Who cares? The moral architecture of urban conflict

This is a draft chapter/article. The final version is available in Buchholz, T., & Kuzmanić, J. (2024). "Chapter 13: Who cares? The moral architecture of urban conflict". In Research Handbook on Urban Sociology. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Retrieved Feb 21, 2025, from https:// doi.org/10.4337/9781800888906.00021 It is deposited under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercialNoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. 204 13. Who cares? The moral architecture of urban conflict Tino Buchholz and Jere Kuzmanić Understanding social conflict is to understand what people care for, what they esteem, respect, and love. Approaching the other on eye level – as autonomous equals – and recognizing their lifeworlds, politics, and experiences is different from shared knowledge in the sphere of education. It also differs from imagination. Shared experience in shared space is key to intimate affection and immediate care. The relationship between social and spatial distance then introduces complexity and poses difficulties for organic solidarity with strangers, as Durkheim and Simmel already observed (Horgan 2017, 2012). Touching upon the ontological dimension of social self, community, and institutional formations with inner, emotional obligations and outer, socio-spatial constraints, we here revisit and update urban sociology’s conceptual foundations of solidarity and mutual care. Investigating the question of mutual care from inside (personal, inner nature) and outside (political, social nature), the chapter outlines pioneer sociological contributions around the epistemological questions of who cares for what and for whom and why care in the first place. Defining the field of social ties around social norms, forms, and scale, in the first part we discuss inner obligations and outer constraints of social care as ontological arguments of social will formation – that is, Tönnies’s (2017) ‘essential will’ of organic communities versus the ‘arbitrary will’ of mechanic society. Asking where individual and social motivations to care for others come from, in the first part we treat spatial relations implicitly. The urban experience nevertheless informs early concepts of social will formations, as Simmel (2020) looks at metropolitan experiences not as the ‘lost unity’ of organic communities but rather the ‘lost control’ of small-town obligations and the family. With a metropolitan view on modern society, Simmel (Berlin) and Durkheim (Paris) looked rather optimistically towards social formations in large cities, which are characterized by anonymity and alienation, on the one hand, and provide for an idea of social freedom, on the other. This picture is contrasted by small-town-resident Ferdinand Tönnies, who was more pessimist about the modern urban constellation and the loss of immediate social drives to care (i.e. shared experiences in shared space). Spatial relations thus significantly inform our analysis of these classic contributions. With Axel Honneth we then go one step further to investigate the moral grammar of social conflicts. Honneth’s (1995, 2011) work mobilizes social philosophy, sociology, and social psychology in order to craft a critical theory of conflict, justice, and social freedom that relies on emotional, legal, and social struggles for recognition. On ontological grounds he systematically links the subject’s inner moral motivation to care to ethical, social struggles for mutual recognition (Petherbridge 2011). Restoring individual self-confidence through mobilizations of collective support and solidarity – beyond Foucault – his analysis comes with consequences for political idealism and ideology, delivering a powerful explanation for the formation of social movements deeply rooted in subjective experiences of social disrespect (Honneth 1993, 1995). The outcome is a philosophy of justice that revives subjective morality and what we Who cares? The moral architecture of urban conflict 205 want from life: recognition of who we are or want to be as human beings (i.e. love, rights, solidarity) – to be at home in the other, as Honneth’s Hegelian formula goes. Social and spatial movements impart complexity to local struggles regarding whether one finds minimum recognition in local communities of shared values and when to resign, resist, and relocate (Buchholz 2016). The simultaneity of multiple, competing meanings, where, for example, homes are at least two things at once (i.e. economic privilege, achievement, and investment vs social need, good, and right), pose difficulties in terms of not losing oneself in alienated ‘relations of relationlessness’ (Jaeggi 2014). Moral explorations into individual and social expectations of a meaningful life thus pose questions regarding everyday, local community and imagined communities (i.e. national state and propertied