Who’s Afraid of a Pan-European Spectrum Policy? The EU and the Battles Over the UHF Broadcast Band

International Journal of Communication 12(2018), 337–358 1932–8036/20180005 Copyright © 2018 (Marko Ala-Fossi and Montse Bonet). Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives (by-nc-nd). Available at http://ijoc.org. "!   MARKO ALA-FOSSI University of Tampere, Finland1 MONTSE BONET Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain Several European Union (EU) member states have consistently opposed European Commission (EC) efforts to create a supranational EU spectrum policy, but only Finland voted against the EC at the World Radiocommunication Conference in 2015, proposing the release of the entire ultra-high frequency (UHF) band for mobile use. Originally, in 2007, the EC and Finland wanted quick release of the UHF for mobile, but the EC has changed its UHF policy completely. Based on a new institutionalism approach, this article argues that one of the main reasons for this development is that the EU’s spectrum policy planning system has become intergovernmental. The EU members are now able to force the EC to seek a wide consensus on spectrum policy. The unique Finnish spectrum policy stand is based on certain nation-specific institutional factors: concentration of power in the spectrum policy, strong economic orientation of the communication policy, and oversupply of UHF frequencies. Keywords: European Union, Finland, spectrum policy, broadcasting, mobile telecommunication A political power struggle between the European Commission (EC), with ambitions for a more supranational spectrum policy, and the European Union (EU) member states, defending their own national competence and government cooperation on spectrum decisions, has continued for nearly two decades. Each commission, one after another, has promoted the benefits of a centralized spectrum policy and management, and in 2014, this policy was made one of the EC’s top priorities (Juncker, 2014). The primary motive for these efforts is economic: The wish to regain global leadership in mobile telecommunication, a position Europe held in the 1990s after the worldwide adoption of Global System for Marko Ala-Fossi: [email protected] Montse Bonet: [email protected] Date submitted: 2016‒12‒07 1 This article is part of a four-year research project ‘Broadcasting in the Post-Broadcast Era: Policy, technology, and content production’, funded by the Academy of Finland (2013–2017). 338 Marko Ala-Fossi and Montse Bonet International Journal of Communication 12(2018) Mobile Communications, originally Groupe Spécial Mobile (GSM), the second-generation (2G) mobile telephony standard, but was later lost through the introduction of 3G and 4G systems. Although the initial success of GSM was based more on European government cooperation and coordination on other levels (Manninen, 2002; Michalis, 2007; Pelkmans, 2001) rather than any direct involvement of the EU, the EC is convinced that any failures in introducing 3G or 4G mobile technologies in Europe could have been fixed by increasing spectrum policy integration. For example, member states with fiscal ambitions and no shared vision were the ones that invited mobile operators to spend so much on new spectrum licenses in auctions that the introduction of 3G services in Europe was delayed (Junkkari, 2001). However, the EC itself promoted a market-oriented telecommunications policy for several years (Simpson, 2009), which is part of the reason that spectrum auctions were used in Europe in the first place (Ure, 2003). This study is focused on the European spectrum policy discussion on the ultra-high frequency (UHF) broadcast band, which in 2007 became the centerpiece of the debate. The EC originally favored a wider definition of spectrum released through digitalization of terrestrial television as “digital dividend” on the UHF broadcast band. However, the member states were ready to release for mobile only the upper part (the 800 MHz band) of the UHF through international decisions at the World Radiocommunication Conference in 2007 (WRC-07) and consecutive EU-level spectrum policy decisions. The debate became more intense at WRC-12, when African and Arab countries forced the European countries to get ready to release another part of the UHF broadcast TV spectrum (the 700 MHz band) for mobile broadband, contradicting the first joint European Radio Spectrum Policy Program (RSPP). In 2013, as most of the EU countries also failed to meet the EC deadline for releasing the 800 MHz band spectrum from television broadcasting for 4G mobile use, the EC reinstated the idea of a more centralized European spectrum policy and management but without success (Sims, Youell, & Womersley, 2015; Youell, 2015). The social importance of mobile telecommunication and the economic value of the industries dependent especially on mobile Internet have increased over the years; therefore, the stakes in the European spectrum policy debate are just getting higher. The proposal made by the EC in 2016 (Fioretti, 2016) is tied to promotion of the forthcoming 5G mobile technology, which is supposed to become “the backbone of the digital future” and the foundation of a vast market in the “Internet of Things” (European Commission, 2015b). The availability and harmonized allocation of the radio spectrum for new 5G mobile broadband services have been identified as the key factors for future economic growth in Europe not only by the EC, but also by leading European telecom manufacturers, mobile operators, and their European associations. In this article, we aim to answer three questions on European spectrum policy development. The first question is in the title of the study: RQ1: Who is afraid of a pan-European spectrum policy? In other words, why do the EU member states continue to formally oppose proposals for a more panEuropean spectrum policy by the EC even when they are willing to support the essential substance of the International Journal of Communication 12(2018) Who’s Afraid of a Pan-European Spectrum Policy? 