Attila the Hun and the Failure of the Divide et impera Roman Policy
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Attila the Hun and the Failure of the Divide et impera Roman Policy Oto Mestek ABSTRACT Throughout the whole existence of their Empire, the Romans used the divide et impera polity against the European barbarians. The Romans tried to prevent the establishment of larger and more powerful political entities which could endanger them. Simultaneously, they supported rivalry amongst the tribal chieftains and provided the friendly ones with gold and goods. The arrival of the Huns into Europe did not initially bring any change to this international system. Since the 420s the Huns unified their own tribe and created close alliances with other tribes in Middle and Eastern Europe. This alliance had at last the military power to clash with the Romans and disrupt Roman international order across Europe. Because the Hunnic military power was not sufficient, their state was more of atribal confederacy than ahierarchical and tightly controlled empire. The Hunnic Empire was also ashort-termed affair limited to Attila’s life. KEYWORDS Attila the Hun, Huns, barbarians, Migration Period, Barbarian Invasions, Later Roman Empire, Germanic peoples, Priscus of Panion, late antiquity It is not entirely clear who said divide et impera— divide and rule. Usually, it is attributed to the Roman politician Gaius Julius Caesar, but there is no mention of this phrase in his Commentario de Bello Gallico or in his Life written by Plutarch. According to other opinions, the author of this quote was Macedonian ruler Philippos II (382–336BC), father of the famous Alexander the Great, or French king Louis XI (1423–1483) who faced the growing power of the House of Habsburg. This political principle appeared in the works of late Italian authors like Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) in his Dell’Arte della Guerra and later satirist Trajano Boccalini (1556–1613). Th divide et impera strategy of lies in creating internal division between foreign parties, blocking the possibility of forming larger unions and alliances, direct dealings with smaller units on the other side and ignoring their main government and encouraging mistrust, jealousy, and competition within foreign elites. This strategy serves to conquer enemy lands, helps to control the subjugated territories, or is simply used in everyday dealings with foreign political entities. OPEN ACCESS
44 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2022 The Romans used this policy when dealing with European barbarians across limes1 at rivers of the Danube and the Rhine. In Africa, the desert Berber did not pose such athreat as the Celtic and Germanic people in Europe. Berber tribes occasionally raided Roman territory and since the second century AD, the Roman province of Africa was guarded by afortified defensive structure called Fossatum Africae, similar to the Hadrian’s Wall in Britain. The Parthian Empire and later the Persian Empire under the Sasanian dynasty were located in the East. These two states were the only empires equivalent to the Roman one. The armed conflicts between these states were common and frequent, although neither side could claim dominance over the other. It would be amistake to consider the tribes from the European Barbaricum as apotential threat to the Roman Empire. Throughout its existence, the Empire maintained military superiority and dominance over the barbarians. However, the tribes of Europe could cause amajor setback to the Roman expansionist policy. The most famous example is the Roman catastrophic defeat by the Germanic tribes in 9AD in the battle of the Teutoburg Forest. As other examples, we could mention the destruction of the army of Marcus Lollius by tribes of Usipeti and Sicambri in 16BC and the Dacian victory over the Roman expedition sent against them by the emperor Domitian in 86 AD. For the Romans, the disunity of their enemies was one of the key elements of their imperial ideology. It gave them the feeling of superiority of their civic society over the tribal society of the barbarians beyond the limes. Simultaneously it gave the Romans hope, that their Empire would not be defeated by their enemies, who were fighting with each other at the same time as they were fighting the Romans. This idea can be found, for example, in the work of Tacitus. In his Germania he wrote that the Germanic people were Rome’s most dangerous enemies even more dangerous than the Kingdom of Arsacids (Parthia) but their mutual battles and struggles hold them back and the discord between Germanic tribes was Rome’s greatest advantage.2 The same motives can be found in Roman literature: from Caesar’s description of his campaigns against the Gallic tribes to the early Byzantine authors who mentioned new enemies of the Empire— the Slavic people. Although this was amotive of aclassical Roman author, the image of quarrelsome and still fighting barbarians displays the reality of these tribes. Several contemporary historians point out that the idea of Germanic unity or at least the idea of common identity among these people was non-existent in the age of classical antiquity and it is just amere conception of some 19th-century authors.3 1 For more informations about Roman frontier and limes see H.ELTON, Frontiers of the Roman Empire, London 1996; W.MOSCHEK, Der Limes: Grenze des Imperium Romanum, Darmstadt 2010; C.R.WHITTAKER, Frontiers of the Roman Empire: ASocial and Economic Study, London 1994. 2 TACITUS, Germania, in: P.Cornelii Taciti Libri qui supersunt: Germania, Agricola, Dialogus de oratoribus, Bibliotheca Teubneriana, Tom. II, Fasc, 2, (ed.) E.KOESTRMANN, Leipzig 1970, 33 and 37. 3 W.GOFFART, Barbarian Tides, Philadelphia 2006, pp.40–50; G.HALSALL, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, 376–568, Cambridge 2007, p.27. OPEN ACCESS
