The Annexation of Crimea: A Realist Look from the Energy Resources Perspective

148 Javad Keypour Ivar Hendla Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 9, No. 3 (28) The Annexation of Crimea: A Realist Look from the Energy Resources Perspective Javad Keypour1 TalTech Law School, Tallinn University of Technology Akadeemia tee 3, Tallinn 12618, Estonia E-mail: [email protected] Ivar Hendla University of Tampere Kalevantie 4, Tampere 33100, Finland E-mail: ivar[email protected] Abstract: The article studies the role of energy resources in the annexation of Crimea by the Russian government. Russian justifi cation that this action was taken to protect Russian ethnicity, as declared with the “referendum”, can be challenged in the light of the realist balance of power concept. According to the research, Russia considered Ukraine’s improving relations with the West as a threat and tried to eliminate it with preemptive action, in order to reestablish regional balance of power with the West. The article fi nds that the energy factor had a signifi cant role in this consideration but in a subtractive approach. More precisely, there were no major incentives for Russia to capture the Black Sea resources intrinsically, but these reserves were recognized as part of the main Ukrainian economic empowerment plan, particularly on the EU’s future energy market. Thus, Russia tried to block Ukraine’s access to them in line with a wedge strategy. Hence, the annexation can be considered as one part of Russian energy policy towards the EU and Russia’s goal to emasculate Ukraine’s natural gas transit role by constructing new pipelines such as Nord Stream and Turkish Stream, as the other part. 1 Hereby, I would like to thank European Regional Development Fund’s programme Dora Pluss activity 2.1 for the grant during my studies. doi: 10.1515/bjes-2019-0027 Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 9, No. 3 (28) Bereitgestellt von TAMPERE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY | Heruntergeladen 19.02.20 12:25 UTC 149 The Annexation of Crimea: A Realist Look from the Energy Resources Perspective Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 9, No. 3 (28) The study exemplifies how Ukraine’s strategic position has been significantly diminished from the energy perspective. Keywords: balance of power, Black Sea energy resources, Crimea annexation, Russia, Ukraine 1. Introduction When Putin came to power at the beginning of the 2000s, Russia had close cooperation with both the United States and NATO. The partnership was strengthened by aligned goals in war against terrorism. However, this trend drasticly changed shortly after NATO’s expansion to the East continued to the Baltic States in 2004. Russia’s perception of the accession process quickly created the notion that its national interests were jeopardized by NATO’s expansion to the East (Kramer, 2002). On top of that, the color revolutions in the former Soviet republics started to undermine Russia’s role in the whole region (Wilson, 2010). Amongst all these states, Ukraine holds a very special place for Russia from the cultural, political and economic perspective. Therefore, when it came to the 2013 –2014 Ukraine crisis, Russia reacted harshly by the annexation of Crimea at the beginning of 2014. The research aim of this article is to put Crimean energy resources under a microscope and discuss its role in the annexation from a subtractive approach, as the novelty of the research.The annexation of Crimea has certainly drawn the attention of many scholars already, so it would be incorrect to say that the event itself is underexplored. Generally, in previous research on the annexation of Crimea, the role of energy has been neglected entirely or trivialized to the level of the gas dispute between a gas owner, Russia, and the transit actor, Ukraine. This is the main knowledge gap that this article addresses. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the role of energy resources in the annexation of Crimea. While often addressed as an energy transit state, Ukraine as a producer and contributer to European energy demand is often overlooked. This negligence is unjustified as Ukraine was known as one of the three largest unconventional gas resource owners in Europe and was promising to hold a significant position in the future energy supply of the continent (Weijermars, 2013). The post-crises changes in the possession of energy resources affects Europe’s energy plans extensively, especially considering the fact that Europe Bereitgestellt von TAMPERE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY | Heruntergeladen 19.02.20 12:25 UTC 150 Javad Keypour Ivar Hendla Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 9, No. 3 (28) is