society), which are also crucial for the planners’ community when intervening into the lifeworld of others in the name of property or the greater good. Addressing the self-confidence and self-limitations of planners, the chapter then discusses the moral architecture of urban conflict, and planning ethics, to present self-critical insights into personal, political, and institutional formations around propertied order. Urban planners are crucial agents for conflict and urban change when acting upon and within urban struggles but usually remain distant, neutral mediators. This is problematic for an understanding of polyrational conflict and mutual care (Inch et al. 2017, Davy et al. 2023). The legitimacy of planning interventions cannot be simply based upon legality but stems from an understanding of legitimacy, how planners ethically relate to normative values, struggles, and lifeworlds of distant others. Planners’ distance from urban struggles and their normative, emotional reservations thus come with damage for ethical institutions such as urban planning (Baum 2015). Hence, we address political subjectivity and social autonomy as crucial concepts for self-critical planning ethics, bringing Habermasian, insurgent, and anarchist planning scholars into conversation. FROM COMMUNITY TO SOCIETY: LOST UNITY AND LOST CONTROL From the outset of sociology, common ground of what is shared between individual members of society and what shared space has to do with this have been contested from the start (Dahme & Rammstedt 1984). Delegating the theoretical, normative challenges of the societal contract to philosophy, the founding fathers keep distant from society as object, or subject, of their studies. They rather speak of sociation (Simmel), social action (Weber), non-logical action (Pareto), or collective consciousness (Durkheim). Ferdinand Tönnies, whose pioneer work Community and Society (2017) explicitly targets the two grand categories for sociology, speaks of a system of social exchange as bottom line. As a member of his time, Tönnies looked at sociology as a mix of social biology, social anthropology, and social psychology, although in a dialectical manner. In his seminal study Community and Society, first published in 1887, community life is organic and society is rather mechanic. For Tönnies (2017), organic community life does not rely on the reflective thought of a societal contract: it is spontaneous, immediate, emotional, and naturally pre-given. As such he emphasizes the family and the home as origin of the organic community: ‘the study of home is to the study of community what the study of organic cells is to the study of social life’ (Tönnies 2017: 47, authors’ translation, see also Wirth 1926). 206 Research handbook on urban sociology In the conventional modern family, social ties come about naturally, where the mother expresses ultimate care, crafting a common language, while it is the father who first introduces notions of powerful authority to the organic community. Siblings establish the most organic ties, which consist of shared memory, custom, and therefore equality – care – when growing up together (Tönnies 2017: 27). Beyond the family, Tönnies highlights the neighborhood for a sense of shared identity through routine customs of everyday encounters. Friendship is not associated with the immediate intimacy of the home or the routine encounter of the neighborhood. Friendship does not have a place-specific shared aspect. Friendship, in other words, departs from the organic community of the nuclear family and its self-made friends; friendship is normatively chosen. The constitutive elements of organic community formation for Tönnies thus strongly rely on shared history and shared space, where lived encounters of shared habits, customs, and memories shape inner obligations of mutual care to form the ‘essential will’ of the community (Cahnman 1976, Marcucci 2017). Bodily ties further lead him to speak of villages and cities as a social body and living organism, an ensemble of cooperatives and families, whose language, customs, soil, and architecture reveal continuity and change (Tönnies 2017: 60ff.). Differentiating between the ‘essential will’ of organic communities and the ‘arbitrary will’ of state-led societies, Tönnies traces forms of lost social unity, harmony and the limits of social cohesion – contested by modernity and industrial urbanization – through social will formation (Marcucci 2017). While organic community life brings means and ends together through interpersonal ties of immediate affection as essential will, the modern social contract of societies comes with artificial ties and thought alone. Hobbes’s ‘war of all against all’ guides his social analysis of evolutionary development, while his critique of state-led society anticipates what Anderson (2006) has called ‘imagined communities’. Tönnies is not naive however. Humankind can take the form