The Personal Structure of the Regional Committees of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in České Budějovice, Ostrava and Prague, 1945–1951

The Personal Structure of the Regional Committees of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in České Budějovice, Ostrava and Prague, 1945–1951 Tomáš Hemza KEYWORDS: Czechoslovakia — Communist Party — České Budějovice — Ostrava — Prague In the Soviet political system, 1 the bureaucratic apparatus of national communist parties occupied the pinnacle of the pyramid of power. Even today, the work of Milovan Djilas2 can be considered the basic analytical work concerning the function of the party apparatus in communist totalitarian regimes. Martin Malia dates the beginnings of a parallel structure of party and state organizations to the period of Russian civil war — in the ranks of Red Army, there was a practice of nominating political commissars, who were supposed to watch over the “unreliable” tsarist officers. Later on, these political commissars were inserted into all areas of civil life to watch over “bourgeois”experts.3 Even though these commissars were originally intended to stay in control only until new “worker intelligentsia” could be educated, the parallel structure of party apparatus became one of the pillars of the communist government not only in Soviet Union proper, but also in the other countries of the Eastern Bloc. Yoran Gorlicki and Hans Mommsen list the institutionalized leading role of the party apparatus among the main differences between Soviet and Nazi establishments.4 As for the theme we’re going to concern ourselves with, the basic overview of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia apparatus is based on the works of Karel Kaplan5 and Jiří Maňák.6 1 This output was created within the project “Dějinný vývoj regionů III.”, subproject “Kolektivní biogram politických pracovníků stranického aparátu KSČ vybraných krajských výborů v letech 1945–1949” solved at Charles University in Prague from the Specific university research in 2015. 2 Milovan Djilas, The New Class. An Analysis of the Communist System, San Diego, 1957. 3 Marin Malia, Sovětská tragédie. Dějiny socialismu v Rusku v letech 1917–1991, Prague 2004, pp. 131–133. 4 Yoran Gorlicky — Hans Mommsen, The Political (Dis)Orders of Stalinism and National Socialism. In: Michael Geyer — Sheila Fitzpatrik (ed.), Beyond Totalitarianism. Stalinism and Nazism Compared, Cambridge 2008, pp. 41–85. 5 Karel Kaplan, Aparát ÚV KSČ v letech 1948–1968. Studie a dokumenty, Prague 1993. 6 Jiří Maňák, Proměny strany moci III. Početnost a složení pracovníků stranické aparátu KSČ 1948–1968, Prague 1999. OPEN ACCESS TOMáš HEMza 55 The purpose of the presented study is to analyze the personal structure of the regional committee apparatus in three selected regions of the post-war Czechoslovakia. For this research, we chose the regions of České Budějovice, Ostrava and Prague. The study of three distinct regions will allow us to compare these regions and find both the common and different development trends. Even though the study only concerns itself with a very brief period of 1945 to 1951, it’s divided into three chronological parts. The first part examines the party apparatus until the seizure of power by the Party in February 1948. Due to the low availability of archived sources, we could only examine the development in all three regions only up until the autumn of 1949. The second part therefore examines the development in all three regions in the period from the spring of 1948 until the autumn of 1949. The final part, which examines the period from the autumn of 1949 to year 1951, could only be examined on the examples of the regions of České Budějovice and Ostrava. The personnel of the party apparatus could be roughly divided into two basic categories — political personnel and everyone else. The non-political personnel category was further divided into administrative personnel (personal assistants and copy typists), technical personnel (drivers, telephone operators, cleaning personnel and others) and specialist personnel (librarians, translators or accountants).7 The study is focused only on the political personnel, since these formed the most crucial and decision-making part of the party apparatus. Each of the three parts of the presented study starts with the description of the developmental determinants that had a significant influence over the organizational framework and personal structure of the party apparatus in each region. Afterwards, we present a basic overview of the personal structure based on the collective biography method. THE COLLECTIVE BIOGRAPHY METHOD We chose three main characteristics for our research of the personal structure of the party apparatus: year of birth, the period of joining the Party and the original vocation of the political employee in question. Furthermore, we take note of the involvement of the political personnel in the insurgency movement during years 1939 to 1945. All statistical data in this study are the result of the author’s calculations. These data mostly originate in the “cadres” materials and assessments available for the political personnel in question. The results should be only considered to be approximate. Many of the cadres materials and assessments state different dates of birth or dates of joining the Party.8 7 J. Maňák, Proměny strany moci III., p. 13. 