International Reporting of the Falklands War. Case Studies from Ireland, Czechoslovakia and Spain

International Reporting of the Falklands War Case Studies from Ireland, Czechoslovakia and Spain Zlata kopřivová — Gerald Power — Jitka Vollamová The present article is concerned with how the Falklands War of 1982 was reported and interpreted in leading newspapers from three European countries: Czechoslovakia, Ireland and Spain.1 The intention is to identify which aspects of the conflict were dominant in the reporting and to assess to what extent there was a bias in favour of one of the two belligerents, Argentina and Great Britain. The Falklands conflict is an especially intriguing international event to study in the context of the mass media and its relationships to political elites and the general public because of its ambiguous implications for the three countries that are analysed. On one hand, each country could be said to have had historical reasons for nursing grievances against Britain that could have resulted in coverage of the war that was sympathetic to Argentina: Czechoslovakia was a Warsaw Pact member once “betrayed” by Britain during the Munich Crisis; Ireland was a former colonial territory of Britain; and Spain disputed claims to Gibraltar with Britain (not to mention the fact that the Spanish population could claim a sense of kinship with the Argentinean people). However, it was not necessarily so straightforward. Operating within a Communist country, the statecontrolled media of Czechoslovakia was not a natural supporter of the right-wing junta that ruled Argentina; Irish nationalism and Anglophobia had been sobered significantly by the on-going Northern Ireland “Troubles”, and the two countries were closely connected economically; Spain had only recently emerged from its own military dictatorship, there was a boom in press freedom and its centrist government was negotiating the country’s entry into both NATO and the EEC. Then, of course, much turns on the choice of newspaper. Each of the newspapers chosen can be considered to be a leading national daily and representative of the conservative establishment of the respective countries. The Irish Independent remains the largest-selling daily newspaper in Ireland, and, together with the more liberal Irish Times, is considered a newspaper of record. It has been associated with traditional middle class values, including Catholic orthodoxy and moderate patriotism; until the 1990s it was broadly supportive of the centre1 This article has been supported by Metropolitan University Prague’s internal grant no. AFS/1/2014 The reception of Margaret Thatcher and Thatcherism in Czech discourse. OPEN ACCESS ZLATA kOPřIVOVÁ — GErALD POwEr — JITkA VOLLAmOVÁ 25 right Fine Gael party.2 Though also a leading national newspaper with a long history, the status of ABC in Spain is somewhat less equivocal than that of the Independent in Ireland. Not only has there historically been a proliferation of national dailies and important regional newspapers in Spain, since the fall of the Franco regime in 1975 newer, more liberal titles have challenged ABC for market share. However, its conservative, pro-monarchy outlook has helped to guarantee it a solid readership, and it continues to number among the leading half-dozen daily titles in Spain. (It is, incidentally, the longest newspaper of the sample, with editions commonly exceeding 100 pages).3 Turning to Czechoslovakia, Rudé právo (‘Red Justice’ or ‘Red Right’) was established in 1920. After the Communist coup in 1948, it became the leading newspaper in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the voice of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. It had the highest circulation and was by far the most read paper in the country. It was strictly obedient to the regime and highly propagandistic. Following the end of Communist rule in 1989, Rudé právo ceased publication, though a successor title, Právo, emerged to cater for left-wing opinion.4 THE IRISH CASE: THE IRISH INDEPENDENT The Falklands war was a major international news story in the Irish media of the time. Certainly, it dominated the pages of the Irish Independent. Out of forty-two newspaper editions between 4 May and 19 June, the conflict made the front page on thirty-nine occasions; on twenty-seven occasions the war was the subject of the leading frontpage article. All told, there were 344 articles (including letters to the editor) dealing with the war, ranging from twenty-three to two articles per issue, with interest peaking in late May.5 Occasionally, other international news stories took precedence. One article, titled “Conflict more important than the Falklands”, argued that the Iran-Iraq war was of greater significance than the Falklands.6 Later, stories such as US-USSR arms negotiations, President Reagan’s visit to Europe, the Israel-Lebanon conflict, the football World Cup, the pope’s visit to Britain and riots in Poland sometimes challenged the Falklands for space; but no single international story came close to rivalling the Falklands in terms of column inches.7 2 LEGG, M.