Stealth democracy, elitism, and citizenship in Finnish energy policy

1 Stealth Democracy, Elitism, and Citizenship in Finnish Energy Policy Ilkka Ruostetsaari, University of Tampere 1.Introduction Inspired by the international financial and euro zone crises, and by the influx of refugees into Europe, the populist political parties have raised the public agenda the claim that there is a widening gap between the elite and the people. This claim, however, is not new in the field of energy policy, which has been characterized as a policy sector where citizens’ involvement is more limited than in most other policy sectors. An American study showed that organizational barriers to more extensive interest representation were higher in the energy sector than in other policy domains [1]. Some firms, especially state-owned and, more generally, those operating in the energy supply, have had privileged access to decision-making arenas, which have remained mostly closed off to average citizens [2]. Similar findings have also been reported in Finland. Despite the new rules of the game – from monopolies and extensive regulation via competition and deregulation to re-regulation – and the Europeanization of the Finnish energy sector, the composition of the energy elite has been fairly stable from the end of 1980s until the end of the first decade of the 2000s. The energy elite has been dominated by energy producers. Civic associations and consumer-citizens have had difficulties in gaining access to the energy policy decision-making arenas [3]. The purpose of the present study is to address whether the attitudinal distance between the Finnish energy elite (decision-makers and experts) and the citizenry has changed regarding the energy policy between 2007 and 2016, and whether their attitudinal differences were more concerned with the substance of energy policy than with the process of policy-making. The rationale for studying the views of the elites and the citizenry stems from the normative ideals of classical democracy; citizens must be able to influence political decision-making and they This is an accepted manuscript. The original article has been published in Energy Research & Social Science. 2017, 34, pp. 93-103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.06.022 2 also actively use this right. This requires responsiveness of the elites towards citizens; the gap between them cannot be wide and above all, it should not grow. The starting point of our study, the year 2007, represents a period of rapid and stable economic growth, while the year 2016 represents the immediate time after a prolonged recession that resulted from both international economic crises and domestic political decisions. A major political scandal also became public in 2008. Thus, the legitimacy of the political rule was called into question. According to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2005, pp. 25, 36, 40), there has been little research on how the citizenry want their democratic process to work. Since the birth of democracy in Athens 2,500 years ago, philosophers have been voicing their opinions on the proper working of government. Since then this has been a major research topic in political philosophy (e.g. Swift 2014) [4] and moral philosophy (e.g. Rachels 2007) [5]. Political scientists have studied citizens’ support for specific policies, political parties, governmental institutions, and for democracy in general, but citizens have not often been asked in detail about their attitudes on how they want their government to work [6]. However, in Finland some political scientists have analyzed empirically citizens’ attitudes on the working of democratic processes [7,8]. Americans, for example, were found to be attuned to the way government works more than to what it produces (i.e., they pay attention to the processes more than the policies). This finding was interpreted to support “stealth democracy”, a form of democracy in which people do not want to make political decisions themselves but leave the decision-making in the hands of selfless politicians and various experts [6]. The topic of our study, energy policy, will be defined in this study as the political steering conducted by political decision-makers and public authorities focusing on energy management. Energy policy covers research, planning, decision-making, implementation, and evaluation pertaining to the goals and measures of political decision-makers and public authorities, which focuses on the production, purchase, storage, transfer and delivery of energy, and on energy 3 consumption. However, energy policy is not determined exclusively by decisions and measures made by politicians and civil servants, and implementation of energy policy depends heavily on the business sector. Firms and interest groups seek to influence energy policy to promote their own interests and shape its content de facto [9]. Finnish policy-making has special characteristics by international standards. According to Rask (2008, p. 199) and Rucht (1997, p. 283), the Finnish governmental policies for science, technology, and energy (e.g. nuclear power, information technology, and biotechnology) have rested on exceptionally high trust in technology and technological development among the citizenry [10,11]. Moreover, with respect to citizens’ trust in various societal institutions, the universities, science and research in general were outweighed only by the police and the judiciary [12]. This attitudinal climate has been reflected in decision-making. While