Can Non-Muslims Become Experts in Islamic Law? Two Sections from the Kawāshif al-ḥujub ʿan mushkilāt al-kutub of al-Māzandarānī (d. 1285/1868)

This is a self-archived version of an original article. This version may differ from the original in pagination and typographic details. Author(s): Title: Year: Version: Copyright: Rights: Rights url: Please cite the original version: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Can Non-Muslims Become Experts in Islamic Law? Two Sections from the Kawāshif alḥujub ʿan mushkilāt al-kutub of al-Māzandarānī (d. 1285/1868) © Authors 2023 Published version Ehteshami, Amin; Rezakhany, Hassan Ehteshami, A., & Rezakhany, H. (2023). Can Non-Muslims Become Experts in Islamic Law? Two Sections from the Kawāshif al-ḥujub ʿan mushkilāt al-kutub of al-Māzandarānī (d. 1285/1868). In K. Kumail Rajani, & R. Gleave (Eds.), Shiʿite Legal Theory : Sources and Commentaries (pp. 94112). Edinburgh University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781399520270-005 2023 Chapter 3 Can Non-Muslims Become Experts in Islamic Law? Two Sections from the Kawāshif al-ḥujub ʿan mushkilāt al-kutub of al-Mzandarnī (d. 1285/1868) Amin Ehteshami and Hassan Rezakhany Introduction Not much is known of Muḥammad Ṣliḥ al-Mzandarnī’s life (hereon Mzandarnī). His name suggests that he descended from the Mazandaran region in the north of Iran. His date of birth is unknown; in light of a report that at the time of his death in 1285/1868 he was around eightyyears old, he was likely born at the beginning of the thirteenth century AH, which coincides with the first decades of the Qajar dynasty (1789–1925).1 In addition to receiving seminary training in Isfahan, he studied in Karbala and Najaf with some of the prominent scholars of the time, including Muḥammad Sharif al-Mzandarnī (d. 1245/1829), Mūs Kshif al-Ghiṭʾ (d. 1242/1826) and his brother ʿAli Kshif al-Ghiṭʾ (d. 1253/1837). After reaching the level of juristic expertise (ijtihād) he returned to Isfahan where he had a distinguished career.2 Mzandarnī has received scant attention in biographical dictionaries and none of his writings are available in print. Besides a few brief treatises on legal topics and a work comprised of his notes (taqrīrāt) taken from the lectures of his teacher Sharif al-ʿUlamʾ (d. 1245/1829),3 Mzandarnī wrote two books on jurisprudence. The first, titled Ulal-fiqh(‘On Jurisprudence’), was written early in his career; it encompasses only two chapters, one on linguistic postulates and theories of scriptural interpretation (alfāẓ), and the other on rational proofs (adillaʿaqliyya). The book’s unorganised presentation, a lack of uniform style, and the fact that it was left unfinished has led some to suspect that it was written as a preliminary to his more elaborate work on jurisprudence, Kawāshifal-ujubʿanmushkilātal-kutub(‘Removing the Veils from Obscurities of Books’).4 Mzandarnī does not mention when he completed this work, although in a biographical work 1247/1832 is reported as a completion date.5 As Mzandarnī remarks in the preface, compared to other texts of jurisprudence, Kawāshif al-ujubis a book of medium length. It is organised in 150 sections, each dedicated to a particular topic; the sections vary in length, some only a few lines, others running for pages. Each section consists of a ‘veil’ (ijāb) followed by Mzandarnī’s corresponding ‘removal’ (kashf) of it. Each veil constitutes a confusion about some matter of jurisprudence, which Mzandarnī attempts to remove, thereby unveiling the truth of the matter. Occasionally he characterises the questions as spurious or sophistic arguments. Although Kawāshifaddresses major topics often discussed in the texts of jurisprudence, the arrangement of the sections does not follow the usual order. For instance, in