OTO MESTEK 45 DIVIDE ET IMPERA IN ROMAN PRACTICE Besides all that the divide et impera strategy was acornerstone of Roman policy at their European frontier. Caesar proceeded in the spirit of this doctrine during his conquest of Gaul. He formed alliances with individual Gallic tribes and supported them against their traditional local rivals and he slowly spread Roman influence over Gaul through that. The first Roman emperor Augustus acted similarly after his defeat at the battle of Teutoburg Forest. After the battle, two larger units were formed in Germania, one along the Rhine River led by chieftain Arminius of the Cherusci tribe and the second one on the bank of the Danube led by Marobud of the Marcomanni tribe. Augustus accelerated their rivalry which led to the war between the Marcomanni and Cherusci tribes and he supported their rebellious and splinter factions. The imperial diplomacy led to the dissolution of both Germanic confederacies and to the creation of several smaller tribal client kingdoms. During the reign of the emperor Marcus Aurelius, the Germanic and Sarmatian tribes on the middle Danube began to cooperate and they launched aseries of raids on Roman territory reaching the Italian city of Aquileia. These events started the Marcomannic wars lasting from 166 until 180 AD. In 171 the emperor Marcus Aurelius negotiated aseparate peace with the Quadi and allied with the Vandalic tribes of Astingi and Lacringi as part of the preparation for the upcoming campaign against the Marcomanni. He thereby isolated the Marcommani from their former allies and then he attacked them in 172. In the following year, the Quadi were defeated by the Romans.4 Constantine the Great followed this strategy when dealing with the Gothic tribes of Thervingi expansion. The Goths living on the plains north of the Lower Danube (today’s Romania) were stopped after they raided the territory of the Empire at the end of the third century, and they began to expand westward. There they encountered the Sarmatian tribes living around the Tisza River, which were in the Roman sphere of influence. In 332 Constantine’s Roman army supported the Sarmatians against the Gothic attackers and repelled their invasion. However, in 334 Constantine attacked these Sarmatian tribes which in his previous campaign he had saved from the Gothic threat.5 Constantine pursued two goals through these actions. Firstly, he unsuccess4 DIO CASSIUS, Historia Romana, in: Dioʼs Roman History III, LCL No.53, (ed.) E.CARY, London 1925, 72, 11–12. More about Marcomannic Wars and the reign of Marcus Aurelius see F.MCLYNN, Marcus Aurelius: ALife, Cambridge 2009; A.BIRLEY, Marcus Aurelius: ABiography, New York 2001; P.KOVÁCS, Marcus Aurelius’ Rain Miracle and the Marcomannic Wars, Leiden 2009; H.FRIESINGER— J.TEJRAL— A.STUPPNER, Markomannenkrige: Ursachen und Wirkungen, Wien 1993. 5 EUSEBIOS, Vita Constantini, in: Eusebius Werke 1. Ubër das Leben Constantins, Constantins Rede and die heilige Versammlung, GCS, (ed.) I.HEIKEL, Leipzig 1902, I, 8; Anonymus Valesianus pars prior, in: Chronica minora saec. IV V.VI VII. (I), MGH, Auct. ant. IX, (ed.) T.MOMMSEN, Berlin 1892, 32; and Consularia Constantinopolitana, in: Chronica minora saec. IV V.VI VII. (I), MGH, Auct. ant. IX, (ed.) T.MOMMSEN, Berlin 1892, 332.Further reading about Constantine the Great’s campaigns against Goths and Sarmatians: M.KULIKOWSKI, Constantine and the Northern Barbarians, in: The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Constantine, Cambridge 2006, pp.347–369; M.KULIKOWSKI, Rome’s Gothic Wars, Cambridge 2007, pp.81–86; H.WOLFRAM, Geschichte der Goten, München 1983, pp.46–48. OPEN ACCESS
46 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2022 fully dreamed of restoration of the abandoned Roman province of Dacia north of the Danube and secondly, he tried to prevent every tribe from gaining adominant position in the Barbaricum. His son Constantius II continued this policy and he took advantage not only of the rivalry between the individual tribes but also of the social tensions within the tribes. In 357–358, he campaigned against the Sarmatians between the Danube and the Tisza rivers whereas he supported aSarmatian aristocratic group called Agaragantes in their fight against an inferior subordinated population of the Limigantes.6 Constantius II showed afascinating use of the divide et impere strategy. When in 360 the Gallic armies revolted against Constantius II and elevated his cousin Julian to the position of Augustus, he secretly incited Alemannic king Vadomorius, aformer Roman enemy, to launch raids on the Roman territory. It should have slowed down Julian’s advance to the east against ConstantiusII.7 We can say that the main Roman objective in their policy toward the Germanic people in the Barbaricum was an effort to prevent the appearance of larger political entities and the creation of afunctional and dangerous Germanic tribal leaders’ alliance. The Romans were seemingly terrified of the possibility of larger barbarian coalitions. Historian Ammianus Marcellinus witnessed this. In 367 aseries of violence and plunder spread all over Roman Britain. The Picts from Scotland, the tribes of Scotti and Attecoti from Ireland, the Germanic Franks and the Saxons from the northern coast of Europe and even the Roman deserters were involved in these raids.8 It was more likely acoincidence that several barbarian groups took advantage of the weakening of the Roman province. From Ammianus’ point of view, it was adangerous coalition of Rome’s enemies and he called it barbarica conspiratione— ‘The Great Conspiracyʼ. According to Ammianus, the raiders were even supported by the local 6 AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS, Res gestae, in: Ammiani Marcellini Rerum gestarum libri qui supersunt, Bibliotheca Teubneriana, Vol. II, (ed.) W.SEYFARTH, Stuttgart— Leipzig 1999, XVII, 12–13. The exact nature of the relationship between Agaragantes and Limigantes is unknown. After the war, Constantius II relocated some parts of Agaragantes on Roman soil and Limigantes were pushed to the other bank of the Tisza. Further readings: J.SZIDAT, Der Feldzug Constantius’ II. an der mittleren Donau im Jahre 358 n. Chr., in: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 21, H.4, 1972, pp.712–720; P.BARCELÓ, Constantius II. und die Limiganten: Einige Präzisierungen zu Amm. Marc. XIX 11, in: Klio, Vol.74, 1992, pp.422–430; P.KOVÁCS, The literary sources of Constantius II’s war against the Sarmatians, in: Mensa rotunda epigraphica Napocensis, Cluj-Napoca 2016, pp.161–192. 