-L., Newspapers, in: CONNOLLY, S. J. (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Irish History, 2nd ed., Oxford 2002, p. 407. 3 PARRONDO, R., Press, in: RODGERS, E. (ed.), Encyclopedia of Contemporary Spanish Culture, London 1999, p. 419; BARRERA, C. — ZUGASTI, R., The Role of the Press in Times of Transition: The Building of the Spanish Democracy (1975–78), in: VOLTMER, K. (ed.), Mass Media and Political Communication in New Democracies, London 2006, pp. 23–41. 4 Rudé právo, in: Encyklopedie Diderot, Prague 1999. 5 Irish Independent, 22. 5. 1982 (twenty-three articles); ibid., 14. 5. 1982; 4. 6. 1982 (two articles each). 6 Ibid., 17. 5. 1982. 7 Ibid., 17.–19. 5. 1982; ibid., 1.–2. 6. 1982; 5. 6. 1982; 7.–11. 6. 1982; 14. 6. 1982. 26 DVACÁTÉ STOLETÍ 1/2015 The following section identifies and explores three major themes observable in the Irish Independent’s coverage of the Falklands war. First, we will see that the Independent’s reportage of the conflict was often from a British perspective, relying heavily on British sources and concentrating on the various implications of the war for the UK. Second, there was a pronounced Irish dimension to the affair, especially because of the controversial stance on the conflict adopted by the Irish government. Finally, as befitting such a major news story, much space was given over to journalists, including the editor and expert commentators, to provide analysis and opinion on the war. Perhaps surprisingly, the Irish Independent was broadly supportive of Britain’s war. The high level of attention devoted to the Falklands conflict was surely due in large part because it involved Ireland’s nearest neighour.8 Ireland and Britain were connected by historical links, the “Troubles”, the large Irish diaspora in the UK and EEC membership; thus readers of the Irish Independent were probably more familiar with Britain and its politics and people than any other foreign country. Irish journalists were stationed in the UK and, of course, language was no obstacle to information gathering. This background helps to explain why the Independent’s reporting of the conflict was largely from a British perspective: 128 out of 344 articles may be characterised as having an overwhelmingly British standpoint.9 This British perspective involved according a profound focus to the attitudes and statements of British politicians and officials. A selection of article titles serves to illustrate this: “No compromise — Maggie sticks to her guns”, “Thatcher pledges no sell out”, “Thatcher to give UN talks ‘one more go’”, “Final battle at hand, says defiant Maggie”, “Maggie gives the go-ahead” and “Argentina role ruled out by defiant Maggie”.10 Articles such as these were largely based on interviews and statements by leading British government figures, reports of Westminster debates, and unnamed sources from “Whitehall” or the Ministry of Defence. The articles offered detailed information on the British government’s reactions and intentions. Throughout, there were frequent references to Mrs Thatcher, many of them complete with quotations from the prime minister. These intimate glimpses into the workings of the UK government are in contrast with the paltry information about the Argentinean government. A mere twenty-four articles can be considered Argentinean in perspective; General Galtieri was only quoted on six occasions, and most of these were clipped to one or two words.11 Although this imbalance was almost certainly shaped by the reluctance of the junta to comment on the conflict as well as by Irish journalists’ lack of familiarity with Argentinean sources and news agencies, these factors alone are insufficient 8 On Anglo-Irish relations see FERRITER, D., The Transformation of Ireland, 1900–2000, London 2004. 9 Admittedly gauging a newspaper article’s “perspective” is not always easy. Herein, we posit that an article can be said to adopt a certain national perspective if it is wholly or mostly concerned with the reporting an incident in terms of a particular state, or if the sources cited are completely or mostly from a particular state. If we accept this as a working definition, it is clear that the Irish Independent reported the Falklands as Britain’s war. 10 Irish Independent, 15. 