Decentralisation in the context of competitiveness discourse : The Finnish labour market relations system since 2008

Nicol Foulkes Savinetti & Aart-Jan Riekhoff (Eds), Shaping and re-shaping the boundaries of working life. Tampere: Tampere University Press, 159–180. http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-359-020-5 Decentralisation in the context of competitiveness discourse The Finnish labour market relations system since 2008 Paul Jonker-Hoffrén Introduction Finland saw quite dramatic changes to its system of labour market relations between 2008 and 2018. In 2007, the main employers’ federation Elinkeinoelämän keskusliitto (EK, Confederation of Finnish Industries) announced that it would not conclude centralised incomes policies anymore, which was the official position in 2008 (Esmerk 2008). These tulopoliittinen kokonaisratkaisu, or tupo in brief, used to be the cornerstone of Finnish labour market policy since 1968. In that year, the so-called Liinamaa I -agreement was concluded, which is seen as the start of the “tupo-era”. In that agreement, the labour market partners and the Finnish state agreed that the employer would collect union dues directly from employees’ salaries and that these dues would be tax-deductable. The partners to these agreements are the labour union federations, employers’ federations 160 Paul Jonker-Hoffrén Nicol Foulkes Savinetti & Aart-Jan Riekhoff (eds) and the state. A centralised incomes policy usually consisted of general wage increases, labour market policy issues as well as tax policy changes. According to Kauppinen (2005), all labour market partners had their own reasons to negotiate a centralised incomes policy, especially since the 1990s: the employers’ federations favoured centralised agreements because it would allow the flexibilisation of the labour markets, prepare the entrance to EMU and make the Finnish economy competitive through wage moderation. The state favoured this model as a way to control inflation. Finally, the labour movement favoured the centralised model to “manage” the economy and, in particular, employment (Kauppinen 2005). Since 1968, there have been quite a few years without centralised incomes policies. In those years, it was not politically feasible to reach such an agreement because either the employers or the labour unions preferred negotiation at the sectoral level. Nonetheless, the announcement in 2008 by EK did come as a shock, although its stance was not by itself new (see Bergholm & Bieler 2013). Earlier, the President of the Bank of Finland, in 2002, questioned whether the solidaristic wage policy hinders the creation of jobs in sectors with weaker productivity growth. Furthermore, he questioned whether the centralised incomes agreements hindered the allocation of resources to those sectors where productivity growth is stronger (Taloussanomat 2002). These considerations were based on the instrument of the “wage norm”: a way to calculate the potential for wage increases based on average productivity growth (Sauramo 2004). The entrance of Finland into the Euro might also have been a catalyst towards a reappraisal of the institute of centralised incomes polices because Finland’s preferred competitiveness-boosting mechanism (devaluation) was not available anymore. Furthermore, the focus on the Maastricht criteria regarding public debt and budget deficits connected economic growth and public sector wage growth through Decentralisation in the context of competitiveness discourse 161Shaping and re-shaping the boundaries of working life regulation. The public sector, like in many European countries, is female-dominated and in Finland there is a significant gender wage gap of roughly 17% (European Commission 2018a). Koskinen Sandberg (2016) has shown that in a highly segregated labour market, sectoral collective agreements can contribute to the gender pay gap, even in the context of centralised incomes agreements. In a sense, disconnected sectoral collective agreement negotiations may provide an easier way to moderate public sector wage growth compared to centralised agreements, where also the public sector receives the same general wage increases. Therefore, the logic of European economic governance also provides an argument for decentralising collective agreement negotiations. The Finnish labour market relations system is in its essence still corporatist, which means that through tripartite consultation, the interests between labour and capital are mediated through e.g. collective bargaining. The developments that started in 2007 reduced its scope because they enabled transferring core decision-making processes on labour market policy away from the corporatist actors to the open political arena. The “new” centralised agreements are characterised more flexibility to implement the agreement at the sectoral level than through the tupo. In this chapter, I view the institutional changes from the point of view of the “competence trap”. This has the benefit of highlighting the role of labour unions and labour union federations in relation to their institutional position and policy-making. At the same time, these institutional changes also show that Finland is following Nordic developments (Andersen, Ibsen, Alsos, Nergaard, & Sauramo 2015). Bergholm and Bieler (2013) explain that this “delayed” decentralisation may be due to a weaker