facing a decline in its domestic gas production until 2030 (Hall, 2018). The researchers who have tried to give energy factor more attention in the annexation have not answered the principal question of how Russia, the biggest world natural gas owner (BP, 2017), would be tempted to seize the peninsula for some potential fields? As an example, Jeff D. Colgan and Thijs Van de Graaf (2017) show that the Ukraine crisis was not an “energy war” although energy did play a crucial role along other several dimensions. The authors believe the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine is the most important factor in Russia – Ukraine energy relationship. John Biersack and Shannon O’Lear (2014) believe the decision for annexation was backed by geopolitical and energy interests of the peninsula in Kremlin. Although the paper mentions the fact that Russia does not need Crimean resources thanks to its own giant gas reserves, it still gives a chance for these energy resources as a motivation for the annexation. The main claim of the article is that Russia tried to hinder the EU’s effort to take advantage of Ukrainian energy resources after Kyiv–EU agreement. Some researchers already assumed that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was raised to prevent it from joining to NATO (Mearsheimer, 2014). This research goes through the question of whether we can apply the same logic for Ukrainian energy resources. However, another point should be clarified at the beginning. The current research is not going to prove that energy interests have been the “main” reason nor “primary” motivation behind the annexation, instead, it tries to shed light on how the seizure of the peninsula has emasculated Ukraine in the future energy scene of Europe and assured Russian dominance on the European gas market. Thus, the research does not raise controversy against the idea, repeatedly stated by some scholars, that implies Russian military interests in the Black Sea as the main impetus of the Kremlin to seize Crimea (Schwartz, 2014; Karagiannis, 2014). Therefore, the research question is—what is the role of Ukrainian energy resources in Russian plans for annexation of Crimea? This study employed theoretical thematic analysis since it is a flexible method appropriate for the problems demand a holistic methodology (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2012). Using data from diverse resources and multiple researchers’ works increases the reliability of the method. Therefore, in the first step, data has been prepared to rely on both primary and secondary sources. In other words, while statistical energy documents have been studied as the primary sources, analytical and statistical reports, as well as books, research papers and journals have been studied as the secondary ones. The structure of the paper is as follows. First, the findings of the current gas Bereitgestellt von TAMPERE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY | Heruntergeladen 19.02.20 12:25 UTC 151 The Annexation of Crimea: A Realist Look from the Energy Resources Perspective Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 9, No. 3 (28) relation between Russia and Europe is investigated. In the discussion part, the Ukrainian plans to achieve energy independence and becoming a net exporter (and a significant energy provider for Europe) is discussed and next, the incentives of Russia for the annexation of Crimea are explained based on the findings and relying on the balance of power concept. Finally, the conclusion will come to find the answer to the research question. 2. Results and findings Ukraine’s role in the EU’s natural gas market can be divided into two parts: the traditional one as the transit route for the gas flow from east to the west and the planned role that implies on a natural gas provider for the future of Europe. 2.1 Ukraine’s role in EU’s gas demand: the transit route Although the first oil shock made the EU think about its ‘energy security’ at the beginning of 1974, the green continent has been dependent on external sources for more than half of its energy needs, and this share has been increasing in recent years. As is shown in Figure 1, EU imported more than 55% of its consumed energy and more than 74% of its natural gas in 2017. Figure 1. Evolution of the EU energy dependency percentage (1990–2016) Source: Eurostat, 2019 Bereitgestellt von TAMPERE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY | Heruntergeladen 19.02.20 12:25 UTC 152 Javad Keypour Ivar Hendla Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 9, No. 3 (28) Russia has been a source of energy for the EU for a long time. This became particularly obvious for gas since the mid-1970s, when the building of natural gas pipelines was