The definition of consequentialism: a survey

ARTICLE The Definition of Consequentialism: A Survey Oscar Horta1* , Gary David O’Brien2and Dayron Teran1 1 University of Santiago de Compostela, Spain and 2 Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK *Email: [email protected] Abstract There are different meanings associated with consequentialism and teleology. This causes confusion, and sometimes results in discussions based on misunderstandings rather than on substantial disagreements. To clarify this, we created a survey on the definitions of ‘consequentialism’and ‘teleology’, which we sent to specialists in consequentialism. We broke down the different meanings of consequentialism and teleology into four component parts: Outcome-Dependence, Value-Dependence, Maximization, and AgentNeutrality. Combining these components in different ways we distinguished six definitions, all of which are represented in the philosophical literature. We asked the respondents which definition is best for consequentialism and for teleology. The most popular definition of consequentialism was the one which accepted value-dependence, but not maximization and agent-neutrality. We therefore recommend the use of this meaning to avoid misunderstandings. The results for teleology were more problematic, with several respondents claiming they never use the term, or indicating that it is confusing. I. Introduction While consequentialism is one of the most prevalent paradigms in ethical theory, the ways in which it is understood by different thinkers diverge significantly. This divergence is evident even among moral philosophers whose research focuses on consequentialism. The different meanings associated with the term ‘consequentialism’cause confusion, and may be the cause of discussions which are not based on substantial disagreement but on different understandings of the terms being used. All definitions of consequentialism accept the following condition: Outcome-Dependence: whether something (e.g., actions, decisions, rules, character features, or any other thing or combination of things) is right or wrong (or to what degree it is right or wrong) depends completely on the outcomes that (may) occur. 1 © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited. 1 This condition is based on Sinnott-Armstrong (2019). We have made it more general so that it encompasses (i) both objective consequentialism (rightness depends on the outcomes that actually occur) and subjective consequentialism (rightness depends on which outcomes we can reasonably expect to occur); Utilitas (2022), 1–18 doi:10.1017/S0953820822000164 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000164 Published online by Cambridge University Press The above is a necessary condition for any version of consequentialism. However, there are other conditions often associated with consequentialism on which there is no consensus. It is unclear whether these conditions are necessary for a moral theory to be consequentialist. They are: Value-Dependence: whether something (e.g., actions, decisions, rules, character features, or any other thing or combination of things) is right or wrong (or to what degree it is right or wrong) depends completely on the goodness or badness of the outcomes that (may) occur. Maximization: whether something (e.g., actions, decisions, rules, character features, or any other thing or combination of things) is right or wrong (or to what degree it is right or wrong) depends completely on whether certain things are (or may be) maximized. Agent-Neutrality: whatever makes something (e.g., actions, decisions, rules, character features, or any other thing or combination of things) right or wrong (or right or wrong to a greater or lesser degree) must do so independently of the viewpoint of any particular agent. The acceptance or rejection of the above conditions results in different definitions of consequentialism, and this has important consequences for categorizing a given view as consequentialist or non-consequentialist. The following are examples of some positions that may or may not be categorized as consequentialist depending on which of the above conditions your definition of consequentialism accepts. Promoting things that are not valuable. According to some people, we should promote (either directly or indirectly) some things even if doing so does not promote what is good or reduce what is bad. For instance, consider the case of someone who thinks that the best situation is that in which aggregate welfare is maximized. Suppose that she also thinks that inequality should be reduced just because it is right to do so, even when doing so brings about scenarios that in her view are less valuable because they contain less aggregate welfare. This person would hold the view that something is right if and only if it promotes both equality and welfare. If our definition of consequentialism just accepts Outcome-Dependence, but does not include Value-Dependence, then this view counts as consequentialist. However, if our definition does include the requirement of Value-Dependence, then this view does not count as consequentialist. In fact, this case can have a stronger version. This person could not just accept that we should promote equality and welfare, but hold the view that we should maximize both things. In that case her view would be consequentialist if our definition just included the requirements of both Outcome-Dependence and Maximization, but, again, not if it also demanded Value-Dependence. 