339 proposals as individual member states? This is what happened when most of the member states rejected an EC proposal for a binding European spectrum policy position on the future of the UHF spectrum at the Council of the European Union, just a few weeks before most of the member states voted in favor of the very same policy on the future of UHF at WRC-15. The second question is what we call the European spectrum policy paradox: RQ2: If the availability and access to additional spectrum resources are so essential for mobile industries in creating new jobs and bringing Europe back on top, why do the EC and all EU member states (except one) at the same time oppose the release of more of the spectrum for mobile use from the UHF band? This is what happened at WRC-15. By voting against the EC spectrum policy position, Finland was the only member state supporting the reallocation of additional UHF spectrum resources to mobile use from traditional TV broadcasting. The third question is RQ3: Why does the small northern state of Finland, one of the European leaders in the development and use of new mobile technologies, have such an aggressive spectrum policy compared with all other member states and with the most recent EC spectrum policy positions? The homeland of Nokia has been boldly pushing its own spectrum policy objectives: Finland was the first nation in Europe to decide to clear the 700 MHz band for mobile service in 2012, contradicting the European RSPP and the EC efforts for European harmonization. Finland is also one of the three EU member states the EC is accusing at the Court of Justice of the European Union of damaging the EU spectrum policy objectives for WRC-15 (Mumford, 2016). This article analyzes the pan-European spectrum policy debate on UHF from a theoretical perspective, which combines new institutionalism with political economy. Our basic theoretical assumption is that policy choices can be explained by analyzing the institutional structure, which frames the process of policymaking (Brevini, 2013; Galperin, 2004a, 2004b). This means that we consider institutions—not only structures, but also norms and procedures—and social actors as the “key mediators between technological innovation and policy reforms” (Galperin, 2004b, p. 162). Moreover, we can distinguish between static neoinstitutionalist approaches from those focused “on the ways norms and shared understanding emerge and evolve” (Katzenbach, Herweg, & Van Roessel, 2016, p. 844). Critical political economy also serves our objective because it is holistic, historical, and concerned with the balance between capitalist enterprise and public intervention and puts the focus on basic moral questions of justice, equity, and public good (Murdock & Golding, 2005). The radio spectrum, and especially the UHF band, is not only a technological resource. It should be understood as a public good with a high social, cultural, and economic weight, and as a relevant part of a political and economic project for the information society. Therefore, policymaking on the use of radio spectrum involves disputes, which, however, may guarantee rationality and efficiency (Bonet & Guimerà i Orts, 2016). 340 Marko Ala-Fossi and Montse Bonet International Journal of Communication 12(2018) In the context of governing European communications, our article begins in the era of competitiveness, knowledge economy, and technological convergence (Michalis, 2007), and it operates on three levels: the international context (World Radiocommunication Conferences) in which the spectrum policies originated, the internal (EU) or domestic (Finland) configuration of interests and institutions, and the legacies of (analogue) television broadcasting and mobile telecommunication systems and regimes. In addition to a large body of public documents—including all the European stakeholder responses for the EC High Level Group report (the Lamy report) on the future of the UHF spectrum in 2015—and previous research on this field, the data for the qualitative analysis consist of 81 communications policy stakeholder interviews (members of the political elite, such as members of Parliament, civil servants; broadcasters; network operators; mobile and information/communication technology industry managers; and representatives of civil society or associations) conducted in eight European countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom [UK]) between September 2014 and March 2016. Framework of the Analysis The decision-making process on the radio spectrum in Europe is a “domestication process” (Michalis, 2007, p. 157) as supranational policies are mediated by the social, political, economic, and cultural contexts of the countries involved in a certain path dependency (Voltmer, 2013). When the dispute over pan-European spectrum policy is examined in a historical context, it is easy to see the two main reasons why the member states rejected the EC’s first attempts to develop more centralized or supranational EU spectrum management. First, the spectrum is a scarce resource for communication, and from a national standpoint, it is