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IMPACT OF DIFFERENT LIFE-CYCLE SAVING STRATEGIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT ON INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS IN DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSION SCHEME IN SLOVAKIA

Mešťan, Michal

Abstract

Searching for the optimal saving strategy is often tied with the life-cycle strategies where only the age of a saver is considered for setting the allocation profile between equities and bonds. Our article contributes to the debate by looking at the performance and adequacy risks arising from applying age-based saving strategies for savers in funded pension schemes. As many studies have proven the shift of the risk onto savers in defined contribution pension schemes under various saving strategies, we contribute to the debate by providing simulations of expected accumulated savings via funded pension scheme under the various life-cycle income profiles and existence of unemployment risk. Using the resampling simulation technique, we compare the fixed and age-based strategies of three different agents with various life-cycle income paths and different unemployment risk. We compare the expected amount of savings and calculate relative indicators comparing the expected monthly benefits, income replacement rate. We look closely on the impact of unemployment on the value of savings and calculate the unemployment factor explaining the value of savings lost due to the periods of unemployment. By combining life-cycle income functions of individuals with different education level and unemployment risk, we show that decisions of implementing low risk saving strategies are suboptimal and lead to a substantial decrease in replacement ratios not only for higher income cohorts but especially for the lowest ones. At the same time, we prove that employing low risk saving strategy leads to the increase of adequacy risk especially driven by the unemployment risk that is higher for lower education individuals. We conclude that age-based life-cycle saving strategies, where the remaining saving horizon is the only factor defining the allocation profile is not the optimal saving strategy and other factors should be considered as well when searching for optimal saving strategy.

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128 2021, XXIV, 3 Finance 10.15240/ ul/001/2021-3-008 IMPACT OF DIFFERENT LIFE-CYCLE SAVING STRATEGIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT ON INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS IN DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSION SCHEME IN SLOVAKIA Michal Mešťan1, I an K álik2, Leoš Ša á 3, Ján Šebo4 1 Ma ej Bel Uni e si y in Banská Bys ica, Facul y o Economics, Depa men o Finance and Accoun ing, Slo akia, ORCID: 0000-0002-4974-2254, [email p o ec ed]; 2 Ma ej Bel Uni e si y in Banská Bys ica, Facul y o Economics, Depa men o Public Economics and Regional De elopmen , Slo akia, ORCID: 0000-0002-9131-7067, [email p o ec ed]; 3 Technical Uni e si y in Košice, Facul y o Economics, Depa men o Finance, Slo akia, ORCID: 0000-0001-8466-0644, [email p o ec ed]; 4 Ma ej Bel Uni e si y in Banská Bys ica, Facul y o Economics, Depa men o Public Economics and Regional De elopmen , Slo akia, ORCID: 0000-0001-7974-3285, [email p o ec ed]. Abs ac : Sea ching o he op imal sa ing s a egy is o en ied wi h he li e-cycle s a egies whe e only he age o a sa e is conside ed o se ing he alloca ion p o ile be ween equi ies and bonds. Ou a icle con ibu es o he deba e by looking a he pe o mance and adequacy isks a ising om applying age-based sa ing s a egies o sa e s in unded pension schemes. As many s udies ha e p o en he shi o he isk on o sa e s in de ined con ibu ion pension schemes unde a ious sa ing s a egies, we con ibu e o he deba e by p o iding simula ions o expec ed accumula ed sa ings ia unded pension scheme unde he a ious li e-cycle income p o iles and exis ence o unemploymen isk. Using he esampling simula ion echnique, we compa e he ixed and age-based s a egies o h ee di e en agen s wi h a ious li e-cycle income pa hs and di e en unemploymen isk. We compa e he expec ed amoun o sa ings and calcula e ela i e indica o s compa ing he expec ed mon hly bene i s, income eplacemen a e. We look closely on he impac o unemploymen on he alue o sa ings and calcula e he unemploymen ac o explaining he alue o sa ings los due o he pe iods o unemploymen . By combining li e-cycle income unc ions o indi iduals wi h di e en educa ion le el and unemploymen isk, we show ha decisions o implemen ing low isk sa ing s a egies a e subop imal and lead o a subs an ial dec ease in eplacemen a ios no only o highe income coho s bu especially o he lowes ones. A he same ime, we p o e ha employing low isk sa ing s a egy leads o he inc ease o adequacy isk especially d i en by he unemploymen isk ha is highe o lowe educa ion indi iduals. We conclude ha age-based li e-cycle sa ing s a egies, whe e he emaining sa ing ho izon is he only ac o de ining he alloca ion p o ile is no he op imal sa ing s a egy and o he ac o s should be conside ed as well when sea ching o op imal sa ing s a egy. Keywo ds: Pension sa ings, unemploymen li e-cycle income, li e-cycle s a egy. JEL Classi ica ion: D14, D15, G11, J26. APA S yle Ci a ion: Mešťan, M., K álik, I,. Ša á , L., & Šebo, J. (2021). Impac o Di e en Li e-cycle Sa ing S a egies and Unemploymen on Indi idual Sa ings in De ined Con ibu ion Pension Scheme in Slo akia. E&M Economics and Managemen , 24(3), 128–148. h ps://doi. o g/10.15240/ ul/001/2021-3-008 EM_3_2021.indd 128 8.9.2021 9:58:04 129 3, XXIV, 2021 Finance In oduc ion Indi iduals in manda o y pension sa ing (MPS) scheme in Slo akia ha e hei sa ings alloca ed mos ly in one o he pension unds – equi y o bond unds. Sa ing in only one o hese unds will be conside ed as benchma k s a egies. In ou a icle, ou goal is o compa e he p o i abili y ha can be achie ed wi h benchma k s a egies compa ed o li e-cycle sa ings s a egies. In hei case, he a io o sa ings be ween equi y and bond componen s changes dynamically, depending on he age and emaining sa ings pe iod o 40 yea s (480 mon hs). We deal wi h 3 ypes o indi iduals wi h di e en educa ion le el. In addi ion o compa ing he po en ially achie able e u ns a he end o he sa ing ho izon, we will also be in e es ed in he ola ili y o achie able e u ns and hei sp ead om he a e age wi h he selec ed sa ings s a egies. Sa e s a e ying o ge he bes alue o money, bu hey should also ake in o accoun he ac ha highe po en ial app ecia ion also en ails highe isk. The hi d key a ea on which we a e ying o ind he answe is how unemploymen will in luence he inal amoun o sa ing a he end o sa ing pe iod. In his a icle, we wo k wi h h ee le els o empi ical unemploymen a e o selec ed educa ional coho s, which we apply o he income o h ee indi iduals. 1. Desc ip iono Slo akDe ined Con ibu ion Pension Sa ing Scheme The Slo ak Pilla II was es ablished as a de ined con ibu ion (DC) pension sa ing scheme in 2005. Since Sep embe 2012, he en olmen is ully olun a y (in Sep embe 2012 i became manda o y) and eligible o pe sons up o 35 yea s o age. The p inciple o he unded pension is based on he accumula ion o sa ings du ing employmen and in es ing sa ings in inancial ma ke s ia special pu pose ehicles – pension unds, which a e managed and adminis a ed by Pension Fund Managemen Companies (PFMCs), licensed by he Na ional Bank o Slo akia (Ande sen e al., 2019). Acco ding o he applicable law in Slo akia ( he Ac on Old-Age Sa ing n. 43/2004), each PFMC is obliged o ope a e a leas wo pension unds which can be di ided in o wo main g oups:  Bond gua an eed manda o y pension und;  S ock non-gua an eed manda o y pension und. Each PFMC is ee o choose (mos ly based on hei business model) i i ope a es addi ional pension unds, which a e op ional. These legisla i e changes en e ed in o law on Ap il 30, 2013. Be o e his da e, each PFMC had o ope a e h ee ( espec i ely ou ) obliga o y pension unds:  Bond manda o y pension und (since Ma ch 2005);  Mixed manda o y pension und (since Ma ch 2005);  Equi y manda o y pension und (since Ma ch 2005);  Index manda o y pension und (since Ap il 2012). A e he legisla i e changes became e ec i e in May 2013, Mixed and Index pension unds became op ional, and some o PFMCs me ged hese pension unds wi h obliga o y Equi y non-gua an eed manda o y pension unds. I is impo an o say ha he i s h ee ca ego ies o pension unds a e ( om an asse managemen poin o iew) ac i ely managed pension unds, and Index pension unds a e he only unds managed passi ely. Howe e , changes in he ee policy (s ic ly egula ed) o ced p o ide s o change he in es men s a egy o pension unds owa ds being passi ely managed using mos ly ETFs as main inancial ins umen s (Ande sen e al., 2019). Indi iduals ha e he possibili y o sa e in one o wo pension unds a he same ime, i is comple ely up o a sa e how much o his own sa ings would be in es ed in one pension und o ano he . They can in es limi ed amoun o sa ings in a Bond gua an eed pension und and ano he pa in an Index non-gua an eed pension und. The e is no ee o cha ge o change his alloca ion a io o swi ch pension unds managed by he same PFMC (Ande sen e al., 2019). Lo s o indi iduals cu en ly en olled in a MPS scheme ha e hei sa ing alloca ed only in one MPF. Acco ding o Minis y o Labou , Social A ai and Family Slo ak Republic, only e y small g oup o indi iduals ha e hei sa ings spli be ween wo MPFs. Slo ak MPS scheme does no ha e p e-de ined so-called li e-cycle sa ing s a egies o indi iduals. In some Eas e n Eu ope coun ies ( o example Es onia, La ia and Li huania) PFMCs p o ide some li e- cycle pension unds o hei clien s. Acco ding o Ba nes e al. (2008) “a li e-cycle app oach o pension in es men could in ol e in es ing EM_3_2021.indd 129 8.9.2021 9:58:04 130 2021, XXIV, 3 Finance in equi y ea ly in li e, and inc easing bond holdings as e i emen app oaches. In es men in equi y ea ly in he li e cycle ensu es a long holding pe iod o equi y (e.g., 20–30 yea s), hus gi ing a po en ial o weal h accumula ion a ela i ely high e u ns and ela i ely low long- un isks, i he long- e m e u ns and isks o equi ies a e simila o wha hey ha e been his o ically. Swi ching in o bonds as e i emen app oaches means ha he holding pe iod o bonds will be ela i ely sho (e.g., 5–15 yea s), so he in es o could heo e ically bene i om he lowe isk o bonds in he sho e m, i bond e u ns and isks a e in line wi h hei his o ical p o ile. In gene al, li e-cycle can be desc ibed as an in es men app oach ha in ol es a swi ching o he po olio o e an indi idual’s li