construction of new nuclear power plants has been prohibited in many countries, the Finnish Parliament licensed the construction of two nuclear power plants in 2010. Moreover, Finland is among the first countries in which the process for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in the bedrock has been authorized both at the national (Parliament in 2001) and local (municipal council in 2000) levels [13]. Permission for construction of the facility was granted in 2015. This study proceeds as follows. First, social changes, mainly deep economic fluctuations and a political scandal, which likely affected the citizens’ attitudes from 2007 to 2016, are outlined. Second, the theoretical starting points concerning stealth democracy and the politics of expertise are defined based on previous studies. Third, a model of elite structures for evaluating empirical findings is outlined, and the research methods, datasets, and hypotheses are imposed. Fourth, the analysis is composed of four sections; the two first sections focus on the substance of energy policy, and the attitudes of the energy elite and the citizenry are addressed with respect to their normative views on the Finnish energy policy and the utilization of various energy sources in energy production; the third section focuses on the views of the energy elite and the 4 general population on the process of energy policy-making; and the fourth section outlines the support for stealth democracy among the citizenry with different socio-economic backgrounds. Finally, the research questions are answered, and the findings discussed in light of the theoretical starting points. 2. Changing political involvement in Finland from 2007 to 2016 After the early 1990s, the societal operating environment of the Finnish elites and the general population was dominated by deep economic fluctuations. The Finnish economy collapsed more drastically in the early 1990s than any other developed market economy after the Second World War [14] and the country plunged into the deepest recession in its history. Social services were cut, and the welfare state began to disintegrate as a result of the cuts in government expenditures. This “great recession” in 1991-1993 was followed by rapid economic growth based mainly on governmental investments in research and development and the expansion of the electronics industry, especially Nokia Ltd. However, Finland’s economic boom was halted in 2008 by the international financial crisis and the euro zone crisis. Due to that the Finnish economy is heavily dependent on exports, the GNP decreased by 8% in 2009 compared with 2008. Although this recession was only about half as severe as the recession of the 1990s, the GNP still decreased in Finland more than in other euro area countries and in those EU member states that had joined the Union before 2004 [15]. The recession originating from 2008 lasted longer than the recession of the early 1990s; the GNP is still approximately 5% lower than before the crises, and a slight economic growth (0.5%) started as late as 2015. In addition to the decreased governmental output as a result of the recession, the elites’ legitimacy was challenged by political scandals. In particular, the political elite was disturbed by the election campaign funding scandal of 2008, which was the most serious political scandal 5 in Finland to date as measured by the publicity surrounding the events [16]. This scandal together with the international financial crisis, the euro zone crisis, and the Greek and Portuguese bail-outs, which dominated the public debate from 2008 to 2011, undermined the legitimacy of the major political parties and affected the results of the 2011 general election; electoral support of the populist Finns Party increased from 4.1% in 2007 to 19.1% in 2011. In the next general election in 2015, the support for the Finns party decreased somewhat (17.7%) but the party rose to the inner core of power, i.e., the government. The new government that was formed after the general election of 2015 started to increase employers’ benefits and to cut citizens’ welfare services to boost economic growth. A substantial body of scholarly literature indicates that many post-industrial societies have experienced a withdrawal from conventional political activism. This transformation also applies to Finland, with some important exceptions. The voter turnout in Finland (67.9% in general the election of 2007; 70.5% in 2011; and 70.1% in 2015) was within the lowest third of all Western democracies and has decreased more sharply than in many other countries, especially within Scandinavia [17]. However, Finns’ trust in the political and legal systems and in other people was the highest among the 28 EU member states in 2013. [18]. According to the 2008 European Social Survey, Finns participated in civic associations more than people in any of the other 24 countries in the study. However, Finnish people’s subjective civil efficacy (the sense that one can understand political processes and participate in them meaningfully) has been much lower, on average, than in Europe. In 2008, it was the third-lowest among 23 European countries [19]. Similarly, Rapeli [20] showed that Finns’ knowledge base is not at such a level, which would enable well-argued and thorough discussion on political issues. Finns also have low civic efficacy concerning energy policy-making. Clearly more than half of the citizens were dissatisfied with their potential to influence energy policy; the proportion of the citizenry who