of social and asocial characters, and both momentums depend on specific contexts and complement one another: ‘Yet… the organic view, he means to say, precedes the rationalistic view logically and historically’ (Cahnman 1976: 843). Tönnies’ reading of historical social relations thus quasi-ontologically investigates social will as defining element of local social ties. For the arbitrary moment of societal will formation various scholars struggle with the confusion inherent to the German publication since Tönnies originally used Willkür, which indeed translates as the arbitrariness of societal will, but changed his terminology for the third edition of the book into the softer notion of Kürwille (Lichtblau 2012: 11). Kürwille is a neologism that is unique to Tönnies’ sociology, which still bears the artificial connotation but which also links to the art of making society. Scholars further debate why Durkheim, in contrast, came up with a reverse conceptualization of mechanic and organic solidarity, framing pre-modern solidarity among equals as mechanic solidarity, while modern solidarity between privileged and underprivileged strangers serves as a desirable standard of organic solidarity (Aldous et al. 1972, Horgan 2017, Marcucci 2017). This organic standard of solidarity was neither realized during Durkheim’s lifetime nor is human society anywhere close to organic solidarity on a global scale today. FROM SOCIAL WILL TO SOCIAL FORM The Parisian Durkheim and Berlin-born Simmel both looked at modern social relations with more optimism than Tönnies. Giving weight to the role of the individual in community and Who cares? The moral architecture of urban conflict 207 society, Simmel (2020) focuses less on the loss of social unity but rather on social diversity in urban processes of sociation. Emphasizing social forms over norms, his normative reservations express the positivist spirit and socialist controversies around 1900 (Levine 1984). Simmel’s major motivation was to shift sociology away from naturalistic explanations when focusing on the project of modernity; that is, the formation of individualization, sociation, and reification are placed at its core. He shared the non-organicistic interest with economic historian Max Weber, who only later turned to sociology. With Weber he also shared the claim of value-free non-normativity as a sociological lens of analysis. In contrast to Weber’s positivist take on objectivity, Simmel sought to objectify subjective needs as sociation process, looking at ‘norms in their forms’ (1910: 377), rather than promoting objectivity as a social research outcome (Adorno et al. 1993, Rammstedt 1988). In his essay ‘How is Society Possible?’ Simmel (1910) keeps a distance from positivist accounts of what members of society necessarily share. Highlighting a variety of social forms and the role of the individual therein: ‘The matter in question is the processes of reciprocation which signify for the individual the fact of being associated’ (Simmel 1910: 378). Addressing the fragments of individual performance and societal abstraction, Simmel thus brings together norms, forms, and scales of socialization processes, addressing a concept of reciprocity that reveals the pitfalls of individual action and social reality: ‘a single life… is lived from two sides’ (Simmel 1910: 382). Social abstraction from individual performance – at a greater scale – makes Simmel insist on particular constellations and speak of ‘imagined completeness’ while ‘each element of a group is not a societary part, but beyond something else’ (Simmel 1910: 381). Social abstraction, in other words, informs functional, political judgments of various sorts: are all sinners evil, all teenagers foolish, all planners technocrats, all cops bastards? Specific moments and places may certainly provide the political context for polarized, normative judgment. Without such a context, however, for Simmel (1910) the individual is always something extra: a product of society and a member thereof. The singular crucially informs the social constellation, and the other way around (Aronowitz 1994). Differentiating forms of socialization, Simmel thus includes norms in forms but excludes morality from his sociological analysis of social formations. For Durkheim, by contrast, social life is nothing else than the moral milieu that surrounds the individual (Levine 1984: 322). For Durkheim morality is an outer social phenomenon that is imposed on the individual by the church, state, and society (Cahnman 1976). Even the most intimate act of individual defeat – suicide – Durkheim (2014) explains as social consequence. Although an early source of inspiration, Simmel remained too vague for Durkheim’s interest in social facts, and he was not alone in this, as Aronowitz (1994: 412) notes: Whereas, Lukacs, Ernst Bloch and others … saw the [revolutionary] fulfillment of the new Life in the Bolshevist forms, Simmel’s