e cycle is obse ed among eal-wo ld DC plans.” Based on he cu en law in Slo akia, indi iduals can bene i om indi idual li e-cycle sa ing s a egies, which allow hem o managed hei sa ings du ing hei li e wi hou he need o c ea e a new pension und. Acco ding o Malkiel (1996), “li e cycle in es men s a egy is buil on he idea o ‘age-based in es ing’, o he no ion ha in es o s should alloca e a la ge po ion o hei long- e m in es men o equi ies o o he isky asse s when hey a e young and ha e a ela i ely long in es men ho izon, g adually shi ing his alloca ion owa ds less isky asse s as hey app oach e i emen .” This concep is discussed in pape s om Me on (2007), Ay es and Nalebu (2008), Basu e al. (2009), P au (2010), Ay es and Nalebu (2013) and Wang e al. (2017). A li e cycle s a egy does no keep i s a ge mix cons an o e ime. Ins ead, i de e minis ically changes he a ge mix ha is held in equi ies and bonds acco ding o a p ede ined ‘glide pa h’, which g adually il s he asse s mix away om equi ies and o he isky asse s owa ds less isky asse s such as bonds and cash as in es o s app oach e i emen . Fo his eason, in ou a icle we ocus on designing, es ing and compa ing li e- cycle sa ing s a egies on indi idual bases. We compa e hose s a egies wi h passi e app oach based on sa ing in one bond o equi y und. Con ibu ions o he MPS scheme a e based on he indi idual’s wage le el, which acco ding o Gu enen (2009) a ies depending on he indi idual’s educa ion, wo k expe ience, age, p e ious wage and unemploymen . Acco ding o ecen esea ch om OECD (2018), educa ion ha e huge impac o indi idual wages ac oss many de eloped coun ies – highe and be e educa ion means highe wages o indi iduals. Ka z and Mu phy (1992) con i med in hei s udy he impac o wo k expe ience on he p oduc i i y o indi iduals which is also ela ed o hei age (assump ion ha highe age indica e mo e wo k expe ience) and he highe wage. Buki e al. (2018) con i med ha he expe ience wo ke s in any ages will inc ease he alue o labou p oduc i i y and also shows ha he amoun o wage in luences he labou p oduc i i y oo. Galdeano and Tu unen (2005) show empi ical e idence ha eal wages a e lowe in local labou ma ke s wi h highe unemploymen . We assume ha indi iduals wi h lowe le els o educa ion a e mo e likely o expe ience unemploymen han indi iduals wi h highe le els o educa ion. The nega i e impac o unemploymen on wages should he e o e be highe o indi iduals wi h lowe le els o educa ion. The nega i e impac o unemploymen on wages is also ela ed o sa ing i sel . In he pe iod o unemploymen , he indi idual does no pay con ibu ions o he MPS scheme. The mo e pe iod o unemploymen du ing he li e o an indi idual, hen he less he will con ibu e o he sys em, which will nega i ely a ec his sa ings. Tha we ocus in he a icle on moni o ing he impac o unemploymen e ec o wages du ing ca ee o indi iduals wi h di e en le els o educa ion and also on he inal amoun o sa ings in he end o sa ing pe iod. 2. Resea ch Me hodology Desc ip ion A he beginning o he me hodology pa , we discuss in mo e de ails he o ms o con ibu ing o manda o y pension unds (MPFs). Nex pa con ains a de ailed desc ip ion o he selec ed simula ion me hod used o es ima e he u u e e u ns o equi y and bond MPFs including in la ion and desc ip ion o he sa ings scheme wi h implemen ed con ibu ions, MPFs e u ns, and a ee policy e lec ing he cu en MPFs se - up. A he end o me hodology pa , we p o ide:  explana ion o selec ed sa ing s a egies:  wo benchma k s a egies (I, II) in es ing du ing he en i e sa ing pe iod in o he equi y und (S ock (I)) o bond und (Bond (II)) only; and * wo li e-cycle in es men s a egies called as Aging I. (III) and Aging II. (IV), EM_3_2021.indd 130 8.9.2021 9:58:04 131 3, XXIV, 2021 Finance which dec ease he isky pa o sa ings as he indi idual ages;  e alua ion c i e ia o he esul s ob ained by implemen ing simula ion me hods and compa ison ma ix o each combina ion o esul s. Le us ha e a li e-cycle income unc ion (LCI) o 3 modelled indi iduals, whe e he LCI unc ions a e de ined by hei p e ious income, educa ion le el and age o an indi idual. In he a icle, we assume ha all h ee indi iduals will ha e he same leng h o sa ing pe iod se a 480 mon hs (40 yea s), which is he same as leng h o he wo king ca ee in he case o an indi idual wi h a mas e ’s deg ee. Howe e , we unde s and ha he wo king ca ee is highe han leng h o sa ing pe iod o an indi idual wi h a high school and elemen a y educa ion le el. Nex , we assume wo possible op ion:  indi iduals wi h a ull ca ee (wi hou he exis ence o unemploymen isk); and  indi iduals wi h an incomple e ca ee (wi h he exis ence o unemploymen isk). In o de o mee he a icle’s objec i es, we do no p ima ily ocus ou a en ion on whe he a longe sa ing pe iod o indi iduals wi h lowe educa ion le el can ha e a signi ican impac on he le el o accumula ed sa ings compa ed o an indi idual wi h a highe educa ion and a sho e sa ing pe iod. Ra he , we ocus on he a iance in he simula ed inal pension po s using h ee simula ion me hods. Tab. 1 p esen s he achie ed educa ion le el o each indi idual, including hei income p o iles, he ini ial mon hly wages, leng h o he sa ing pe iod exp essed in mon hs, pension sa ing scheme en y age and espec i e e i emen age exp essed in mon hs. We should s ess ha acco ding o he Social Insu ance Ac