Search for Partnership: German-Soviet Political Relations on the Eve of the Second World War

Search for Partnership: German-Soviet Political Relations on the Eve of the Second World War klára Fabianková The aim of the essay is to analyse the most important circumstances which could affected the final Stalin’s decision leading to the ratification of Soviet-German political relations at the end of the thirties. Among others to verify the affirmation that it was a calculated deal with exact objectives in the case of Ribbentrop-Molotov’s Pact. To prove that both regimes shielded the ideological differences by common national interests, which based for example in the separation of Poland. A part of the research is also the analysis of importance and direct consequences of the German-Soviet Pact. PURSUIT OF THE POLITICAL RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION In the second half of the thirties Stalin had several possibilities of foreign-political orientation. Firstly to cooperate with Great Britain and France. Secondly he could assert the isolationistic policy, thirdly intensify the very limited economical-political relations with the Third Reich in that time period.1 In last two prewar years the Soviet governance asserted all the three variations. The collateral negotiations were preceded. In June 1938 F. von Schulenburg positively commented the statement of Soviet commissioner M. Litvinov who presented the possibility including even the orientation on Germany.2 M. Litvinov didn’t exclude neither a deeper cooperation with Great Britain and mainly with France in that time. 3 By the end of 1938 it was evident that increasing rate of German armament expenses is sustainable only just in the short-term time period. Nazi armament ex1 S. TUMIS, The Soviet Search for Partnership: Some Remarks on Soviet Foreign Policy on the Eve of the Second World War, in: Prague Papers on History of International Relations, No. 1, 2010, p. 117. 2 See Botschafter am AA von 27. 6. 1938, in: Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945 (further only ADAP): Von Neurath zu Ribbentrop: September 1937 bis September 1938, Serie D (1937–1945), Bd. 1, Baden-Baden 1950, Dok. Nr. 627. 3 TUMIS, p. 117. OPEN ACCESS kLáRA FAbIANkOvá 103 penses more than tripled since the half of the thirties. 4 Second four-year plan established the programme of extensive import substitution in the form of domestic projects of synthetic production of key materials and raw-materials through which helped enlarge the industrial production. It placed high demands on resources which were due to high military costs in shortage anyhow. The projects of synthetic production of petrol and caoutchouc, coal, iron ore and industrial chemicals were started, there were invested into manufacturing of ships and increasing of power supplies. Autarchic arrangement of Nazi government in the field of agricultural production didn’t achieve a self-sufficiency at a majority of chosen foodstuff, even if in comparison to the twenties, there was an increase in volume of corn, potatoes, meat, or sugar.5 There wasn’t ensured the sufficient stock of strategical raw materials; particularly chromium for production of armoured steel, nickel for production of ammunition, copper for electrotechnical equipment or caoutchouc used in transport. Although the Nazi economy was dependent on import, there didn’t exist a functioning institutional framework which would effectively coordinate the import of strategic raw materials and their dividing between particular economic groups.6 One of the ways how to increase German resources and minimize consequences of nearly zero trade exchange with the Soviet Union at that time, was conquering and overrunning of other areas. The effective way was shown by annexation of Austria which even in the previous year provided the necessary qualified labour force, raw materials, foreign exchange including the production capacities. In the half of March 1939 Germany strengthened economic positions even by economic complex of Bohemia and Moravia. Hitler could utilize the Polish areas and attack the Soviet Union after the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia. Although it is very probable that none of the participants of Soviet-British-French negotiation wasn’t willing to guarantee a help to the Czechoslovak, the Munich Pact and its consequences enforced Stalin’s distrust in the principles of both collective security and credibility of the British-French bloc as the potential ally.7 It confirmed the reluctance of Western world powers to take strong action against Hitler’s aggression. The reluctance was enhanced by mutual suspicion. Soviet politicians perceived the Great Britain and France as the hostile capitalist countries; on the other hand Western European agents criticized the Soviet economic system, military purges and ideology.8 The Soviet position of world power 4 The total expenses on armament including Mefo-drafts increased from 5.5 billion of Imperial Marks (IM) to 17.3 billion of IM. See W. A. BOELCKE, Die Finanzpolitik des Dritten Reiches: Eine Darstellung in Grundzügen, in: K. H. BRACHER — M. FUNKE — H. A. JACOBSEN (hrsg.), Deutschland 1933–1945: Neue Studien zur nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft, Bonn 1992, p. 103. 5 D. PETZINA, Autarkiepolitik im Dritten Reich: Der nationalsozialistische Vierjahresplan, Stuttgart 1968, p. 95. 6 See K. FABIANKOVÁ, Sovětské surovinové dodávky a jejich význam pro německou válečnou ekonomiku v letech 1939–1941, in: P. CHALUPECKÝ (Ed.), Mezinárodní hospodářské vztahy zemí střední Evropy v první polovině 20. století, Praha 2015, pp. 87–93. 7 TUMIS, pp. 118–119. 8 Z. STEINER, The Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Czechoslovakian Crisis in 1938: New Material from the Soviet Archives, in: The Historical Journal, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1999, pp. 752–753. 104 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015 was negated, and an exit to isolation was caused from which the Soviet Union broke out successfully of in the half of the thirties.9 According to Sergej Sluc, Stalin returned to the strategy of utilizing disputes between particular Western European countries and enforcing his own interests and objectives.10 According to Thierry Wolton the Munich Pact served to Soviet propaganda as a pretence for apology for participation at the pact, however, it doesn‘t explain a speed with which both dictators come to the cooperation. He assumes that Stalin was motivated to cooperate with Germany not thanks to French-British compromises towards Hitler’s Munich requirements, but thanks to the will pointed against peace which was asserted co-operatively.11 The result of Munich crisis was also the fact that Soviet government started to look for alternatives to the system of collective security and its foreign policy started to become unpredictable and unstable. The Kremlin representatives become aware of the fact that isolationism strategy without reliable associate is very disadvantageous.12 Geoffrey Roberts mentions in connection with a Munich Pact the interview between Soviet deputy of Foreign Affairs‘ Commissioner and French ambassador in Moscow, in which V. Potemkin claims shortly after the document’s signature: “I cannot see else way than fourth dividing of Poland.”13 The revision in a Soviet approach appeared at the celebration of the New Year’s Day 1939 when Hitler talked publicly to the Soviet ambassador Alexej Mereklovov firstly since the half of the thirties; he even had a lunch with him two months later. Diplomacy agents in Moscow couldn’t overlook such gesture and the London journal called “News Chronicle“ printed an article of Moscow correspondent V. Bartlett and a close friend, the Soviet ambassador I. Majsky at the end of January 1939 in which he drafted the possible deal between the Soviet Union and Germany.14 Stalin let the whole noncommented translation published in the official party’s journal, however Hitler didn’t respond. He probably didn’t want to call attention to the possible German-soviet deal in the period when negotiation with Poland was proceeded. J. von Ribbentrop dealt with Polish representatives about handover of Danzing, rights of passage through the Polish Corridor and connecting Poland to the anti-Comintern Pact, whose failure led Hitler to prepare an attack on Poland.15 Historians aren’t able to agree on the interpretation of reasons of the Stalin’s turn and accurate timing. The object of discussion is a question since when the Soviet 9 W. BENECKE, Die Entfesselung des Krieges: Von München zum Hitler-Stalin-Pakt, in: Osteuropa, Bd. 59, Nr. 7–8, 2009, pp. 33–36. 