodium , pyrolysis of the li gnin structure is of se condary
importance, therefore a simplified one e quation pyrolysis mechanism wa s developed. The results are
compared with the re sults from the model e xcluding inner tra nsport eff ects, the Eule rian flame speed
model developed by Spijker ( 2014). Fu r th er more the influenc e of he at transfer by radiation was
considered.
Keywords: inner particle effects, dust deflagration, simulation, Eulerian approach, Lycopodium
1. Introduction
Usually, the transport e ffects in the particles are neglected du e to the high demand on computing
resources. To model particle inner effects with discretized particles would i ntroduce new differential
equations to be solved fo r each particle. A radial 1- D model from Spij ker (2 015) wi th 25 layers n eeds
680 seconds to model 0. 25 seconds real time on on e co re of an Intel i7 -970. Using a Eul erian approac h
su ch a particle must be solved in ev ery cell and additional transport equations have to be introduce d
on the fluid grid, to account the movement of the particles. When a L agrangian a pproach is used, the
differentia l equations must be solved for e very parc el. The grid used to m odel the duc t experime nt
from Kern (2013) ha s 6 ,3 Mill ion cells. Pollhammer (2015 ) used additionally 4 mi llion pa rcels,
repre senting approx. 16 mil lion particles for his Lagrangian approa ch . As shown in Fig. 1 the
dominate process on the thermal conversion of Lycopodium in a dust deflagration is the evaporation
of the contained oil. The 0 D model, negl ecting inner particle transpo rt effects, sho ws higher
evaporation rates th an the fully resolved 3D p article model. This will result in a faster flame
propagation. Wi th an analytical model describing the transport resistance of the oil vapour in th e
pores of the particle, thi s e ffect can be modelled with low additional computing resources. The
pyrolysis of the lignin st ructure is of secondary relevance and sho ws no diffe rence betw een the 0 D
an d 3D model.
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Fig. 1. Change of mass for a Lycopodium particle in a dust deflagration (Spijker 2015)
2. Model description
2.1 Global Eulerian Mod el
The global Eulerian model uses an Eulerian approach to describe multi component reacting mixtures
in the gas phase, includin g turbulence and radiation. An additional Eulerian approach is used for the
particle phase, with additional transport equations fo r the composition of the particles.
2.1.1 Momentum and continuity equations
Equation 1 represents the momentum e quation for the gas phase. Here is 𝑣
→ the ve locity vector, 𝜀 the
gas phase volume f rac tion calculated from the p article concertation 𝐷 and de nsity of the m ixture 𝜌 ,
calculated using the ideal gas equation and the molar mass of the mixture. Turbulenc e is consider ed
by the effective viscosity 𝜇 𝐸𝑓 𝑓 which is the sum of the molecular viscos ity , given by the Sutherland
approac h (Sutherland 1893) and the turbulent vi scosity from the turbulence model. To consider
gravitational effec ts, the volume force s caused by the gravitational acceleration vector 𝑔
→ are included
in the equation. The int erac tion forces betw een particle and gas phase i s considered by Wen -Yu
(1966 ) copping coefficient 𝐾 (equation 2) a nd the relative velocity between the phases 𝑢
→ − 𝑣
→ . The
continu ity equation for t he gas phas e (equation 3) considers the gas phase volume fr action and the
mass transfer source term 𝑄 𝐷 , calcu lated using the inner particle model.
