Policy of Czechoslovakia towards Chile 1973–1980

Policy of Czechoslovakia towards Chile 1973–19801 Michal Zourek INTRODUCTION This study analyzes the transformation of the Czechoslovak perception of the Chilean coup d’état and the following takeover of power by the military government (1973–1989). As the title of the study suggests, the main focus will be on the correlation between pragmatism, solidarity and propaganda in the approach of the Eastern Bloc countries towards Chile after 1973. The first chapter follows the development of Czechoslovak-Chilean relations during the Cold War. The second part analyses the factors which lead the Soviet Union (and consequently the Eastern Bloc countries) to break off diplomatic relations after the coup. What losses and gains did this decision bring? The third part discusses the economic interests of Czechoslovakia in Chile. The key question is if the coup meant a total suspension of commercial exchange in line with the proclaimed government policy, or what form did the exchange have. The fourth chapter is focused on the activities of Czechoslovak intelligence service in Chile. The final two chapters follow the reflection of the Chilean coup d’état in the Czechoslovak society — the activities expressing solidarity with Chile and the use of these events for propaganda reasons — through critical analysis of book, film and song production. The period under consideration comprises the 1970s, the first years of Pinochet’s government. During the following decade, the Chilean question retreated within the international communist movement into the background. This fact can be attributed to two reasons. After 1977, Chilean communists started to return to their home country and the party leadership demanded that the material support be directed to the conflict inside the country.2 At the same time, the attention of Moscow 1 The following paper has been written as part of the project “The changes in the perception of Eastern Europe in Argentina and Chile in the course of the 20th century”, funded by the Charles University Grant Agency under the number 94410. 2 Národní archiv (National Archives, Prague) [further NA], KSČ-ÚV-02/1, f. 1261/0/7, 1976–1981, sv. 64, a. j. 68, bod 12, Zpráva o zasedání řídícího výboru KS Chile v Praze, 30. 1. 1978, p. 5. Michal ZOuRek 43 shifted towards the events which were more prestigious (Olympic Games in Moscow) and more pressing in the geopolitical respect (Iran, Afghanistan). The gradually declining importance of the Chilean question meant that the country virtually disappeared from the Czechoslovak government documents. Prague became the seat of the congresses of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Chile — August 1977, January 1978 (governing committee), January 1985, but more attention is focused on Chile since 1988 in connection with its democratization. After the defeat of Pinochet in the 1988 referendum, the tension in mutual relations began to ease. This issue has not received sufficient attention of researchers due to the relatively limited availability of sources in Czech archives. In the case of the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is caused by the liquidation of the diplomatic mission and with respect to the National Archives it is, with few exceptions, due to the absence of official communication between the political representatives. Thus, the main source of information comprises the recently declassified materials from the Security Services Archives, in particular the reports of the Czechoslovak rezidentura (a term used for the seat of intelligence services of the Eastern Bloc countries) in Chile after the 1973 coup. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAK-CHILEAN RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR Whereas Czechoslovakia soon after the Second World War became a part of the world controlled by the Soviet Union, which dictated the domestic and foreign policy of its allies and satellites, Chile belonged to the sphere of influence of the United States. This difference in political development played a crucial role in the relations between the two countries. Any possible rapprochement depended in the first place on the political orientation of the Chilean government and the extent of its dependence on Washington. In the autumn of 1947, at the outset of the Cold War, the government of Gabriel González Videla suspended diplomatic relations with the countries of the Eastern Bloc. Czechoslovakia, which had the most extensive contacts with Latin America of all communist countries (in the interwar period there was a large network of diplomatic missions in the region), served as an intermediary of Soviet influence on multiple occasions. This was the case in Chile, where a Czechoslovak Commercial Service was established in 1955. This unique institution was created to defend the interests of the communist country in Chile (both the USSR and China set up their commercial services in 1961).3 Diplomatic relations between Chile and Czechoslovakia were restored during the presidency of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964–1970) in January 1965. However, Prague did not overestimate the reform efforts of the Christian Democratic government. 