10 S. SLUC, Der Weg in die Sackgasse: Die UdSSR und der Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pakt, in: Osteuropa, Bd. 59, Nr. 7–8, 2009, pp. 75–76. 11 T. WOLTON, Rudohnědá nemoc 20. století, Praha 2003, p. 21. 12 TUMIS, p. 119. 13 G. ROBERTS, The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany, in: Soviet Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1992, pp. 58–59. 14 See D. C. WATT, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War: 1938–1939, New York 1989, pp. 122–123. 15 See H. KISSINGER, Diplomacy, New York 1994, p. 338; Y. SANTAMARIA, 1939: Německosovětský pakt, Praha 2001, p. 21; J. ZARUSKY, Hitler bedeutet Krieg: Der deutsche Weg zum Hitler-Stalin-Pakt, in: Osteuropa, Bd. 59, Nr. 7–8, 2009, pp. 106–107; A. ZUBOV, Dějiny Ruska 20. století: 1939–2007, Vol. 2, Praha 2015, p. 3. kLáRA FAbIANkOvá 105 government started to think whether to continue in negotiation about alliance with Western world powers, or to settle with Nazi Germany. Different opinions could be noticed even in a question whether it was really the turn in foreign policy, or only the use of different means for enforcement of the same objectives.16 While R. C. Raack asserts the opinion that Stalin tried to get to the war conflict other countries, including Western Europe and then extract the maximum of such situation, G. Roberts says that Stalin was forced to cooperate with Hitler and defines the opinion streams dealing with a question since when Moscow started the negotiation leading to the signature of German-Soviet political pact.17 According to his opinion, it could be considered as the one of possible signals about similar decision making also the Stalin’s speech from March 193918 at the party’s congress and mainly his words “not to burn fingers”19 connected with a criticism of British-French appeasement policy, when advised not to rush, maintain vigilance and not to draw the country into war before being defeated by Western European democracy.20 To the Stalin’s words responded most quickly a German foreign minister J. von Ribbentrop who found in it an indirect encouragement for improvement of Soviet-German cooperation. Both speeches give evidence of uncertainty prevailing in the world in this time period. The Soviet leader negated still more common fears about the destiny of Zakarpatska Ukraine21 and preferred a counter-western Pact conception against Comintern, in fact. According to E. H. Carr that was exceedingly ingenious rhetorical exercise whereof wasn’t possible to deduce any reliable conclusions because only one sixth of the speech was devoted to foreign-political topics.22 However, this could be deduced that a new Soviet foreign policy stopped to make differences between countries; it didn’t feel to be restricted formally by any obligations. It didn’t really oppose any possibility. F. von Schulenburg preferred the Stalin’s easement of attack rhetoric against totalitarian countries and effort for stronger criticism of the foreign policy of democratic countries, at an assessment of the speeches. 23 16 ROBERTS, The Soviet Decision…, pp. 58–77; G. ROBERTS, The Soviet union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and the Road to War: 1933–1941, New York 1995; R. C. RAACK, Stalin’s Drive to the West: 1938–1945: The Origins of the Cold War, Stanford 1995. 17 ROBERTS, The Soviet Decision…, pp. 58–59. 18 The text of Stalin’s speech from XVIII. Congress see in: J. V. STALIN, Otázky leninismu, Praha 1950, pp. 560–570; ADAP: Die letzten Monate vor Kriegsausbruch: 9. August bis 3. September 1939, Serie D (1937–1945), Bd. VII, Baden-Baden 1956, Dok. Nr. 213, pp. 189–191. 19 This collocation is often translated “not to pick hot chestnuts from the fire instead of others” which could be evidently considered as an allusion to the former accusation of the United States of America towards Great Britain. 20 ZUBOV, p. 4. 21 At the beginning of 1939 the Soviet leadership was afraid of that Hitler want to capture Zakarpatska Ukraine in order to gain preferable position for the war conflict with the Soviet Union. In the half of March, however, Hitler dispensed publicly with these territorial requirements. 22 E. H. CARR, Berlin-Moskau: Deutschland und Russland zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen, Stuttgart 1954, pp. 162–164. 23 ADAP: Die letzten Monate vor Kriegsausbruch: März bis August 1939, Serie D (1937–1945), Bd. VI, Baden-Baden 1956, Dok. Nr. 1, pp. 1–3. 106 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015 Although most of German historians24 consider the March speech to be a Soviet step towards the future political cooperation with Germany, it doesn’t mean that Stalin would decide in favour of such policy just now. Soviet leader himself had intended to choose the time and conditions under which the entry into the war. Negotiations with the Western powers used as a means of exerting pressure on Hitler.25 He was rather sceptical, careful and didn’t be rash needlessly, after the repeated unsuccessful attempts at negotiations with Great Britain and France. The Moscow authorities waited probably for any proposal. It depended on who will suggest more. According to W. Maser, Hitler was much more prudent and indulgent to the deductions declared by Ribbentrop, although still regarded the possible deal with Great Britain.26 Hitler didn’t contemplate to respect the possible allies and restrict his expansive plans. At the same time he wanted to avoid the offensive at two fronts. After failure of the last German-Polish negotiation about Gdansk and corridor’s exterritoriality from the end of March 1939, the prime minister N. Chamberlain declared the British guarantee of Polish borders which guaranteed that if Germany and Poland enter the war, Great Britain won‘t stay neutral but take the Poland side. These guarantees crossed the Hitlerʼs intentions and affected even the subsequent international events. Since that time the German leader didn’t consider an understanding with the Poles to be realistic and perceived that he won’t enforce his requirements other than by the military way. At the same time he trust London till the beginning of August that won’t intervene militarily.27 It’s without question that everyone wanted to avoid the repetition of World War I, whereas the United Kingdom hoped that trilateral alliance will disallow Hitler to make a longer-range conflict. The Nazi economy as well as army weren’t prepared for the European war yet; moreover it couldn’t even count with effective support from abroad. In addition, Western European governments didn’t understand that the balance of strengths isn’t well-disposed to the advantage of Germany.28 When considering more further, it emerges that in the first half-year of 1939 Wehrmacht reinforced much more than British and French armies together. Whereas in 1938 Western powers could consider the Soviet Union to be a possible ally, Stalin was a Hitler’s ally in the following year. According to the German documentation preserved, the Soviet Ambassador Mereklov discussed with German assistant secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker on 17 April 1939.29 The official reason of the visit regarded a fulfilment of arranged supplies of war material from Pilsner Skoda to the Soviet Union. However, Mereklov amplified the 24 This opinion was confirmed by W. Maser, A. Hillgruber, W. Hofer, F. A. Krummbacher, H.Lange, J. W. Brügel. On the contrary D. C. Watt, E. H. Carr or G. Roberts impeach this assumption. See W. MASER, Der Wortbruch: Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg, München 1994, p. 5; CARR, p. 164; ROBERTS, The Soviet Decision…, p. 59. 25 ZUBOV, p. 4. 26 MASER, p. 5. 27 ZARUSKY, pp. 105–108. 28 N. FERGUSON, The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West, New York 2006, pp. 361–367. 