∂ ( 𝜀𝜌 𝑣
→ )
∂𝑡 + 𝑑𝑖𝑣 ( 𝜀𝜌 𝑣
→ 𝑣
→ ) − 𝑑𝑖𝑣 [ 𝜀 𝜇 𝐸𝑓𝑓 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑 ( 𝑣 ) ] − 𝜀𝜌 𝑔
→ − 𝐾 ( 𝑢
→ − 𝑣
→ ) = −𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑 ( 𝑝 ) 𝜀 (1)
𝐾 = 3
4 𝐶 𝑤 𝜀 ( 1−𝜀 ) 𝜌
𝑑 𝑝 𝜀 2, 65 | 𝑣 − 𝑢
| (2 )
∂ ( 𝜀𝜌 )
∂𝑡 + 𝑑𝑖𝑣 ( 𝜀𝜌 𝑣
→ ) = 𝑆 𝐷 (3)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0 0,05 0,1 0,15 0,2 0,25
mass/initi al mass
time [s]
Lignin 3D-Model Oil 3D-Modell Oil 0D-Model Lignin 0D-Model
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The particle phase conservation equation ( equation 4) describes the momentum of the dust, wh ere 𝐷
stands for dust mass concentration and 𝑢
→ is velocity vector of the particle phase. Diff usive effec ts on
the particle phase are considered by the kinetic particle viscosity 𝜇 𝑘𝑖𝑛 and the particle collision
viscosity 𝜇 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙 . Granular pre ssure 𝑝𝑠 as well as 𝜇 𝑘𝑖𝑛 and 𝜇 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙 are calculated by an a nalytical
approac h (Syamlal 1993). The continuit y equation (equation 5) is based on the mass concentra tion 𝐷
and takes the mass transfer source term 𝑄 𝐷 into account.
∂(𝐷 𝑢
→ )
∂𝑡 + 𝑑𝑖𝑣 (𝐷 𝑢
→ 𝑢
→ ) − 𝑑𝑖𝑣 [ 𝜀 ( 𝜇 𝑘𝑖𝑛 + 𝜇 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙 ) 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑 ( 𝑢
)] − 𝐷 𝑔
→ − 𝐾 ( 𝑣
→ − 𝑢
→ )
= −𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑 ( 𝑝 )( 1 − 𝜀 ) − 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑 ( 𝑝𝑠 ) (4)
∂ ( 𝐷 )
∂𝑡 + 𝑑𝑖𝑣 (𝐷 𝑢
→ ) = −𝑆 𝐷 (5)
2.1.2 Energy equations
An e nergy equation is solved for each phase. The gas phase ene rgy equation (equation 6) is based on
the e nthalpy ℎ , using in O penF OAM 2.4 implemented rea ction a nd ther mophysical models. The heat
conduction is calculated using effective heat conductivity 𝜆 𝐸𝑓𝑓 which is the sum of the molecular
heat conductivity and the turbulent heat conductivity. The turbulent heat conductivity is calcula te d
from the turbulent viscosity and turbulent Prandtl number. This equation c onsiders the h eat source
from homogenous reactions 𝑄 𝑅 ,𝑔 , the heat transfer with the partic le phas e and the heat source term
for radiation 𝑄 𝑅𝑎𝑑 . This source term considers only gas absorption and wall interac tions. F or the he at
transfer coefficient to the partic le phase 𝛼 𝑔 ,𝑝 th e Nusselt corre lation by Ranz-Marshall (Ansys 2009)
is used. 𝐴 𝑉 describes the volume specific surface a rea of the particles, based on the dust concentration
𝐷 . 𝑇 𝑝 is the particle temperature and 𝑇 𝑔 the gas tempe rature from the thermophysical model used in
OpenFOAM.
∂ ( 𝜀 ℎ )
∂𝑡 + 𝑑𝑖 𝑣 (𝜀 𝑢
→ ℎ ) − 𝑑𝑖𝑣 [ 𝜀 𝜆 𝐸𝑓𝑓 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑 (𝑇 𝑔 )] = 𝑄 𝑅 ,𝑔 + 𝛼 𝑔, 𝑝 𝐴 𝑉 (𝑇 𝑝 − 𝑇 𝑔 ) + 𝑄 𝑅𝑎𝑑 (6)
In the energy equation for the pa rticle ph ase (equ ation 7) enthalpy is formulated using dus t
concentration 𝐷 , temperature of the particle phase 𝑇 𝑝 and heat capac ity of the particles 𝑐 𝑝 𝑝 . Heat
capacity is calculated con sidering particle composition and temperature, bas ed on the work of Spijker
(2015). Additionally to transient and source te rms the convective heat tran sport is considered. Heat
source term for the particle reactions 𝑄 𝑅,𝑝 is mo delle d with inner particle model. Absorption an d
emission from the pa rticles are tak en in account in the radiation model with a separate source term
𝑄 𝑅𝑎𝑑 ,𝑝 for the particle phase.
