The Izala Movement in Nigeria: Its Split, Relationship to Sufis and Perception of Sharīʿa Re-Implementation

The Izala Movement in Nigeria: Its Split, Relationship to Sufis and Perception of Sharīʿa ReImplementation A Dissertation Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Dr. phil.) at BIGSAS by Ramzi Ben Amara Research Area (A): Uncertainty, Innovation and the Quest for Order in Africa Supervisor: Dr. Franz Kogelmann June 2011 2 Table of Contents Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................. 2 Foreword ............................................................................................................................................ 5 Technical Note .................................................................................................................................. 7 Chapter One: Introduction ...................................................................................................... 8 1 The Study ..................................................................................................................................... 13 2 Scope of literature ....................................................................................................................... 22 3 Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 40 4 Theoretical framework ................................................................................................................ 45 4.1 Bourdieu applied to Izala .................................................................................................... 47 4.2 “Modes of Religiosity” theory .............................................................................................. 56 4.3 Religious Market Theory & Religious Movements .......................................................... 60 Chapter Two: Religious Landscape in Nigeria .................................................................. 67 1 Christianity in Nigeria .................................................................................................................. 67 2 History of Islam in Nigeria .......................................................................................................... 71 2.1 Sufi Brotherhoods ................................................................................................................ 75 2.1.1 The Qādiriyya ................................................................................................... 75 2.1.2 The Tijāniyya .................................................................................................... 78 2.2 The Indirect Rule .................................................................................................................. 81 2.3 English Law or Islamic Law ................................................................................................ 89 2.4 Islam in Nigeria during the postcolonial era ..................................................................... 95 2.5 The conflict between the Sufi Brotherhoods .................................................................. 102 2.6 Sheikh Abubakar Gumi and his struggle against Sufism ............................................. 109 2.6.1 Sheikh A. Gumi: his early life until 1972 .................................................... 111 2.6.2 Sheikh A. Gumi: from al-ʿaqīda al-ṣaḥīḥa (1972) to the establishment of Izala (1978) ............................................................................................................... 118 Chapter Three: Reform Islam versus Sufism .................................................................. 122 1 What is reform in “Nigerian” Islam? ........................................................................................ 125 2 Shiʿites in Nigeria ....................................................................................................................... 136 3 3 The JTI in Nigeria ...................................................................................................................... 138 4 From Maitatsine to Boko Haram - a coincidence or a continuation? ................................. 141 5 Salafiyya oriented groups ......................................................................................................... 147 Chapter Four: The Izala movement between success and failure .............................. 150 1 Sheikh Ismaila Idris and the Izala Question .......................................................................... 150 2 The J.I.B.W.I.S.: Formation of Izala Organization in 1978 .................................................. 157 2.1 One constitution and two factions or many constitutions of the same organization? ..................................................................................................................................................... 165 2.2 Structure of the Organization ........................................................................................... 178 2.2.1 The Council of ʿulamā' .................................................................................. 178 2.2.2 The Administration Council .......................................................................... 179 2.2.3 First Aid Group (FAG) ................................................................................... 180 2.2.4 Other Committees ......................................................................................... 181 2.3 Current leadership in Izala ................................................................................................ 185 2.3.1 The Jos branch of Izala ................................................................................ 186 2.3.2 The Kaduna branch of Izala ......................................................................... 190 3 Izala and Innovation .................................................................................................................. 196 3.1 Definition(s) of bidʿa ........................................................................................................... 196 3.2 The Discourse of Izala on bidʿa........................................................................................ 215 4 Izala and Wahhabism ............................................................................................................... 228 5 The Division of the Movement: One organization and two doctrines or two organizations and one doctrine? ........................................................................................................................ 242 5.1 Time of the division ............................................................................................................ 243 5.2 Reasons of the Division .................................................................................................... 250 5.3 The Izala “War of words” between Kaduna and Jos: “Two open letters to Sheikh Jingir vs. answers from Jos” ................................................................................................... 268 5.4 Attempts at reconciliation .................................................................................................. 284 Chapter Five: Sharīʿa Debate of 1999 .............................................................................. 291 1 Who implemented Sharīʿa? ...................................................................................................... 293 2 Proponents and opponents of the Sharīʿa-project ................................................................ 307 2.1 Proponents of Sharīʿa ........................................................................................................ 310 4 2.2 Opponents of the re-implementation of Islamic Law .................................................... 314 2.3 The Federal Government, the States, the ʿulamā' , and grassroots’ positions on sharī‛a re-implementation ........................................................................................................ 323 3 Izala’s contribution to the re-implementation: initiators? ..................................................... 331 4 Izala, Sufis, and Sharī‛a-law: a chance for reconciliation? .................................................. 339 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 344 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................... 359 Abstract (English) ..................................................................................................................... 377 Abstract (German) .................................................................................................................... 379 5 Foreword I want to express my gratitude to all people who assisted me in my project at different stages and apologize to all those I did not mention here by name. First of all, I am very thankful to Prof. Dr. Ulrich Berner who encouraged me during my undergraduate, graduate and during the process of writing my PhD-Thesis. In the field of Religious Studies I learnt a lot from Prof. Berner and I am really lucky and happy for studying under him and working under his supervision. Without the assistance and unlimited patience of my supervisor Dr. Franz Kogelmann, this dissertation would not have been accomplished. I thank him for his kind support, critical readings and for sharing his knowledge about sharīʿa and Islam in Africa. Prof. Dr. Roman Loimeier’s lecture at Bayreuth University about Islam in Africa linked my attention to Nigeria and Izala. I am grateful to him for providing me with contacts and networks during my field research. I thank him for the discussions and valuable information he provided me on Izala at different stages of my PhD-project. Through Prof. Dr. Kurt Beck I knew how to deal with Islam from an anthropological perspective. I enjoyed his seminars, lectures and discussions. I am thankful to him for his kind assistance in all directions. Dr. Philip Ostien assisted me in Nigeria and there are no words to thank him enough for his kind support and assistance. Na Gode! I am thankful to: Prof. Dr. Umar Danfulani (Jos) who assisted me in many directions: He did not only host me in his department, but linked me to many Nigerian scholars of religions. I learnt a lot from Dr. Azonzeh Ukah and appreciated his comments, corrections and critical readings. I am very grateful to him for his kind assistance. I thank Prof. Dr. Christoph Bochinger and Prof. Dr. Gabriele Cappai for their support and for discussing my work in their excellent methodology course: Prof. Dr. Sani Umar, Prof. Dr. Abdukader Tayob, Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Seeseman shared their knowledge with me and provided me with ideas and theoretical orientation. I am thankful to all them for taking time to discuss my project with them. Many thanks to Cathlene Dollar for her corrections, critical reading, and recommendations. I thank all my interviewees in Nigeria for giving me time and sharing their ideas and for being patient to the many questions I raised. In Nigeria, I am grateful to Prof. M. Yahya (Jos), Prof: Musa Gaiya (Jos), Dr. Gwamna (Jos), Dr. Yilpet (Jos), Ustaz Sani Modibbo (Jos), Ustaz Abdurrahman Lawal Adam (Jos), Mallam Kabiru (Jos), Ahmad Garba (Jos); Mallam Sani Abdurrazaq (Jos), Mallam Dawood Abubakar (Jos/Berlin), Rahina Muhd (Jos), Chikas Danfulani (Jos/Bayreuth), Yusuf Abdullahi Yusuf 6 (Jos/Katsina), Dr. Afe Adogame (Edinbrough/Lagos), Dr. Selome Kopunu (Lagos), Dr. Remi Brito (Lagos), Dr. Umar Adam (Kaduna), Babangida (Katsina), Mallam Bala (Zaria), Sheikh Mujahid (Zaria), Mallam Amino Kano (Kaduna/ Kano), Dr. Maren Milligen (USA), Mallam Khidr (Kano), Mallam Uthman (Kano), Saleh Ibrahim (Jos), Prof. Dr. Aljunnar (Sokoto), Dr. Kamal Babakr (Sokoto), Mallam Salisu Bala (Kaduna), Mallam Musa (Arewa House, Kaduna), Dr. Gwadebe (Arewa House, Kaduna), Dr. Haruna Wakili (Mambayya House, Kano), Prof. Dr. Muhammad Munkaila (Maiduguri), Dr. Balarbe Zulyadaiyni (Maiduguri) for their kind assistance. My family in Tunisia and my friends in Germany (Aissa, Amr, Kamel, Abdou, Ronny, Oliver, Marcus, Eva, Silke, Tobi, Ahmad, Valerie, Salma and many others) helped me a lot during the last years and I am very grateful to all of them. Meron Zeleke and Halkano Abdi corrected parts of this dissertation and provided me with critical remarks and corrections. Many thanks to both of them! This study was financed by different institutions at different steps. I am grateful to the Tunisian Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur, The Volkswagen Foundation, The International Office (University of Bayreuth), The International Club (University of Bayreuth), and to BIGSAS for the financial support throughout my doctoral thesis. I am thankful to all members and staff of the Zentralbibliothek (University of Bayreuth), Permanent Site Library (University of Jos), Mambayaa House Library (Kano), Arewa House Library (Kaduna), Library of the Department of Islamic Studies (Usman Dan Fodio University, Sokoto). 7 Technical Note Non-English words are italicised; the transliteration of Arabic words follows that used in the International Journal of Middle East Studies. The meanings of non-English words are given in parentheses following their first appearance, e.g. ribā (in Arabic: interest). All dates are cited according to the “Common Era” (c.e.), numerically equivalent to the Christian a.d. To protect the identity of my interview partners, I have decided not to add a detailed list of interviewees as well as the different locations of the interviews. If for academic reasons more details are necessary please contact the author directly. 8 Chapter One: Introduction Nigeria is the most populous nation in Africa. According to the 2006 census more than 140 Million inhabitants live in this West African country. Nigeria is ethnically, linguistically and religiously heterogeneous. Approximately over 500 languages 1 are spoken in the country. Hausa in the north, Ibo in the south east and Yoruba in the south west are considered to be among the most important languages and dominant ethnic groups. Nigeria borders Cameroon and Chad in the east, the Republic of Niger to the north, the Republic of Benin in the west and the Gulf of Guinea to the south. (Wikipedia 2010) Today, Nigeria is a federation of 36 states with Abuja, as the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). In 1999 the Fourth Republic was declared after a democratic 1 http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=NG speaks of 527 “individual languages” in Nigeria among which 512 are “living languages” and 11 have “no known speakers” (4/10/2010). 9 election. This was the fourth attempt by a civilian government in Nigeria after three failed attempts and a long experience with military dictatorship. 2 Nigerians are considered to be among the happiest people in the world. This is based on an outcome of a study from the year 2003 comparing more than 65 countries. 3 Another study entitled “What the World thinks about God” dating from 2004 regards Nigerians as the most religious people worldwide. 4 A Global Corruption Report from 2009 published by Transparency International places Nigeria 121 among 180 countries. 5 In the media, Nigeria is often known for oil, ethnic, and religious crises. In the Niger Delta area where many international oil companies operate, explosions related to leaking pipelines as well as kidnappings of Nigerians and foreign residents and workers of oil companies happen intermittently. 6 The situation in this area of Nigeria is a result of unequal distribution of oil income. Nigeria has been a member of the Oil 2 Nigeria gained its independence from Britain in Oktober 1960. The country was then ruled by the Military with attempts of a civilian government. The First Republic was between 1963 and 1966; The Second Republic was between 1979 and 1983; the Third Republic took place in 1993 when democratic elections were organized and annulled by the Military. 3 According to the www.bbc.co.uk/news of 02/10/2003 the study was published by the New Scientist magazine in the UK. It is based on a survey conducted between 1999 and 2001. The study dealt with the level of happiness and satisfaction of people with their lives in the country they come from. (4/10/2010). 4 www.bbc.co.uk/news (26/02/2004). 5 Transparency International (2009): Global Corruption Report 2009. Corruption and Private Sector. Cambridge: University Press, pp. 200-203; In July 2010 the Nigerian Minister of Finances declares his dissatisfaction with the actual situation and stresses that one of the greatest concerns of the actual administration is fighting corruption, see www.allafrica.com (15/07/2010). 6 During the 1st October independence celebrations in 2010, a car bomb explosion in Abuja killed eight people and injured three. Rebels from the Niger Delta area seemed to be behind this action; see http://english.aljazeera.net for more details (2/10/2010). 16 initial field work was the ʿulamā' , experts and religious leaders with the aim of extending these interview subjects at a grassroots level during future field research. The ʿulamā' as well as many religious scholars are the ones who witnessed the establishment of Izala towards the end of the 1970s. They played a major role in the history of the movement. When it comes to doctrinal differences between Izala and groups outside of the movement, the leaders are the primary source of ideas and religious doctrines. In 2008 the spectrum of the study was enlarged to include other parts of northern Nigeria and more case studies derived from different contexts were added. I conducted my field research between February and April 2008. During this period of the research eleven out of twelve northern states were visited. The only exception was Niger State. This was a result of my contacts in the field and the availability of interview subjects and by no means an exclusion of specific actors. The leaders of Izala in Jos and Kaduna were interviewed in different areas. Places like Maiduguri, Sokoto, Zamfara, Gombe, and Katsina – among others – were covered. 14 Thematically three basic topics were explored. First, the establishment of Izala as an organization and its presence in different regions of the north, its division into two major groups and the attempts of reconciliation constitute the first part of the interviews. The issue of leadership, money, and structure were also part of these discussions. 14 I am thankful to Dr. Philip Ostien for assisting with travelling in northern Nigeria. He was conducting research on Sharīʿa Courts in the twelwe Sharīʿa States. Joining him in 2008 allowed me to move in many places and conduct interviews with several Izala and non-Izala people in different states of the north. 17 The second topic is the relationship between Izala and Sufi brotherhoods past and present. In order to analyse this relationship between the 1970s and the beginning of the 1990s studies published by Roman Loimeier 15 , Sani Umar 16 and Ousmane Kane 17 were used. Through interviews with Sufi and Izala representatives and ordinary members this relationship is analysed from the perspective of today’s leaders. Important here is the discourse of both groups as well the change in that relationship. The third and last topic of the interviews was the re-implementation of sharīʿa law in northern Nigeria and its impact on Izala and the Sufis. On several occasions Izala leaders claimed that the movement was the initiator of sharīʿa in the north. The expectations from the sharīʿa project were high. The re-implementation started at the top (by single governor) and was accomplished by the masses ( sharīʿa reimplementation in other states was forced at the grassroots level). The reimplementation itself presents for Muslims of the north a “success”. All Muslim groups in northern Nigeria with the exception of the Shiʿites (knowan among Nigerian Muslims as Yan Shia; calls itself Islamic Movement in Nigeria) under the leadership of Ibraheem Zakzaky 18 accepted and appealed for the re-implementation. Through 15 Loimeier, Roman (1997): Islamic reform and political change in Nigeria. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. 16 Umar, M. Sani (1983): Islamic Revivalism Today. The Example of Jama‘tu Izaltul Bidʿah Wa Iqamitis Sunnah, BA-Thesis, Jos University; Umar, M. Sani (1988): Sufism and Anti-Sufism in Nigeria, MAThesis, University of Kano. 17 Kane, Ousmane (2003): Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria: A study of the Society for Removal of Innovation and reinstatement of Tradition. Leiden, Boston: Brill. 18 For his biography and the Shiʿism question see Suleimann, Galadima I. (2005): Mallam Ibrahim ElZakzaky and the Question of Shiʿism; BA-dissertation in Islamic Studies, University of Jos, Nigeria. 18 this pressure to implement Islamic Law a new situation developed: a situation in which all Muslim groups needed unity. According to Ousmane Kane “Any outbreak of major conflict between Christians and Muslims caused Muslims factions to unite and forget, at least temporarily, their doctrinal divisions to fight the common enemy.” 19 The sharīʿa issue was a major contention between Muslims and Christians. Izala as well as Sufis had no option but to come together. There are some claims within the Izala that the movement was the initiator of sharīʿa and that Ahmad Sani Yeriman Bakuru is a member of the movement. There is no definitive answer as to how he became a member and how he was influenced by Izala. Sufis also claim that they were behind the re-implementation of sharīʿa in northern Nigeria. If we take the re-implementation itself, then it can be considered as the realization of a “dream” of many Muslims to re-establish what has been removed during colonial times. It is a matter of identity related to the situation in the legal field that existed during the time of the Sokoto caliphate which was forbidden by the British colonial administration. Northern Nigerians are emotionally attached to the Sokoto Caliphate and its history. For them, Izala and sharīʿa go side by side. Izala doctrine feeds into the sharīʿa project and sharīʿa can be regarded as a realization of Izala doctrine: Islamization of the society (not to be confused with an Islamic State project) - as some scholars describe it. 20 19 Kane, Ousmane (2003), p. 211. 20 Informal discussion with Prof. Musa Gaiya from the University of Jos 2006; the scholar of religion sees the Izala project in no way as an attempt to Islamize the state. Furthermore, it is an Islamization 19 During the field research, ordinary members and ex-members of Izala were interviewed in order to gain grassroots perspective on the movement. Although many members (especially young people) could not tell much about the history of Izala through biographical sketches they provided insights of Izala from a different perspective. The environment in which they grew up is an additional source of information on Izala. The interviews were supplemented with visits to Izala institutions in Jos and other towns. Mainly mosques and schools of Izala were visited. In Gombe, I had a unique opportunity to visit an Izala hospital. The first chapter is an introductory one. After dealing with what has been published/written on the Izala movement in Nigeria so far and its development in and outside of the West African country, the methodology throughout the dissertation is clarified. Then the theoretical framework is introduced. The second chapter is a historical one. It serves as a historical background for the next chapters. The history of Christianity and Islam in Nigeria with an emphasis given to the Sokoto Caliphate period as well as an outline of other Islamic groups in the country will be given. The Sufi brotherhoods played an especially important role in spreading of Islam in the country. The British introduced so-called “indirect rule” in Nigeria. This strategy as well as the development of Islam during the British colonial and post-colonial periods will be analysed. The struggle between Sufis and reform-oriented Islamic groups in the 1970s are taken in consideration. This is shown through the struggle of Sheikh Gumi and Sufi Brotherhoods. of the society by insisting on several societal aspects such as Islamic education, dressing code, education of women, ban of alcohol, etc. 20 Izala has a reform project in Nigeria, but it is not the only Islamic group with such a plan. In chapter three this notion of “reform” is dicussed in the Nigerian context. The examples of the Shiʿite movement, the Jamāʿat Tajdīd al-Islām (JTI), Maitatsine, Boko Haram, or Salafiyya groups are different manifestations of the same phenomenon. Some of these groups were established at the same time of the Izala foundation, others, such as Boko Haram, are contemporary ones. Chapter four deals with the establishment of Izala. It gives an overview about the life and contribution of Sheikh Idris to the movement. It serves to clarify issues related to Izala like the discussion on innovation (Arabic: bidʿa), and the relationship between Izala and Wahhabism. In this chapter the development of Izala from the beginning of the 1990s is outlined. In particular, the division of the movement into two major groups is analysed. The division of Izala which was mostly unclear to nonMuslims in northern Nigeria, was a big event within the movement. The doctrinal differences and attempts of reconciliation as well as the amendment of the Izala constitution are important parts of the movement’s history. Doctrinal controversies and internal debates are in many cases hidden to outsiders. This chapter is an attempt to clarify some aspects of internal differences within Izala. The discourse(s) within the movement and the rationale of leaders regarding the division is analysed and reflected through interviews and writings from within the Izala. One cannot deal with Izala without dealing with its relationship to Sufis. In chapter five this relationship is elucidated. Especially in the context of the reimplementation of Islamic law, the Izala-Sufi struggle took another dimension. The 21 controversy surrounding the re-implementation of sharīʿa in northern Nigeria was huge. This event was perceived differently. Some speak of a project of Islamization of Nigeria and see in sharīʿa a danger to the democratization process for the federation during the Fourth Republic. For many Muslims, sharīʿa was constitutionally adapted. Freedom of religion is guaranteed in the constitution of the West African country and what happened was an adaptation of an Islamic Law that existed in northern Nigeria for hundreds of years. In this chapter, the discussion goes beyond the Muslim community of Nigeria. The sharīʿa controversy in the country is a national dilemma. This chapter deals with the intra-Muslim discourse on sharīʿa especially Izala-Sufi debate(s). In addition, the discourse between Muslims and Christians is illustrated. The concluding chapter serves as a summary of the results and findings carried out in this study. The objective of this dissertation is to go beyond the studies of Roman Loimeier, Sani Umar, Ousmane Kane, and to some extent Andrea Brigaglia. Apart from dealing with the current Izala movement in Nigeria and its leadership and structure and updating the work of the previous scholars, a central objective will be to examine the Izala-Sufi relationship today within the sharīʿa project. Sharīʿa reimplementation in Nigeria brought all Muslim groups irrespective of their doctrinal differences together. Apart from the Shiʿites under their leader Ibraheem Zakzaky all Muslim groups and individuals welcomed the re-implementation. How different Islamic groups dealt with their differences within the context of sharīʿa will be a 22 central question in this study. The study attempts to answer the following questions: How did Islamic groups (Izala or Sufis) legitimize their initiation of the sharīʿa project with the Umma (Muslim community) in northern Nigeria? What kind of discussions related to sharīʿa took place? What was the role of other Muslim groups within this project? 