7 AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS, Res gestae, XXI, 3–4. Julian learned of the dealings between Vadomarius and Constantius II through the capture of their envoys. Vadomarius was subsequently captured and imprisoned in Hispania. Emperor Julian’s wars against Alemmanni are described in T.ZOTS, Die Alemannen um die Mitte des 4.Jahrhunderts nach dem Zeugnis des Ammianus Marcellinus, in: D.GEUENICh (ed.) Die Franken und die Alemannen bis zur “Schlacht bei Zülpich” (496/97), Berlin 1998, pp.384–406; J.DRINKWATER, The Alamanni and Rome 213–496, Oxford 2007, pp.217–265; D.WOODS, Ammianus Marcellinus and the “Rex Alamannorum Vadomarius”, in: Mnemosyne, Vol.53, Fasc. 6, 2000, pp.690–710; K.BRINGMANN, Kaiser Julian, Darmstadt 2004, pp.52–76. 8 AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS, Res gestae, XXVII, 8. OPEN ACCESS
OTO MESTEK 47 Roman secret service areani.9 It seemed obvious that these events in Britain created substantial concerns across the Empire and they were exaggerated and mystified. Emperors Augustus and Tiberius successfully caused the dissolution of the Cher usci tribal confederation led by Arminius and the Marcomanni one led by Marobud. 150 years later, the emperor Marcus Aurelius eliminated the barbarian coalition formed by the Marcomannic king Ballomar. In 106 his predecessor Emperor Trajan conquered the kingdom of Dacia. Thus perished the last centralized monarchy north of the Danube. Korean-Australian scholar Hyun Jin Kim argues that the tribal polities of the Germanic people were decentralised and unstable in the fourth century and that they lived in merely chaotically organised warbands. The hierarchized and centralised creation of the Germanic kingdoms began after their closer encounter with steppe nomadic people such as Sarmatians, Alans and especially Huns.10 It could be conceivable that the absence of an organized and centralized monarchy, regardless of the presence of such apolitical establishment in the Hunnic society, was caused by Roman influence and interventions. Ido not want to accuse the Romans of some advanced social engineering towards the barbarian population in Europe but maintaining status quo in the Barbaricum was always one of Rome’s main interests. While practising the divide et impera strategy used amethod of ‘carrot and stickʼ. The Roman limes were not an insurmountable barrier, they allowed movement in both directions. For example, amber travelled through the Barbaricum to the Roman territory. And vice versa, the Romans supplied barbarian tribes with luxury items, jewellery, wine, and gold. This way they wanted to maintain the cooperation of the barbarian tribes and ensure stability in the border area. In case of the hostility of the neighbouring tribe, the Romans supported their rivals inhabiting remote regions of the Barbaricum. The Roman aid to the Burgundians against the Alemanni and the Gepids (aGermanic tribe living in the Carpathians) against the Goths during the fourth century could be an example of such support. Tribes across the border could make adiplomatic agreement with the Romans. These agreements could form actual alliances, or they could be only prestigious and honorary. In the age of the Republic, it was the socius et amicus populi Romani (ally and friend of the Roman people) title.11 In the early Empire, this old republican designation prevailed but nowadays historians called these dependent rulers ‘client kingsʼ. They were mostly rulers of monarchies in the Middle East, however, kings of the Quadi tribe Vangio and Sido could be included 9 Ibidem., XXVII, 8 and XXVIII, 3. 10 H.J.KIM, The Huns, Rome and the Birth of Europe, Cambridge 2013, pp.50–53; H.J.KIM, The Huns, New York 2016, pp.67–72. Hyun Jin Kim applies some of Peter Heather’s thoughts about the Goths to the Hunnic society, although he is heavily criticized by contemporary scholars for creating a‘Hunno-centric’ version of later Roman history and for exaggerating the Hunnic influence on Europe. 11 More information about the system of allies of the Roman Republic in L.MATTHAEI, On the Classification of Roman Allies, in: The Classical Quaterly, Vol.1, No.2/3, 1907, pp.182–204; M.F.CURSI, International Relationships in the Ancient World, in: Fundamina, Vol.20, 2014, pp.186–195; M.R.CIMMA, Reges socii et amici populi Romani, Milano 1976. There is awork about Roman diplomacy C.EILERS, Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Roman World, Leiden 2009. OPEN ACCESS