not politically or economically rational to let someone else decide the use of national property or give it away without compensation (Garnham & Mulgan, 1991). Second, control of sufficient spectrum resources is vital for national defense and security. For example, in the UK, slightly more than half of the radio spectrum is occupied by the public sector, and the British Ministry of Defense alone uses 75% of this space below 5 GHz. The majority of the EU members (22 of 28) are also NATO members, and some also need to adapt to military spectrum use by non-EU countries across the border (Junkkari, 2001; Sims et al., 2015). Therefore, in later policy proposals (e.g., COM [2005] 400 final), the EC excluded all of the spectrum used for military and scientific purposes or aviation and satellite communication, and defined the common European market for the spectrum in practice only as the spectrum bands used for terrestrial broadcasting and telecommunications. However, this has not eliminated member states’ rationales for opposing proposals to limit the states’ fundamental rights to national competence over spectrum policy within the EU (Michalis, 2016, p. 122). The UHF broadcast band is an especially interesting case because more than half of the European population still watches terrestrial broadcast television (European Broadcasting Union, 2014). In certain countries, such as Spain, Italy, and France, it is still the dominant TV platform; therefore, the availability of the spectrum for terrestrial broadcasting has very high political and cultural importance. At the same time, in other countries, such as Finland, Sweden, and Germany, the very same frequencies are, for various historical reasons, seen as much less crucial for television broadcasting and are treated more like International Journal of Communication 12(2018) Who’s Afraid of a Pan-European Spectrum Policy? 341 national economic resources for mobile industries (Jalava & Pohjola, 2007). It is interesting that although Nokia, Finland, and the EC obviously did not agree on every aspect of European spectrum policy, they were ready to end the priority position of TV over the UHF broadcast band at WRC-07 to make room for digital video broadcasting–handheld (DVB-H) mobile broadcasting. A small change in the international regulatory status of the UHF band (giving mobile use a coprimary status) would have allowed each nation to decide how much of the UHF spectrum it wants to have for regular broadcast television. However, the time was not ripe for mobile TV or abandoning international regulation on the UHF band. The decision-making process on the use of the spectrum includes state actors; structural and organizational arrangements, procedures, and routines; the role of lobbyists; and even ideological factors. All of this determines the capacity of those who make and those who try to influence policy and makes it a good example of the institutional analysis approach (Galperin, 2004a). Table 1. European UHF Spectrum Policy Processes at the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC) 2007. Note. ITU = International Telecommunication Union; CEPT = European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations; DVB-H = digital video broadcasting–handheld; ASMG = Arab Spectrum Management Group; ATU = African Telecommunications Union; GSMA = Global System for Mobile communications Association; RSPG = Radio Spectrum Policy Group; RSC = Radio Spectrum Committee.   !   !  "!!  !$   !   !  !   ! $     !   &)+  *     '#     "   (  65$! . "##" 0$! "" ""!%!1 ""$"#!$ "$##*!#* !)# $! "# 01+ "#!"#  68!"##" 0&#$#1 *"*$#$!*  #%$"+ #!!"#!"#  #! ":44)"## %!$"$#  944)!#!!"#! ,  !&#*#  ##%"" ! "!!"#! # !#.,  66!$#!" "#!#!"#   ! "! $"  77!$#!" "#!#!"#  "(:44)"# #%       $! 069$#!"1- $! ""05;;8/1 "" $### $ * #* "#!#%$" "##!! $""#! ## "$""&#.,  !&#* "!!%$ "##!# !#., $"#!"*$ $## !&#* "!!%$ $ !#!!"$# ' "#".,  %"%   %"!(+06446/1 06446/1 %"!("!! " #!$ (.<   #!$(!! 01 /  342 Marko Ala-Fossi and Montse Bonet International Journal of Communication 12(2018) Although the EU and its regulatory and advisory bodies already play a big role in regional spectrum planning and coordination and harmonization for creating a digital single market, all the international decisions on spectrum issues are made by member states (see Table 1). The European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT), the regional organization of the International Telecommunication Union (see Tables 1, 2, and 3), prepares the common European proposals for WRCs, but the EU prepares its own policy position based on EC communication. As the EU has no right to vote in the ITU or to dictate the spectrum policy for sovereign nation states, it has to rely on member states to promote joint EU policy goals at WRCs (Puigrefagut, 2011; Shahin, 2011). This means that the domestication process also works the other way, as the EC must try to reach consensus among member states to get the widest possible support for EC proposals. Table 2. European UHF Spectrum Policy Processes at the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC) 2012. Note. ITU = International Telecommunication Union; CEPT = European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations; ECP = European Common Position; DVB-H = digital video broadcasting–handheld; ASMG = Arab Spectrum Management Group; ATU = African Telecommunications Union; RSPP = Radio Spectrum Policy Program; GSMA = Global System for Mobile communications Association; RSPG = Radio Spectrum Policy Group; RSC = Radio Spectrum Committee.   !   !  "!!  !$   !   !  !   ! $     !   &)*  )     '#     "   (  21# + !""! -# !! !! $ . !!#!" # !#""( "(  '" )"#!"  "," !" " "500' !* 24 !""! -%"#". (!(#"# ( "$#!) " !" !" "  #!"  "," !" " "500' !*   %"(" ""$!! !!"" !" # !"+12  22 #" ! ""    "") !500 ' #!  33 #" ! ""    "") !500 ' #!       # -25#" !. # !!-1664,. (!! #""" # ("( !" "$#! "+%!!#! #!  !" #&" "  !"   %"( !  $# !500'  #! #!" !(# #""  %"( !  $# !500'  #!  %"%   $! &) $! &&   !" #& ,  International Journal of Communication 12(2018) Who’s Afraid of a Pan-European Spectrum Policy? 343 This is one of the reasons that the EC started to seek new European consensus on UHF after the first RSPP was ruined at WRC-12, instead of just encouraging member states to follow Finland and release the 700 MHz band as soon as possible. There was strong disagreement over the 700 MHz issue among the member states from the beginning. Thus, the EC had to invest time and effort in building the basis for tolerable consensus for all of Europe. Another reason that the UHF broadcast band received special treatment at the EU level is the continuing importance of television broadcasting in European politics and culture (European Broadcasting Union, 2014, 2017). Although European governments and national broadcasters may no longer have a hegemonic power position over the spectrum policy in the entire ITU Region 1 as they used to (El-Moghazi, Whalley, & Irvine, 2014), there is absolutely no reason to underestimate their cumulative lobbying power at the domestic and international levels. Table 3. European UHF Spectrum Policy Processes at the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC) 2015. Note. ITU = International Telecommunication Union; CEPT = European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations; ECP = European Common Position; ASMG = Arab Spectrum Management Group; ATU = African Telecommunications Union; GSMA = Global System for Mobile Communications Association; RSPG = Radio Spectrum Policy Group; RSC = Radio Spectrum Committee.   !   !  "!!  !$   !   !  !   ! $     !   &)*  )     '#     "   (  64%" ! . #$$#  ##%#$" %  #%$$ + "$ + " *$  ,!! #$"#  $'7948;7*+  "$"# $944 * " - 69"#$$# 0'$ %$1   +# +%$%"+ ! $&%#, $""#$"#$  !$ " !! #$"#  $'7948;7*+  "$"# $944 * " -    " '$+$   !$$&## . %$")!" ! # " "#$$"-  66" %$"#  $" ##%#+ (&%# ! # %$. %$")071!" ! # " "#$$"-  77" %$"#  ##%# $%$%"  $0# $ '%" ! ##%#  $%# 1 !! #$"#  $'7948;7*+  "$"# $944 * "        %" ! 06: %$"#1 %" ! ## 05;;8/1 )"! "$+" ! #  " %#    +! $+ #$"$&%# !! #$"#  $'7948;7*+  "$"# $944 * " -     " '$+ #" "&% #$$"  %#$"#+% %$ $    " '$+ #" "&% #$$"  %"%   "$, &# ") ) ""  #!$"%! ) /  344 Marko Ala-Fossi and Montse Bonet International Journal of Communication 12(2018) The EC’s economic goals for a coordinated and harmonized European spectrum policy may have remained the same as before, but the institutional framework for making decisions and shaping measures for the spectrum policy in the EU has changed, and the level of direct EU activity at the ITU declined (Shahin, 2011) between 2007 and 2015. Therefore, the EC proposed a carefully drafted compromise between the mobile industry’s wants and the broadcast industry’s needs as a common EU position for WRC-15. The main reason the member states rejected the proposal as a legally binding position was a formal dispute over political power. There might have been others, but we have evidence that only one country disagreed on the substance of the proposal. Finland, which has held the same view on the future of the UHF broadcast band with the mobile industry, again found itself alone, this time as the only member state to oppose the EU’s position. The Context of the UHF Spectrum Dispute The politics of the national television policies of EU member states spread into European spectrum policymaking as soon as the mobile industries started to battle over control of the UHF band with the broadcasters. Since 1947, a large part of the UHF spectrum (300 MHz to 3 GHz) has been reserved exclusively for television broadcasting (470–862 MHz). In Europe, this portion was also widely used for that purpose, whereas the U.S. television industry preferred the lower very-high-frequency (VHF) band. In the context of the growth of mobile telephony, the release of the UHF broadcast spectrum for mobile became one of the main motives for digitalization of broadcast television (Galperin, 2004a), mainly because the UHF frequencies provide a unique combination of wide coverage and good indoor reception with very small antennas suitable for mobile use. The foundation for the worldwide success of European GSM mobile technology was laid at the World Administrative Radio Conference in 1979. This ITU conference adjusted the reservation of the 900 MHz band for land mobile to become global. However, a European plan for use of this band was created only after the success of the new analogue Nordic mobile phone system NMT (1G). Within two years of its introduction on the 450 MHz band in 1981, the Nordic countries had almost as many mobile phone subscribers as the rest of the Europe and the U.S. combined (Manninen, 2002, p. 28). GSM (2G) development began in 1982 under the control of European national postal, telegraph, and telephone services, other telecom operators, and the GSM Group within CEPT. They coordinated the use of the 900 MHz band directly with the national governments. In all of this activity, the EC had practically no role: As late as 1984, mobile telephony was a minor issue in the EC’s telecom policy program. However, the EC became a supporter of GSM technology and made strategic interventions, such as the GSM Directive (87/372/EEC) harmonizing the frequencies reserved for GSM in the European Economic Community member states. This happened in a context marked by liberalization of telecommunications toward a single European market, as well as increasing deregulation in the audiovisual sector, which both aimed at creating and/or supporting “European champions” to improve Europe’s global competitiveness. However, the EC did not have much power to steer the telecom sector or spectrum use until the Maastricht Treaty, which changed the European Economic Community into the European Union in 1993, and even after that, the EC’s power remained limited. In this early stage, the EU International Journal of Communication 12(2018) Who’s Afraid of a Pan-European Spectrum Policy? 