contrast with theMaʿālimal-dīn – a widely-read book that Mzandarnī was familiar with – Kawāshifal-ujub does not begin with a discourse on knowledge followed by chapters dedicated to topics such as linguistic postulates and theories of scriptural interpretation, commands and prohibitions, consensus, prophetic reports, abrogation, legal analogy, and the 95Chapter 3: al-Mzandarnī, Kawāshifal-ujub obligation of non-expert believers to follow the legal opinions of qualified jurists.6 Rather, Mzandarnī’s chosen approach in Kawāshifal-ujubis to address various topics, often with the aim of refuting the opposing views, and without necessarily seeking to compose a comprehensive and cohesive work of jurisprudence. Indeed, as the book’s title indicates, Mzandarnī explicitly seeks to address and remove the veils from the various difficulties he has encountered in other jurisprudential books. Mzandarnī’s approach to the issues he discusses in Kawāshifal-ujubis representative of the Uṣūli jurisprudence.7 The Uṣūli jurisprudential paradigm had faced a serious challenge at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Muḥammad Amīn al-Astarbdī (d. c. 1033/1623), acknowledged as the founder of the Akhbri movement, had undermined the central juristic principles of his contemporaries.8 This was met with a concerted effort to counter the Akhbri current, which had become increasingly popular. By the time Mzandarnī undertook his training in Isfahan, the Uṣūli framework, as exemplified by Muḥammad Bqir al-Bihbahnī (d. 1205/1791), had established itself as the dominant force in Iranian seminaries.9 One of the most contentious disagreements between Uṣūlis and Akhbris pertained to the probative force of the Qurʾan’s primafaciesense. Mzandarnī has a section on this topic in his treatise which is included in the present study and is an illustration of his adherence to the Uṣūli framework. The fact that Kawāshifal-ujubstill remains in manuscript form and a critical edition is yet to be published indicates its lack of widespread readership or impact.10 Mzandarnī may have been overshadowed by his influential contemporaries like Murtaḍ al-Anṣrī (d. 1281/1864), who is considered one of the most prominent Shiʿi jurists in history.11 Despite its unenthusiastic reception thus far, Kawāshifal-ujubremains an appealing text. For our part, we have chosen two of its sections. Following Mzandarnī’s preface to the book, Section 39 examines whether non-believers can become experts in Islamic law; Section 12 is on the probative force of the prima faciesense (ẓawāhir) of the Qurʾan.12 It is hoped that the passages presented here will kindle the interest of a reader to pursue the entire text. In keeping with the volume’s overarching aim, we have avoided a word-for-word translation of the Arabic text; instead, the following is a close paraphrase, accompanied with commentary whenever necessary. The following edition is based on the MS #1443 of Kshif al-Ghiṭʿ Library in Najaf. Figure 3.1 MS Kshif al-Ghiṭʾ, Najaf (#1443), p. 24 Figure 3.2 MS Kshif al-Ghiṭʾ, Najaf (#1443), p. 25 98 Shiʿite Legal Theory بجحلا فشاوك ـه1285 م يناردنزاملا حلاص دمحم بجحلا فشاوكب ةاّمسملا ةلاسرلا يتقث هب و ميحرلا نمحرلا هللا مسب لبحلاو ىقثولا ةورعلاب كسمتلاب ةاجنلا كلاسم ىلإ انادهو ،نيقيلا حيباصمب انرئاصب نع باجحلا فشك يذلا هلل دمحلا ،نيناوقلا تامكحمو ةيفاولا دعاوقلاب قحلا ملاعم انفّرعو ،نييبتلاو نايبلا نسحأب فراعملا جاهنم انل نّيبو ،نيتملا مالسلاو ةولصلاو ،نييلع ىلعأ ضاير نم ةضورب اهوعباتم لصي ىتح نيملاعلل ىركذو ةرصبت للملاو عئارشلا لعجو ْنَم ٰىَيْحَيَو ٍةَنِّيَب نَع َكَلَه ْنَم َكِلْهَيِّل﴿ نيعمجأ قلخلا ىلإ هيلإ لزنُا ام غيلبتو ،نيدلا جهانم بيذهتل ثعُب نم ىلع نيديرملا دارم هب يهتني يذلا يلع همع نباو هيصو ىلعو ،نيلسرملا ديسو نييبنلا متاخ دمحم ،نيبم ئيشب 1﴾َّيَح راهطألا ةصالخو راونألا علاطم هترتع ىلعو ،نيملسملاو مالسإلا تالكشم ماكحأ هب حَضويو ،نيدشرملا داشرإو .