N. 461/2003, he e i emen age o indi iduals will be di e en due o he mechanism ha ies he e i emen age o he li e-expec ancy o a e i ing coho . An indi idual wi h an elemen a y educa ion le el joins he pension sa ing scheme in 2018 as a 16-yea s- old, howe e an indi idual wi h a mas e ’s deg ee en e ing he labou ma ke in ha same yea (2018) is al eady 24 yea s old. This na u ally implies ha an indi idual wi h mas e ’s deg ee will ha e a e i emen age lowe han an indi idual wi h Elemen a y educa ion when en e ing he labou ma ke in he same yea . Fo a compa abili y o he esul s, we uni ied he pension scheme en y age and hus we can expec he same e i emen age o all modeled indi iduals. Es ima ion o li e-cycle income o analysed indi iduals is ealized using he li e ime income unc ion p esen ed by Gu enen (2009) and Gu enen and Smi h (2014) and de ailed o he condi ions o he Slo ak Republic by Balco e al. (2018) and Šebo e al. (2017). We ha e modi ied he LCI model and abs ain om bo h expec ed and unexpec ed shocks such as unemploymen , disabili y, ma e ni y lea e, e c. The model uses he long- e m da a om he Ame ican Communi y Su ey (ACS, 2014) when es ima ing he li e ime income unc ions, as he e is no longi udinal da a se ies o Slo akia a ailable. Ini ial wage o each indi idual wj,1 is es ima ed using he Slo ak S a is ical O ice da a (Tab. 1). Indi idual income Educa ion le el (j)Wages p o ile Ini ial mon hly wage (w1) Sa ing pe iod (T) En y age in o MPS scheme (x1) Re i emen age (xT) Elemen a y Minimum wage 480 € in 2017 480 mon hs (40 yea s × 12 mon hs) 300 mon hs (25 yea s) 780 mon hs (65 yea s) High school A e age wage 998 € in 2017 480 mon hs (40 yea s × 12 mon hs) 300 mon hs (25 yea s) 780 mon hs (65 yea s) Mas e ’s deg ee 1.2 × a e age wage 1,198 € in 2017 480 mon hs (40 yea s × 12 mon hs) 300 mon hs (25 yea s) 780 mon hs (65 yea s) Sou ce: own Tab. 1: Inpu da a o 3 ypes o indi iduals EM_3_2021.indd 131 8.9.2021 9:58:04 132 2021, XXIV, 3 Finance w in educa ion le el j and ime is ep esen ed as w* j, , τ ep esen s in la ion a e o e ime . Le ∈ {1, 2, …, T}; T = 480 and indica es a se ial numbe o he sa ing a e. Simula ed expec ed u u e income is calcula ed as ollows: (1) whe e ω* j, deno es he eal annual wage inc ease o he indi idual wi h he app op ia e educa ion j a ime , calcula ed as: (2) Fo mula (2) is aken om he esea ch o Šebo e al. (2015) and Gu enen and Smi h (2014). y* j,x and y* j,x –1 indica e indi idual income o each educa ion le el j and age x in ime and −1, and ep esen s he acc ued labou capi al in o m o he wo k skills and expe ience. Acco ding o Coope (2014) and Gu enen e al. (2015), i an indi idual was unemployed o a ce ain pe iod, his wage does no ollow he o iginal ull-ca ee income unc ion due o he missed skills, wo king habi s, expe ience e c. When he e u ns o he labou ma ke , he can expec o nego ia e he wage lowe han his pee s wi h highe acc ued labou capi al. His nego ia ed wage is expec ed o copy only he in la ion, o in o he wo ds, he is able o nego ia e he wage ha is o he same eal alue as be o e becoming unemployed. Due o exis ence o unemploymen isk, we modi y o mula (1) as ollows: (3) whe e U indica es he employmen s a us in ime . U = 1 indica es ha an indi idual is unemployed, while U = 0 indica es ha an indi idual is employed. When indi idual is employed (U = 0), he o mula is equal o he Fig. 1: Income g ow h and unemploymen a e o 3 ypes o indi iduals Sou ce: own in R EM_3_2021.indd 132 8.9.2021 9:58:05 133 3, XXIV, 2021 Finance o mula p esen ed in o mula (1) and income unc ion in ime depends on in la ion a e as well as on acc ued labou capi al du ing he pe iod. I an indi idual is unemployed (U = 1), his income unc ion in ime changes only due o he in la ion. Le el o unemploymen a es o selec ed indi iduals wi h espec ed educa ion le el and age was ob ained om o icial da abase o S a is ics o ice o Slo ak Republic o qua e ly pe iods om 2008 ill 2018. The g aphs in Fig. 1 p esen he es ima ed income unc ions and unemploymen a es o modeled indi iduals o a de ined educa ion le el and di e en ages. Simula ions, calcula ions and hei g aphical in e p e a ion we e pe o med using R – ee so wa e en i onmen o s a is ical compu ing and g aphics. Fu he , we can easonably expec ha indi iduals con ibu e o he MPS scheme only i hey a e employed (U = 0). In he case o unemploymen (U = 1), indi idual ecei es a empo a y unemploymen bene i , bu hey do no con ibu e in o he pension scheme. In o de o es ima e he le el o con ibu ions, we de ine he wage an indi idual ecei es as w* j, and we can de ine he con ibu ion base as ollows: (4) Thus, he con ibu ions owa d he pension scheme a e ied o he wages paid and can be exp essed in ela i e e ms (con ibu ion a e). Le us ha e manda o y con ibu ions c and olun a y con ibu ions c a, owa d he pension scheme. Manda o y con ibu ion a e is se by law and olun a y con ibu ions a e based on he disc e iona y decision o an indi idual. Fo pu pose o his a icle we conside only manda o y con ibu ions based on cu en law, so he olun a y con ibu ion a e c a, o ∈ {1; 480} = 0. The manda o y con ibu ion a e c de ined o Slo ak pension scheme o ime is as ollows: c o ∈ {1; 12} = 4.50%; c o ∈ {13; 24} = 4.75%; c o ∈ {25; 36} = 5.00%; c o ∈ {37; 48} = 5.25%; c o ∈ {49; 60} = 5.50%; c o ∈ {61; 72} = 5.75%; c o ∈ {73; 480} = 6.00%. Amoun