8 The dates of joining the Party is based on the contemporary practice — not every member of the Communist Party during the first Czechoslovak Republic was automatically considered to have been a pre-war member after the war. The party members who weren’t active in the illegal Communist Party during the war weren’t considered to have been pre-war members. In the years immediately following the war, pre-war membership was OPEN ACCESS 56 WISOHIM/ESHP 23 The most difficult factor to assess is the original vocation. In the cases where the statistical materials stored by the Party include the social and professional characteristics of party employees, they usually concern themselves with social origins. The Communist Party recognized three categories of social origin: worker origin, farmer origin or clerk origin. These party statistics are unsuitable for use in this study for several reasons. First of all, a significant amount of employees claiming worker origin never made a living as workers themselves. Secondly, the “worker” category was very broad, often allowing people to classify themselves as workers, even though they have held employee contracts. Thirdly, many of those who considered themselves to be workers actually spent some time as laborers, for example as a part of total deployment during WWII. However, for the most part of their active working life, these people actually worked in other, non-worker vocations. For these reasons, we have established four categories of original vocation for the purposes of this study: workers, other employees, intelligentsia and farmers. Therefore, contrary to contemporary party materials, only the people who actually worked as manual workers in a factory are considered to be “workers” within this study. Usually, these employees worked as machine fitters, blacksmiths, lathe operators, machinists or furnace operators. Furthermore, the worker category embraces vocations that include heavy manual labor, mostly miners, masons or carpenters. The second category, “other employees”, encompasses mainly employees within services. This category includes waiters, barbers, bakers, butchers, servants, merchants, shop clerks or tailors. We also included housewives and former small businessmen in this category. The purpose of this division is to differentiate factory workers and heavy manual laborers from other categories of economically active people. “Farmer” and “intelligentsia” categories are less controversial. “Intelligentsia” encompasses a broad range of professions that share a common definition of a non-manual vocation. Most often, these party members were clerks, accountants and teachers. Less common were lawyers, journalists or architects. The results should, however, only be considered to be approximate — many of the party employees used to perform work from more than one category of original vocations during their lifetime. In these cases, the inclusion into one of the categories is based on the length of the each vocation. DEVELOPMENT DETERMINANTS, 1945–1948 Until the communist takeover in February 1948, the amount of political employees in regional party structures was significantly limited by the lack of financial resources. In České Budějovice region, the problem of party financial management was repeatrecognized only for members who were active in the anti-Nazi insurgency. This also meant that in some cases, a pre-war membership recognition was denied even some concentration camp survivors. According to Jiří Maňák, during 1950s this approach relaxed somewhat and a pre-war membership was also recognized for members who weren’t involved in insugrency activities. See J. Maňák, Proměny strany moci. Studie a dokumenty k vývoji Komunistické strany Československa v období 1948–1968. 1. část, Prague 2005, pp. 58–59. OPEN ACCESS TOMáš HEMza 57 edly raised during the meetings of the Politburo of the Regional Committee. In June 1946, the Party was forced to terminate the employment of seven administrative employees due to the shortage of funds. Another five employees chose to leave voluntarily.9 The issue of financial management was also discussed in September and November 1946, when the Politburo questioned whether the Party can afford to pay its own driver, among other matters.10 As a means to improve the financial situation, several measures were decided upon: to improve the morale of membership fees, to draw some funds from the regional party newspaper and to organize evening events focused on entertainment and lectures. The more well-off party members with double income were asked to consider providing a donation to the party treasury.11 In November 1946, several additional options of improving the income were discussed, e.g. the organization of an event for “gadgeteers”, who would make toys for kids that would be sold by the Party during Christmas. Additionally, the committee once again considered the organization of entertainment events. As a last resort, the committee discussed the option of taking a loan of half a million crowns, for which the Party would mortgage its headquarters.12 Bad morale of party members, when it came to paying membership fees, presented a significant problem. Antonín Nový, a member of the Politburo of the Regional Committee in České Budějovice, suggested inviting especially glaring offenders to the party Cadres Department and admonishing them sternly. If the problem persisted, the offenders would be expelled from the Party and their cases subsequently published.13 Despite these measures, in April 1947, the party budget was deficit by more than a million and two hundred thousand crowns. This deficit had to be replenished from the funds of the Central Committee.14 However, in October of the same year, the party budget was already in deficit again and the Party had to terminate the employment of another driver.15 Due to this lack of funds, the apparatus of the Regional Committee in České Budějovice region was composed of only several paid employees. The specific regional structure employee records therefore state the following. In October 1945, the committee employed eleven political employees,16 in December 1945, this number decreased to nine.17 In the two following years, this number was only a little higher. In 9 The State Regional Archives in Třeboň (hereinafter as SOA Třeboň), fond (hereinafter asf.) KSČ-JKV České Budějovice, file 290, pp. 6–7, The Secretariat of the Regional Committee [SKV] meeting 3.6.1946. 