29 The official record made by Weizsäcker see in: see ADAP, Ser. D, Bd. VI, Dok. Nr. 215, pp. 221–222. kLáRA FAbIANkOvá 107 possibility of mutual political relationsʼ improvement.30 The claimed words by Mereklov about a directness of the Soviet foreign policy wasn’t faithful because since the half of March there were negotiations proceeded between Soviet and British diplomats in an effort to make longer-range contracts about mutual help in the case of aggression. M. Litvinov submitted an eight-point proposal for the trilateral pact in the same April day which should in case of an attack guarantee a help to the East European countries lying between the Baltic See and the Black Sea and neighbouring with the Soviet Union at the same time.31 The suggestion resulted from a fear of Leningrad’s occupation by German army which in respect of the imperial marine predominance wasn’t unrealistic. According to D. C. Watt, E. H. Carr or G. H. Gornig, the Mereklovov’s politically motivated speech could be considered as the first seriously meant signal from the Soviet side against Berlin leading to August pact. At the same time it’s an evidence of duality of Soviet foreign-political tactics.32 At the beginning of the nineties there were the Soviet official documents declassified,33 which exemplify somewhat different Mereklovov’s written record from the negotiation process. An author otherwise doesn’t deny the claimed meeting’s business purpose but all the initiative including political notes and comments of the above-mentioned importance attributes to the German side. According to G. Roberts even the third version of a written report survived whose author is G. Astachov who accompanied the Soviet Ambassador.34 The Soviet side always interpreted the tendentiously exaggerated Weizsäcker’s German version as vague and improbable; it pointed at Hitler’s speech from the end of April 193935 about upcoming attack on Poland whereof weren’t heard any anti-Soviet hints, nor communism’s criticism. In April 1939 the Japanese weren’t prepared to a military cooperation with Germany against Great Britain; however no one from the London diplomacy could rely on that. Hitler, according to N. Ferguson, expected British appeasement in exchange for a postponement of military conflict which considered to be nearly unavoidable since 30 ADAP, Ser. D, Bd. VI, Dok. Nr. 215, p. 221. 31 A. J. P. TAYLOR, The Origins of the Second World War, London 1964, p. 287. 32 See G. ROBERTS, Infamous Encounter? The Merekalov Weizsäcker Meeting of 17 April 1939, in: The Historical Journal, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1992, pp. 921–923; ROBERTS, The Soviet Decision…, pp. 59–60; CARR, p. 166; G. H. GORNIG, Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt: Eine völkerrechtliche Studie, Frankfurt am Main 1990, pp. 4–5. 33 L. F. IĽJIČEV (red.), God krizisa 1938–1939: dokumenty i materialy v dvuch tomach (further only GK): 2 ijunja 1939 g. — 4 sentjabrja 1939 g., Tom II, Moskva 1990, pp. 256–271. 34 ROBERTS, Infamous Encounter…, pp. 922–923. 35 The speech demonstrating the sudden turn in a German policy towards Poland and Great Britain was inspired by the Roosevelt’s message in which the American president was alarmed by the Hitler’s invasion into the Czechoslovakia and called upon Hitler to abandon the attack on about thirty mainly European countries, as a compensation he will ensure him the approach to raw materials necessary for Germany in the world markets. The Nazi leader just proclaimed cynically that “in each country mentioned by him the probes were carried out, but none of the countries feels to be threatened by Germany“. See J.RIBBENTROP, 100 dokumentů o vzniku války: Výbor z úřední německé Bílé knihy, Praha 1940, dok.Nr. 49, pp. 87–93. 108 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015 March.36 However, Hitler didn’t contemplate to provoke this fight earlier than in September in the same year. For the maximum objective depiction of the situation it’s necessary to say that a period of activities in which the properly accredited diplomats as well as empowered emissaries and the Secret Service, started roughly in this moment. An alliance with the Soviet Union should have become “exclusiveness” which this or that party should have firstly deserved, thus offer a sufficient price for it. Each pursued his own aim and agreed with the initiative in case it was useful for him, and at the same time was concerned honestly in a doubletalk of reality and doubt’s deepening. The importance of Hitler’s April neglect came out several days later when the answer from Soviet embassy followed. Maxim Litvinov resigned involuntarily from the function of foreign affairs minister on the third day in May.37 Although he had a Jewish origin he was married with a daughter of an English historian, preferred cooperation with Great Britain and France and was closely bundled with a policy of collective security which could have made an obstruction during negotiations with Hitler, in such personal exchange couldn’t be seen any official turn in the Soviet policy. According to W. Maser and A. J. P. Taylor couldn’t be evidenced that it was a consequence of the Hitler’s April speech.38 According to V. Smetana the policy of collective security could be a proof of Stalin’s dualism and hid his real political aims.39 German party saw in the Litvinov’s resignation a “gesture of good will” which made easy a decision making in the situation when it couldn’t in the planned conflict with Great Britain rely on Japanese militarily involved in China and Mongolia. German historian R. Ahmann mentions that resignation of M. Litvinov raised attention of Hitler because he got knowledge about the content of Stalin’s March speech as lately as in a half of May.40 On the other hand, W. Maser argues that J. von Ribbentrop immediately thoroughly handed over the Stalin’s speech to Hitler.41 No one should let be cradled by obligatory formulation that Litvinov’s exchange was carried out “at own request”,42 especially if Soviet government didn’t stopped the talks with Western European powers. Some expert studies signify that Vjaceslav M. Molotov after his coming even further exhibited effort to find the deal with Western powers and personally denied a change in Soviet foreign policy.43 36 FERGUSON, p. 378. 37 A. RESIS, The Fall of Litvinov: Harbinger of the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact, in: EuropeAsia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2000, p. 50. 38 MASER, p. 10, 22; TAYLOR, pp. 284–285. 39 Vít Smetana argues with the words of Walter Krivicky that Stalin never lost the trust in the cooperation with Germany and always called attention to the possible rapprochement in the series of articles printed in the international journals. Also the explanation is offered that he could be inspired by the domestic policy. See V. SMETANA, Vítězství geopolitiky nad ideologií, sovětsko-německý pakt 1939, in: Dějiny a současnost, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1999, p. 26. 40 R. AHMANN, Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt: Nichtangriffsund Angriffsvertrag?, in: E. OBERLÄNDER (hrsg.), Hitler-Stalin-Pakt 1939: Das Ende Ostmitteleuropas?, Frankfurt am Main 1989, p. 33. 41 MASER, p. 4. 42 The four-lined message informed about the resignation printed in the back side where was literally mentioned: “The Presidium of the Highest Soviet released Mr. Litvinov from his function on own request.” See RESIS, p. 51. 