48 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2022 among them.12 Atreaty of foedus, which established semi-autonomous military units from barbarian tribes and provided them annual Roman payments, was amatter of business in the fifth century. The relocation of barbarians was another possible option for the Romans. They often settled defeated enemies on Roman soil, dispersing them, placing them under the administration of Roman officials and giving them the laeti or dediticii status.13 The ‘stickʼ example could be the Roman counterattacks reacting to the barbarian raids. These punitive expeditions were in some cases more brutal and destructive than barbarian plunder.14 During the fourth and at the beginning of the fifth century the Romans sustained significant military superiority over the barbarians and in addition to that from an ideological point of view, the Roman leaders needed avictory over aforeign enemy to stabilize the political situation of the Empire. These Roman counterattacks did not stop even during the Migration Period. In 392 or 393 Roman magister militum Arbogast campaigned against the Franks and he crossed the Rhine into the Barbaricum15, he was probably the last Roman commander to do so. Overall, this happened at the time when the Goths had settled in the province of Thracia for several years. In the fifth century, although the initiative was for most of the time in the Roman hands, their attacks were directed against barbarian groups located already in the territory of the Empire. THE HUNS IN EUROPE Initially, it might seem that the arrival of the Huns in Europe would not anyhow change the situation in Europe. Before the year 370, the Huns appeared in the area of the rivers Volga and Don and they subjugated local tribes of Alans, subsequently the defeated Gothic people of Greuthungi in the Pontic steppe. Another victim of the Hunnic advance was the Gothic tribe Thervingi, which was defeated in 375 near the Danaster (Dniester) river.16 The Thervingi then crossed the Danube and sought refuge 12 TACITUS, Annales, in: Tacitus: The Annals, Books 4–6, 11–12, LCL 312, (ed.) J.JACKSON, XII, 30. 13 About laeti and dediticii in: C.J.SIMPSON, Laeti in the Notitia Dignitatum. „Regular“ Soldiers vs. „Soldier-Farmers“, in: Revue belge de philologie et d’historie, tom. 66, fasc. 1, 1988, pp.80–85; R.MATHISEN, Peregrini, Barbari, and Cives Romani: Concepts of Citizenship and the Legal Identity of Barbarians in the Later Roman Empire, in: The American Historical Review, Vol.111, No.4, 2006, pp.1011–1040; H.ELTON, Warfare in Roman Europe, AD 350–425, Oxford 1996, pp.129–132;G. HALSALL, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, pp.152–153; S.WILLLIAMS— G.FRIELL, Theodosius: The Empire at Bay, London 1998, pp.75–90. 14 G.HALSALL, Barbarian Migrations and the Birth of Medieval Europe: From Unity to Diversity, in: P.LÓPEZ QUIROGA (ed.), In tempore Sueborum: el tiempo de los suevos en la Gallaecia (411–585): el primer reino medieval de Occidente: volume de estudios, Ourense 2018, p.16. 15 GREGORY OF TOURS, Libri historiarum Francorum X, in: Gregorii Turonensis Opera, MGH, Script. rerum. Merov. I/1, (ed.) B.KRUSCH, Hannover 1951, II, 9; and H.DESSAU, ILS, Vol. I, Berlin 1892, 790. For date see U.NONN, Die Franken, Stuttgart 2010, p.62; S.WILLLIAMS, G.FRIELL, Theodosius ,p. 126. 16 AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS, Res gestae, XXXI, . 3–4. OPEN ACCESS
OTO MESTEK 49 among the Romans, but this chain of events culminated in acatastrophic Roman defeat and the death of emperor Valens in the battle of Adrianople in 378. The Romans did not face the incursion of eastern nomadic people for the first time. In the times of Caesar and Augustus, the Sarmatian tribes of Iazyges and Roxolani migrated westwards from the Pontic steppes and they came in the area of the Danube River.17 However, these tribes settled on the left bank of the Danube and did not move farther. In 135 large groups of the Alans went through the Caucasus and tried to ransack Roman provinces in Asia Minor but they were defeated by the local Roman governor Flavius Arrian.18 In addition to that, the Huns remained in the area of the Pontic steppe after 375. Therefore, the Romans might not have considered them athreat. The Huns also originally did not bring any disturbances to the Roman system of divide et impera. From the Roman perspective, they were probably seen as areinforcement for this system. Above that, in contrast to the opinion of some historians19, the Huns did not arrive in Europe as one united cooperating group under unified leadership. From our literary sources, we can identify several distinguished Hunnic groups and some of them may or may not be identical to each other. — In the second century, Geographer Claudius Ptolemy recorded the presence of atribe called Χοῦνοι— Chunoi in the region between the rivers of Dnieper and Don.20 They could be the first Hunnic group in Europe after the Chinese destroyed the Xiongnu state (ancestors of Huns) in 91 AD while the majority of their fellow tribesmen remained in the steppes around the Altai Mountains. — Group consisted of the Alpidzuri, Alicidzuri, Itimari, Tuncarsi/Tunsuri and Boisci tribes. Around 370 they lived near Maeotian lake (Sea of Azov) and together with the Alans they became the first objective of the main Hunnic mass westward 17 PLINIUS SECUNDUS, Gaius Naturalis historia, in: C.Plinii Secundi Naturalis Historiae Libri XXXVII, Sammlung Tusculum, (ed.) R.KÖNIG— G.WINKLER, Regensberg 2002, IV, 12 and TACITUS, Historiae, in: Tacitus: Histories, LCL 111, (ed.) C.MOORE, London 1930, I, 79. Readings about arrival of Iazyges and Roxolani to the Roman limes in T.SULIMIRSKY, The Sarmatians, London 1970, pp.133–137; V.BÂRCĂ, Nomads of the Steppes on the Danube Frontier of the Roman Empire in the 1st Century CE. Historical Sketch and Chronological Remarks, in: Dacia: Revue d’archéologie et d’histoire ancienne, vol.57, 2013, pp.99–125; R.BATTY, Rome and the Nomads: The Pontic-Danubian Realm in Antiquity, Oxford 2007, pp.229–236. 18 ARRIAN, Acies contra Alanos, in: Flavius Arrrianus Vol. II, Scripta minora et fragmenta, Bibliotheca Teubneriana, (ed.) A.G.ROOS— G.WIRTH, Leipzig, 2002, 1–31 and DIO CASSIUS, Historia Romana, 69, 15 19 The view that the Huns were united and politically organized already when they came to Europe can be found in the writing of Hungarian archaeologist István Bóna— I.BÓNA, Das Hunnenreich, Stuttgart 2001, pp.9–13, 35. 20 CLAUDIUS PTOLEMY, Geographike, in: Claudii Ptolemaei Geographia, (ed.) K.F.NOBBE, Leipzig 1843, III, 5. This mention in Ptolemy’s map is highly questionable. Hyun Jin Kim believes in the possibility that they were asplinter group of Huns that arrived first in Europe (H.J.KIM, p.66). Quite contrary, according to sinologist O.Maenchen-Helfen there was no relationship between the Chunoi and later Huns and it was the mere coincidental similarity of their names (O.MAENCHEN-HELFEN, The World of the Huns: Studies in Their History and Culture, Berkeley 1973, pp.447–452). OPEN ACCESS