10 The National Archives in Prague (hereinafter as NA Prague), f. Organizační oddělení Marie Švermová 1945–1951, sv. 28, a. j. 199, pp. 73–74, PKV meeting 23.9.1946. 11 NA Prague, f. Organizační oddělení Marie Švermová 1945–1951, sv. 28, a.j. 199, p. 76, The Politburo of the Regional Committee [PKV] meeting 1.10.1946. 12 NA Prague, f. Organizační oddělení Marie Švermová 1945–1951, sv. 28, a.j. 199, pp. 90–93, PKV meeting 29.11.1946. 13 SOA Třeboň, f. KSČ-JKV České Budějovice, file 66, p. 161, PKV meeting 17.2.1947. 14 SOA Třeboň, f. KSČ-JKV České Budějovice, file 66, p. 176, PKV meeting 21.4.1947. 15 SOA Třeboň, f. KSČ-JKV České Budějovice, file 66, p. 286, PKV meeting 21.10.1947. 16 NA Prague, f. Organizační oddělení Marie Švermová 1945–1951, sv. 30, a.j. 211, p. 1. 17 NA Prague, f. Organizační oddělení Marie Švermová 1945–1951, sv. 28, a.j. 196, p. 1. OPEN ACCESS 58 WISOHIM/ESHP 23 June 1946, the committee again employed eleven political employees;18 in April 1948 it employed thirteen people.19 The lack of fund resulted not only in very limited number of paid party employees, but also in their low salaries. The monthly salary of leading secretary of the Regional Committee was 7000 crowns, the rest of the employees was paid an amount that averaged between 3000 and 4000 crowns.20 Even lower salaries were paid to women employed in the regional structure, who rightly complained about the higer salaries of their male counterparts.21 The party leadership in Ostrava region faced problems similar to those in České Budějovice. Presumably due to the higher membership base22 and better sales of party newspaper, the organization in Ostrava wasn’t in deficit, however, it also couldn’t afford to pay high salaries to its employees. In Ostrava region, too, the Party appealed to its well-off members to donate higher fees to its treasury. According to the suggestion of Viktor Linhart, a member of the Politburo of the Regional Committee, party members with monthly income above 12 000 Czechoslovak crowns were supposed to donate 15–20% of their income to the Party.23 In June 1946, the Politburo concluded that the party apparatus employees are underpaid, and had to reassess their salaries. Even though the salaries of political employees in Ostrava were on average higher than those in České Budějovice by 2000 crowns, it was difficult to attract employees to the party structure, because most people preferred better paid jobs and weren’t interested in working within the party apparatus.24 Due to the size of the region, the apparatus in Ostrava was bigger than the one in České Budějovice. The first available status report concerning the apparatus in Ostrava from December 1946 lists twelve political employees and thirty six administrative employees.25 The next available report is dated March 1948, when the apparatus consisted of twenty five political employees.26 18 SOA Třeboň, f. KSČ-JKV České Budějovice, file 290, pp. 6–7, SKV meeting 3.6.1946. 19 NA Prague, f. Organizační oddělení Marie Švermová 1945–1951, sv. 28, a.j. 196, p. 14. 20 NA Prague, f. Organizační oddělení Marie Švermová 1945–1951, sv. 28, a.j. 196, pp. 14a–14b. 21 SOA Třeboň, f. KSČ-JKV České Budějovice, file 66, pp. 206–208, SKV meeting 19.5.1947. 22 By the time of the intra-Party screening in 1948, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had 97406 members in České Budějovice region, 164407 members in Ostrava region and 570688 members in Prague region. Until February 28, 1950, the number of party members in respective regional organizations declined significantly — to 67675 members and 13976 candidates in České Budějovice, 118764 members and 24580 candidates in Ostrava and 388660 members and 89369 candidates in Prague region. See J. Maňák, Proměny strany moci. Studie a dokumenty k vývoji Komunistické strany Československa v období 1948–1968. 1. část, p. 80, 100. 23 The Provincial Archives in Opava (hereinafter as ZA Opava), f. KV KSČ Ostrava, carton (hereinafter as cart.) 109, inventory number ( hereinafter as i. no.) 51, sign. P-32, PKV meeting 9.8.1946. 24 ZA Opava, f. KV KSČ Ostrava, cart. 109, i. no. 51, sign. P-28, PKV meeting 21.6.1946. For comparison, the average salary in Czechoslovakia in 1946 was 4.340 Czechoslovak crowns. See Václav Průcha et al., Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa 1918–1992, 2. díl, Brno 2009, p. 209. 25 NA Prague, f. Generální sekretariát 1945–1951, sv. 5, a. j. 30, p. 9. 26 NA Prague, f. Organizační oddělení Marie Švermová 1945–1951, sv. 69, a. j. 384, pp. 26–29. OPEN ACCESS TOMáš HEMza 59 The largest of the three monitored regional structures was the party organization in Prague region. In December 1946, the regional apparatus consisted of 140 employees, of which there were twenty six political employees and 114 administrative employees.27 According to the report of an instructor of the Central Committee from June 1947, the regional apparatus struggled with the lack of competent employees to such extent that several regional departments and especially county secretariats were severely understaffed.28 The problem of low salaries of party employees is also mentioned in the summary status report concerning regional and county structures from June 1947, which states that despite all the directives and guidelines from the Central Committee, employees in regions and counties weren’t paid enough to be self-sufficient.29 However, this report doesn’t mention that the regional organizations haven’t had the funds to provide higher salaries, not mentioning their inability to provide accommodation for their employees in their place of employment. A significant number of employees had to commute from afar, which subsequently