tragic imagination which was anything but utopic, held him back. Despite his own insistence that history is the working out of the contradiction between life and form … he could only see the chaos immanent in a revolution that appeared to be directed against form itself. As Aronowitz further observes, Lukacs later revised his revolutionary enthusiasm when embracing the limits of revolutionary class consciousness in history and everyday life: ‘Thus, while much of contemporary sociology considers conflict an exceptional event to be resolved 208 Research handbook on urban sociology by formal reconciliation, for Simmel and Lukacs ‘becoming’ and its presupposition, ‘dissonance’, is the essence of life’ (Aronowitz 1994: 405). A STAGE FOR CONFLICT: EMOTIONAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIAL SELF-REALIZATION Investigating the moral grammar of social conflicts, Axel Honneth’s (1995) philosophical anthropology takes together sociological explorations into the (inner) emotional obligations and (outer) social constraints discussed above, delivering a systematic threefold explanation of social conflict around social, legal, and emotional struggles for recognition. Following sociology’s interest in the relationship between autonomous subjects and community formation with Hegel’s philosophy and G. H. Mead’s social psychology, his interest targets the nature of social interaction with mutual recognition relations that rely on subjective, moral expectations of the good life and ethical relations-to-self that reveal a reflexive idea of social autonomy and social freedom (Deranty 2009, Honneth 2011). For Frankfurt School scholars, subjectivity has a central role to play for a critical theory of society, which is always reflexively social and political (Scherr 2005). Taking up political subjectivity, social autonomy and the making of self-confidence as starting point for care and conflict, Honneth outlines his critical theory of justice (Buchholz 2021). Although Tönnies and Durkheim both approached the empirical project of sociology with their lens of diagnosing the limits of morality, solidarity, and law in the modern social contract (Aldous et al. 1972, Cahnman 1976, Marcucci 2017), ‘neither of them give the phenomenon of social confrontation a systematic role in their basic concepts’, Honneth (1995: 160) states. Simmel’s sociology certainly started to give weight to the individual motivation and socializing function of conflict, as he considered forms of social difference and hostility as sources of conflict, ‘but he does so little to trace this dimension of personal and collective identity back to intersubjective preconditions associated with recognition that it is impossible for moral experiences of disrespect to come into view as the occasions for social conflict’ (Honneth 1995: 161). Honneth explicitly points to the limits of academic sociology – giving priority to interests instead of needs –underrating subjective moral experiences of disrespect for the emergence of conflict and social movements (Honneth 1995). Capturing the personal victims’ perspective, Honneth deeply embraces the subjective dimension of social suffering and social struggle, where harms to subjective morality form the start of any conflict, protest, and resistance. ‘For the victims of disrespect… engaging in political action has the direct function of tearing them out of the crippling situation of passively endured humiliation and helping them in turn, on their way to a new, positive relation-to-self’ (Honneth 1995: 164). Through protest and resistance, disrespected individuals thus restore their self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem, which are central elements to the structure of recognition relations. For social psychology Honneth (2012) follows Mead and Winnicott, where individual needs for mutual recognition take the form of lifelong struggles that start at birth. Here, the innocent child depends on primary caretakers – the mother or other –, internalizing the need for emotional care and social ties through intersubjective gestures and rituals. Winnicott goes as far as to state that even adults never lose the experience of this initial impulse when later experiencing growing individual autonomy: searching for emotional care of others throughout Table 13.1 Structure of recognition relations Modes of recognition Emotional support Cognitive respect Social esteem Dimension of personality Needs and emotions Moral responsibility Traits, abilities, and achievements Forms of recognition Primary relationships (love, friendship) Legal relations (rights) Community of value (solidarity) Relation-to-self Self-confidence Self-respect Self-esteem Forms of disrespect Abuse and rape Denial of rights, exclusion Denigration, insult Threatened component of personality Physical integrity Social integrity ‘Honor’, dignity Source: Honneth (1995: 129), edited by the authors. Who