o g oss con ibu ions payed by indi idual in absolu e e ms (Cj, ) is calcula ed as ollows: (5) Fu he , we ha e o ac o in he ee policy applied o he pension scheme. The con ibu ion ee φ in Slo ak pension scheme is equal o 1.25%, ou o which 1% o con ibu ions cj, is paid o he pension asse managemen company and emaining 0.25% o he Social Insu ance Company, which adminis a es he manda o y con ibu ions. Ne con ibu ion is calcula ed as ollows: (6) Pension asse managemen companies apply wo addi ional ees – managemen ee and a pe o mance ee. P ocess o ee implemen a ion is p esen ed by Meša o á e al. (2015) whe e hey ans o med g oss e u ns s, and b, in o ne e u ns * s, and * b, as ollows: (7) (8) whe e F M ep esen s mon hly managemen ee. The managemen ee cha ged by pension asse managemen company is applied on asse s unde managemen . Le el o annual managemen ee is 0.3% p.a., so he mon hly managemen ee can be calcula ed as ollows: (9) F V ep esen s he pe o mance ee, applied by an in es men manage o gene a ing posi i e e u ns. Acco ding o he Slo ak law, he pe o mance ee can be cha ged only i he pension und closing p ice (P ) eaches new highs (High-Wa e -Ma k P inciple acco ding o Shin e al., 2017). Pe o mance ee is se a 10% o he di e ence be ween new and old highs eached du ing he las 36 mon hs (3 yea s). Pe o mance ee can be calcula ed as ollows: (10) EM_3_2021.indd 133 8.9.2021 9:58:05 134 2021, XXIV, 3 Finance Many di e en simula ion app oaches can be ound in he li e a u e. The mos popula me hod is he Mon e Ca lo me hod wi h he bes i dis ibu ion (Rubins ein & K oese, 2007; Wie sema, 2008; Vaja gah & Shoghi, 2015). This app oach allows us o c ea e basically unlimi ed amoun o simula ions o almos any inancial ins umen wi h su icien ime se ies. Disad an age o his me hod is ha hey do no main ain ela ions among inancial ins umen e u ns o mac oeconomic a iables. I we wan o main ain a ela ionship be ween a iables, we could use copula unc ion wi h Mon e Ca lo simula ion me hod. I is compu a ionally and nume ically e y di icul me hod ( he di icul y inc eases wi h he numbe o simula ed pa ame e s). The simula ion me hod ha o e comes he disad an age o he Mon e Ca lo me hod and he e o e used in his a icle is called esampling. The pu pose o his me hod is o use a long his o ical ime se ies o a ious pa ame e s and simula ed he expec ed u u e pa hs wi hou des oying he ela ions among he pa ame e s. The eason why we decided o use his app oach is ha in ou model we could po en ially wo k wi h many di e en mac oeconomics indica o s as well as many di e en inancial ins umen s, so he combina ion o pa ame e s is unlimi ed. We mus choose one pa ame e which will de ine he size o he blocks. In ou model, we wo k wi h wo asse classes (equi ies and bonds) and supplemen he da a wi h he in la ion. This me hod is desc ibed in de ail by Šebo e al. (2017), Balco e al. (2018), and Mešťan e al. (2018, 2021). Resampling me hod wo ks wi h almos 100 yea s-long block o his o ical inancial da a se ies ( om Janua y 1919 o Sep embe 2018) consis ing o : Equi y e u ns ep esen ed by mon hly his o ic e u ns (di idends included) o Dow Jones Indus ial A e age 30 (DJIA 30) index since Janua y 1919 un il Decembe 2001, and since Janua y 2002 un il Sep embe 2018 we use mon hly e u ns o ETF DIA which is he exchange aded inancial ins umen designed o copy DJIA30 index pe o mance. Bond e u ns ep esen ed by mon hly his o ic e u ns o 7–10 US easu y bond (cons an ma u i y) om Janua y 1919 o Decembe 2001, and om Janua y 2002 o Sep embe 2018 we use mon hly e u ns o ETF IEF which copies he US easu y bonds wi h 7–10 yea s du a ion. In la ion a e ep esen ed by mon hly changes in US cus ome p ice index (CPI) since Janua y 1919 un il Sep embe 2018. All da ase s desc ibed abo e ha e been ex ac ed om he FRED – FED S . Louis da abase. This da ase (called block (B)) consis s o 3 columns ep esen ed by mon hly in la ion changes, equi y and bond mon hly e u ns o a gi en pe iod. We di ide his o iginal block o da a in o 36 sho e blocks o da a based on he business cycle (expansion, con ac ion) using he Na ional Bu eau o Economic Resea ch me hodology, which p o ides in o ma ion on US Business Cycle and Expansions and Con ac ions. We ge 18 expansion blocks (BG) and 18 con ac ion blocks (BD). Then we s a gene a ing 480-mon hs (40-yea ) long blocks con aining mon hly e u ns o equi ies, bonds and in la ion. Combining expansion and con ac ion blocks, we ge 1,000 new da a se ies o bonds, equi ies and in la ion, which gi es he o al numbe o simula ions. We ma k mon hly o ecas ed e u n o equi ies s, , o bonds as b, and o in la ion a e as τ . Based on he analysis o he pension unds’ po olio s uc u es (Manaze Uspo .sk, 2018), we can easonably expec han almos 99% o he po olios consis om ETFs acking one o mo e equi y and/o bond indices. Fo pu pose o his a icle we will conside ha equi y MPF und will in es 100% o he po olio in o equi ies and bond MPF und will in es 100% o he po olio in bonds. In o de o p esen easonable esul s o simula ions, we p esen h ee scena ios – neu al, op imis ic and pessimis ic. Neu al scena io is ep esen ed by he 50 h pe cen ile o all simula ions esul s, nega i e and posi i e scena io is ep esen ed by he 10 h, espec i ely 90 h, pe cen ile. The e is no speci ic na ional egula ion on he me hodology o simula ion me