further lessened their motivation to work in the party apparatus. PERSONAL STRUCTURE, 1945–1948 From 1945 to April 1945, there were eighteen political employees in total in the party apparatus in České Budějovice. Only four of these political employees were pre-war members of the Communist Party, eleven joined the Party after the war and in three cases, the available sources list no discernible date. Half of these employees were born after 1920 and therefore were younger than thirty years of age. Even though the České Budějovice region was predominantly agricultural, only one farmer was employed by the party apparatus. Furthermore, five of the employees were workers, another five hailed from intelligentsia backgrounds (all of them were clerks) and another three came from the service sector. The leading party secretary in České Budějovice was Josef Paleček. He was born in 1902 and was a party member since 1925. Between 1933 and 1936, he studied the International Lenin School in Moscow in the Soviet Union. During World War II, Paleček was detained in a Nazi concentration camp. Also another member, Václav Statečný, was imprisoned in a concentration camp. As for the remaining employees, the only two other members who took part in the anti-Nazi resistance movement were Jaroslav Kubát and František Novotný. In Ostrava, there were thirty political employees in total in the post-war period. Twelve of these joined the Party before 1938, another two joined in 1939. Hynek Kožušník, Marie Lauferová, Josef Martyš and Vilém Nový were numbered among the founding members of the Party in 1921. No specific age bracket was dominant in the age structure. The Party employed both younger and older employees. The structure of the origi27 NA Prague, f. Generální sekretariát 1945–1951, sv. 5, a. j. 30, p. 9. 28 NA Prague, f. Generální sekretariát 1945–1951, sv. 199, a. j. 1270, p. 79. 29 NA Prague, f. Generální sekretariát 1945–1951, sv. 199, a.j. 1270, p. 93. OPEN ACCESS 60 WISOHIM/ESHP 23 nal vocation was very similar to České Budějovice region. There was only one farmer among the employees and the number of workers and intelligentsia was balanced. After the war, the post of leading party secretary in Ostrava was filled by Vilém Nový. He was born in 1904 and was a party member since seventeen years of age. Since 1930s, he was a professional party functionary and journalist. During World War II, he was in exile in Great Britain. However, he spent only one year in Ostrava after the war. In 1946, he was transferred to Prague, where he became the editor in chief of “Rudé právo” newspaper. After his departure, the office of leading secretary went to Vítězslav Fusch. Fuchs was born in 1915 in Ostrava in a family of a small tradesman. When he was seventeen, he joined Komsomol, and in 1936 he joined the Communist Party. After graduating from the Gymnasium in Ostrava, he attended the Faculty of Law of Charles University in Prague. Due to his Jewish origin, he left Czechoslovakia in 1939 and spent the war period in Great Britain. Initially, he worked as a factory worker and after the Soviet Union joined the war, he joined the foreign Czechoslovak Army. Before he became the leading secretary, he worked in the Provincial National Committee in Ostrava. Vítězslav Fuchs was not the only member who took part in the armed insurgency against the Nazi Germany. Josef Ploskonka also fought in the ranks of the Czechoslovak Army on the west, and Arnošt Matýsek and Karel Štefka were partisan fighters. The head of the regional Cadres Department Rudolf Peschel left for the Soviet Union before the WWII and during the war was deployed in the Protectorate as a paratrooper. He was arrested by the Nazi secret police and imprisoned until the end of the war, however. Many other employees were involved in illegal underground activities, ten employees were imprisoned in Nazi concentration camps. The biggest number of political employees, at least 44 people, worked in the first three post-war years in Prague. Compared to the previous two regions, this region had a higher number of older employees and also a higher number of pre-war party members. Josef Hulínský, Stanislav Mlejnek and Antonín Novotný were among the founding party members in 1921, another fifteen employees counted among the pre-war members, and František Vomastek joined the Party in 1939. The structure of the original vocation was very similar to the previous cases. There was only one farmer among the employees in Prague, too, and the number of workers and intelligentsia was balanced. The leading secretary in Prague region was Antonín Novotný. He was born in 1904. His original vocation was a machine fitter. He joined the Party as early as 1921 and during 1930s he worked in the party apparatus on a regional level. During the Nazi occupation, he was involved in illegal activities, was arrested and since 1941 detained in Mauthausen concentration camp. Jindřich Kotál, Stanislav Mlejnek, František Vodsloň and Josef Šťastný also spent some time in Nazi prisons and concentration camps. Josef Bína, Josef Hulínský, Alois Ducháček and Jiří Lukavský were also involved in illegal underground activities in the Protectorate. Josef Altrichter, Bohuslav Macháček and Božena Macháčová spent some time in the Soviet Union. František Kriegel spent the war years in China, where he was stationed with the Allied forces as a battle medic. The personal structure of the political employees of party regional committees in České Budějovice, Ostrava and Prague from 1945 to spring of 1948 can be summarized by the following three tables: OPEN ACCESS TOMáš HEMza 61 table 1 — Year of birth, Political employees 1945–1948 Year of birth before 1899 1900–1909 1910–1919 1920–1929 unknown ČeskéBudějovice 2 4 3 9 0 Ostrava 4 7 10 7 3 Prague 1 23 8 9 3 Total 7 34 21 25 6 table 2 — Party membership, Political