Selectivity of clientele in Finnish private early childhood education and care

This is a self-archived version of an original article. This version may differ from the original in pagination and typographic details. Author(s): Title: Year: Version: Copyright: Rights: Rights url: Please cite the original version: CC BY-NC 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ Selectivity of clientele in Finnish private early childhood education and care © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Published version Ruutiainen, Ville; Alasuutari, Maarit; Karila, Kirsti Ruutiainen, V., Alasuutari, M., & Karila, K. (2021). Selectivity of clientele in Finnish private early childhood education and care. Nordic Journal of Studies in Educational Policy, 7(2), 91-105. https://doi.org/10.1080/20020317.2021.1911161 2021 Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=znst20 Nordic Journal of Studies in Educational Policy ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/znst20 Selectivity of clientele in finnish private early childhood education and care Ville Ruutiainen, Maarit Alasuutari & Kirsti Karila To cite this article: Ville Ruutiainen, Maarit Alasuutari & Kirsti Karila (2021): Selectivity of clientele in finnish private early childhood education and care, Nordic Journal of Studies in Educational Policy, DOI: 10.1080/20020317.2021.1911161 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/20020317.2021.1911161 © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Published online: 11 Apr 2021. Submit your article to this journal View related articles View Crossmark data RESEARCH ARTICLE Selectivity of clientele in finnish private early childhood education and care Ville Ruutiainen a , Maarit Alasuutari b and Kirsti Karila c a Ville Ruutiainen, Department of Education, University Of Jyväskylä, Jyvaskyla, Finland; b Maarit Alasuutari, Department of Education, University Of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylän Yliopisto, Finland; c Kirsti Karila, Faculty of Education, University of Tampere, Tampereen Yliopisto, Finland ABSTRACT In accordance with the Nordic welfare model, the Finnish early childhood education and care (ECEC) system has traditionally been based on public provision and the idea of universalism. However, over the last twenty years the ECEC system has undergone market-oriented reforms. As a result, the share of private for-profit ECEC provision has grown significantly. By applying impression management theory, this qualitative research examines how representatives of private ECEC providers describe the selection and selectivity of their clientele and how they aim at managing the impression they convey through their descriptions. The study shows how three different mechanisms of selectivity are produced and legitimized in the interview talk. Furthermore, the study makes visible the cultural assumptions and expectations related to private ECEC provision and the potential selectivity it produces. ARTICLE HISTORY Received 22 February 2021 Accepted 26 March 2021 KEYWORDS Early childhood education and care; impression management; private provision; selectivity; legitimation Introduction Scholars have argued that during the neoliberal era welfare states have undergone a transformation characterized by intense marketization (Çalışkan & Callon, 2010; Djelic, 2006; Gilbert, 2002; Moss, 2014). This marketization has extended into education as well, including early childhood education and care (ECEC) (Adamson & Brennan, 2014; Rubiano & Urban, 2014; Vanderbroeck, 2006). Market-oriented reforms within ECEC services have been especially intense in liberal Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g. Adamson & Brennan, 2014; Mahon et al., 2012) and they are presented as a way to increase parents’ freedom of choice by enabling them to choose the services they prefer from among many competitive providers. Thus, ECEC (or childcare) becomes conceptualized as a commodity purchased from markets (e.g Author reference; Woodrow & Press, 2018). However, the accessibility and affordability of services in ECEC markets is often questionable (Vandenbroeck et al., 2008; Vandenbroeck & Lazzari, 2014). This, in turn, potentially leads to growing inequality of children and families (e.g. Brennan et al., 2012; Knijn & Lewis, 2017). Unlike Anglo-Saxon countries, Nordic countries have traditionally relied more on public service provision and the idea of universalism 1 (e.g. Kildal & Kuhnle, 2005; Lloyd & Penn, 2014; Vlasov, 2018). However, neoliberal policy discourses have spread to Nordic welfare regimes as well (Brennan et al., 2012; Mahon et al., 2012), and there have been various shifts towards marketoriented systems (e.g. Dýrfjörð & Magnúsdóttir, 2016; Haug, 2014; Mäntyjärvi & Puroila, 2019; Naumann, 2011; Vlasov, 2018). For example, in Sweden roughly 20% (EURYDYCE, 2018) and in Norway around half (Jacobsen & Vollset, 2012) of ECEC is privately provided, with a growing focus on for-profit provision. Due to increased privatization and marketization, parents have become positioned as subjects ultimately responsible for ECEC choice and thus their choices become moral acts related to what is considered good parenting (Karlsson et al., 2013). In Finland, the shift towards ECEC markets is evident in the increase of private ECEC provision. Until the 2010s, less