2 Scope of literature In academia, the works of Sani Umar, Roman Loimeier, and Ousmane Kane are among the most well-known on Izala in Nigeria. There are also cases dealing with the situation in the Republic of Niger (Masquelier’s study on Muslim women in Dogondoutchi town, Grégoire on Maradi town; Alidou on Muslim Women). Literature on Izala in other contexts like Ghana, Chad and Cameroon is limited. These other contexts could be a subject of investigation in the future. The material collected in Nigeria at different universities shows that much research on Izala can be seen as case studies. They were dealing with local developments of the movement in a particular place or town. Some of them deal with one aspect related to Izala (education, mosques, etc.). The founder of Izala and current leaders of the movement were also often subject of studies. The studies listed below are in no way complete and they are only samples of academic research related to Izala done by Nigerian and other scholars. The Izala movement attracted the attention of a few scholars from both western and Islamic countries. Intensive work on Izala was done by a Nigerian Muslim from the north, Sani Umar, who looked at the relationship between Sufism 23 and anti-Sufism in his country. The author is a Nigerian and a native speaker of Hausa originally from Jos where he had access to the movement and conducted his field research during a very important period of the organization’s development. His BA-Dissertation was submitted at Jos University in 1983 and his MA at Kano University. Sani Umar is considered to be the first scholar who dealt with Izala in an academic way. 21 Sani Umar traces the changes of Islamic identity from Sufism to anti-Sufism in the postcolonial period. 22 Umar takes note of a “popularization” of Sufism in Nigeria during the 1940s. He relates the growth of anti-Sufism in the 1950s to anti-colonial tendencies in Kano, Sokoto and Katsina. The revival of Islam started according to Umar with Sa’ad Zungur (1915-1958) and Abubakar Gumi (1922-1992). This trend continued during the 1970s with the popularization of Sheikh Gumi’s views by the media. Through the establishment of Izala in 1978 as an organized entity, the struggle between the movement and Sufi brotherhoods became more visible. The author concludes that anti-Sufism is a form of “protest” and “reorientation” within the Islamic religious field in Nigeria. The studies of Roman Loimeier and Ousmane Kane are two different analyses of reform Islam in Nigeria. The former is a western scholar of Islam (Islamwissenschaftler) and the latter is a Senegalese political scientist coming from a Sufi background. Both researchers conducted field work at the end of the 1980s. Both took Kano as starting point for their studies. Loimeier looks at the development 21 Umar, M. Sani (1983), (1988). 22 See Umar, M. Sani (1993): Changing Muslim identity in Nigeria from the 1960s to the 1980s: from Sufism to Anti-Sufism, in: Brenner, Louis (ed.): Muslim identity and social change in Sub-Saharan Africa, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, pp. 154-178. 24 of the Sufi brotherhoods in Nigeria (the Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya) and their struggle for power and for followers. The doctrinal differences between both brotherhoods especially during the 1950s and 1960s are well documented. The advent of Sheikh Gumi as a pioneer of reform in Nigeria led to a shift of the religious landscape in the north. The struggle began between him and the “unified” Sufi Brotherhoods. The dispute between both exceeded the intellectual dispute. In the early 1970s Gumi and several Sufi leaders exchanged attacks via their writings. The doctrinal differences and disputes led to physical attacks. Loimeier’s work can be considered as fundamental background-study of the Nigerian religious and political landscape after independence. Sheikh Gumi played a central role during this period. Gumi and his reform program are analysed by Loimeier in other publications 23 as well as in a general overview on Islamic reform in Nigeria in comparison to other African contexts 24 It was no surprise that an organization that shared Sheikh Gumi’s stance visà-vis the Sufi-brotherhoods was founded. This idea of establishing an organization was realized by Ismaila Idris through the establishment of Izala. Kane regards the establishment of Izala as a project of modernity. The organization is an interesting 23 Die radikale islamische Opposition in Nordnigeria, In: Afrika Spectrum, 32, 1, 5-23; see also Loimeier’ publication of the same year: Islamic Reform and Political Change: The Example of Abubakar Gumi and the 'Yan Izala Movement in Northern Nigeria , in: David Westerlund (ed.). African Islam and Islam in Africa. Encounters between Sufis and Islamists, London, 286-307; Loimeier, Roman (2003): Patterns and Peculiarities of Islamic Reform in Africa, In: Journal of Religion in Africa, 33, 3, 237-62. 24 Loimeier, Roman (2005): De la dynamique locale des réformismes musulmans. Études biographiques (Sénégal, Nigeria et Afrique de l´Est), in: M. Gomez-Perez (ed.). L'Islam politique au sud du Sahara. Identités, discours et enjeux. Karthala, Paris, 29-48. 25 phenomenon in the history of Islam in Nigeria. The movement calls people to Islam based on the Qur’ān and the sunna . Izala invited followers to the old tradition of alSalaf al-Ṣāliḥ (pious predecessors; the first generations after the death of the Prophet), but at the same time Izala established schools and asked for women to be educated. The movement recruited ʿulamā' as well as young people at an early stage of its establishment. It then developed into an officially registered organization in Nigeria. Izala adapted itself to the needs of people and concentrated on several aspects of social life to propagate its doctrine. Islamic education played an important role in Izala. From Kane’s study, it is possible to identify several main figures of the movement and its development in Kano state. Although Kane’s book was published in 2003, it was based on the materials he collected for his PhD dissertation 25 at Bordeaux University in 1993. This valuable study on Izala started with the rise of the movement and ended with its “domestication” – to use Kane’s concept. In other publications 26 Kane analyzes the main figures and the social environment in which Izala came out and relates it to economic and political changes in and outside of Nigeria (Sheikh Gumi’s influence, the Saudi factor, etc). Kane 27 sees in Izala a project of “modernization” of Islam and links up it with several other reform movements in West Africa, for instance, in Mali or Senegal. Studying abroad and 25 Kane, Ousmane (1993): Les mouvements islamiques et le champ politique au nord du Nigeria: le cas du mouvement Izala à Kano, thèse de doctorat, IEP, Paris. 26 Kane, Ousmane (1994): Izala: The rise of Muslim reformism in Northern Nigeria, in: Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (ed.), Accounting for fundamentalisms: The dynamic character of movements, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 490-512. 27 Kane, Ousmane (1999): La polémique contre le soufisme et les ordres soufis en Afrique de l'Ouest post-coloniale, in: Frederick de Jong & Bernd Radtke (ed.) Islamic mysticism contested: thirteen centuries of controversies and polemics. Leiden: E.J. Brill. pp. 324-40. 32 issues related to fiqh (in Arabic: jurisprudence) such as marriage, definition of Ahl alKitāb , attachment to the Mālikī School of law, etc. Izala preaching in Bauchi is the main subject of this study. Preaching is central and khutba (the Arabic for “Friday sermon”) are under the supervision of the ʿulamā' Council of the movement. The first part is an introduction related to a definition of the concept of khutba and focusing on its meaning in a religious context. According to the author, preaching by Izala members in Bauchi goes beyond a religious context and extends to social and political aspects of the community. These three aspects sum up the content of Izala preaching. In addition to that, Abdulkadir adds what he calls “ khutba tashjīʿiyya ” (supportive preaching) through which Izala invites its followers to continue following the path of the movement. This kind of preaching is also directed at other people in order to inform them of the organization’s ideas. The Izala preaching is within the framework of the Mālikī School of Law as understood by the founder, Sheikh Idris. Abdulkadir stresses the weaknesses of Izala preaching in Bauchi criticising the competence of Imams in terms of language and experience. He comes to the conclusion that this situation will not change since the organization restricts itself to the teachings of Sheikh Idris. The work of Idris Abdullahi Alhassan 38 deals with one of the important institutions of the Izala faction in Jos. Namely, the Higher Islamic School, Sarkin Mangu, where the headquarters of the organization are also situated. Like many 38 Alhassan, Idris A. (2003): The role of School of Higher Islamic Studies Sarkin Mangu Jos in advancing the spread of Islamic culture, and Arabic language for the year 1989 to the year 2001, BAdissertation in Arabic Studies, University of Jos. (in Arabic) 33 projects, the study starts by giving an overview on the city of Jos and Islamic education in the city before the author deals with the history of Izala and its main figures, both past and present. This institution was founded in 1985 in Sarkin Mangu, Jos. In 1985, it obtained approval from the Ministry of Education in Plateau State as well from Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria in 1989. The curriculum of the School is divided into two phases: preparatory (3 years) and secondary (3 years) in order to achieve a Secondary Level Certificate. In addition to highlighting the structure of the school and its institutional framework, the author also concentrates on the contribution of three important figures in the improvement of education in this institution. Five major subjects are taught in this school, namely Islamic Education (Qur’ān, tafsīr , ḥadīth , etc.); education (methodology, psychology), as well as Arabic; English, and Hausa. In addition to that there are other three subjects; the History of Islam, General Knowledge, and Household Training. The author accentuates the objectives of the schools: mastering the Arabic language and Islamic education, and preparing students for university. The author gives a variety of statistics and tables in his study which illustrate the contributions of former school students in spreading Islamic education. A number of issues are seen by the author as obstacle, such as lack of books and finances, and low levels of Arabic and English competency. Bawa D. Muhammad Anka 39 presents a case study from Zamfara State where Izala was established on 25th May 1978. Similar to other contexts, Izala attracted young people more than any other population. This resulted in social conflicts within 39 Bawa D. Muhammad Anka (2002): Izalah-Tariqah relationship in Zamfara: A Study in perspective, MA-Dissertation in Islamic Studies, Usman Dan Fodio University Sokoto. 34 families and between Izala and other Islamic groups. Izala in Zamfara State are generally more peaceful than those states of the north. Also the division of the movement into two groups happened in Zamfara State and as a result two main factions emerged. This division, Izala’s changing of methodology, political participation, and sharīʿa re-implementation are seen by Muhammad Anka as reasons for rapprochement between Izala and Sufi brotherhoods in Zamfara State. In addition, the author highlights the impact of Izala on education (Islamic knowledge, establishing schools, etc.) and on social life (the changing of existing practices) in Zamfara State. This research is different from other studies on Izala since it gives examples of cooperation between the movement and Sufi-Brotherhoods. The author sees the re-implementation of Islamic law behind this rapprochement. The studies mentioned above are samples of works written on Izala. The spectrum is wider and depends on the context and department in which the project was fulfilled. Personal observations of BA and MA projects in the department of Islamic Studies, at Usman Dan Fodio University, Sokoto, show that most projects are more closely related to Sufism and to the histoy of the Sokoto Caliphate. Only a few projects deal with the Izala movement. This can be explained by the fact that Sokoto has been a centre of Sufism since the 19th century. The development of Izala seems to be similar in many northern states of Nigeria. The relationship to Sufis and also the division of the organization into two major groups can be compared in different contexts. The headquarters in Jos and later in Kaduna played a role in guiding the doctrinal lines of the movement. 35 Izala is a transnational movement. It spread not only to most Nigerian states but also from Nigeria to neighbouring countries like Chad, Cameroon and the Republic of Niger. The case study of Masquelier 40 on the town of Dogondoutchi, in the Republic of Niger, is a documentation of Izala development outside of Nigeria. From an anthropological perspective she shows the social conflicts that emerged after the coming of Izala. The new “mode of life” introduced by Izala created social conflicts in the town. Izala emerged during a time of economic weakness and it especially attracted young people. According to the author, it offers a discourse of “morality” in a time of dissatisfaction. Izala are categorized by Masquelier as reformist and conservative in comparison to mainstream Islam or to traditional Muslim clerics. Izala’s advent created several problems in families and between Muslim groups. The discourse analyzed by the author reflected the type of on-going discussions and debates among reform oriented Muslims (Izala) and ṭarīqa (Sufis) on the meaning of Islam. Antagonism is depicted through attacks on one group by the other, and destroying each group’s social image. For instance, name-calling often occurs between the groups, using terms as “donkey, dogs,” which illustrates “the animalized other” – as shown by the author. 40 Masquelier, Adeline M. (1996): Identity, alterity and ambiguity in a Nigerien community: Competing definitions of 'true' Islam, in: Richard Werbner and Terence Ranger (ed.), Postcolonial identities in Africa, London, Zed Books, pp. 222-244. 36 In another publication 41 the struggle for mosque space was a starting point in the history of Izala in the Republic of Niger. After that the movement changed its strategy to insist on the issue of “knowledge” and necessity of education, and especially the education of women. The movement questioned the existing religious authorities ( Malamai ; Hausa: traditional Islamic scholars) in order to establish its own system of values and norms, such as the way of dressing, the type of education, etc. Masquelier’s in-depth study on the same town is reflected in her book on “Women and Islamic revival”. 42 This publication focuses on one charismatic scholar of the town who represents a Sufi answer to reform Islam, and particularly to Izala. The well respected Islamic scholar, Malam Awal, came to Dogondoutchi with a program to “purify” the town from Izala and establish his vision of “being a Muslim”. In this program women play an essential role in such a way that they gain more and more social prestige. If the Izala puts restrictions on marriage (i.e. quick marriage, law costs, etc.), the new order gives women space for “self-determination” (bride wealth, material needs, fashion etc.). Masquelier highlights that “women’s strategic efforts to defend their interests and agendas (…) centered on the redefinition of Islamic orthodoxy”. 43 41 Masquelier, Adeline M. (1999): Debating Muslims, disputed practices: Struggles for the realization of an alternative moral order in Niger, In: Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff (ed.), Civil society and the political imagination in Africa: Critical perspectives, 1999, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, pp. 219-250. 42 Masquelier, Adeline M. (2009): Women and Islamic revival in a West African town, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press; in the same direction see the study of Husseina D. Alidou: (2005): Engaging modernity: Muslim women and the politics of agency in postcolonial Niger, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. 43 Masquelier (2009), p. 277. 37 The study of Emmanuel Grégoire 44 examines the relationship between trade and Islam in the town of Maradi in the Republic of Niger. To be merchant and using the title Alhaji (pilgrim) is a prestigious social position in that town. This prestige developed recently by joining Izala as a kind of identity marker. Being an Izala in this context is a kind of rebellion against the existing Sufi authorities of Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya as well a rebellion against social rules. These merchants wanted to establish new societal regulations. Instead of establishing mosques they tended to build schools for education. A new affiliation dictates new social behaviour towards others and towards the old, established tradition. Grégoire makes an interesting remark when he compares the Izala ideology of the Islamic Brotherhoods with the relationship between Protestantism and Catholicism in a Christian context. 45 Furthermore, the Izala movement seems to combine religion and business. Abdoulaye Sounaye’s 46 study deals with Izala in the Republic of Niger, particularly in an urban centre (Niamey). The movement reached the country during the mid-1980s and developed into a socio-religious authority. The Izala movement often uses different strategies to propagate its doctrine. Through the wa ‘ zin casa (in Hausa: national preaching), the markaz (in Hausa and Arabic: centre of social interaction), and the mosque, the movement’s discourse changed from being “marginal and périphérique” to a “plutôt accepté” discourse – as Sounaye points out. 44 Grégoire, Emmanuel (1993): Islam and identity of merchants in Maradi (Niger), in: Louis Brenner (ed.), Muslim identity and social change in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1993, London, Hurst, pp. 106-115. 45 Ibid. p. 114. 46 Sounaya, Abdoulaye (2009): Izala au Niger: une alternative de communauté religieuse, in: L. Fourchard, O. Goerg and M. Gomez-Perez (ed.), Les lieux de sociabilité urbaine dans la longue durée en Afrique, Paris, L'Harmattan, pp. 481-500. 38 The wa ‘ zin casa is an occasion for international preaching, wherein preachers from outside the Republic of Niger come to preach. During these few days topics related to the situation of the Umma are discussed. This event is also an occasion to collect money for the movement and mobilize people of different ages to join Izala and assist. This can be compared to the maulid celebration of Sufis but, with different objectives and organization. The markaz is the place of “sociability” and appears as a place of continuous education. With a library and a weekly sermon every Thursday, this place attracts merchants, young people and other categories of people. The markaz is a place for building social networks. It can be compared with the Zāwiya in the Sufi context. The third place is in the mosque. It is a place of building the “communauté Izala” and for “mediation” among its members. Sounaye sees the mosque as a place for building the sense of “collectivity” in Izala. The author indicates three institutions that are used by Izala as “tools” to propagate its doctrine. This strategy aims to bring religious, economic and social aspects together. It allows Izala to dominate the “religious field” in which it operates. Finally, the author raises an important question related to the institutionalization and normalization of Izala. To what extent is it possible to talk the dynamism of its reform project in the future? Robert B. Charlick, 47 a political scientist, thinks that Izala (as the defender of Islamic morals) is an “Islamist movement” which confronted the Nigerian state several times on different occasions since the 1990s. The author explains that the movement has been looking for an “autonomous identity” which opposes the existing 47 Charlick, Robert B. (2004): Islamism in West Africa: Niger, In: African Studies Review 47 (2), pp. 97107. 39 traditional Hausa social rules. He adds that Izala attracted youth, merchants, and “urban unemployed” and it offers a particular system of values. Charlick concludes that Izala is “used in part to permit a form of capitalist economic modernization (…) without an acceptance of the western Beliefs…” Olivier Meunier, 48 anthropologist and sociologist who has published extensively on Islam in the Republic Niger, describes a phenomenon of unification of Sufi brotherhoods against Izala in the town Maradi that seems to be similar to what Roman Loimeier described in northern Nigeria. Meunier documents that the founder of Izala in the Republic Niger, Malam Chaibou, studied in Katsina (Nigeria) and was a student of Sheikh Abubakar Gumi in Kaduna, Nigeria before he returned to Maradi and founded the movement in early 1980s. His preaching was even recorded and transmitted on the radio. Meunier views in Izala a Wahhābī movement that crossed the Nigerian border to the town of Maradi. He relates the development of Izala to external influences, especially Saudi Arabia. The rise of the movement took place during a time of economic crisis (1980). Izala attracted many unsatisfied people and established itself as a movement against Sufism and the syncretistic practices of Marabous. In his book 49 on Islam in Niger, the author differentiates between three major groups in Maradi: traditionalists (Sufis), rationalists (those who call themselves Mālikīs without any affiliation to Sufism or to reform Islam), and reformists (Izala). 48 Meunier, Oliver (1998): Marabouts et courants religieux en pays hawsa: dynamique de l’islamisation de la ville de Maradi à la fin du XIX° siècle et durant le XX° siècle, In: Revue Canadienne d’Études Africaines 32 (3), pp.521-557. 49 Meunier, Olivier (1998): Les voies de l'islam au Niger dans le Katsina independant du XIXe au XXe siècle, Paris: Publications Scientifiques du Museum. 40 3 Methodology The Study of Religion offers different approaches for dealing with the phenomenon of religion. The historical-philological and the empirical-sociological methods are well-established, scholarly methods which are often applied. Many other academic approaches are also accepted, i.e. the anthropological, philosophical, psychological and even feminist approaches. 50 In this study, I am not defining the concept of “religion” either in substantial or in a functional ways as it is the case in many publications in Religious Studies. I am going far beyond the problem of definition of the concept of “religion”, and the debate behind it. I am aware of the importance of this debate to my project. I think instead of defining “religion” myself I am looking at this notion from the angle of the Izala and Sufis. This study combines a historical and empirical approach. The history of Izala in Nigeria and its relationship to Sufis has been documented and analysed in this study. There is a lack of literature concerning recent developments, current leaders, and especially on-going discourses within the movement. The objective is to attempt to fill this gap in academia and especially to consider how Izala’s contemporary central figures reconstruct the history of the movement. Izala’s history from the perspective of its current members, ex-members and non-Izala seems to be 50 Literature on methods and approaches in the Study of Religion is diverse; for an overview on different perspectives dealing with this topic see for e.g. Connolly, Peter (1999) (ed.): Approaches to the Study of Religion, London and New York: Cassell; also Whaling, Frank (1995) (ed.): Theory and methods in Religious Studies. Contemporary approaches to the Study of Religion, Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 41 consistent with what has been already written on the history of this movement. The empirical approach consists of dealing with actors from different religious backgrounds and affiliations (within Islam) and analyzing the actual discourse(s) and the doctrinal orientation of the movement. My field research in Nigeria took place between December 2006 and March 2007 and again from February to April 2008. The aim of the first experience in the field was to build networks and connections to the Izala movement in Nigeria and to explore the “religious field” of the city of Jos. This endeavour was facilitated by the department of Religious Studies at the University of Jos. 51 The first period of research was restricted to identifying central religious figures and leaders in Jos and to exploring the relationship between the movement and Sufism. It did not take much time to identify Izala leaders linked to the founder, Sheikh Ismaila Idris and within the Jos faction and finally, others linked to the second group: the Kaduna group which split from the Jos faction. The Izala was established in Jos and its headquarters are still in Jos. Today, followers of Sheikh Ismaila Idris have their national office at Sarkin Mangu, Jos. The Kaduna faction and its leaders are based in the same town, as well in Kaduna. The leaders of Izala can also be found in other northern states. Being affiliated with Izala as a movement or as a religious organization doesn’t require any initiation, ritual, official forms or membership fees. The organization requires the acceptance of its doctrine and rejection of Sufism as basic elements of 51 I am thankful to the Head of the Department of Religious Studies, Prof. U. Danfulani who hosted me and introduced me to his colleagues but also for his assistance in all directions; I am also thankful to all staff of the department. Through Mallam Dawood Abubakar I had my first contacts with Sufi Sheikhs and Izala members in Jos. I really appreciate his valuable support and patience. 