43 See M. J. CARLEY, End of the “Low, Dishonest Decade”: Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939, in: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2, 1993, p. 320; D. WATSON, Molotovʼs Ap- kLáRA FAbIANkOvá 109 The prompt nomination of V. M. Molotov, a self-confident man and with a certain influence on Stalin, improved diplomatic relations of Moscow with Berlin. There were the talks carried out in May44 mainly between Georgij Astachov and Karl Schnurre in which both commented the desire to deepen sluggish relations and pick up on the Rapallo period which has been welcome mainly by representatives of German economic sphere in comparison with an opinion of the old party elite. Elaborated expert studies 45 still resulted from the thesis that Soviet union fall within a group of enemy countries but at the same time confirmed that German need of raw materials and foodstuff will be ensured by import only from 25 %, and provided that German firms don’t break the business contacts with South Eastern Europe. There should be missing roughly two millions of tons of crude oil the most, and the demand should yet raise in the war conditions. Full-value raw materials could be ensured only by Stalin’s Soviet Union in case of military-economical blockade. There were noticed another decline of import from Soviet Union at the final volume of 6 millions of imperial marks during the first quarter of 1939.46 The authority for four-year plan and Wehrmacht leadership deduced final conclusions from that. In order the short-term war needs were ensured, they calculated with an implementation of Soviet economical potential into imperial production capacities. The German side offered to Baltic and Scandinavian countries the non-aggression agreements in order to ensure the neutral zone in the north-east of Europe and so assure indirectly its food and raw materials’ reserves. At the same time there was planned the contraction of German-Italian-Japanese alliance which should have discouraged Western countries and even Soviet Union from possible attack. According to Rolf Ahmann, Hitler relied on the fact that Stalin won’t have an interest in deal with the West without this alliance.47 As early as 20 May 1939 the Moscow ambassador F. von Schulenburg instructed to suggest follow-up openings of talks about economic topics at the visit to V. M. Molotov. After longer than hour-long mutually cautious and distrustful discussion they come to an ambiguous conclusion that mainly “Soviet army considers the business negotiations to be unhelpful until necessary political conditions will be made for them”.48 The German representative even tried to learn the mysterious sense of Molotov‘s words, however their host was decided not to reveal more; he had no choice but to wait tactiprenticeship in Foreign Policy: The Triple Alliance Negotiations in 1939, in: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2000, pp. 695–722. 44 ADAP, Ser. D, Bd. VI, Aufzeichnung Schnurre, Dok. Nr. 332, p. 355; ibidem, Dok. Nr. 351, p. 381; GK: 29 sentjabrja 1938 g. — 31 maja 1939 g., Tom I, Moskva 1990, Nr. 349. 45 There are analyses submitted at the end of April 1939 by Karl Krauch, director I. G. Farben and Göringʼs general representative for special requests of chemical production, and the Reich authority for the military-economical planning. See R. D. MÜLLER, Das Tor zur Weltmacht: Die Bedeutung der Sowjetunion für deutsche Wirtschaftsund Rüstengspolitik zwischen den Weltkriegen, Boppard am Rhein 1984, pp. 317, 329. 46 ADAP, Ser. D, Bd. VI, Dok. Nr. 530, p. 608. 47 AHMANN, p. 34. 48 J. von Ribbentrop already required the talks about division of Poland that time which was, however, rejected by Hitler shortly before. ADAP, Ser. D, Bd. VI, Dok. Nr. 414, p. 454; ibidem, Dok. Nr. 424, p. 456; GK, Tom I, Nr. 363. 110 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015 cally until the Soviet diplomats will be more communicative. However, it was evident already soon that Molotov’s discretion was only the beginning of Soviet waiting game. Moscow representatives still waited patiently for the British-French proposals. They wanted to make safe the Baltic countries in which Germany successively acquired the impact.49 The Molotov’s priority interest was to persuade a British and French government about contraction of a military deal with clearly defined conditions based on solidarity and equality of duties, mainly with the respect to providing of guarantees to Estonia, Latvia, Finland and Lithuania.50 Molotov responded to western proposal by sending of amended variation of the resolution at the beginning of June which guaranteed the help in case of any aggression and concerned the namely mentioned countries. British politicians despite of stipulations agreed and promised delegating of a diplomatic delegation. However, the personal constitution didn’t conform to Moscow imaginations.51 Mainly William Strang, a member of the British Foreign Affairs Ministry, was perceived by Molotov as a representative of the “second league” of the British diplomacy.52 During the trilateral negotiation in a half of June, Molotov criticized further the vagueness and lack of reciprocity in duties of British-French proposals and even their effort to extend the talks unproportionally.53 It’s evident that Soviet interest to make a contract with Great Britain and France was still actual in this time period. According to T. Wolton and R. Ahmann, Stalin was afraid of a German attack through Baltic countries or Romanian area, and that is why the future economic cooperation with Germany was conditioned by the political non-aggression agreement. The successful ratification of such conceived agreement would then motivate a Soviet dictator to abandonment of negotiations with France and Great Britain, according to their opinion.54 There were proceeded even the Soviet-Germany negotiations, in parallel. At the beginning of June 1939 Anastas I. Mikoyan, a country commissioner, appealed to Gustav Hilger, a legacy councillor, with a question what “modus procedendi” the German empire imagines in the question of possible business negotiations.55 By this Mikoyan confirmed the Soviet wish to start the common negotiations as soon as possible, and implied at the same time that parallel trilateral talks aren’t proceeded satisfactorily. On the basis of interdepartmental talks a new schedule of business negotiations was formulated by K. Schnurre. The list56 of mutual requirements markedly exceeded the framework of January determined objectives, namely by the Soviet two-year obligation of raw materials’ import in the value of 300 million of imperial marks. Except the supplies of war material, iron ore, phosphates, natural gas and cotton, Moscow 49 Occupation of Memel in March 1939. See TUMIS, p. 120. 50 WATSON, pp. 699–702. 51 Ibidem, pp. 705–706. 52 GK, Tom II, Nr. 570, p. 270. 53 SSSR should help Poland, Romania, Belgium, Greece and even Turkey, but Great Britain and France didnʼt have the same duty towards Latvia, Estonia and Finland in the case of an aggression. WATSON, pp. 706–710. 54 AHMANN, p. 35; WOLTON, pp. 22–23. 55 ADAP, Ser. D, Bd. VI, Dok. Nr. 491, p. 551. 56 ADAP, Ser. D, Bd. VI, Dok. Nr. 530, pp. 608–609. kLáRA FAbIANkOvá 117 transport was stopped.97 This event was assessed very positively by the majority of representatives of imperial enterprise sphere and even Soviet press. It welcomed the business recovery as well as sales possibilities in the east market. It was considered bilaterally as the signal for starting of the first phase of political convergency.98 For Hitler it represented a pleasant easement because he didn’t need to worry about an attack of France and Great Britain in the period of German-Polish conflict planned. Germany returned to the position of the biggest business partner of SSSR. The very importance of an agreement could be appreciated after understanding of political circumstances, including the events of the following period. IMPORTANCE OF THE RIBBENTROP-MOLOTOV PACT AND ITS IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES When interpreting this agreement there still exist extensive disproportions up to the present day. They are also influenced by the ideologisation of a whole topic, mainly in case of communist historians. Until the beginning of the eighties of the Twentieth Century there weren’t any discussions on the topic of background and consequences of German-Soviet pact preferred officially in countries of the Soviet bloc.99 Also the opinion was prevailing there until the Gorbacovʼs reforms that agreements helped Stalin get time, a certainty of neutrality necessary for armament. The non-aggression pact was in Brezhnev’s epoch considered by Roj Medvedev as contributive and reasonable.100 A declassification of the archival materials and crisis of the communist system which survived several tens of years longer unlike Nazism, helped understand more the essence of alliance.101 The current historiography still justifies the Stalin’s decision. Among the most frequent arguments belong affirmations that the decision was forced indirectly to Soviet leadership by the moderation of Western powers, respectively was influenced by security interests102 by which they marginalize the Stalin’s part in the creation of World War II. I. K. Koblyakov argues that the subsequent German-Soviet cooperation didn’t have a large importance for the eco97 See MÜLLER, p. 334. 