Planetary well-being : Ontology and ethics

This is a self-archived version of an original article. This version may differ from the original in pagination and typographic details. Author(s): Title: Year: Version: Copyright: Rights: Rights url: Please cite the original version: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Planetary well-being : Ontology and ethics © 2024 selection and editorial matter, Merja Elo, Jonne Hytönen, Sanna Karkulehto, Teea Kortetmäki, Janne S. Kotiaho, Mikael Puurtinen, and Miikka Salo; individual chapters, the contributor Published version Kortetmäki, Teea; Puurtinen, Mikael; Salo, Miikka; Cortés-Capano, Gonzalo; Karkulehto, Sanna; Kotiaho, Janne S. Kortetmäki, T., Puurtinen, M., Salo, M., Cortés-Capano, G., Karkulehto, S., & Kotiaho, J. S. (2024). Planetary well-being : Ontology and ethics. In M. Elo, J. Hytönen, S. Karkulehto, T. Kortetmäki, J. S. Kotiaho, M. Puurtinen, & M. Salo (Eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Planetary Well-Being (pp. 26-41). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003334002-4 2024 Introduction Planetarywell-beingisdefinedas“astateinwhichtheintegrityofEarthsystem and ecosystem processes remains unimpaired to a degree that lineages can persist to the future as parts of ecosystems, and organisms (including humans) can realize their typical characteristics and capacities” (Kortetmäki et al., 2021, p. 4). This “state” is a dynamic rather than a static condition: Planetary well-being may increaseanddecline,andhumanactivitiesinfluenceitgreatly.Understandingthese dynamics necessitates grounding the ontology and ethics of planetary well-being. In this chapter, we examine how the conceptualization of planetary well-being is grounded and positioned in the broader theoretical landscape, both in ontological andethicalterms.Wealsoreflectupontheoverallconceptualunderpinningsof planetary well-being and its implications for the different well-being frames that are used for guiding societal development and policy-making, hoping to encourage further research. It should be noted that we limit our normative reasoning to human activities: Although large-scale natural events might also affect planetary well-being by disrupting large-scale processes, only humans are morally responsible for their activities’ impacts on planetary well-being. Ontology behind planetary well-being: Systems and processes Ontologically, planetary well-being takes a systemsand process-oriented approach. Planetary well-being commits to the Bungean type of systemism (see e.g., Bunge, 2000) where every “thing” is a system or a component of one (Kortetmäki et al., 2021). Ontologically speaking, a system is an entity that consists of interacting components and has structures and processes that are characteristic of 2 PLANETARY WELL-BEING Ontology and ethics Teea Kortetmäki, Mikael Puurtinen, Miikka Salo, Gonzalo Cortés-Capano, Sanna Karkulehto and JanneS. Kotiaho DOI: 10.4324/9781003334002-4 Planetary well-being: Ontology and ethics 27 the given kind of system. All systems are situated in a context (environment) where they interact with other systems. Most systems are material and independent of human and nonhuman minds.1 Communication systems as well as human-made complex systems, such as schools,financialsystems,andpreservablesemioticandsymbolicsystems(texts and images), may be partially immaterial but their immaterial parts have causal effects only through cognition and action, i.e., through the material neural system (Elder-Vass, 2010a). For example, money does nothing unless humans believe it does and agree with (and act upon) the rules determining what money can do. Systems have both aggregative and emergent properties. Aggregative properties result from the simple addition of the properties of the parts. A classic example of an aggregative property is mass (ibid.). Emergent properties are those novel properties that emerge particularly due to the ordering and interaction of the components in a system (Bunge, 2000). Emergent properties are those that make the system “greater than the sum of its parts”: Its components do not have such properties in themselves, nor in aggregate. Certain emergent properties, such as the ability of systems to reproduce and preserve themselves, and sentience, also add to the properties of a system in a way that is relevant to moral considerations (see the section on ethical underpinnings). Emergentpropertiesconstitutethebasisforaviewofthestratifiednatureof reality. Various phenomena have physical, chemical, biological, psychological, and sociallevels.Variousscientificdisciplineshavealsospecializedintheresearch ofaspecificlevelofreality.Whilescientificactivitiesmayoftenbemostfruitful when a level is studied with the concepts, theories, and methods developed for that particular level, it is also possible and sometimes valuable to combine tools or apply them at different levels. For example, psychological level phenomena can be viewed through psychology but also approached with the tools of neurobiology (a lower level), or with social psychology and sociology (a higher level). Phenomena in