50 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2022 expansion.21 Their names suggest that they were of Turkic origin and were related to the Huns. After their defeat, they retreated westward and settled on the left bank of the lower Danube. They gained permission to relocate to the Roman bank and live in the province of Thracia22. There they were attacked in 422 or 43423 by the main group of the Huns under king Rua. — The Hunnic foederati. This group together with the Alans crossed the Danube River in 37724 and joined the warring Goths. They played apivotal role in the battle of Adrianople in 378. On the Roman soil they, together with the Alans and the Gothic Greuthungi, formed atribal federation which Austrian historian W.Herwig named ‘Dreivölker-Könfedaration’.25 In 380 they were all defeated by emperor Gratian and settled in the provinces of Pannonia Iand Valeria as local military garrisons— foederati. The Alans and the Greuthungi left the Pannonia for Italy and the Hunnic foederati have never been mentioned again. They probably remained in the Pannonian provinces26 until the year 427 when they were expelled from Pannonia.27 — Another Hunnic group which arrived at the Roman border at the Danube river is the one ruled by king Uldin. They appeared at the lower Danube in 400 and in January 401 they defeated arebellious Roman commander Gainas.28 Uldin then allied with aRoman military commander in the West magister militum Stilicho, and in 406 he helped him to defeat ahost of barbarians of king Radagaisus that invaded Italy. As time went on, Uldin broke up his alliance with the Romans and in408 he unsuccessfully attacked the Roman fortress Castra Martis (modern Kulain Bulgaria).29 We know nothing more about Uldin’s fate, though his group operated in 400–410 in the Wallachian Plain. 21 JORDANES, Getica, in: Iordanis Romana et Getica, MGH, Auct. ant. XI, (ed.) T.MOMMSEN, Berlin 1882, 126. 22 PRISCUS, in: R.C.BLOCKLEY, The Fragmentary Classicising Historians of the Later Roman Empire: Eunapius, Olympiodorus, Priscus and Malchus, Liverpool 1983, fr. 2 (Exc. de Leg. Rom. 1). All fragments of Priscus of Panium and Olympiodorus of Thebes are quoted according to the bilingual edition of R.C.BLOCKLEY.This edition used adifferent numbering of the fragments than the older editions of Karl Müller and Ludwig Dindorf. 23 For the date 422 see E.SCHULTHEIS, The Battle of the Catalaunian Fields, AD 451, Barnsley 2019, p.4 and the date 434 is suggested in H.J.KIM, Huyn Jin, The Huns, p.80; I.BÓNA, Das Hunnenreich, p.54. 24 AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS, Res gestae, XXXI, 7,4. 25 H.WOLFRAM, Geschichte der Goten, p.100. 26 H.GRAČANIN, The Huns and South Pannonia, in: Byzantinoslavica, Vol.64, 2006, pp.34–49. 27 MARCELLINUS COMES, Chronicon, in: Chronica minora saec. IV V.VI VII. (II), MGH, Auct. ant. XI, (ed.) T.MOMMSEN, Berlin 1894, 427, 1. This passage is controversial and difficult to interpret because comes Marcellinus wrote that in 427 after 50 years Huns were expelled from Pannonia. However, in his previous text, he never mentioned Huns in Pannonia, so we don’t know about which group of Huns he spoke about and under what circumstances they settled in Pannonia. 28 ZOSIMOS, Nea historia, in: Zosimi comitis et exadvocati fisci Historia nova, Bibliotheca Teubneriana, (ed.) L.MENDELSSOHN, Leipzig 1887, V, 21–22. 29 SOZOMENOS, Historia ecclesiastica, in: Patrologia graeca LXVII, (ed.) J.P.MIGNE, Paris 1864, IX, 5. OPEN ACCESS
OTO MESTEK 51 — In 408 emperor Honorius made an alliance with 10 000 Hunnic warriors to support him in awar against the Gothic ruler Alaric.30 This alliance was made after the murder of magister militum Stilicho and it is unclear which Hunnic group these warriors belonged to. Therefore, they are here listed separately. — Olympiodorus of Thebes mentioned amysterious group of the Huns ruled by kings Donatus and Charaton. In 412 they received an embassy from Constantinople.31 The problem is that we do not know where these Huns lived, they were either settled somewhere in the Pannonian Basin north of the Danube or in the Pontic steppe north of the Black Sea.32 — The main group of the Huns could be addressed as ‘the Attila’s clan33’. After 370 they remained in the Pontic steppe and in 395, they led alarge raid through the Caucasus and ravaged Armenia, Persia and Roman Cappadocia and Syria34. Later they moved westward and settled in the Great Hungarian Plain alongside the Danube. According to recent historians, these Huns arrived in the middle Danube shortly after 42035, but it is possible that could have settled there sooner, sometime after 410. In the 420s they were ruled by two brothers Rua and Octar and thanks to magister militum Flavius Aëtius they gained anew land in the former Roman 30 ZOSIMOS, Nea historia, V, p.50. 31 OLYMPIODORUS, Historiae,in: R.C.BLOCKLEY, The Fragmentary Classicising Historians of the Later Roman Empire: Eunapius, Olympiodorus, Priscus and Malchus, Liverpool 1983, fr. 19 (Bibl. cod. 80). See note 22. For the route of the embassy, see W.TREADGOLD, The Diplomatic Career and Historical Work of Olympiodorus of Thebes, in: The International History Review, Vol.26, No.4, 2004, p.714. 