3 Archiv bezpečnostních složek (Security Services Archives, Prague) [further SSA], fond [further f.]: I. správa SNB, 11380/000, Návrh na zřízení rezidentury čs. rozvědky v Santiagu, 10. 10. 1961, p. 1. 44 DVACÁTÉ STOLETÍ 1/2014 In foreign political analyses it was described as a national bourgeoisie, which aims to strengthen the capitalist structures.4 “We have to acknowledge the fact that it is an antinational government which through partial reforms strives to prevent any further radicalization of working classes and strengthening of the anti-imperialist movement.”5 Under Salvador Allende’s presidency (1970–1973) the relations between the two countries were very close. Despite certain scepticism towards the “Chilean experiment”, caused by the divisions within the government coalition as well as by the pressure of domestic and foreign opposition, Chile became after Cuba the biggest political partner of Czechoslovakia in Latin America (not economic). A number of bilateral contracts and cultural agreements were signed, despite not being fulfilled on many occasions. The financial aid granted by the Eastern Bloc to Allende’s regime was also minimal. The 1973 Chilean coup d’état symbolizes the end of this process. While the bilateral relations had never been better, after September 11 they deteriorated dramatically. THE SUSPENSION OF RELATIONS AND ITS REFLECTION After the overthrow of Allende, the Soviet leadership was faced with a genuine dilemma. Should they maintain diplomatic relations with Chile even after the overthrow of an allied government or should they make a political gesture and withdraw completely from this significant country of the region? When military governments seized power in Brazil (1964), Uruguay (1973) and later in Argentina (1976), which also severely persecuted left-wing activists, the Soviet Union responded pragmatically and did not suspend diplomatic relations with these countries. In the first days following the coup, it seemed that Chile would not be an exception.6 The minister of foreign affairs Andrei Gromyko and the people surrounding him were against the suspension of relations.7 Immediately after the coup, Yuri Zhukov, the head of the Latin American department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, stated that relations with Chile would be suspended only if Chile itself broke them off. “Keeping the diplomatic mission in Chile is beneficial and provides us with 4 Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí (Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague) [further AMFA], f. Teritoriální odbor — tajné [further TOT] Chile 1965–1969, Chile — informační materiály pro návštěvu chilské parlamentní delegace v ČSSR, 13. 10. 1965, p. 1. 5 AMFA, TOT Chile 1965–1969, Zpráva o současné situaci v Chile a úkolech čs. zahraniční politiky pro další rozvoj čs.-chilských styků, 17. 6. 1965, pp. 9–10. 6 Different approaches of Czechoslovakia towards military regimes in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay were analysed in the study ZOUREK, M., Political and Economic Relations between Czechoslovakia and the Military Regimes of the Southern Cone in 1970s and 1980s, in: Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2013, pp. 74–96. 7 ULIANOVA, O., La Unidad Popular y el golpe de militar en Chile: Percepciones y análisis soviéticos, in: Estudios Públicos, No. 79, 2000, p. 113. Michal ZOuRek 45 an opportunity to support certain groups from within.”8 On 13 September, the Soviet ambassador in Chile Alexander Basov informed his colleagues from the Eastern Bloc countries that “the USSR would not publicly criticize the Chilean junta and would not suspend diplomatic relations. The criticism shall be restricted to social organizations.”9 The first Soviet commentaries, analyses and evaluations were rather restrained.10 The military government itself wished to keep relations with communist countries and with the exception of Cuba maintained a largely correct attitude towards them. On 15 September, the Soviet Union was informed that the junta assumed all commercial commitments and debts of the Popular Unity government. Their amount was not insignificant and Moscow was well aware that if the diplomatic relations were suspended, any chance of their recovery would be extremely difficult. However, several ideologists from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held a different opinion than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarev advocated the suspension of diplomatic relations. They emphasized that Chile was not of any economic or strategic importance for the Soviet Union. These men had undoubtedly stronger influence than Gromyko who was not a member of politburo.11 Another important factor was the public response in Western countries, which denounced the military coup. In the end the opinion that the suspension of diplomatic relations with Chile would bring more benefits than drawbacks prevailed. Allende’s