48 a limited extent as David Swartz observes. Bourdieu only published a study on French Catholic Bishops in 1982 and two articles on sociology of religion in 1987 and 1991. 59 Some key concepts of Bourdieu’s theory are capital , habitus , field , and symbolic power . They are compatible with more than one academic discipline. They are applicable to culture but can also be used in the context of economy, religion or philosophy. Bourdieu’s notion of capital 60 is manifold. The most important are: economic capital , which can be converted into money and is institutionalized in property rights; cultural capital which is under certain circumstances related to economic capital and its institutionalization manifested in educational qualifications; and finally social capital based on social obligations and institutionalized in titles of nobility. For my project the concepts of cultural and social capital appear important and appropriate. Thus, I want to explain both concepts in more detail. Concerning the cultural capital , Bourdieu differentiates between embodied , objectified , and institutionalized forms. By embodied he means the notion of culture, cultivation, or “Bildung”. This capital can be converted into habitus and “cannot be transmitted instantaneously” like money or property. It is acquired and it depends on time, society and social class. It is unequally distributed and needs power in order to be imposed and transmitted. 61 59 Swartz, David (1996): Bridging the study of culture and religion: Pierre Bourdieu’s political economy of Symbolic power, In: Sociology of Religion 57 (1), p. 71. 60 Bourdieu, Pierre (1986): The Forms of capital, In: Richardson, John (eds.): Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education. New York: Greenwood Press, pp. 241-258. 61 Ibid., pp. 244-245. 49 The objectified state of cultural capital is related to the first type (embodied) and is “objectified in material objects and media, such as writings, paintings, monuments, instruments, etc.” It is transmitted materially but also symbolically. 62 The last state of cultural capital , the institutionalized , is more related to academic qualifications that gives its holder a kind of “certificate of cultural competence”. These qualifications are differentiated between people in a particular society and establish a system of values. 63 If the cultural capital is more or less related to the individual, the social capital is related to groups of people. Bourdieu also calls it “collectively-owned capital”. Its volume depends on the networks of an individual and on his or her capital. It is based on the principle of “solidarity” and “durable obligations”. A kind of “symbolic constitution” emerges from these and “recognition” (in the group) takes place. Production of social capital requires – according to Bourdieu – “an unceasing of sociability” and “a series of exchanges” in which recognition is “affirmed and reaffirmed”. A group regulates its own rules internally and appoints a representative as a leader who enjoys symbolic power . 64 The described forms of capital and people’s habitus are to be found in every field of the society (politics, religion, education, art, etc.). These various fields are not isolated from each other, and are based on symbolic power . In all fields a struggle for 62 Ibid., pp. 246-247. 63 Ibid., pp. 247-248. 64 For more details on the “cultural capital” see ibid., pp. 248-253. 50 this symbolic power takes place. These dynamics and the interactions between the fields constitute the habitus of a particular society. Bourdieu defines that notion as: “The habitus is the source of these series of moves which are objectively organized as strategies without being a product of a genuine strategic intention – which would presuppose at least that they are perceived as one strategy among other possible strategies.” 65 Actors produce and reproduce “objective meaning”. Important for Bourdieu is the “orchestration” of the different meanings to produce a “common-sense world” on the basis of common practices. These actors come across as “similar” or “identical” experiences. The common habitus of these actors is then perceived as “immediately intelligible and foreseeable” and “hence taken for granted”. 66 The production of habitus requires “mobilizers” (prophets, leaders) who master common codes and who can undertake “corrections” and “adjustments”. 67 The reproduction of habitus can take place as a result of an “inculturation” and “appropriation” through which “objective structures like language or economy can reproduce themselves”. 68 In the course of the development of a common habitus a new form of capital emerges: the so-called symbolic capital. This type is characterised by Bourdieu as “ the most valuable form of accumulation ” and has to do with acknowledgment and 65 Bourdieu, Pierre (1977): Outline of a theory of practice, Cambridge: University Press, p. 73. 66 Bourdieu (1977), pp. 79-80. 67 Ibid., p. 81. 68 Ibid., p. 85. 51 prestige. 69 This capital is better called “symbolic violence” and is necessary because it is the “only way in which relations of domination can be set up, maintained, or restored”. 70 This “invisible” form – as qualified by Bourdieu – is “neither officially declared nor institutionally guaranteed” 71 . This power cannot be acquired by a distribution of economic capital. It is based on what Bourdieu calls “virtue”. 72 The different types of capital as well as the construction and regeneration of habitus and the symbolic violence require an abstract setting. Bourdieu suggests the notion of field , characterised by its dynamics and based on particular rules, mechanisms and structures. The concept of field is located in many places of the society. It can be a “field” of art, of economy, politics, or religion. Magnus Echtler, 73 anthropologist and scholar of religious studies from Bayreuth, offers a good description of what the notion of field means in Bourdieu’s terminology. The metaphor of game summarizes the whole situation. In every game there are players playing and developing their skills to master the rules. The example given by Bourdieu is that of roulette. Playing the game means accepting its rules and regulations. This metaphor reflects a more important game which is social game . This type is a longterm one and has implicit regulations in a particular field and depends on players and their positions. This social game differs from roulette as formulated by Echtler: “But unlike roulette, where the result of the game is determined by chance, social games 69 Ibid., p. 85. 70 Ibid., p. 191. 71 Ibid., p 193 72 Ibid., p 194. 73 Echtler, Magnus (2008): Changing rituals - The New Year’s festival in Makunduchi, Zanzibar, since colonial times, PhD thesis, University of Bayreuth. 52 are always rigged: the actors who accumulate the highest amount in the right combination of capitalia will usually succeed.” 74 According to Bourdieu, a game requires a strategy that he defines as “(…) the product of a practical sense, of a particular social game”. 75 Players differ in their capacity to play by using effective strategies and by adapting to new and/or different conditions in particular. As Bourdieu formulates it: “The good player, who is as it were the embodiment of the game , is continually doing what needs to be done, what the game demands and requires. This presupposes a constant invention, an improvisation that is absolutely necessary in order for one to adapt to situations that are infinitely varied. This cannot be achieved by mechanical obedience to explicit, codified rules (when they exist).” 76 According to Echtler, Bourdieu develops his notion of habitus or his theory of practice respectively as an answer to “objective and subjective theories”. According to his theory the habitus of people is based on the experience of people in a way that it can be produced and reproduced. 77 The concepts of field, capital, and practice are interrelated. Echtler formulates it accurately: “All practices are strategic in the sense that interested actors compete with each other, make use of the capitalia at the disposal in order to enlarge their capital or improve their position within the field of 74 Echtler (2008), p. 28. 75 Pierre Lamaison and Pierre Bourdieu (1986): From Rules to Strategies: An Interview with Pierre Bourdieu, p. 112. 76 Ibid., pp. 112-113. 77 Echtler (2008), p. 25 53 practice.” 78 Habitus is dynamic and is based on actors’ “unlimited capacities” to generate it. 79 Since the re-implementation of sharīʿa in northern Nigeria in 1999, the relationship between Sufi-Brotherhoods and Islamic reform movements like Izala has been affected in a very profound way. It changed from violent confrontations to peaceful co-existence. These two groups reduced their long on-going struggle over doctrinal questions. To elucidate this phenomenon and to put it into a theoretical framework I will use Pierre Bourdieu’s notions of field , capital , habitus and symbolic power . Kane 80 uses Bourdieu’s theory to describe the religious field in Nigeria and particularly the field in which Izala was established. Kane agrees with Bourdieu’s understanding of the notion of capital that symbolic capital in a particular field is more important than economic capital and identifies “accumulation” and “conservation” of capital as key concepts of that theory. 81 For the “religious field” of northern Nigeria Kane proposes the following five categories of capital. 1) Non-formally certified cultural capital (exoteric knowledge and esoteric science - Sufism), 2) formally certified cultural capital or exoteric knowledge like a university certificate or mastery of Qur’ān, 3) economic capital (material wealth), 4) symbolic capital (fighters for the cause of Islam) and 5) social capital (supporters, clients, disciples, etc…). 82 78 Ibid., p. 30. 79 Ibid., p.31. 80 See Kane (1993) and (2003) 81 See Kane (2003), pp. 20-23. 82 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 54 The applicability of the Bourdieu’s theory by Kane in the context of the Izala movement is summarized in the following: “An assumption of Bourdieu’s field theory is that, in each field, one finds a struggle between the “newcomers” and the “established dominant actors.” The strategy of each category of players (or their game) is determined by the quantity and the types of capital they possess (e.g., money, followers, prestige, knowledge, etc.). In all fields, established dominant actors controlling diverse sorts and substantial volumes of capital will tend to be very conservative in order to preserve the structure of the field – understood as "the state of power relations among the agents and institutions engaged in the struggle […] to defend the monopoly and keep out competition".” 83 The category of “newcomers” is very important when it comes to the start-up of Izala. This group is represented by the youth, women, and a new generation of entrepreneurs who supported Izala from the beginning. Through biographies of some actors of Izala Kane shows how capital was obtained and how it was converted within the Izala religious field into other forms, for instance: economic capital to a social or symbolic one. This change offers the movement an opportunity to set up its own ideology against the traditional religious institution. 84 Kane uses Bourdieu’s theory to explain the Izala phenomenon. An important question arises here: what is the relevance of using the same approach with the same movement again? The answer is: since Ousmane Kane’s research the 83 Ibid., p. 227. 84 For a brief summary on the application of Bourdieu’s theory of field on Izala see Kane (2003), pp. 228-233. 55 religious field is entirely re-defined. Izala has new leaders, the movement is divided into two major factions, and the discourse is different to the 1980s and 1990s. Even more important is the whole new setting: re-implementation of sharīʿa by the northern states. These new challenges affected Izala politically, economically and religiously. The Izala of today is faced with many challenges. The new religious and more precisely the Islamic religious field is different from the past. The Izala of today is divided between the Jos and Kaduna factions and both are contending for acknowledgement among their adherents. The Izala is also part of the Muslim community as a whole at a national level as the sharīʿa issue shows. The religious field in which Izala is acting nowadays is different from how Kane described it. The setting he illustrated and in which Izala evolved has changed. During the time of Sheikh Idris, the establishment of a strong mass-movement with many followers was at the top of his agenda. The category of “newcomers” (youth, women, etc.) as well of those who possessed an economic capital (merchants for e.g.) played an important role in the start-up phase of Izala. Islamic preachers (Arabic: duʿāt , sing. dāʿi ) who joined the Izala-founder came with their cultural capital and assisted in the process of recruitment. The founder enjoyed loyalty and respect and Izala was mainly focused on fighting Sufis and Sufism and attracting new adherents and followers. Today the movement is affected by internal strife and friction. The religious field is re-defined. The Jos-faction’s leader, Sheikh Sani Yahya Jingir, a former student of the Izala founder and current leader of the Izala faction in Jos, is attached 56 to the tradition of Sheikh Idris and defines all aspects of “being-an-Izala” in relation to the tradition originally established by him [Idris]. In Kaduna group, the two distinguished Sheikhs are Sheikh Yusuf Sambo and Sheikh Rabiu Daura. 85 The Izala religious field in Kaduna is different from what the founder of the movement established. Defining Izala-identity internally and acting as a dynamic movement within the Muslim community of Nigeria are the new challenges that Izala are facing today. These challenges are elaborated in the coming chapters. 86 4.2 “Modes of Religiosity” theory The “modes of religiosity theory” 87 of Harvey Whitehouse can also be a model for explaining the Izala development. This type of cognitive approach is new in religious studies and has not been applied to any Islamic context. In his theory, Whitehouse is interested in religious experience and in explaining cognitive mechanisms in the transmission of religion or any religious ritual. This theory recognises remembering and motivation as crucial elements for any particular religion or ritual that wants to survive. Religious beliefs and rituals should be repeated and easily accessible to people. They must be meaningful for believers in order to be transferred from one generation to the next. 88 85 Both Sheikhs Yusuf Sambo and Rabiu Daura are the leaders of the Kaduna faction of Izala that split from the founder Sheikh Idris. 86 See chapter “Reform Islam vs. Sufism.” 87 This approach is elaborated by the author in several of his publications and especially in his book Whitehouse, Harvey (2004): Modes of Religiosity: A cognitive theory of religious transmission, Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press. 88 Whitehouse (2004), p. 64. 57 Based on literature in psychology, Whitehouse analyses the notion of memory and divides it into two types: an implicit and an explicit one. By “implicit memory” he means “those things that we know without being aware of”. For the explicit memory – which is more important for us – he distinguishes a short-term from a long-term memory. 89 The long-term memory is also sub-divided into semantic and episodic. The semantic type reflects “knowledge about the world” and the individual is unable to remember the point in time of its adoption. The episodic type deals with particular events in life (death, war, etc.). According to Whitehouse, these types of memory are activated differently in what he calls “doctrinal” and “imagistic” modes of religiosity. 90 These two modes occur separately or together in a single religious tradition. For the doctrinal modes, frequent repetition of religious rituals, a long-term-episodic memory, religious leaders, hierarchy, and orthodoxy are important for a doctrine to survive. The imagistic mode of religiosity is characterised by its low frequency (initiation for e.g.) and its high emotional arousal. It doesn’t need orthodoxy, it is hard to spread, and it appeals episodic memory. 91 In the case of Izala the doctrinal mode appears more applicable. Why? We might get the impression that Izala tends to the doctrinal mode of religiosity while 89 Ibid., p 65 90 Ibid. 91 The two modes are explained in detail in Whitehouse (2004), pp. 65-85; Whitehouse (2002): ‘Modes of Religiosity: a cognitive explanation of the sociopolitical dynamics of religion’, In: Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 14 , 2002, pp. 293-315; 64 “This year, hundreds of new religious movements will appear on earth. Some will be formed by disgruntled members who withdrew from older religious bodies. Others will be born because someone created or discovered new religious culture and convinced others of its authenticity. However, whatever their origins, virtually every new group will have one thing in common: eventual failure.” 97 The approach of Stark goes further and applies the so-called “rational choice theory” to religion. This theory is well-known in economics and to some extent in sociology and a few other disciplines. From an economic point of view, individuals try to maximize benefits on the one hand, and on the other to minimize their expenses. Economists observe that market mechanisms depend on daily decisions made by “consumers and producers (who) rationally calculate profit and loss” 98 In the context of religion the theory of rational choice combines market behavior with individual religious action. 99 As mentioned above, religious institutions are considered “firms” offering different products and compete against each other for a monopoly within the market. Consumers (or adherents) have the choice to define their needs and calculate their benefits. When it comes to Islam, the Religious Market Theory seems to draw the attention of scholars. The sociologist of religion, Massimo Introvigne, applied it to Islam in Turkey 97 Stark (1996), p. 133. 98 Spickard, James V. (1998): Rethinking religious social action: What is „rational“ about rational choice theory?, in: Sociology of Religion. Vol. 59 (2), pp. 99-115. 99 Spickard (1998), p. 99. 65 and few other Muslim societies. 100 He focuses on the concept of “niches” – developed by Stark – and its relationship to “strictness”. Religion is often perceived to be stricter when its symbolic costs are higher and when its members are expected to believe and behave in more traditional and conservative ways than society at large.” 101 He developed a model where he classified Islamic groups into five categories:  ultrastrict (Al-Qāʿida for e.g.);  strict (like Brotherhoods, Wahhabism);  moderate-conservative (Naqshabandiyya Sufi brotherhood);  liberal (Baʿath Party);  ultraliberal (Islamo-Marxism). Following this categorization he designed a “Model of the Turkish Religious Market” and proved that Stark’s theory can be validated empirically in an Islamic context. Introvigne’s insight generates the question of the applicability of the Religious Market Theory vis-a-vis the Izala movement in northern Nigeria. Does it help to understand the enormous growth of Izala during its first two decades of existence? Does it also explain a potential failure of the movement? If we apply the “Religious Market Theory” in the north Nigerian context we can state that the “religious market” in which the Izala operates is “pluralistic”. In addition to Muslims, Christians and adherents of African Traditional Religions are part of the 100 Introvigne, Massimo (2005): Niches in the Islamic Religious Market and Fundamentalism: Examples from Turkey and Other Countries", Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion: Vol. 1(1), Article 3, pp. 1-23. 101 Ibid, p. 3. 66 general religious landscape of Nigeria, and there are sub-categories in each of these communities. Among Muslims, the two Sufi-brotherhoods (Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya) had a quasi-monopoly because of their well-established tradition in northern Nigeria. Loimeier 102 elaborates on the struggle between them during the 1950s and 1960s. Sufi Brotherhoods made big efforts to win new affiliated members in their ṭuruq (Arabic: brotherhoods). The theological and to some extent political debates came to an end with the appearance of the Izala movement at end of the 1970s. 102 See Loimeier, Roman (1997): “Islamic reform and political …”, especially chapter two “The development of Sufi Brotherhoods in Nigeria”, pp. 19-104. 67 Chapter Two: Religious Landscape in Nigeria This chapter serves as a historical background to the current development in the country. It gives an overview on the spread of both Christianity and Islam in Nigeria. The focus here is the religion of Islam. In this context, these chapters highlight the establishment of the Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya Sufi brotherhoods, give insights into the Britisch colonial policy of “indirect rule”, and finally document the rise of anti-Sufism during the post-colonial period. 1 Christianity in Nigeria Unlike Islam, Christianity found its way to Africa’s most populous country through missionaries. The first “sporadic” activities of Christian missionaries in the southern part of Nigeria took place in 1515. In the early 16th century, a few Christian missionaries like Gregorio Lourenço and Afonso Anes were in Nigeria but without much success. 103 The following attempts to Christianize Nigeria suffered from the same set-back. The historian Toyin Falola explains this fact in three basic elements: slavery and trade of slaves at that time, lack of missionaries who were able to undertake proselytization, and lack of finances. The activities of missionaries were intensified by the end of the 19th century in the south of the country. Christian organizations (esp. Protestant and Catholic ones) from Europe and North America were interested in a “great missionary expansion”. Some introduced Christianity as 103 Isichei, Elisabeth (1983): A History of Nigeria. New York: Longman Group Limited, p. 318. 68 an alternative to slave trading and found a way to enter the West African country. 104 To some extent, this mission can be interpreted as an answer to the presence of Islam that has a long tradition in the country. The Christian missionaries opted to spread Christianity amongst Africans themselves. This strategy is known as “native agency”. It reduces costs, protects non-Africans from diseases, and especially mobilizes Africans to propagate Christianity in their local regions. 105 After Slavery was abolished many former slaves from Sierra Leone, Cuba, and Brazil returned to Nigeria after 1830. They were considered by Europeans to be potential missionaries who could expand Christianity. Furthermore they were essential elements needed in the education and health sectors. In 1840 a British expedition, The Niger Mission , came to the Niger River area. This organization had a religious background, but tried through trade activities to come in contact with local leaders. This can be considered one of the most successful activities of the Church Missionary Society (C.M.S.) and led to the conversion of many people in Nigeria. 106 The C.M.S. was successful especially among the Yoruba in the south (Lagos, Abeokuta, Ibadan und Ilesa), and in the Delta Region. In that area Methodist and 104 Falola, Toyin (1999): The History of Nigeria. Westport, Connecticut, London: Greenwood Press, p. 40. 105 Ibid., p. 41. 106 Falola points out the success of this mission through the activities of Samuel Ajayi Crowther, a former slave known as the „hero of the Niger Mission“. This man is the first African Bishop of the C.M.S., see Ibid., p. 41. 69 Catholic Churches were established. Catholicism spread among the Yoruba and the Ibo. The success of Christian missionaries in Southern Nigeria can be explained by the fact that Yoruba -leaders expected that “the missionaries would help them win their wars and procure arms and missionaries.” 107 Concerning the Delta Region there were more economic interests behind the success of the missions. Local traders were interested in contacts with Europeans. This explains why leaders in those areas allowed the establishment of Christian schools in their territories. The spread of Christianity in southern Nigeria is due to the fact that people associated reforms with Christianity. For the local leaders of that time Christian missions offered solutions to their problems. Missionaries were involved in local politics and played the role of intermediaries, for instance, missionaries were responsible for putting an end to the Yoruba confrontations. This kind of role brought missionaries more respect and confidence from local rulers, but also amongst common people. In addition, missionary schools played a crucial role in converting people: “in many places, the church and the school went together” 108 – as Falola points it. When Christianity in Nigeria gained a foothold, African religions were increasingly characterized as symbols of “paganism”. Traditional deities, priests and 107 Ibid., p. 42. 