نيبملا نآرقلا هب قطن امك ىصقأ هغَّلب هايندو هترخآ رمأ هللا حلصأيناردنزاملا حلاص دمحم نسحم دمحم نبا يناجلا قبآلا دبعلا لوقي دعبو ،اهمظنو ،اهفيلأتو ،اهعمج ىلإ ًاقوشتم نامزلا نم ًارهد تنك ةفيرش 2دعاوقو ةفيطل دئاوف هذه نأ -هانمتيو هبلطي ام ةلق كلذ نع ينعنمي ناكو قيقحتلا كرادم ىلإ ًاجارعمو قيقدتلا كلاسم ىلإ ًاجاهنم نيبلاطللو يل نوكيل ،اهفيصرتو ،ناودعلاو يغبلا لهأ ءاليتساو ،نحملاو بئاصملا مومعو نتفلاو ايالبلا عويشل ةعاطتسالاو ةصرفلا نادقفو ةعاضبلا .لاحملا نم ّدعُي لومأملا قفو ىلع رومألا حاجنإ نأ تيأر نأ ىلإ ،نافرعلاو ملعلا لهأ لاصيتساو لاسراپ زا غیرد 3متفگ ون لاس دمآ هچ ره و ريمضلا يف نونكملا وه ام زاربإ يف تاقوألا لامعتساو ،ىلوأ ريطخلا رمألا اذهب لاغتشالا نأ يسفنل تلقف .ىقبأو ريخ ةرخآلا رجأَلو ىرخألا ةأشنلا يف رجألل بجوم هنإف ،ىرحأو بسنأ يبسح هنإف هب ًانيعتسم ليزجلا باوثلا ىلاعت هللا نم ًايجار ليوطتلاو ريصقتلا نيب ًاطّسوتم هتدرأ اميف تعرشف يرمعلو .بتكللا تالكشم نع بجحلا فشاوكب هتيّمس 4،هميمتتل تقّفُوو هميقرت نم تغرف املو .ليكولا معِنو بتكللا رئاسك ًابّترم نكي مل امل هنكللو ،ءامسلا نم لَزنُت ءامسألا نأ ةظحالم دعب امّيس ىّمسملل قِباطم مسالا نإ لعجأ نأ تبجأف ،لئاسملا نم هيف ام ىلع 5عالّطالا كلذب رسعي ناكو ،ةفورعملا رُبُزلا وحن ىلع ًابّوبمالو ةروهشملا .ًافشك نيسمخو ةئامو ًاباجح نيسمخو ةئام ىلع لمتشم اذه يباتك نإ لوقأف .هيف ام ىلع عالطالا لهسيل ًاتسرهف هل 1 Qurʾan 8:42. 2 MS: دئاوق 3 MS: متفك 4 MS: هيميمتل 5 MS: قالطإلا 99Chapter 3: al-Mzandarnī, Kawāshifal-ujub Commentary Mzandarnī commences Kawāshif with a brief preface. As it is customary, it begins by offering praises to God and salutations upon the Prophet and the Imams. This is followed by a brief remark concerning the book’s purpose and structure. He notes that throughout his life, he has been eager to compose such a book to serve as a path to inquiry and reflection for him and others. He adds that due to various factors he has been prevented to undertake this task; these include his own frailties, lack of opportunity, prevalence of tribulations and trials, and the domination of the adherents of oppression and the subjugation of the adherents of knowledge. Nevertheless, realising that waiting for ideal circumstances is bound to be futile and that the passing of years brings more despair than hope for the future, he decided to write the book despite the difficulties involved. Mzandarnī informs the readers that in this endeavour he has chosen a middle path between writing a comprehensive or a compressed book. He has arranged the book into 150 sections each containing a veil (i.e. misgiving) and its corresponding removal (i.e. resolution), hence the title of his book: Kawāshifal-ujub(‘Removing the Veils’). Mzandarnī mentions that considering his book is not arranged like other well-known books of jurisprudence, readers might feel disoriented; hence, he is providing a supplementary list of its contents, facilitating the book’s navigation. The rest of the preface contains the title for each of the 150 sections of the book. Passage One: On Whether or Not Becoming a Legal Expert Depends on Having Faith One of the topics often discussed in the texts of jurisprudence concerns the requirements a person must fulfil in order to be considered a legal expert (mujtahid). Some of these requirements include fluency in Arabic, familiarity with the legal verses of the Qurʾan and their interpretive traditions, and mastery of the hadith literature. Others pertain to beliefs and personal characteristics, such as religious affiliation (or lack thereof) and personal integrity. Various questions have been raised regarding the second set of requirements. Can, for instance, a Christian or an unbeliever, become an expert in Islamic law even though, according to Muslims, a Christian has but partial knowledge of theological truths and an unbeliever none? In the following section Mzandarnī addresses this issue by examining whether the discipline of jurisprudence is dependent on the discipline of theology. The passage begins with a line of arguments, posed to Mzandarnī by his hypothetical interlocutor, concerning why being a believer is a condition on being a legal expert. 