5. 1982; 18. 5. 1982; 3. 6. 1982; 4. 6. 1982; 16. 6. 1982. 11 Ibid., 14. 5. 1982; 17. 5. 1982; 24. 5. 1982; 9. 6. 1992; 18. 6. 1982; 19. 6. 1982. ZLATA kOPřIVOVÁ — GErALD POwEr — JITkA VOLLAmOVÁ 27 to explain the comparative lack of detail on the Argentinean side. For most of the conflict’s duration, the Independent could call on the services of the Northern Irelandborn Fleet Street journalist Ted Oliver, who, on the basis of his Irish connections, was one of the few UK reporters to be tolerated in Buenos Aires. However, despite his residency in the capital, Oliver only authored two substantial reports on the Argentinean experience of the conflict for the Independent, and the longest article was concerned with the exceptional circumstance of the papal visit to Argentina in mid-June.12 Thus, there seems to have been an editorial decision to accord more attention to Britain. Many articles were related to the British military aspect of the conflict. Details were given on issues including army manoeuvres, resources, tactics and strategy. Sometimes these articles were accompanied by photographs and drawings. Very often articles were based on the press briefings of the Military of Defence’s chief spokesman, Ian MacDonald.13 That the newspaper’s coverage of the military-strategic aspects of the conflict was largely from a British point of view can be illustrated by an article on Argentinean submarines. Although ostensibly about Argentinean military resources, the piece merely analysed the implications of this for the UK task force. It concluded: “Along with the political need for a quick victory in the Falklands, the most urgent problem facing British forces now is the imperative of discovering those submarines before they get in a deadly blow.”14 Similarly, an article entitled “Haig fears result if Argentina humiliated” was in fact concerned, not with the substance of the US secretary of state’s anxieties, but with the fact that British officials had yet to comment on them (how the junta might respond was not enquired into).15 There were also pieces dedicated to personnel, including profiles and interviews with and statements from commanding officers,16 and two illustrated articles detailing the equipment and rations of British.17 Other pieces carried verbatim reports from UK journalists (often from Independent Television News or the BBC) who were observers on manoeuvres.18 The financial implications were also discussed: three articles totted up the cost to Britain per day of the Falklands (although a later article described the implications of the costs of war for both sides); another calculated the cost of the destroyed battleship HMS Sheffield.19 Space was also given to internal political affairs. Brief notices were made of the British Labour Party’s responses to the conflict, including leader Michael Foot’s statements in the Commons and his handling of “rebels” from his party who voted against 12 Ibid., 11. 6. 1982; 12. 6. 1982; see also Oliver’s obituary in the Daily Telegraph, 29. 9. 2007, in: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1570843/Ted-Oliver.html. 13 MacDonald’s notoriously tight-lipped briefings were the subject of an entire article by one exasperated journalist: Irish Independent, 26. 5. 1982. 14 Ibid., 24. 5. 1982. 15 Ibid., 28. 5. 1982. 16 Ibid., 24. 5. 1982 (profile of Sandy Woodward); 27. 5. 1982 (quoting skipper of HMS Sheffield); 3. 5. 1982 (quoting Major-General Moore, chief of the land army). 17 Ibid., 25. 5. 1982; 22. 5. 1982. 18 Ibid., 24. 5. 1982; 26. 5. 1982; 31. 5. 1982; 10. 6. 1982. 19 Ibid., 5. 5. 1982; 7. 5. 1982; 21. 5. 1982; 8. 6. 1982; 11. 6. 1982. 28 DVACÁTÉ STOLETÍ 1/2015 the counter-invasion of the islands. Former Labour Prime Minister Jimmy Callaghan was also quoted.20 British opinion polls on Thatcher’s and the Conservatives’ popularity and approval were reported, giving Irish readers an appreciation of the “Falklands Factor” in British politics.21 The war had implications for Ireland and these implications grew more critical as the Irish government ultimately pursued a controversial stance on the conflict. For these reasons there was a pronounced Irish dimension to the reportage: forty-nine articles focused solely on the consequences of the conflict for Ireland (twice as much as the numbers dealing with the Argentinean perspective). In April 1982, the Fianna Fáil government of Charles Haughey had been understated in its reaction to the crisis. A temporary member of the UN Security Council, Ireland had supported Resolution 503 which called for the withdrawal of Argentinean troops from the Falklands as a precondition for a