108 Ibid., p. 42-43. 70 temples were rejected. Traditional values were not respected and were largely replaced by new Christian norms and values. 109 Christianity in Nigeria came through the southern region before it spread to other parts of the country. By the end of the 19th and 20th centuries and through the activities of the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) and Sudan United Mission (SUM) several Christian missions were initiated in the Middle belt region and spread from there to the north. This enterprise was interrupted by the coming of the British who restricted missionary activities in the north. The “Nigerian Christianity” – as Klaus Hock connotes it – became more fastened (“befestigt”) through the independence. From that time Christian missions became more intensified in the north. Klaus Hock calls it the “strategic counter-invasion” (“strategische Gegeneroberung”) of Islam. In addition to the SIM, the SUM intensified their missions, as well as the Catholic Church, the Methodist, the Church of Brethren Mission (CBM), the Qua Ibo Mission, and the United Missionary Mission (UMS) undertook the same project. 110 Klaus Hock observes that the Christian Churches in northern Nigeria had no split like what happened in the south of the country with the establishment of African Independent Churches. 111 Christian missions played a central role in spreading Christianity. Through the structure of the missions and especially their concentration on education led to their 109 Ibid., p.44; also Isichei (1983) confirms that both the Catholic and Protestant Mission condemned aspects of traditional religions, p. 326. 110 Hock (1996), p. 46. 111 Ibid., p. 48; the absence of such a split does not mean that African Independent Churches are not to be found in northern Nigeria. Churches like Celectial Church of Christ and Aladura are well established in especially in big towns of the north, see Ibid., p. 49. 71 success among the African population of Nigeria. Christian missions started in the south of the country and succeeded in recruiting African missionaries familiar with their local communities. At a later stage, European missionaries themselves intensified their activities in all directions. Concerning northern Nigeria missionary activity was restrained by the policy of “Indirect Rule” of the British before entering in the post-colonial period, and a new and more successful era. 2 History of Islam in Nigeria 112 The territory of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and its political borders is a product of the colonial era. Nigeria as a state did not exist before the coming of the British. The first contact between the population of what is today known as Nigeria and Islam happened during the 8th and 9th centuries through tradeing caravans 113 coming from North Africa. The German scholar of religion and theologian, Klaus Hock describes this period as “superficial Islamization” (“oberflächliche Islamisierung”). This first contact took place especially in the north-western part of the territory. Concerning the north-eastern area located near Lake Chad known as Kanem-Bornu, Islam came during the 11th century with traders from Egypt and Fezzan (Libya). Islam especially attracted people elite members of the society and remained for a long time 112 This chapter is based on my unpublished M.A.-Dissertation (2005) “Die Entwicklung der Šarī‘aFrage in Nigeria…”. 113 The majority of these traders were Ibadites belonging to Charijite-Islam. This group of people were pushed back as well in West Africa as in North Africa. Instead of this version of Islam, Sunni Islam became dominant; for more details see Hock, Klaus (1996): Der Islam Komplex. Hamburg: Lit Verlag, p. 14. 72 as such. After a period of weakness during the 16th and 17th centuries Islam became a “religion of the masses” in that area. 114 In the Hausa states, the Algerian Islamic scholar and reformer ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Maghīlī played a crucial role in the process of Islamizing the region. Islam was spread by this scholar at the end of the 15th century and was adopted by Hausa kings from the beginning of the 16th century. Al-Maghīlī’s influenced the masses as well the Hausa kings who adopted his ideas and suggestions for reform. 115 The history of Islam in Nigeria remains incomplete if the Sokoto Caliphate of the 19th century and the jihād movement of Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio are not mentioned. The Sokoto Caliphate was one of the important kingdoms in West Africa. It spread beyond the current borders of Nigeria. Sheikh Dan Fodio was from the 114 Ibid., p. 15; Klaus Hock mentions the establishment of the Kingdom of Kanem-Bornu in the 14th century in the Lake Chad area as a “stabilizing factor” of the region at that time. This stability explains the spread of Islam to the masses. Hock compares the Islamization of Kanem-Bornu with a model of Islamization in West Africa suggested by Forstner, M. (1987): Der Islam in der westafrikanischen Sahel-Zone. ErscheinungsbildGeschichte-Wirkung. In: Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft 71. This Islamization model consists of a period of “Islam as religion of minority“(9th-12th centuries), “Islam as religion of the elites” (12th-16th centuries), “Islam on the way of being the religion of the majority” (17th-18th centuries), and finally the period of “Ğihād-movement” (18th-19th centuries). According to Klaus Hock, this model is applicable to Kanem-Bornu but only to its third level “Islam on the way…”. 115 For detailed information on the life and influence of al-Maghīlī in Nigeria see Batran, Abd al-Aziz Abd-Allah (1973): A contribution of the biography of Sheikh Muhammad (‘Umar-Amar) al-Maghīlī alTilimsāni, in: Journal of African History, Vol. 14. p. 381-394; Hunwick, John O. (1974): AlMaġhili's replies to the questions of Askia Al-Hajj MuÎammad ed. and transl. with an introduction on the history of Islam in the Niger Bend to 1500, Brit. Thesis Service, Betchworth. - London, Univ., Diss.; for the expansion of Islam in Hausa land see Meunier, Olivier (1997): Les Routes de L’Islam. Anthropologie politique de l’islamisation de l’Afrique de l’Ouest en général et du pays hawsa en particulier du 8ème au 19ème Siècle. Paris: Editions L’Hartmann; according to Klaus Hock the Islamization of Hausa land took place later than Kanem Bornu. Islam came to Kano through traders from Mali during the 14th and 15th centuries; see Hock (1996), p. 16. 73 ethnic group known as the Fulani . He was born in Gobir in 1754. He received a traditional Islamic education and at the age of 20 he was already a student, teacher, and preacher. 116 Sheikh Dan Fodio moved from place to place throughout Hausaland and attracted many followers along the way. He criticised prevalent practices in that area and considered them to be un-Islamic innovations ( bidaʿ ). This attitude was also supported by his adherents. The well-known jihād of Usman Dan Fodio started 1804 and was interpreted differently. Some scholars interpret it as “holy war” as well as Islamization of north Nigeria and neighbouring areas. The historian Jamil Abun-Nasr considers it as a “militant answer“ vis-à-vis the leadership of that time. According to Abun-Nasr, the jihād started when the King of Gobir’s soldiers attacked the community of ‘Abd al-Salām, a former student of Dan Fodio, and captured some of his people. 117 The struggle against ʿAbd al-Salām’s community and the liberation of prisoners from among his community were interpreted by the Hausa king as an offensive against his authority. As a result he ordered Dan Fodio to leave that area. The answer was an “Islamic revolution” - as Abun-Nasr describes it. Dan Fodio called his allied people from among the Hausa , Tuareg and Fulani and mobilized them for war. This is how the jihād started and spread in different directions. As a result, the Sokoto Caliphate was established and became the dominant authority in that region 116 For the life of Sheikh Dan Fodio see: El-Masri, F.H. (1963): The life of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio before the jihād , In: Journal of The Historical Society of Nigeria 2 (4), pp. 435-448. 117 Abun-Nasr, Jamil (1993): Muslime im Nationalstaat Nigeria, in: Abun-Nasr, Jamil (Hg.): Muslime in Nigeria: Religion und Gesellschaft im politischen Wandel seit den 50er Jahren. Münster, Hamburg: LitVerlag, p. 3. 80 The Tijāniyya was initiated in West Africa through Mauritania by Sheikh Muḥammed al-Ḥāfiz (1759-1830). From there it spread to Senegal through al-Hajj Umar Tall (1794-1864). He was not only the Caliph of Aḥmad al-Tijānī, but also an Islamic scholar and political leader. He visited Nigeria in 1826 on his way to Mecca and married a daughter of Muhammad Bello, the son of Sheikh Dan Fodio. From 1831 al-Hajj Umar Tall stayed in Sokoto for six years. During that time the Tijāniyya expanded throughout what is now Nigeria and beyond. The Tijāniyya became an influential Sufi order in West Africa especially after the jihād -movement of al-Hajj Umar against the French colonial expansion in the mid-1850s. 132 In Nigeria, the advent of the Tijāniyya is throughout to be related to al-Hajj Umar’s visit to the country, although some views confirmed the presence of this Sufi order in Kano and Borno as early as the time of Aḥmad al-Tijānī, the founder. Umar Tall contributed to the spread of the brotherhood as he initiated many people to it. 133 During his stay in Sokoto, he seems to have initiated Muhammad Bello to the Tijāniyya. This claim is still controversial. 134 Furthermore, the initiation of many people to the Tijāniyya in different parts of the north (especially in Zaria, Kano, Borno, and Sokoto) contributed to its spread. This resulted in a struggle for hegemony 132 Quadri (1981), pp. 39-51. 133 Ibid., pp. 64-66. 134 The debate whether Muhammad Bello was a Tijānī or not was debated by many scholars in and outside Nigeria. One cannot deny the influence of Sheikh Umar Tall on Dan Fodio’s son. Muhammad Bello was also inspired by the Tijānīyya in some of his writings; see Qadri (1981), pp. 66-72. 81 between it and the well-established Qādiriyya particularly in the late 19th century and even during the colonial era. 135 2.2 The Indirect Rule 136 The colonial occupation of Nigeria started in the south during the second half of the 19th century. Lagos and its hinterland became a British protectorate in 1867. The expansion to the north occurred during the first years of the 20th century after a period of weakness of the Sokoto Caliphate at the end of the 19th century. According to Klaus Hock, Muslims reacted to the British in three different ways: some Muslims reacted with a kind of hijra (emigration) according to the example of the Prophet who migrated from Mecca to Medina; some ʿulamā' in Sokoto seemingly accepted the presence of the British but in fact practiced an “inner-emigration”; and the third group of Muslims preferred military confrontation. 137 The British administration was aware of the fact that invading such a vast territory like modern-day Nigeria would be very difficult. The obstacles seemed insurmountable, especially in light of the absence of an appropriate number of British officers, adequate finances, and necessary military capacities. 138 Thus, they divided 135 See more details on the Tijānīyya-Qādiriyya struggle as well on the attitude of the British to the Tijānīyya, in Qadri (1981), pp. 81-106. 136 This policy of Indirect Rule practiced in British colonies was developed by Lord Lugard, former Governor in Nigeria and high-ranking colonial officer in other British colonies. The theoretical dimensions as well the applicability of this approach are explained in detail in Lord Lugard, Frederick D. (1965): The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa.. Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., London. 137 Hock (1996), p. 22. 138 Isichei (1983) mentions that the British administration lacked officers, soldiers and especially monetary resources to be able to control the Nigerian territory. Their strategies consisted then of using African soldiers to fulfill this task; see p. 380. 82 the country into northern and southern regions. They designed their approach of “indirect rule”. This policy was especially formulated for the northern region. The British learned from the history of Islam in northern Nigeria that intervention in Islamic affairs is risky. Because of that they guaranteed Muslims that they could keep their old structures of authority. The first British Governor in Nigeria, Lord Frederick Lugard, promised Muslim rulers that they could keep their system of education and their Islamic courts. Furthermore, he prohibited Christian missionary activities in the north without prior agreement of northern rulers. 139 The British implemented “indirect rule” in Nigeria as their way of colonial domination. For Michael Crowder the way Britain ruled in Nigeria became exemplary for other British colonies. 140 The policy stipulates that British officers serve as advisors for native rulers and allowed them to interfere in local decisions. Local governments based on “single executive authority” or a “council of elders” were supported by the British to continue acting as such. Lord Lugard acted until 1906 as first High Commissioner of the Protectorate of northern Nigeria, between 1912 and 1914 as the Governor of the two Nigerian protectorates and finally from 1914 to 1919 as the Governor of the amalgamated Colony of Nigeria, which relied in northern Nigeria on the emirs’ authority to govern this vast region. As part of his plan he 139 Hock (1996), p. 23. 140 Crowder, Michael (1964): Indirect Rule: French and British Style, in: Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 34 (3), pp.197-205. 83 suggested changing the system of taxation as well as modernizing the administration in general. 141 These reforms changed the status of the emirs within the political power structure. They were originally allies of the Sultan of Sokoto. After the establishment of indirect rule they came under the supervision of the British administration and had to collect taxes in its name. They retained up to seventy percent of money collected from taxes to finance their own native administration. 142 “Indirect rule” was applied in the north and succeeded because of the pre-existing political struture of authority. In other parts of Nigeria, like the east, it was hardly applicable. British political officers stayed for a long time in their position and worked as advisories to the local chieftaincy. They also adapted to the needs of their administration; for example, those who learned languages were often promoted. 143 This “indirect rule” policy was a necessity for the British administration because only a few officers (thirty one to be exact) were sent from London to the protectorate in Nigeria. 144 The British took advantage of the ethnic factor in the north 141 Ibid., p. 198; Crowder mentions that Sir Donald Cameron, who served in Tanzania as governor was inspired by Lugard’s policy in Nigeria. When he came to Nigeria (Sir Cameron), where he took the same position between 1931 and 1935 he was surprised by the level of independence of the northern Emirates that developed a kind of “Indian-style native states”. 142 Ibid. 143 Crowder (1964) distinguishes here between the French and the British in dealing with their former colonies. The French choose a policy of “assimilation” and the British that of “indirect rule”, pp. 203205. 144 Ikime, Obaro (1970): The establishment of Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria, in: Tarikh (Indirect Rule in British Africa), Historical Society of Nigeria, pp. 8; the author speaks of foury-two officers approved by the British government in London, but only thirty-one were appointed in Nigeria. In fact, 84 and at the same time recognized the attachment of the population to the emirs. From a historical perspective, Obaro Ikime speaks of two reasons which led to the establishment of “indirect rule”: on the one hand Lord Lugard legitimated the British occupation over the Fulani and Hausa emirs as similar to the Fulani occupation over the Hausa during the jihād of Dan Fodio. On the other hand those emirs who died or fled their territories were replaced by new ones appointed by the British. Their appointment took into consideration their acceptance within the local communities as well as their intention to cooperate with British officers who represented the British High Commissioner and the Governor, respectively. As exchange for their loyalty which manifested itself in collecting taxes, building roads and establishing “good governance”, the British promised not to intervene in religious affairs. 145 In 1914 the amalgamation of Nigeria was declared and indirect rule was extended to the south of the country. This situation was not an easy task. The southern parts of the colony lacked clear structures of “traditional rulers” which was not the case in the north. 146 The reason for the centralization of the protectorates was economic in nature. It happened under the governorship of Lugard. The wellestablished direct taxation system that worked well in the north failed in the southern part of the country. Falola and Heaton explain the British economic interest in three main points: first of all expanding Nigerian commerce, second introducing an many of them were not able to work because of diseases. Because of that the cooperation with the Northern emirs was more than a necessity. 145 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 146 See more details in Falola, T. & M. M. Heaton (2008): History of Nigeria, Cambridge: University Press, pp. 112-116. 85 economy based on UK currency, and third, to force Nigerians to work in this direction. 147 Both authors conclude the efficiency of indirect rule in the following: “In the period before the 1930 the British colonial regime developed and implemented its program for imperial dominance in Nigeria. Indirect rule became the cheapest, easiest, and most ideologically attractive way to justify the colonial presence. Indirect rule theoretically preserved indigenous political institutions, but the nature of these institutions was significantly altered by the colonial presence.” 148 The transformation of the Nigerian economy and society soon became visible. Indirect rule contributed to that change. Britain benefited from Nigeria and exploited its mineral and human resources. Additionally, the colony became a market for British industrial products. Nigeria on the other hand benefited from imported European goods, and the construction of railways and roads. Prior to the 1930s a Nigerian national identity was not yet constructed: “Prior to the 1930s Nigerians by large did not see themselves as ‘Nigerians’ at all”. 149 This explains the rise of national movements after that period of time. Better educational facilities in Nigeria and in Europe educated Nigerian intellectuals contributed to the formation of a sort of national consciousness which was deeply rooted in the region. 150 The formation of associations and the intensification of political activism were basic elements for 147 Ibid., p. 119; see also pp. 116-118 for the amalgamation of Nigeria. 148 Ibid., p 134. 149 Falola & Heaton (2008), p. 137. 150 Ibid., pp. 137-139; the authors mentions the increase of primary and secondary schools in Nigeria between 1912 and 1937. In addition to that the number of students and western educated Nigerians increased as well. 86 politically oriented organizations. These institutions were the result of personal initiatives of Nigerian activists. That is why Nigerians used to be very regionally and ethnically oriented. The National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) was founded in 1944 in the south east of the country. In 1943, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) was established in the North. The Action Group (AG) was set up in the south west region. 151 We return our focus to Islam and British policy during the colonial period – the title of Jonathan Reynold’s publication on “indirect rule” in Nigeria summarizes the British policy on Islam in Nigeria up to the 1930s, in which the categorization of “good and bad Muslims” is made. 152 The author points out that the British kept the structure of governance established by Dan Fodio in the Sokoto Caliphate intact. Centralization of power and affiliation to the Qādiriyya were basic elements of the system. The British explicitly declared respect for the Islamic faith and allowed Muslims continue practicing their religion without disturbance. The experiences in India and Egypt compelled the British administration to change its strategy and to avoid confrontation with Islam. The colonial administration made efforts to keep its “image” towards Islam and Muslims as neutral – as Reynolds confirms it. 153 This policy was perceived even by the different Muslim groups in the north as tolerant, and they 151 See Ibid., pp. 140-154 for more details on political activism and initiation of ethnicand regionalbased organizations/parties. 152 Reynolds, Jonathan (2001): God and bad Muslims. Islam and Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria, In: The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 3/4 ( 3), 601-618. 153 Ibid., p. 601. 87 readily accepted imposed categorizations of “good” and “bad” Muslims according to their affiliation, resistance to the British, and readiness to cooperate. 154 The Qādiriyya Sufi brotherhood, the largest Sufi order in the north, was positively perceived by the colonial authority. The British characterized it as a “peaceful sect”, “state friendly”, a “non-fanatical branch of Islam”, and “the tarika of the region”. 155 Its previously established structures were maintained and integrated in the indirect rule guidelines. No doubt that this understanding was good for both the Qādiriyya and the British; the Qādiriyya kept its hegemony over the northern region and the British relied on a strong partner. A good example of the success of this partnership was the appearance of a Mahdist movement in the northwest in 1906. This movement revolted against British presence and rallied people to revolt against Christians and not to cooperate with them. Collaboration between the Sokoto army and the British forces succeeded in putting an end to this upheaval. This served in enhencing the Qādiriyya image. Furthermore, the order was for the British more or less isolated from external influences since they did not want the whole northern region to be exposed to “Islamic thought” from outside. 156 The Qādiriyya were classified among “good Muslims”. Other Sufi groups like the Tijāniyya, the Sanūsiyya, and Mahdist oriented Muslims were considered by the British to be among the “bad” ones. Reynolds indicates that the British neither made 154 Ibid., pp. 602-3. 155 Reynolds (2001), p. 605. 156 , Ibid., pp. 606-8. 88 clear differentiations between Muslim groups nor between their doctrinal differences. Realistically, British colonialists tended to avoid any possible resistance, especially from those groups with ties to other parts of Africa were there was resistance to French colonialism i.e. that resistance from Mahdis or Tijānī's in a different context could take place in northern Nigeria. When Nigerian Muslims passed by several other Muslim communities on pilgrimage routes to Mecca and came in contact with other Muslim communities, they were at risk of exposure to ideas of resistance. 157 The Tijāniyya was largely suspected by the British because of its relation to other centres in Africa like Senegal, Algeria, and Morocco. Its exclusiveness means that Tijānī's cannot join another order and cannot pray behind another ṭarīqa -imam. This was a source of suspicion for the British. 158 Reynolds revisits the strategy behind the British indirect rule and its relationship to the Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya as well to other group as follows: “(…) British rulers of northern Nigeria were instead evaluating orders such as the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya according to a complex set of assumptions about Islam. Chief among these was the association of Islamic education and piety with "fanaticism," but other important issues included the structural relationship of each group to the system of Indirect Rule and their spiritual linkages beyond the region of northern Nigeria.” 159 157 Ibid., pp. 609-111. 158 Ibid., p. 613; also p. 616. 159 Ibid., p. 618. 89 In addition to this policy of understanding the religious landscape of northern Nigeria the British planned on reforming Islamic law and reducing its validity. All judgements which were not compliant with the British law tradition were to be revised and corrected. 2.3 English Law or Islamic Law The juridical aspects of “indirect rule” were implemented in three different proclamations: the first one was the Native Courts Proclamation of 1900 and consisted of the institutionalizing of native courts at four different levels (A, B, C, and D). The first level A, headed by the Grand Qadi and the emirs, was able to impose the death penalty (with approval by the High Commissioner). At a later stage judgements defined by the British as “inhuman” were revealed and abolished. The second proclamation known as the Native Revenue Proclamation of 1906 consisted of implementing a direct taxation, assisting the emirs in fixing the level of taxes and at the same time to give them the opportunity to keep a considerable part of the revenue to manage their territories. The last proclamation of 1907, called, the Native Authority Proclamation, legally recognized local chiefs even outside of the emirs’ juridiction. It fixed the duties of district heads, as well as their salaries within the emirates or native authorities. 160 160 Ikime (1970), pp. 8-12; see also Reynolds, Jonathan T. (1999): The Time of Politics (Zamanin Siyasa). Islam and the politics of legitimacy in Northern Nigeria 1950-1966, San Francisco: International Scholars Publications, pp. 60-61. 