100 Shiʿite Legal Theory ...لوقأو ةسياقملاب بجحلا ملعُيل فشاوكللا ركذأ 6اذإ اّلهف وهو ،فيلكتلا ةيفيك نع ثحبي دهتجملا نأب ًالّلعم مالكلا ملع ىلع داهتجالا فقوت مهوتُي امبر :باجح]1.1[ عماج عناص ىلإ هراقتفاو ملاعلا ثودحب ملعلا ىلع فقوتملا فّلكملاب ملعلا ىلع فقوتملا هسفنب ملعلا ىلع فقوتم ةمئألا مهيلع فلخم ،تازجعملاب مهايإ قّدصم ،ءايبنألل ثعاب ،ةيبلسلا تافصلا نع سّدقم ،ةيلامكللا تافصلل .مالكلا يف ةلّصفملا ةلدألا نم ًاداهتجا فرعُي امم ماكحألا نايب يف بذكللاو أطخلا نع نيموصعملا ًافلاخم دهتجملا ريصي دق اذلو ،داهتجالاو ةهاقفلل ال نيفلكملا ةماعل ناميإلا طرش داقتعالا اذه :فشك ]1.2[ ال ثيحب ةيليصفتلا انتلدأب انلوصأ نم عورفلا طابنتسال ةوقو ةكللم اذ ًاقلطم ًادهتجم قلطملا رفاكلاو ًارفاك ًايفوصو اذهو ،ةهاقفلا ثادحإ ىنعمب ال هيلإ عوجرلا زاوجل طرش ناميإلا ،معن .هنع داهتجالاو ةهاقفلا مسا بلس حصي ًاذوخأم ناميإلا ناك ولف .ةلادعلاو ُناميإلا داهتجالا ىلإ ًافاضم يتفملا يف طرتشُ ي هنأ نم هولاق ام هب دهشيو حضاو هانلق ام ىلع دهاوشلا نم ًاضيأ اذهو ةيرشع ىنثالاب ءاهقفلا نوفصوي ًاضيأو ،هوركذ امل ىنعم ]ناك[ امل هانعم يف .ةدعاقلاو لصألل فلاخملا ديكأتلا نم ًارذح 6 MS: اذإف اّلهف 101Chapter 3: al-Mzandarnī, Kawāshifal-ujub [1.1] Veil: Mzandarnī’s interlocutor remarks that jurisprudence depends on theology. He bases this statement on eight closely linked premises: (1) jurists investigate what one’s legal responsibility is, and (2) knowledge of this depends on knowing the legal responsibility, (3) which depends on knowing the One who sets the legal responsibility, (4) which depends on knowing that the world came into being, (5) which depends on the fact that it needed some creator, (6) that this creator has all the attributes of perfection and is entirely free of negative attributes, (7) sends prophets, supporting them with miracles, and (8) appointing after them the Imams, who are protected from error and falsehood in explicating the law. Mzandarnī’s interlocutor concludes that all these matters are known in jurisprudence as a result of the extensive proofs given in theology. According to this position, in order to become an expert in Islamic law, one must know that there is a God; knowledge of God’s existence dependents on knowing God’s attributes, among which is that he is the creator of the world and through his providence sends inerrant prophets and imams to guide humans. Proofs for each of these propositions regarding God and his attributes are discussed in the discipline of theology. Hence, Mzandarnī’s interlocutor concludes, becoming an expert in Islamic law is dependent upon first acquiring theological knowledge. [1.2] Unveiling: Mzandarnī finds this argument unpersuasive. He responds that such theological beliefs are a condition on having faith for believers in general – not on being a jurist. Hence, he asserts, a person can become an expert in Islamic law even if he is a non-believer (mukhālif) or an infidel Sufi. An infidel parexcellence, Mzandarnī continues, could very well be a jurist parexcellence, and fully capable of deriving particular rulings from the principles of Islamic law using its legal sources,13 such that it would be incorrect to deny legal expertise of him. In Mzandarnī’s view, law is a discipline like any other. To become an expert in any discipline, one needs to master the requirements specific to it. In the case of Islamic law, one of the requirements is to acquire knowledge of Arabic, since the foundational sources of the law were revealed in that language. This knowledge, he remarks, can be obtained regardless of one’s religious beliefs. After making this