than 10% of ECEC was privately provided (see Mahon et al., 2012), but in 2019 the share of private provision was already around 18% (FINEEC, 2019). At the same time, small local enterprises and non-profit providers were joined by rapidly growing ECEC chains. Between 2015 and 2019, the combined revenue of the three biggest forprofit chains increased from around EUR 46 million to EUR 146 million. During the same period, their staff increased from 1,033 to 3,566 employees CONTACT Ville Ruutiainen [email protected] Ville Ruutiainen, Department of Education, University Of Jyväskylä, Jyvaskyla Finland Transcription key (. . .) excluded section[] Author’s comment . . . sentence is not completed, address continues, A short break. pause in speech, continues the speech(-) Missing word or part of a word(–) Missing section(word) Unclear word or sectionunderlining Stressed word or section NORDIC JOURNAL OF STUDIES IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY https://doi.org/10.1080/20020317.2021.1911161 © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (Asiakastieto, Financial information about companies -database, 2021). The growth of private provision is supported by public funding. Our previous study (Author reference) demonstrated how municipal politicians and ECEC administrators commonly consider private ECEC accessible and affordable to all families and children. Their view was that contemporary development in Finland would not lead to differentiation of clientele between public and private services, even though the risk for this was identified. In this study, we turn to the private ECEC providers in Finland, inquiring about how they describe, in particular, their services and clientele from the viewpoint of selectivity. The reforms promoting the marketization of ECEC in Finland have been enacted on an already existing universal and public system (See Mahon et al., 2012; Vlasov, 2018). The organization of ECEC services in Finland is municipalities’ obligation, but the municipalities are allowed to decide whether they provide the services publicly or purchase them from private organizations. As is typical in Nordic countries, the governance of ECEC in Finland combines information governance and national-level regulations, including national core curriculum and statutes about preschool staff qualifications and adult-child ratios (Act on Early Childhood Education and Care). The same legislation regulates both public and private providers. Traditionally, municipalities have made purchase contracts with private ECEC providers, but today two different demand-side subsidies have almost completely replaced them: the private daycare allowance (PDAMS), introduced in 1997, and ECEC vouchers, introduced in 2009. 2 The features of the two demandside subsidies differ somewhat. Vouchers are granted by municipalities. They are usually income-tested (Lahtinen & Svartsjö, 2018) and, according to legislation, their value should be ‘reasonable’ for the customer. The PDAMS combines a private day care allowance (PDA) granted by the Social Insurance Institution and a municipal supplement (MS) granted by municipalities. The PDA has fixed and incometested parts and the MS can be either income-tested or fixed. In principle, income-tested subsidies enable customer fees relatively close to those in public sector. 3 If the subsidy is fixed-sum, the customer fee is the same for every family regardless of their income level. There is a growing body of academic literature about the marketization of ECEC, childcare 4 and education and how they are enabled or promoted in policies and policy discourses (e.g. Mahon et al., 2012; Vanderbroeck, 2006; Author reference; Woodrow & Press, 2018). The other stream of research has touched upon affordability, accessibility and availability or other characteristics of ECEC systems that potentially increase or reduce the selectivity of ECEC(e.g. Barnett, 2010; Lloyd & Penn, 2012; Mäntyjärvi & Puroila, 2019; Noailly & Visser, 2009; Vandenbroeck & Lazzari, 2014; Van Lancker, 2017). The research on parents’ ECEC choices, in turn, argues that successful choices in ECEC markets require skills and resources (economic and cultural). These skills and resources are not equally distributed, and thus, market conditions benefit some families more than others (e.g. Angus, 2015; Eika, 2006; Grogan, 2012; Kampichler et al.’s, 2018; O’Donnell, 2018; Vincent & Ball, 2006). Research has also started to pay attention to the reciprocal relationship between the ECEC system and parents’ choices and how the two affect each (e.g. Meyers & Jordan, 2006; Vandenbroeck et al., 2008). However, regardless of the many perspectives researched around the potential selectivity related to ECEC markets, little is known, especially in Nordic contexts, about how private providers themselves see their role in relation to possible selectivity. A study by Vandenbroeck et al. (2008) suggests that the admission policies of childcare settings can form an environmental constraint on the accessibility of ECEC. However, in their study, the state, municipal and private providers’ policies rarely differed from each other. Mäntyjärvi and Puroila (2019) research in the Finnish context, in turn, indicates that some private providers value their freedom to choose their customers (e.g. only children in need of