diplomatic settlement; and it had consented without protest to the EEC’s imposition of trade sanctions on Argentina as a gesture of support for the UK. However, this changed after the sinking of the General Belgrano cruiser on 3 May. The following day Haughey announced that the government was re-thinking its position on sanctions, while making an extraordinary unilateral plea for a UN Security Council to discuss the conflict; that same day the Minister for Defence asserted that the British were “the aggressors now”. From this point until the end of the war, the government opposed EEC sanctions and was public in its preference for a United Nations solution rather than a British military reoccupation. Though this damaged Ireland’s relations with Britain, and its standing within the EEC and the United Nations, the government’s policy undoubtedly had some popular support in Ireland and was justified by the government as consistent with the state’s tradition of neutrality.22 The government’s Falklands policy was accorded a high priority in the Independent. In addition to reporting on the latest statements and rumours from the government, there was detailed coverage of the heated debate in the Irish parliament, as the liberal, pro-EEC opposition leader Garret Fitzgerald challenged Haughey’s interpretation of Irish neutrality and harangued him for upsetting the British government and people and destabilising sensitive talks over Northern Ireland.23 The political implications of the affair would certainly have been more profound had not the Thatcher government been deliberately muted in its official response. Thus the Independent fo20 Ibid., 24. 5. 1982. 21 Ibid., 13. 5. 1982; 18. 5. 1982; 20. 5. 1982; 24. 5. 1982. 22 FREEMAN, L., The Official History of the Falklands Campaign. Vol. 2: War and Diplomacy, Abingdon 2005, pp. 424–425. On the problem of neutrality, see e.g. JESSE, N., Choosing to Go it Alone: Irish Neutrality in Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, in: International Political Science Review, Vol. 27, 2006, pp. 7–28; for a contemporary assessment of the Falklands conflict in terms of Irish neutrality, see KEATINGE, P., A Singular State: Irish Neutrality in the 1980s, Dublin 1983. 23 Irish Independent, 5. 5. 1982; 7. 5. 1982; 8. 5. 1982; 10. 5. 1982; 12. 5. 1982; 13. 5. 1982; 15. 5. 1982; 17. 5. 1982; 18. 5. 1982; 19. 5. 1982; 20. 5. 1982; 22. 5. 1982; 24. 5. 1982; 1. 6. 1982; 3. 6. 1982; 19. 6. 1982. ZLATA kOPřIVOVÁ — GErALD POwEr — JITkA VOLLAmOVÁ 29 cused also on the damage to Irish industry caused the furore, especially after the British Sun newspaper called on its readers to boycott Irish goods. Stories drew readers’ attention to the apparent damage to the tourism and agricultural sectors.24 The implications for Irish agriculture were also reflected on, especially in relation to the EEC and the question of Argentine trade sanctions. In this regard, the government’s opposition to sanctions and the UK government’s twin demands for support for its war as well as a budget rebate fused into a single complex dilemma that threatened to derail a proposed settlement on farm prices. The headline story of 8 May typified the awareness that the conflict had immediate ramifications for ordinary readers of the Irish Independent: “The Falklands crisis looks like overshadowing other items on a crowded agenda this weekend. And Irish farmers may well [have] seen their hope of price rises by mid-May shattered once again.” The agricultural deal, it was often repeated, was worth £235 million to Irish farmers, and the travails of the Irish ministers for Agriculture and Foreign Affairs at EEC meetings were frequently reported.25 The Falklands war was more than a distant conflict over sovereignty: according to the Independent it was also a conflict with immediate economic implications for Ireland. The Independent came down in favour of Britain. This may be explained by the general editorial tone of the newspaper. Conservative in social, political and economic terms, the Independent was by ethos disinclined to look favourably on violent attempts at disrupting the status quo by a volatile state such as Argentina (whose chief supporters in the war included Cuba and the Soviet Union). The newspaper was also supportive of the Fine Gael party, which was more moderate in its approach to Anglo-Irish relations than the self-styled “republican” Fianna Fáil party. Nonetheless, there was sufficient hostility to the British handling of the Falklands conflict within the Irish media and society (and indeed internationally) to make the Independent’s stance worthy of note. Charles Haughey alluded to “anti-British feeling” within