complex systems, such as societies, can only be explained comprehensively by studying them with multiand interdisciplinary approaches. In the planetary well-being framework, the well-being of a system is understood in a nonsubjective way, as the functional integrity of that system. Well-being means meeting the needs conveyed through critical processes at the biological, mental, and social levels. This understanding is in line with the above-described systemsand process-oriented approach where also non-conscious entities can gain or lose well-being. In the case of conscious entities such as sentient animals (those who can feel pain and suffer), consciousness does not always capture all critical processes. Also, some subjects with rich imagination and tendencies to comparison (many human beings) may consider some non-critical processes hastily as critical to their well-being. Hence, the subjective experience of well-being—although generally a good indicator of, for example, experienced human well-being—is not necessarily accurate or a comprehensive description of the state of well-being of an individualinthesenseofthedefinitionrelevanttoplanetarywell-being. 28 Teea Kortetmäki et al. Processes and relations Planetary well-being is rooted in the idea that all living systems come into existence (emerge), develop, and behave in ways that result from complex sets of causal relations and patterns of species association (assemblages/communities of species) (Banitz et al., 2022; DeLanda, 2016). Relations and feedbacks between interacting entities generate emergent properties: Many ecological processes are produced by the interactions between species (Folke et al., 2016). For example, pollination as an ecological process often emerges from the relations between animal pollinators and the plants they pollinate (see also Chapter 6 for soil processes). These processes are mostly contingent: If the interactions end, animal pollination as an emergent process would cease to exist (DeLanda, 2016). The integrity of ecological processes in turn is vital for the continuity and well-being of the members of the communities, that is species and organisms (Levin et al., 2013). It is important to note that in many relations between the entities (e.g., species) and the emergent systems they belong to (e.g., ecosystems), entities maintain their relative autonomy and are not fused together into a homogeneous whole (DeLanda, 2016). For example, individuals can be connected to each other in many ways yet also remain as individuals in their community. Acknowledging the relative autonomy of entities as parts-of-wholes implies in some cases replaceability or functional redundancy within processes: A pollination process can (at least in many cases) continue even if the current pollinator species is replaced with other species, local or exotic, or robot brushes, as long as the replaced entities realize the same functions in the system. However, very rarely does a species have only one role in an ecosystem. Pollinators, for example, also interact in numerous other assemblages beyond pollination such as comprising a food source for other species in that system. This overall complexity of relationships means that precautionary measures and preventive action should be adopted to avoid potential harm to the integrity of larger ecological systems, and hence, to planetary well-being. Knowledge about the interactions between and among Earth’s geophysical systems, ecosystems, and human-created systems is still very limited (e.g., Mastrángelo et al., 2019). The ontological basis of planetary well-being implies the need for interdisciplinary work to make sense of the connections between different processes that comprise planetary well-being. This also necessitates acknowledging epistemic humility: We humans will likely never be able to know, and thus take into account, all relevant relations and interactions between different species. To avoid too simplistic ontological or epistemic assumptions, it is important to recognize the social dimensions of such knowledge, while asserting the reality of the material dimension of the problems (Bhaskar et al., 2010). The ontological position taken in planetary well-being challenges traditional dualisms between humans and nature and the assumption that humans’ interactions with (the use of) nonhuman entities or materials could be considered in isolation from their ecosystems and processes. Planetary well-being emphasizes that Planetary well-being: Ontology and ethics 29 humans are part of co-evolving systems and participants in multispecies processes in nature, not external to the rest of the natural world (cf., Berkes and Folke, 1998). The processual viewpoint in planetary well-being also highlights the presence of agency throughout nature, as life is intertwined in these processes in myriad ways: Humans are not the active agent using and managing passive nature, but a participant in the webs of actants. However, moral agency—the capacity to think of (and shape) one’s actions with an ethical perspective—and, thus, also the responsibility