argument, Mzandarnī draws a distinction between whether a non-Muslim can become a legal expert and whether the same person can serve as a source of legal authority for Muslims. In the latter role, the legal expert is also required to be a Muslim of good character. That a jurist be also a believer, he notes, is a condition for seeking legal advice from him, but it is not a condition on his being a legal expert. In Mzandarnī’s view, this position is corroborated by what is said about how, in order to be a jurist-consult (mufti), one must have not only legal expertise (ijtihād) but also faith (imān) and integrity (ʿadāla). That, however, would be senseless to say, were faith constitutive of the term’s (i.e. ijtihād) meaning. Moreover, he takes the fact that jurists are qualified by their sectarian affiliations or juristic orientations, as another piece of evidence for his position, insofar as that qualification is meant to eschew emphasis that would contravene the rule. In Mzandarnī’s view, the fact that legal experts identify themselves or other legal experts as “Twelver Shiʿi” legal experts, for example, is another indication that the semantics of the word mujtahid does not require any specific religious affiliation. 108 Shiʿite Legal Theory ةيجحلا نكت مل ولف اذه اننامز ىلإ ةثعبلا ندل نم ءاملعلا نم مهريغو ةمئألا باحصأ جاجتحا :ثلاثلا ]2.4.3[ رُجاشتلا ماقم يف كلذب ةيضاق ةداعلا نأل ريكنلا نع اوكسمأ امل مهيدل ةمولعملا ةرَّرقملا رومألا نم ةروبزملا .موزلملا كلذكف لطاب مزاللا نكلل ،عُزانتلاو مهريرقت نأ نّيبلا نمو ،هوعنمي مل جاجتحالا ىلع مهعالّطا عم مالسلا مهيلع مهنإف ريرقتلا :عبارلا ]2.4.4[ .ةجح مهلوقو مهلعفك مالسلا مهيلع ]ناك[ امل ةلدألا ىوقأ نم كي مل ول باتكلا نإف باتكلا ىلع ضرعلاب اهيف ةرمآلا رابخألا :سماخلا ]2.4.5[ .هيلع ليلدلا ضرعب رمألل ىنعم هيجو ريغ ىنعملا هيف مهفُي الو هيف لئاط ال اميف رّبدتلا نأل هكرت يف مذلاو ربدتلاب رمألا :سداسلا ]2.4.6[ .ًادج .ىلوألا قيرطلاب باتكلا رهاوظ ةيجح مزلتسي ةنسلا رهاوظ ةيجح نإف ةيولوألا :عباسلا ]2.4.7[ ملعت امأ ،كموق ناسلب كلهجأ ام« هلآو هيلع هللا ىلص لاق ثيح ةروهشملا ىرعَبِزلا نبا ةصق :نماثلا ]2.4.8[ 10»؟لِقعي مل امل ‘ام’ نأ نأب لوقلاب مهيلع نوضرتعي ام ًاريثك مالسلا مهيلع ةمئألا باحصأ نأ وه رخآ ريرقتب ريرقتلا :عساتلا ]2.4.9[ ةجحب سيل هنأ وأ باتكلا نومهفت ال مكنأب هيف َحدقلا مهدحأ نم ري ملو باتكلا رهاظل فلاخم ينالفلا مكحلا مهلعفك مهريرقت نأ ّرم دقو .مالسلا مهيلع مهنم ريرقت اذهو .ةفلاخملل هجولا هنم رهظي ٍهجو ىلع نوبيجي لب مكيلع .ةجح مهلوقو هللا باتك :ًادبأ اولضت نل امهب متكّسمت نإ ام نيلقثلا مكيف كرات ينإ« :روهشملا يوبنلا :رشاعلا ]2.4.10[ .ىفخي ال امك ةيجحلاو رابتعالا ةلحرم يف نيرمألا نم لك لالقتسا رهاظلا نإف 11.»يترتعو [2.4.3] Third. The fact that the Imams’ companions and other scholars besides – from the time of the Prophet until today – have adduced the Qurʾan’s primafaciesense as evidence: according to Mzandarnī, were the Qurʾan’s primafaciesense instead non-probative and not a well-established matter among the Imams’ companions and other scholars, they would have objected to its use as supporting evidence for a given position. He adds that such is the prevailing practice in cases of disputation and debate. But since the consequent – namely, that they objected to using the primafaciesense of the Qurʾan as proof – is false, so too must be the antecedent – namely, that they denied that the Qurʾan’s primafaciesense could be used as proof. 