whole-day-ECEC) and resist public interference in that freedom. This qualitative interview study continues this branch of research by examining how representatives of private ECEC providers describe the selection and selectivity of their clientele and how they aim at managing the impression they convey through their descriptions. Furthermore, by applying impression management theory, we investigate the cultural assumptions and expectations related to private ECEC provision and the potential selectivity it produces. Impression management Impression management (IM) theory, introduced by Ervin Goffman (1959), provides a framework for wide-scale studies on both individuals and organizations. According to the theory, people use different techniques or tactics to manage the impression they wish to give in interactional situations. Organizational IM, in turn, can be understood as actions purposefully trying to influence an audience’s perceptions about the organization (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). The techniques applied depend on what people think is appropriate in a certain situation. In other words, IM techniques used in a particular situation depend on the expectations and assumptions individuals presume that the other 2V. RUUTIAINEN ET AL. parties of an interaction have for them. According to Schlenker’s (1980 6) widely quoted definition, IM is ‘the conscious or unconscious attempt to control images that are projected in real or imagined social interactions’. Traditionally, IM research has focused on individual impression management behaviour, for example, in interviews, performance appraisals and career success (Bolino et al., 2008; Lievens & Peeters, 2008; Tata & Prasad, 2015). However, organizationallevel IM by organizations’ spokespersons and representatives has also been a subject of research (e.g. Bolino et al., 2008; Elsbach, 2003; Elsbach et al., 1998; Talbot & Boiral, 2018; Vaara & Monin, 2010). It has been suggested that organizations should be understood as unique social actors, or as a bridge between institutions and individuals, and therefore it might be more appropriate to use individual-level theories when constructing theories of them (King et al., 2010; Whetten et al., 2009). In this respect, individual-level IM constructs are possible in interpreting organizational action (Tata & Prasad, 2015). Brennan and Merkl-Davies (2013) suggest four different perspectives for examining organizational IM: economic, psychological, sociological and critical perspectives. This study focuses on the sociological approach, which understands IM according to legitimacy theory as actions aimed to align an organization’s norms and values with those of society (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). IM is, thus, understood as an instrument for organizations or organizational spokespersons in trying to increase the legitimacy of an organization or its actions (Elsbach, 2003; Elsbach et al., 1998; Ogden & Clarke, 2005; Ravasi & Schultz, 2006; Tata & Prasad, 2015). Research at both the individual (e.g. Boeije, 2004; Bolino et al., 2008; Ellis et al., 2002) and organizational (Bolino et al., 2008: Mohamed et al., 1999; Talbot & Boiral, 2018; Tata & Prasad, 2015) levels often recognizes defensive and assertive IM techniques. At the individual level, assertive IM tactics may include selfpromotion tactics, exemplification and ingratiation. Defensive tactics may include excuses, justifications and apologies (Ellis et al., 2002). At the organizational level, assertive IM tactics are often proactive and used to enhance the organization’s image. To respond to threatening situations, organizations may adopt more responsive defending tactics (Mohamed et al., 1999). Such accounts may include excuses, justifications, denials and apologies (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013; Elsbach, 2003). In general, defensive IM tactics are used to minimize bad effects and assertive tactics to maximize good effects (Bolino et al., 2008). Moreover, IM strategies are used to promote credibility and maintain the social accessibility of companies (Lillqvist & Louhiala-Salminen, 2014) or to provide explanations, legitimizations and rationalizations of organizations’ actions (Tata & Prasad, 2015). This article draws on the notion of IM described above. Methodologically, following Vaara and Monin (2010) suggestion, the study adopts a discursive approach as a means to examine the sense-making processes through which organizational legitimacy is established. Data and analysis The data of this study consist of qualitative interviews with representatives (entrepreneurs, owners or managers) of private ECEC providers (N = 12) from seven Finnish municipalities in 2016. In order to capture different orientations to ECEC provision, the interviewees represented non-profit organizations (n = 3), ECEC chains (n = 4) and small local entrepreneurs (n = 5). All of the ECEC chains provided services in two or more municipalities and the size of their business varied notably from a few centres to dozens. The average duration of the interviews was 81 minutes. In total, the data comprise 126,643 transcribed words (156 pages). The interviews were conducted by a team of four experienced researchers so that in the actual interviews, only one interviewer and interviewee were present. All of