agreed (fully or somewhat) with the statement that “citizens’ opinions have 6 not been heard sufficiently enough in energy policy decisions” was 71% (mean) in 1983-1993, 67% in 1994-2000, and 64 % in 2001-2007 [21]. Stolle and Micheletti (2006, pp. 266, 39) have argued that political consumerism may substitute for conventional forms of participation that are increasingly perceived as less efficient and less suitable for the global nature of political problems. Political consumerism can be defined as “actions taken by those who make choices among producers, products and services with the aim of changing objectionable institutional or market practices.” [22]. In Finland, as in the Nordic countries in general, the endorsement of political consumerism has been relatively high since 2007. With respect to influencing the energy policy-making Finns’ have more trust in their consumption choices than voting in general elections [23]. All in all, since 2007 the Finnish citizenry has been characterized, in international comparison, by low levels of voter turnout, civic efficacy, and political knowledge but high support for political consumerism. All of these factors reflect citizens’ low trust in their possibilities to influence policy-making trough representative democracy. Moreover, the economic downturn, a major political scandal, and the influx of refugees have undermined governments’ output in the face of the citizenry. However, simultaneously the citizenry has been profiled by high trust in the regime and technology. Because of this special attitudinal combination we may anticipate that citizens are increasingly willing to give political decision-making in the hands of experts rather than elected officials, as the theory of stealth democracy suggests. However, it is unnecessary and even impossible on the basis of available data to specify the effect of these individual factors on the endorsement of stealth democracy. This ambivalent attitudinal climate together with the tradition of energy policy as a relatively closed policy sector for citizen involvement make Finland a particularly fruitful object for studying the relationship between the energy elite and the citizenry and for testing the theory of stealth democracy. 7 3. Approach of stealth democracy to political involvement A common notion among social scientists concerning citizens’ strong, even increasing interest in political involvement has been challenged. According to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2005, 1-2, 143, 127), rather than wanting a more active, participatory democracy, a large number of people want what they call “stealth democracy”. Their claim is that the people do not routinely play an active role in decision-making, or in providing input for or monitoring decision-makers. The goal in stealth democracy is for decisions to be made efficiently, objectively, and without commotion and disagreement. Stealth aircraft such as B-2 bombers are difficult to see with standard radar techniques, but everyone knows they exist. Similarly, the citizens want democratic procedures to exist but not to be visible on a routine basis. They want to be able to make democracy visible and accountable on those rare occasions that they are motivated to be involved. Just like stealth bombers can be made to show up on radar when desired, the citizenry want to know that their government will become visible, accountable, and representative should they decide such traits are warranted. However, until that time, most people prefer not to be involved and therefore desire unobtrusive accountability. Thanks to representatives, people do not need to constantly pay attention to many issues about which they do not care. Because individuals are often too uninformed, unmotivated, or narrow to exert appropriate political influence, politicians should make the decisions for them [6]. We cannot fully understand citizens’ attitudes toward government without taking into account how they think government ought to work and how they think government works in practice. As far as the citizens’ attitudes toward government are concerned, they are more affected by the process of government than by the policies government enacts. Dissatisfaction usually stems from perceptions of how government does its business, not what the government does. In fact, 8 the policy matters, but process, rather than policy, is often a better predictor of citizens’ attitudes and behaviors with respect to government [6]. The fact that citizens have preferences for policy and process has also been shown in European studies. In the absence of clearly formulated interests and related identities that representatives could work to promote, elected officials have become more and more detached from their constituency. Voting has come to resemble a Schumpeterian [24] picture of democratic elitism where the main concern is to elect people into positions of power, leaving actual issues of substance and policy directions largely indeterminable. This is a particular concern in the Finnish proportional electoral system where citizens can never know at the ballot box exactly how their votes will be used; which political parties will form the government coalition, and what objectives they will adopt in the government program [25]. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2005, pp. 7, 122, 85-6, 139-143) argue that people want to distance themselves from government not because of a system defect but because many people are simply averse to political conflict and many others believe political conflict is unnecessary and an indication that something is wrong with governmental procedures. Elites are not what the citizens fear; rather, it is self-serving elites who are feared. The citizenry is surprisingly smitten with the notion of elite experts making choices - provided that those experts have nothing to gain from selecting one option over another. Because the citizenry agrees on societal goals, no conflict need exist, and governing is reduced to the mechanical process of implementing a good plan for attaining these goals. Determining appropriate policy action thus requires no elaborate institutions and powerful elected officials. In short, contrary to conventional wisdom, the citizenry like the concept of objective bureaucrats making their technical decisions. “People want to avoid government by people who act selfishly, not government by experts and elites” [6]. Thus, stealth democracy represents elitist conception of democracy. 9 However, the stealth democracy claim that the experts representing, for example, business and public administration are legitimate policy-makers equal to the elected officials, has long been challenged for by several scholars. According to Frank Fischer (1990, pp. 14-21, 40, 148), fundamental to the critique of technocratic expertise is the argument that experts have overrelied on and misused scientific and technical knowledge. Thus, technocracy is a deepseated challenge to democracy and its political form of decision-making [26]. Western science and technology policy has generally been seen as a policy sector that is dominated by experts and public administration, where political decision-makers have neither played, nor had an aspiration to play a role [27, 28]. This is also the case in Finland; governmental policy-making in the field of science and technology has been dominated by experts, perhaps more so than any other policy sector. Despite its vital position in societal development, however, this has played only a marginal role in the agenda of political parties and Parliament. Although most political parties had comprehensive party programs dealing with science policy as early as the 1960s and 1970s, these programs have since been absent. In fact, the link between science and technology policy and civil society has remained more fragile than the link with political decision-makers [29]. However, Finns have trusted most in the technology among various actors or devices in solving the environmental problems caused by energy production and consumption [9]. 4. Model of elite structures, research questions and hypotheses The existence of elites is an unavoidable fact in all past and current societies, both in democratic and un-democratic ones [30]. Elites and democracy are not necessarily mutually exclusive but the compatibility of elites with democratic principles depends on elites’ characteristics or types. A typology of elite structures can be outlined based on two variables; degree of the elites’ 16 was the same in all surveys conducted in 2007 and 2016, except that in the 2016 survey “the future” was defined by the year 2030. Response options were “increase substantially”, “increase a little”, “nowadays appropriate”, “curtail a little”, “curtail substantially”, “close down totally”, and “can’t say” (Table 2). Table 2 about here In terms of the utilization of various energy sources, the energy elite were much more unanimous than the citizenry in terms of coherence index. The index scores for the elite were 70.5 in 2007 and 62.3 in 2016, and for the citizenry 53.8 and 53.7. 4 The findings indicate that the unanimity, or coherence, within the elite decreased, while it remained unchanged among the citizenry. The coherence among the elite and the citizenry was noticeably higher in terms of the utilization of various energy sources (Table 2) than with respect to the statements of energy policy (Table 1). The greatest differences between the elite and the citizenry in 2007 concerned the utilization of nuclear power, wood fuels, and biogas, all of which the elite preferred more than the general population. In 2016, the differences were smaller but they concerned the same energy sources as in 2007. The greatest disagreement between the elite and the population during the entire research period involved the future of nuclear power in energy production. However, dissension about nuclear power decreased, which can be explained by the fact that the additional construction of nuclear power was much debated before Parliament accepted it in 2010, while in 2016 it was less prominent in the mass media agenda. 4.6% (3.5%), net import of electricity 4.5% (3.1%), peat 4.1% (6.9%), wind power 0.6% (~0%), and other 3.8% (1.7%) (Statistics Finland 2007; 2016a). 4 Unanimity within the elite and the citizenry can be measured by an index: (increase substantially % + increase a little %) – (curtail substantially %+ curtail a little %+close down totally)/N. 17 The attitudinal distance between the elite and the citizenry can be measured again by standard deviation in terms of utilization of various energy sources. Thus, the standard deviation between the elite and the citizenry was 15.2 in 2007 and 8.7 in 2016, respectively. This means that the attitudinal distance between the energy elite and the citizenry decreased. The attitudinal distance between the elite and the general population was clearly lesser in 2016 in terms of the utilization of various energy sources than with respect to the statements many of which addressed the ways energy policy is directed (Table 1). This suggests that the differences between the energy elite and the general population may especially concern the process of policy-making. 