death as a martyr, subsequent severe repressions, and the intervention of the US — all this could serve as a possible tool for propaganda, which would help to divert the attention from the violation of human rights in the USSR as well as from the Soviet external policy. The intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 in particular was seen as a major blow to the Soviet prestige abroad. The Soviet stance towards Chile first became evident on 17 September when Leonid Brezhnev issued a statement from Sofia, in which he described the events in Chile as a “fascist coup”. In the first days following the coup, the Chilean newspapers El Mercurio, La Tercera and La Prensa labelled the weapons confiscated at La Moneda Palace as Soviet and Czechoslovak products.12 The weapons, which the Chilean left used and which were desperately sought by the junta in the first days after the coup, were indeed produced in these countries, yet they were imported from Cuba.13 Following Brezhnev’s statement, the anti-Soviet sentiments grew in intensity. On 18 September the president of the Senate and the future president of Chile Patricio Aylwin from the Christian Democratic Party issued a statement that soldiers prevented the 1948 Czechoslovak coup from happening in Chile.14 8 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12543/000, 14. 9. 1973. 9 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12543/000, Telegram ze Sofie, 13. 9. 1973. 10 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12543/000, 17. 9. 1973. 11 ULIANOVA, O., La Unidad…, p. 113. 12 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12543/000, 19. 9. 1973. 13 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12543/000, 17. 9. 1973. 14 Left-wing Christian Democrats (Fuentealba, Tomic, Leighton), however, issued a similar 46 DVACÁTÉ STOLETÍ 1/2014 On 21 September, the Soviet Union suspended diplomatic relations with Chile. The other countries of the Eastern Bloc with the exception of Romania soon followed.15 Czechoslovakia followed the Soviet Union and broke off diplomatic relations with Chile on 25 September, two weeks after the coup. Yugoslavia maintained consular relations with Chile due to a large number of emigrants from Croatia. Neither did communist China break off diplomatic relations. Chile allowed the communist countries to temporarily keep two or three administrators who would oversee the property of former diplomatic missions.16 The Embassy of India took over the affairs of Czechoslovakia and the USSR.17 The Embassy of Austria assumed the affairs of Bulgaria and Hungary, the Switzerland office represented the interests of Poland, the Finnish embassy took charge of East Germany’s affairs and the People’s Republic of China was to represent the interests of the People’s Republic of Korea. On the other hand, the interests of Chile were still represented in Cuba and East Germany by Switzerland, in Bulgaria and the USSR by Peru, in Poland by Brazil and in the People’s Republic of Korea by China.18 ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN CHILE On 26 September 1973, the Czechoslovak Federal Ministry of External Trade issued guidelines, which were based on the assumption that “despite the negative course of events, the domestic political situation will gradually become stable and allow for commercial exchange in ways and forms which are common for states with reactionary governments in power.”19 Taking into account the vague interpretation of these instructions and the political importance which the situation in Chile assumed, on 17 May, 1974 the Czechoslovak government issued a resolution, which listed Chile as a country, with which individual foreign trade corporations could not close any deals.20 Nevertheless, not all Eastern Bloc countries strictly adhered to this officially proclaimed policy. They sought to keep minimum commercial contacts as a pretext to maintain their representatives in the country.21 These representatives were statement as the Soviets and classified the coup as fascist and the military government as a dictatorship. SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12543/000, 19. 9. 1973. 15 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12543/000, 19. 9. 1973. 16 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12543/000, 23. 9. 1973. 17 The Republic of India was authorized to represent the interests of Czechoslovakia in Chile. Its diplomatic mission, which also represented Soviet interests, was not prepared for such task in terms of staff and could not solve the problems which emerged. Furthermore, the communication with the diplomatic mission was rather difficult. SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12543/000, 12623/101, Záznam z instruktážní schůzky s „REGENT“, Situace v čs. kolonii po 11. 9. 1973, 19. 6. 1974, p. 2. 18 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12543/000, 23. 9. 1973. 19 AMFA, f. TOT Chile 1965–1969, Návrh pro předsednictvo vlády ČSSR na další postup v oblasti hospodářských a obchodních styků a vědeckotechnické spolupráce s Chilskou republikou, 11. 1. 