96 administration succeeded in limiting Islamic criminal law and situating it under the British law tradition. 176 The new Penal Code (mentioned above) which was inspired by the Sudanese judicial system was ratified in September 1960. Islamic Law became more meaningful especially in civil matters. The so-called Moslem Courts of Appeals were replaced by Sharia Courts of Appeals . 177 Hock describes the judicial system in Nigeria in the early years of independence as follows: the top of the system consisted of the Supreme Court of Nigeria , followed by the Federal Court of Appeal and Federal High Court . At the level of the provinces there were State Courts represented in all states by the State High Court or by the State Sharia Court of Appeal and in some states by the State Customary Court of Appeal . The last category of the judicial system is represented by the Area Courts and the Customary Courts at the local level. Judicial cases were handled according to this hierarchy from the local to the federal level. The Federal High Court was the place where ultimate judgements were taken. In case of conflict between two different law traditions (e.g. a struggle between a Muslim and a Christian) an agreement over one court (Islamic or not) was agreed upon. 178 According Ostien and Dekker, the implementation of the Penal Code of 1960 was to the advantage of Muslims in northern Nigeria. Although the new Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes replaced the Native and Customary Criminal Law and 176 Hock (1996), p. 191. 177 Reynolds, Jonathan T. (1999), pp. 95-96. 178 Hock (1996), p. 192-193. 97 became standardized for all Nigerian citizens, and although Sharia Court jurisdiction was reduced to personal matters, and the Emirs Courts lost much of their juridical weight to the Provincial Courts , and the Alkalis’ Courts were asked to rely on the Penal Code (translated into Hausa) instead of using Arabic law books, Muslims nevertheless maintained higher legal prestige in the federation. 179 This prestige was achieved through the establishment of the Sharia Court of Appeal whose judgements (usually restricted to Islamic family and personal law) were final and could not be revised by other courts. In addition, the Native Courts Appellate Division was instituted with the duty of listening to cases of Native Courts directed to the High Court . The Native Courts Appellate Division consisted of three judges: two from the High Court and one from the Sharia Court of Appeal . Another advantage for Muslim judges was that they could handle cases according to Islamic Law as long the conflicting parties agreed on it and confirmed it in written form. 180 The judicial system introduced in Nigeria after independence worked well and judges were in a position to handle Islamic, English, or customary law. Problems started in 1967 when Nigeria was divided into twelve states instead of the existing four regions. Through this partition six new High Courts , six Sharia Courts of Appeal and later on a Court for every state was established. Ostien raises the problem in the following statement: “How to harmonize the work of all these new state courts, while 179 Ostien, Philip and Albert Dekker (2010): Sharīʿa and national law in Nigeria, in: Otto, Jan Michiel (ed.): Source Sharīʿa Incorporated: a Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present, Leiden: Leiden University Press, pp. 564-566. 180 Ibid., p. 567. 98 preserving the essential elements of the settlement of 1960?“ 181 For the High Courts the situation was unproblematic since they could appeal to the Federal Supreme Court . For the Sharia Courts of Appeal the situation was more complex: judgements from these courts were divergent and could not be directed to any other court. The establishment of a final, Upper or Federal Sharia Court of Appeal was suggested as a solution to the issue. This kind of court’s role was to solve cases from the different Sharia Courts and to solve all judicial questions between them. 182 Throughout the 1970s the need for establishing a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal became more apparent. Particularly in relation to debates over the new constitution of 1979 and the transition to the Second Republic 183 , sharīʿa turned out to be an issue in the country. The preparation for the new constitution started 1976. Two years later, the Constituent Assembly turned the proposed establishment of a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal down and suggested the related section 180 (1) c from the planned constitutional draft be removed. As a protest against this decision, Muslim deputies left the assembly. 184 The then head of the state, General Obasanjo, appealed to all factions to engage in dialogue. The Constituent Assembly proceeded 181 Ibid., p. 569. 182 Ibid. pp.569-570; for more details see also Ostien, Phil (2006): An Opportunity missed by Nigeria’s Christians: The 1976-78 Sharīʿa Debate revisited, in: Soares, E. Benjamin (ed.): Muslim-Christian encounters in Africa, pp. 221-255. 183 The First Republic in Nigeria was between 1960 and 1966. After that the Civil War (Biafra) took place. A military government took over from 1970. General Murtala Muhammad, the head of State at the time, announced in 1975 a transition to civil government. He formed a Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) with the aim of sketching the new constitution of the federation; see Ostien and Dekker (2010), p. 570. 184 According to Abun-Nasr (1993), 88 among 93 Muslim deputies left the Assembly, see p. 221; Hock (1996) indicates that all 93 Muslim members protested by boycotting the meeting, see p. 194. 99 with its task on the 29th August 1978, and the new constitution was presented on 1st September 1979 without the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal clauses. Apart from that, states could create State Sharia Courts of Appeal in case they elected to establish such courts. 185 The debate on Islamic law did not stop in the postcolonial period. For many Muslims this law is part of their identity and cannot be replaced by any other law. If Muslims were ready to compromise that Islamic law was reduced to personal and family matters by the British and that Islamic Criminal Law was integrated in the Penal Code of the whole country, they were not ready to compromise when it came to the Sharia Court of Appeal . The democratization process in Nigeria in the 1980s was interrupted by the military, and the Second Republic came to an end in 1983 when General Buhari became head of State. Two years later general Babangida took over after a successful coup d’état. Babangida announced a transition to a civilian government by end of the 1980s and a new discussion about the constitution of the federation in the Third Republic of Nigeria arose again. The head of the state set up a political board in 1986 with a consultative function of pertaining to the judicial situation of the country. Muslim leaders of the ten northern states asked Islamic Law beyond personal matters to be extended. Replacing the expression “Personal Law” with 185 In Section 240 (1) of the 1979-constitution it was indicated that establishing State Shari‘a Courts of Appeal is allowed “for any state that requires it”; see Ostien and Dekker (2010), p. 572. 100 “Islamic law” in Decree 26 in 1986 of the constitution of 1979 made this expectation feasible. Also the creation of Sharia Courts of Appeals was allowed. 186 The constitution of 1979 was again revised in 1988 and several committees were asked to come up with suggestions. According to Hock, Committee 16 was concerned with the sharīʿa -issue. From the beginning, views were divided between Muslims asking for obligatory Sharia Courts of Appeal in all states and Christians suggesting removal of all sharīʿa sections from the constitution. The representative of the military government on 28th November 1988 stated that the absence of any compromise, all negotiations over sharīʿa were halted. A few days later an official declaration was announced, keeping the 1979 constitutional formulation. 187 Hock describes the sharīʿa -discussions in the 1980s as the “second round” of the debates on Islamic law. Several factors hindered the establishment of a law system combining British secular law with traditional Islamic law. Muslims never forgot the devaluation of their law through the British and used any opportunity to revive it. Christians considered sharīʿa a danger and tried every means to have it removed from the constitution. The Military government failed to solve the sharīʿa - controversy. At the same time Nigeria was passing through a political, economic, and social vacuum during the 1980s. The division between Christians and Muslims took on another dimension with absence of a compromising policy of Babangida’s administration. Hock articulates the controversy surrounding Nigeria’s membership in Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986 and the crisis related to it. The 186 Hock (1996), p. 196. 187 Ibid., pp. 197-198. 101 author wonders if such a membership can be explained as “grand design” or a “misleading step” of the government of Babangida. Certainly, such an event challenged Muslims and Christians to place their religion an increasingly central aspect of their interest in the federation. 188 The 1980s were not different from the crisis of 1979 when it came to the sharīʿa -issue. Questions related to Islamic law in the constitution were still not answered. The establishment of Sharia Federal Courts failed several times since Muslims and Christians did not find a way to compromise. The democratic election of 1993 with the elected President Abiola gave Nigerians hope that the third transition to civilian government (the Third Republic) could solve the country’s problems, including judicial controversy. These hopes disappeared very soon when a new coup d’état occured in the same year and the military took over again until 1999. The era of General Sani Abacha was one of the most unstable periods in Nigerian postcolonial history. The turmoil in all sectors deeply affected the Nigerian experience with democracy. According to the historian Toyin Falola „...General Abacha (...) abolished all the elected national and state assemblies, dismissed all the state executives, dissolved all the local government councils, and banned all political parties.“ 189 General Abdulsalami Abubakar became head of state after Abacha died unexpectedly in 1998. As part of his accession, he promised a speedy transition to 188 The OIC is an Islamic organization that was established 1969 in Fez, Morocco. General Babangida registered Nigeria 1986 in that organization apparently for economic reasons. This act raised a big controversy between Muslims and Christians in the federation. The form of the state (secular, Islamic) was especially contested; for an overview on the debate see Hock (1996), pp. 212-235. 189 Falola (1999), p. 195. 102 democracy. Within a few months new presidential elections were organized and Olesegun Obasanjo was elected President of Nigeria. From 1999, the Fourth Republic was declared and a new controversy over constitution and Islamic law arose once again. The civil war, the military regime, the transition to democracy, the constitutional and judicial debates, and the political discussions about Islamic Law in Nigeria during the postcolonial era overshadowed other debates within the different religious communities. The ongoing political discussions in the federation seemd to be confrontation between the two major religious communities: Muslims and Christians. Religious struggle and political interest can be found in any religious community. In the following section, the intra-Islamic debates between Muslims in Nigeria, especially the struggle between the Sufi-brotherhoods and subsequently against Sheikh Gumi are evaluated. These debate(s) can be understood as the historical background of the Izala formation. 2.5 The conflict between the Sufi Brotherhoods The Qādiriyya Sufi-Brotherhood is the oldest and most dominant Sufi-order in northern Nigeria. The Sokoto-Caliphate played a decisive role in spreading the Qādiriyya. Most leaders of the jihād movement of Usman Dan Fodio were members of the Qādiriyya. 190 190 Loimeier, Roman (1993): Auseinadersetzungen im islamischen Lager, in: Abun-Nasr, Jamil (ed.): Muslime in Nigeria: Religion und Gesellschaft im politischen Wandel seit den 50er Jahren. Münster, Hamburg, p.129. 103 The Tijāniyya came to Nigeria in the 19th century and soon became a counter-pole ṭarīqa . If the leaders of Sokoto were members of the Qādiriyya, then the Tijāniyya spread among traders and religious scholars. According to Loimeier, the controversy between both brotherhoods dates back to 1845 when a debate arose about the affiliation of Dan Fodio’s son, Muhammad Bello, to the Tijāniyya. That was the starting point when affiliation to one of these ṭuruq (pl. of ṭarīqa ) became religiously and politically meaningful. Being “Qadiri” means the conservation of Dan Fodio’s tradition and changing to Tijāniyya means a rebellion against Sokoto rulers and the old tradition. In addition, Kano emerged as a new centre of the Tijāniyya that became increasingly independent from Sokoto, the Qādiriyya centre. At the beginning of the 20th century the two brotherhoods started looking for more adherents and prestige in northern Nigeria and building networks with Sufi centres outside of the country, particularly via Kano, where trade and religious contact was intensive. 191 The more Kano became economically prosperous and religious affiliation became an important part of social life, the more the growth of the Tijāniyya became visible. The contact with Morocco and Senegal was intensified. Even the Emirs of Kano were affiliated with the Tijāniyya and stove for legitimacy through their membership to the ṭarīqa . 192 The Tijāniyya changed from being a ṭarīqa of traders and scholars to a massmovement in Kano and in other parts of northern Nigeria. This can be attributed to 191 Ibid., pp. 130-131. 192 Loimeier indicates that the Emir of Kano between 1903 and 1919 ‘Abbas was a member of the Tijānīyya. The Emir Abdullahi Bayero who ruled from 1926 to 1954 was initiated to the Tijānīyya by the Senegalese Sheikh Ibrahim Niasse (1900-1975) during the Pilgrimage to Mecca in 1937. Also Muhammad Sanusi, Emir of Kano between 1954 and 1963 took advantage of the contact with the Tijānīyya in order to become more independent from Sokoto; see more details in Ibid., pp. 131-133 104 the success of Sheikh Ibrahim Niasse 193 as the Tijāniyya caliph of West Africa as well as the affiliation of the Emirs of Kano with this ṭarīqa . The Qādiriyya reacted to such a development through the actions of Sheikh Nasiru Kabara (1925-1996) who tried to reform his own brotherhood. Apart from building networks with the hometown of the Qādiriyya, Bagdad, Sheikh Kabara initiated a reform-project of his ṭarīqa in Nigeria. Among others he introduced the celebration of the birthday of ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī in Kano as well as the bandiri -celebrations (Hausa: drum) in the mosques. He also became the Qādiriyya Caliph in West Africa. 194 The Sufi dispute over hegemony and followers within Muslim Nigeria took on a political dimension during the 1950s. For political parties, Sufi brotherhoods represented a source of networks and potential voters. The brotherhoods themselves became involved in politics and increased their political influence and the numbers of their followers. Having religious, economic and political influence was part of the “rules of the game”. Nevertheless, the more the political weight of religious leaders increased the more this influence turned out to be ambivalent and risky. 195 The politicization of religion in northern Nigeria can be seen through the debate on the identification of many Tijānī youth with the political party, northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), and the reaction to that by Ahmadu Bello 193 For more details on Sheikh Niasse’s life and influence see Seesemann, Rüdiger (2011): The Divine Flood: Ibrahim Niasse and the Roots of a Twentieth-Century Sufi Revival, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 194 Loimeier (1993), p. 134. 195 Ibid., p. 135; the author speaks of the “political instrumentalization” of religious debates among religious scholars from the 1950s. 105 northern People’s Congress (NPC) as well by other religious leaders. In addition, a religious debate over the correct way to perform prayers (with qabdh or with ṣadl ) 196 emerged. The Tijāniyya leader Sheikh Ibrahim Niasse tended to pray with qabdh and Sheikh Nasiru Kabara preferred ṣadl . This became a political issue among adherents and a reason to divide mosques as well for blaming kufr (non-belief) on each other during the 1950s and 1960s. The discourse consisted of finding proof for each point of view in the tradition of the Prophet. This controversy was used by Sardauna Ahmadu Bello in his political program. The political leader tended to condemn qabdh and distanced himself from Ibrahim Niasse as well from the NEPU. This pragmatic choice reflects Bello’s interest in avoiding any obstacles blocking his political agenda of “one north”. The qabdh - ṣadl -controversy came to an end in the mid-1960s. In the following years it became a minor issue particularly with the appearance of Sheikh Gumi as an opponent to Sufis and Sufism. 197 Reynolds understands the link between the Qādiriyya and NPC as well as between the Tijāniyya and NEPU as a “cooperation (…) [that] was constantly being renegotiated as necessitated by changing political conditions.” 198 Historically, the spread of the Tijāniyya in Kano and Zamfara State was a continuation of a long resistance against the center of Qādiriyya, Sokoto. The Qādiriyya was linked to the 196 Qabdh means praying with arms crossed in front of the navel and sadl means having them alongside the body. 197 Ahmadu Bello set up the Kaduna Council of Malamai in 1963 in order to solve the issue of qabdhsadl . The report recommended that Imāms should practice Sadl since it is the common practice of the Maliki School of Law, see ibid., pp. 136-138. 198 Reynolds (1999), p. 179. 112 islāmī (Muslim World League). 217 He was also close to Sardauna Ahmadu Bello 218 (1909-1966), Premier of the northern Region, and acted as his religious adviser. Sheikh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi was born in 1922, in Gumi, in the modernday Sokoto State. He was educated by his father, Mallam Mahmud na-Gumi. He attended the Central Middle School (1936-42) in Sokoto and moved to Kano to study Islamic Law at the prestigious Sharia Law School. He traveled to Sudan where he studied Arabic and graduated in 1951. Upon his return to Nigeria Sheikh Gumi was appointed as a teacher in Maru, in what is now Zamfara State before he moved to the School of Arabic Studies in Kano, the same institution he attended several years ago. Gumi was appointed as deputy Grand Qadi of the north in 1960 and three years later he served as Grand Qadi of the northern Region. In 1976 he was appointed as Pilgrims Board Chairman 219 . General Murtala Muhammad (1938-76), president of Nigeria (1975-6), appointed Gumi as Grand Mufti but the coup d’état of 1976 and his assassination hindered this measure. 220 In his autobiography, Sheikh Gumi mentioned that he was a peaceful person, who avoided any kind of conflict. He was “blessed with an excellent memory” and he liked mathematics, geography and history, and had trouble with the English 217 For an overview on the Muslim World League see Schulze, Reinhard (1990): Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Untersuchungen zur Islamischem Weltliga, Leiden: Brill; in this book Sheikh Gumi is mentioned with other prominent Islamic personalities as member of the Constituent Assembly of the IWL in 1964, p. 227; also as member of the Majlis al-ala al-‚alami li-l Masajid, MAAM (World High Council of Mosques) in 1975, p 285; It is also mentioned that Gumi was a delegate in the Egyptian Organisation Majma’ al-Buhuth al-islamiyya (Academy for Islamic Studies) from 1972, P. 237. 218 See Paden, John (1986): Ahmadu Bello. Sardauna of Sokoto, Zaria: Hudahuda Publishing Company. 219 For details on pilgrimage politics in northern Nigeria see Loimeier, Roman (1988): Das Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme" In: Afrika Spectrum, 23, 2 (1988), pp. 201-14. 220 Shehu, Balarabe I. (2001): The Light of Truth, Kano: Gidan Dabiro Publisher, p. 1. 113 language. At an early age, he started identifying himself with religion: “Identifying me with the religion quite early in life, was, indeed, a moral and social check.” 221 He studied the classical work of Islamic law like Mukhtassar, al-Risala – to mention some. 222 At school, Gumi met prominent personalities who later became famous figures of the country. Among others, Gumi was taught by Mallam Junaidu, the later Wazir of Sokoto. Also the Sardauna, Ahmadu Bello was teaching in the same school in Sokoto. Shehu U. Shagari, who headed Nigeria as President between 1979 and 1983, was a classmate of Gumi in Sokoto and later on in Kaduna College. 223 During his time in Sokoto, Sheikh Gumi was close to Aminu Kano, one of the prominent activists and oppositionists to the British colony. Both of them, along with Shehu Shagari, were known in Sokoto as troublemakers: “…the three of us, Malam Aminu, Shagari and I were marked down as being dangerous to the peace in Sokoto province . ” 224 After primary school, which Sheikh Gumi finished in three years instead of four, he attended a Middle School in Sokoto, and then he attended a Qadi School in 221 Gumi (1992), p. 20. 222 Ibid., p. 23; the Mukhatassar al-Risala is considered a standard book of Islamic law in Nigeria. It is written by Sidi Khalil (d. 1365) on the basis of the al-Risala, a work by Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani (d. 996); on an overview on Maliki law and its application in Nigeria see Ghazali, Abdullahi (n.d.): Maliki Law: The Predominant Muslim Law in Nigeria, published online at http://www.gamji.com/article4000/NEWS4601.htm (21/05/2011). 223 Gumi (1992), pp. 22-34. 224 Gumi (1992), p. 48. 114 Sokoto between 1942 and 1943. 225 Later on, Sheikh Gumi went to Kano where he joined the School of Arabic Studies 226 and graduated with the highest distinction in four years. 227 After his graduation he served as Secretary of the Chief Alkali between 1947 and 1948. Being uncomfortable with his job, Sheikh Gumi left Sokoto again to teach in the newly-established Teacher Training College in Maru, Katsina. The Sheikh remained at that institution for 18 months. He was unsatisfied, especially regarding the ignorance about religion and basic knowledge of Islam: “I observed quite early that both students and workers in the school were in many respects ignorant about their religion. They had no significant knowledge about the proper Islamic regulations even as they affected their daily life. They did not observe Islamic Etiquette in much of their conduct. Many could not say their prayers well. In fact, some could hardly perform the ablution . ” 228 In town, Sheikh Gumi observed that people performed tayammun (in Arabic: connotation of ablution with sand if water is not available) and not wuḍū' (in Arabic: ablution) and even the Imam of the Central Mosque did so. As a result Gumi started praying with students on the school grounds and warned them about going to the mosque in town. 229 225 Sani, Abul-Mumin (1994): The image and legacy of late Sheikh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi, unpubl. BA-Dissertation, Islamic Studies, University of Jos, Nigeria. 226 Sani Umar points out that „…the School (School of Arabic Studies, Kano) came to be regarded as the breeding ground of Anti-Sufism in Nigeria“, See S. Umar (1988): Sufism and Anti-Sufism in Nigeria, MA-dissertation, ABU Kano, p. 169. 227 Gumi (1992), p. 34. 228 Gumi (1992), p. 47-8. 229 Gumi (1992), p. 48. 115 At the same time, the Sultan of Sokoto gave a speech during the Muslim Eid celebration 230 thanking Allah, the Prophet, Usman Dan Fodio, and the King of Britain. Gumi sent the Sultan a letter warning him about thanking the King of Britain. Disappointed, the Sultan wanted to punish him. Gumi was charged with illegal praying in the school grounds, stopping students from going to Friday prayers, and for pretending to be a mahdī . 231 The next step in Gumi’s life was his move to Kano where he began to teach in the same School of Arabic Studies that he attended as a student. During this period Gumi applied for a scholarship to study in Egypt, but the government decided to send him with seven others to the Institute of Education in Khartoum, Sudan. 232 Sheikh Gumi left Sudan in 1956. In the year 1957 he became the Pilgrims Welfare Officer in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. He was confronted in Mecca by established Sheikhs who guided pilgrims for money and he tried to change their attitude towards pilgrims. 233 According to Loimeier, the fact that Sheikh Gumi was close to “religious scholars of the neo-Wahhâbiyya in Saudi Arabia” 234 and a leading member of the 230 Eid is the most important religious feast of Muslims. The are two different Eid celebrations: the first one is the first day after the fasting month of Ramadan and the second one occurs during the Hajj period and during which all Muslims sacrifice (a sheep/a cow in memory of the Prophet Ibraham’s sacrifice story in the Qur’ān). 231 Gumi (1992), 49-51; being a mahdi seems to have a negative connotation in northern Nigeria during Gumi’s time. 232 Paden (1986) mentioned that 6 students (including A. Gumi) traveled to Sudan for Bakhter-Ruda School in Khartoum, Sudan, see p. 301. 233 Gumi (1992), 69. 234 Loimeier (1997), 182. 116 Rābiṭat al-ʿālam al-islāmī founded in 1962 meant that he was largely identified by Sufis and others in Nigeria as representative of Wahhābiyya in the country. Back in his country, Sheikh Gumi served as Deputy Grand Kadi for two years (1960-2) and was promoted to Grand Kadi, when Sheikh Awad, of Sudanese descent and holder of that position, went back to Sudan. Gumi described his years in the Sharia Court of Appeal as “memorable” and he appreciated the work of that body to establish justice in northern Nigeria. 