98 About which even the words of K. Schnurre testify: “If we look back from the economical importance of the agreement, its significance lies in the fact that negotiations helped for the re-establishment of mutual thread with the Soviet Union and is assessed from both sides as the first decisive step for the renewal of political relations.” See J. H. PERREY, Der Rußlandausschuß der deutschen Wirtschaftdie deutschsowjetischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen der Zwischenkriegszeit: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Ost-West Handels, München 1985, p. 296. 99 ZARUSKY, p. 98. 100 R. Medvedev moderated his declaration after 1989. See R. BUCHNER, Todfeinde: Komplizen: Kriegsbrandstifter: Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt und die Folgen, Leipzig 2009, p. 62. 101 The newest and most complex analysis of causes, significance, consequence of the pacts in the Europe-wide context see in: A. KAMINSKY — D. MÜLLER — S. TROEBST, Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt 1939 in den Erinnerungskulturen der Europäer, Göttingen 2011. 102 See B. PIADYSHEV, We Defended Whole World: Now We Will Take Care of Ourselves, in: International Affairs, Vol. 3, 2005, pp. 18–21. 118 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015 nomical growth of both economies.103 S. Sluc has such opinion that a mutual cooperation brought economical advantages mainly to the Nazi system.104 August events could be interpreted in many ways. The supporters of an “offensive stream” among which V. Suvorov and W. Maser could be ranked thing that World War II was provoked consciously by Stalin with the aim to weaken Germany and even the Western European countries. The economical-political alliance should have been used according to their opinions to increasing of military potential of Soviet army. French historian Y. Santamaria points out in this context on the incompletion of German and Soviet archives which probably brought about that supporters of the offensive stream accredited a huge importance to the NKVD materials which directly or indirectly proved the Stalin’s aggressive plans.105 Another opinion stream is American “revisionist school” represented by Geoffrey Roberts and Alan J. P. Taylor.106 Its representatives accredit the main guilt to Stalin who according to them didn’t estimate the rate of strong-mindedness of the West to oppose Hitler and tried primarily to assure own security and neutrality. On the other hand we could state the theory of “two handcuffs in the fire” represented by G. L. Weinberg and David C.Watt. This interprets the Soviet leader to be a minister of dualism and disguise who always tended subconsciously to the German empire. Germany historian G. L.Weinberg thinks that Hitler would attack the Poland even if there wasn’t reached the contraction of German-Soviet pact because he wasn’t afraid of war but peace.107 Although the pro-German orientation couldn’t be denied, this conception attributes too large importance to a secret diplomacy compared to the official line and doesn’t take into account the genuine Stalin’s aims. According to a current Estonian historian Hein Arumäe,108 a large critic of the Russian official stream, there were an opinion widespread in the countries of former Soviet bloc that the pact was an unavoidable defensive arrangement because Soviet Union would become already in 1939 a victim of Nazi aggression on the one hand and on the other hand it was endangered even by capitalist countries after the failure of trilateral negotiations.109 Was this opinion justified? Hitler didn’t stop to seek the “living space” in the east and the mutual conflict due to ideological reasons was unavoidable in the long term. However, the leader on a short-term basis didn’t wish a mutual war earlier than re103 I. K. KOBLYAKOV, Wer hat den Zweiten Weltkrieg entfacht, Moskau 1982, p. 338. 104 S. SLUC, 17. September 1939: Der Eintritt der Sowjetunion in den Zweiten Weltkrieg: Eine historische völkerrechtliche Bewertung, in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Bd. 48, Hf. 2, 2000, pp. 219–254. 105 SANTAMARIA, pp. 101–102. 106 See for example ROBERTS, The Soviet Decision…, pp. 58–77. 107 G. L. WEINBERG, Offene Fragen und kontroverse Punkte, in: R. MÖLLER — A. ČUBAR’JAN (hrsg.), Mitteilungen der Gemeinsamen Kommission für die Erforschung der jüngeren Geschichte der deutsch-russischen Beziehungen, Bd. 1, München 2002, p. 82. 108 Heino Arumäe acted at the Academy of Sciences in Tallinn and as the first one translated and published in the Baltic the German wording of the August agreement even with the secret supplement which has already previously been printed in the West. 109 H. ARUMÄE, Noch einmal zum sowjetisch-deutschen Nichtangriffspakt, in: E. OBERLÄNDER (hrsg.), Hitler-Stalin-Pakt 1939: Das Ende Ostmitteleuropas, Frankfurt am Main, 1990, p. 115. kLáRA FAbIANkOvá 119 solve the “Polish issue” and remove the threat of British-French intervention. Olaf Groehler mentions that already in the ratification day of August credit agreement the German instruction110 was carried out for the war against Soviet Union. There was taken into account that Soviet sea military forces will be destroyed and German trade in the Baltic Sea will be safeguarded including the sea connection in East Prussia. If we consider then the military-strategical analyses, war potential and a fact that Germany didn’t dispose of suitable starting space for the offensive, then could be assumed that the response to a question raised is negative. Even the creation of possible front launched against the Soviet Union could be assessed as too unilateral theoretic speculation. H. Arumäe argues that supporters of this idea underestimate the antagonism within a capitalist block and forget that real state interests always stay on the first place against subjective opinions and moods of particular politicians.111 Since the non-aggression pact was connected with the secret amendment, both documents were assessed negatively since the very beginning. According to H. Arumäe their negative consequences consisted in the fact that European power balance which was existing till this time and represented the effective element of international stability namely in favour of Germany, was destroyed. Hitler could take a share in the destruction of Poland and break off the World War II.112 However, it’s not so easy to find an explicit response to question why the system of collective security was broken down. The representatives of Soviet diplomacy are criticised in this context for the inconsistency and permanent effort for a recovery of the cooperation with Germany, disregard of democratic system and short-term calculations with the aim to turn the Nazi aggression towards the west. All of these could be proved successfully. Similar accusations could be, however, applied even against Stalin’s democratic partners as well. According to B. Litera and J. Wanner is much more difficult to assess the extreme interpretations which blame Stalin for the incitation to war within own power strategy, as well as at unilateral expediently focused attempts of Soviet professional public to prove a solidarity to the Fascism and democracy relating to the Soviet Union.113 Even the historical experience of that time indicated that a collective security didn’t infill the programme aim because responsible powers simply weren’t interested in the fact that small state organs, the principles of international law, majesty and even democracy, could complicate their intentions. The proof of this affirmation is for example the non-punishment of Japanese expansion to China, inadequate reaction to Anschluss of Austria or the circumstances of Munich Deal. As Comintern didn’t manage to discomfit by its mistaken and chaotic progress the Nazi’s grab of power, 110 O. GROEHLER, Sebevražedné spojenectví — německo-sovětská spolupráce 1920–1941, Praha 1997, p. 82. 