1974, p. 4. 20 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12623/101, Návrh na obnovení práce v Chile, 4. 6. 1974, p. 3. 21 SSA, f. I. správa SNB., 12623/012, Současná situace přátel NDR v Chile, 31. 5. 1977. Michal ZOuRek 47 supposed to collect receivables, as Banco Chile temporarily froze debt repayments. The debt of Chile with Czechoslovakia exceeded 3.5 million dollars. The commercial bank Československá obchodní banka also had a 5 million dollars share in the credit granted to Chile by the International Bank for Economic Cooperation in Moscow.22 The receivables were also collected by Czechoslovak companies. Motokov filed a suit against the Imcoda company concerning the repayment of a loan of 235,000 dollars.23 Therefore, the TRACO Ltd. affiliation, which promoted the export of machines to Chile since 1966, was maintained. It was officially presented as a Czechoslovak-Canadian trading company, but the Canadian partner was in reality a Czechoslovak affiliation based in Canada.24 The affiliation was managed by the Transakta trade group. As the military government was interested in establishing business contacts with communist countries except for the Soviet Union and Cuba, the TRACO affiliation did not encounter any serious problem with Chilean authorities and two Czechoslovak employees of the company were allowed to stay in Chile.25 The absence of goods and components, which could not be shipped due to political reasons, was solved by purchases in the Czechoslovak company Škoda Platense in Argentina.26 “Chilean economic institutions (banks) show a genuine interest in establishing regular trade relations with Czechoslovakia. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the junta would resort to any repressive measures against the Czechoslovak company. The central issue in this situation is to keep the activity of the affiliation at a level which would justify its existence in a commercial sense, that means to trade and not exceed the limit which would de facto imply the recognition of military junta government and its institutions.”27 In 1974, the Czechoslovak export decreased by more than 80%, yet it exceeded 3,5 million dollars.28 The majority of deals were concluded during the first half-year, that is before the government regulation banning the trade with Chile. In later years, the reduction of the Czechoslovak export was even more dramatic. In 1975 and 1976 it totalled 22 The rule in relation to Latin American countries was to withhold state loans and grant them only bank and corporate loans. This was the case of loans granted to Chile from 1968 to 1973. AMFA, f. TOT Chile 1970–1974 Chile, Správa o postupe v oblasti hospodárskych a obchodných stykov s Chilskou republikou, 6. 11. 1974, pp. 5–6. 23 Ibid., p. 5. 24 SSA, I. správa SNB, 12623/100, Akce ANDROMEDA, 11. 7. 1974, p. 1. 25 Nevertheless, this economic pragmatism of the military government in Chile was wrapped in an anti-Marxist discourse which labelled the USSR and Cuba as the main source of unrest in the world and Czechoslovakia as a loyal satellite. Every time an “enemy” was arrested or shot, a public display of their weapons followed. The weapons were usually of Soviet (AKA) or Czechoslovak origin (Škorpion and the CZ 50 pistol). In this respect, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia were regarded as countries which provide material support (mainly weapons) to the “subversive movement” not only in Chile, but in other countries as well. SSA, I. správa SNB, 12623/014, Chile — vnitropolitická situace, 18. 5. 1982, p. 3. 26 SSA, I. správa SNB, 12623/101, Informace o Chile, 4. 6. 1974, p. 6. 27 SSA, I. správa SNB, 12623/101, Akce Andromeda — současný stav, TRACO R. L., 18. 9. 1974, p. 2. 28 AMFA, f. TOT Chile 1970–1974 Chile, Správa o postupe v oblasti hospodárskych a obchodných stykov s Chilskou republikou, 6. 11. 1974, p. 4. 48 DVACÁTÉ STOLETÍ 1/2014 0.2 million dollars. In 1978 the overall amount was 0.7 million, 0.8 million in 1979 and 1.3 million in 1980. The export comprised almost exclusively spare parts for previously supplied machines, which were not subject to the regulation (Strojimport, Intersigma, Pragoinvest). Despite the steady growth, Czechoslovak export to Chile reached the lowest figures within the whole Latin America and it was comparable to countries such as Honduras or Haiti.29 Apart from the policy of the Czechoslovak government, another adverse factor was that Czechoslovak products lost their high reputation. The then director of the TRACO affiliation Sergio Osorio explained: “All the good and established clients, which we had, left us in fear of buying products from socialist countries, as the worst thing possible was to be accused of collaboration with the enemies of Chile.