2 and (ii) both direct consequentialism and indirect consequentialism, including among others indirect-act consequentialism, virtue consequentialism, or rule consequentialism. Other views, such as motive consequentialism or global consequentialism, can be included under this definition as well, as the list of examples of items that could be right or wrong according to consequentialist views included in it is not exhaustive nor necessarily disjunctive. 2 Perhaps the best-known view of this sort might be that of Rawls. He claims that the principles he uses to describe his account of justice as fairness are deontological, even though those principles imply Outcome Dependence, because they do not imply Value Dependence. As is known, Rawls assumed Value Dependence was required for a position to be consequentialist or teleological. He writes. ‘It should be 2 Oscar Horta, et al. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000164 Published online by Cambridge University Press Satisficing. Some people hold the view that something is right if and only if it promotes (either directly or indirectly) what is good or reduces (either directly or indirectly) what is bad at least to some extent, although not necessarily beyond that. If our definition of consequentialism accepts Outcome-Dependence and Value-Dependence but rejects Maximization then this view counts as consequentialist; if, however, it requires Maximization, then it does not. Agent-Relativity. Finally, some people hold the view that something is right from the point of view of a moral agent if and only if it promotes (either directly or indirectly) what is good or reduces (either directly or indirectly) what is bad from a viewpoint relative to that agent. They may defend this even though they can agree that this is not what would promote the best situation from an agent-neutral perspective. If our definition of consequentialism accepts Outcome-Dependence and Value-Dependence but rejects Agent-Neutrality then this view counts as consequentialist; if it requires Agent-Neutrality, then it does not. 3 The acceptance/rejection of the above conditions results in confusion over whether a particular view should be categorized as consequentialist or not. Furthermore, it may also lead to unproductive discussions in which the parties to a dispute talk past each other. For example, many critiques of consequentialism emphasize its supposed demandingness, or its alleged inability to allow for preferential treatment for one’s friends and family. 4 Such criticism, however, is only relevant to consequentialist positions that endorse Maximization and Agent-Neutrality respectively, and so pose no threat to views that reject these conditions. To adequately assess the merits of any particular consequentialist position, it is necessary first to be clear on which of the above conditions that position accepts. Any strategy of criticizing consequentialism by assuming that all consequentialist positions must endorse some or all of the above conditions and arguing against those cannot succeed, as it is based on the faulty assumption that all versions of consequentialism must accept the same general set of conditions. 5 Partly because of this confusion in the exact meaning of ‘consequentialism’, another term that is sometimes used instead of, or together with it, is ‘teleology’. However, the same problems we have seen in the case of defining consequentialism are present in the case of defining teleology. We believe that the plurality of incompatible definitions of consequentialism and teleology causes confusion. This is regrettable and avoidable, because this plurality does not reflect a disagreement on any substantive philosophical problem. There is no one true definition of these terms. All the definitions presented here are reasonable and valid. The question of which of them we should accept is not a substantive question in normative ethics. In particular, whether we accept or reject Outcome-Dependence, Value-Dependence, Maximization, and Agent-Neutrality is something totally independent of whether we include the acceptance of those views as parts of the definition of ‘consequentialism’or ‘teleology’. If the terms ‘consequentialism’and ‘teleology’did not exist at all, the debates on whether Outcome-Dependence, Value-Dependence, noted that deontological theories are defined as non-teleological ones, not as views that characterize the rightness of institutions and acts independently from their consequences’(Rawls 1971: 26). 3 As in Promoting things that are not valuable, among those holding this view some may defend not just promoting, but maximizing what is good from an agent relative view, so their view may satisfy Outcome-Dependence, Value-Dependence, and Maximization, and yet fail to be consequentialist if we require Agent-Neutrality. 4 See Scheffler (1988) and Williams (1988) respectively. 5 This is what Mukerji (2016) has called the ‘definitional method’. Utilitas 3 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000164 Published online by Cambridge University Press Maximization, and Agent-Neutrality are acceptable moral views could take place in the same way. Equally, these debates can take place in the same way regardless of whether we decide to use the terms ‘consequentialism’and ‘teleology’with one meaning or another. Our decisions about which meanings to give to the terms ‘consequentialism’ and ‘teleology’don’t raise moral questions that can make a difference in those debates. However, the fact that different people use those terms with different meanings adds confusion to those debates and significantly impedes their success. So, to facilitate substantive philosophical discussion it would be useful to have agreed upon definitions of both terms. To investigate the question of how best to define consequentialism