structural power of the employers. Lilja (1998) introduced the concept of “competence trap” in labour market relations research. A competence trap means that existing or otherwise dominant procedures that lead to positive results will 162 Paul Jonker-Hoffrén Nicol Foulkes Savinetti & Aart-Jan Riekhoff (eds) become entrenched because actors are profiting from experience within the organisation (Levitt & March 1988). In other words, a competence trap occurs when a union’s internal organisation and the skills of their officials are less suited to handling questions of work organisation, skill development and management (Alasoini 2004). This phenomenon has been shown to occur both in the use of new technologies and new processes of work (e.g. Zucker 1987). The idea of a competence trap is also relevant labour market relations research because labour unions are organisations with a strong institutional memory (Huzzard 2000; Huzzard, Gregory, & Scott 2004). The main problem concerning the competence trap of labour unions, according to Lilja (1998, 183), is that “there are no mechanisms at the industry collective bargaining level to intervene in the actual world of work and skill development in a proactive way”. In short, Lilja argues that because most union activities relate to institutions (collective bargaining, work safety, union managed unemployment funds), there is more focus on these specialties rather than involvement with actual working life. In particular, the centralised agreements “dictated” the content of collective agreements regarding the main issues, thus not allowing much flexibility at the sectoral or local levels. This means that although labour unions have a strong local presence through shop stewards and collective agreements, they may be more vulnerable to changes in either institutions or working life than assumed through their institutionally entrenched position. Dølvik (1997) argues that labour unions can have a “logic of representation” or a “logic of influence”, which is different way of explaining the relation between institutions and labour unions. In the Finnish case, the “logic of influence” may be the primary determent of action, because the rules and conventions regarding collective bargaining worked predominantly top-down until the “new” centralised agreements. Decentralisation in the context of competitiveness discourse 163Shaping and re-shaping the boundaries of working life To clarify this last point, it is useful to show the general pre-2008 process of centralised collective bargaining (Jonker-Hoffrén 2019). In the Finnish system, even if a collective agreement has expired, its provisions remain valid until a new agreement is concluded (the sopimukseton tila). The only difference is that the so-called peace clause is not valid anymore—strikes are allowed to put pressure on the negotiations. Usually before this phase, labour union federations and employers’ federations have indicated their willingness to negotiate a centralised agreement, although sometimes this willingness has to be found through policy promises by the state on, for example, tax reductions. The most important negotiation at the centralised level is the general wage increase because this is binding for the collective agreements based on the centralised agreement. The issues relating to the content of centralised agreements are to a large extent nonnegotiable at the sectoral level. Other issues agreed between labour union federations, employers’ federations and the state are labour market policy directions, which may also include social policy issues such as pension. Furthermore, the state promises what it will do when the sectoral phase of collective bargaining is successfully completed. The threshold for successful completion recently has been the implementation of the centralised agreement by 90–95% of collective agreements, which is a much higher coverage than in the former “tupo” era (Jonker-Hoffrén 2019). The basis for this process is the socalled “January Engagement” of 1940, when employers acknowledged labour unions as part of democratic society. This agreement also led to legislation on collective bargaining, industrial action and conflict mediation. Through a voluntaristic agreement, the labour market partners became a central part of labour market policy-making. This is the essence of Finnish labour market corporatism. The main negotiation problem at the sectoral level is how to translate the general wage increase into the various wage levels and shift systems existing in the sectors. Applying a general wage increase 164 Paul Jonker-Hoffrén Nicol Foulkes Savinetti & Aart-Jan Riekhoff (eds) is easier in collective agreements that feature hourly wage (such as for cleaning personnel) than for manufacturing collective agreements that often have highly complex shift systems. For this reason, some sectors prefer wage increases in eurocents, while others prefer percentages. At the sectoral level working time issues and social provisions are also negotiated unless included in the centralised agreement. For example, general working time reductions were agreed in the centralised agreements of 1984 and 1986, and in 1992 issues regarding income-dependent pensions were negotiated (SAK n.d.). The core idea of this chapter is that Finnish labour unions have had to deal with sustained attacks on their main role as collective