the interviewers were trained and they used the same thematic interview template. The interview questions concerned the background of the organization, the economy and operating environment, pedagogical and ideological orientations, clientele and possible future visions. The interviews included explicit questions about the selection of clientele, the selectivity of customers, possible inequalities caused by the marketization of ECEC, and interviewees’ considerations of critiques that have been directed at private ECEC providers or provision. The interviewees were also asked to describe their customer families. Figure 1 5 summarizes the premises of the analysis of this study. In this article, we analyse the talk of the interviewees that considers and relates to the present and potential future clientele of their organization and private ECEC in general. In such descriptions the interviewees, explicitly or implicitly, include or exclude families, parents and/or children in/from their clientele. Instead of using these expert interviews as a source of knowledge about the specific private ECEC providers, we approach them as accounting (see Nikander, 2012). By analysing such accounting, one is able to observe the generally approved cultural discourses that the interviewees draw on in their talk (see Tienari et al., 2003). Thus, although the research data consist of person-toperson conversation, it can be related to a wider cultural context (Wetherell, 2003). The interviewees had a dual role in the interviews: they represented themselves but they act also as NORDIC JOURNAL OF STUDIES IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY 3 spokespersons and representatives for their organizations (Bolino et al., 2008; Elsbach, 2003; Elsbach et al., 1998). Because of this dual role, the audience (see Elsbach, 2003; Elsbach et al., 1998; Goffman, 1959; Parker & Warren, 2017; Tata & Prasad, 2015) of the interview talk can also be understood as twofold (Lillqvist & Louhiala-Salminen, 2014 The unseen (Goffman, 1959 81) or the external audience includes members of other organizations, public interest groups and the general public, while the internal audience consists of, for example, employees or stockholders (Elsbach, 2003). The interviewer, in turn, comprises the immediate audience of the situation. Therefore, in keeping with Goffman’s (1959) original metaphor, even if some ‘backstage’ moments might occur (see Lillqvist & Louhela-Salminen, 2013) in this study, the interview situations are understood mainly as ‘official frontstage’ performance (see Sinclair, 1997). As Tata and Prasad (2015) suggest, the IM used is expected to increase as interviewees interpret the interview situation containing public elements. Since the accounts and descriptions by the interviewees are expected to be directed to a wider audience, we are able to analyse the interview talk as organizational IM. Hence, this study takes advantage of the view, sometimes used as a critique of interview data, that interviews contain features of a public performance (see Silverman, 1998). In the analysis, we first carefully read the interviews and distinguished the talk related to the clientele of ECEC. This talk could be categorized in three thematically different types of talk in relation to the potential selectivity of private ECEC (see Braun & Clarke, 2006): screening of clientele, families’ financial situation as a reason for selectivity, and cultural and ideological selectivity. Then, by applying tools of discourse analysis (Wood & Kroger, 2000) and using Deborah Tannen’s (1993) ideas about expectation frame as a guideline for analysis, we examined the linguistic characteristics of the talk to identify the forms of IM used in it. We categorized descriptions that function to foster the organizations’ image or legitimacy as assertive IM. These descriptions were often brought out without the interviewer presenting an explicit question about the issue, and they included, for example, overtone of pride, examples of high morals (e.g. aim for non-selective services) and descriptions of how the organization contributes Table 1. Impression management (IM) used as analytical tool. IM Tactics Function Assertive/proactive Self-promotion Exemplification Ingratiation Other linguistic/rhetoric means Enhancing the organization’s image/legitimacy To create the desired image or impression Defensive Justifications apologies excuses Defending from expected accusation Protecting organization’s image Figure 1. Organizational impression management in research interviews. 