and teleology we ran a survey among specialists in this area. We did not rely only on what the most renowned experts in the field think. Rather, we intended to include a wide group of people who are likely to understand the implications of the different positions involved. The purpose of the survey was not to discover which normative views respondents considered to be correct, but to discover their opinions on the best way to understand the meaning of these terms. Furthermore, our goals were prescriptive, not merely descriptive. Our aim was not simply to learn how people actually understand these terms. Rather, we want to know which definitions of these terms are the best candidates to facilitate clear philosophical discussion and it is our opinion that the definitions favoured by a majority of the experts in the field are the best candidates to fulfil that role. It is important to bear in mind that we are not claiming that there is some definition of consequentialism and teleology which, by combining the acceptance or rejection of Value-Dependence, Maximization, and Agent-Neutrality in a particular way, is better than others. Our working assumption is not that experts will be better situated to discover the right definitions of the terms in question, since, as indicated above, there are no such right definitions. There are competing incompatible definitions of these terms, all of which are valid ones. Because of this, we wanted to see if there were definitions for consequentialism and teleology that could garner more support than the others among those better situated to understand them. These could then be adopted as the standard definitions, thus avoiding confusion as different thinkers talk past each other. Finally, even if we fail to convince readers to agree on a particular definition, we think that there is value in pointing out the different ways in which thinkers use these terms – by making people more aware of the significant divergences in use of these terms, we may help avoid confusion even if no single definition is universally adopted. II. Methodology Questionnaire We used a survey for quantitative and qualitative data collection using a Google form. The survey included two closed and two open-ended questions. With the latter we intended to gather further ideas we might not have initially considered that may be relevant in the definition of consequentialism and teleology. The two closed questions were: Which of these different descriptions of the meaning of ‘consequentialism’do you consider more adequate? Which of these different descriptions of the meaning of ‘teleology’do you consider more adequate? 4 Oscar Horta, et al. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000164 Published online by Cambridge University Press In both cases, we presented the same set of possible answers, which are listed below: 1. Whether something (an action, a decision, whether a certain rule is followed, the possession of some character feature …) is right or wrong depends completely on its consequences, agent-neutrally considered. 6 2. Whether something (an action, a decision, whether a certain rule is followed, the possession of some character feature …) is right or wrong depends completely on the goodness or badness of its consequences, agent-neutrally considered. 7 3. Whether something (an action, a decision, whether a certain rule is followed, the possession of some character feature …) is right or wrong depends completely on whether it maximizes the goodness and/or it minimizes the badness of its consequences, agent-neutrally considered. 8 4. Whether something (an action, a decision, whether a certain rule is followed, the possession of some character feature …) is right or wrong depends completely on its consequences, whether agent-neutrally considered or from an agent-perspective. 9 5. Whether something (an action, a decision, whether a certain rule is followed, the possession of some character feature …) is right or wrong depends completely on the goodness or badness of its consequences, whether agent-neutrally considered or from an agent-perspective. 10 6. Whether something (an action, a decision, whether a certain rule is followed, the possession of some character feature …) is right or wrong depends completely on whether it maximizes the goodness or/and it minimizes the badness of its consequences, whether agent-neutrally considered or from an agent-perspective. 11 7. Other. Respondents choosing ‘Other’were in each case invited in a different question to explain the meanings of the terms they considered more adequate. We chose the six alternatives listed above because of the way they differ in their acceptance of the conditions required for a position to be consequentialist or teleological, as shown in Table 1. 12 6 This is accepted as a definition of consequentialism in Kupperman (1981); Williams (1988) and Sosa (1993). A similar definition is presented in Driver (2011), where consequentialism is described as the view that the rightness of actions depends largely on their consequences. 7 Consequentialism is defined in this way in Slote (1984); Griffin (1992); Brink (2005); Kamm (2008) and Parfit (2011). Consequentialism is defined in ways compatible with both definition 1 and definition 2 in Haines (2006) and in Jamieson and Elliot (2009). Teleology is defined in this way in Ashby (1950); Frankena (1963); Broome (2006); Chandra (2021). 8 Consequentialism is defined like this in Kagan (1984); Railton (1984); Scheffler (1988); Pettit (1989); (1993); McNaughton and Rawling (1991); Howard-Snyder (1994); Lenman (2000); Mulgan (2001). In addition, the way consequentialism is understood in Carlson (1995) would be compatible with both this definition and the second one. Teleology is defined like this in Rawls (1971); Attfield (1975); Portmore (2005); Ware (2018) and Thomsen (2020). 