8. The process of energy policy-making The respondents were asked a structured question, as follows: “How great is the importance that you attach to following principles in energy policy-making?” The response options were “very important”, “fairly important”, “not really important”, “not important at all”, and “can’t say”. (Table 3). Table 3 about here In 2007, the greatest difference between the energy elite and the citizenry concerned the statement according to which experts should be in charge of decision making. While 91% of the general population perceived this statement as important, only 38% of the elite were of the same opinion. The other major differences concerned the principles according to which those politically responsible to the constituency should be in charge of decision-making (the elite stressed this more), and decisions should be made by consensus based on negotiations (the citizenry stressed this more). In 2016, the greatest difference between the elite and the general population dealt with the same statement as in 2007, i.e., the experts should be in charge of 18 decision-making, which the citizenry underscored more than the elite. Another major difference concerned the statements according to which environmental organizations should play a central role in decision-making (the citizenry stressed this more). The firms’ role in decision-making was stressed both in 2007 and 2016, slightly more by the elite but the difference between the elite and the citizenry was marginal. The elite accentuated more the role of business organizations in decision-making than the general population in 2007, while in 2016 there was no difference. Moreover, the elite perceived the participation of firms in decision-making as being slightly more important than the citizenry since 2007. Our finding that citizens were willing to see political power more in the hands of non-elected experts than businessmen was in agreement with Bengtsson and Mattila’s (2009, p. 1040) survey conducted among Finns in 2007 (not focused on energy policy). They found that approximately 30% were in favor of giving power to a more pronounced experts, while less than 20% wished to give more power to business leaders. These shares are lower than in our survey that focused on energy policy. Results from the world values survey of 1995, however, provided a different result, which indicated that political or economic factors might strongly influence the answers. Finland showed the strongest support among Western democracies for an extended use of expert rule in political matters. As much as 61% of the Finnish respondents gave a positive response to this question in 1995, compared with 33% in Norway, 34% in the US and 38% in Sweden 2009 [7]. Our datasets suggest that the citizens prioritized the involvement of the experts and representatives of firms more than elected officials in energy policy-making. Moreover, the citizenry stressed the importance of consensus and negotiations, which avoids conflicts in energy policy-making more than the elite. However, the elite accentuated the role of elected 19 officials in decision-making more than the general population. These findings are consistent with our hypothesis that the citizenry endorses stealth democracy more than the elite. In terms of the process of energy policy-making, the energy elite were more unanimous (coherent) than the citizenry; index scores for the elite were 66.4 in 2007 and 55.4 in 2016, and for the citizenry, they were 53.4 and 52.6, respectively. Thus, the attitudinal unanimity has decreased within the elite but also to a lesser extent among the citizenry from 2007 to 2016. The attitudinal distance between the elite and the citizenry in terms of the process can again be measured by the standard deviation. Because the standard deviation was 17.4 in 2007 and 10.1 in 2016, we may conclude that the attitudinal distance between the elite and the general population has decreased from 2007 to 2016. As a result of that the standard deviation between the elite and the citizenry with respect to use of various energy sources was 15.2 in 2007 and 8.7 in 2016 (Table 2), our hypothesis in that the attitudinal distance between the elite and the citizenry is lesser in relation to policy than to process was verified. However, in terms of statements (Table 1) the standard deviation was 16.0 in 2016, i.e., even higher than with respect to a process in the same year that did not support the hypothesis. To test our hypothesis in that the support on stealth democracy has increased among the citizenry but remained unchanged within the elite from 2007 to 2016, we constructed a sum variable from five of the statements mentioned in Table 3. The five statements all depict the claim of stealth democracy, as follows: “experts should be in charge of the drafting of decisions”, “experts should be in charge of decision-making”, “representatives of firms should take part in decision-making”, “business organizations should play a central role in the decisionmaking”, and “decisions should be made by consensus as a result of negotiations”. The mean support (very or somewhat important) for the sum variable among the elite was 61.0% in 2007 and 63.0% in 2016, while among the citizenry, it was 71.0% and 72.2%, respectively. Thus, 20 our hypothesis was not verified because the endorsement increased slightly among both the elite and the citizenry from 2007 to 2016. Our findings exposed a striking decreasing appreciation for democracy within the energy elite. In 2007, 92% of the elite agreed with the statement according to which those politically responsible to the constituency should be in charge of decision-making, but this number was no more than 68% in 2016. However, of the elite 38% in 2007 and 68% in 2016 agreed with the statement that experts should be in charge of decision-making. Moreover, the support for the idea that citizens should be able to influence decisions decreased from 76% to 61% in 2007 and 2016, respectively. 