4V. RUUTIAINEN ET AL. to the benefit of families or municipalities. The IM interpreted as defensive comprises accounts that function to protect the organization’s legitimacy or image. These accounts included, for example, justifications and excuses (e.g. Bolino et al., 2008). The identified IM allowed us to analyse the cultural assumptions regarding the selectivity of the ECEC system (Table 1). Legitimating selection and selectivity of private ECEC’s clientele Every interview included discussion about the selectivity of clientele. Eight interviews touched upon features of clientele’s screening, in 10 interviews the selectivity was considered in relation to families’ financial situation, and in 10 interviews selectivity was rationalized through cultural and ideological issues. Overall, the talk about selectivity comprised both assertive and defensive IM. The assertive IM was used to promote an organization’s legitimacy and defensive IM to protect it. Screening of clientele Screening of clientele refers to talk that expresses how the provider is active in selecting the customers and excluding particular children and families from the services. Selecting or excluding customers was discussed in eight interviews. Selecting customers was based on children’s age, gender or the hours they would attend ECEC per day. Exclusion, in turn, was linked to the organization’s decision not to offer particular services, in most cases, special educational support. Even though the private providers positioned themselves as intentional in screening of the clientele, the reasons for it, even pragmatic ones, were presented so that they would strengthen the impression of an organization that aims at the best interest of children. In addition, the screening was justified by stating that the provider’s hands were tied for external reasons (such as the subsidy system or municipalities’ choices). Only defensive IM tactics were used in the context of screening of clientele. When the selection of clientele is associated with children’s best interest, the interviewees present justifications concerning daily ECEC routines, the provider’s limited resources, group structure and financial realities. Excerpt 1 demonstrates how these different viewpoints may be brought together to justify or excuse an organization’s decision to favour families in need of whole-day ECEC at the expense of those families who use the service for part-time ECEC. Excerpt 1 In excerpt 1, the interviewee explains that children’s part-time ECEC (20 h per week) would make it more difficult to plan pedagogy for all children and that children would miss some pedagogical activities (1–3). Furthermore, a little later the interviewee says that having part-time children in the group would burden it and increase the group size (13–14). Both reasons for selection are hence justified by presenting them as serving children’s best interest. In a similar manner, the justification of the child’s best interest was produced by another interviewee, who stated that the selection of customers can be based on the child’s age, gender and language ‘profile’ so that the selection serves the group’s ‘needs’ as well as the aims to facilitate the group’s functionality, enhance ECEC quality and support the staff’s motivation. In Excerpt 1, the interviewer also invokes the inflexibility of the subsidy system (6–7) and the regulation of ECEC to account for the selection by stating that children’s part-time attendance of ECEC would complicate following the regulations regarding the adult–child ratio (7–9). From an IM perspective, the regulation and inflexible subsidy system serve as external reasons for the selection and thus the account functions as an excuse. The interviewee also mentions in passing the public subsidies’ role in decisions about excluding part-time children from the clientele (6–7). This indicates that financial aspects play a role in the selection. Elsewhere in the data, the selection of customers is related to the administration and financial management of the enterprise and pedagogy. However, as in Excerpt 1, when the financial aspects related to selection are touched upon it is done rarely, vaguely and briefly, and only when asked about explicitly. This caution around the theme indicates interviewees’ assumptions about the cultural sensitivity of the subject and is thus understood as a form of defensive IM. Financial aspects were, however, invoked when justifying the exclusion of children with special educational needs (SEN). The Finnish education system has a three-tired support system: general, intensified and special support (Heiskanen et al., 2018). The legislation obligates municipalities to provide educational support () for the children with SEN. However, the role of private providers is not explicitly specified. Thus, practices related to public–private partnerships in providing educational support vary between municipalities. Some municipalities may pay increased subsidies for children with SEN and/or offer consulting services (special education teachers) to private providers. Municipalities can also try to obligate private providers to provide special support or they can decide not to direct children with SEN to the private sector at all. If a SEN appears when the child is already in private services, the practices to address it are diverse. The existing literature suggests that especially the educational support, which requires resourcing, is provided mainly in the public sector NORDIC JOURNAL OF STUDIES IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY 5 (Eskelinen & Paananen, 2018). When financial aspects were mentioned regarding the exclusion of children with SEN, the private providers stated that they would actually benefit financially if they accepted children with SEN, but the organization still excluded them, because the public ECEC was considered better resourced to support the children than private providers are. The talk about finances functioned to strengthen the credibility of the argument regarding the child’s best interest, which was expanded to justify the exclusion of children with special