cares? The moral architecture of urban conflict 209 the course of social life, the individual frequently falls back to the initial need for intense fusion the human subject has once experienced, that is, love (Honneth 2012: 210). Rooting one’s need for emotional care in early childhood, Honneth (2012) ontologically outlines the formation of the I in We throughout lifelong struggles for intersubjective self-realization in the spheres of emotional, social, and legal recognition (i.e. friends and family, community and society, the market and the state) (see Table 13.1). The internalization of moral values thus starts in childhood and is later experienced in the other social constellations of school and everyday life, where the state, church, society, and property market challenge the legitimacy of homemade moral achievements and a just social order. For the legitimacy of legality, Honneth argues that unconditional love and context-specific solidarity compete with historical, legal conventions, while legal recognition historically follows social recognition as a ‘parasite’ (Honneth 2011: 221). Although not free from ambivalence (Butler 2021) Honneth’s philosophical anthropology thus touches upon the inner nature and interpersonal social outplay of identity formations. His point should not be confused with identity politics, as Nancy Fraser puts it, but rather associated with identity formation, as when he states: ‘The reproduction of social life is governed by the imperative mutual recognition, because one can develop a practical relation-to-self only when one has learned to view oneself, from the normative perspective of one’s partners in interaction, as their social addressee’ (Honneth 1995: 92). Against Fraser he argues that identity formation is a social process that relies on the intersubjective moment of recognition – or disrespect – between at least two subjects, who provide one another with the mutual recognition that is needed for self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem. Normative struggles of social self-formation and political order precede distributional justice (Fraser & Honneth 2003). Whoever seeks to escape the narcissistic trap of atomistic self-formation thus requires a social idea of human interaction and the social response of others. One cannot do this alone (Ehrenberg 2015). In contrast to egocentric, atomistic self-formation, which is characteristic of neoliberal ideas of self-realization, Honneth’s moral starting point of social engagement thus concerns the quality and mutuality of social relations within three spheres of mutual recognition: social esteem, legal respect, and emotional care (see Table 13.1). 210 Research handbook on urban sociology POWER AND SCALES OF STRUGGLES FOR RECOGNITION While subjective moral expectations highlight normative values one cares for emotionally, respects legally, and esteems socially, these inner moral expectations then enter the social arena of interpersonal ethical relations at different social, legal, and spatial scales. Honneth (1997: 37) makes clear that normativity and scale both impact the forms of recognition significantly. Scale is crucial to normative limits of shared identity (see Figure 13.1). Beyond the interpersonal dimension of social interaction and conflict, he is moreover aware of historical and ideological group formations, where intra-subjective moral values (e.g. father, teacher, leader, god) inform powerful inter-subjective ethical struggles. When challenged to differentiate between recognition and power, Honneth argues that powerful recognition relations are interpersonal in the end and ‘practices of recognition don’t empower persons, but subject them’ (2007: 323). Like his Frankfurt colleagues and Foucault, Honneth is skeptical about an alienated perspective on power relations, as if they were not human-made or socially approved: recognition can take the form of ideology (i.e. nationalist, classist, racist, sexist, and so on). Historicizing moral progress with normative reservations and emphasis on human agency for self-critical judgment, he states: ‘Because we live in an era that regards itself as being morally superior to past ages, we are certain that the esteem enjoyed by the virtuous slave, the good house-wife, and the heroic soldier was of purely ideological character’ (Honneth 2007: 326, emphasis added). What sounds provocative at first sight is due to critical theory’s reliance on immanent critique (Stahl 2013): not to judge political constellations from an outer standpoint but to aim for normative reconstruction of the legitimating moral infrastructure situated at moments and places. Following Deranty (2009), Honneth’s Critique of Power (1993) reads like an explicit critique of Habermas when making the notions of interpersonal power and infinite struggle strong: As Honneth writes, the institutions of the economy and the state are never just embodiments