9. Effects of socio-demographic background on the support of stealth democracy 9.1. Civic efficacy We have shown above that the citizens prioritized the involvement of experts and businessmen more than that of elected officials in energy policy-making. But how the ordinary people experience their own role in energy policy-making? To analyze the endorsement of stealth democracy among various citizens groups, we used the sum variable constructed in the previous chapter. The response options of “very important” or “somewhat important” were coded as an endorsement of stealth democracy, while the options of “not really important”, “not important at all”, and “can’t say” were coded as nonendorsement of stealth democracy. Table 3 showed that three-fourths of people perceived their involvement as important in energy policy-making. However, energy issues have not played an important role in the electoral arena; the number of citizens who admitted that energy issues had affected their voting decision in the 21 last general election was only 25% in 2007 and 23% in 2016. The support for stealth democracy was higher among people whose voting decision was affected by energy issues compared with those whose voting decision was not affected. The dependence was statistically significant both in 2007 (p<.05) and 2016 (p<.001). In 2007, 44% of citizens agreed (fully or somewhat) with the statement “I am well acquainted with energy issues”, while the proportion (57%) was clearly higher in 2016. The support for stealth democracy was higher among citizens who felt that they were knowledgeable in energy issues than among those who were not. The dependence was statistically significant only in 2016 (p<.001). However, Finns’ subjective civic efficacy in the field of energy policy was low; only 25 % in 2007 and 24% in 2016 perceived that they can influence the Finnish energy policy by their own action, while 66% of the elite were of the same opinion in 2016. People who perceived having possibility to influence supported stealth democracy more than those who did not trust in their possibility to influence. However, the dependence was statistically significant only in 2016 (p<.001). In 2016, 52% of people agreed with the statement that “citizens’ opinions have not been heard sufficiently in energy policy decisions” (29% disagreed), while 40% of the elite agreed (57% disagreed). However, the Finns’ overall sense of powerlessness has decreased significantly; in 1983-2007, the proportion of those who agreed with this statement was more than 60% (Energy Attitudes 2007). In 2016, support for stealth democracy was higher among people who agreed with the statement than among those who disagreed with it (p<.001), while among the energy elite members the relationship was the reverse. These findings suggest that there were differences with respect to endorsement of stealth democracy among people with different socio-economic characteristics which will be addressed next. 22 9.2. Sex and age Due to the fact that political consumerism, an alternative form for electoral participation, was found in previous studies to be connected to the citizen agency of women and the young [22], we expected that women support stealth democracy (which also can be seen as an alternative practice for controlling decision-makers through elections) more than men. Because young people generally voted less actively in general elections and trusted less in conventional modes of political participation than older people [32], we anticipated that young people will approve of stealth democracy more than older people. In contrast to our expectations, women did not support stealth democracy more than men (Table 4). In 2007, the endorsement was the same among men and women (78%), while in 2016 it was slightly higher among women (80%) than men (77%). Our expectation concerning the effect of age was also not observed. The endorsement of stealth democracy increased linearly from the youngest age cohort of 18-29-year-olds to the oldest age cohort of 60-75-year-olds in 2007 and 2016. Table 4 9.3. Education and occupation The high levels of education and occupational position have generally been connected to active electoral participation [34]. Thus, we anticipated that highly educated people and individuals with a high occupational status would support stealth democracy less than other people because more well-off people have more material and knowledge-based resources at their disposal. Due to that the energy sector is very technical in nature, we expected that people with an engineering education would endorse the important role of experts representing business or public 23 administration, such as their colleagues, in energy policy-making more than people educated in other areas, for example, in humanities. Basic education partly explained the adherence to stealth democracy; the share of supporters of stealth democracy was lowest