agreement negotiators since 2008 while being pressured to accept negotiation outcomes that were not necessarily positive for their membership. These negotiation outcomes derived from an analysis of Finnish competitiveness based on the metric of Unit Labour Costs, and in relation to that discourse, they exemplify the “competence trap”. This metric disregards sectoral and local difference, as well as the impact of changes in demand. Because the focus on ULC was the only legitimate discourse from the start of the financial crisis, labour unions had to focus on labour costs rather than on the quality of working life, in particular since 2013, as explained below. After 2016, the labour unions additionally had to withstand the pressure emanating from the state to deliver certain outcomes, lest the state not intervene through legislation. The successful drive towards decentralisation (to the sectoral level) may lead to a change in focus on part of the labour unions because the institutional environment compels them to do so. The next section discusses the developments since 2008 in more detail. Decentralisation in the context of competitiveness discourse 165Shaping and re-shaping the boundaries of working life Labour market relations developments since 2008 Finland has had a positive period of growth since its economic and financial crisis of the 1990s, and the system of labour market relations did not have a serious test during the euro membership. In fact, the last centralised incomes agreement (of 2005–2007) was concluded in calm circumstances and had a record duration of three years. In fact, only the pulp and paper industry witnessed a protracted industrial conflict in 2005, but this sector had explicitly stayed out of that centralised incomes agreement (Jonker-Hoffrén 2011). After the centralised agreement of 2005–2007 Finland had a period of sectoral agreements between 2007 and 2011. In practice, this consisted of two sectoral bargaining rounds and an attempt (in 2009) to introduce a “wage-anchor” in manufacturing that no subsequent collective agreement should exceed. Table 1 shows a summary of developments (see also Jonker-Hoffrén 2019). 166 Paul Jonker-Hoffrén Nicol Foulkes Savinetti & Aart-Jan Riekhoff (eds) Table 1. Duration and main elements of centralised and sectoral agreements since 2005 (SAK n.d.; Jonker-Hoffrén 2012) 2005– 2007 centralised agreement (paper industry separate sectoral agreement, 2005–2008) longest centralised agreement in tupo history; in negotiations for next agreements there was a peculiar labour conflict in the public health sector involving a threat to collectively resign 2008– 2011 Sectoral yearly pay review, in practice two sectoral rounds (2007–2009 and 2010–2011); 2009 (failed) attempt at manufacturing-led wage-anchor 2012– 2013 “new” centralised agreement (“Framework agreement”) focus on training, position of temp workers, other working life issues 2013– 2015 “new” centralised agreement (“Employment and Growth Agreement”) focus on improving employment, competitiveness, potential reforms of labour market relations system, extreme wage moderation, 3 year agreement 2015– 2017 “new” centralised agreement (“Competitiveness Agreement”) focus on competitiveness and economic growth, creating jobs, consolidating government finances, wage freeze, working towards local bargaining. Originally 2015–2016, option for extension through 2017, which was implemented 2017– 2018 Sectoral Full implementation of EK’s rule change led to decentralisation to the sectoral level. Sectoral round mostly based on first manufacturing agreement (informal wage anchor) The tensions between employers’ organisations and labour unions, especially in the public sector, stem from the collective agreements signed for the period 2007–2009. Many sectoral agreements featured relatively high wage increases. Figure 1 in Delahaie, Vandekerckhove, and Vincent (2017, 71) confirms that in 2007, there was indeed a sudden upwards trend in both collectively agreed (nominal) wages, although also before 2007, the nominal wage increases had outstripped increases in labour productivity. With the onset of the financial crisis shortly after the agreements for 2007–2009 had been finalised, a correction was needed in the “competitiveness” of Finland. This was also a theme for Finland in the European Semester’s country-specific recommendations where general wage moderation, in line with real productivity development, was recommended (Van Gyes & Schulten 2015, 16). Decentralisation in the context of competitiveness discourse 167Shaping and re-shaping the boundaries of working life For a pilot study on labour market partners’ views on the European economic governance system, expert interviews were held in early 2013. The experts were exclusively senior labour market negotiators of labour unions, employers’ federations and labour union federations. The interviews were transliterated and coded. The analysis used content analysis, because this was an exploratory study of the issue. The respondents (N=7) were generally unanimous regarding their view of the wage increases in collective agreements in the period 2007–2011. As one researcher from the Service Union United PAM states: “It kind of got out of hand, competing about collective agreement wage increases”. His colleague stated: “The public sector reached agreement last [in 2007], and they