employees 1945–1948 Joined the Party 1921–1938 1939–1944 1945–1947 unknown ČeskéBudějovice 4 0 11 3 Ostrava 13 2 12 4 Prague 18 1 7 18 Total 35 3 30 25 table 3 — Original vocation, Political employees 1945–1948 Vocation Worker Other Intelligentsia Farmer unknown ČeskéBudějovice 5 3 5 1 4 Ostrava 11 4 11 1 4 Prague 16 4 18 1 5 Total 32 11 34 3 13 As can be clearly seen from these tables, a significant portion of the regional party structures in Ostrava and Prague region consisted of pre-war party members. In all three regions, the post of the leading secretary was filled with experienced and long-term party members. Aside from the aforementioned Josef Paleček from České Budějovice, three other party employees (Josef Alrichter from Prague, Rudolf Peschel and Jan Teper from Ostrava) also studied the International Lenin School in Moscow. Out of total 93 political employees, seven people were involved in the abroad resistance movement during World War II, nine were involved in illegal underground activities within the Protectorate and another eighteen were imprisoned for these activities. Out of 34 members of intelligentsia, the biggest portion consisted of clerks, teachers and students. Other vocations are represented by one doctor, one architect and two lawyers. The farmers are represented by a surprisingly small number in all three of the monitored regional structures. DEVELOPMENTS AND DETERMINANTS AFTER FEBRUARY 1948 The personal and organizational structure of regional apparatuses proved completely insufficient after the communist takeover in February 1948. The largest deficiencies could be observed especially in the area of “cadre’s policy” and economy. Due to the lack of financial resources these two key branches were left in the competency of party committees until February 1948 — within the regional apparatus, OPEN ACCESS 62 WISOHIM/ESHP 23 only a handful of employees worked in these departments. The party effort concentrated on massive industrialization,30 collectivization31 and especially the filling all the leading positions in state administration, economy, public administration and political organizations with loyal employees. These tasks meant the personal structure of the party apparatus had to be strengthened.32 Simply put, if the Communist Party wished to become the leading force in the state and society, its activity could no longer be based only on the work of party executive bodies or primary organizations. It had to be based on the work of professional political employees. Therefore, the main change after February 1948 consisted of significant increase of the number of paid political employees on all levels of the party apparatus. Another important reason for the personal increase of the regional structures stemmed from the establishment of a regional structure in Czechoslovakia from January 1, 1949.33 This meant that the Regional Committee of the Communist Party was no longer only an intermediary between the party headquarters and county organizations, but was supposed to become the leading political force in its respective region.34 However, financial matters represented one of the lingering problems. In České Budějovice, the regional committee budget for 1949 anticipated a deficiency of 2 736 000 Czechoslovak crowns.35 To improve the party budget, the regional Politburo came up with special party stamps in February 1949.36 Regardless of this effort, the monthly deficit of the regional party finances in 1950 was 250000 to 260 000 Czechoslovak crowns.37 The regional party Politburo in České Budějovice again struggled for a solution in August 1950, when the Party established a series of measures designed to im30 Václav Průcha et al., Hospodářské a sociální dějiny, pp. 249–278; Karel Kaplan, Kořeny československé reformy 1968, Brno 2000, pp. 163–175; Zdislav Šulc, Stručné dějiny ekonomických reforem v Československu (České republice) 1945–1995, Brno 1998, pp. 9–21. 31 Karel Jech, Kolektivizace a vyhánění sedláků z půdy, Prague 2008. 32 Lenka Kalinová, Společenské proměny v čase socialistického experimentu. K sociálním dějinám v letech 1945–1969, Prague 2007, pp. 129–134; Jiří Maňák, Orientace KŠČ na vytvoření socialistické inteligence. In: Zdeněk Kárník — Michal Kopeček (ed.), Bolševismus, komunismus a radikální socialismus v Československu II., Prague 2005, pp. 110–155. 33 Zdeňka Hledíková — Jan Janák — Jan Dobeš, Dějiny správy v českých zemích. Od počátků státu po současnost, Prague 2007, p. 447. 34 NA Prague, f. Organizační oddělení Marie Švermová 1945–1951, sv. 21, a. j. 156, pp. 61–63, SKV meeting 27.9.1948. 35 The 1949 budget anticipated income of 2 585000 crowns and expenditure of 5 321000 crowns. See SOA Třeboň, f. KSČ-JKV České Budějovice, file 290, p. 38, PKV meeting 7.1.1949. 36 Once in a quarter, every party member had to buy a stamp of following values. A party member with a monthly income 2500 crowns or less had to buy a stamp for 5 crowns, with a monthly income up to 4000 crowns a stamp for 10 crowns and with a monthly income higher than 4000 crowns a stamp for 20 crowns. The counties kept 30% of the stamp sale income, the remaining 70% had to be passed on to the regions. The proceeds of the stamp sale was supposed to be used mainly to finance the party schools. SOA Třeboň, f. KSČ-JKV České Budějovice, file 15, p. 218, PKV meeting 12.2.1949. 