111 The World War II showed that the Great Britain deliberately supported the Soviet Union, and not Germany. The evidence is the business agreement from October 1939 which lost its value when it emerged that the Soviet Union exchanged British products for the German weapon stockpile, however, the image of Stalin wasnʼt damaged in any radical way. ARUMÄE, p. 118. 112 Ibidem, pp. 119–120. 113 LITERA — WANNER, p. 37. 120 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015 either the West underestimated a danger of aggression when didn’t respond to the cancellation of particular articles of the Versailles agreement with a necessary resolution and relied upon to its diversion by a traditional backstage diplomacy. Even if the principle of collective security was evidently the only instrument against the war led according to Hitler’s unprecedented rules and means, it was never an easy option. According to the British historian, N. Ferguson, the connection with a Stalin’s regime was practically impossible for the British conservatives, likewise the deal with a czarist Russia for the liberals before the World War I.114 According to I. Kershaw, R.D.Müller or H. Arumäe, all the sides involved in the eruption of war have its share of responsibility, even if Hitler’s share was the biggest unambiguously.115 What motivated both dictators to the cooperation even at a political stage? Although Hitler was decided for the military attack against Poland, we cannot pass over the fact that despite numerous postponements he would hardly make so fatal step if he didn’t secure the alliance with Stalin. According to Suzanne Schattenberg116 it wasn’t a failure of French-British policy but in connection with the pact it could be rather discussed about the momental conformity of two different strategies which agreed in a certain historical moment regardless of their inner policy, ideological principles and fundamentals.117 A. N. Tupolev, a soviet aero builder, characterized concisely the value of pact when he read the Moscow journal with a published text of the agreement about borders and friendship. He crumpled the news and yelled: “What friendship? What is going on, they already went mad totally?”118 Hitler proved a political flexibility; he connected shortly with his ideological enemy in order to simplify the way to his future assault. Stalin managed to exploit a maximum from the given international situation thanks to his calculation. According to W. Maser, the vague formulations and other law inadequacies of the document give a clue that both pact partners didn’t prepare to keep exactly the letter of documents, it was just a temporary resolution dictated by circumstances which was confirmed later by themselves, not only verbally.119 Stalin wanted to avoid a lone conflict with Hitler and at the same time needed a free transit over Polish and Romanian areas. When Soviets suggested a trilateral alliance with Western European countries which would protect not only them but also the neighbouring countries against the Nazi aggression, they were rejected or the 114 FERGUSON, p. 377. 115 MÜLLER, pp. 343, 398; ARUMÄE, p. 120; I. KERSHAW, Hitler: 1936–1945: Nemesis, New York 2000, pp. 224–225. 116 Suzanne Schattenberg (*1969), German historian and professor at the University of Bremen. 117 S. SCHATTENBERG, Diplomatie der Diktatoren: Der Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pakt, in: Osteuropa, Bd. 59, Nr. 7–8, 2009, p. 7. 118 See R. C. TUCKER, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above 1928–1941, New York / London 1990, p. 599. 119 When Ribbentrop said to Stalin after the signing of September agreement that he „is convinced about the fact that now both the Germans and Russians should never cross the weapons“, Stalin had a think about for an instant and then replied: “You are right, it should be like that probably.” See MASER, pp. 123, 126. kLáRA FAbIANkOvá 121 negotiations were extended disproportionally.120 According to H. Kissinger, the British politicians enabled unconsciously the Soviet side to acquire more advantageous negotiating position, they provided Stalin an unilateral guarantee without additional costs that will defend the borders of all European countries neighbouring with the Soviet Union excluding the Baltic territory. This enabled Stalin to choose the delaying tactics. He could talk with allies led in Moscow primarily used as an instrument of psychological pressure on Hitler. 121 If Poland is attacked, there will a war conflict occur but it would take place several hundreds of kilometres from Soviet borders.122 It’s also necessary to understand that Stalin was helpful towards all the variants and wanted to decide for this one which would be the most advantageous in ä given moment with respect to potential territory gains. Even T. Wolton confirms this indirectly and holds an opinion that when the British-French delegation arrived to Leningrad at the beginning of August 1939 to negotiate the military-political agreement, the Soviet side didn’t look for another resolution already and was preparing for cooperation with Germany.123 The Nazi regime wasn’t much prepared to a war on two fronts. According to N.Ferguson, Hitler relied rather on the infringement of liabilities of Western countries against Poland.124 If Germany attacked the Soviet Union which would stayed neutral, then a military potential would be rather in favour of Stalin. The Red Army exceeded the number of divisions of ground forces in Germany two and a half, four times as France, Great Britain five times, and the United States eleven.125 American politician John F. Dulles found as far as fascinating similarity when comparing the ideological basis of the Stalinist dictatorship to a mind base of the Hitler’s regime, mainly as regards the aims and even means leading to their achievement. Both systems made efforts to acquire the world supremacy and the instrument with whose it could have been achieved was the “programme of unlimited expansion” which others could “ignore just at their own risk”.126 Just the August pact helped them invaluably as the means to achievement of the continental majority. Stalin enabled Hitler a territorial expansion, however, he could be aware of that the surest way how to stop the Hitler’s intentions, is a threat of encirclement of Germany at two fronts but he didn’t calculate that. According to N. Ferguson, the British liabilities towards a Polish territory disallowed such alliance which could discourage Hitler or speed up his defeat.127 In my opinion, the German-Soviet pact is a characteristic example of a real-policy applied in practise and thus it’s not seldom called the Hitler’s “voucher for the war”. Paul Schmidt still had a chance to look inside the secret protocol that night and commented its text in words: “The intentions of both contract sides couldn’t be expressed more 120 FERGUSON, p. 377. 121 ZUBOV, p. 7. 122 KISSINGER, pp. 342–343. 123 WOLTON, pp. 24–25. 124 FERGUSON, p. 379. 125 ZUBOV, p. 4. 126 See J. L. GADDIS, The United States and the Origins of the Gold War 1941–1947, New York 1972, p. 320. 127 FERGUSON, p. 377. 