10 47 ص 3 ج ،ماكحألا لوصأ يف ماكحإلا 11 238–231 صص ،ةمعنلا مامتو نيدلا لامك 109Chapter 3: al-Mzandarnī, Kawāshifal-ujub [2.4.4] Fourth. The Imams’ tacit approval: according to Mzandarnī, although the Imams were aware that the Qurʾan’s primafaciesense was being used as evidence, they did not try to stop it. He adds that it has been well-established that the Imams’ tacit approval is just as probative as their deed or word. [2.4.5] Fifth. Those hadith (akhbār) commanding that every hadith be compared with the Qurʾan:25 he argues that were the primafaciesense of the Qurʾan not one of the strongest forms of proof, there would be no meaning to commanding that hadith be measured against it in order to establish their veracity. [2.4.6] Sixth. The command to contemplate and the censure for failing to do so as found in the Qurʾan and hadith:26 he notes that to command someone to contemplate the Qurʾan when it is futile, and the meaning cannot be understood, would be preposterous indeed. [2.4.7] Seventh. Anafortioriargument: granting that the primafacie sense of the sunna is probative, Mzandarnī holds, afortioriso too must be the primafaciesense of the Qurʾan. [2.4.8] Eighth. The story featuring Ibn Zibaʿr:27 Ibn Zibaʿr was a renowned poet belonging to the Prophet’s tribe, the Quraysh. According to some accounts, he was at first a fierce opponent of the Prophet but later became a Muslim. It is reported that in one incident, when Ibn Zibaʿr misunderstood a verse of the Qurʾan, the Prophet said to him, “How ignorant you are of your tribe’s language. Don’t you know that …”. In this passage, Mzandarnī invokes Ibn Zibaʿr to indicate that mastery of the language has a direct relation to understanding the Qurʾan and its primafaciesense; had it been otherwise, the Prophet would not find Ibn Zibaʿr’s failure to understand the Qurʾan despite his renowned literary abilities something worth pointing out. [2.4.9] Ninth. Another tacit approval: Mzandarnī points out that the Imams’ companions would often object to their pronouncement on some matter, saying that it contradicts the prima faciesense of the Qurʾan, and yet none of the Imams saw it fit to criticise this on the grounds that “you do not understand the Qurʾan” or that “the Qurʾan is not to be taken by you as proof”. Instead, they would answer the objections in such a way as to explain the apparent contradiction. He concludes, this is a form of tacit approval, and – as already noted – the Imams’ tacit approval is as probative as their deed or word. [2.4.10] Tenth. The famous hadith of al-thaqalayn: Mzandarnī bases his last argument on a well-known hadith attributed to the Prophet: “I leave among you the two weighty things (al-thaqalayn), and if you cling to them, you will never go astray: the book of God and my progeny”.28 According to both Shiʿi and Sunni sources, the Prophet addressed these words to the believers during the sermon he delivered on his last pilgrimage to Mecca. Mzandarnī uses this hadith to argue that the primafaciesense of the hadith is that each of the two weighty matters, namely the Qurʾan and his progeny, is independent of the other in terms of serving as proof. In Mzandarnī’s view, had the primafaciesense of the Qurʾan lacked probative force, the Prophet would not include it as one of the two means of guidance. Mzandarnī believes that the arguments he has outlined, taken as a whole, establish with certainty that the Qurʾan contains clear and ambiguous passages and that the primafaciesense of the clear passages can be understood and, hence, is probative. 110 Shiʿite Legal Theory Endnotes 1 Mahdawī, Bayānal-mafākhir(Isfahan, 1368Sh/1989), v. 2, p. 185. For a brief overview of Qajar Iran see Ettehadieh Nezam-Mafi, “Qajar Iran (1795–1921),” in TheOxfordHandbookofIranianHistory (Oxford, 2012), pp. 319–345; for a more detailed examination see Amanat, Iran:AModernHistory (New Haven, 2017), pp. 177–385; for Qajar religious history see Gleave (ed.), ReligionandsocietyinQajarIran (Oxford, 2005). It is to be noted that as of now only a limited number of studies on the Qajar period are available in English. 2 Mahdawī, Aʿlām-eIfahān (Isfahan, 1386Sh/2007), v. 3, p. 500. 3 Muḥammad Sharif al-Mzandarnī, known as Sharif al-ʿUlamʾ, was a prominent teacher in Karbala; he left no writings behind. On him see al-ʿĀmili, Aʿyānal-shiʿa (Beirut, 1403/1983), v. 9, p. 364. 