hods in his scheme. Fo his eason, he pe cen iles ha e been se acco ding o he Slo ak egula ion on Pension Bene i S a emen o supplemen a y pension und p o ide s in supplemen a y pension scheme in Slo akia s a ing om 2019. In o de o calcula e expec ed pension sa ings, we apply ou di e en sa ing s a egies – wo benchma k s a egies and wo li e-cycle s a egies. Benchma k s a egies a e ma ked as S ock (I) and Bond (II) s a egy. EM_3_2021.indd 134 8.9.2021 9:58:06 135 3, XXIV, 2021 Finance Unde he s a egy (I), indi iduals alloca e weI s, = 100% o hei sa ings exclusi ely o he equi ies (bonds weigh s a e weI b, = 0%), unde he s a egy (II), hey alloca e weII b, = 100% o hei sa ings exclusi ely o bonds (equi ies weigh s a e weII s, = 0%). The emaining wo sa ing s a egies, Aging I. (III) and Aging II. (IV), a e based on a dynamic change in he indi idual sa ings alloca ion a io o e he sa ing pe iod. We speak abou so called li e-cycle sa ing s a egies ha use de- isking o e ime depending bo h on he indi idual age o he o e all emaining leng h o sa ing pe iod. The signi icance o li e-cycle sa ing s a egies in he case o long- e m sa ings (including e i emen sa ings) was exp essed by se e al au ho s Me on (2007), Ay es and Nalebu (2008), Basu e al. (2009) o Ay es and Nalebu (2013). Fe nandes (2013) highligh s he impo ance o li e-cycle s a egies as ollows: acco ding o li ecycle s a egies, po olio’s exposu e o isky asse s should decline and in es o s should alloca e mo e capi al o iskless asse s as hey ge olde . We check i ou esul s suppo wo a gumen s behind li ecycle s a egies. The i s pa o he p e ious sen ence claims ha equi ies ou pe o m bonds in he long e m and he second one ha he isk o equi y dec eases in he long e m. Aim o hese s a egies is o educe expec ed isk h ough educing exposu e o iskie asse s on an asse -weigh ed basis o e he li ecycle, dec ease po en ial ola ili y o sa ings close o he e i emen and deli e highe e u n (accumula ed weal h) o indi idual compa ed o any di e en s a egy. The li e-cycle sa ing s a egy (III) is based on indi idual’s cu en age and ollow he simple equi y alloca ion ule ‘100 − age’. As he age is exp essed in mon hs (no yea s), equi ies alloca ion a io is calcula ed as ollows: (11) and espec i e bond alloca ion a io is calcu la- ed as ollows: (12) Second li e-cycle sa ing s a egy (IV) is based on he leng h o a emaining sa ing pe iod, no on he age o an indi idual. In ou case, he de- isking is ealized du ing he sa ing ho izon. The equi y alloca ion a io is exp essed as ollows: (13) Fig. 2: Leng h o economic cycles om Janua y 1919 o Sep embe 2018 Sou ce: own based on da a om NBER, FRED, Thomson Reu e s Eikon, Mo nings a Di ec and Finance Yahoo EM_3_2021.indd 135 8.9.2021 9:58:06 136 2021, XXIV, 3 Finance and espec i e bond alloca ion a io is calcula- ed as ollows: (14) In o de o espec legal es ic ions on equi y alloca ion in Slo ak pension scheme, we ha e implemen ed he mechanism limi s he equi y alloca ion based on ollowing ules: (15) The alue o sa ings a he end o sa ing pe iod o speci ic sa ing s a egy is ep esen ed by Si j,T , whe e Cj, is explained by o mula (5), can be calcula ed as ollows: (16) and i indica es a se ial numbe o sa ing s a egy whe e i ∈ {I, II, III, IV}. We assume ha new con ibu ions Cj, a e in es ed a he beginning o he each sa ing pe iod ( ). I means, ha he i s con ibu ion is in es ed o a pe iod o 480 mon hs, second con ibu ion is in es ed 479 mon hs and he las one is in es ed only o 1 mon h. Cu en egula ion on Pension Bene i S a emen in Slo akia uses o mula (12) wi h T – ins ead o T – + 1. Using T – app oach compa ed o he T – + 1 app oach logically sligh ly unde es ima e he inal alue o sa ings. Based on he abo e-men ioned me hodology, we a emp o answe he ollowing scien i ic ques ions: Which sa ing s a egy deli e highe e u ns o accumula ed weal h in he end o he sa ing pe iod? Does li e-cycle sa ing s a egies dec ease po en ial isk/ ola ili y a he end o sa ing pe iod and deli e highe sa ing pe o mance han he benchma k s a egies? How does he exis ence o unemploymen a ec he inal alue o sa ings o modeled indi iduals? Final me hodological pa ocuses on he e alua ion o achie ed esul s and should p o ide he solid g ound o he discussion pa . The i s e alua ion indica o is he sa ings pe o mance SPi j,T o each indi idual j and each sa ing s a egy i. I can be iewed as a a io o inal sa ings and paid con ibu ions. Sa ings pe o mance indica o , as p esen ed by Šebo e al. (2017) and Mešťan e al. (2021), is calcula ed as ollows: (17) Second indica o (used by Kiliano á e al., 2006; and la e Meliche čík e al., 2015) is he mon hly e i emen indica o (MRIi j,T), which indica es he numbe o mon hs du ing which an indi idual j will ecei e pension o each s a egy i which is equal o his las p e- e i emen wage. Mon hly e i emen indica o has an in e es ing in e p e a ion alue, as i allows an indi idual o modi y his consump ion beha iou based on expec ed mon hly pension bene i s. I he desi ed indi idual eplacemen a io is applied, he indica o can be di ided by he desi ed eplacemen a io and i p o ides he numbe o mon hs, ha he inal pension po can co e a ce ain eplacemen a io o he las income o an indi idual. MRIi j,T could be calcula ed as ollows: (18) Thi d indica o is called indi idual eplacemen a io (IRRi j,T). This a io old us a io