started from the Soviet Union toward the West. In 2017, Russia provided 35% of the total EU-28 supply (EIA, 2018). Traditionally, Russian gas has flowed to the west via Ukraine; however, a conflict in Moscow–Kyiv energy relationship started to rise after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In fact, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia and Ukraine have struggled to address the problem of the changing conditions before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the Soviet Union period, one country had combined significant state-owned gas reserves and a vast pipeline system stretching to the borders of Europe (Lockwood, 1993). However, in the post-Soviet era, one country controls gas supply (Russia), while the other one (Ukraine) both relies on that supply and has a significant influence on its delivery to important export customers. This resulted in two major conflicts in Russia–EU natural gas relations in 2006 and 2009 (Henderson, 2015). As a result, Europe considers dependency upon Russian gas as a threat also because of the Ukraine–Russia conflict in recent years. According to a Russian energy diplomacy document, published by the government, “politicization in energy relationship between Russia and foreign countries” and “Russian export dependence on transit countries” are the two main problems of the country (IES, 2010). As the document points out Ukraine implicitly, Ukraine’s role in transiting Russian gas to the west has declined from 85% in 2006 to 48% in 2017. This means that while in 2006 Ukraine transferred 128.5 bcm out of 151.46 bcm, in 2017 it transferred 93 bcm out of 194 bcm (BP, 2017). The declining trend of Russian gas export to the EU via Ukraine is likely to continue in the future. In April 2018, Alexei Miller, head of Russian gas giant Gazprom, declared that Russian resource base has been moving northward and there won’t be the same resources in the central gas transportation corridor as it was in the past. That’s why a certain transit could still be in place, in the amount of 10–15 bcm per year, but the Ukrainian side has to explain the viability of the new transit contract. (Soldatkin, 2018) Despite the fact that Miller did not give a time frame for the portrayed goal, it shows obviously how Ukraine’s role in the gas transfer is falling. Russia’s plan to diminish Kyiv in the gas transmission is based on the construction of two main pipelines towards the EU: Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream. Bereitgestellt von TAMPERE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY | Heruntergeladen 19.02.20 12:25 UTC 153 The Annexation of Crimea: A Realist Look from the Energy Resources Perspective Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 9, No. 3 (28) Some eastern EU Member States believe Nord Stream 2 to be a threat to their interests and, therefore, have tried to hinder the pipeline construction relying on a legal measure of the EU (Pirani & Yafimava, 2016). This has been followed by proposing a revision to the Third Energy Package, the main existing antitrust legislation package in the EU (Talus, 2019). However, as Germany will be the main customer of Russian gas via Nord Stream 2, and due to the participation of giant energy companies like Gazprom, ENGIE, OMV, Royal Dutch Shell, Uniper, and Wintershall as the shareholders (Nord Stream 2, 2018) it seems to be a promising project. Elimination of Ukraine from the EU–Russia gas relation will not only deprive Kyiv of the transit revenue but also emasculates Ukrainian strategic place in this relation. 2.2 Ukraine’s role in EU’s gas demand In addition to Russia’s plan for curtailment of Kyiv’s transit role, Moscow tends to affect Ukraine’s plan for domestic gas production. In fact, Ukraine has been planning to optimize its efficiency in energy consumption while increasing its domestic production. As depicted in Figure 2, the Ukrainian energy intensity (units of required energy per unit of GDP) has been improving in the postSoviet era; however, it is still significantly higher than the EU average. In April 2018, Ukraine and EU signed a 50 million euro agreement to support energy efficiency projects which obviously shows the great potential of Ukraine to lower its energy waste (EEAS, 2018). Figure 2. EU and Ukraine energy intensity, 1990–2015 Source: The World Bank, n.d. Bereitgestellt von TAMPERE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY | Heruntergeladen 19.02.20 12:25 UTC 154 Javad Keypour Ivar Hendla Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 9, No. 3 (28) Because of the decline in energy intensity and gas consumption, Ukraine has decreased its gas import during the last two decades, and it promises to cut its dependence on external sources (EIA, 