“30 The volume of export from Chile, which was traditionally minimal, during these years practically reached zero level. The only exception was 1977, when copper in the amount of 1.7 million dollars was imported to repay the debt. Other socialist countries had already been repaying their debts in this way. Czechoslovakia had not been interested in doing so until then.31 ACTIVITIES OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK INTELLIGENCE SERVICE The Czechoslovak rezidentura in Chile was established on the request of the Soviet Union in 1961. Its principal aim was to follow the activities of the United States and undermine the US influence in Chile through disinformation and confrontation campaigns.32 After the suspension of diplomatic relations the rezidentura was liquidated together with the diplomatic mission. Thus, any further intelligence operations were out of the question. The remaining Czechoslovak rezidenturas in Latin America (Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela) were responsible for mapping the situation in Chile, particularly the immigration from Chile. Rezidenturas in Argentina and Mexico were soon reopened.33 In 1974, the KGB laid down five key targets of its operations in Latin America: Cuba, Argentina, Peru, Brazil and Mexico. Chile under Pinochet’s firm hand was not a primary target anymore. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) took over the role of the main socialist intelligence service after the Soviet Union. The main reason of the East German involvement in the country was a personal interest of the chief 29 AMFA, f. Porady kolegia 1953–1989, libro no. 225, Informace o významu Latinské Ameriky se zvláštním zřetelem na národněosvobozenecké hnutí ve Střední Americe a karibské oblasti, dopadu politiky USA vůči zemím LA po nástupu prezidenta Reagana a zahraničně politická aktivita ČSSR v Latinské Americe, 1. 9. 1981. 30 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12623/101-II, Překlad dopisu p. S. Osorio P., chilského ředitele afilace TRACO Ltda., 16. 11. 1974, p. 2. 31 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12623/012, Záznam ze schůzky s IS PERLA, konané dne 21. září 1977 od 12. do 14. hod. v restauraci hotelu Albatros v Praze na Vltavě, p. 2. 32 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 11380/000, Návrh na zřízení rezidentury čs. rozvědky v Santiagu, 10. 10. 1961, p. 2. 33 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12543/000, Podklady k úkolům u s. plk. Žemly dne 3. 10. 1973, 15. 10. 1973, pp. 5–7. Michal ZOuRek 49 state and party official Erich Honecker in the fate of the persecuted opposition, as his daughter Sonia married Chilean communist Leandro Yañéz. The primary task of the East German intelligence service was to ensure communication between the members of the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) working illegally in Chile and those exiled in Europe. Their work did not have an entirely intelligence character, it was more of an international support. The materials, which the GDR received from Chile, were passed on to the head of the international department of the PCCh and then they were sent to the Central Committee of the party in Moscow.34 Chilean communists at the same time demanded that the intelligent agents carried out activities against the government, contributed to “the acceleration of the differentiation process and to the separation of the junta from the armed forces, provoked antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the middle classes.”35 However, these tasked were never approached. In July 1974, the East German intelligence service opened negotiations on the cooperation with several comradely countries in an effort to create a spare channel in the event of expulsion of its workers. Whereas Bulgaria and Hungary refused the request of Berlin,36 Czechoslovakia accepted it. The TRACO affiliation with two posts for Czechoslovak employees was an ideal platform for legalization. The third member was legalized as an administrator of Czechoslovak property.37 These three agents arrived in 1975 and therefore the Czechoslovak rezidentura, the then largest in Latin America, was re-established. The preparatory stage, which received the code name ANDROMEDA, was thus completed. Besides the intelligence activities, the employees within the frame of this operation focused on maintaining contacts with members of the PCCh and prepared false identity papers. The illegal work of Chilean communists came under considerable criticism in the reports. “They are not experienced. There was a lack of discipline at lower levels and the intelligence operations faced serious risks.”38 There is a note in one of the reports that “the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Cde. Gustáv Husák should point out to Cde. Corvalán that Chilean comrades need to work in a conspirative manner not to jeopardize their contacts abroad by insufficient organization and non-adherence to the basic principles of illegal work.”39 34 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12623/101, Záznam o konzultaci s představiteli NDR k akci ANDROMEDA z 9. 10. 1974, 11. 10. 1974, p. 16. 35 Ibid., p. 4. 36 The GDR representatives expressed their gratitude that Czechoslovakia became involved in the “international support of the PCCh in the fight against the fascist dictatorship, mainly in a situation when neither Bulgarian, nor Hungarian comrades were willing to help.” SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12623/000, Záznam o jednání s představiteli rozvědky NDR, 28. 