122 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015 clearly, I realized that I didn’t say goodbye to the peace unnecessarily that evening before a signature.”128 Both systems didn’t share too many mutual values, rules or regulations, nor did ideology connect them. They tried primarily to ensure more advantageous position and decisions subordinated to that. The Soviet archives indicate that it wasn’t an act planned in the long term but rather a momental conformity of interests achieved several days before the deal’s ratification. There could be the unreadiness and a certain rate of improvisation when organizing proved by insufficient formal essentials of the paper form of pact as well as by the situations, to a certain extent paradoxical, before and during the Moscow conference at which the non-aggression agreement was signed. The secrecy of the action was purportedly so excellent that neither the Soviet anti-aircraft defence knew about it nor planes destined to Moscow were bombarded over the town of Smolensk.129 The Moscow airport was garnished with turned-up swastikas borrowed from the Moscow film studio which used them for recording of anti-Nazi films. More consistent information about the progress of negotiation come mainly from German official sources and memories. The non-aggression agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany130 contains seven articles. Both signatories rejected to use violence in mutual relations and take part at the power groupment bent against one of them, denied help to any third side in possible war action, nevertheless, there was missing a clause about automatic banishment of the contract in case of aggression committed by one of the contract sides. Further, it embeds a duty to consult issues of the common interest and exchange information. The fifth article imposes a duty to resolve all the issues by peaceful means. The agreement’s lifetime was prolonged from five to ten years and entered in effect immediately after the signature. At the same time it didn’t contain national emblems, government or ministerial seals and shields of no of contract sides. I am inclining to the opinion that British and French politicians underestimated some key matters. They didn’t estimate the real Soviet military force, judged the Stalinism and didn’t appreciated the strategical importance of the Soviet Union for Germany in the Central and Eastern Europe. They didn’t realize as well that will lose, in case of alliance of both totalitarian systems, an impact in large part of important European space, as well as they missed out the fact that Stalin has more options how to enforce his interests. After the Munich crisis Stalin was afraid of the long-term isolation and needed to contract the military pact which would ensure him the neutrality and territorial gains in the sequence on Hitler’s expansive policy.131 According to N. Ferguson, France and Great Britain still assumed incorrectly that foreign policy of Germany and Soviet Union will be more corresponded with their ideology than pragmatism. The representatives of British diplomacy made a mistake according to his opinion when didn’t conduct against Germany more vigorously, didn’t estimate 128 P. SCHMIDT, Paměti Hitlerova tlumočníka, Brno 1997, p. 169. 129 This affair was indirectly confessed by V. M. Molotov in the interview with a Russian historian F. Cujev from 4.10.1972; see F. CUJEV, Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics, Chicago 1993, p. 12. 130 See ADAP, Ser. D, Bd. VII, Do. Nr. 228 p. 205; GK, Tom II, Nr. 602, pp. 319–321. 131 TUMIS, pp. 122, 125. kLáRA FAbIANkOvá 123 its military-economical power and rather retreated in the second half of the thirties.132 Thus they increased unconsciously the Hitler’s chances to win in the long term planned war. Two strong countries decided in a certain moment to prevent a mutual conflict by defining clearly the spheres of influence and divided the controversial territories. Both regimes were interested in Poland. This wouldn’t change even if the alliance wasn’t signed. Thanks to the absence of suspensive clause, both signatories could attack their neighbours without prohibition by the second side. The first tangible result was the agreement about borders and friendship.133 The additional secret protocol134 specified the spheres of influence in the SouthEast Europe and Baltic. Stalin used negotiations to make a press on the German partner and achieve as many compromises as possible. Hitler found himself in a time pressure and his starting position was worse objectively. The final version thus much more correspond to the Soviet requirements. In consequence of the August and September pact and autumn expansion, the Soviet Union’s border was shifted to the line of four rivers Pisa-Narew-Visla-San and thus exceeded the Curzonov’s line per nearly 150 kilometres to west, by which both countries became neighbours.135 The territorial changes concerned mainly Lithuania which thereby fell into the Soviet sphere of influence. The Lublin province and a part of the Warsaw province fell into Germany.136 Since that time the Third Reich controlled 48 % of the territory of former Poland instead of 35 % declared by the August agreement. Thus even the area east of Visla bordered by the Bug River as far as the Krylov, further to west over Tomaszów as far as the San River, including the hook around Suwalki and Augostow. The Soviets annexed finally 194,000 km2 of Polish areas including 12 million of inhabitants of mainly Ukrainian and Belorussian nationality. South-west areas which belonged to Austria-Hungary in the past, for example Lvov-Lemberg, until that time didn’t make a part of the Soviet Empire. They acquired the control over sea and aero baselines in Estonia and Latvia at the same time. The territorial balance was active at the side of Soviet Union which gained successively 77,620 km2 even with Romanian Bessarabia, the Baltic, Karelska isthmus and Finnish sea baselines compared to the territory of 72,866 km2 falling into the German sphere of influence.137 Even if it’s not so difficult to trace up the signals calling attention to the agreement’s conclusion today, in the eye of then fellows the events antecedent to this act were judged rather more blithely. For example the tragically fatalistic attitude of the Poles shows evidence that they assumed with a marvellous calm that “this pact will 132 FERGUSON, pp. 379–380. 133 The text of German-Soviet agreement about borders and friendship from 28. 9. 1939 and related protocols see in ADAP: Die Kriegsjahre: 4. September 1939 bis 18. März 1940. Serie D (1937–1945), Bd. VIII, Baden-Baden 1961, Dok. Nr. 157–159, 193, pp. 127–129, 162–165. 134 See ADAP, Ser. D, Bd. VII, Dok. Nr. 229, p. 206; GK, Tom II, Nr. 603, p. 321. 135 Valentin Falin in German television stated in 1989 that the original demarcation line was equivalent to the Curzonovovʼs line which was determined in August 1918 as the Eastern border of Poland, thus was correct from the historical point of view. See GORNIG, p. 38. 136 ADAP, Ser. D, Bd. VIII, Dok. Nr. 159. 137 GORNIG, p. 29; SANTAMARIA, p. 28; ARUMÄE, p. 119. 124 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015 not change anything”138 and fully relied on British-French help.139 In the European society the persuasion that both systems are so contrary that their reconciliation wouldn’t be possible, or it would earlier or later end in a war conflict, hadn’t got a minority position. There were the Germanization and Sovietization of the rest of population proceeded on the divided territories, including the rights’ restriction of the local elites. The Sovietization under Chruscov leadership allowed the Red Army levy on the local resources. The offer concerning the Baltic and Poland submitted by Hitler could be specified as a very well-calculated step. H. Arumäe supposes that Stalin considered the existence of a sovereign Baltic to be a temporary effect, its implementation into the Soviet Union to be natural and unavoidable from the long-term perspective.140 The Soviet interest in the mentioned areas was inspired not only by an effort to broaden the communism, but also by particular economical, military-strategical and historical reasons. Especially in the reflection on increasing danger of the attack, it was necessary to shift aside the positions of German armies as west most as possible. Although the German and Soviet Union‘s policy were calculative in that moment and their means unforgivable, it was realistic at the very most. If we summarize the immediate results of both political agreements, we will reach the following conclusions. They allowed the Soviet Union to restrict the scope and authority of the Nazi regime in the East European territory whereby minimalized the war conflict temporarily. At the same time ensured that Stalin had an approach to the strategical economical areas on the Western border, not unnecessary even for his defensive. The Soviet leader got a slight time for armament and realization of some military reforms, including the promise of an economical cooperation. Stalin believed that pacts will bring the weakening of a German position. Last but not least they indirectly brought about the war conflict