be ween he indi idual las wage in ime o e i emen and expec ed pension bene i . In op imal case, his a io should be 1 o 100% (o i we mul iply his a io by 100). I his a io is equal 1.0, he pension bene i is equaled as hei las wage be o e e i emen and hei s anda ds o li ing will no dec ease. Bu i his a io is 0.5, hen i means ha an indi idual will ha e esou ces o co e only hal wha he could a o d om his las pay. We calcula e i as ollows: (19) EM_3_2021.indd 136 8.9.2021 9:58:07 143 3, XXIV, 2021 Finance (III) as well as Aging II. (IV). Due o he ela i ely low unemploymen isk o an indi idual wi h he mas e ’s deg ee (see he Fig. 1), he simula ion esul s unde he ull employmen and unde he exis ence o unemploymen isk deli e ed almos simila esul s (see Tab. 4). Unlike he p e ious wo indi iduals wi h lowe educa ion le els, an indi idual wi h a mas e ’s deg ee could ace he unemploymen du a ion o only 21 mon hs, which is less han 2 yea s o e he whole wo king ca ee . As can be seen in Fig. 1, an indi idual wi h a mas e ’s deg ee could ace he highes unemploymen isk (almos 30%) only du ing he i s 1–2 yea s a e g adua ion. La e in he ca ee , he unemploymen isk alls signi ican ly, which gi es he oppo uni y o he pension po o ise s eadily wi h no signi ican in e up ion o e he emaining wo king ca ee as he unemploymen a e o he emaining age coho s dec eases and oscilla es a ound 5%. Tab. 4 p esen s he esul s o indica o s o each s a egy. We obse e simila dis ibu ion o sa ings pe o mance simula ions as in he p e ious wo educa ional coho s. As he e a e no majo in e up ions in he con ibu ions, he indica o s o eplacemen a io as well as MRI a e on a e age highe compa ed o he lowe educa ed indi iduals. We e e o he Appendix 3 o mo e de ailed esul s o each analyzed indica o . I should be no ed, ha he e is a hand ul o esea ches in es iga ing pension sa ing p ocess unde a ious isk ac o s, including unemploymen . Howe e , mos o he au ho s ac o in he e ec o unemploymen , bu ocus ei he on compa ing sa ing and/o in es men s a egies wi hin DC schemes (EIOPA, 2020; Šebo e al., 2017, 2015; Wang e al., 2017; Fe nandes, 2013; Meliche čík e al., 2015; Basu e al., 2009) o he e ec o unemploymen on li e-cycle income p ocesses (Buki e al., 2018; Galdeano & Tu unen, 2005; Gu enen, 2009; Gu enen & Smi h, 2014; Gu enen e al., 2015; Ka z & Mu phy, 1992). The e is no s aigh o wa d esea ch ha would analyze he impac o educa ion-speci ic unemploymen Fig. 5: Sa ing pe o mance dis ibu ion o each sa ing s a egy wi hou and wi h he unemploymen isk o an indi idual wi h mas e ’s deg ee educa ion le el Sou ce: own in R EM_3_2021.indd 143 8.9.2021 9:58:09 144 2021, XXIV, 3 Finance U = 0 U = 1 U = 0 – U = 1 U = 1/U0 – 1 Con ibu ions ∑T =1 Cj, 110,493.03€ (33,512.97€)* 107,763.60€ (32,738.60€)* −2,569.30€ (−800.39€)* −2.39% Las wage w* j,T 5,749.10€ (1,722.42€) 5,615.91€ (1,686.39€) −113.54€ (−36.03€) −2.09% Mon hs o unemploymen – 21 (4.46)** – – S ock (S a egy I) Sa ing Si j,T 332,114.25€ (99,684.43€)* 311,421.26€ (93,490.40€)* −19,351.24€ (−5,863.50€)* −6.09% Pension bene i PBi j,T 1,323.59€ (397.28€)* 1,241.12€ (372.59€)* −77,12€ (−23.37€)* −6.09% Sa ing pe o mance SPi j,T 2.05 (1.56)** 1.93 (1.50)** −0.11 −3.77% IRRi j,T 0.23 (0.12)** 0.22 (0.12)** −0.01 −4.06% MRIi j,T 57.87 (31.31)** 55.46 (30.04)** −2.29 −4.06% Unemploymen e ec UEi j,T –596.53€ (363,24€)** – – Bond (S a egy II) Sa ing Si j,T 231,200.12€ (70,167.32€)* 217,229.53€ (65,900.40€)* −13,781.01€ (−4,231.60€)* −6.07% Pension bene i PBi j,T 921.41€ (279.64€)* 865.73€ (262.64€)* −54.92€ (−16.86€)* −6.07% Sa ing pe o mance SPi j,T 1.08 (0.46)** 0.99 (0.44)** −0.08 −3.75% IRRi j,T 0.16 (0.04)** 0.15 (0.04)** −0.01 −4.04% MRIi j,T 40.74 (10.28)** 39.07 (9.88)** −1.64 −4.04% Unemploymen e ec UEi j,T –415.04€ (138.09€)** – – Aging I. (S a egy III) Sa ing Si j,T 278,715.33€ (85,087.01€)* 261,172.90€ (79,992.50€)* −16,647.95€ (−5,136.70€)* −6.08% Pension bene i PBi j,T 1,110.77€ (339.10€)* 1,040.86€ (318.80 €)* −66.35€ (−20.47€)* −6.08% Sa ing pe o mance SPi j,T 1.56 (0.80)** 1.46 (0.77)** −0.10 −3.77% IRRi j,T 0.20 (0.06)** 0.19 (0.06)** −0.01 −4.06% MRIi j,T 49.4 (16.23)** 47.46 (15.58)** −2.00 −4.06% Unemploymen e ec UEi j,T –509.04€ (213.42€)** – – Tab. 4: A e age esul s o each s a egy o an indi idual wi h mas e ’s deg ee educa ion le el – Pa 1 EM_3_2021.indd 144 8.9.2021 9:58:09 145 3, XXIV, 2021 Finance on he e minal alue o pension sa ings and hus ou pape p o ides mo e insigh in o he u u e esea ch in he a ea o sea ching o an op imal sa ing s a egy unde he exis ence o unemploymen o agmen ed con ibu ions unde mode n employmen con ac s ( eelance s, pa - ime jobs, e c). Conclusion The aim o he pape was o show, on he example o h ee indi iduals wi h di e en educa ion le els, he expec ed pe o mance o applying wo s a egies using a passi e app oach o sa ing and in es ing (S ock (I) and Bond (II) and wo li e-cycle s a egies (Aging I. (III) and Aging II. (IV)), which a e based on a dynamic de e mina ion o he sa ings a io be ween sha es and bonds o e ime. Only ew au ho s ha e analyzed he impac o unemploymen on he le el o sa ings unde a ious in es men s a egies. Ou app oach en iches he exis ing esea ch by es ima ing he expec ed li e-cycle income and unemploymen ajec o ies o h ee di e en educa ional and income coho s. The i s educa ional coho is ep esen