∂ ( 𝐷𝑇 𝑝 𝑐 𝑝 𝑝 )
∂𝑡 + 𝑑𝑖𝑣 (𝐷 𝑣
→ 𝑇 𝑝 𝑐 𝑝 𝑝 ) = 𝑄 𝑅, 𝑝 + 𝛼 𝑔 ,𝑝 𝐴 𝑉 (𝑇 𝑔 − 𝑇 𝑝 ) + 𝑄 𝑅𝑎𝑑, 𝑝 (7)
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2.1.3 Species equations and reactions
Species transport in the gas phase is given by equation 8. This equa tion is based on the gas phase
mass fraction 𝑌 𝑖 . Diffusive transport is modelled by an effec tive diffusivity 𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓 which is the sum of
the molecular diffusivity ca lculated from the viscosity , constant Schmidt number and th e turbulen t
diffusivity from the turbulence model. The source term 𝑆 𝐷 ,𝑖 represents the heterogenous reaction rate
fo r the speci es i in the in ner particle model. 𝑆 𝑖 is the homogenous reaction r ate c alcula ted by using
the Partially Steered Reactor (PaSR) model implemented in OpenFOAM 2.4. Fo r the homogenous
reac tions, two combined reaction mechanisms were used. For the combustion of the pyr olysis gases
the Jones-Linstedt (1988) was used, whereas for the combustion of the oil vapor in the gas phase the
mechanism by Pollhammer (2015) was implemented.
𝜕 ( 𝜀𝜌 𝑌 𝑖 )
𝜕𝑡 + 𝑑𝑖𝑣 ( 𝜀𝜌 𝑣
→ 𝑌 𝑖 ) − 𝑑𝑖𝑣 [ 𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓 𝑔𝑟𝑎 𝑑 ( 𝑌 𝑖 ) ] = 𝑆 𝐷 ,𝑖 + 𝑆 𝑖 (8)
In the particle phase two transport equations are sol ved, one for the m ass frac tion of the liquid oil 𝑋 𝑜𝑖𝑙
and one fo r th e li gnin mass fra ction 𝑋 𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑛 . Only convective transport a nd the py rolysis re action rate
fro m the inner particle model 𝑆 𝐷 ,𝑗 were considered.
𝜕 ( 𝐷𝑋 𝑗 )
𝜕𝑡 + 𝑑𝑖𝑣 (𝐷 𝑢
→ 𝑋 𝑗 ) = −𝑆 𝐷,𝑗 (9)
2.1.4 Turbulence modelling
For turbulence modelling a modi fied standard k- ε model was used. Bas ed on the studies of turbulence
behaviour in dust deflagrations by Spijker (2014), an additional sour ce term, based on the consistent
approac h of Crowe (Crowe, 2000) was implemented in the equation for the turbulent kinetic energy
𝑘 (equation 10 ). This term models the g eneration of turbulent ki netic en ergy due to the relative
velocity of the phases.
∂ ( 𝑘𝜌 )
∂𝑡 + 𝑣 𝑖 ∂ ( 𝑘𝜌 )
∂𝑥 𝑖 = ∂
∂𝑥 𝑖 ( 𝜇 𝑡
𝑃𝑟 𝑘 ∂𝑘
∂𝑥 𝑖 ) + 𝜇 𝑡 ( ∂𝑣 𝑖
∂𝑥 𝑗 + ∂𝑣 𝑗
∂𝑥 𝑖 ) ∂𝑣 𝑖
∂𝑥 𝑗 − 𝜀𝑝𝜌 + 𝜌 𝐷
𝜏 𝑝 | u
− 𝑣 | 2 (10)
2.1.5 Radiation
The ra diation model use d is a P1-model, consid ering absorption and emissi on of gas phase a nd
absorption, emission an d uniform scattering o f the particle pha se. Radi ation int ensity 𝐺 is using
equation 11. Here is 𝑎 the absorption coefficient of the gas phase. This coefficient will b e modelled
by a Weighted Sum of Gray Gases Model, based on the TNF6 Proceedings (Grosshandler 1993) .