and destruction of the very Poland. V. M. Molotov assessed the significance of political pacts in words: “My mission was to broaden the borders of our native country. It seems that Stalin and me faced up to this task quite well.”141 According to T. Wolton, Stalin was serviceable, reconciliatory and loyal ally since the first days of the pact’s existence, on the contrary Hitler was rather reserved in the fulfilment of obligations.142 The political alliance provided Germany both a feeling of relative security in the war against Poland and neutrality of the second party, including a guarantee of a series of commodities necessary for the war economy. The defensive alliance of Western powers became inefficient. Hitler got near to the realization of main objectives of the conception of the New Rule in Europe. Whether Hitler was motivated by the effort to apply the Nazi ideological plan, or was affected purely by the power-political calculus and pragmatical usage of international political situation at his decision making, the historians conform that the Nazi leader was willing to risk a war conflict since Munich crisis and subsequent occupation of the rest of Czechoslovak territory. The representatives of British diplomacy were on one hand willing to arrange the talks 138 KERSHAW, p. 206; WATT, p. 466. 139 ADAP, Ser. D, Bd. VII, Dok. Nr. 217, p. 195. 140 ARUMÄE, p. 122. 141 See CUJEV, p. 8. 142 WOLTON, p. 25. kLáRA FAbIANkOvá 125 about German requirements, on the other hand they didn’t accept other corrections. At the same time they didn’t accept the Soviet efforts to revision of Polish borders justified by ensuring of security. Only Hitler could offer a similar alliance to Stalin. Although their motives were different, both Germany and Soviet Union considered the pacts as the means for reaching the long-term intentions. Both countries renewed their economical cooperation143 and strengthened the positions in the international situation that is wasn’t possible to reach any deal on the Europe continent without them in the future. CONCLUSION Stalin had several possibilities of the foreign-political orientation in the second half of the thirties of the Twentieth Century. Firstly to cooperate with the Great Britain and France. Secondly, he could assert the isolationistic policy. Thirdly, to intensify the economical-political relations with the Third Reich, which were very limited in that time. The Soviet leadership asserted all three variants and parallel negotiations were proceeded in the last two pre-war years. The Soviet respectable decision about cooperation with Germany was sudden, unplanned in the long run and caused probably by a series of partial events and circumstances from July and beginning of August 1939. The Soviet archives imply that Kremlin leadership definitely decided for the political deal with Berlin after the failure of negotiations with France and Great Britain roughly in the half of August 1939 at the latest. Unreadiness and a certain rate of improvisation could be evidenced by insufficient formal essentials of the physical form of the pact and even paradoxical situations before the performance and even during the Moscow conference at which the Non-aggression agreement was signed. I am tending to the opinion that British and French politicians underestimated some key circumstances. They didn’t estimate the real military power of Red Army, judged the Stalinism and under valuated the strategical significance of the Soviet Union for Germany in the Central and East Europe. They didn’t realize as well that in case of the alliance of both totalitarian regimes, they will lose the influence in a large part of important European area. They missed out the fact that Stalin has more options how to enforce his aims. After the Munich crisis Stalin was afraid of isolation and needed to make a contract which would ensure him neutrality as well as territory gains in the sequence of Hitler’s expansive policy. At the same time, the Nazi regime wasn’t prepared for the war at two fronts. Further, France and Great Britain assumed wrong that the foreign policy of Germany and Soviet Union will correspond more with their ideology rather than pragmatism. In my opinion, the German-Soviet pact was a characteristic example of a realpolicy applied in practice. It was a calculated deal with exact objectives when both 143 About the importance and character of the renewed economical cooperation see: K. FABIANKOVÁ — T. KASHAPOV, Torgovlja i ekonomičeskoje sotrudničestvo Germanii i SSSR v period s 1939 po 1941 gg., in: Nacionalnaja bezopasnosť, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2012, pp. 111–123; K. FABIANKOVÁ, Hospodářská spolupráce totalitních režimů na příkladu Německa a Sovětského svazu v letech 1939–1941, in: Dvacáté století — The Twentieth Century, No. 2, 2014, pp. 54–71. 126 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015 systems outshone the ideological differences by common national interests which among others consisted in the division of Poland. The political alliance provided Germany both a feeling of relative security in the war against Poland and neutrality of the second party, including the guarantee of a series of commodities necessary for the war economy. The defensive alliance ofWestern powers became inefficient. The August and September pacts enabled the Soviet Union to restrict the scope and authority of the Nazi regime in the East European territory by which minimalized the war threat temporarily. They at the same time ensured that Stalin had an approach to strategical economical areas at the Western border, not unnecessary even for his defensive. The Soviet leader achieved the realization of its goals, the capitalist States entered the war, waited to run out and be willing to accept its conditions. He acquired a slight time for the armament and realization of some military reforms, including the promise of the economical cooperation. The economical association had a large significance even for the Nazi economy in relation to a longer persistence of war conflict and military aid at the destruction of the British Empire. Hitler drafted a series of power-political decisions in which the Soviet Union played the central role surprisingly, and because he also assumed that at the given economical situation the Soviet import of mineral resources and foodstuff is irreplaceable. SEARCH FOR PARTNERSHIP: GERMAN-SOVIET POLITICAL RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR ABSTRACT The aim of the essay is to analyse the most important circumstances which could affected the final Stalin’s decision leading to the ratification of Soviet-German political relations at the end of the thirties. Among others to verify the affirmation that it was a calculated deal with exact objectives in the case of Ribbentrop-Molotov‘s Pact. The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 23rd, 1939 was a calculated accord with precise objectives when in both systems common national interests, which consisted also in the partition of Poland, overshadowed their ideological differences. This paper outlines the circumstances of the negotiations, the main actors, and motives leading to the creation of the agreement. A part of the research is the analysis of importance and direct consequences of the German-Soviet Pact. The political alliance provided Germany both a feeling of relative security in the war against Poland and neutrality of the second party, including the guarantee of a series of commodities necessary for the war economy. The defensive alliance of Western powers became inefficient. The August and September pacts enabled the Soviet Union to restrict the scope and authority of the Nazi regime in the East European territory by which minimalized the war threat temporarily. They at the same time ensured that Stalin had an approach to strategical economical areas at the Western border, not unnecessary even for his defensive. KEYWORDS Hitler; Germany; Soviet Union; Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact; Political Relations; August 1939 Klára Fabianková | Department of Economic History, Faculty of Economics, University of Economics, Prague, W. Churchill Sq. 4, 130 67, Praha, Czech Republic, [email protected]