toactethically,isspecificonlytohumans.Asthetechnologicalcapacityofhumans to use nonhuman world and interfere with its processes has grown, the concept of moral agency has also become more important since human actions can have such huge and far-reaching effects on planetary well-being. Notably, the ontological basis of planetary well-being described here leaves room for different, more detailed ontological perceptions. For example, it is possible to emphasize the different levels of complexity in the existence of entities. Moreover, questions about how inter-entity relations are constitutive of the entities engaged in such relations, remain open to different characterizations. This, we believe, allows the engagement with planetary well-being from different perspectives and worldviews (see also Chapters 3 and 8). The ethical underpinnings of planetary well-being Planetary well-being is based on certain normative premises, some of which are influencedbytheabove-describedontology,thatconstitutestheethicalunderpinnings of planetary well-being. By “underpinnings”, we emphasize that such considerations still leave room for the diversity of further ethical elaborations. In our treatment,weadheretoscientificrealismaboutvalues.Scientificrealism commits one to treating values as socially produced and historically contingent. This does not, however, prevent us from reasoning about values, nor from developing critiques by combining ethical reasoning with a theoretical understanding of the social world and its possibilities. (Elder-Vass, 2010b, p. 33) Most importantly, planetary well-being transcends human-prioritizing value hierarchies (moral anthropocentrism) for more inclusive and equal valuation. The more inclusive stance is known as moral non-anthropocentrism or more-thanhuman ethics (e.g., Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017; see also Kohler et al., 2019) and broadens the sphere of moral considerability. Morally considerable entities have a particular moral status and moral (intrinsic or non-instrumental) value regardless of their utility for humans. The value of nonhuman well-being is not derived from its importance to humans (without denying such importance): In the planetary wellbeing framework, both human and nonhuman well-beings are morally worthy for their own sake. 30 Teea Kortetmäki et al. The basic sphere of moral considerability in planetary well-being grounds moral value in the self-regulative and self-regenerative capacity of living entities, extending moral considerability beyond humans (Kortetmäki et al., 2021, p. 3). This is closely connected to the functional integrity, the well-being, of such entities. Understood this way, well-being as a morally relevant idea also extends beyond individuals. However, since individuals’ striving for well-being unavoidablygeneratescontinuousconflictsbetweenorganisms,andbecausetheorganisms aresovastintheirnumber,itwouldbeextremelydifficultorevenimpossibleto adequately capture ethical concern for all well-being by paying attention to each individual. Thus, planetary well-being seeks to focus on another level to capture the moral concern for all well-being in a way that is meaningful and applicable to guiding societal development and policy evaluation. To succeed in this, planetary well-being takes a dual standpoint to moral valuation: First, it takes lineages (a group of organisms with a shared genetic ancestry) as the key entities of moral concern, and second, it embraces a multicriterial valuation that is relevant for addressing the diversity in how well-being is manifested in different life forms. Focusing on lineages (e.g., species and populations) is a theoretically and pragmatically satisfactory way to capture the moral concern for all nonhuman wellbeing. This is for two reasons. First and foremost, lineages as species possess particularly weighty value. Each species manifests a unique historical continuum and story of evolving life; many lineages have existed for thousands, even millions of years, and many of them will continue to exist far beyond the duration of human communities. However, if a species is driven into extinction by human activities, it is likely lost forever; the irreversibility of the harm and the piece of history lost due to it makes the harm particularly severe (Rolston, 1985). Second, pragmatic reasons also favour the focus on lineages. The status of lineages indicates well the overall state of affairs regarding the possibility of nonhuman entities to satisfy their needs and strive for well-being. Population declines or the increased number of endangered species are signs that some critical processes are failing and compromising planetary well-being (see Chapter 14). Another ethically focal acknowledgement in planetary well-being, already highlighted, is that both human and nonhuman well-being are valuable for their own sake.Thewell-beingofvarioushumansandnonhumansrequiressufficientintegrity of Earth system and ecosystem processes (shared preconditions for all wellbeing)butalsothesatisfactionofspecies-specificneeds.Thisimpliesthatplanetary well-being is inclusive of multicriterial approaches to moral