his party and in Ireland and candidly declared that he was struggling to “keep a balanced and mature approach” to the issue.26 The national broadcaster, RTÉ, referred to the islands as “Las Malvinas” and was accused of bias in favour of Argentina.27 Internationally, there was predictable opposition from the Soviet Union and Cuba, but even EEC partners were concerned at the belligerence of the British response, while the Austrian government condemned the “colonial principles” which Britain was allegedly defending.28 To be sure, there were expressions of sympathy for Argentina and dissatisfaction with Britain in the pages of the Independent. Peter Kellner, a prominent UK journalist then political editor at the left-leaning New Statesman current affairs maga24 Ibid., 6. 5. 1982; 7. 5. 1982; 8. 5. 1982; 17. 5. 1982; 19. 5. 1982; 25. 5. 1982; 14. 6. 1982; 15. 6. 1982; 16. 6. 1982; 18. 6. 1982. By the end of the conflict, the newspaper tended to conclude that the economic damage to Ireland had not been as dire as some had predicted. 25 Ibid., 15. 5. 1982; 17. 5. 1982; 18. 5. 1982. 26 Ibid., 7. 5. 1982; 1982; FANNING, R., op. cit. 27 Irish Independent, 3. 6. 1982. The allegation was made by a Fine Gael deputy. For RTÉ, see BOWMAN, J., Window and Mirror: RTÉ Television, 1962–2011, Dublin 2011. 28 Irish Independent, 5. 5. 1982. FREEMAN, L., op. cit., pp. 420–435. 30 DVACÁTÉ STOLETÍ 1/2015 zine, contributed a series of extended articles on the conflict.29 His second piece was a broad endorsement of the Irish government’s “refusal to underwrite Mrs Thatcher’s jingoism”.30 On 24 May the tone was again pessimistic, because of the British government’s apparent reluctance to forge a future for the Falklands that could enjoy cross-party and international support. Letters to the editor were also reflective of anti-British sentiment: most letters on the Falklands either evinced sympathy with the Argentinean claim (sometimes drawing parallels between the Falklands and Northern Ireland) or were supportive of the Haughey government’s Falklands diplomacy.31 Nevertheless, editor Vincent Doyle’s leader articles were broadly consistent in endorsing Britain’s war. Although he paid tribute to the efforts of the UN, the USA and Peru in advancing peace proposals, and frequently lamented that the dispute had escalated to all-out war, Doyle was in no doubt that Argentina was the guilty party. The day after the Belgrano’s sinking he asserted that “civilised countries do not settle disputes over pieces of territory by arbitrarily seizing those territories”.32 As the Haughey government developed its response towards the conflict, the Independent editor put on record his disagreement, reminding his readers that Argentina was the aggressor.33 In criticising Fianna Fáil’s Falklands policy, Doyle was joined by the newspaper’s chief political reporter, Bruce Arnold (whose telephone was “tapped” by the Fianna Fáil Minister for Justice in 1982).34 Arnold accused Haughey’s government of inconsistency and hypocrisy in its approach to Britain and the doctrine of neutrality; his arguments were similar to those of the Fine Gael leader Garret FitzGerald.35 Doyle’s editorials continued to criticise the Haughey government in the following weeks for isolating Ireland from her usual allies and sending Anglo-Irish relations into freefall.36 From late May the leader articles became much more pro-British. On 22 May it was asserted that Thatcher “in serving Britain … has served the interests of the free world”. The endorsement of Britain’s war was cemented in the wake of Pope John Paul II’s visit to the UK at the end of May and the beginning of June. The Independent praised Thatcher and her government for not seeking an audience with the pope — a move that would have caused embarrassment to the pontiff who was trying to avoid taking sides.37 The editorial of 1 June drew attention to the “tolerance and maturity of the British people […] This maturity cannot be confined to religion. It has perhaps taken the first visit of a Pope to demonstrate a quality which is not properly appreciated. In those who have other quarrels with Britain — ourselves and Argen29 Irish Independent, 6. 5. 1982; 19. 5. 1982; 17. 6. 1982. 30 Ibid., 19. 5. 1982. 31 Ibid., 4. 5. 1982, 7. 5. 1982; 10. 5. 1982; 20. 5. 1982; 24. 5. 1982; 25. 5. 1982; 7. 6. 1982; 17. 6. 1982; 18. 6. 1982. 32 Ibid., 4. 5. 1982. 33 Ibid., 7. 5. 1982; 19. 5. 1982. 34 KEOGH, D., Twentieth-Century Ireland: Nation and State, Dublin 1994, pp. 363–364; FOSTER,R.F., Luck and the Irish: A History of Change, 1970–2000, London 2007, p. 110. 35 Irish Independent, 10. 5. 1982. 36 Ibid., 13. 5. 1982; 15. 5. 1982; 20. 5. 