got the biggest wage increases”. A former negotiator of SAK, the Confederation of Finnish Trade Unions commented: “I still remember, in 2007, when the sectoral agreements were negotiated, they were spread over several years and they were far too expensive on every level from the perspective of the crash of the economy in 2008, and in part the competitiveness of the Finnish economy still suffers from this period”. The former National Conciliator stated: “Fantastic collective agreements were concluded then [in 2007], wage increases to the tune of 11–15% over two years. So we had the agreed wage increases and then came the 2008–2009 recession. Wages went up and production went down. […] It affects the competitiveness even today”. The Finnish National Conciliator is the labour market mediator that becomes involved in collective agreement negotiations when 174 Paul Jonker-Hoffrén Nicol Foulkes Savinetti & Aart-Jan Riekhoff (eds) Conclusion: Competence trap and post-2017 developments The previous sections have shown the changes in the Finnish system of labour market relations. The “organized decentralisation” has happened primarily from the initiative of the employers’ federations. Organized decentralisation in the Finnish context means that issues previously negotiated at a higher level can be decentralised through stipulations of collective agreements (see Jonker-Hoffrén 2019). Regarding the substantial changes in collective agreements, especially the “new” centralised agreements, it is important to acknowledge the pressure the state put on the labour market partners in 2016, and in particular the labour unions, to conclude a deal that would satisfy the requirements of the state. The state wanted to force the labour market partners to conclude a deal that would improve the competitiveness of Finland. For the unions, this episode perhaps epitomises the “competence trap” because their focus had to be on the negotiations and dealing with the pressure from both state and employers rather than “[intervention] in the actual world of work and skill development in a proactive way”. The core objective was doing its part in restoring Finnish competitiveness. Finland is bound to the economic governance architecture of the Eurozone, which means that both state and labour market partners do not necessarily have much flexibility, especially in downturns. The new Finnish labour market system, which enables only sectoral bargaining, has effectively decoupled the domestic, public and export sectors. Giving up the traditional tri-partite bargaining may have been a blow to especially the labour movement because it has been focused on the solidaristic wage policies for so long. On the other hand, it can also be argued that the new model better reflects the regulatory and competitive pressures these sectors face—the Maastricht criteria influence the labour market relations in a way that Decentralisation in the context of competitiveness discourse 175Shaping and re-shaping the boundaries of working life the export sector does not experience and vice versa regarding global market developments. An interesting question regarding economic discourses is still open: how and why did ULC come to the forefront when it did? In the 2000s, it seemed that the discourse was rather on R&D and quality. This question requires more research and interviews with, for example, labour union economists and actors from the employers’ federations. The current situation in 2020 is that Finland has successfully completed a sectoral bargaining round with moderate wage increases and openings to more local bargaining on wages following the first agreement of the technology industry (manufacturing). A casual glance shows positive signs towards the general mood regarding local bargaining. For example, the Service Union United PAM earlier stated that local bargaining is a way of quickly improving working conditions (PAM 2018). The union AKAVA Special Branches reports of a membership questionnaire, which asked about important issues for local bargaining. Members regarded issues like work-life balance, possibilities to have influence, motivation and general working conditions as most important for local bargaining (Akavan Erityisalat 2018). Further empirical research should show whether labour unions actually have increased their local influence. What conditions enable this influence to become established? It is reasonable to expect that this requires strong local union representation. It is possible that the dramatic changes in the labour market relations system have thereby reduced the risk of the “competence trap” by forcing the unions to turn their gaze to the local level. Unions have worked skilfully at the local level through co-determination procedures, as Sippola (2012) shows. In recent years these procedures have nonetheless often looked like “redundancy management procedures”. The current process of renewal of this law could help unions to achieve stronger 176 Paul Jonker-Hoffrén Nicol Foulkes Savinetti & Aart-Jan Riekhoff (eds) local influence. Furthermore, it will be interesting to follow how and where the metric of ULC will be used in the future. Acknowledgment Paul Jonker-Hoffrén wishes to thank the Academy of Finland for project funding, which also enabled this contribution (decision number #307925). 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