32 Initial discussion is in E.A.THOMPSON, The Huns, Malden 2004, p.34; O.MAENCHENHELFEN, pp.74, 423. For the relationship between Donatus and Charaton, see D.SINOR, The Hun Period, in: The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, Cambridge 1994, p.186; BÓNA, Das Hunnenreich, p.35; P.HEATHER, Der Untergang des Römischen Weltreichs, Reinbek bei Hamburg 2017, p.376; M.KELLY, The End of Empire: Attila the Hun and the Fall of Rome, New York 2010, p.70. 33 Firstly, German scholar B. von Arnim called the European Huns “Attilahunnen” (B. von ARNIM, Bemerkungen zum Hunnischen, in: Zeitschrift für Slavische Philologie, Vol.13, No.1/2, 1936, p.100). This was followed by the eminent scholar on the Hunnic topic O.Maenchen-Helfen who used the term “Attilanic Huns” (O.MAENCHEN-HELFEN, The World of the Huns, p.477). In the sources Priscus had been using the designation ‘βασίλειοι Σκύθοι— Royal Scythians’ (PRISCUS, fr. 11, 2, 600–603 (Exc. de Leg. Rom. 3). However, it cannot be contemporary terminology, because Priscus took over this name from Herodotus according to which Royal Scythians were one of the tribes living in the Pontic steppe in fifth century BC. 34 PRISCUS, fr. 11, 2, 600–603 (Exc. de Leg. Rom. 3). For adetailed description of the Hunnic raid in Asia, see O.MAENCHEN-HELFEN, The World of the Huns, pp.51–59. Contrary to Maenchen-Helfen, E.A.Thompson and Hyun Jin Kim dates this raid to approx. 420 (E.A.THOMPSON, The Huns, p.35 and H.J.KIM, The Huns, Rome and the Birth of Europe, p.54). 35 P.HEATHER, The Huns and the End of the Roman Empire in Western Europe, in: The English Historical Review, Vol.110, No.435, 1995, pp.16–18; I.BÓNA, Das Hunnenreich, p.46; W.GOFFART, Barbarian Tides, pp.76–78. OPEN ACCESS
58 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2022 as the only one in the first half of the fifth century endanger the Romans, similarly the most tremendous barbarian raids in the 260s during the crisis of the third century. We must realize that the barbarian invasions at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries were mostly unsuccessful. Even the groups which penetrated the Roman limes were defeated later like the Goths that crossed the Danube in 376 and were defeated later and settled by the Romans in Thracia in 382 or the barbarians from the Great Rhine crossing in 406 were expelled from Gaul in 409 and escaped in Hispania. In comparison to them, the Huns were repeatedly able to clash with the Roman Imperial army and even if they were defeated, they were always able to launch anew campaign the against Romans. Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear how the Hunnic Empire/Confederacy controlled its internal affairs. For Jordanes this topic was unambiguous. Each tribe under Attila’s command had its own tribal king. The most powerful and influential kings were Ostrogothic king Valamir and Gepid king Ardaric. Attila acted as asupreme commander and leader, and he had the last say. The subordinate rulers served as Attila’s advisers which meant that they were occasionally present at Attila’s court, and they were able to keep some influence over the decision-making process of the Hunnic empire.62 Jordanes probably exaggerated the importance of the Amal dynasty in Hunnic society. In the fragments of Priscus, adifferent situation is described. Priscus with his friend and superior Maximinus visited Attila’s court as the diplomatic envoy of Constantinople in 449. Priscus wrote about the negotiation with Attila, and he mentioned no subordinate Germanic king was present during the negotiations. Although Attila should hold the supreme power amongst the Huns, the envoys had to 62 JORDANES, Getica, 199–201. ‘Inter quos Ostrogotharum praeminebat exercitus Valamire et Theodemire et Videmere germanis ductantibus, ipso etiam rege, cui tunc serviebant, nobilioribus, quia Amalorum generis eos potentia inlustrabat; eratque et Gepidarum agmini innumerabili rex ille famosissimus Ardaricus, qui ob nimiam suam fidelitatem erga Attila eius consiliis intererat. Nam perpendens Attila sagacitate sua, eum et Valamerem, Ostrogotharum regem, super ceteros regulos diligebat. Erat namque Valamir secreti tenax, blandus alloquio, dolis gnarus; Ardaricus fide et consilio, ut diximus, clarus. (…) Reliqua autem, si dici fas est, turba regum diversarumque nationum ductores ac si satellites notibus Attilae attendebant, et ubi oculo annuisset, absque aliqua murmuratione cum timore et tremore unusquisque adstabat, aut certe, quod iussus fuerat, exequebatur. Solus Attila rex omnium regum super omnes et pro omnibus sollicitus erat.’ ‘Amongst them the prominent was the host of Ostrogoths led by brothers Valamir, Theodemir and Vidimir, they were more noble than the king they served, because the might of the Amal family made them illustrious. And with the countless troops of the Gepids there was their most glorious king Ardaric, who thanks to his excessive loyalty to Attila participated on his council meetings. For Attila compared him and Ostrogothic king Valamir in his keen mind and he appreciated them above all other kings. Valamir was good in keeping secrets, flattering speeches and he was skilled in deceptions; Ardaric, as we have said, was famous for his loyalty and wisdom. (…) The rest of the crowd of kings, if we could call them so, and the leaders of various nations were turned to Attila as his attendants, and even when he blinked, every single one of them was standing without murmur and in fear and trembling and was ready to follow his order. Only Attila, the king of all kings, was above all and he was concerned about everyone.’ OPEN ACCESS