7. 1975, p. 6. 37 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12623/000, Plán práce rezidentury Santiago de Chile na rok 1975, 2.1. 1975, p. 2. 38 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12623/000, Záznam o jednání s představiteli rozvědky NDR, 28. 7. 1975, p. 4. 39 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12623/012, Akce ANDROMEDA, 3. 8. 1977, p. 5. 50 DVACÁTÉ STOLETÍ 1/2014 A growing disillusionment caused by the attitude of the party’s leadership in exile towards the management of operations in Chile can be seen. The inhomogeneity of the Popular Unity manifested itself already when it was in power and became even more evident during the years in illegality. It was not only political disputes within the emigration. The GDR became the engineer and organizer of the PCCh’s activities, as the work of its members was insufficient. The major issue was “the unwillingness to send members to Chile, despite proved and confirmed possibilities”.40 Moreover, maintaining the party activities was rather costly for Berlin, therefore the interest in this form of cooperation gradually decreased. Nevertheless, the East German rezidentura was preserved, which was also advocated by Corvalán himself in Berlin in March 1977, as it represented the only reliable connection.41 After 1978, when an operation called “Return” was launched, the focus of Chilean communists shifted to Chile. The East German intelligence service thus ceased to be the only communication channel and its importance gradually diminished. Under the mutual agreement of 28 February 1980, the operation ANDROMEDA was by the end of the year concluded after five years and the Czechoslovak rezidentura was liquidated. Although it functioned as a spare communication channel throughout the whole period, as East German agents were never expelled from the country, its reports constitute valuable source material for the analysis of the situation. SOLIDARITY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WITH CHILE Following the Soviet example, Czechoslovakia launched a massive campaign denouncing the military coup in Chile. Besides the activities in support of Luis Corvalán, Czechoslovakia was also the proponent of the motions for resolutions on the restoration of human rights and on the request for the liberation of the former minister of foreign affairs Clodomir Almeyda. Both resolutions were approved by the UN General Assembly on 6 November 1974.42 Centres of solidarity with Chile were established at all Czechoslovak universities and telegrams protesting against the military government as well as calling for the support of prominent figures were sent.43 The International Conference of Solidarity, held in Paris in June 1974 and chaired by Francois Mitterand, established the most important organization in support of Chile: the Czechoslovak Committee for the Defence of the Chilean People’s Rights.44 40 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12623/012, Záznam o jednání náčelníka rozvědky NDR s. gen. Horstem Jänickem, 16. 4. 1977, p. 8 41 Ibid., p. 3. 42 AMFA, f. Dokumentace teritoriálních odborů 1953–1989 [further DTO] Chile, book no. 15, Prohlášení Čs. výboru na obranu práv chilského lidu, 18. 7. 1974. 43 SSA, f. I. správa SNB, 12543/000, Situace v Chile a Argentině — výzva, 10. 10. 1973. 44 The committee, which was subordinate to the Central Committee of the National Front, appointed Ján Marko, a deputy and a former minister of foreign affairs, as the first president. On the occasion of the first anniversary of the coup, the committee organized a gathering at the main square of city of Ostrava, which was attended by 16,000 people, according to Michal ZOuRek 57 This excerpt illustrates the Soviet view of the Chilean path to socialism and its failure. Soviet ideologists and political scientists in accordance with Lenin’s positions always emphasized that international revolutionary movement has to learn from its victories as well as its defeats. Allende’s government, in their opinion, helped to define the rules of revolutionary fight in capitalist countries which are in subordinate position in relation to the world imperialism. The main reason of the collapse of the government was according to Moscow the presence of ultra-left groups (inside the socialist party and the far-left organization MIR) proclaiming Che Guevara’s path of armed revolution. Further massive bloodshed was one of the reasons of the Soviet reluctance to any possible intervention. On the occasion of its first anniversary, the Czech Television broadcast the drama Svědkové obžaloby (The Witnesses of the Indictment) directed by Pavel Háša and Jaroslav Novotný and based on the work by Roman Hlaváč. The film featuring many famous actors, such as Josef Vinklář as Pinochet, won the Annual Award of the Director-General of the Czechoslovak Television (1975) and also the International Award Silver Nymph in Monte Carlo (1976). Miroslav Hladký, one of the most important