4 Āgh Buzurg al-Ṭihrnī,al-Dharīʿailātaānīfal-shīʿa (Beirut, 1403/1983), v. 2, p. 205; v. 18, p. 177. It is to be noted that Kawāshifis also not a particularly well-organised treatise. 5 Mahdawī, Aʿlām-eIfahān, v. 3, p. 501. 6 See Maʿālim’s Table of Contents in al-ʿĀmili, Maʿālimal-ul (Qum, 1374Sh/1995), pp. 353–354. 7 For an overview of various historical developments in Shiʿi legal thought, including the Uṣūli school of Twelver jurisprudence, see Gleave, “Imami Shiʿi Legal Theory: From its Origins to the Early-Twentieth Century,” in TheOxfordHandbookofIslamicLaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 8 On the Akhbri movement see Gleave, “Akhbriyya and Uṣūliyya,” in EI3; Gleave, ScripturalistIslam (Leiden, 2007); Gleave, InevitableDoubt:TwoTheoriesofShīʿīJurisprudence (Leiden, 2000); Stewart, IslamicLegalOrthodoxy:TwelverShiiteResponsestotheSunniLegalSystem (Salt Lake City, 1998), pp. 175–208; Stewart, “The Genesis of the Akhbri Revival,” in SafavidIranandHerNeighbors (Salt Lake City, 2003), pp. 169–193 (see note 2 for a list of studies on the Akhbris); Kohlberg, “Aspects of Akhbri Thought in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” InPraiseoftheFew:StudiedinShiʿiThought andHistory (Leiden, 2020), pp. 522–546. 9 On al-Bihbahnī see Gleave, “Muḥammad Bqir al-Bihbihnī (d. 1205/1791),” in IslamicLegalThought: ACompendiumofMuslimJurists (Leiden, 2013), pp. 415–432. For a study of his legal thought see Gleave,InevitableDoubt:TwoTheoriesofShīʿīJurisprudence (Leiden, 2000). 10 According to some reports, copies of some of Mzandarnī’s books like Ulal-fiqh were circulating among several leading scholars, including Sayyid Muḥammad Kẓim Ṭabṭabʾī Yazdī (d. 1337/1919). See Āgh Buzurg al-Ṭihrnī, al-Dharīʿa, v. 2, p. 205. 11 For a brief outline of Anṣrī’s life and thought see Hairi, “Anṣrī,” EI2. 12 The section on the primafacie sense of the Qurʾan and the semantic discussions concerning the term ‘mujtahid’ in the previous section on whether a non-Muslim can become an expert in Islamic law are related. Hence, we have placed the latter before the former in the chapter, although they are reversed in the Arabic. 13 The four sources of the law are the Qurʾan, the sunna, consensus, and reason. 14 Sharif al-ʿUlamʾ, though an active teacher, was not a prolific author; reportedly he only authored one treatise. His view on the topic examined here, beside Mzandarnī’s presentation, can also be consulted in the extant lecture notes of his students. See, for example, Sayyid Ibrhim al-Qazwīnī, Ḍawābiṭal-ul, p. 453. 15 Other renditions of luṭf include “divine assistance” and “divine favour”. On this principle see Shihadeh, “Favour, Divine (Luṭf),” in EI3. For a Shiʿi treatment of this principle see al-ʿAllma al-Ḥilli’s brief exposition as translated in Watt, Islamic Creeds: A Selection (Edinburgh, 1994), pp. 101–102. 16 A reference to the verse, “God does not charge a soul with more than it can bear” (Qurʾan 2:286). 17 Sunna refers to the prophetic tradition as preserved in the hadith literature. 18 Mzandarnī is referring here to a well-known verse from the Qurʾan: “There is no God but Him, the Mighty, the Wise. It is He who has sent down to you [Prophet] the Book. Some of its verses are clear in meaning [mukam]–these are the cornerstone of the Book–and others are ambiguous [mutashābih]” 111Chapter 3: al-Mzandarnī, Kawāshifal-ujub (Qurʾan 3:7, trans. by Abdel Haleem with minor revisions). 