of purely objective, instrumentally rational considerations; they are framed within ‘political-practical principles’, which themselves depend upon (distorted) communicative processes. The same can be said of economic and administrative institutions. What falls out of view, in the end, is the centrality of struggle in the organisation of society. (Deranty 2009: 97, emphasis added) The value of Honneth’s self-critical theoretical turn, therefore, is to realize the normativity of moral values individuals consider just or good, which implies historical constellations and situated practices of qualitative recognition for social hierarchies, power relations, and uneven developments that do not necessarily lead to open, public conflict but are internalized and articulated in different forms. This comes with consequences for scales of common human ties (i.e. global solidarity) and postcolonial critique, the historical limits of moral progress, and the abandonment of a social telos in the name of modernity (Allen 2016) on the right side of history: ‘We must ask, therefore, whether we can continue to speak of a ‘moral grammar’ or ascribe an emancipatory meaning to the struggle for recognition once we have realised that recognition as such implies neither freedom from domination nor the absence of power’ (Honneth 2007: 350). Feminist critique contributes to this line of reason, as social justice has deep roots in feminist urban anthropology and sociology (Mann & Huffman 2005, Tristan 1840, Weber & Bermingham 2003) focused on gender inequality in suburban, heteronormative lifestyles and emotional labor (Hochschild 1983, Komarovsky 1940). Iris Marion Young Who cares? The moral architecture of urban conflict 211 (2007) explicitly targets ‘love’s labor’ in Honneth’s feminism and welcomes his overall argument. THE MORAL ARCHITECTURE OF URBAN CONFLICT Spatial relations complicate the picture for political analysis of urban conflict once people move towards or away from local conflict – voluntarily or forced – for the sake of normative ideals or a better life or to stay alive. Beyond the limits of chance and choice in moving freely, the question remains: what touches, what moves the subject socially, legally, and emotionally? Spatial relations of social formations reveal simultaneous social orders in the form of territorial b/orders, propertied order, gendered practices, and cultural qualities of social life at different places, which do not only involve one single conflict or one history but many (España 2021, Massey 2005). The multitude of simultaneous local conflicts also raises questions of socio-spatial complexity: ideas of spatial un/consciousness, spatial autonomy, and the polyrationalities of the good life in place (Davy et al. 2023, Pohl 2019). Such complex urban constellations made Edward Soja (2010: 71) claim: ‘We are spatial beings’. For moral geography, David M. Smith (1994, 2000) has stressed common human needs, while respecting differences, explicitly referring to ethical, mutual recognition relations with Kant and Habermas: ‘We should not be prepared to do to distant others what we would not do to ourselves and our own kind’ (Smith 1994: 294). Considering a variety of intellectual routes to normative justice, he argues that relativist and relational spatial explanations benefit from a universal idea of social relations. For this matter also Walzer (2019) makes a distinction between thin universal morality and a thick, particular, local morality, which connects to Honneth’s argument on strong ethical relations and a weak idea of the moral good (Fraser & Honneth 2003: 262). Localizing struggles for recognition in history and geography is to link normative ideas of social self-realization to forms of struggle and the scale of the greater good (see Figure 13.1). Individuals, in this sense, seek mutual recognition (of who they are or want to be) and communities of shared values – be they the traditional or chosen family (friends) or other social constellations of solidarity – where they find minimum recognition in social space (Horgan 2017). In case of local disrespect, they may suffer and ‘resign’ (i.e. lower expectations of an urban experience and the good life while remaining in place), ‘resist’ the ruling social order (i.e. restore self-confidence when opposing ideological recognition in place), or ‘relocate’ after time (i.e. struggle for the good life elsewhere). Possibilities of relocation primarily respond to one’s energy to struggle (i.e. local commitment to values and place), chances for resistance, and the quality of resignation at a certain moment and place. Relocation further responds to education and imagination (i.e. the good life elsewhere) and fundamentally requires freedom of movement and other resources (i.e. purchase power, property, citizenship, solidarity), which are limited (Buchholz 2016). 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