9 Consequentialism is defined like this in Sen (1982). 10 Consequentialism is defined like this in Bennett (1989). Teleology is defined like this in Broome (1991) and Fink (2007). 11 Consequentialism is defined like this in Skorupski (1995). Teleology is defined like this in Schroeder (2007). 12 For this reason, and for consistency, we did this in the case of teleological views as well, even though, while we found in the literature examples of all the six definitions presented above for consequentialism, for teleology we found examples of definitions 2, 3, 5 and 6, but not 1 or 4. Utilitas 5 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000164 Published online by Cambridge University Press Sample and recruitment process We sent an invitation to fill in the questionnaire via email to 116 scholars on consequentialism. We selected them according to the following criterion: all the authors of articles in the ‘Varieties of Consequentialism’section at the PhilPapers website with at least one citation. This was a way of discerning those who are most likely to understand the questions involved in the survey. We sent the chosen scholars a link to complete the survey in February 2021. To maximize the number of responses we got, we made the survey as short as we possibly could, and so we did not include questions about demography. We obtained a total of 35 responses. Among them, there were 34 responses to the question concerning the definition of consequentialism and 33 responses to the one about the definition of teleology. We considered the possibility of running another survey targeting a wider group of potential participants, including other scholars and philosophers who do not specialize in the specific topic of consequentialism, to compare the results with this one. However, we rejected this idea, given our prescriptive rather than descriptive aim. If we ran this survey targeting a wider group of non-specialists and the results conflicted, we would still consider more reliable the opinions of those who are more likely to understand the implications of the different definitions than the opinions of those who may not. III. Results The definition of consequentialism Direct preferences Among those who chose ‘other’, two of them presented options that appeared to accept Value-Dependence, and reject Maximization and Agent-Neutrality, according to which they could be considered close to definition 5 presented in the list (see Table 2). 13 Table 1. Conditions for a view to be consequentialist/teleological included in each definition Definitions Conditions Value-Dependence Maximization Agent-Neutrality 1NoNoYes 2 Yes No Yes 3YesYesYes 4NoNoNo 5 Yes No No 6YesYesNo 13 ‘I define consequentialism not as a single doctrine, but as a broad approach to ethics and political philosophy: consequentialism attempts to explain ethical phenomena (such as the rightness of actions, reasons for action, the justice of institutions, or the virtuousness of character traits) as being a function of the goodness of outcomes. This is intended to allow for (a) indirect forms of consequentialism, such as Rule Consequentialism and Motive Consequentialism, (b) non-maximising forms of consequentialism, and (c) agent-relative as well as agent-neutral forms of consequentialism.’ ‘I’m sympathetic to the description in #5 with this caveat: Whether an action (or decision) is morally 6 Oscar Horta, et al. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000164 Published online by Cambridge University Press Another one accepted Value-Dependence and Maximization but did not address Agent-Neutrality, due to which they are closer to definitions 3 or 6. 14 Finally, two other responses did not indicate any position on Value-Dependence, Maximization, or Agent-Neutrality, and provided other reasons to reject the definitions presented in the list, including a preference for defining consequentialism in terms of reasons for action, instead of what is right, and an objection that the definitions may not adequately accommodate forms of consequentialism other than act consequentialism. 15 The direct votes for definition 5 were equivalent to 47.06% of the votes, which is a very high number. Moreover, if we count the two votes under the label ‘other’that appeared to be close to definition 5 as equivalent to votes for 5, then that means that 18 respondents would have supported that option. This is equivalent to 52.94%, which is the majority of respondents. Indirect preferences By voting for a certain definition, respondents expressed approval or rejection of the different conditions which that definition, in comparison to the available alternatives, holds as necessary for a view to be consequentialist. Accordingly, we can extract from the responses presented above the stances with regard to the three conditions for a position to be consequentialist that are at stake (see Table 3). In addition, we can also consider here the views held by those who voted ‘other’. These included two votes for Value-Dependence and against Maximization and Table 2. Direct votes for preferred definitions of consequentialism Definition Votes 1. No Value-Dependence ⋅No Maximization ⋅Agent-Neutrality 1 2. Value-Dependence ⋅No Maximization ⋅Agent-Neutrality 8 3. Value-Dependence ⋅Maximization ⋅Agent-Neutrality 3 4. No Value-Dependence ⋅No Maximization ⋅No Agent-Neutrality 1 5. Value-Dependence ⋅No Maximization ⋅No Agent-Neutrality 16 6. Value-Dependence ⋅Maximization ⋅No Agent-Neutrality 0 Other 5 right depends completely on the goodness or badness of its consequences *and the goodness or badness of the consequences of the alternatives to that action*, whether agent-neutrally considered or from an agent perspective.’