This model considers te mperature de pended absorption of CO 2 , CO and H 2 O. The absorption
coeff icient of the particles 𝑎 𝑝 is calculated by formula 12, where 𝜀 𝑝 is a constant emission coefficient ,
𝐷 the mass concertation of dust, 𝜌 𝑝 the density of the particle and 𝑑 𝑝 the particle di am eter. I n sim ilar
manner the scattering co eff icient 𝜓 𝑝 for uniform scatt ering modelled (formula 13). The source t er m
for the energy equation o f each ph ase ( formula 14) is calculated by the diffe renc e between absorption
by the phase 𝐺𝑎 and emission by the phase 4𝑎𝜎 𝑇 𝑔 4 .
𝑑 𝑖𝑣 [ 1
3 ( 𝑎+𝑎 𝑝 +𝜓 𝑝 ) 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑 ( 𝐺 ) ] + 4𝑎𝜎 𝑇 𝑔 4 + 4𝑎 𝑝 𝜎 𝑇 𝑝 4 = ( 𝑎 + 𝑎 𝑝 )𝐺 (11)
𝑎 𝑝 = 𝜀 𝑝 3 𝐷
𝜌 𝑝 𝑑 𝑝 (12)
𝜓 𝑝 = (1 − 𝜀 𝑝 ) 3 𝐷
𝜌 𝑝 𝑑 𝑝 (1 3)
𝑄 𝑅𝑎𝑑 = 𝐺𝑎 − 4𝑎𝜎 𝑇 𝑔 4 an d 𝑄 𝑅𝑎𝑑,𝑝 = 𝐺 𝑎 𝑝 − 4𝑎 𝑝 𝜎 𝑇 𝑔𝑝 4 (1 4)
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2.2 Inner particle Mode ls
2.2.2 Oil evaporation
The numeric al studies by Spijker (2017) on different for ms of resolved Lycopodium particles have
sh own that the maximum occurring thickness of the oil e vaporation region is less than 3,4 µ m . So,
the analytical model for the oil evaporation uses a c ore approach shown in figure 2. This approa ch is
based on t wo radii, 𝑟 0 is the constant particle radius equal to 𝑑 𝑝
2 , whereas the second 𝑟 𝑣 is the radius
of the o il saturated particle, ca lculated as a func tion of the oil mass fr action 𝑋 𝑜𝑖𝑙 . To a ccount the d ens
core, an a veraged core radius 𝑟 𝑐 is introduc ed. The calculation of the radius 𝑟 𝑣 is shown in e quation
15, where 𝑋 𝑜𝑖 𝑙, 𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑟𝑡 is the oil mass fraction before evaporation.
Fig. 2. Concept of the core model for the oil ev aporation
𝑟 𝑣 = [ 𝑋 𝑜𝑖𝑙
𝑋 𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 (𝑟 0 3 − 𝑟 𝑐 3 ) + 𝑟 𝑐 3 ] 1
3 (1 5)
The main transport m echanism for the oil vapor from the evaporating layer to the particle surface is
the convection through the po re structure. To de scribe the pr essure gr adient, the Carman Kozeny
(1956) equation for a sp herica l coordinate system is us ed (equation 16). Here is 𝑢 𝑟 radial velocity,
𝜇 𝑜𝑖𝑙 viscosit y of the oil vapor a t evapora ting temperature, 𝜀 𝑒𝑓𝑓 e ffective pore volum e fraction, 𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑒
pore diameter and 𝐹 stands for an empirical factor for the form of the pore structure.
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑟 = −𝜇 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑢 𝑟 ( 1−𝜀 𝑒𝑓𝑓 ) 2
𝐹 𝜀 𝑒𝑓𝑓 𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑒
2 (1 6)
To obtain the radial vel ocity continuity equation for a spheri cal coordinate system is de fined b y
equation 17 and used as the source term for the g lobal species equations. Here is 𝜌 𝑜𝑖𝑙 the density o f
the oil vapor, 𝑝 ∗ the vapor pressure of the oil ca lculated by the Antoine equation a nd 𝑝 ∞ the pre ssure
of the computing cell.