ed by an indi idual wi h an elemen a y educa ion, who o e he li e-cycle ecei es he minimum wage, which is close o 60% o an a e age wage, and is exposed o he high p obabili ies o being unemployed o e he wo king ca ee . The second indi idual is ep esen ed by a high school educa ion and his li e-cycle income s a s below he a e age wage, while du ing he p oduc i i y peak eaches a highe wage han he economy a e age and la e in a ca ee p e e s job s abili y and hus accep lowe inc eases o wages. O e all, du ing he en i e wo king ca ee , his wage s ood a he a e age. The las indi idual holds he mas e ’s deg ee, while his li e-cycle income is on a e age a 1.25 he a e age wage. Again, his wage s a s below he a e age and has a s eepe g ow h du ing he i s wo hi ds o his ca ee . La e on, he p e e s job s abili y and accep s lowe wage inc eases. Bo h highe educa ion le el indi iduals ace lowe unemploymen isks o e he li e-cycle, which u ned in o smalle di e ences in he sa ings pe o mance o bo h scena ios (wi h and wi hou unemploymen isk). We ha e o mula ed h ee esea ch ques ions and ollowing conclusions can be d awn based on he pe o med simula ion and esea ch. O he 4 selec ed s a egies, an indi idual, ega dless o his/he educa ion, can expec he highes pension po by applying he S ock (I) s a egy ha in es s all con ibu ions in o he equi y und. In ui i ely and in he line wi h many p e ious pape s, his isky s a egy deli e s high dispe sion o expec ed e u ns. Li e-cycle s a egies, Aging I. (III) and Aging II. (IV), a e a comp omise be ween he pe o mance and associa ed down-side isk ep esen ed by he s anda d de ia ion o e u ns. These s a egies equi e an ac i e U = 0 U = 1 U = 0 – U = 1 U = 1/U0 – 1 Aging II. (S a egy IV) Sa ing Si j,T 270,849.33€ (80,160.78€)* 254,105.97€ (75,124.50€)* −16,011.48€ (−4,840.50€)* −6.09% Pension bene i PBi j,T 1,079.43€ (319.47€)* 1,012.70€ (299.40€)* −63.81€ (−19.29€)* −6.09% Sa ing pe o mance SPi j,T 1.37 (0.67)** 1.28 (0.64)** −0.09 −3.78% IRRi j,T 0.19 (0.06)** 0.18 (0.05)** −0.01 −4.07% MRIi j,T 46.54 (14.32)** 44.62 (13.73)** −1.89 −4.07% Unemploymen e ec UEi j,T –490.17€ (193.47€)** – – Sou ce: own in R No e: * p esen ed in eal e ms (discoun ed by in la ion); ** ep esen s a s anda d de ia ion (S dDe ) om he a e age. Tab. 4: A e age esul s o each s a egy o an indi idual wi h mas e ’s deg ee educa ion le el – Pa 2 EM_3_2021.indd 145 8.9.2021 9:58:09 146 2021, XXIV, 3 Finance app oach, howe e he ac i i y is equi ed on an annual basis. A sligh ly highe pe o mance o all h ee indi iduals was achie ed by applying he Aging I. (III) s a egy compa ed o he Aging II. (IV) s a egy. The ad an age o li e- cycle s a egies is ha hey a e less agg essi e wi h signi ican ly less dispe sion o e u ns. The lowes pe o mance has been obse ed by applying he Bond (II) s a egy, which uses a passi e alloca ion o con ibu ions exclusi ely o he leas ola ile inancial ins umen s such as bonds. Li e-cycle s a egies ailed o p o ide a single indi idual wi h a highe pe o mance han he S ock (I) s a egy, bu bo h ha e achie ed highe pe o mance han he second Bond (II) s a egy. His og ams o pe o mance dis ibu ion a he end o a sa ing ho izon p o ides he e idence ha he li e-cycle s a egies b ing less ola ili y o an indi idual han he S ock (I) s a egy, while he Bond (II) s a egy is he leas ola ile s a egy. Looking a he esul s o all he s a egies applied o all h ee indi iduals, one can obse e he igh skewed dis ibu ion, which indica es ha in all s a egies, an indi idual can expec below a e age esul s wi h a chance o achie ing abno mal sa ings pe o mance in a ew (ex emes), cases especially o S ock (I) s a egy. The hi d and pe haps he mos aluable ques ion, we ied o answe , is how he isk o unemploymen a ec s he accumula ed alue o sa ing o indi iduals wi h di e en li e-cycle income pa hs. Based on he esul s o ou model, we can conclude ha he impac o unemploymen is he g ea e he longe an indi idual is unemployed. Howe e , he impac is g ea e when he unemploymen occu s a he beginning o he wo king ca ee . This is due o he los e ec o compound in e es , which is in line wi h many p e ious esea ch indings. As he unemploymen isk is U-shaped o e he wo king ca ee , we can expec di ec nonlinea ela ion be ween he inal alue o sa ings and he leng h o unemploymen . When ying o unde s and he impac o unemploymen isk on he inal alue o sa ings, one should ca e ully conside he pe iods o wo king ca ee , when unemploymen occu s. I a pe son is unemployed a he beginning o he sa ing ho izon, he does no con ibu e o he pension sys em and he e o e he loses he compound in e es e ec on ini ial con ibu ions e en i he alue o ini ial con ibu ions is small due o he lowe wage a he beginning o he wo king ca ee . The impac o unemploymen on inal alue o sa ings dec eases when he unemploymen isk occu s la e in he ca ee . I indi iduals con ibu e egula ly o 30 yea s, especially o e he las 10 yea s, and would ha e been unemployed o some ime, hen his would ha e had a signi ican ly lowe impac on his inal alue o sa ings han he non-con ibu ion pe iod ha occu s ea ly in his ca ee . Howe e , we ealize ha he pape has no speci ically ocused on he impac o unemploymen wi h ega d o he pe iod o unemploymen , and he e o e we lea e his in e es ing ques ion open o u he esea ch. 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