1982; 25. 5. 1982. 37 Ibid., 1. 6. 1982; 5. 6. 1982. ZLATA kOPřIVOVÁ — GErALD POwEr — JITkA VOLLAmOVÁ 31 tina for example — understanding the latent reasonableness of her people might go some way to bringing peace closer”. This positive attitude towards the British was contrasted with the editor’s criticism of the Galtieri regime, which it characterised as repressive and “oblique” in its dealings with the international media.38 As the conflict reached a climax, Doyle’s editorials reflected that the British approach to the controversy had been consistent and just, and that “World opinion has generally supported” the principles involved. A day later, the final leader column on the Falklands was rather more cautious. It expressed the hope that the British government, having been “Churchillian” in its rhetoric during the war, could now show “magnanimity in victory”, while speculating that the British triumph could make it less likely to negotiate any resettlement of its territories — including Northern Ireland.39 THE CZECH CASE: RUDÉ PRÁVO As in the case of the Irish Independent, the Falklands war was given extensive coverage in the pages of Rudé právo in May and June 1982. Given that the war was taking place in faraway islands with no direct relation to Czechoslovakia, the articles dealing with the conflict were voluminous in number and column inches. The Communist propaganda machine took the opportunity to present the war as an example of predatory imperialistic interests. The invasion was portrayed not only as a war per se, but also as a representation of the exercise of power and superiority of a strong state over a weak one. The major source of information was the Czech Press Agency, with no specific authors named. Eight articles in the period under review were written by Rudé právo’s foreign correspondents Karel Starý, Milan Jelínek, Dušan Rovenský and Zdeněk Porybný. These articles were highly opinionated, biased and propagandist. (It may be noted in passing that in 1990 Zdeněk Porybný became chairman of the board of Borgis Publishing, the majority owner of Rudé právo’s successor newspaper, Právo. He also became the paper’s editor-in-chief, a position he has since retained.)40 By using citations and quotes from the British press, Rudé právo tried to give the impression of being an independent observer. However, the two major sources of information were the tabloid the Daily Mail and the paper of the British Communist Party, The Morning Star. Forty-one editions of Rudé právo were published between 4 May and 19 June, with fifty-three articles covering the conflict. There was usually only one article per issue, although on six occasions there were two articles. The maximum number of articles — four — was published on 8 May. The conflict made the front page on eighteen occasions in the period under consideration, for the first time on 5 May with the ar38 Ibid., 8. 6. 1982. 39 Ibid., 15. 6. 1982; 16. 6. 1982. 40 “Zdeněk Porybný odstoupil z představenstva vydavatelství Borgis” [Zdenek Porybny resigns from the board of Borgis Publishing], in: http://zpravy.e15.cz/byznys/technologie-a-media/ zdenek-porybny-odstoupil-z-predstavenstva-vydavatelstvi-borgis-1054822 (25. 11. 2014). 32 DVACÁTÉ STOLETÍ 1/2015 ticle “Hundreds of victims already”, and for the last time on 16 June with the article “Britain restores colonial status of Malvinas by force”.41 When the conflict did not make the front page, it usually dominated the page dedicated to foreign affairs (pages six and seven in each issue). The front pages were otherwise full of propagandistic articles on the successes of the Czechoslovak economy and on events in the countries of the Soviet bloc. Massive space was given over to the perpetual “imperialist” threat to international peace. Readers were constantly reminded of the danger of nuclear war imposed by the United States. Rudé právo’s reports fall into three major categories. First, we can observe a very strong anti-colonial perspective. The “colonialist” and “neo-colonialist” policy favoured by the Conservative Party was mentioned in almost every article about the Falklands. Second, there was explicit condemnation of the UK and the USA. Much space was given over to making sure readers understood that the two superpowers were acting from a position of strength and were not willing to settle the conflict peacefully. Finally, we will see the Czechoslovak Communist regime’s support and sympathy for Argentina despite the rule of the military junta there. Although its early notices of the conflict were rather neutral in tone as headlines ‘Intrasigence of both sides’ or ‘Both sides continue with military preparations’42 