among people with the highest level of basic education, i.e., completed their matriculation examination. However, adherence to stealth democracy was not highest among people with lowest education (primary school) but among individuals with elementary school education. The endorsement of stealth democracy was not statistically dependent on vocational education. Contrary to our expectations, support was lowest among the least educated citizens, i.e., those who had no occupational education at all in 2007 rather than among the most highly educated citizens. However, it was the second lowest among people with highest education, i.e., those with an academic education. In fact, the adherence to stealth democracy was highest among citizens with the second lowest education, i.e., vocational course. Thus, our finding differed from that of a Finnish survey conducted in 2007 among the general population in which the support on stealth democracy correlated with lower education levels [7]. In 2007, endorsement of stealth democracy was lowest among citizens with education in the natural sciences (67%), humanities and arts (65%), business (77%), and engineering (77%), and highest among people educated in pedagogics (89%). In 2016, the adherence to stealth democracy was lowest among citizens educated in social sciences (65%) and agriculture and forestry science (75%), and the highest among people with a business education (84%). Thus, the effect of the education field was not that what we expected (p>.05). Our expectation about a negative connection between a high occupational position and the support for stealth democracy was partially realized. In 2007, the support for stealth democracy was highest among the unemployed, pensioners and entrepreneurs, and lowest among students, 24 upper functionaries, and people with a leadership position. In 2016, the endorsement was highest among farmers and lower functionaries but lowest among the unemployed, students, upper functionaries, and people with a leadership position. 9.4. Type of accommodation and political affiliation Individuals who own their residences have had higher likelihood of voting in general elections than those living in rented flats. This may partially be a result of greater stability with respect to residency and thus reflecting social attachment [34]. Hence, we expected that citizens living in rented flats endorses stealth democracy more than those who own their residence. This was the case in 2007 but not in 2016. In 2007, 80% of citizens who lived in rented flats endorsed stealth democracy, while the proportion was 78% among people who owned their residences; in 2016, the relationship was the reverse 77% and 79%, respectively. The dependency was not statistically significant (p>.05). The degree of attachment to the political system has varied to some extent between the voters of different political parties. The interest in politics, a sense of civil efficacy, and the level of knowledge on politics have been higher among the voters of the Conservatives and the Left Alliance than among the supporters of other political parties [41]. Thus, we anticipated that the supporters of the Conservatives and the Left Alliance would endorse stealth democracy less than supporters of other parties. However, our expectations were not realized. In 2007, stealth democracy was supported most by the respondents who identified themselves with the Left Alliance, the Greens, and the Conservatives, while the adherence to stealth democracy was lowest among citizens who did not want to disclose their political party identification, would not vote at all, and couldn’t say their party affiliations. In 2016, it was highest among supporters of the Christian Democrats 25 and the Swedish People’s Party of Finland, and lowest among those who would not vote at all as well as supporters of the Finns’ Party and the Greens. All in all, the dependence between the endorsement of stealth democracy and variables measuring citizens’ socio-economic background was statistically significant only in terms of age in 2007 and 2016, and political affiliation in 2016 (Table 4). As our expectations that were derived from the electoral behaviour of various citizens’ groups did not materialize, our hypothesis in which socio-economically underprivileged people endorse stealth democracy more than the privileged was not verified. 10. Results The present study addressed whether the attitudinal distance between the Finnish energy elite (decision-makers and experts) and the citizenry has changed with respect to the energy policy between 2007 and 2016, and whether the attitudinal difference was more concerned with the substance of energy policy than the process of policy-making. With respect to use of various energy sources in energy production in the future, the attitudinal distance between the energy elite and the citizenry decreased from 2007 to 2016. The attitudinal distance between the elite and the general population in 2016 was clearly lesser regarding use of various energy sources than with respect to the statements about energy policy. Thus, in terms of the substance of energy policy, the attitudinal distance between the energy elite and the citizenry decreased from 2007 to 2016. Additionally, the attitudinal gap decreased between the elite and general population regarding the process. Our hypothesis in which the attitudinal distance between the energy elite and the citizenry is lesser in relation to substance, i.e., related more to policy than to process, was verified when