educational needs. Some interviewees also explain that their organizations’ decision not to offer special educational support is made in mutual understanding or in cooperation with municipalities’ ECEC administration. This shifts at least part of the responsibility for exclusion from private organizations to the public sector, so such accounts thus serve as excuses. Another way to account for the decision to exclude children with special educational needs is to represent the municipality as responsible for the restriction. In our data, the reasons that interviewees mention are (1) municipalities’ decisions to take charge of educational support themselves and, thus, not to refer children with special educational needs to private ECEC and (2) as Excerpt 2 demonstrates, the providers’ reliance on the municipal subsidy policy. Excerpt 2 In Excerpt 2, the provider presents deficient public subsidies as an external reason that precludes the provision of special support. Elsewhere in the data, the form of subsidies is also blamed. The fixed-sum PDAMS is represented as an inflexible system that does not enable resourcing in special education. The voucher system, in turn, is represented as a flexible system that enables special education if a municipality decides to set a reasonable value for it. In all cases, the public subsidies are represented as enabling or disabling special support in private ECEC. Hence, the public subsidies serve as excuses that diminish organizations’ responsibility for the negatively interpreted outcome. The interviewees presented the child’s age as another reason for the exclusion of clientele. Age-based exclusion was justified by the provider’s limited resources and by presenting opinions about the importance of home care for children under two years of age. Highlighting the deficient resources can be interpreted as an excuse and the ideological view about the right age to start ECEC justifies exclusion in the name of the child’s best interest. Families’ financial situation as a reason for selectivity The interviews included discussion about the affordability of private ECEC services and the potential selectivity related to them. In 10 out of 12 interviews, the representatives of private ECEC mentioned that the provider has, at least slightly, higher customer fees than the public sector. 6 The reported amounts of the extra costs varied from 10 euros per month per child to around 160 euros on top of the maximum price of the public sector. 7 In this context, defensive IM tactics were mainly used. However, some assertive overtones could be distinguished as well. Moreover, the accounts produced by the same interviewee could be internally contradictory. For example, one interviewee emphasized their organization’s striving for affordable and accessible ECEC, but said elsewhere that the organization also runs centres, under a different ‘brand’, that provide specialized ECEC at a higher price. 8 Defensive IM In the accounts analysed, five different ways to justify or excuse the higher customer fees or selectivity related to them could be identified. The first explanation was to justify the higher prices of the organization by linking them with higher quality and, consequently, with children’s best interest. Second, the interviewees could underline families’ initiative by representing them as active in seeking for high quality ECEC and by representing the organization as just answering to this demand. Third, the municipality’s subsidy system or law could be presented as an excuse for higher prices. Fourth, the interviewees could present the gravitation of families from a higher socioeconomic background to private services as natural. Finally, they could understate the price difference between their services and public sector by arguing that it is so low that it does not actually cause selectivity. In Except 3, the interviewee accounts for the higher fees of the organization’s services by employing the first three of the explanations listed above. Excerpt 3 In the account, the interviewee notes that the customer fees of the organization are higher than in public services and that families’ socioeconomic conditions in other municipalities hinder their growth (1–4). This indicates the interviewee’s perception that the organization’s services are financially inaccessible for some families. Firstly, the higher fees causing the selectivity are justified by the high quality of ECEC the organization provides. The interviewee offers an example of how different kinds of tables differ in price, drawing a parallel between ECEC provision and markets for other goods (1, 6–8). The suggestion is that ECEC is the same as any other good exchanged in the markets. By that logic, prices are elastic according to the quality of a good. The interviewee also implies that today’s parents are willing to invest in high-quality ECEC because they are nowadays more and more interested in developing their children’s competitiveness (8–13). The parents are 6V. RUUTIAINEN ET AL. represented as active and demanding subjects and the provision of high-priced and high-quality private ECEC as an answer to that demand. Thus, the IM used justifies the higher fees with parents’ preferences. The other interviewee, in turn, states that in larger cities ‘there is a completely separate clientele wanting private