suggest, Rudé právo soon came out strongly in favour of Argentina; as the conflict progressed, anti-colonialist, anti-imperialistic and anti-capitalist perspectives dominated its reports. Rudé právo presented the war as a conflict caused by imperialistic, neo-colonial, reactionary Britain. The British, it kept repeating, wanted to seize control over a territory which did not belong to the UK at all. Almost every article mentioned the history of the Falkland Islands, in particular the fact that Britain had seized them in 1833 by force. Especially worth noting in this context is Milan Jelínek’s article of 16 April, “Colonialism is to blame”. It gives an idea of just how much stress Rudé právo put on the colonial issue and illustrates its strong anti-colonialist rhetoric. Commenting on responsibility for the conflict, he wrote: “The blame lies fully with one of the most hideous products of imperialistic policy — colonialism. How much evil, suffering and impoverishment colonialism has caused to the nations of the world!”43 In his article “South Atlantic massacre”, Jelínek, in line with this anti-colonial rhetoric, fulminates against Britain, stating that the sinking of the Belgrano “was a massacre, a barbaric act. The British colonial conscience had been burdened again with immense human suffering… Proud Albion… had again punished the weaker side and did not want to negotiate or discuss the problem… No such policy or way of thinking belonged in today’s world… Colonialism and neo-colonialism had caused enough 41 “Už dnes stovky obětí” [Hundreds of victims already], Rudé právo, 5. 5. 1982; “Británie silou obnovila koloniální status Malvín” [Britain restores colonial status of Malvinas by force], ibid., 16. 6. 1982. All translations are by Jitka Vollamová. 42 “Neústupnost obou stran”, Rudé právo, 10. 4. 1982; “Obě strany pokračují ve válečných přípravách”, ibid., 16. 4. 1982. 43 “Vinu nese v plné míře jeden z nejohavnějších produktů imprialistické politiky — kolonialismus. Kolik zla, utrpení a bídy již způsobil národům světa!”, ibid., 16. 4. 1982. ZLATA kOPřIVOVÁ — GErALD POwEr — JITkA VOLLAmOVÁ 39 detailed information was presented on the emphatic expressions of support for Argentina and condemnations of the UK and the US from Cuba, Brazil, Nicaragua and Bolivia, as well as the most measured response of Peru.83 Turning its focus to the US, ABC struggled to comprehend American policy on the Falklands. On 14 May it condemned the US for supporting Britain while at the same time claiming that it wished to have the best possible relations with Argentina.84 Furthermore, the newspaper’s New York correspondent, José María Carrascal, went so far as to accuse the US of false neutrality. He called the US “belligerents” because of their support for the UK by, for example, permitting the British navy to use American bases.85 The ongoing controversy surrounding Gibraltar also, unsurprisingly, featured in ABC’s reporting of the Falklands conflict. Generally speaking the Spanish public saw parallels between the Falklands and Gibraltar, which undoubtedly made Spanish diplomacy more sensitive during the conflict.86 Parallels were most often drawn in the opinion sections of the newspaper. On one occasion it was noted that the older generation from the Franco regime was especially angry about British claims and actions.87 The Gibraltar issue was also reflected upon in connection to negotiations on the entry of Spain to NATO, which was seen as an opportunity to open pacific negotiations about the sovereignty of Gibraltar and to establish progress on the island as one of the conditions of membership.88 However, as Britain’s resolve over the Falklands became increasingly obvious, the feeling within the pages of ABC was that no amount of diplomacy would persuade the UK to hand over Gibraltar to Spain, and negotiations with “stubborn” Britain were useless.89 Finally, attention was paid on a daily basis to United Nations developments. In the early weeks of the conflict, these included the early attempts of the Secretary General to mediate between Britain and Argentina and the ultimate unwillingness of both sides to accept a mediated settlement on his terms. The reasons for the failure of the UN initiatives were explored, and Thatcher was quoted on the inability of the UN to convince the Argentineans to quit the islands. Commentary was given on the various solutions countenanced by the UN, such as UN administration of the archipelago.90 The implications of the UN failure were perceived as crucial for Spain, as it was thought that if the conflict deepened it would eventually be Spain itself that would have to assume a mediation role. (Indeed, Spain formally announced the offer of mediation on 2 May.)91 83 Ibid., 4. 