235 Of course such a position allowed the Sheikh to come closer to politicians. He became the “principal adviser” of the Sardauna Ahmadu Bello. Both of them travelled together to several countries in Africa and the Middle East and went on ‘umra to the Mecca every year during Ramadan. 236 This opportunity of travelling in the Islamic world and observing Nigerian Muslims especially during their visits to the Holy Land provoked Sheikh Gumi to establish an organisation to educate Nigerians about their Islamic faith. That was the idea behind the JNI ( Jamāʿat Naṣr al-Islām : Society for the Victory of Islam) established in 1962 with financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 237 Although Sheikh Gumi held the position of Grand Kadi, he was passionate – as he confessed – about teaching and preaching. The opening of the Sultan Bello Mosque in Kaduna in 1963 gave him a good opportunity to fullfil this passion. His tafsīr sessions were attended – apart of ordinary people – by prominent politicians 235 Gumi (1992), pp. 96-97. 236 Gumi (1992), pp. 100-104. 237 Sheikh Gumi wrote to the Saudi government asking for assistance to set up the JNI. The Saudis donated ₤ 100000; also the government of Kuwait contributed ₤ 300000, see Gumi (1992), p. 107. 117 (the Sardauna amongst others). This opportunity was used by Sheikh Gumi to transmit his message(s): “I was happy with the mosque especially because it allowed me to talk directly to those in authority. (…) It has always been to my conviction that the best way to effect change in the society is to educate those who have power, about the virtue of justice and the fear of God . ” 238 In Kaduna, the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation started recording the tafsīr sessions of the Sheikh in 1967 and transmitting them over the the radio. 239 This happened without special organization or any financial support to the Sheikh. 240 In addition, in 1970 Gumi started writing in the daily Hausa newspaper Gaskiya ta fi Kwabo . This access to the media allowed him to propagate his ideas about many religious issues and particularly about Sufism. Gumi dealt with many issues in the religion of Islam from sacrifice to communication with spirits and from attributing a divine nature to Sufi Sheikhs to criticism of drums and songs in mosques. 241 Andrea Brigaglia speaks of three phases when it comes to Gumi’s tafsīr : the first one was between 1962 and 1966 when Gumi was preaching in Ahmadu Bello Mosque in Kaduna and his audience was “made up of the administrative bourgeoisie of this 238 Gumi (1992), p. 130. 239 Brigaglia, Andrea (2007): The Radio Kaduna 'Tafsir' (1978-1992) and the construction of public images of Muslim scholars in the Nigerian media, Journal for Islamic Studies, vol. 27, pp. 173-210. 240 Sheikh Gumi mentioned that he neither visited a radio studio nor received money for recording his Tafsir sessions, Gumi (1992), p. 133. 241 Gumi (1992), p. 138. 118 political centre.“ 242 During this first period Gumi “attributed specious elements to Sufism”; the second phase suggested by Brigaglia was between 1967 and 1976 when Gumi’s preachings were broadcasted for the first time by Radio in Kaduna. Here Gumi avoided open conflict with Sufism and “moderated the anti-Sufi tones of his comments” 243 . The last phase which began in 1977 was characterized by “explicit tones” that go as far as to takfīr (in Arabic: charge of kufr , non-belief). 244 Sheikh Gumi was a distinguished Islamic scholar. His closeness to the Sardauna Ahmadu Bello opened several doors for him. Gumi travelled to many Islamic countries; He established a network of contacts in and outside of Nigeria, and found access to the media in order to propagate his ideas and ideology. His criticism towards Sufis and Sufism reached an apogee when the Sheikh published his book “ al-ʿaqīda al-ṣaḥīḥa bi muwafaqat al-sharīʿa ” which is regarded by Loimeier as the major religious work of Gumi – apart of his Qur’ān translation into Hausa. 245 2.6.2 Sheikh A. Gumi: from al-ʿaqīda al-ṣaḥīḥa (1972) to the establishment of Izala (1978) Gumi wrote his book “ al-ʿaqīda al-ṣaḥīḥa …” 246 in Arabic language, gave it to a Mallam Galadanci, who at that time was a member of the academic staff at the University of Kano, to be revised and then to a Syrian publisher in Saudi Arabia for 242 Brigaglia, Andrea (2005): Two published Hausa Translations of the Qur’an and their doctrinal background, in: Journal of Religion in Africa, 35 (4), p. 429. 243 Ibid., 244 This takfir was especially directed to the Tijānīyya followers as Brigaglia mentions; see Brigaglia (2005), p. 430. 245 Loimeier (1997), p. 186. 246 Abubakar Gumi (1972): Al-ʿaqīda al-saḥīḥa bi muwafiqat al-shari'a ( The Right Belief Is Based on the Sharīʿa ), Ankara: Hilal Yayinlari. 119 publication. Gumi opposed certain doctrines of Sufism in his book, criticized their “access to the hidden” (Arabic: al-bāṭin ), “their communication with the Prophet” and “receiving special prayers from him”. Gumi drew upon the writings of Usman Dan Fodio that there is “nothing after the sunna of the Prophet.” 247 Gumi denounced the idea that a Sufi sheikh can intervene for their disciples during the Last Day (the Day of Resurrection). He criticized the presence of drums in mosques. 248 He insisted on the idea of oneness of God (Arabic: tawḥīd ) and confirmed that Muhammad is the seal among all Prophets. Gumi opposed the Sufi idea that the Prophet still exists mystically and continues to transmit instructions (to particular persons, Sheikhs, etc.). Gumi analyzed the issue of sainthood and insisted that “religious obligations” (Arabic: wajibāt ) are as important as faith (Arabic: īmān ). He then discussed the concept of bidʿa . He considered bidʿa to be all practices that contradict the Qur’ān and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. Sheikh Gumi criticized the Tijāniyya Sufi Brotherhood and its practice. Tijānī’s believe that ṣalāt al Fātiḥ (one of their important prayers) was revealed to the founder of the order by the Prophet himself and reciting it is equivalent to six thousand recitations of the Qur’ān. Gumi criticized practicing witchcraft and looking for blessings for a particular purpose. He attacked practicing dhikr and categorized it as bidʿa. He also attacked hierarchies 247 Gumi (1992), p. 142-4. 248 Sani, Abul-Mumin (1994), p. 31. 120 in Sufi orders and how leaders are considered as aqṭāb (in Arabic: poles) who can receive revelations or communicate with the Prophet. 249 Gumi’s book was not written for the public as he himself confessed: “The book had not been written for general reading, and I was aware that in formulating its major arguments a lot had been taken for granted.” 250 His book was taken by one of his students, Ismaila Idris, who used it to preach in Kaduna to the public in absence of its author who was by then in Saudi Arabia. This provoked a big controversy and a campaign against Gumi in the media. Sufi Brotherhoods defended their doctrines in the media and especially through writings of their leaders at that time. Both Sani Kafanga and Nasiru Kabara, leaders of the Tijāniyya and the Qādiriyya, wrote replies to Gumi’s books. They used a polemic language to defend Sufism. They blamed Gumi of being a Wahhābī who misunderstood the language of Sufis and their interpretation of the text. The Sufi leaders traced Sufism in the tradition of the Prophet. They claimed to follow orthodoxy and by no means deviate from it. According to them Sufism is a part of the sunna . 251 The situation escalated and reached the grassroots level. Sheikh Gumi was isolated in the JNI (where many Sufi leaders were present) and common people (among Sufis) became agitated against him. The reactions went as far as several 249 Loimeier (1997) provides a detailed analysis of al-ʿaqīda al-saḥīḥa and the major argument and criticism of Gumi towards Sufi Brotherhoods see pp. 186-196. 250 Gumi (1992), 145. 251 For an overview of the Sufi answers see Loimeier (1997), 197-206. 121 attempts to kill him in Kano and Jeddah – as mentioned in his autobiography. The relationship between Gumi and the Sufi Brotherhoods took on another dimension when a new organization called Jamāʿat Izalat al-Bidʿa Wa Iqamat as-Sunnah , abbreviated as J.I.B.W.I.S. or simply, Izala, was established in Jos 1978. The founder of the organization was the same Ismaila Idris who used Gumi’s book to preach in Ahmadu Bello Mosque in Kaduna. 128 reform project in northern Nigeria. They brought several writings and books of the Mālikiyya in North Africa. 266 The period between the 16th and 18th century is called by Bunza, or a period of “emerging scholars” and resulted in the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate as part of Usman Dan Fodio’s reform program during the 19th century. 267 Also during the colonial and postcolonial period of the 20th century, revivalism in the Hausaland seems to have its roots in North Africa’s experience with Islamism. Scholars like Ḥasan al-Bannā’ (1906-49), Sayyid Quṭb (1906-66), Muḥammed ʿAbduh (1849-1905), al-Afghānī (1838-1897) are considered by Bunza to be “sources of materials and inspiration” for the Nigerian revivalism movement. 268 To give examples of reform in post-colonial Nigeria, Bunza mentioned Sheikh Abubakar Gumi and the major Islamic organizations that he deeply affected: Jamāʿat Naṣr alIslām (JNI) and the Izala-movement. Also Zakzakys Muslim Brothers movement and others have been influenced by writings from North Africa (e.g. Sayyid Quṭb and Ḥasan al-Bannā’). 269 Bunza goes further in recognizing that the call for sharīʿa in northern Nigeria should also to be understood in the context of tajdīd inspired by Mālikī jurisprudence and North African scholars of Islam. 270 Thus, Bunza’s historical account highlights the distinctive role of the North African scholars over reform in Nigeria. 266 Ibid., p 328; al-Mudawwana al-Kubra, al-Risala al-Qayrawaniyya, Mukhtassar Khalil are some examples mentioned books of Malikiyya by the author. 267 Ibid., p 330. 268 Ibid., p 331. 269 Ibid., pp 331-333. 270 Ibid., p 333. 129 According to Loimeier “reform” has no fixed definition (it is rather a described but not defined concept). In an Islamic context, reform is linked to several connotations like tajdīd (in Arabic: renewal); iṣlāḥ (in Arabic: restitution, restoration); iḥyā’ (in Arabic: revival); ṣaḥwa (in Arabic: awakening). 271 For Sub-Saharan-Africa, Loimeier identifies the concept tajdīd as key concept for reform during the 19th and 20th century. He summarizes his understanding of the concept of reform as “change with a program”. Its meaning is especially related – according to Loimeier – to criticism of immoral life or government. Loimeier regards a change during the 20th century at the level of terminology from using tajdīd to iṣlāḥ which is more related to “programmatic reorientation of Muslim reformers” as well as to “new types of Islamic reform movements in Sub-Saharan Africa.” 272 Generally, “reform” is to be found in both in academic and non-academic literature and is related to societal, political, and religious movements. The concept is translated as “progress” and “modernization” or as “renewal of Society on the basis of “fundamental” dogma. 273 Loimeier suggests the following definition of reform: “Reform has many meanings. It has modernizing as well conservative, liberal, progressive, egalitarian, elitist, activist or revolutionary connotations.” 274 He adds that any reform movement “conduct a specific dialogue 271 See Loimeier, Roman (2007): ”Yesu Hakusulubiwa –Jesus wurde nicht gekreuzigt”: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des Vergleichs religiöser Reformbewegungen; Paper presented at the University of Leipzig, 11/10/2007, p 2. The Author mentions that other concepts are also found in literature like nahda (renaissance), taraqqi or taqaddum (progress), see footnote (4). 272 My English translation of Loimeier’s German Terminology „programmatische Neuausrichtung muslimischer Reformer“ and „neuer Typus islamischer Reformbewegungen im subsaharanischen Afrika“, Ibid. 273 Ibid., p 3. 274 Ibid. (my translation). 130 with history and the canon of its own religious tradition (…).” 275 Loimeier speaks of “markers” that characterize religious reform movements. He listed eleven markers: having particular religious reference (particular person or event), using specific texts and particular interpretation, choosing particular types of organization, particular position to the state – just to mention some. 276 The example of Loimeier hints at the fluidity of the term “reform”. Ousmane Kane, from political sciences, refers to “reform movements” as “those Islamic movements that attempt to reform social and religious practices” 277 and differentiates between them and “islamist movements” that “attempt to capture political power and establish the rule of God.” 278 Kane’s approach links a reform program to social change. This aspect is missed in several studies on Islam in and outside of the African continent. 279 Furthermore, Kane understands reform – of Izala (the movement he is dealing with) – as a modernity project. 280 According to Peter Clark, sociologist and historian of religion, “Islamic reform in Nigeria is not a new phenomenon.” 281 It becomes more visible in the context of the 275 Ibid., p 4 (my translation) 276 See these eleven “markers” explained by Loimeier; Ibid., pp 4-5. 277 Kane, Ousmane (2003): Islamic Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria. Leiden, Boston: Brill, p. 7. 278 Ibid. 279 Ousmane Kane listed several case studies dealing with reform Islam in Algeria, Indonesia, Morocco, Egypt, Oman, Ivory Coast, French Sudan, and Guinea. In these examples, the author misses a “direct causality between social change and the rise of a new Islamic attitudes or beliefs” – as he said. See pp. 8-14. 280 Ibid. especially see pp 1-7 and Kane’s discussion on his understanding of “modernity” in relationship to reform Islam (Izala Movement). 281 Clarke, Peter (1988): Islamic Reform in contemporary Nigeria: methods and aims, in Third World Quarterly 10 (2), p. 519. 131 “nation-state” where Muslims as well as Christians were, and still are asked to answer the demands of one nation. From their site, Nigerians (Christians and Muslims) questioned the “character and orientation” of that state. 282 Clarke locates Islamic reform in Nigeria in the 19th century. The Sokoto jihād of Usman Dan Fodio has not only “religious, political, social, and economic” effects on Muslims and nonMuslims, but it also led to “fear and opposition to Islam which persist to this day”. 283 In contemporary Nigeria, Clarke identifies two types of reform: moderate and radical. Clarke makes his differentiation on the basis of the sources used by reformers. He considers those who only rely on the Qur’ān and the sunna of the Prophet as “fundamentalists”, while moderates are those relying on other sources (in addition to the two). When it comes to sharīʿa , both (moderate and conservative types of reform) have similar attitudes. Both of them desire to Islamize Nigeria although the “fundamentalist” invests more energy in that direction. 284 Furthermore Clarke understands Reform in its social and economic circumstances. By giving the example of Maitatsine riots in Kano in the beginning of the 1980s and the Kafancan disturbance of 1987, Clarke tries to find a link between fundamentalism and Islamic reform. He suggests the following definition: “Fundamentalism is essentially about the reform of Islam for the purpose of creating a more just society along Islamic lines. It is not only a moral response to what it sees as the corrupting influence of western libertarianism and exploitation, and godless socialism, but 282 Ibid. 283 Ibid. 284 Ibid., pp 521-2 132 also a failure of western, secular (…) political, economic, and educational systems to provide solutions to the country’s problems.” 285 Clarke concludes by making a distinction between what he called “intellectual and moral” reform of the Sokoto Caliphate and between the “purifying” reform that fights innovation and tends to Islamize Nigeria. 286 The expert on Nigerian Islam, Andrea Brigaglia 287 , observes the transformation of the concept of Islamic “reform” in Nigeria. He stresses that the Muslim identity of the elites during the Sokoto Caliphate was related to Sufism and was adopted by the masses. Interestingly, “reform” as a concept is also present in Sufi milieu. Brigaglia gives the example of the “doctrinal reorientation” of the Tijāniyya headed by Sheikh Ibrahim Niasse (d. 1975) 288 and also of the Qādiriyya led by Sheikh Nasiru Kabara (d. 1996) 289 in Kano. He also quotes the concepts used by John Paden who speaks of “traditional” and “reformed” brotherhoods (Qādiriyya, Tijāniyya) 290 respectively. The appearance of a “counter-reform” project of Sheikh Gumi (d. 1992) and the Izala movement inspired by him drew attention to a new discussion about reform. The internal discussion among Sufis on reformism seems to have taken a new 285 Ibid., p 527 286 Ibid, p 538. 287 Brigaglia (2004). 288 For more details, see Seesemann (2004); also Brigaglia, Andrea (2001), "The Fayda Tijānīyya of Ibrahim Niasse: Genesis and implications of a Sufi doctrine", Islam et Sociétés au Sud du Sahara 14/15, pp. 41-56. 289 Among others see Loimeier (1997), pp. 52-70 on the Life of Sheikh N. Kabara and the development of the Qādiriyya-Nasiriyya. 290 Brigaglia (2004), pp 108-109. 133 dimension. This tendency is a result of the anti-colonial resistance of many West African Muslims against colonial masters, but also is due to Islamic education and rapprochement to the Arabic and Islamic world. 291 Sheikh Gumi is the pioneer of religious reformism in post-colonial Nigeria (from 1969), but it seems that “reform” or “reformism” appear to have been used even during the colonial time. 292 Sani Umar 293 , an expert on Islam in Nigeria, uses the concept of “Islamic modernism” to qualify the Izala movement and its Salafi/Wahhābī program. This form of Islam seems to be the counter-pole of the so-called “popular Islam” represented by the Sufis. The argument of Sani Umar is that Izala adopted a modern “organizational format” and its leaders and members have such an educational background. 294 Dealing with the development of Izala, Sani Umar speaks of the division of Izala beginning in 1984 and how doctrinal differences lead to different orientations within the movement. On the one hand a faction of Izala follows the teachings of Sheikh Idris (the founder) and which is considered the “hard-liner” faction (fundamentalist) while the other one (those who are largely Medina-educated members) is more moderate or “soft-line” (as Umar calls it). In fact, Sani Umar regards the terms 291 Brigaglia (2004) quotes the study of Kaba Lansiné (1974) on Wahhabism in Mali and how Islamic education in Egypt (Al-Azhar) and Sudan (Omdourman) played a role in the “reformist” movement established in Mali, see pp 115-117 292 In the context of Nationalism and resistance against the British Colony, Sa’du Zungur and Amino Kano criticized the established traditional authority of the Ulama in the north in that they considered it as an obstacle to any “reform” or political progress. See Brigaglia (2004), pp. 116-118 293 Umar, Muhammad Sani (2001): Education and Islamic trends in Northern Nigeria, 1970s-1990s, Africa Today 48:2, pp. 127-150. 294 Ibid., p. 134; Sheikh Gumi and Sheikh Idris attended modern schools like the Kano School of Arabic; concerning the Sufi-context Sani Umar speaks of a transformation to “virtual civic associations.” 134 “fundamentalist” and “modernist” as not reflecting “stable realities”. He shows the flexibility of both concepts by giving the example of how the “ ʿulamā'’s traditionalism shifts to modernism” and “Izala’s shifts from modernism to fundamentalism”. 295 The Africanist and Historian, John Hunwick 296 observes a “connection” between reform and revival in an Islamic context. Revivalism in Africa started in the 19th century with Usman Dan Fodio in Nigeria and Muḥammad Aḥmad in Sudan. Both movements took place to “regenerate” religion ( tajdīd ) and the two leaders appeared to be the mahdī 297 (in Arabic: rightly guided restorer of religion) of their time. 298 Although Nigeria and Sudan have two different experiences with Islam and colonialization, Hunwick links the idea of Islamic revival and Mahdism to social, political, and economical changes in both countries. In Nigeria Usman Dan Fodio is seen as a mahdī who brought change especially to Muslims. His “movement” became a source of inspiration during the post-colonial era when Muslims called for implementation for sharīʿa as a solution to the problems of the West African country. In Sudan, the situation is comparable. The rise of change is due to social and political problems of the country. The appearance of the Sudanese mahdī Muḥammed 295 For Umar’s analyses of the two Izala factions see pp. 135-138; concerning the different types of shifts see p. 138. 296 Hunwick, John (2005): Islamic Revival in Africa: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. In: Kamari Maxine Clarke (2005): Local practices, Global controversies: Islam in Sub-Saharan African Context, pp. 25-42. 297 On the concept of mahdi see among others Kramer, Roberts S. (2009): Mahdi, In: Esposito, John (eds.): The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic world, pp.448-450; the author refers to standard work on the term mahdi .and refers to Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah , chap 3 where the term is discussed in sunni as well as shi’a Islam. 298 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 135 Aḥmad at the end of 19th century was an answer to colonialism. The religion of Islam became an identity marker for Muslims. This revival attempt reflects their wish. Similar developments can also be found in the 1989 implementation of Islamic law – sharīʿa – as a result of years of social and political instability in Sudan. 299 The concept of reform narrated above is multifaceted and complex. Sometimes this concept is presented in relationship to new Islamic movement with Salafi/Wahhābī tendencies opposing Sufis and Sufism 300 . In other contexts reform is to be found among Sufis – as Brigaglia points it out. 301 In some cases reform is related to other phenomenon (like fundamentalism) and discussed in relationship to it and to the Nigerian nation-state – as Clarke did. 302 This demonstrates that the concept of reform is fluid and depends on the circumstances in which it is used. I would agree with Kane and Loimeier who relate reform to a “program with change”. Analyzing the context of reform instead of defining it appears to be more fruitful. Tariq Ramadan, the popular scholar of Islam, articulates it rightly: “We are in a kind of terminological haze in which the meaning of words is so variable that one no longer knows exactly what the discourse about “reform” refers to .” 303 This sentence summarizes the dilemma of defining “reform”. In the African context, including 299 For more details on revival in Nigeria and Sudan, see Ibid., pp 32-40. 300 See Loimeier 1997; Kane 2004 and Sani Umar 1983, 1988. 301 See Brigaglia 2004. 302 See Clark 1988. 303 Ramadan, Tariq (2007): On the Concept of Reform; at http://www.tariqramadan.com (accessed 01.12.09); even in the European context, debates on reform are still going on. Ramadan mentions different concepts meaning reform. Among others: Iḥyā’ (in Arabic: revival), tajdīd (in Arabic: renewal), iṣlāḥ (in Arabic: reform). According to him, tajdīd and iṣlāḥ are more related and complementary. See also his book Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation (2009). 136 Nigeria, we witness similar developments. In times of uncertainty, turmoil and political instability, the door of “reform” and the need for change are more debated than in times of prosperity.The example given by Hunwick in Nigeria and Sudan shows it very well. 304 One cannot study Islamic reform in Nigeria without speaking of the Izala movement. This movement stands for the recent experiences of Nigerian Muslims with a structured organization that took up the course of purifying Islam from innovation and establishing the sunna of the Prophet. Before dealing with “reform” as seen by Izala itself, a few other examples of Muslim groups are introduced. Shiʿites, JTI, Maitatsine, Boko Haram or Salafiyya oriented groups all share one goal: reforming Islam in Nigeria. These groups, their doctrines, and their objectives are introduced in the following section. 2 Shiʿites in Nigeria 305 This movement is led by Sheikh Ibraheem Zakzaky. The Movement itself was influenced by the Iranian revolution of 1979. This influence developed into to a full Shiʿite orientation. The movement calls itself “The Islamic Movement” and is known in Nigeria as Yan Shiʿa (Shiʿite people). The group is based in Kano and it became more visible among Nigerian Muslims as the only group publicly opposing the sharīʿa re-implementation and declaring this point of view openly. 304 See Hunwick 2005. 305 Sulaiman, Muhammad Dahiru (1993): Shiaism and the Islamic movement in Nigeria 1979-1991, Islam et sociétés au Sud du Sahara 7, pp. 5-16. 137 The Shiʿite doctrine originates in Nigeria’s social, economic and political challenges during the colonial era and especially throughout the post-independence period. 306 Inspired by the success of the revolution in Iran and due to Nigeria’s turmoil in many directions Sheikh Ibraheem Zakzaky started introducing Shiʿite ideas to the West African country. Sheikh Zakzaky was born in Zaria in 1950 and studied at Ahmadu Bello University in the same city. He was among the most active members of the Muslim Students Society (MSS) before he left it. He was amongst the students who demonstrated against the state. He visited Iran in the 1980s and came back to recruit new members for his “Islamic movement”. He sees in Islam a solution to the country’s problems and propagated these ideas through lectures and public gatherings in northern Nigeria. He opposed the nation-state with all its symbols and defined it as a ṭāghūt (in Arabic: symbol of idolatry, evil). In many cases, demonstrations by Zakzakys followers turned into violent contestations against the police. Zakzaky himself was imprisoned several times because of his ideas and opposition to the federal state. 