345 was also keen to work on its own with the ITU (Manninen, 2002; Michalis, 2007; Pelkmans, 2001; Shahin, 2011; Simpson, 2009). The foundation for the current spectrum battle was laid after the U.S. made a breakthrough in the development of digital television in 1990. The EC stopped its economic and political support for the development of an analogue high-definition television standard in 1993, and a pan-European industry-led project to develop digital video broadcasting (DVB) was established instead (Ala-Fossi, 2016). The involvement of the British government in the EU policy shift from analogue high-definition television to digital TV and in early recognition of the economic potential of spectrum release through digitalization of television was crucial. According to Galperin (2004a, p. 252), largely because of a structural concentration of power in the British cabinet, radical innovations and policy experiments are typical for the British regulation of communications industries. This has been the case in the British approach to the European spectrum policy (Minervini, 2014). It is perhaps no surprise that, in 2000, the British government was the first in Europe to organize an auction for the licenses of new mobile spectrum blocks above 1 GHz,2 which became available after WRC-2000 (Sims et al., 2015). Within a year, the UK was followed by five other EU member states. The result was a success in fiscal terms as the mobile operators ended up paying almost €136.6 billion for their new licenses into state coffers, but it was also a disaster (Ure, 2003) as many European operators were now deeply in debt, and some were unable to invest in the new 3G networks (Fuentelsaz, Maícas, & Polo, 2008; Junkkari, 2001; Whalley & Curwen, 2006). The turning point came in 2002 as the Framework Directive (2002/21/EC) along with four directives and one decision were approved. The directives realized the will of the European Parliament and the Council to normatively control all aspects of the spectrum. As a result of this regulatory change, a joint European Radio Spectrum Committee (RSC) and a Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG) were created. The EC was also trying to catch up to the U.S. lead in 3G by increasing European integration. The EC proposed a market-based approach to spectrum management (COM [2005] 400 final), an initiative to increase European coordination of the spectrum policy (COM [2006] 334), and the creation (COM [2007] 699) of the European Electronic Communications Market Authority. The supranational regulator European Electronic Communications Market Authority has been described as “one of the most radical proposals of the Commission” (de Streel, 2008, p. 731). The proposal was rejected by the member states, but in 2009, it led to increasing government cooperation with the creation of the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BERED) (Simpson, 2009). Currently, the EU also has a government body for content regulation, the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) and the RSPG is a coordinating and advisory body of national spectrum regulators, which advises the EC on the development of a joint radio spectrum policy for the EU. The RSPG is also able to direct the CEPT to carry out studies for the RSPG’s recommendations (Shahin, 2011). 2 The new allocations for mobile telephony at WRC-2000 were 1.7 GHz (1,710–1,885 MHz) and 2.5 GHz (2,500–2,690 MHz). 352 Marko Ala-Fossi and Montse Bonet International Journal of Communication 12(2018) social, and cultural goals either, because all of these issues belong largely or completely to member states. This means that the EC tends to emphasize the perspectives of the economic and monetary value of the spectrum use. Therefore, even if the EC still defines the spectrum primarily as a vital resource for economic growth, European governments and broadcasters with increased power within the policymaking process for the EU spectrum policy continue to treat the UHF broadcast band as a vital resource for sustaining and supporting their domestic politics and culture. In addition, we argue (RQ3) that Finland is a special case within the EU basically because of three institutional, path-dependent factors: the concentration of power in spectrum management and planning (institutional/political), the strong one-dimensional economic orientation of the communication policy (institutional/economic), and the planned oversupply of UHF frequencies (institutional/technological). In many European countries, more than one ministry is involved in the decision making for broadcast spectrum use—or the spectrum for broadcasting and telecommunication like mobile broadband, is controlled by two different ministries. But in Finland, for example, the Ministry of Education and Culture has no role in spectrum policy. All