𝑆 𝐷 ,𝑜𝑖𝑙 = 𝐷 𝜌 𝑜𝑖 𝑙 𝜋𝐹 𝜀 𝑒𝑓𝑓 𝑑 ℎ 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑒
2
4𝜇 𝑜𝑖𝑙 ( 1−𝜀 𝑒𝑓𝑓 ) 2 𝑝 ∗ −𝑝 ∞
1
𝑟 𝑣 − 1
𝑟 0
(1 7)
This equation fails nume rically when 𝑟 𝑣 ≈ 𝑟 0 . For that reason, if 𝑟 𝑣 > 0.9 𝑟 0 simple enthalpy
differe nce eva poration model is used. To avoid unphysical conditions, the s ource them 𝑆 𝐷 ,𝑜𝑖𝑙 is set to
zero i f 𝑝 ∗ ≤ 𝑝 ∞ or 𝑋 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝐷 < 𝑆 𝐷,𝑜 𝑖𝑙 ∆𝑡
2 .
To eva luate the oil evaporation model, evaporation rates of the single particle models by Spijker
(2015) were use d. The 0D model n eglects transport effec ts and as a consequence overestimates
evapora tion rate of the oil. The 3D model represents a fully resolved pa rticle with a core structur e,
diffusive and convective transport though the pores . The boundary c onditions are mappe d fr om the
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two Lagrangian models (Particle 1, Particle 2), used for a dust deflagration in a vertical duct by
Spijker (2015). As can been see n fr om figure 3 evaporation rates calculated using eva poration model
3D model are almos t ide ntical. The sli ght diffe rence is c aused by th e sim plified round core in the
evapora tion model.
Fi g. 3. Compression of oil evaporation model to the 0D and 3D results from Spijker (2015)
2.2.3 Pyrolysis of the Lignine
The pyrolysis rates between the 0D, 1D and 3D studies of Spij ker (2015, 2017) show basically no
differe nce. The implementation of 8 reaction pyrolysis model would re quire 7 additional variables in
the particle phase of th e global model. To simpli fy the pyrolysis only one averaged reaction is
implemented (equation 18 ). The frequency factor 𝐴 , the activation energy 𝐸𝑎 and the reaction order
𝑛 are a veraged from the result s of the studies by Sp ijker (2015, 2017).
𝑆 𝐷 ,𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒 = D 𝐴
𝑋 𝐿𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛 ,𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑛 𝑒 − 𝐸𝑎
𝑅𝑇 𝑝 (𝑋 𝐿𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛, 𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑋 𝐿𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛 ) 𝑛 (18)
To provide different sou rce terms for the gas pha se, a spli tting gas factors for each spe cies 𝜙 𝑖 were
introduced. Th ese provide an average composition of the pyrolysis gases, based on the studies by
Spijker (2015, 2017).
𝑆 𝐷 ,𝑖 = 𝑆 𝐷 ,𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝜙 𝑖 (1 9)
0
1E-13
2E-13
3E-13
4E-13
5E-13
6E-13
0 0,05 0,1 0,15 0,2
evapora tion rate per particle [kg/s]
time [s]
Particle 1 3D (Spijker 2015) Particle 2 3D (Spijker 2015)
Particle 1, 0D (Spijker 2015) Particle 2, 0D (Spijker 2015)
Particle 1, evaporation model Particle 2, evaporation model
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3. Model evaluation and results
3.1 Evaluation
The model was evaluated by the flame propa gation from du ct experiment s by Kern (201 3) and th e
flame temperatur e meas urements by Wieser (2015). For both experiments the sa me apparatus was
used. A vertical duct wit h an inner diamet er of 140 mm and a length of 20 00 mm. At the top of the
duct pa rticles we re dispersed by a scre w conveyer and ignited a t the bottom by a spark. T he fir st step
in the modelling of dust deflagration in the duct is to a chieve the ini tial conditions befor e ignition.