37 NA Prague, f. Organizační oddělení Marie Švermová 1945–1951, sv. 29, a. j. 206, pp. 91–94, PKV meeting 4.8.1950. OPEN ACCESS TOMáš HEMza 69 nizations and factories with new people who would be loyal to the Communist regime. It was also necessary to build a party apparatus capable of action. The party leadership targeted young people, ideally hardworking and capable workers. These promising members would be provided basic training either in “Central workers’ schools” or in one of the party political schools. Graduates of these schools subsequently became the main source of personnel for the staffing of the leading positions within the state administration, mass organizations, factories and also in the party apparatus. The goals of the party leadership, however, were mostly incompatible with the goals of the manufacturing sector and especially with the goals of the individual factories. These factories had their own main goals, namely the meeting of production plans, and for this, they needed capable employees. Therefore, the factories often released an expendable employee for the party political training, rather than a capable one. Many of these less capable employees then ended up in the party apparatus. Usually though, these employees weren’t sufficiently capable to handle the difficult work in the party apparatus and had to be replaced within a few months. This was noted by the deputy leading secretary Rudolf Peschel in Ostrava on the occasion of criticising the poor quality of new political employees during the assembly of the Politburo: “The main source (of new employees) is the regional political school, however, it’s becoming obvious that this regional political school doesn’t attract the people we need. Instead, it attracts the people that are expendable. It’s crucial to get the best people into the four month regional political school, that would provide us with the best flow of competent students.”58 As far as party political schools were concerned, the situation was similar to the selection of students for Central workers’ schools. Even though it was generally emphasized that only the best workers and especially “Stakhanovites” should be sent into these schools, factory leaders were inclined to send the less capable employees.59 Regional party political schools provided a sufficient number of graduates, but the downside was that these graduates had generally poor quality, which led to the high fluctuation rate in the party apparatus. The Party training also concerned party functionaries and the personnel already working within the apparatus, not only the rank and file members. These employees were sent to the study in the Central School of Politics to further deepen their theoretical knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. The function of the regional party apparatuses, however, was further significantly hampered by the fact that these employees weren’t returned back to their original position after graduation, but instead were sent to various positions in the party headquarters. The original goal of the party leadership, which was to educate the party employees, functionaries and members, therefore had a destabilizing effect on the function of the party apparatus on the local level. On one hand, the institute of party training provided county and regional apparatuses with inexperienced and incompetent em58 NA Prague, f. Organizační oddělení Marie Švermová 1945–1951, sv. 72, a.j. 399, pp. 76–77, PKV meeting 22.1.1951. 59 Marek Pavka, Kádry rozhodují vše! Kádrová politika KSČ z hlediska teorie elit. Prvních pět let komunistické vlády, Brno 2003, p. 59; Jiří Maňák, Orientace KSČ na vytvoření socialistické inteligence. OPEN ACCESS 70 WISOHIM/ESHP 23 ployees that no other employer was interested in. On the other hand, the party education program in the Central political school made it easier for the competent regional political employees to move on to higher positions in the headquarters. As a result, the party leadership in České Budějovice region was confronted with a very unpleasant truth during the “party screening” (stranická prověrka) in 1950. Due to the high fluctuation rate, the vast majority of the party apparatus was composed of new employees, who had absolutely no idea what kind of activity is expected of them. Moreover, the party apparatus was almost completely devoid of experienced employees, who could train and guide new colleagues. Josef Dušák, employed in the Department of Defense, complained that he was brought into the apparatus without any explanation or guidance.60 Similarly, František Černík, an employee of the Cadres Department, complained that no one gave him any instructions concerning his work.61 The very same complaint was also brought up by Oldřich Nouza,62 František Novotný,63 Jan Plánský,64 Josef Čadek,65 Jan Čerkl,66 Miloslav Kušl,67 Zdena Kulhánková,68 Václav Lejčar69 or Jaromír Neuhort.70 This problem wasn’t limited to České Budějovice, as evidenced by the account of one Miroslav Tovara, who worked as a political employee of the Department of Culture and Propaganda in Prague. Like others, Tovara hasn’t been given any instructions concerning his work and had no idea what he should do and how to do it.71 During the party screening, many employees also complained about low salaries and other voiced their dissatisfaction with the party apparatus work and wanted to leave and find other jobs. Additionally, the party screening had shown that the individual employees of the party apparatus weren’t very fond of each other on a personal level. This already very troubled situation within the party apparatus in 1951 was further destabilized by another factor, the hunt for traitors within the Communist Party itself. In summer of 1950, the leading political secretary in Ostrava region, Vítězslav Fuchs, received praise for his good work during the party screening.72 His deputy and the head of the Cadres Department Rudolf Peschel was showered with praise from other party members as well: “Comrade Peschel handles his work well and his extensive experience helps the regional organization handle its challenging tasks. He’s one of the pillars of our regional organization […]”.73 No one has voiced any seri60 SOA Třeboň, f. KSČ-JKV České Budějovice, file 437, pp. 72–74. 61 Ibid., p. 54. 62 Ibid., pp. 11–13. 63 Ibid., pp. 29–31. 64 Ibid., pp. 39–41. 