the issues related to media, communication, and spectrum use are controlled by the Ministry of Transport and Communications only. The ministry itself argues that when “all spectrum matters are in the same hands” (Pursiainen, 2015, p. 1.), it becomes possible to implement a more “dynamic” spectrum policy than anywhere else in Europe. It is hardly surprising that the government of Finland promotes mobile industry goals in its spectrum policy, because the emphasis chosen for the national communications policy is on creating new jobs and economic growth (Ministry of Transport and Communications, 2008b). The former mobile phone giant Nokia is now a network giant, and again, the most significant company in the Finnish economy in terms of the gross domestic product, with lobbying power unrivaled in Finland (Ali-Yrkkö et al., 2016; Lindén, 2016). Nokia’s influence on Finnish society continues to extend beyond the traditional limits as many of the key positions in the government and media system relevant to the spectrum policy are held by former Nokia top executives or their former business partners. The proportion of Finnish households that are dependent on terrestrial television broadcasting is still relatively high, but the total population is only 5.5 million. The economic importance of television broadcasters operating in Finland is also small, especially when compared with the mobile sector with two other companies in the Finnish top 10 in addition to Nokia (Ali-Yrkkö et al., 2016). Because of the combination of a flexible national spectrum policy, a small number of channels, and the rapid implementation of advanced digital broadcasting standards such as DVB-T2, there has not been a severe spectrum shortage for terrestrial television broadcasting in Finland, although the 700 MHz band has also been cleared for mobile broadband use. Finally, our analysis of the disputes about the European UHF radio spectrum management discussed in this article shows that even in a globalized system, which fosters technological change and economic growth, nation states and their policies still matter. International Journal of Communication 12(2018) Who’s Afraid of a Pan-European Spectrum Policy? 353 References Ala-Fossi, M. (2016). Why TV bits and radio bits did not fit together? Digitalization and divergence of broadcast media. In A. Lugmayr & C. Dal Zotto (Eds.), Media convergence handbook: Vol. 1. Journalism, broadcasting, and social media aspects of convergence (pp. 265–285). Berlin, Germany: Springer. Ali-Yrkkö, J., Seppälä, T., & Mattila, J. (2016). Suurten yritysten ja niiden arvoketjujen rooli taloudessa [The role of largest companies and their value chains in the economy] (ETLA Reports No. 53). Helsinki, Finland: The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. Bonet, M., & Guimerà i Orts, J. (2016). When efficiency meets clientelism: Spectrum management policy and broadcasting model—The Spanish case. European Journal of Communication, 31(4), 411– 425. Brevini, B. (2013). Public service broadcasting online. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Council of the European Union. (2007, October). 2821st meeting of the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Committee. Luxembourg, 13066/07 (Presse 203), C/07/203, p. 20. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-07-203_en.pdf Council of State. (2008). Valtioneuvoston kirjelmä Eduskunnalle U52/2007 [Government communication U52/2007]. Retrieved from https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Kirjelma/Documents/ u_52+2007.pdf de Streel, A. (2008). Current and future European regulation of electronic communications: A critical assessment. Telecommunications Policy, 32(11), 722–734. Department for Culture, Media, and Sport. (2015). Explanatory memorandum on European Union Document 9455/15 +ADD1, COM (2015) 234. London, UK. Retrieved from https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-internal-market-subcommittee/ITUWorld-Radiocommunications-Conference/9455-15-internal-telecommunications-UnionCom(2015)234-150615.pdf El-Moghazi, M., Whalley, J., & Irvine, J. (2014). European influence in ITU-R: The end of an era of dominance? Info, 16(4), 1–17. European Broadcasting Union. (2014). Radio spectrum—The EBU Q&A. Retrieved from https://www.ebu.ch/contents/publications/Fact%20Sheets/radio-spectrum-the-ebu-qa.html European Broadcasting Union. (2017). Audience trends. Television 2017 [Public version]. Geneva, Switzerland. Retrieved from http://www.ebu.ch/mis 354 Marko Ala-Fossi and Montse Bonet International Journal of Communication 12(2018) European Commission. (2007a). Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2007) 371 final. The ITU World Radiocommunication Conference 2007 (WRC-07), Brussels, Belgium. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/ cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=4368 European Commission. (2007b). Commission opens Europe’s single market for mobile TV services [Press release]. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/ 07/1118&format=HTML& European Commission. (2007c). Results of the World Radiocommunication Conference 2007 (WRC-07)— Information from the Commission, 15493/07. Retrieved from http://register.consilium.europa.eu/ doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015493%202007%20INIT European Commission. (2015a). Collection of public stakeholder responses on the Lamy report, DG Connect/ B4. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/ document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=9735 European Commission. (2015b). The EU and China signed a key partnership on 5G, our tomorrow’s communication networks [Press release]. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/digital-singlemarket/en/news/eu-and-china-signed-key-partnership-5g-our-tomorrows-communicationnetworks European Commission. (2015c). Opinions for the future use of the UHF TV broadcasting band: The Lamy report—Outcome of the public consultation. Summary report, DG Connect/B4. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=9736 European Commission. (2015d). Proposal for a council decision on the position to be adopted, on behalf of the European Union. In The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) World Radiocommunication Conference 2015 (WRC-15), COM (2015) 234 final. Brussels, Belgium. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/AUTO/?uri=COM:2015:0234:FIN European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations. (2007). European Common proposals for the work of the conference, Part 4, Agenda Item 1.4. World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-07). Geneva, Switzerland: International Telecommunication Union. European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations. (2012). European Common proposals for the work of the conference, Document 5-E. World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-12). Geneva, Switzerland: International Telecommunication Union. European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations. (2015). European Common proposals for the work of the conference, Document 9-E, Agenda Item 1.1. World International Journal of Communication 12(2018) Who’s Afraid of a Pan-European Spectrum Policy? 355 Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-15). Geneva, Switzerland: International Telecommunication Union. European Court of Justice. (2015). Case C-687/15: Action brought on 17 December 2015—European Commission v Council of the European Union, 2016/C 068/32, OJ C 68, 22 February, 24–25. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2016:068:FULL Finland. (2007). Proposals for the Work of the Conference. Agenda Items 1.4 and 7.2. Committees 4 and 6. Document 128-E. World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-07). Geneva, Switzerland: International Telecommunication Union. Finland. (2015). Proposals for the Work of the Conference. Agenda Item 1.1 Document 99-E. World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-15). Geneva, Switzerland: International Telecommunication Union. Fioretti, J. (2016, August 15). EU to propose minimum spectrum license duration of 25 years. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-telecoms-license-idUSKCN10Q1M4 Fuentelsaz, L., Maícas, J. P., & Polo, Y. (2008). The evolution of mobile communications in Europe: The transition from the second to the third generation. Telecommunications Policy, 32, 436–449. Galperin, H. (2004a). Beyond interests, ideas, and technology: An institutional approach to communication and information policy. The Information Society: An International Journal, 20(3), 159–168. Galperin, H. (2004b). New television, old politics: The transition to digital TV in the United States and Britain. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Garnham, N., & Mulgan, G. (1991). Broadband and the barriers to convergence in the European community. Telecommunications Policy, 15(3), 182–194. Global System for Mobile communications Association. (2015). GSMA welcomes multi-country support for sub-700 MHz spectrum for mobile broadband at WRC-15 [Press release]. Retrieved from http://www.gsma.com/newsroom/press-release/gsma-welcomes-multi-country-support-for-sub700mhz-spectrum-for-mobile-broadband-at-wrc-15/ Jalava, J., & Pohjola, M. (2007). ICT as a source of output and productivity growth in Finland. Telecommunications Policy, 31, 463–472. Juncker, J.-C. (2014). My priorities. Retrieved from http://juncker.epp.eu/my-priorities Junkkari, M. (2001, June 14). Telekomissaari Liikanen sysää vastuun umts-katastrofista EU:n jäsenmaille [Telecommunications Commissioner Liikanen: The EU member states responsible for the UMTS 356 Marko Ala-Fossi and Montse Bonet International Journal of Communication 12(2018) catastrophe]. Helsingin Sanomat. Retrieved from http://www.hs.fi/talous/art2000003976154.html Katzenbach, C., Herweg, S., & Van Roessel, L. (2016). Copies, clones, and genre building: Discourses on imitation and innovation in digital games. International Journal of Communication, 10, 838–859. Kiuru, K., & Hatt, A.-K. (2014, 20 May). Letter to distinguished colleagues in the EU. Helsinki, Finland, and Stockholm, Sweden: Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications and Swedish Ministry of Information Technology and Energy. Lamy, P. (2014). Results of the work of the High Level Group on the future use of the UHF band (470–790 MHz). Report to the European Commission, Brussels, Belgium. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=6721 Lindén, C.-G. (2016). Nokian valtakunta. Raportti hulluilta vuosilta [Kingdom of Nokia. Report from the crazy years]. Helsinki, Finland: Gaudeamus. Manninen, A. T. (2002). Elaboration of NMT and GSM standards. From idea to market (Doctoral dissertation). Studia Historica Jyväskyläensia 60. Jyväskylä, Finland: University of Jyväskylä. Michalis, M. (2007). Governing European communications: From unification to coordination. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Michalis, M. (2016). Global communications and national policies: The view from the EU. In T. Flew, P. Iosifidis, & J. Steemers (Eds.), Global media and national policies: The return of the state (pp. 122–138). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Minervini, L. (2014). Spectrum management reform: Rethinking practices. Telecommunications Policy, 38(2), 136–146. Ministry of Transport and Communications. (2005). Taajuuspoliittinen kuulemistilaisuus 4.10. 2005. Pöytäkirja [Minutes of the public hearing on spectrum policy at October 4, 2005]. Helsinki, Finland: Author. Ministry of Transport and Communications. (2008a). Collection of public statements about FICORA report (112/04/2008) on technical conditions for the use of spectrum released from analogue TV broadcasting. Request for comments (53/12/2008). Helsinki, Finland: Author. Ministry of Transport and Communications. (2008b). Viestintäministeri Lindén: Kansallista viestintäpolitiikkaa tarvitaan jatkossakin talouskasvun ja työpaikkojen luomiseksi [Minister of Communications Lindén: National communication policy is necessary also in the future for creating economic growth and jobs] [Press release]. Retrieved from https://www.lvm.fi/- International Journal of Communication 12(2018) Who’s Afraid of a Pan-European Spectrum Policy? 357 /viestintaministeri-linden-kansallista-viestintapolitiikkaa-tarvitaan-jatkossakin-talouskasvun-jatyopaikkojen-luomiseksi-770937 Ministry of Transport and Communications. (2012a). Collection of public statements on government proposal for communications policy programme for electronic media. Request for comments LVM/1262/01/2012. Retrieved from https://www.lvm.fi/asiat/2012/-/mahti/asianasiakirjat/61038 Ministry of Transport and Communications. (2012b). Communications policy program for electronic media: Government report to the Parliament of Finland. Retrieved from https://www.lvm.fi/lvm-mahtiportlet/download?did=80234 Ministry of Transport and Communications. (2015a). Expert statement for the Transport and Communication Committee. E 27/2015 vp LiV. Retrieved from https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/JulkaisuMetatieto/Documents/EDK-2015-AK-11403.pdf Ministry of Transport and Communications. (2015b). Memorandum LVM2015-00160. Retrieved from https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Liiteasiakirja/Documents/EDK-2015-AK-8076.pdf Mumford, K. (2016, March 10). Brussels legal action includes swipe at three member states. Retrieved from http://www.policytracker.com/headlines/brussels-legal-action-includes-swipe-at-threemember-states/ Murdock, G., & Golding, P. (2005). Culture, communications and political economy. In J. Curran & M. Gurevitch (Eds.), Mass media and society (pp. 60–83). London, UK: Arnold. Nokia. (2005, September 10). Lausunto liittyen taajuuspoliittiseen kuulemistilaisuuteen 4.10.2005 [Nokia’s statement concerning the public hearing on spectrum policy at October 4, 2005]. Helsinki, Finland: Nokia. Nokia. (2008, April 29). Nokia Oyj:n ja Nokia Siemens Networks Oy:n lausunto koskien teknisiä reunaehtoja analogisilta televisiolähetyksiltä vapautuneiden taajuuksien käyttömahdollisuuksille [Nokia and NSN statement about technical report on possible uses of spectrum released from analogue broadcasting]. Helsinki, Finland: Nokia. Nokia. (2012, June 28). Nokia Oyj:n ja Nokia Siemens Networks Oy:n vastaus lausuntopyyntöön LVM/1262/01/2012 luonnoksesta sähköisen median viestintäpoliittiseksi ohjelmaksi [Nokia and NSN statement on proposal for communications policy program for electronic media]. Helsinki, Finland: Nokia. Nokia. (2015, April 12). Nokia response to the public consultation on the future use of the UHF TV broadcasting band: The Lamy report. Helsinki, Finland: Nokia. 358 Marko Ala-Fossi and Montse Bonet International Journal of Communication 12(2018) Pelkmans, J. (2001). The GSM standard: Explaining a success story. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(3), 432–453. Puigrefagut, E. (2011). Broadcasters define their positions for WRC-12. EBU Technical Review, Q4, 1–12. Retrieved from https://tech.ebu.ch/docs/techreview/trev_2011-Q4_wrc-12_puigrefagut.pdf Pursiainen, H. (2015, December 7). Stagnant spectrum policy. Retrieved from http://www.lvm.fi/en/- /stagnant-spectrumpolicy-859099 Russell, R. (2007). United States delegation report. World Radiocommunication Conference 2007, Geneva, Switzerland. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/108955.pdf Shahin, J. (2011). The European Union’s performance in the International Telecommunication Union. Journal of European Integration, 33(6), 683–698. Simpson, S. (2009). Supranationalism through institutionalization and its limits in European telecommunications. Information, Communication & Society, 12(8), 1224–1241. Sims, M., Youell, T., & Womersley, R. (2015). Understanding spectrum liberalisation. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Ure, J. (2003). Deconstructing 3G and reconstructing telecoms. Telecommunications Policy, 27, 187–206. Valero, J. (2015, October 23). Lamy: Commission should take member states to court in spectrum dispute. Retrieved from http://www.euractiv.com/sections/digital/lamy-commission-should-takemember-states-court-over-spectrum-dispute-318792 Voltmer, K. (2013). The media in transitional democracies. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Whalley, J., & Curwen, P. (2006). Third-generation new entrants in the European mobile telecommunications industry. Telecommunications Policy, 30, 622–632. Youell, T. (2015, July 1). EU agrees spectrumless “connected continent” package. Retrieved from http://www.policytracker.com/headlines/european-union-adopts-201cconnected-continent201drules-on-roaming-and-net-neutrality