services anyway’ and that private ECEC providers compete for these ‘marginal groups’ (exemplified by referring to the employees of high-end technology companies). The interviewee represents private provision as an answer to the prevailing demand of those solvent families ‘wanting’ private services. Therefore, in this kind of IM, the selectivity of clientele (earlier in the interview, the interviewee states that they are not ‘only’ an elite centre) is justified by diminishing the provider’s agency and highlighting ‘marginal groups’. Moreover, in contrast to those accounts, elsewhere in the data, downplaying a provider’s possibilities to make a profit or justifying a company’s strong finances by stating that it enables them to be a reliable partner for the municipalities, the interviewee in Excerpt 3 states that a limited company’s statutory duty is actually to make profits for its shareholders (5–6). Using the modal phrases ‘one must not avoid’ and ‘pricing has to’ indicates the interviewee’s assumption that bringing up profit-seeking in the context of ECEC is somehow not an accepted way of talking and thus against cultural norms. Hence, the interviewee uses IM and excuses profit-seeking by referring to an external reason, namely the law. The other external subject presented the municipality’s subsidy policy as a reason for higher fees and selectivity (13–24). The interviewee implies that the value of the subsidy is so low that the ECEC provider has no other option but to charge high fees. The argument is strengthened by mentioning the more generous subsidies in other municipalities and highlighting the socioeconomic segregation caused by subsidies that are too low. In general, municipalities’ subsidy policies are repeatedly represented in the data as playing a key role in the interviewees’ accounts of the selectivity due to families’ financial situations. Income-tested subsidies are connected to affordability and fixed-sum PDAMS to selectivity of services. Defensive IM is also used to justify socioeconomic selectivity by representing it as a natural situation. In such accounts, however, the prices of the services are not discussed directly but, as Excerpt 4 exemplifies, the naturalization is created by describing the clientele in a way that indicates high socioeconomic positions in society. Excerpt 4 The interviewee starts the account with the modal expression ‘must not’ and thus brings out the norm of universally accessible ECEC (1). Then, when noting that typically their clientele is highly educated, the interviewee uses the expressions kyllähän (but, sure it’s true) and onhan (it’s true that we have), which in Finnish in this context indicate admitting or confessing to an undesirable state of affairs (1–4). This contradiction between the norm and the actual situation threatens the organization’s legitimacy, so the interviewee uses IM to naturalize the situation: using the expression ‘That’s just how it is’ represents the situation as a natural state of affairs beyond the organization’s authority and hence offers justification for the selectivity. In sum, it can be said that clear add-ons in public fees and the selectivity of families related to those are expected to be not accepted and thus defensive IM tactics are used when discussing them. In addition, as noted above, assuring somehow that the services are accessible and/or affordable for every family is one way of managing the image of the organizations. However, depending on the context, this kind of talk can represent defensive or assertive IM. When the interviewees produce accounts that function to diminish the importance of their slightly higher customer fees than those in the public sector (e.g. 30 euros add-on per moth), the IM is interpreted as defensive. In such instances, IM functions to diminish the negative readings of the importance of an organization’s somewhat higher customer fees and is therefore interpreted as giving justifications. Assertive IM Assertive IM is not used in the context where interviewees discuss possible selectivity related to their higher customer fees. However, as mentioned above, the interviewees can also assure that their services are affordable and accessible for every family. When this is done in an assertive sense, the interviewees can highlight that they have ‘all kinds of families’ as customers or describe themselves as a local service for ordinary families living nearby. When these issues are mentioned with overtones of pride or without an explicit question they are understood as exemplification. Exemplification is an assertive IM tactic used to present oneself as a model of morally virtuous or principled conduct (Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984). Excerpt 5 demonstrates the use of assertive IM. Excerpt 5 Excerpt 5 is a part of the response to a question about the provision of special educational support. Later the interviewee says that the organization provides special education when public subsidies enable it. In the account, the interviewee assures that they do not intentionally select customers and there is no selectivity of customers (1–3, 8–10). This is interpreted as assertive IM (exemplification) since the organization represents itself as an active subject in aiming for affordable and accessible ECEC. 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