considerability where the moral status can be grounded in several criteria. The multicriterial approach also has the advantage of being much better equipped to explain some of the carefully considered ethical intuitions that are illustrated by the range of problem cases used to test various moral approaches. For example, single-criterion approaches that attribute moral value only to an entity’s characteristic of having a life would not explain why we might have special (additional) duties to the individuals of endangered species (Warren, 2000, pp. 172–173). The use of multiple criteria also Planetary well-being: Ontology and ethics 31 helps distinguish and clarify why we have such different duties to dif ferent morally considerable entities: Our duties to fellow human beings are different from our duties to nonhuman individuals, let alone the duties to non-individual entities such as species or populations. In multicriterial moral valuation, different criteria constitute together the overall sphere of moral considerability, which is comprised of different (overlapping) spheres of morally considerable entities. Different spheres set different demands and limitations to acceptable human behaviour, depending on the features of the systems. Sentience,forexample,constitutesonefeature-specificsphereofmoralconsiderability. The well-being of sentient creatures sets some additional well-being related requirementsbecause sentienceinfluences thebehavioural andphysical needsof these beings. Many of those activities that are wrong towards sentient beings (such as industrialized meat production) would not, to our current knowledge, harm nonsentient beings and would therefore be wrong only when practised towards sentient beings. This way, multicriterial valuation is also compatible with the view that we humanbeingsowesomespecies-specificdutiestofellowhumanbeings. The broadest sphere of moral considerability includes all entities that can have well-being and have self-regenerative capacities. This broadest sphere is relevant for the framing of well-being in contexts that aim to guide overall societal development. Planetary well-being, thus, means a paradigmatic change in how well-being should be framed in such contexts. The inclusive notion of well-being broadens the scope of consideration when the well-being impacts of societal development are to be assessed (or when policy planning and implementation aim to improve the overall well-being or more equal well-being). As a non-anthropocentric notion, planetary well-being requires that a society-guiding conception of well-being is framed in a way that considers nonhuman well-being for its own sake, not only as a factorthatinfluenceshumanwell-being.Thisimpliesthatthepossibilitiesofnonhumans to satisfy their needs, now and in the future, must not be undermined when societies strive to increase well-being or promote development that is assumed to increase well-being indirectly. The needs-based understanding of well-being also highlights the universality of humanneeds,whichhasramificationsontheappropriateframingofhumanwellbeinginsocietalcontexts.Ramificationsconcernuniversalityandinclusiveness. Regarding universality, an objective approach to well-being—a conception where well-beingisneitherdefinednorusuallymeasuredbysubjectiveexperiencesbut by external criteria—is necessary for considering social contexts and inequalities adequately (e.g., Nussbaum, 2011).2 Objective approaches have a strong foothold in justice and social policy studies (e.g., Doyal and Gough, 1984; Nussbaum, 2011). Protecting the opportunity of all humans to satisfy their needs and strive for a good life is a condition for minimum social justice (e.g., Nussbaum, 2011). This condition of considering all humansisquitedemanding:Theneedsfulfilment of current generations should take the global perspective and must not compromisethepossibilityoffuturegenerationstofulfiltheirneeds(Max-Neef,1991;the 32 Teea Kortetmäki et al. World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 1987). The needsbased understanding of well-being is thereby also more attentive (than subjective accounts) to the situation of disadvantaged human communities and groups. It urges the prioritization of the satisfaction of universal human needs before investing in thefulfilmentofdesiresthatstemfromtheincreasedstandardoflivinginhighincome communities and consumerist marketing processes (see also Chapters 9 and 10), even though such desires might be perceived locally as important to subjective well-being. Overall, an objective approach to well-being provides a tangible set of criteria for conceptualizing well-being for societal development purposes in a more suitable and morally acceptable way than subjective approaches do (e.g., Doyal and Gough, 1984; Kortetmäki et al., 2021; Nussbaum, 2011; Rice, 2013). The objective approaches to well-being also allow the moral inclusiveness that planetary well-being seeks to promote. Some approaches already extend inclusiveness beyond human well-being and thus provide a compatible platform for further theorizing about the politics of planetary well-being. They