65 Ibid., pp. 45–49. 66 Ibid., p. 51. 67 Ibid., pp. 214–216. 68 Ibid., p. 225. 69 Ibid., p. 248. 70 Ibid., pp. 271–276. 71 NA Prague, f. Organizační oddělení Marie Švermová 1945–1951, sv. 21, a.j. 153, pp. 251–254. 72 ZA Opava, f. KV KSČ Ostrava, cart. 35, i. no. 29, sign. Z-35, p. 3. 73 ZA Opava, f. KV KSČ Ostrava, cart. 35, i. no. 29, sign. Z-35, p. 4. OPEN ACCESS TOMáš HEMza 71 ous problems with neither Peschel nor Fuchs on any of the meetings of the Politburo nor the plenum of the Regional Committee. Therefore, it came as a great surprise for Ostrava when, in early February 1951, Vítězslav Fuchs and Rudolf Peschel were arrested as enemies of the Party and the people.74 Their arrest was followed by a significant power struggle in Ostrava — notably, the activity of so-called workers’ checking committees led to an extensive purge of personnel in the party apparatus. The party organization in České Budějvice went through this inner crisis, too. Late in 1950, the current leading secretary Josef Paleček was sent to Brno to take the place of Otto Šling, who was arrested. The place of the leading secretary for České Budějovice region was filled by the instructor of the Central Committee Stanislav Vlček. Very soon, Vlček became embroiled in a conflict with local party functionaries. As the available reports suggest, this conflict was neither caused by the differences in opinion concerning the program or factual matters — instead, it was a power struggle, plain and simple.75 On one side, there was the new leading secretary Stanislav Vlček. On the other, deputy secretary Ivan Halada, the head of the Department of Organization and Instruction Albert Vyškovský and a member of the Politburo of the Regional Committee and the regional head of secret police Antonín Nový. On regional party conference in June 1951, Stanislav Vlček managed to enoforce the election of a new Politburo of the Regional Committee, which subsequently sided with him in the power struggle. Mere days after the regional conference, the Politburo announced the retirement of Ivan Halada, Albert Vyškovský, Antonín Nový and other party functionaries from their positions.76 Before autumn of 1951, the new leadership has effected sweeping personal changes among the political employees of the regional party apparatus.77 PERSONAL STRUCTURE, AUTUMN 1949 TO 1951 From autumn of 1949 onwards, the number of political employees continued to rise. It would reach its maximum in 1950. In České Budějovice, the number of political employees increased from 42 in October 1949 to 58 in July 1950. In Ostrava, the increase 74 In January 1954, Vítězslav Fuchs was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment. His wife spent two years in prison. In 1955, the original sentence was revoked and Vítězslav Fuchs was again sentenced by the Supreme Court to 10 years of imprisonment. He was released on parole in 1956 and subsequently worked as a construction fitter in Teplické strojírny. In 1963, he was rehabilitated by both the court and the Party. According to available sources, he has never returned to active politics and died in 1995. Rudolf Peschel was sentenced to six years of imprisonment in 1954. In 1963, he was rehabilitated by both the court and the Party. He died in 1967 and was posthumously awarded Order of Labor. 75 NA Prague, f. Organizační oddělení Marie Švermová 1945–1951, sv. 31, a.j. 212, pp. 280–281. 76 SOA Třeboň, f. KSČ-JKV České Budějovice, file 71, pp. 338–340, PKV meeting 21.6.1951. 77 NA Prague, f. Organizační oddělení Marie Švermová 1945–1951, sv. 30, a.j. 210, pp. 32–36, PKV meeting 13.7.1951; SOA Třeboň, f. KSČ-JKV České Budějovice, file 71, p. 488, PKV meeting 13.7.1951; SOA Třeboň, f. KSČ-JKV České Budějovice, file 72, pp. 658–664, PKV meeting 18.10.1951. OPEN ACCESS 72 WISOHIM/ESHP 23 was from 75 political employees in October 1949 to 102 employees in December 1950. This was too big an increase even for the party leadership. In connection with the new reorganization and systematization of the party apparatus workflow, the number of employees in Ostrava was significantly reduced. Therefore, by the end of 1951, there were 57 political employees in the regional apparatus in České Budějovice and in Ostrava, the number was significantly reduced to 67.78 In both of these regional secretariats, the high rate of personnel fluctuation remained a problem. Between autumn of 1949 and 1951, at least 203 political employees joined the party apparatus in Ostrava and České Budějovice. Most of these employees quit after a few months. The following three tables contain the basic biographical data of these new employees. table 10 — New political employees, autumn 1949–1951, year of birth Year of birth before 1899 1900–1909 1910–1919 1920–1929 after 1930 unknown České Budějovice 0 4 30 27 3 10 Ostrava 1 17 37 47 0 27 Total 1 21 67 74 3 37 table 11 — New political employees, autumn 1949–1951, year of joining the Party Joined the Party 1921–1938 1939–1944 1945–1947 1948 unknown České Budějovice 4 2 57 0 11 Ostrava 4 1 103 1 20 Total 8 3 160 1 31 table 12 — New political employees, autumn 1949–1951, original vocation Vocation Worker Other Intelligentsia Farmer unknown České Budějovice 33 14 13 2 12 Ostrava 80 21 7 0 21 Total 113 35 20 2 33 The developmental constants of the previous years only intensified. There were only a few pre-war party members among the new employees, and only a handful of the new employees were involved in the resistance movement during World WarII. Similarly, there were no former members of the Social Democratic Party among the new employees. As far as original vocations are concerned, in both of the monitored regions, a vast majority of new employees represented workers. Especially in Ostrava, the difference between workers and intelligentsia is staggering. Therefore, the public proclamations of workers