the relationship to the policy was measured by the views on the utilization of various energy sources. However, with respect to policy 32 concerned the energy certificate; Parliament ordered the government to clarify the content of the Energy Certificate Act. In 2015, one-third of people reported that they have signed at least one civic initiative, and four-fifths argued that this opportunity improves democracy. Civic initiatives have especially activated young people, and raised the political agenda important questions of values, which were previously excluded from the agenda, or divided parties internally. [45]. All in all, the high popularity of referendums and civic initiatives do not support the key claim of stealth democracy, according to which, people do not really want to be personally more involved in politics. Acknowledgements: The study was funded by the Strategic Research Council at the Academy of Finland References [1] J.E. Chubb, J., Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy, The Politics of Energy. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1983. [2] A. Prontera, Energy Policy: Concepts, Actors, Instruments and Recent Developments. World Political Sci. Rev. 5(1) (2009) 1-30. [3] Removed [4] A. Swift, Political Philosophy, 3rd ed., Polity Press, Cambridge, 2014. [5] J. Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 5th ed., McGrew-Hill, Boston, 2007. [6] J. R. Hibbing, E. 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Table 1: The views of the energy elite and the citizenry on the statements dealing with the substance of the energy policy in 2016 (agree fully or somewhat %) Statement Elite Citizenry Difference E-C Climate change is serious, but is has received far too little attention in our country’s political decision-making. 44 61 -17 Finland’s dependence on the energy imports from Russia should be reduced. 84 79 +5 A centralized energy system based on large-scale energy production units is better than the decentralized system based on small-scale energy production units. 36 26 +10 The EU should direct the member states’ energy policy to a greater extent than they do today. 34 29 +5 There is sufficient competition between electricity suppliers. 74 50 +24 Finland should strive for the national energy self-sufficiency by 2030. 53 74 -21 Public subsidies for the energy policy should be increased that new technology can be put into operation more quickly than it is today. 47 65 -18 Energy markets should be allowed to operate on the market terms. 81 41 +40 Use of petroleum and diesel as traffic fuels should be discontinued by 2030. 40 26 +14 Finland should move entirely to the use of renewable energy sources by 2030. 36 42 -6 Coherence index 30.0 30.3 Attitudinal distance (standard deviation) 16.0 N= 93 1349 Table 2: The proportion of the energy elite and the citizenry who preferred to increase (substantially or somewhat) the use of various energy sources in the future (%) Energy source 2007 2016 Elite Citizenry Difference Elite Citizenry Difference E-C E-C Wind power 96 87 +9 74 77 -3 Biogas 96 69 +26 88 74 +14 Wood fuels 96 64 +32 77 52 +25 Nuclear power 84 43 +41 43 22 +29 Solar energy 76 91 -15 92 91 +1 Hydroelectric power 66 65 +1 54 60 -6 Peat 33 39 -6 12 22 -10 Natural gas 25 43 -18 30 34 -4 Coal 4 4 0 1 2 -1 Oil 0 3 -3 1 2 -1 Coherence index 70.5 53.8 62.3 53.7 Attitudinal distance (standard deviation) 15.2 8.7 N= 24 1180 93 1349 Table 3: The proportion of the energy elite and the citizenry who perceived very or somewhat important the principles concerning the process of energy policy-making in 2007 and 2016 (%) Principle 2007 2016 Elite Citizenry Difference Elite Citizenry Difference Decision should be announced as openly as possible. 100 96 +4 99 95 +4 Experts should be in charge of the drafting of decisions. 100 96 +4 99 94 +5 Societal effects of decisions should be taken widely into account. 100 93 +7 100 94 +6 Decisions should take account of various interest groups. 96 67 +29 68 69 -1 Environmental effects of decisions should be taken widely into account. 92 95 -3 99 92 +7 Those politically responsible to the constituency should be in charge of decisionmaking. 92 54 +38 68 56 +12 The drafting process of decisions should be open. 88 90 -2 91 89 +2 Citizens should be able to influence decisions. 76 75 +1 61 75 -14 Experts should be in charge of decision-making. 38 91 -52 68 89 -21 Representatives of firms should take part in decision-making. 67 62 +5 68 66 +2 Business organizations should play a central role in decision-making. 67 41 +26 48 48 0 Decisions should be made by consensus based on negotiations. 33 65 -32 32 64 -32 Environmental organizations should play a central role in decision-making. 30 54 -24 28 53 -25 Energy policy should be determined free of governmental direction 12 29 -17 21 32 -11 Coherence index 66.4 53.4 55.4 52.6 Attitudinal distance (standard deviation) 17.4 10.1 N= 24 1189 93 1349 Table 4: Proportion of supporters of stealth democracy among various socio-economic citizen groups in 2007 and 2016 (%) 2007 2016 Sex Men 78 77 Women 78 80 p>.05 p>.05 Age group 18-29 72 73 30-44 74 75 45-59 79 76 60-75 83 83 p<.05 p<.01 Basic education Primary school 78 79 Elementary school 80 80 High school 77 78 p>.05 p>.05 Vocational education No vocational education 74 75 Vocational course 82 82 Vocational school 79 78 Polytechnic 78 81 University 76 78 p>.05 p>.05 Occupational position Leading position 76 76 Upper functionary 72 72 Lower functionary 77 85 Blue-collar worker 76 77 Entrepreneur 84 82 Farmer 76 90