For that purpose, the dust dispersion was modelle d, until there was no significant change in the dust
concertation and turbulence fi eld. Subsequently the mi xture w as igni ted by setting one ce ll to a
constant gas phase temperature of 2000 K for 20 m s. The top flame posit ion is the highest point i n
the duct wh ere the flame re aches a temperature ab ove 1000 K. In figure 4 the top flame position from
the evaporation model is comp are d to the flame sp eed model by Spijker (201 4) and experiments by
Kern (2013) w here the flame position is trac ked by video ana lysis. For the fir st simulations the same
grid was used as by Spij ker (2014), called normal grid. This grid has a hexahedral cell length of 2.5
mm . Here is the flame v elocity using the evaporation model much slower than th e 0D model and
adequate accordance to t he measurements. The fl ame speed m odel by Spijker (201 4) has the best
agree ment with the experiment unti l 200 ms. Flame velocities of the evaporation model are in good
accordance to the mea surements after 120 ms but overe stimated at the beginni ng. A grid study for
this model shows grid independency for a hexahedral cell length of 1 mm (fine grid). The coarser
grid overestimates the flame ve locity at the begi nning, caused by the l arger volume of the ignition
cell and therefore higher ignition energy.
Fig. 4. Comparison of the top flame position between different models and experimental results
from Kern (2013)
0
0,25
0,5
0,75
1
1,25
1,5
0 40 80 120 160 200 240
top flame position [m]
time after ignition [ms]
Experiment (Kern 2013) 0D model
Evaporation model, normal grid Evaporation model, fine gr id
Flame speed model (Spijker 2012)
4
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The measurements by Wieser (2015) wh ere carried out by the an alysis of the transient h eat up of
thermocouples. The measurements have a large spread, still all simulation results are within given
range (T able 1). The temperatures of the 0D and evaporation model are close due to the li mitation of
oxygen. The flame speed model has a different th ermophysical model, ba sed on p rogress v ariables
and calculates slightly lower te mperatures.
Table 1 : Comparison of the Flame temperatures
Hight in t he duct
Measured
tempera te
(Wieser 201 5)
Temperat ure
flame speed
model
(Spijker 2 014)
Temperat ure
0D m odel
Temperat ure
evapora tion
model
300 mm
1 186 K – 1642 K
(3 )
1205 K
1238 K
1232 K
600 mm
1222 K - 1299 K
(3 )
1219 K
1251 K
1246 K
900 mm
1 149 K – 1307 K
(3 )
1 153 K
1225 K
1213 K
3.2 Evaporation and flame propagation
Till approx. 120 ms th e evaporation take s place in a thin laye r and the flame grow s in an elliptical
shape, as shown in figure 5 at 100 ms. After 120 ms the flame gets influenced by the w all and sta ts
to accelerate, where the top of the flame de forms and the thi ckness of the ev aporation layer in creases ,
as can be seen from figure 5 at 200 ms. Th is behaviour continues and the top of the fla me deforms
further, the volume of t he evaporation zone increases, as well as the total evaporation rate in th e
system. At 245 ms the flame reaches the high est point . Due to the rich mixture and the lack of oxygen
the flame starts to collapse, as shown at 250 ms.
100 ms
200 ms
225 ms
245 ms
250 ms
Fig. 5. Representation of the flame position and evaporation zone. The orange iso- su rface
represents the flame position at the temperature of 1000 K, the green represents particles with 1 %
of the initial o il content and the brown particles with 99 % of the initial o il content.
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4. Conclusions and outlook
Imple mentation of the ev apora tion mode l using an analytical solution for the transport resistance in
the particle gives a bette r prediction of the flame in a Lycopodium deflagration then a 0 D model ,
without increasing calculation time significant ly . In the curr ent form the model is applicable to large
industrial geometries with reasonable calculation t ime and can expl ain the physics on a d etailed level.
Th e approach in this form is only applicable for the evaporation of f luids in the po re structures o f
small particles. The focus of further research is to d eve lop simplified models for other particles, using
highly resolved single particle models. A model for coal dusts i s in progress.