2017). It is even predicted by Yuriy Vitrenko, the chief commercial officer of Naftogaz Ukraine that Ukraine will get rid of the dependence on Russian gas supplies from 2020 and become an exporter (Favasuli, 2017). Figure 3 shows how Ukraine has been decreasing its dependency on external gas sources during the last decades. Figure 3. Ukraine’s gas production, consumption, and import 1995–2016, bcma Source: BP, 2017 In addition to demand management, Ukraine’s achievement of the position of a net exporter has been planned on promotion of domestic production, mainly unconventional sources in the Eastern Ukraine and the resources of the Black Sea. While unconventional gas resources, including shale gas and coal bed methane, are located in the east, particularly in Kharkiv and Donetsk, Black Sea resources in Crimean territorial water are classified as conventional ones. An early estimate has already implied on the potential of resources in the Dnieper-Donets basin, the Donbas fold belt in Eastern Ukraine (Kabyshev et al., 1998). Energy Information Administration of the United States (EIA), estimated that 63.5 Tcf of natural gas and 1.2 billion barrels of oil are technically recoverable from the Dnieper-Donets basin and has come to similar conclusions (EIA, 2015). This is worth more than 450 billion dollars at 70 dollars per barrel. Bereitgestellt von TAMPERE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY | Heruntergeladen 19.02.20 12:25 UTC 155 The Annexation of Crimea: A Realist Look from the Energy Resources Perspective Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 9, No. 3 (28) Another recent study shows that amongst European countries, Poland, France, and Ukraine host the largest unconventional resources by estimations (Weijermars, 2013). EIA ranked Ukraine as the third shale gas resource owner in Europe (excluding Russia) as can be seen in Figure 4. The noteworthy point here is that while there are restricting rules and regulations in EU against shale gas activities (Tawonezvi, 2017), Ukraine is not an EU Member State and therefore can start production from unconventional resources without any legal bans. Figure 4. Shale gas resources in Europe, trillion cubic feet (tcf) Source: EIA, 2015 When it comes to the Crimean energy resources, no unanimously accepted prognoses are available, as the exploration of the reserves by ExxonMobil was stopped after the annexation. However, former Russian Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology Sergei Donskoi announced that Crimean territory has 44 hydrocarbon fields, 7 gas condensate reservoirs, and 10 oil and 27 gas fields. Natural gas reserves of 165.3 billion cubic meters, 47 million tons of oil and 18.2 million tons of gas condensate. “Oil fields are not numerous in Crimea but natural gas resources are big enough for such a relatively small region. It has gas condensate reservoirs as well,” he said (TASS, 2014). Ukrainian media last reported that Russia had seized some 7 billion cubic meters of natural gas from nine producing fields around Crimea since the annexation of the peninsula until April 2018 (UAWire, 2018). Bereitgestellt von TAMPERE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY | Heruntergeladen 19.02.20 12:25 UTC 156 Javad Keypour Ivar Hendla Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 9, No. 3 (28) In November 2013, Ukraine signed a 10 billion dollar shale gas productionsharing agreement with Shell for exploration at Yuzivska in Eastern Ukraine in order to take advantage of its natural gas resources. Yuzivska was discovered in 2010 and, according to an optimistic scenario presented by the former Minister of Power Generation and Coal Mining of Ukraine Eduard Stavytsky, Kyiv could double production only owing to Yuzivska gas field (Stavytskyi, 2013). In another, more realistic scenario it was predicted that these two shale projects, Olesska field in the West and Yuzivska field in the East, would help Kyiv to reach an additional 11 to 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas in five years’ time (Polityuk & Balmforth, 2013). A similar production plan was sketched for development of the Skifska block in the Black Sea by a consortium led by ExxonMobil (XOM.N) and Royal Dutch Shell (RDSa.L). It was planned to reach a production level of 5 bcma, according to Stavytskyi (Polityuk, 2012). These plans are now suspended due to the seizure of the peninsula by Russia. Figure 5 shows the location of the exploration blocks next to Crimea. Figure 5. Crimea’s oil and gas assets Source: Eurasian Business Briefing, 2016 It is also worth mentioning that according to the statistics, Ukraine had 600 bcm of conventional natural gas resources in 2014 (BP, 2017). 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