taking the stage in the party apparatus during 78 This is the number of regularly employed political employees. The number of the systematized positions was higher. In České Budějovice, this was 62 political employees, in Ostrava it was 78. OPEN ACCESS TOMáš HEMza 73 the period of “aggravation of class struggle” have proven to be true in practice.This is also evidenced by the two following tables. These represent the percentage share of workers and post-war party members among political employees. table 13 — The percentage share of workers among political employees Workers 1948 1949 1950 1951 České Budějovice 27.8% 28.6% 39.7% 54.4% Ostrava 35.5% 53.5% 56.7% 67.2% table 14 — The percentage share of post-war party members among political employees KSČ 1945–1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 České Budějovice 61.1% 78.6% 86.2% 92.9% Ostrava 38.7% 70.7% 67.6% 85.1% We can summarize the personal changes in České Budějovice region to October 19, 1951, when the Politburo ratified the new personnel systematization for the regional party apparatus.79 Along with the systematization, a personnel structure of the apparatus was approved. The total number of political employees decreased from 58 people in July 195080 to 57 in autumn of 1951. Comparing the personnel structure, we find that from the original 58 employees remained only 14. Similarly sweeping personal changes happened in the regional apparatus in Ostrava. The total number of political employees decreased from 102 people in December 1950 to 67 on October 28, 1951. From the original 102 people, only 21 political employees remained. The rest have left the party apparatus. Comparing the personal structure of the party apparatus in March 1948 and October 1951, we find that only five of the original political employees remained in Ostrava. In České Budějovice, there was only one employee left of those who worked in the regional apparatus in April 1948. The last three tables, therefore, compare the end result of the personal structure of regional committees in České Budějovice and Ostrava in 1951. The trends of previous years are still immediately apparent and are additionally exacerbated in 1951 by the inner purge the Party underwent. Dominant position was held by young workers who joined the Party after World War II. Most of these people became professional political employees after February 1948. Some of these employees worked on a county level before joining the regional apparatus. Majority of these employees, however, were common workers without any political experience, who only went through a brief training in one of the party schools before joining the regional apparatus. 79 SOA Třeboň, f. KSČ-JKV České Budějovice, file 72, pp. 658–664, PKV meeting 18.10.1951. 80 SOA Třeboň, f. KSČ-JKV České Budějovice, file 424, pp. 148–172. OPEN ACCESS 74 WISOHIM/ESHP 23 table 15 — Political employees, 1951, Year of birth Year of birth before 1899 1900–1909 1910–1919 1920–1929 after 1930 unknown České Budějovice 0 2 26 27 2 0 Ostrava 3 13 18 28 0 5 Total 3 15 44 55 2 5 table 16 — Political employees, 1951, Year of joining the Party Joined the Party 1921–1938 1939–1944 1945–1947 1948 unknown České Budějovice 2 2 53 0 0 Ostrava 7 0 57 0 3 Total 9 2 110 0 3 table 17 — Political employees, 1951, Original vocation Vocation Worker Other Intelligentsia Farmer unknown České Budějovice 31 11 15 0 0 Ostrava 45 11 8 0 3 Total 76 22 23 0 3 SUMMARY The study had two basic goals. The first was to describe the basic determinants impacting the organizational structure of the party apparatus on a regional level. The second aim was to describe the personal structure of three regional party apparatuses based on the collective biography method. Until February 1948, regional party organizations struggled with a fundamental lack of financial resources and therefore could only afford to employ a limited number of political employees. From an organizational standpoint, the party apparatus wasn’t divided into individual specialized departments. Rather, each employee was responsible for a certain political, organizational or economic segment. After February 1948, all three monitored party apparatus underwent a massive increase in the number of political employees. At the same time, the party apparatus was organized into specialized departments. The lack of funds continued to be a significant factor. Its main impacts were low salaries and resulting high rates of fluctuations. As far as personal structure is concerned, in the first three years after the war, a significant part of political personnel consisted of pre-war party members, who were also largely involved in the anti-Nazi resistance movement. These experienced party members almost exclusively held leadership positions in regional party organizations. After 1948, however, many of them left for other positions and their vacated posts were gradually staffed by younger employees, mostly post-war party members. Even despite the high personal fluctuation rate, after 1948 a new notable trend has emerged — new political employees were recruited from the ranks of young workers without political experience. After the inner party purge in 1951, these young political employees controlled regional party apparatuses not only by sheer numbers, but OPEN ACCESS TOMáš HEMza 75 also by holding leadership positions. Therefore, we can conclude that by the end of 1951, the party apparatus within the two monitored regional committees of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was staffed mainly by young workers with not only negligible political experiences, but also no work experience concerning leadership positions. They also completely lacked any kind of higher education, which was instead substituted by a quick training in the basic Stalinist dogmas in any political party school. OPEN ACCESS