OTO MESTEK 59 stay longer at Attila’s court, because the Huns were waiting for Attila’s chief counsellor Onegesius who was at that time fighting with the rebellious Akatziri tribe. Among Attila’s courtiers participating in the negotiations, there were Hunnic noblemen, Attila’s sons and Romans from Pannonia and Noricum. Even Edeko, who later ruled the Sciri, was described by Priscus as Attila’s envoy and bodyguard not as the ruler of this tribe.63 As for the subordinate tribal kings, there are different points of view on them in recent literature. P.Heather states that tribes living further from the Hunnic core area were virtually autonomous.64 Controversial thoughts can be found in the works of Hyun Jin Kim. According to him the tribes related to the Huns much more firmly. The tribal rulers of the Amal dynasty, Edeko, Odoacer and Ardaric were of Hunnic origin and they were installed to their posts by Bleda and Attila thanks to their service to Hunnic kings.65 The kings were probably not participating in the common agenda of the Hunnic court. That explains their absence in the fragments of Priscus. Priscus also mentioned that Attila invited Akatziri King Kuridac to his court, but Kuridac refused to accept the invitation concerned about his own safety.66 Attila probably usually organised the gatherings of subordinate kings in preparation for upcoming campaigns. After all the role of the Hunnic Confederacy was primarily military. Attila’s power over the confederacy consisted in picking up targets of raids and campaigns and in the redistribution of loot and the Roman financial payments between his people. Thus, he could organize punitive attacks against the tribes resisting his commands. It happened in the case of the Akatziri in 449. Attacks against individual tribes could have also facilitated the willingness of other tribes to cooperate with the Huns. Attila also controlled the cash flow of the Roman Empire. This had two main reasons. Firstly, Attila knew that direct subsidies from Constantinople to the individual tribes could be under the condition of resistance against the Huns. Confederacy would thus become another victim of the Roman divide et impera. This is also indicated by Priscus, the revolt of the Akatziri against Attila in 449 was instigated by gifts from emperor TheodosiusII.67 Secondly, the tribes knew that thanks to the growing power of Attila’s Empire they could gain much higher tribute from the Romans, although this tribute would then be redistributed by Attila himself. In 435 according to the treaty negotiated in Margus Attila and Bleda gained an annual tribute of 700 pounds of gold.68 Later, when Attila was at the peak of his power after the campaign of 447, the annual tribute from Constantinople increased to 2 100 pounds of gold and the Huns received an extraordinary payment of 6 000 pounds of gold. The gold from the tribute along with the loot from raids created considerable wealth thanks to which Attila controlled subordinate tribes. Simultaneously with the Hunnic Confederacy formation, apopulation transfer occurred in the first half of the fifth century. The population from all Ponto-Danubian 63 PRISCUS, fr. 11, 2 (Exc. de Leg. Rom. 3). 64 P.HEATHER, The Goths, Oxford 1996, p.113. 65 H.J.KIM, The Huns, pp.56, 59 and 92–112. 66 PRISCUS, fr. 11, 2, 251–255 (Exc. de Leg. Rom. 3). 67 Ibidem, 241–263. 68 Ibidem, fr. 2, (Exc. de Leg. Rom. 1) OPEN ACCESS
60 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2022 regions moved to the area of the middle Danube. Together with the Huns the Goths, Alans and Heruli arrived from the east and the Rugians and Gepids from the north. Historians often argue that the core territory of the Huns was located on the Great Hungarian Plain alongside the Tisza River. According to the story written by Priscus Attila’s court was somewhere near the Tisza in the vicinity of today’s Hungarian town Szeged. That is why, historians suppose that subordinate tribes lived around the Huns, in former Roman Pannonia, in the Carpathians and along the lower Danube. However, newly found archaeological discoveries propose adifferent point of view on the Hunnic society. One of the most significant Hunnic finds are large bronze kettles, which in contrast with weapons and jewellery from the Hunnic period may be associated with the elites of Hunnic ethnic origin.69 These kettles were probably used during Hunnic funeral rites; however, they did not serve as urns, but more probably as pots for preparing funeral meat. New numerous finds of these kettles enabled reinterpret of the Hunnic society and its settlements. Three kettles were discovered in Silesia (in both Czech and Polish Silesia), one was found on the northern bank of the Danube in Iža (Slovakia), four of them were found in the former Roman province Pannonia Valeria, seven kettles were found along the lower Danube in Romania and another three were located on the Moldavan-Ukrainian border along the Dniester.70 The latest find was discovered even in Sanok in Poland on the north side of the Carpathians.71 However, only two of these kettles were found in the Great Hungarian Plain (Ócsa and Törtel), the supposed core area of the Hun territory. Recent Hungarian archaeologists recommend reconsidering the aim of the Hunnic settlement in the Danube region.72 The demographic situation of Attila’s realm was in such astate, that Attila with his court and family lived in the area of confluence of the rivers Tisza and Mureş (based on fragments of Priscus and finds of golden hoards near Szikáncs and Szeged-Nagyszéksós). They were subsequently surrounded by subordinate tribes living all around the Great Hungarian Plain, such as the autochthonous Sarmatians in today’s Banat and Bačka and the newly arrived Goths and Sciri living probably along the Danube, the Alans upon the upper Tisza and the Gepids from the Carpathians and the river Körös. This was noticed by Romanian archaeologist Daniela Tănase, who points out that Priscus met sedentary farmers of probably Sarmatian origin and not the Hunnic herders on the Hunnic bank of the Danube.73 Amajority of Hunnic warbands with their leaders and chieftains lived around the boundaries of Attila’s Empire, predominantly in the abandoned province of Pannonia Valeria. It 69 I.BÓNA, Das Hunnenreich, pp.140–143. 