have addressed the well-being of nonhuman animals (e.g., Broom, 1991; Nussbaum, 2011), other organisms, and even species and ecosystems (Kortetmäki, 2017; Schlosberg, 2007; see also Prescott-Allen, 2001). Adopting the non-anthropocentric, inclusive framing of well-being to guide societal development makes a big difference for the consideration of legitimate and illegitimate societal actions, policies, and development trajectories. It renders the nonhuman world from a background resource and serviceproviderintoanensembleofactiverecipients,beneficiaries,andsufferers, of societal development. The relevant community affected by societal development and policies always includes the biotic community (Dryzek and Pickering, 2018). Planetary well-being and moral duties Assigning at least some moral value to well-being for its own sake means that moral duties related to well-being arise in relation to any entities that may gain or lose well-being. Such duties, however, are not identical towards all morally considerable entities. Negative duties, or duties to avoid causing harm, comprise the cornerstone of environmental ethical duties to nonhuman nature. Because planetary well-being comprises processes whose functioning is the general precondition for the well-being of morally considerable entities, the primary duty for planetary wellbeing would be the negative duty to avoid impairing those processes. However , the impairments already caused—and the consequent harm to nonhuman and human well-being at all levels—suggest that positive duties to restore the prospects of nonhumanstostriveforwell-beingcanbejustifiablydemanded.Weseethiskind of positive duty, or a duty to actively promote good, as crucial. The moral obligation to aim at restoring the impaired Earth and ecosystem processes is an important ethical implication of the idea of planetary well-being. May positive duties also imply duties to advance planetary well-being even in situations where the impairment is not human-originated? The quick answer Planetary well-being: Ontology and ethics 33 intuitively appears to be “no”: Humans are unlikely to have duties to compensate the impacts of volcanic eruptions to nonhuman species. However, the actual question is more complex since it is increasingly hard to tell whether the negative impacts from “nonhuman activities” are exacerbated by human activities. For example, volcanic eruptions might today induce greater harm to nonhuman well-being because the human-induced habitat degradation prevents nonhumans from migrating to new places from areas damaged by the eruption. Addressing the question of positive duties beyond restoration goes, in its complexity, beyond this chapter’s scope. Here it can be noted that even for now, the positive duty to restore processes that comprise planetary well-being but have been degraded by human activitiesissosignificantthattakingitseriouslyimpliestransformativechangesto human activities. When it comes to duties to individuals, the planetary well-being framework goes beyond individualistic approaches in its framing of moral considerability. This does not need to render the well-being of individuals unmeaningful or valueless. Both individuals and entities beyond individuals, such as species or ecosystems, are acknowledged to be morally considerable. Yet, the duties for planetary well-being must be imposed on levels higher than the individual to make the obligations feasible. The ethical framework that underpins planetary well-being allows the integration of various approaches with the attribution of moral considerability (also inherent value) in environmental ethics. Yet, the requirements set by planetary well-being limit the range for the approaches that planetary well-being embracing pluralism can accommodate. Moral obligations to individuals, whatever they comprise (depending on the chosen ethical approach), must not require actions that would cause societies to undermine planetary well-being. Mapping planetary well-being in environmental ethics How is the normative core commitment of planetary well-being positioned within environmental ethics? Inclusive approaches that grant moral considerability to nonhumans comprise three stances where moral considerability is grounded in different attributes (e.g., Goodpaster, 1978; Schweitzer, 1969; Taylor, 1981; for a good summary, see Warren, 2000): sentientism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism. Sentientism (e.g., Nussbaum, 2011; Singer, 2002) only considers sentient animals. Biocentrism grants moral considerability to individual organisms that act as teleological systems so that something can be good or bad for them.3 It has also been proposed that biocentric moral considerability is grounded in the state of being alive as the ultimate goal or good, for which all other goals are instrumental. Ecocentrism, in turn, emphasizes the stability and integrity of ecosystems and/or ecological entities (such as lineages) more broadly but essentially beyond individuals who are not of primary concern in ecocentric approaches (Callicott, 1986; Leopold, 1949; Naess, 2008). The most-cited