5. 1982. 84 Ibid., 14. 5. 1982. 85 Ibid., 3. 5. 1982. 86 DEL ARENAL, op. cit., p. 190. 87 ABC, 8. 5. 1982. 88 Ibid., 16. 5. 1982. 89 Ibid., 24. 5. 1982. 90 Ibid., 7. 5. 1982. 91 Ibid., 3. 5. 1982. 40 DVACÁTÉ STOLETÍ 1/2015 CONCLUSION In the introduction, it was suggested that from an Irish, Czech or Spanish perspective the Falklands war was an ambiguous conflict, in which neither of the two belligerents could be unequivocally cast as either hero or villain. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, to conclude that the three national newspapers reviewed here — despite the very different domestic and international contexts in which they were operating — each came down with varying degrees of emphasis on one side’s favour: Rudé pravo and ABC supported Argentina, while the Irish Independent endorsed the case of Great Britain. In the Czech case it seems that traditional hostility towards a leading opponent of the Warsaw Pact was the crucial factor, as Galtieri’s junta was hardly the most palatable regime from a Communist perspective. The Madrid paper ABC, on the other hand, seems to have been motivated by a sense of Spanish kinship with the Argentinean people, but its advocacy of the junta may also be seen as a reflection of the newspaper’s conservative political inclination; ABC had, after all, been a loyal supporter of the Franco regime. Political orientation also seems to have been behind the Irish Independent’s support for the UK. The newspaper’s version of conservatism placed emphasis on the need to uphold international law and democracy as a check on instability, while its traditional support for Fine Gael made it unlikely to approve of the Haughey government’s anti-British diplomacy. The comments offered here on the three case studies invite further research. In particular, additional research into other Spanish and Irish titles would be welcome in order to test the interpretations offered. If the liberal El País or the republican Irish Press adopted significantly different attitudes from ABC and the Irish Independent respectively, it would tend to support the point that the newspapers’ reporting on the war was heavily influenced by their political orientation. Meanwhile, a comparison between Rudé pravo and other leading dailies of the Warsaw Pact states would help to indicate to what extent reporting on the war behind the Iron Curtain was seen uniformly through a Communist lens. ABSTRACT INTERNATIONAL REPORTING OF THE FALKLANDS WAR: CASE STUDIES FROM IRELAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND SPAIN The present article explores the reporting of the Falklands war in leading daily newspapers of Czechoslovakia, Ireland and Spain. The issues examined include the importance of the war as a news story, the various aspects of the war that were reported, and the perspectives and attitudes adopted by the newspapers. The article reveals that, while each newspaper operated in very different political circumstances, some commonalities may be observed. Not only was the Falklands war a dominant news story in each case, each newspaper, to varying degrees, demonstrated a clear sympathy for one of the two belligerents: the Czech and Spanish newspaper both endorsed the Argentinean perspective, while the Irish newspaper was more sympathetic to Britain. KEY WORDS Falklands war, newspapers, reporting, Czechoslovakia, Ireland, Spain ZLATA kOPřIVOVÁ — GErALD POwEr — JITkA VOLLAmOVÁ 41 ABSTRAKT MEZINÁRODNÍ REFLEXE VÁLKY O FALKLANDY PŘÍPADOVÉ STUDIE Z IRSKA, ČESKOSLOVENSKA A ŠPANĚLSKA Studie reflektuje válku o Falklandy na stránkách předních deníků v Československu, Irsku a Španělsku. Soustředí se zejména na význam války jako zpravodajského příběhu, na různé aspekty války, o nichž tisk referoval, či na pohled a postoj jednotlivých deníků. Autoři dochází k závěru, že přestože jednotlivá periodika pracovala za velmi odlišných politických okolností, je možné sledovat několik shodných rysů. Nejenže válka o Falklandy dominovala zpravodajským tématům, ale každý deník vyjadřoval v různé míře jasné sympatie pro jednu z válčících stran: česká a španělská periodika podporovala argentinský pohled, zatímco irské deníky měly více sympatií spíše s Velkou Británií. KLÍČOVÁ SLOVA Válka o Falklandy, noviny, reflexe, Československo, Irsko, Španělsko Zlata Kopřivová | Department of Anglophone Studies Metropolitan University Prague | [email protected] Gerald Power | Department of Anglophone Studies Metropolitan University Prague | [email protected] Jitka Vollamová | Department of Anglophone Studies Metropolitan University Prague | [email protected]