70 Z.MASEK, AFresh Look at Hunnic Cauldrons in the Light of aNew Find from Hungary, in: Acta Archeologica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, Vol.68, 2017, pp.75–135. 71 M.OKOŃSKA-BULAS— J.BULAS, M.MAZUREKB— A.GARBACZ-KLEMPKA— M.PEREK-NOWAK, ANewly Discovered Fragment of aHunnic Cauldron from Site 59–60, Sanok, Poland, in: Acta Archeologica Carpathica, Vol. LV, 2020, pp.235–254. 72 E.ISTVÁNOVITS— V.KULCSÁR, The “Argumentum ex Siletio“: APossible New Approach in the Research of the Hun Period, in: Z.RÁCZ, G.SZENTEH (eds.), Attilas Europe? Structural Transformation and Strategries of Success in the European Hun Period, Budapest 2019, pp.435–447. 73 D.TĂNASE, Considerations on the Archeology of the Early Migrations Period in Banat, in: Dacia: Revue d’archéologie et d’histoire ancienne, vol.59, 2015. OPEN ACCESS
OTO MESTEK 61 is unknown, what the reason for the such arrangement of the Hunnic state was. We can only speculate whether this constellation was aresult of Attila’s suspicion and distrust toward the rest of the Hunnic nobles, or on the contrary that the borders should have been guarded by loyal units of Hunnic origin. ROMAN RESPONSE TO ATTILA’S CONFEDERACY AND CONCLUSION The Romans were not able to defeat Attila in abattle. The destruction of the Roman army in the battle of Utus in 447, asubsequent sack of the entire Roman Balkans and acceptance of Attila’s peace terms were significant disasters for Constantinople. The Romans tried to diminish Attila’s power and at first, they used their usual ways. Pursuing the divide et impera strategy the Romans with subsidies of gold instigated the revolt of the Akatziri tribe against Attila. These efforts brought no success, so Constantinople tried an unusual approach. In 449 Vigilas, atranslator of the embassy of Maximinus and Priscus had asecret mission. By order of the eunuch Chrysaphius, chief minister of emperor Theodosius II, he, with the support of Attila’s courtier and bodyguard Edeko, had to kill the Hunnic king himself. Priscus claims that he himself together with Maximinus did not know at all about the planned assassination. Edeko betrayed the Romans to Attila and Vigilas was banished from the embassy, while Attila himself demanded more gold from Constantinople as an apology.74 This failed assassination of Attila is interesting because it was ordered directly by the imperial government. The fourth century’s Roman assassinations of barbarian leaders and chieftains were initiated by local Roman governors and military commanders.75 Attila was so imminent as athreat that the imperial court itself decided to take such vigorous action. In the spring of 450 new embassies of Anatolius and Nomus achieved mitigation of Hunnic peace conditions and in the autumn of the same year new emperor Marcianus revoked the peace treaty with Attila. We should not overestimate the structure and functioning of the Hunnic Confederacy. Their influence on medieval society was much lower than the influence of the social and political structures that were formed after the fall of the Western Roman Empire. The purpose of the Hunnic Confederacy was not intertribal cooperation but raiding and ravaging. Attila’s society was mainly based on the idea that more warriors could undertake larger attacks and gain more loot. Nevertheless, the barbarian tribes realized that their involvement in Attila’s state was beneficial to them. Heretical patriarch of Constantinople Nestorius was entirely right in his statement that the Scythians (the Huns and their neighbouring tribes) were divided groups of robbers, that united and established their kingdom to become stronger.76 However, Attila and 74 PRISCUS, fr. 15, 1 (Exc. de Leg. Rom. 3) 75 In 373, King Gabinius of Quadi was murdered by order the province Pannonia Valeria governer dux Marcellianus and in 376 Thervingi chieftain Alavivus was killed in Marcianople by the instigation of local Roman military commander comes Lupicinus (AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS, Res gestae, XXIX, 6 and XXXI, 5). 76 NESTORIUS, Liber Heraclidis, in: Nestorius: The Bazaar of Heracleides, (ed.) G.DRIVER— L.HODGSON, Oxford 1925, 366. OPEN ACCESS
62 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2022 Bleda succeeded whereas all the other barbarian leaders before them had failed. They established afunctional and operational tribal alliance which posed athreat to the Romans. The existence of the Hunnic Confederacy was rather ashort-term affair. The Hunnic alternative77, is that they represented another centre of power equivalent to Ravenna and Constantinople which functioned only in the years from 430/435 until Attila’s death in 453. The Confederation then disintegrated and the speed and easiness, with which it happened, proved that the Hunnic state was more aloosely united voluntary confederation than acentralized empire. After Attila’s death, the practice of divide et impera was resumed. In 455/456 the Romans made several separate treaties with each tribe individually. Constantinople negotiated foedus with the Pannonian Goths, Thracian Goths, Gepids, Huns, Sciri and Alans and Ravenna (the regime of emperor Eparchius Avitus) probably made treaties with the Suebi78 and Rugians. The Roman foreign policy thus got back on track and the Romans were then faced more with serious domestic threats than with foreign cross-border invasions. 77 H.WOLFRAM, Das Römerreich und sein Germanen, Köln 2018, p.221. 78 P.KOVÁCS, Emperor Avitus in Pannonia?, in: Acta Archeologica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, Vol.71, 2020, pp.661–668. OPEN ACCESS