[As it is expressed, this response seems to accept Maximization, though the fact that it explicitly indicates a sympathy for definition 5 led us to conclude that the respondent actually rejects Maximization.] 14 ‘An evaluative focal point (e.g., an action, rule, motive, etc.) is right or wrong if and only if, and because it outranks all available alternatives according to the relevant evaluative ranking.’ 15 ‘To accommodate Scalar Consequentialism, the view should be formulated in terms of reasons, not rightness. E.g. The strength of one’s reasons to phi depends entirely on the consequences (whether agentneutral or agent-relative) of phi-ing.’ ‘All of the above are definitions of act consequentialism. Rule consequentialism denies that the rightness or wrongness of an act depends exclusively on a comparison of the act’s consequences with the consequences of alternative acts.’ Utilitas 7 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000164 Published online by Cambridge University Press Agent-Neutrality, as well as one vote for Value-Dependence and Maximization. Adding all these votes together, we get these results: Total votes for and against Value-Dependence: 30 vs 2 Total votes for and against Maximization: 4 vs 28 Total votes for and against Agent-Neutrality: 12 vs 19 We can therefore conclude that: There is substantial agreement that the condition of Value-Dependence is necessary to the definition of consequentialism: 93.75% of respondents agreed. There is also significant agreement that that the condition of Maximization is not necessary: 87.5% of respondents agreed. Most respondents also agreed that Agent-Neutrality is not a necessary condition either, even if the agreement here was not as substantial: 61.29% agreed. These results coincide with the results of respondents’direct preferences, suggesting that a definition like 5, which accepts Value-Dependence and rejects Maximization and Agent-Neutrality, should be preferred. The definition of teleology Direct preferences Among those who chose ‘other’, three appeared to reject Value-Dependence and Maximization, and to therefore be close to definitions 1 and 4, despite being formulated differently from the ones in the survey (see Table 4). 16 Another one rejected Value-Dependence and Maximization, and accepted Agent-Neutrality, in line with Table 3. Support for each of the conditions for a view to be consequentialist expressed by direct votes for preferred definitions of consequentialism Value-Dependence Maximization Agent-Neutrality Votes Against Against For 1 For Against For 8 For For For 3 Against Against Against 1 For Against Against 16 For For Against 0 16 ‘Whether something is right or wrong depends on a conception of what is good or desirable as an end to be pursued or achieved.’ ‘Whether something is right or wrong depends on it realizing its end, where that includes both causal consequences and constitutive becoming.’ ‘I think this is a bad term because of the baggage that “teleology”brings with it. But insofar as it can be used sensibly it should be used for any theory that holds that things are right or wrong (etc) in virtue of some ends that they serve. This is a broader notion than consequentialism.’ 8 Oscar Horta, et al. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000164 Published online by Cambridge University Press definition 4. 17 Two others accepted Value-Dependence and rejected Maximization and Agent-Neutrality, thus presenting descriptions close to definition 5. 18 Two of them just identified it with Value-Dependence, even rejecting Outcome-Dependence, thus holding a view clearly different from any among the six options indicated in the list. 19 However, six other respondents stated that the term should not be used in this context. Two of them indicated that the term is not used by them or others. Three indicate that the term has other meanings different from the ones considered in this context, and one states that it is a confusing term that should not be used. 20 In this case, the direct votes that the most voted option got, which was again definition 5, were only equivalent to 24.24% of the votes. If we include the three votes under the label ‘other’that appeared to be close to definition 5, then that means that 11 Table 4. Direct votes for preferred definitions of teleology Definition Votes 1. No Value-Dependence ⋅No Maximization ⋅Agent-Neutrality 2 2. Value-Dependence ⋅No Maximization ⋅Agent-Neutrality 2 3. Value-Dependence ⋅Maximization ⋅Agent-Neutrality 0 4. No Value-Dependence ⋅No Maximization | No Agent-Neutrality 7 5. Value-Dependence ⋅No Maximization ⋅No Agent-Neutrality 8 6. Value-Dependence ⋅Maximization ⋅No Agent-Neutrality 0 Other 14 Another comment to an actual vote in support of definition 4 also supported a definition in terms of reasons instead of rightness ‘you could have scalar teleology without rightness’. 17 ‘I am less wedded to the meaning of “teleology”in ethics. But maybe I think of views as teleological as long as they make rightness/wrongness depend at least in part on the goodness/badness of the consequences, whether agent neutrally or from an agent-perspective.’ 18 ‘Description #5 with this addition: the goodness or badness of the consequences of the alternatives to said action, decision, rule following, or character trait also play a role in determining whether said action, decision, rule following, or character trait is right.’ ‘I would define it in the same way as I defined “consequentialism”. If they were to be distinguished, I would treat consequentialism as a species of teleology, defined by agent-neutral evaluation of outcomes. But “consequentialism”is used frequently to refer to agent-relative views, so I do not distinguish consequentialism from teleology.’ 19 ‘An action is right and wrong if and only if, and because, of facts about value.’ ‘…depends on the goodness or badness it realizes (which may or may not be consequences)’. 20 ‘I never use the term.’ ‘I am not very familiar with people using that word for these kinds of views.’ ‘There are teleological ethical theories that don’t operate with the terms right/wrong: Aristotle.’ ‘This does take in Aristotle, for one thing.’ ‘While “teleology”is sometimes used as something like a synonym for “consequentialism”, I don’t see it as having a very precise meaning in this regard. It has another meaning connected to Aristotelian views of things as aiming at some goal, but this need not be about rightness and wrongness as such. Perhaps because of interference from this second meaning, the word isn’t used in the first way consistently enough to get a precise meaning.’ ‘I wouldn’t bother trying to define “teleology”. The term is ambiguous because it has multiple meanings. That is a good reason for trying to avoid using it.’ Utilitas 9 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000164 Published online by Cambridge University Press not include this possibility because we had not expected it as a possible answer, but given that some people did choose it, it seems to us now that we should have included it (though obviously not for consequentialism). Finally, we also considered the possibility of including another question asking respondents about their favourite view. The purpose of this question would not have been to gather information about the issues we were investigating (i.e. whether the conditions of Value-Dependence, Maximization, and Agent-Neutrality ought to be part of the definition of consequentialism). Rather, the point of this question would be to mitigate the risk that the respondents would choose the definition that most closely matches their own preferred normative view, rather than choosing what they think is the most accurate definition of consequentialism. We decided against this because we believed that the risk of this happening was very low given that the respondents are experts in the field. VI. Conclusion The aim of this article was to discern whether the conditions of Value-Dependence, Maximization, and Agent-Neutrality are considered necessary to consequentialism and teleology, and so to settle on a way of defining those terms that would avoid confusions over how to categorize particular views, as well as avoiding more substantive confusions based on misunderstandings about how the terms are being used. In light of the results reached in the survey, we recommend using definitions of consequentialism that accept ValueDependence and reject Maximization and Agent-Neutrality, regardless of whether they are formulated similarly to or differently from the definitions we provided in the survey. Accordingtothis,allthatisrequiredforaviewtobeconsequentialististhatitsatisfies Outcomeand Value-Dependence, regardless of whether it also satisfies Maximization and/or Agent-Neutrality or not. To use a broad definition, we can say that consequentialist views are those according to which rightness, or reasons to act, ultimately depend on circumstances related in one way or another to the goodness and badness of outcomes. We are aware that shifting to this definition may be uncomfortable for people who have been using other definitions for a long time. In fact, some of us running this survey have until now been supporters of a different type of definition including the condition of Agent-Neutrality. But we believe that the results of the survey should lead us to change the definitions we use, for the sake of improving philosophical practice in general and avoiding confusion. It might also be worthwhile for philosophers writing about consequentialism to explicitly state which conditions they are accepting or rejecting in their discussion. As for teleology, the responses we got must lead us to recommend that this concept is not used in the context of normative views related to consequentialism. It seems to confuse rather than clarify things. 22 Its preferred meaning just coincides with that of consequentialism, which makes its use redundant and potentially confusing. In addition, several respondents warned that the concept has many meanings and can therefore be misunderstood. Given this, if we continue to use the term we should be aware that we run the risk that people will misunderstand our intended meaning. 23 22 Other, very different, uses of teleology, like the Aristotelian idea that welfare consists in fulfilling our telos or inner nature, or the idea that the world or cosmos has some kind of purpose to which we ought to adapt, are unaffected. 23 The authors are very thankful to Dale E. Miller and Brad Hooker for their critical comments on the method and the content of the survey, which have helped to improve this article very significantly, especially in the section about the objections and limitations of the study. 16 Oscar Horta, et al. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000164 Published online by Cambridge University Press Competing interests. The authors declare none. References Ashby, W. 1950. Teleology and Deontology in Ethics. The Journal of Philosophy 47: 765–73. Attfield, R. 1975. Toward a Defense of Teleology. Ethics 85: 123–35. 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