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Explosionsschutztag , Magdeburg
Proceedings of the 13th Symposium International Symposium
on Hazards, Prevention and Mitigation of Industrial Explosions
DOI: 10.7795/810.20200724
261
CFD Simulation of an Unconfined V apor
Cloud Explosion thr ough obstacles using
OpenF oam R
C. Langrée a , b , E. Franquet c , J. Re veillon a , G. Lecocq b & F .X. Demoulin a
a Comple x e de Recherche Interprofessionnel en Aérothermochimie (CORIA), Rouen, France
b Institut National de l’En vironnement Industriel et des Risques (INERIS), V erneuil en halatte,
France
c Laboratoire de Thermique, Ener gétique et Procédés (LaTEP), P au, France
E-mail: langr [email protected]
Abstract
In this work, numerical simulations are carried out to characterize the impact of obstacles on
flame propagation v elocity to properly assess the consequences of Unconfined V apor Cloud Explo-
sions (UVCE). W ithin this scope, an UVCE within a congested en vironment is simulated using RANS
modeling of the turb ulence. Comb ustion phenomena are characterized through the progress v ariable
transport equation. The simulation is done with the open source library OpenFoam R
. Numerical
results are compared with data from the INERIS and GDF-SUEZ e xperimental campaign EXJET
(hydrogen-air and methane-air e xplosions).
K eywords: hazar ds, industrial explosions, CFD, pr emixed comb ustion
1 Intr oduction
Unconfined V apor Cloud Explosion (UVCE) is one of the most dev astating industrial accidents
possible (J. Daubech (2016)). The loss of containment of a flammable product (e.g. methane or
hydrogen) can lead to the formation of a flammable cloud all across the plant. The resulting mixture
can be lit by an y ener gy source within the cloud (e.g. sparkles, hot surfaces). The propagation of the
flame front within the cloud can cause damaging pressure ef fects in close and long range. In order
to assess these damages, CFD can be used, in parallel with widely used phenomenological tools.
The open source code OpenF oam R
has already been used for such purpose (Bauwens et al. (2011),
Ghasemi et al. (2014), Rao et al. (2018)). The global aim of this study is to improv e numerical
methods for CFD simulation of industrial UVCE.
Hazardous consequences of UVCE are mainly caused by the o v er -pressure generated by the
propagation of the flame front. In deflagration cases, this ov er-pressure is directly link ed to the
flame front propagation speed (J. Daubech (2016)). In an industrial configuration, the flame front
is impacted by the v arious obstacles in its way (e.g. pipes, walls). One of the consequences of the
presence of obstacles is an acceleration of the flame front (Moen et al. (1980), Moen et al. (1982))
and, consequently , man y e xperiments has been conducted to e v aluate this ef fect. The EXJET cam-
paign (INERIS, GDF-SUEZ) has been set to study experimentally the ef fect of an obstacle module
on the propagation of a flame front in man y configurations (steady flammable mix, methane-air jet,
hydrogen-air jet).
2 Description of the experimental work
The e xperimental work considered here has been carried out by INERIS and GDF-SUEZ (Sail
et al. (2014)). The aim of the experiment w as to study methane jet e xplosion in a congested en viron-
ment. The congestion module was a medium size (3m × 1m × 0.45m) obstacle module, consisting of
296 steel tubes of 2cm diameter . In the framew ork of the EXJET experimental setup, se veral e xperi-
ments ha v e been carried out : methane jet dispersion within the module (without ignition), methane
jet ignition within the module, and ignition of a steady methane-air mix. The steady methane-air mix
13 t h International Symposium on Hazar ds, Pr evention and Mitigation of Industrial Explosions
Braunsc hweig, GERMANY - J uly 27-31, 2020
ISHPMIE 2020
Braunschweig, Germany
Proceedings of the 13th Symposium International Symposium
on Hazards, Prevention and Mitigation of Industrial Explosions
DOI: 10.7795/810.20200724
262
5 Conclusions
In this study , a methane-air explosion in a confined en vironment has been simulated. The
e xplosion "at rest" case of the EXJET (INERIS GDF-SUEZ) as been taken to assess for the fidelity of
the simulation with OpenF oam R
. So far , se v eral aspects of the simulation ha ve sho wn good agreement
with the e xperiment : The accelerating ef fect of the obstacles can be reproduced, and magnitude
of both flame speed and ov er-pressure peaks are conserv ed. But the study fails to reproduce the
accelerating beha vior of the flame front and hence the ov er-pressure signals obtained numerically are
not accurately reproducing the e xperimental ones.
The ke y to reproduce with fidelity the ov er -pressure signals (and more specifically , the ov er
pressure peak v alues) is to capture with fidelity the flame propagation speed. Current works on the
transport equation for Ξ are carried out to take care of that aspects. Results will be updated accord-
ingly .
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