representatives of the Czechoslovak propaganda film from the “normalization” period is the author of four-part work Půl milionu za Alvara (Half-Million for Alvaro). This series recounts the life of a young Communist journalist Alvaro Hamilton, his relatives and friends during the Unidad Popular government, from Allende’s victory until the coup. In 1984, a film by Antonín Dvořák Ohněm proti ohni (With fire against fire) was based on the dramatic escape of the communist senator from Chile. Martin Chalupáč is the author of the documentary Chile 1970–1986, a propaganda interpretation of the development of the country based on authentic film material. Another important propaganda tool was song. Czechoslovak music propaganda is mainly associated with the Festival of Political Song in Sokolov, which was held in from 1973 to 1988 and soon became the most evident example of the subordination of art to ideological values during the normalization period. Both amateur and wellknown professional artists representing the pick of popular music appeared on stage to express their support for the party line and the officially proclaimed power and socio-political attitudes.68 Foreign participants played an important role at the festival, as unlike some of the Czechoslovak artists they truly identified with the lyrics and at the same time demonstrated that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is not alone in the fight for its ideals. Guests coming from capitalist countries were particularly significant, as they in accordance with the ideological requirements of the festival expressed their critical view of the amoral and decaying Western world. Artist from socialist and developing countries expressed their solidarity with the communist regime and the effort to establish world peace. They also voiced their opposition to wars, for which the aggressive politics of imperialistic countries are to blame.69 The audience, which consisted mainly of young people and workers, could not have understood the lyrics of foreign performers much and the party members might 68 FLAM, Z., Festival politické písně Sokolov, Brno 2010, p. 19. 69 VOJTA, M., Vyřiďte básníkům, že slova nestačí, in: Tvorba, 8. 3. 1978. 58 DVACÁTÉ STOLETÍ 1/2014 not have understood them either. This is illustrated by the commentary in the Melodie (Melody) music magazine from 1980. “More time should have been devoted to familiarizing us with the content of the songs, which we could only speculate about”.70 Therefore, highly melodic and fierce songs, where the language barrier was not of the greatest importance, were more successful. “Exotic” artists from Latin America, Africa and Asia also lightened the winter atmosphere of the mining town and clearly helped to boost the festival attendance. Except for the first edition, the festival was held every February to commemorate the events of 1948. Thus, the second edition took place less than a half year after the Chilean coup and was strongly associated with this event. It was called “Solidarity with Chile” and the symbol of the festival was a guitar with a clenched fist. Several Chilean artists performed at the festival, namely the bands Jasampra and Inti-Illimani and the singers Osvaldo Rodríguez and Ricardo Padilla, who were in exile in Europe. The festival also featured a so-called “Solidarity shop”, a stand with books, records, songbooks and paintings which donated all proceeds from sale to the Chilean Solidarity Fund.71 Chilean musicians were regular guests at the Sokolov festival. Apart from the already mentioned, participants at the later editions included among others the music groups Ranquil, Aparcoa, Tiempo Nuevo and Amankay and the singer Sergio Ortega. His famous revolutionary song called Venceremos, which he performed at the 4th edition of the festival in 1976, was used as model song for Czechoslovak artists and it was used as the final song of the festival in later years. Chile was the topic of many Czechoslovak songs as well. In 1974, Hana Talpová performed the song Růže pro Santiago (Roses for Santiago) and the band Královští hoši played the song Já hořím Santiago (I am burning, Santiago). A truly agitational song was Pozdrav chilskému lidu (Greeting to the Chilean People) performed in 1975 by Bob Frídl with the lyrics by Oskar Man. “They left the schools and factories to follow the voice of Victor Jara. How many men and how many women were taken to the graveyard on the bier? / They followed Pablo Neruda and died in the name of happiness. Their mothers will not cry, but clench their fists tightly. / These fists are shaking at the generals, who sold houses, fields, rocks for a pile of gold and imposed an executioner instead of Allende. / They left like Che Guevara. The memory is still vivid. Every guitar and every voice in Chile sings a song of them. / The left like a tree being cut down, a train leaving without any notice. One day, though, a thunder will roar, a thunder of their clenched fists.” CONCLUSION The 1973 Chilean coup d’état had profound consequences for the foreign and domestic policy of communist countries. With the exception of Romania, all countries of the Eastern Bloc suspended their diplomatic relations with Chile. The reason of this decision in the Soviet Union was the lack of any strong economic and strategic inter70 TŮMA, J., Sokolov jaký byl, in: Melodie, 1980, No. 5, p. 145. 