articulation of an ecocentric viewpoint is Leopold’s (1949,pp.224‒225)landethicthesis:“Athingisrightwhenittendstopreserve 40 Teea Kortetmäki et al. IPBES (2019) Summary for Policymakers of the Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. Zenedo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3553579 Kohler, F. et al. (2019) ‘Embracing diverse worldviews to share planet Earth’, Conservation Biology, 33(5), pp. 1014–1022. https://doi.org/10.1111/cobi.13304 Köhler, J. et al. (2019) ‘An agenda for sustainability transitions research: State of the art and future directions’, Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 31, pp. 1–32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2019.01.004 Kortetmäki, T. (2017) ‘Applying the capabilities approach to ecosystems: Resilience as ecosystem capability’, Environmental Ethics, 39, pp. 39–56. https://doi.org/10.5840/ ENVIROETHICS20179263 Kortetmäki, T. et al. (2021) ‘Planetary well-being’, Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 8, p. 258. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00899-3 Leopold, A. (1949) A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Levin, S. et al. (2013) ‘Social-ecological systems as complex adaptive systems: Modeling and policy implications’, Environment and Development Economics, 18, pp. 111–132. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X12000460 Mastrángelo, M.E. et al. (2019) ‘Key knowledge gaps to achieve global sustainability goals’, Nature Sustainability, 2, pp. 1115–1121. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-019-0412-1 Max-Neef, M.A. (1991) Human Scale Development: Conception, Application and Further Reflections. New York: The Apex Press. Muraca,B.(2011)‘Themapofmoralsignificance:Anewaxiologicalmatrixforenvironmental ethics’, Environmental Values, 20, pp. 375–396. https://doi.org/10.3197/096327 111X13077055166063 Naess, A. (1989) Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511525599 Naess, A. (2008) in Devall B. and Drengson, A. (eds.) Ecology of Wisdom: Writings by Arne Naess. New York: Counterpoint. Nussbaum, M.C. (2006) Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Nussbaum, M.C. (2011) Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Nussbaum, M.C. and Sen, A. (eds.) (1993) The Quality of Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Prescott-Allen, R. (2001) The Wellbeing of Nations. Washington, DC: Island Press. Puig de la Bellacasa, M. (2017) Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics in More Than Human Worlds. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Rice, C.M. (2013) ‘Defending the objective list theory of well-being’, Ratio, 26, pp. 196–211. https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12007 Rockström, J. et al. (2009) ‘A safe operation space for humanity’, Nature, 461, pp. 472–475. Rogers, D.S. et al. (2012) ‘A vision for human well-being: Transition to social sustainability’, Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 4, pp. 61–73. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.cosust.2012.01.013 Planetary well-being: Ontology and ethics 41 Rolston, H.I. (1985) ‘Duties to endangered species’, BioScience, 35, pp. 718–726. https:// doi.org/10.2307/1310053 Rolston, H.I. (2002) ‘What do we mean by the intrinsic value and integrity of plants and animals’, in Genetic Engineering and the Intrinsic Value and Integrity of Plants and Animals [workshop]. Edinburg: Royal Botanic Garden, pp. 18–21 September. Available at: https://mountainscholar.org/bitstream/handle/10217/39371/Ifgene-updated.pdf (Accessed: 14 January 2023). Schlosberg, D. (2007) Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, Movements, and Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/ 9780199286294.001.0001 Schweitzer, A. (1969) Reverence for Life. New York: Harper & Row. Singer, P. (2002) Animal Liberation. 1st Ecco paperback ed. New York: Ecco. Taylor, P.W. (1981) ‘The ethics of respect for nature’, Environmental Ethics, 3, pp. 197–218. https://doi.org/10.5840/ENVIROETHICS19813321 Taylor, P.W. (1986) Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt7sk1j UN (2015) Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. A/RES/70/1. Geneva: United Nations General Assembly. Available at: https://sdgs. un.org/2030agenda (Accessed: 14 January 2023). Warren, M.A. (2000) Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Oxford: Clarendon Press. WCED (1987) Our Common Future [Brundtland Report]. A/42/427. Geneva: United Nations General Assembly. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/139811?ln=en (Accessed: 14 January 2023). Wienhues, A. (2017) ‘Sharing the earth: A biocentric account of ecological justice’, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 30(3), pp. 367–385. https://doi.org/10.1007/ S10806-017-9672-9 Wienhues, A. (2020) Ecological Justice and the Extinction Crisis: Giving Living Beings their Due. Bristol: Bristol University Press. https://doi.org/10.46692/9781529208528 Yi Sencindiver, S. (2017) ‘New materialism’, Oxford Bibliographies Online in Literary and Critical Theory. https://doi.org/10.1093/OBO/9780190221911-0016