19 For al-Astarbdī’s view on the probative force of the Qurʾan’s primafaciesense see, for example, al-Astarbdī, al-Fawāʾidal-madaniyya (Qum, 1426), pp. 178–179. Gleave has translated and contextualised this passage from al-Fawāʾid in his ScripturalistIslam, pp. 72–74. Also see al-Astarbdī, al-Fawāʾid al-madaniyya, pp. 269–271. For a study of the disagreements between Akhbris and Uṣūlis on various issues including on the probative force of the Qurʾan’s primafaciesense see Newman, “The Nature of the Akhbrī/Uṣūlī Dispute in Late-Safawid Iran. Part One: ʿAbdallh al-Samhijī’s ‘Munyat al-Mumārisīn’,” and “Part 2: The Conflict Reassessed,” BSOAS 15 (1992), pp. 22–51, 250–261. 20 Unlike their Sunni counterparts, Twelver scholars do not regard consensus (ijmāʿ) as the agreement of all or most experts on some matter guaranteeing the correctness of their view on it. Rather, they regard consensus as the agreement on some matter between any number of people – at least one of whom is unknown – indicating that the hidden Imam also agrees, which would guarantee the correctness of the position, since the Imam is considered inerrant in his views. For brief studies on the Shiʿi conception of consensus see Stewart, “Ejmʿ,” EIR; Pakatchi, “Ejmʿ,” Dāʾiratal-maʿāref-ebozorg-eeslāmī (Tehran, 1374Sh/1995), v. 6, pp. 615–632. For discussions of consensus in Sunni thought see Zysow, The EconomyofCertainty(Atlanta, 2013), pp. 113–158; Weiss, TheSearchforGod’sLaw (Salt Lake City, 1992), pp. 181–258; Hallaq, “On the Authoritativeness of Sunnī Consensus,” IJMES 18/4 (1996), pp. 427–454; Stewart, “Consensus, Authority, and the Interpretive Community in the Thought of Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī”, JQS 18/2 (2016), pp. 130–179 (esp. pp. 133–141). 21 al-Fḍil al-Tūnī (d. 1071/1660) was an active figure in Safavid intellectual scene. As Gleave has pointed out, his stance on the Akhbri-Uṣūli disputes is nuanced and both sides have claimed him as their own. See Gleave, ScripturalistIslam, pp. 238–239, 262–263. 22 A report or text is considered mutawātir when the recipient attains certainty that it was faithfully transmitted by first-hand independent narrators in such a number and in each successive generation that it would be inconceivable for them all to have colluded in forging it. According to most Muslim theologians and jurists, mutawātir reports engender necessary knowledge in their recipients. 23 al-Fḍil al-Tūnī, al-Wāfiya fiulal-fiqh (Qum, 1424/1992), p. 147. For al-Tūnī’s discussion of the prima faciesense of the Qurʾan see his al-Wāfiya, pp. 136–140, 257–260. 24 al-Wāfīfisharal-Wāfiya, al-Sayyid Muḥsin al-Aʿrajī al-Kẓimī’s (d. 1227/1812) commentary on alTūnī’s al-Wāfiyaremains in manuscript (for further details see Chapter 2 of this volume). 25 In one version of this hadith, the Prophet is reported to have stated that if a saying of his reaches his followers, they should compare it to the Qurʾan. If the saying agrees with it, they should accept it; if it disagrees with it, they should put it aside. See, for example, al-Kulayni, al-Kāfī (Qom, 1429), v. 1, pp. 171–174. 26 Mzandarnī is likely alluding to the following verse: “Will they not contemplate the Qurʾan? Do they have locks on their hearts?” (Qurʾan 47:24, trans. by Abdel Haleem). 27 For a study of Ibn Zibaʿr’s life, poetry, and relationship to the Prophet see Coster, TheGood,theBad, andtheUgly:AllegianceandAuthorityinthePoeticalDiscourseofMuammad’sLifetime (PhD diss., Groningen, 2019), pp. 176–262. This reported interaction between Ibn Zibaʿr and the Prophet, and its possible implications in legal hermeneutics, appears in several major texts of the classical period. See, for instance, al-Āmidi, al-Ikāmfiulal-akām (Riyad, 1424/2003), v. 3, pp. 46–48. 28 On this statement, known as adithal-thaqalayn, and its various versions see Bar-Asher, Scriptureand ExegesisinEarlyImāmiShiism (Leiden, 1999), pp. 93–98. Bibliography Amanat, Abbas. Iran:AModernHistory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017). al-Āmidī, Sayf al-Dīn. 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