71 FLAM, Z., Festival…, p. 15. Michal ZOuRek 59 ests in the country (unlike e.g. Argentina). Commercial exchange did not reach significant levels during Allende government either. Despite the officially proclaimed policy, the Eastern Bloc countries sought to maintain at least minimal economic contacts which could be deepened, should the Chilean government change. The military government was interested in further commercial exchange as well. The suspension of diplomatic contacts was undoubtedly an important political gesture. What form did the Czechoslovak aid to the Chilean opposition in the mentioned period have? We could agree with the criticism expressed by Hortensia Allende that Czechoslovakia did not accept many Chilean exiles. However, this decision also to a great extent depended on Moscow. Czechoslovakia, where many Latin American students expressed their support for the reform movement known as the Prague Spring and denounced the invasion by the Warsaw Pact armies in August 1968 (so did the leadership of the socialist Party of Chile), was not regarded as a suitable destination by the Soviets. However, Czechoslovakia later accepted several Chilean communists who worked in international organizations seated in Prague. The claims made by Carlos Altamirano that Prague provided Chile, unlike other socialist countries, only with a verbal aid, are not accurate, especially in the view of the subsequent activities of the Czechoslovak rezidentura. The Czechoslovak secret service granted the request of the GDR and in cooperation with its rezidentura carried out activities in support of Chilean communists. Probably the most characteristic feature of this period of mutual relations is the use of political situation in Chile for propaganda purposes by the international communist movement. During the first years following the military coup, the amount of information about this rather distant country the Czechoslovak people were provided with was unparalleled and surpassed the period of the allied Allende’s government. However, the nature of the information was rather questionable, as it was often inaccurate and manipulative. The communist propaganda to a great extent contributed to the difficulty of an objective analysis of the governments of Salvador Allende and Augusto Pinochet. After 1989, in several post-communist countries, partly under the influence of uncritical acceptance of capitalism and the condemnation of the previous regime, the other extreme attitude emerged. A number of right-wing politicians and media depicted Augusto Pinochet as a statesman who had saved his country from communism and the repressions of the military government as a necessary evil or regrettable mistakes representing an indispensable part of the fight against communism. ABSTRACT POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA TOWARDS CHILE 1973–1980 The aim of this paper is to analyze the policy of the Eastern Bloc towards Chile from 1973 to 1980 on the example of Czechoslovakia. The documents from Czech archives and the literature from that period show its complexity as well as its transformation. Although Czechoslovakia suspended diplomatic relations with Chile in September 1973, it sought to maintain its positions in the country. Apart from the economic importance, another reason was the possible legalization Czechoslovak intelligence agents. The Chilean coup d’état was well reflected in the Czechoslovak society, as the people received an unprecedented amount of information about this distant country (e.g. 60 DVACÁTÉ STOLETÍ 1/2014 exhibitions, literature, films and music). Its character, without doubt, contributed to numerous stereotypes in the perception of Allende’s and Pinochet’s governments which have survived in several post-communist countries to this very day. KEYWORDS International Relations, Communism, Czechoslovakia, Chile, 20th century ABSTRAKT ČESKOSLOVENSKÁ POLITIKA VŮČI CHILE V LETECH 1973–1980 Cílem studie je analýza politiky východního bloku vůči Chile mezi léty 1973 a 1980 na příkladu Československa. Dokumenty z českých archivů a dobová literatura demonstrují její komplexnost a proměnlivost. Ač Československo přerušilo v září 1973 se Santiagem diplomatické styky, i nadále usilovalo o udržení svých pozic v zemi. Vedle hospodářského významu byla dalším důvodem možnost legalizace agentů československých tajných služeb. Chilský převrat byl reflektován v československé společnosti způsobem, že občan dostával o vzdálené zemi mimořádné množství informací (např. výstavy, literatura, film a hudba). Jejich charakter nepochybně přispěl k vytvoření řady stereotypů ve vnímání Allendeho a Pinochetovy vlády, které stejně jako v dalších postkomunistických státech přežívají do dnešní doby. KLÍČOVÁ SLOVA Mezinárodní vztahy, Komunismus, Československo, Chile, 20. století