307 There were debates in Nigeria during the 1980s and 1990s concerning the “Islamic movement” and whether it was a real Shiʿite group or not. The debates were related to the ideology and practices of its members. There was no doubt that it started as a political movement inspired by Iran and the revolution of 1979. Nowadays the movement seems to be fully involved in Shiʿite 306 Ibid., pp. 5-8. 307 Ibid., pp. 8-10. 144 Maitatsine riots of the 1980s back to into focus. Mass media 324 reported extensively on the events and were divided in their condemnations of the movement, its anti-west orientation as well its ideology on one hand and criticizing the Nigerian state’s way of dealing with it on the other. In academia the movement seems to attract attention of scholars from different disciplines. Boko Haram 325 is an Islamic group led by Muhammad Yusuf, a Nigerian Muslim who was arrested and killed during the riots of 2009 in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state. The name “Boko Haram” translates in Hausa as “western education is a sin”. The movement is often labeled as a “sect”. It is also referred to as the “Taliban 324 Most of German newspapers (like Die Zeit, FAZ, Süddeutsche Zeitung, etc) and magazines (like Der Spiegel, Focus) as well TV-programs reported extensively on the events at the end of July 2009 and those in December 2010. Also the BBC and Aljazeera English (to mention other examples) spoke of the riots in Nigeria. For a comparative study of Aljazeera English and the BBC see Gerhard, Tobias (2010): Counter-discourse in global news media? How Aljazeera English covers sectarian violence in Nigeria, MA, Central European University, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Budapest, Hungary. In the first riots the media estimated the number of victims to be over 700. In 2010 several conflicts between Boko Haram and the police especially in Maiduguri were registered and mostly accompanied by deadly shootings. Boko Haram became well known because of its tendency towards western education and its militant answer to the Nigerian state. There was also an interpretation assuming a connection between that group and the Taliban of Afghanistan. 325 Not much has been written in academia on Boko Haram but the group is gradually subject of intensive study by researchers from different backgrounds. Adesoji, Abimbola (2010): The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria, In: Africa Spectrum 45 (2), pp. 95-108; for more understanding of the genesis of the movement see and possible connections of Boko Haram in and outside Nigeria see Brigaglia, Andrea (2012): Ja‘far Mahmoud Adam, Mohammed Yusuf and AlMuntada Islamic Trust: Reflections on the Genesis of the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria, In: Annual Review of Islam in Africa, Vol. 11, pp. 35-44; Brigaglia, Andrea (2012), A Contribution to the History of the Wahhabi Daʿwa in West Africa: The Career and the Murder of Shaykh Ja‘far Mahmoud Adam (Daura, ca. 1961/1962-Kano 2007), in: Islamic Africa , 3, 1, 1-23. 145 of Nigeria” and in many cases people have speculated about its relationship to the Al-Qaeda network. 326 The group has existed under different names, and had another leader from the mid-1990s (if not earlier) and became visible in Yobe state as a result of its confrontations with the police. 327 In the year 2004 some students in Borno and Yobe withdrew from the university and joined Boko Haram. The Nigerian federal government became aware of the group in 2007. 328 The group ideology consists of denying western culture and way of life and establishing Islamic values and norms on the basis of sharīʿa . It opposes the secular state and attempts to resists it. The leader himself made use of western technology like “exotic cars, the latest communication equipment and the best medical services” 329 . The members of the groups come from different social backgrounds, and vary from former students and university lecturers to jobless and lawless people. The majority of them come from an underprivileged background. Many factors have 326 Muhammad Yusuf (1970-2009) was from Yobe State. He was married to four wives and father of twelve children. He was educated in Chad and Niger Republic. He attended Qur’anic school and broke with education at the secondary level. He rejected Darwinism, the Nigerian State; and western civilization. His group sees establishing Sharīʿa in the whole country is a duty to be fulfilled; see Onuoha, Freedom C. (2010): The Islamist challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram crisis explained, In: African Security Review, Vol. 19 (2), pp. 56-57. 327 ; Ibid., p. 55; the author narrates that the group was known as “Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah wal hijra” and its leader was Abubakar Lawan. After that it has different names like “Taliban”, Yusufiyya, and Boko Haram. It was called by Taliban through the events of December 2003, when the group stormed police stations and other buildings, occupied them and hoisted the Taliban’s flag. In 2004 the group founded a base called “Afghanistan” in Yobe state. The new leader was Muhammad Yusuf. 328 Ibid., pp. 55-56. 329 Adesoji (2010), p. 100. 146 led them to join the movement of Muhammad Yusuf. Among others, lack of opportunities, poverty, educational deficiency, unemployment and corruption. 330 Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen see the riots related to Boko Haram as the first ”…intra-state governmental power since 1966.” An armed struggle that had already started in 2005 broke out again in 2009. 331 Jonathan Hill relates the rise of Boko Haram to the re-implementation of sharīʿa in northern Nigeria. According to him the group emerged in 2002 as an answer to the re-implementation project and quickly recruited adherents among young people, women and students. 332 There are speculations as to where to place Boko Haram within the Islamic spectrum. In the absence of evidence about a link to foreign Islamic movements and organizations, it is difficult to place it within a particular Islamic ideology or group. Nevertheless it is compared to the Taliban and its model. Apart from that, it is situated within the spectrum of groups with Islamic-Jihadist and fundamentalist orientations. 333 There is no proof about monetary support from outside to Muhammad 330 Ibid., p. 100. 331 Harbom, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen (2010): Armed conflict 1946-2009, In: Journal of Peace Research Vol. 47 (4), pp. 501-509. 332 Hill, Jonathan N. C. (2010): Sufism in Northern Nigeria: Force for counter-radicalization?- www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil, pp. 1-65. 333 Adesoji (2010) mentions that the “modus operandi” of Boko Haram is “fashioned after the Taliban” model; The author also listed the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) of Algeria, Tablighi of Pakistan, Wahabiyya of Saudi Arabia, and Al-Qaeda as possible links to Boko Haram. These all are speculations of the press in and outside of Nigeria and need further investigation; see p. 101. 147 Yusuf. Some wealthy sympathizers from northern Nigeria seem to have supported him financially. One can only speculate about the reasons for this assistance. 334 5 Salafiyya 335 oriented groups The Salafiyya is oriented after al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ (in Arabic: pious predecessors; first three generations after the death of the Prophet). There are Salafiyya-oriented groups in the country like the Izala movement, but many Salafiyya scholars act as individuals. The late Sheikh Jaafar clarified in an interview that the Salafiyya as an organized group does not exist in Nigeria. 336 Salafī ideas are considered to be among the fastest growing Islamic orientations especially in West Africa. 337 Furthermore, these ideas are preferred by several Muslims in this region of the continent: “There is a current fervour among Muslim communities for the shariah and the return to the Salaf’s vision ranks high in popularity with many Muslim masses in different parts of West Africa.” 338 334 Adesoji (2010) speaks of Alhaji Buji Foi, the former commissioner of Borno State, as a supporter of Muhammed Yusuf. There are speculations about other religious leaders and businessmen who believed in Yusuf’s cause and may have assisted him financially. The failure of the “Sharīʿa project” and the desire to make change could be an explanation of that, see p. 101-102. 335 For an overview on the Salafiyya generally as well for a biography of its leaders see Murtaza, Muhammad Sameer (2005): Die Salafiya, die Reformer des Islam: eine Darstellung der Biographien und des politischen Denkens von Gamal Al-Din Al-Afgani, Muhammad ʿAbduh, Muhammad Rashid Rida und Hasan Al-Banna, sowie der Muslimbruderschaft in ihrer formativen Phase 1928 - 1932, Nordersted; see also chapter “Izala and Wahhabism” for a summary on Salafiyya. 336 Interview in Kano, January 2nd, 2007. 337 Muhammad, G. Bala and M. Sani Umar (2002): Religion and the Pan-African ideal: The Experience of Salafi Islam in the West African Sub-Region; in: African Journal of International Affairs, p. 141. 338 Ibid., p. 144. 148 The emergence of Salafiyya ideas in Nigeria can be understood within the context of the struggle against “colonization” and “decolonization” and the rise of Islamic activism after the success of the Iranian Revolution. Salafī ideas were appreciated by educated as well as non-educated Muslims. Mosques, education (especially women’s education) and media such as cassettes/VHS-cassettes contributed to the propagation of the Salafiyya. 339 Its central strategy is to remind Muslims of the onesness of God (Arabic: tawḥīd ) and reject all practices related to shirk . Salafists question the relevance of Sufism and its basis in Islam. 340 Sani Umar elucidates that the emergence of Salafiyya in Nigeria took place during the 1960s. According to him this movement is a response to Sufism. This response became more structured under the Izala organization. Furthermore Izala is perceived by Sani Umar as a Salafiyya/Wahhābiyya oriented organization with a modernist agenda. 341 For Roman Loimeier, the Salafiyya in Nigeria is related to Sheikh Abubakar Gumi and his tafsīr sessions and “dogmatic” contest with Sufi leaders. Sheikh Gumi was inspired by writings of Salafiyya forefathers like Muḥammed ʿAbduh, Rashīd Riḍā, Sayyid Quṭb – amongst others. 342 His interpretation of the Qur’ān is to be understood within that same tradition and goes beyond the tradition of the four Islamic schools of law (Mālikiyya, Ḥanbaliyya, Ḥanafiyya, Shafiʿiyya). Gumi’s 339 Ibid., pp. 145-147. 340 Ibid., pp.148-149. 341 Umar, Muhammad S. (2001): Education and Islamic Trends in Northern Nigeria: 1970s-1990s In: Africa Today, Vol. 48 (2), pp. 127-150; see pp. 132-134. 342 Loimeier (1997), p. 177. 149 terminology is strongly influenced by the language used by Salafiyya leaders themselves. 343 There are many Islamic groups in Nigeria which follow Salafī ideology. They have different names like Ahl al-Sunna – among many others. They are currently modeled on Islamic centres like Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Sudan. It is difficult to speak of one organized group or movement called Salafiyya. It is a “trend,” or an Islamic orientation within the Muslim community. According to Bala and Umar this tendency is especially observed among youth (both men and women) and became a kind of “way of life,” particularly in places like university campuses. 344 The establishment of the Izala-organization in Jos in 1978 was an answer and a concretization of many anti-Sufi oriented Muslims. With the foundation of the Izala, the conflict with the Sufis turned out to be more equally weighted. The new organization undertook the duty of criticizing Sufism and purifying Islam in Nigeria from all “non-Islamic additions”. How was the Izala established? Who were its leaders/actors? What was the agenda introduced by the organization? To what extent has Izala succeeded in achieving its objective(s)? How did the conflict with the Sufis change over the years? What is the difference between the Izala of the late 1970s and the Izala of today? All these questions as well as the Izala understanding of bidʿa , the relationship between Izala and Wahhabism, as well the division of the organization will be highlighted in the next chapter. 343 Ibid, p. 181. 344 Bala and Umar (2002), p. 143. 150 Chapter Four: The Izala movement between success and failure After dealing with the keyword “reform” itself, the discussion proceeds to some biographical sketches of the life and work of Sheikh Abubakar Gumi, the pioneer of Islamic reform in postcolonial Nigeria, and his student Sheikh Ismaila Idris who took over from him and established the Izala organization and proceeded with his own “reform” program. Furthermore, the Izala movement is to be described from its establishment until until now with focus on its division, attempts at reconciliation and its main figures in Nigeria today. Of course, the relationship with Sufis and the doctrinal discourses are not to be ignored. 1 Sheikh Ismaila Idris and the Izala Question The person of Abubakar Gumi overshadowed Sheikh Ismaila Idris, the real founder of Izala in Jos. Even now, some Nigerians (Muslims as well as non-Muslims) still believe that Gumi is the one who set up Izala. This chapter tries to give an overview on the life, influence, and writings of Sheikh Gumi and Sheikh Idris, and then clarify the Izala question. Muhammad N. Gurama 345 described Sheikh Idris as someone who grew up without “games and sport”, without “fun and festivity”, but who was more interested in books since an early age. 346 Sheikh Idris was born in 1937 in Gwaskwarom, which is 345 Muhammad Nuhu Gurama. (2000): Leadership trusless in an Islamic Organisation: A case study of the Jama’at Izala Al-Bidʿah Wa Iqamat Al-Sunnah (J.I.B.W.I.S.), M.A in Islamic Studies, University of Jos, Nigeria. 346 Ibid., p. 49. 151 modern-day Bauchi State. His grandfather, belonging to the Jahun tribe (Fulani), came from what is now Kano State with his entire family and their belongings to settle in that area. Sheikh Idris’ father, Idris Zakariyya, was an Islamic scholar, imam, and preacher in his community. The first education of Sheikh Idris was with his father. Apart from recitation of the Qur’ān and the reading of classical books of fiqh , they looked after their cattle – as is the case for many Fulani. 347 Muhammed Sadis tried to give an overview on Sheikh Idris’s life. He indicated that Sheikh Idris started learning under several Islamic scholars. He was taught Islamic theology, jurisprudence, and Arabic. Mallam Mahmud in Bauchi especially drew the attention of Sheikh Idris to the notion of tawḥīd . With him, Sheikh Idris read Mukhtasar – among many other Islamic books of the Mālikī School of Law. 348 Sheikh Idris then attended the School of Arabic in Kano, where he studied Arabic under Gumi and Sheikh Hassan Khalil who were known for their “antiṭarīqa ideas” – as mentioned by Loimeier. 349 After his graduation, Sheikh Idris was appointed as a teacher in Bauchi State. “He was not satisfied with that because his aim in life was to preach and teach about Islam”. 350 As a result, he left Bauchi in order to go to Kaduna where he was appointed as a teacher in the Sultan Bello Primary School which was under the control of the newly founded organization, J.N.I. 347 The late Sheikh Ismaila Idris Bin ZakariyyaHis contribution to the development of Jamaʿatu Izalatil Bidʿa Wa Iqamatis Sunnah (J.I.B.W.I.S) in Nigeria, B.A. in the Religious Studies Department at the University of Jos, Nigeria, p. 4; Loimeier (1997) indicates that in addition to the Fulani-language, Sheikh Idris spoke Hausa, Arabic and English, see p. 211. 348 Muhammed, M. Sadis (2001), p. 6-7 349 Loimeier (1997), p. 211. 350 Muhammed, M. Sadis (2001), p. 8. 152 His dream of preaching to people was realized in Kaduna where Sheikh Idris started talking to people after Friday prayers in different mosques (Kawo Mosque, Doka Mosque), but, in particular in the Sultan Bello Mosque and from time to time in the barracks of the Army. Annoyed by a report of the J.N.I. which indicated that the Kakuri mosque had been turned by some soldiers into a “beer parlour” and the impossibility of any reaction, Sheikh Idris decided to join the Nigerian Army as an Imam and his application was successful. 351 Sheikh Idris was employed as a Chief Imam Grade I civilian in 1st Division in Kaduna. He was known by his superiors because of his “harsh” preaching and from time to time they tried to send him to the primary schools to teach soldiers’ children, a duty that Sheikh Idris was not comfortable with. At the same time the Sheikh was also preaching to people in town, outside the barracks. Consequently he was punished, and transferred to Ibadan, where Muslims are few in number. Apart from leading prayers, Sheikh Idris had the duty of solving problems between Muslim soldiers. In Ibadan, Sheikh Idris observed that soldiers have to pay zakāt (in Arabic: alms) from their own salaries to the officers, so he issued a fatwā (in Arabic: legal opinion) condemning that act. 352 This act influenced the relationship between Sheikh Idris and his superiors in Ibadan. Sheikh Idris appeared to many people as a “trouble-maker” since his first day in Ibadan and his open criticism of the Imam for performing additional practices and recitations after the zuhr obligatory prayer (after midday prayer). Sheikh Idris called 351 Ibid., 9-11; see also Aliyu, Tamimu (n.d.): Ingataccen Tarihin Jama’atu Izalatil Bidʿah Wa’ikamatis Sunnah (1), p. 17, the author confirmed the event leading Sheikh Idris to join the Nigerian Army 352 The JIBWIS Journal 2005, Vol. 1 No. 3, p. 8 and p. 12; see also Loimeier (1997), p. 211. 153 the attention of the Imam and the congregation that there is no proof of their practice neither in the Qur’ān nor in the sunna of the Prophet. Furthermore, he invited them to read the book of Usman Dan Fodio Iḥyā’ al-Sunna (in Arabic: revivalism of the sunna ). 353 After only three months he was transferred to Kontagora, which is in modern-day Niger State. Sheikh Idris continued his preaching to soldiers in Kontagora and even people from town came to listen to him and record his sermons/lessons. He then examined the need for establishing a Friday-mosque in the barracks and obtained permission from his Captain for it. The mosque attracted many people from inside and outside the barracks and caused problems with the local authorities. 354 A dispute between Sheikh Idris and an Imam from the town – a Sufi – occurred. The situation escalated and finally Sheikh Idris was demoted to Warrant Officer I. Later on, Sheikh Gumi intervened as mediator and organized a meeting between the former student of his and other local scholars in Kontagora. After the meeting, the same Imam, who was also the Emir of Kontagora, left his Sufi order. 355 Loimeier regards this event as a political and religious success of Sheikh Idris in Kontagora. The next important step in Sheikh Idris’ life was his transfer to Jos, the capital of Plateau State. Jos is especially meaningful because of its ethnic and religious diversity. The city still holds symbolic relevance for many Izala members today. Not 353 Muhammed, M. Sadis (2001), p. 13-14. 354 Ibid. p. 16-17. 355 See Loimeier (1997); Loimeier himself relies here on Umar (1983), p 51. 256 them, he neither was the leader nor was he registered as such. They criticized his lack of transparency in guiding Izala in financial matters. Very often the question was raised as to whether money (also other donations like cars, etc.) was donated to Sheikh Idris as a person or to his organization as an institutional body. Accusation and counter-accusations regarding the financial management of Izala played an important role in the division. The discussion about the structure of the society also took place. The main question concerned the structure of the organization: what is its paramount body? Is it the Council of ʿulamā' - since the organization is a religious one? Or is it the Council of Administration? Who was leading Izala? Is it Sheikh Idris who is an Islamic scholar, or Alhaji Mai Gandu who was not a scholar? The struggle within Izala was directed against Sheikh Idris, accusing him of selfishness in guiding the organization, but also for violating the constitution. Sheikh Idris blamed his opponent’s deviation and rebellion against him. The actual leader of Izala in Lagos (linked to Jos-faction), Dalha Abubakar Abdallah, describes the situation as follows: “In the center of accusation was Sheikh Ismaila Idris. Those who split from him accuse him of being selfish in guiding the society. They blame him of deviating from the initial goals outlined in the beginning. Sheikh Idris was charged with dominating Izala and “breaking” its constitution. He was accused of going beyond his position as an “ordinary scholar” among many others and deviating far from the leadership of Musa Muhammad Mai Gandu. The latter is not an Islamic scholar but an administrator and official leader of the society. 257 From his turn, Sheikh Idris accused the group that deviated from his path of ’rebellion‘ when they split from him – as the leader and architect of the organization.” 591 For Alhaji Ibrahim Musalla (Kaduna branch of Izala, served as state treasurer of the organization at a very initial stage), the issue of division started in the year 1981 in Saudi Arabia when Sheikh Idris contacted the Muslim World League and introduced himself as the leader of Izala. He was confronted by the fact that they recorded the name of Alhaji Mai Gandu as leader. Annoyed by this experience, Sheikh Idris started a struggle for power within the society: “He went to Rabita and introduced himself as a leader of the organization. After sending the message the officer asked him:’ is he the one called Alhaji Musa Mai Gandu?’ He said: ‘no’, he is Sheikh Ismaila Idris.’ They told him that the man in their record is Sheikh Musa Muhammed Mai Gandu. He is the leader of the organization in Nigeria. ‘Did the organization have two leaders?’ He said: ‘yes, he is the leader of the Imam committee, as Imam among preachers and Musa Muhammed Mai Gandu is the head of the entire organization’s administration.’ That is according to him. They said:’that they are very sorry and they can only attend to Musa Muhammad Mai Gandu as the leader in their record which they received from the embassy.’ Then he was annoyed, and was very very angry. He was complaining about why he was suffering and that somebody else is taking the all the credit. There is the beginning of the problem in the organization. 591 Interview in Lagos on 18th February 2007, (my translation from Arabic); in another occasion the interview subject compared the split of the group in Kaduna to the Charijites: the first Islamic group who split from Caliph Ali during the 7th century, See Gurama (2000) p. 110. 258 The moment he came back, he started bulldozing his way around, looking for a way to turn against Alhaji Musa Mai Gandu and place the fault with him.” 592 The informant adds that according to the constitution of Izala, the executive chairman of the entire organization is Alhaji Mai Gandu who was elected by unanimous vote. When it comes to the Council of ʿulamā' and the First Aid Groups, both of them are under the chairmanship of the administration council. This was rejected by Sheikh Idris who considered the ʿulamā' to be at the top of the organization. Furthermore, in the mid-1980s Sheikh Idris started excluding members from the organization. 593 If some leaders of Izala did not accept the way Sheikh Idris headed Izala, there were others who were also frustrated and left him because of a negative personal experience. An example of this is evident in the Jos-based Sheikh Alhassan Said Alhafiz, the former Qur’ān reciter under Sheikh Idris. He is now linked to the Kaduna-faction of Izala. Sheikh Alhassan Said points out that from the beginning he was on the side of the Izala founder and never thought of deviating from him: “I swear by Allah that I did not belong to any other group when I was with Ismaila Idris. I was with him until they removed him from his position. They organized a meeting at Hadija – the name of the town as I told you – and some brothers asked us to go there to that meeting so if they say something wrong we can answer. 592 Interview in Jos on 24th December 2006. 593 Ibid. 259 Sheikh Idris agreed and appointed me as the leader of a committee that should go to Hadija and put a car under my disposition. We were on the way to leave and he stopped us and said: “No”, he didn’t want us to go there. Since we didn’t go, they decided to remove him from his position. If we were there, this would not have happened. This is the will of Allah.” 594 Sheikh Alhassan Said adds that other reasons led him to join the Kaduna branch of Izala. His relationship became worse with Sheikh Idris because of misunderstandings and wrong stories transmitted to the Izala founder. After leaving Nigeria to study at the Islamic University in Medina, Sheikh Alhassan Said came back for a visit in 1992/3 and preached against riyā (in Arabic: hypocrisy) of some people. He was misunderstood and blamed of bringing a “new religion” to the country. Furthermore Sheikh Idris was angry with him and advised him to abstain from that type of preaching which is not allowed among Ahl al-Sunna . The situation escalated when Sheikh Said was accused of being a shīʿa follower: “He [Sheikh Idris] said: ‘Where are you and your Shiʿite teachers?!’ I said: ‘me’ and he added: ‘yes! In the Islamic University there are a lot of Shiʿites.’ ‘No, no, no! By Allah, in the Islamic University there were no Shiʿites and I don’t know any teachers who are Shiʿite. Even if students, find out that another student is among the Shiʿites, they might kick him out of the University.’ And he swears by God that the majority of teacher in the Islamic University are Shiʿites. I said: ‘No! It is not like that’. (…) I said: ‘No, look; Sheikh, the books of the sunna are different from those of Shiʿites.’ 594 Interview in Arabic with Sheikh Alhassan Said in Jos on 12th December 2006 (my translation). 260 He mentioned some saying and I answered him: ‘Sheikh! These are the statements of Muʿtazila .’ Suddenly I had the Tafsīr of Dhahabi and I opened it and said to him: ‘Look! These are the sayings of Mu‘tazila and not of Ahl al-Sunna . You are our leaders, fathers, teachers and we will follow you according to the al-ʿaqīda al-ṣaḥīḥa (in Arabic: the right faith), but if you come with the teachings of then we will not agree with you . ’ So he was angry and left. He also mentioned that if someone kills another person intentionally, he is a kāfīr (non-believer) even if he repents. I said: ‘No! This is the sayings of Charijites’ and I opened the same book and showed him the proof. When a person kills a human being intentionally and if he repents then Allah will forgive him because Allah is the Forgiver and the Merciful. It is mentioned in the Qur’ān: ‘I am the forgiver for those who repent…’ And I showed him the places (where it was mentioned) as well as the ḥadīth . This is what brought the Sheikh to say: ‘You never come to me again!’ I said: ‘no, I will come and greet you. I consider you to be my teacher and Sheikh if you are mistaken, then I forgive you and I don’t blame you for anything since you are a human being. This is the crisis that started between them and me.’ 595 Sheikh Alhassan Said adds that he joined the Izala in Kaduna when he was asked to do so by that faction. He was given the opportunity to be with al-ḥaqq (in Arabic: truth) on the basis of the Qur’ān and sunna . From that time he could not remember any blame or big issues within the Kaduna group of Izala that led him to regret his choice. This is an example at the top level of the organization of the factors that led to the division because of the founder of Izala. At the grassroots level, people are more or less guided by emotions. In Izala there is no particular ritual or initiation into any 595 Ibid. (my translation). 261 faction of the organization. Followers can easily stop their affiliation to one group or the other. Followers are more directed by their own observations and interpretations of problems. If issues occur at the top level, interpretations of leaders circulate promptly and become well-known to members of the group. To identify with one faction means to be on the side of Sheikh Idris for the Jossawagroup and against him in the Kadunawafaction. People who are in Jos and witnessed the Izala from its initial stage are mostly on the site of Sheikh Idris and follow his path. They also protect him against any accusation, be it concerning his leadership or concerning money. Alhaji Khamis Zakariyya from Jos, who affirmed his attraction to the Izala and the preaching of Sheikh Idris since the early stages of the foundation, explains that the split of the movement is basically due to al-ḥasad (in Arabic: envy). He explains that there was a time when Sheikh Idris was given a new car by Mallam Hamza Abdallah. Sheikh Idris spent six months without using that car and then called the ʿulamā' and asked them what to do with it. They suggested that he use it as a public car to generate some money. There are some people who were not happy with that. Mai Gandu and other Izala leaders betrayed Sheikh Idris in order to get money from the organization, and in the process they excluded him. Even today they blame Sheikh Idris for taking the money of Izala. In defence of the Izala founder, Alhaji Zakariyya mentions that Yusuf Sambo (leader of Izala Kaduna) also collected money to build his house in Kaduna. That money belonged to the organization. Also Sheikh Alhassan Said received money (one million Naira) from the ex-governor of Bauchi, 262 Muazu, and also collected donations in Port Harcourt and Abuja. He used the money to build a house. Then Alhaji Zakariyya asked, astonished, whether Sheikh Idris collected money or not. After his death they realized that he left behind only a house that was built by the organization for him. He confirms that he was present after the death of Sheikh Idris when his property was distributed among his children. Only a house was found. He says: “I swear that all the people present cried!” Each daughter of the Sheikh got 5,000 Naira and every son received 10,000 Naira. He concludes: “I know Sheikh Idris personally! I swear! He will preach from morning to evening without having a single Naira in his pocket!” 596 Of course such a statement cannot be confirmed or denied because of the absence of any evidence. It only shows how complicated the money issue in Izala is. The organization is based on donations – even today. Money is collected in mosques after prayers and at any big events organized by the society. Money is accounted for and directed to headquarters (local, state or nationwide). Trust plays a crucial role at all the different levels. The definition of donations is also important: are they directed either to a person or to the organization. There are always those who blamed, and still blame Sheikh Idris for using the organization’s money for his own purposes. The absence of clear evidence makes any accusation or counter-accusation void. 596 Interview with Alhaji Khamis Zakariyya in his shop in Jos, 14th February 2008; (interview conducted in Hausa with simultaneous translation into Arabic by Mallam Sani Abdurrazzaq). 263 The growth of Izala particularly in northern Nigeria made control over it complicated. It’s no wonder that money became an issue since the increase of the organization’s resources. A struggle for power between the ʿulamā' and executive members of the Izala internally affected credibility and transparency in the organization. Many questions were raised within Izala: are ʿulamā' only preachers or can they also act as treasurers of Izala? Can money go to individual accounts of ʿulamā' or only into the account of the organization? If it goes to the ʿulamā' ’s account then how can the organization know about that? Is that money a private one or does it belong to Izala as a whole? Ustaz Sani Modibbo who hold several positions 597 in Izala since its establishment and was familiar with its internal affairs illustrates how the issue of money developed into one of reasons for division in Izala. To some extent he considers money to be one of the major sources of the split: “Money is one of the major factors because when the ʿulamā' decided to have their own accounts, we said: “no!” at that time; because the account was for the organization. Nothing was wrong if one of the ʿulamā' , if Ismaila himself was the signatory to the account, but they should not have a separate account. Anything belonging to the Izala should go into the main account. Later on we heard that they had their own accounts in case there is a donation from an individual. So if you are donating to account A, the executive will not have any idea; if the donation goes to the account of the executive account, then everybody will know. And then there are audits; and we have audit 597 served as Secretary General of the Nasarawa-GwonBranch (Jos) between 1979 and 1985; State Secretary General in Plateau State from 1985 to 1986; Administrative Secretary 1985/86; National Executive Secretary 1985/1986 to 1987; National Escort Member of the organization. 264 unit and an auditor who will come and audit the account. (…) the monetary issue; one cannot deny that. Really!” 598 The structure of Izala as a religious and modern society organized after regulations similar to state institutions (well-established structure, documentation, constitution, etc.) does not guarantee equality or transparency. The religious leaders and ʿulamā' of the organization enjoyed, and still enjoy a special status and are in positions of power. It is difficult to control them and adapt them to the law or to the constitution of the Society. They feel that they are the law-makers and controllers of the organization and when it comes to money they see themselves in a position of trustees. They are the ones who bring in money and they are the ones who control it, save it or distribute it in the name of Izala. They are the policy-makers and the “religious capital” of the organization. So how can they mollify any regulation or law? Many interview subjects attested that the division of the movement was not because of the doctrine or concerning faith. This is also explained by the fact that both kept the same name even after the division: “Indeed! Both kept the same name because their problem was not a basic one that concerned ideology. There was no need for changing the name. They did not split because of crucial, basic or principal issues, but because of new economic problems; maybe you can say “mashākil dunyawiyya” (in Arabic: problems of this world).” 599 This can be also confirmed through the fact that both groups have kept the same name and constitution even today. As an outsider of Izala, the late Sheikh Jaafar 598 Interview in Jos with Ustaz Sani Modibbo, 28th February 2007. 599 Interview in Jos with Ustaz Muhammad Khamis Idris, 11th December 2007; former Izala member. 265 Mahmud from Kano related the division in Izala to fitna 600 (in Arabic: secession, upheaval) within the movement. He added that the financial aspect cannot be ignored as a reason for the division of the organization. According to him, the property of Jamāʿa (community; Izala) especially seems to be a source of debate. In addition, the intervention of politicians and ethnicity played an important role in splitting of the movement: “Despite that the Jamāʿa was founded by loyal people, their knowledge is very limited. Of course, if the number of followers increases and the leaders don’t have the proper knowledge, experience and study of old experiences of the daʿwa -work, this leads to division among people. The second issue is the attempt of some politicians to divide the Jamāʿa into two. This happened with the first founder of the Izala, Ismaila Idris, when they tried to seek revenge on him by separating people from him and inventing issues within the movement. They (politicians) used some members to harm to Sheikh Idris and blame him for things that only Allah knows whether they were true or not. Well, these things were mostly right. They (politicians) fear that the Jama‘a spread out in a short amount of time and see in it a danger in the future. They tried to destroy it in this way. They opposed it by arresting people and by involving their own agents in it. Well, maybe these are the main reasons. People also say that altaʿṣṣub al-qabalī (ethnicity) played an important role. You find ethnic differences everywhere and that can lead to an attempt to dominate the whole society. This could also play an important role in the division.” 601 600 This concept is mentioned in the Qur’an. Its meaning is related to division, chaos and the situation of war. In Islamic History, the first civil war is known as al-Fitna al Kobra . It took place after the death of the third “rightfully guided Caliph” Uthman (d. 656). 601 Interview with late Sheikh Jaafar Mahmud Adam in Kano, 2nd January 2007; the Sheikh assured me that he was outside of the country studying during the time of division and his point of view was 272 the past. He listed the first and second “Rightly-Guided-Caliphs” (Abū Bakr and ʿUmar) and their struggle to maintain the guidelines of Islam as established by the Prophet. The struggle of the ʿulamā' against new religious groups - like the Mutazilite (8th-10th centuries, CE) - is mentioned by Dr. Jallo. Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim, and al-Shatebi are among the scholars – according to the author – who fought and responded to innovations in the religion of Islam. Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, Usman Dan Fodio, and Abubakar Gumi also belong to this category. All of them contributed to the revival and purification of the sunna of the Prophet. 611 From this historical overview the author shifts to the Nigerian context, mentioning the appearance of ḥaraka muḍilla (in Arabic: delusive movement) under Ismaila Idris. This movement scarcely relies on the views of the founder and denies any advice or corrections. 612 After the death of Sheikh Idris, he was succeeded by his murīd (in Arabic: committed one) Sheikh Sani Yahya Jingir. Again the use of a Sufi term to qualify the Izala leader shows the deepness of the intra-Izala-conflict. The author concludes his introduction with the fact that he wrote the first letter to the leader of Jos in order to advise him and his followers. The reaction and denial of the first letter pushed him to write a second one, which was more detailed and explanatory than the first. 613 611 See Jallo (n.d.), pp. 1-7 612 Ibid., p. 9. 613 Ibid., p. 9-12. 273 The first letter, written on 4th December, 2005. Jallo addressed his statement to the Rais al Jamāʿa al-Ismaiʿliyya (leader of the group of Ismaila Idris) urging him to return to the sunna of the Prophet and to abstain from any form of deviation from Islam. This letter relies on a study of Sheikh Idris’ cassettes and fatwā s which conform neither to the sunna nor to the Mālikī School of law – as Jallo claims. There are five points mentioned in the letter criticizing the founder’s fatwā s. The first and third issue are on al-tahajjud , the second on qabdh , the fourth on circumcision, and the last point on jinn -possession. The author blames the founder of Izala for lies and deviation from the Māliki School of law in many ways. According to him Sheikh Idris rejects the claim that his followers pray with qabdh or hold amulets. Sheikh Idris denies the existence of Ahl alKitāb and refuses to eat their slaughtered animals or to get married to their daughters. He advises his followers to circumcise their children after they reach seven years of age. He rejects the claim that anybody can exorcise a possessed person from jinn . Jalo demonstrates that these fatwā s are not in conformity with the Mālikiyya and quoted several ḥadīth indicating the opposite. 614 The author closes his letter by warning the current leader of Izala and urging him to avoid bidʿa and repent to Allah and return to the sunna on the path of the pious predecessors. Furthermore he declares his disposition for any religious debates: 614 Ibid., p. 14-27. 274 “I am ready – by the will of Allah – to meet you for any debate in order to clarify truth, revive the sunna of the Prophet, and eradicate satanic innovations. This meeting can happen in any place and at any time here in Jalango or any other suitable town . ” 615 The second letter, written on 17th June, 2006. While the first letter is only a few pages in length, the second one is much longer and includes more details. The issues discussed are the same mentioned in the first letter. Jallo tries to legitimate the night prayers denied by Sheikh Idris. The author relies on different sources that mention this practice of the Prophet. Jallo did not restrict himself to argumentation and proof from the source (Qur’ān and sunna ), but he goes a step further andattacks Sheikh Idris by locating him at the same level of Sufis and their practices: “You! Leader of the Ismaiʿliyya-Sect! [the group around Sheikh Idris] You are on the same path as the Sufis because you invite people (in your fatwā s and cassettes) to undertake bidʿa and other rubbish. Sufis in many cases disregard what is written in the Qur’ān and the sunna of the Prophet – PBUH – and follow their passion ( al-hawā ). This is exactly your case. You urged your murīdīn to advance the decision of what you call “Headquarters in Jos” instead of what is fixed in the sunna . By doing that, you led your murīdīn to be like Ahl al-Kitāb and Sufis in making their ʿulamā' like their deity. You do that through denying what Allah allowed and by allowing what Allah denies.” 616 615 Ibid., p. 27. (my translation) 616 Ibid., p. 47 275 The strategy followed by Jallo in his statement is to question the fatwā s or legal opinions of Sheikh Idris, then to compare Idris with Sufis and Ahl al-Kitāb in falsifying their holy books. He quotes the classical work of the Tijāniyya Jawāhir alMaʿāni where it is required that the leader should be followed and obeyed without any opposition and compares this obedience to Sheikh Idris and his followers from the Jos-faction. 617 Jallo uses the opportunity to remind the Jos leader of the history of Izala. In a long (two pages in length) footnote on page fifty-three, he refers to the establishment of Izala by enthusiastic people wanting to re-establish the sunna of the Prophet. He denies Sheikh Idris’ taking of any leadership position apart from being on the head of the ʿulamā' Council. According to him Sheikh Idris deviated from that path until he – as a person – became the norm and not the sunna . 618 Jallo accuses Sheikh Idris of allowing aid group members to look after his personal security instead of performing prayers (Jallo: 61) and of banning his followers to listen to no other recorded preaching apart from his cassettes (Jallo: 63). The author criticizes the fact that Sheikh Idris’ followers would not pray behind somebody who is not Izala. They will not even greet a non-Izala or go to his funeral. This behavior is different to the tradition of al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ since many ʿulamā' accept differences and criticism (Jallo.65). 617 Ibid., p. 51. 618 For more details see pp. 53-55. 276 Similar to the first letter, the author points out to the actual Izala leader that Sheikh Idris took people back on the path of Sufism and not on the path of Ahl alSunna wa’l-Jamāʿa : “There is no doubt that what I mentioned to you is enough to confirm that Sheikh Ismaila Idris, the founder of the al-Jamāʿa al-Ismaʿiliyya was the one who brought people to the pathway of Sufism by encouraging them to follow their passion and deviate from the Qur’ān and the sunna .” 619 The author reiterates in the very last footnote of this letter that he is preparing a new book entitled Ismaila Idris fi Mizān al-Sharʿ (Ismaila Idris at the Level of Legacy) in which he indicates the numerous mistakes and bida ‘of the Izala founder. The next part of the “book” consists of discussing the answers from the Jos group (Saleh Idris Muhammad and Dalha Abubakar). Jallo considers these responses to be not only full of mistakes (print, language, knowledge), but also as assertions to keep bidʿa alive and to deviate from the Islamic sharīʿa . 620 Kalimāt Wajīza li-Qamʿ Sharr al-Ḥasūd This booklet was published in 2006. On the front page is a picture of the Grand Mosque in Medina and the last page has the logo of the Izala: a palm tree and two crossing swords in the middle. This picture is overlayed by the full name of the organization at the top. Below that it reads “founded by Sheikh Ismaila Idris”. Finally it is indicated that the national headquarters of Izala are in Jos. 619 Ibid., pp. 74-75 620 Ibid., p. 77. 277 A first interpretation of the cover of this booklet is that the author locates – as expected– the Izala between the tradition of the Prophet that has its origin in Saudi Arabia, Mecca, and the tradition of Sheikh Idris who founded Izala in Jos. Identifying the Jos-faction with its founder is a “marker” of its originally and loyalty to him. The sentence li mu’aṣṣihā al-Sheikh Ismaila Idris (established by Sheikh Idris) is visible at all Izala schools and institutions. The name of the founder is a sign of authenticity of the Jos-faction. This faction of Izala insists that the movement represents the tradition of the founder. It gives the organization not only a historical originality but also legitimacy among other groups. Even when it comes to official documents issued by Izala in Jos, the name of the founder is always connected with Sheikh Idris’ name. Content/Subject(s): The thirty-six-page booklet is subdivided into twenty chapters introduced by the author. After the first sentence reserved for to praise Allah, Saleh Idris Muhammad quotes a verse from the Qur’ān (4:112) and a ḥadīth of the Prophet. [4:112] “anyone who commits an offence or a sin, and then throws the blame on to some innocent person, has burdened himself with deceit as well as flagrant sin” (Abdel Haleem translation of 2005) The ḥadīth quoted by Sunan Abu Dawood (book 24, 14) states: “Allah sends the one who tells lies about a believer (Muslim) to hell, until he repents from what he said.” 278 From the beginning the author shows that any Muslim risks committing a sin if he mistakenly blames an innocent of any fault. Also anyone who slanders a believer (a Muslim) risks going to hell until he repents. It is a sign that the “defense”-project of Sheikh Idris started with two major sources: The Qur’ān and sunna . He continued by defending the founder of Izala and proving that that which has been written by Dr. Jallo is nothing but a rumor. In the introduction the author mentions that he had the letters addressed to the current leader of Izala in Jos. Saleh Idris Muhammad expected a kind of warning about the mistakes, but he was surprised by the level of subjectivity of Dr. Jallo’s text. He says: „I observed through what I read in the “fire of jealousy”, that there is antagonism and abhorrence in your heart. In fact what you have written cannot in any sense damage the two Sheikhs . [Sheikh Idris and Sheikh Jingir]” 621 To make the argument more plausible, the author makes use of Arabic poetry by emphasizing the issue of jealousy and illustrating the sentiments of envy and jealousy towards those who are in a higher position – the Izala founder and his successor in this case. The first chapter of Saleh Idris bears the title “Sheikh Idris is on the side of truth”: here the author explains how the founder of Izala relies only on the Qur’ān and the 621 Saleh (2006), p. 2 (my translation) 279 sunna of the Prophet and the path of al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ including the four Imams (four schools of law). He stresses that nobody can deny the importance of Imam Malik. He also defends Malik (d. 795) in front of al-Albānī (d. 1999) preferred by Jallo. “What divides us is that we invite people to learn about the Oneness of Allah and to avoid polytheism without restricting ourselves to the sayings of this or that person. And you work to destroy what we build, for instance, your invitation to people to keep amulets and prayers like every polytheist worshipping al-Tijānī or ʿAbd al-Qādir.” 622 The next nine chapters deal with the issue of bidʿa . The main subject is the night prayers during Ramadan and its evidence in the sunna . The argument of the author is that the Prophet practiced it, but because he feared that people would make it into a sunna [norm, canon], he stopped doing it. The discussion deals with the controversy over the ṣalāt at-tarāwīḥ (in Arabic: a prayer after night prayers during Ramadan) considered to be sunna (optional but a recommended practice). Interestingly, it is in this context that Saleh Idris Muhammad accuses his opponent of practicing bidʿa . First of all he criticizes the call for prayers (Arabic: adhān ), inviting people enthusiastically to perform it, and to practice it in only during a few days of Ramadan. “You start practicing this bidʿa at midnight, five hours after finishing attarāwīḥ (we don’t deny its existence). Before you start somebody can hear the voice of the muezzin with a new type of adhān : Prayers! Prayers! Prayers! And so on … continuously. You! Jallo! Keep Allah in 622 Ibid. p. 6. 280 mind! You and those who are on your side! Where did you get this [prayer]?” 623 Saleh Idris Muhammad relies on the statements of the Prophet, especially regarding his practices in insisting that he [the Prophet] preferred prayers during Ramadan and advised people to perform them at home. Consider the sentence practicing bidʿa is more difficult than practicing sunna (Saleh: 12). The argument is to show that the Prophet considered the different categories of people (weak, sick, needy) before establishing any rules. The author adds that the practicing of this bidʿa led to the fact that many Muslims cannot perform fajr -prayer (in Arabic: first Muslim obligatory prayer). If Muslims – according to Saleh – would restrict themselves to the tarāwīḥ -prayers during Ramadan, which is recommended by the “pious predecessors”, that would be much better for them. The so called qiyām (synonym for tarāwīḥ prayers) as known by al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ is practiced during the entire month of Ramadan. The new bidʿa [night prayers] is only practiced during the last ten days of Ramadan – which is not in conformity with the practice of al-Ṣaḥāba (Prophet Companions). One of the practices that is harshly criticized by the author is what he called al-adhān al-mukhtaraʿ (the invented call for prayers). In chapter eleven, a new topic is introduced and discussed, namely the qabdhṣadlcontroversy. The author mentions that Izala in Jos prefers praying ṣadl (in Arabic: hands alongside the body during the prayer) instead of qabdh (in Arabic: right hand crossed over the left hand at the navel). He adds that followers of the Jos623 (my translation) 281 faction pray in both ways and that Sheikh Idris never forbid it. The argument of Saleh is that Izala relies on strong sources confirming its preference for ṣadl over qabdh (Ibn al-Mundhir, al-Ḥasan and Ibrāhīm al-Nakh’ī, Ibn alʿ Arabī, al-Ṭabarī are some sources mentioned by the author in order to give legitimacy to his argument). The next subject, which is discussed in chapter twelve, concerns taslīma , or the conclusion of prayers. The Izala Jos has a preference to perfrom one taslīma instead of two. This practice is criticized by the Kaduna group. To show the strength of his argument, Saleh quotes three different aḥādīth 624 (Arabic: pl. of ḥadīth ) showing that the Prophet completed his prayers with one taslīma . Many ʿulamā' have not considered them [ aḥādīth ] weak or authentic but instead that the four “rightfully guided Caliphs” (the first four caliphs after the death of the Prophet) practiced only one taslīma , which shows that it was a widespread practice. The argument of the author here is to prove that the issue of “closing” prayers is debated among Islamic scholars. He assumes that opponents of Sheikh Idris would never agree with him. The next subject touched by Saleh concerns al-tamā’im (amulets). From the title his position is clear: holding amulets is an act of polytheism. He addresses Jallo directly by saying: “You defend amulets although it is related to shirk .” 625 The fact that Imam Mālik allowed this practice (of holding amulets) doesn’t mean that Mālik’s statement is unquestionable. Saleh’s duty is to defend Sheikh Idris 624 The first ḥadīth here is documented in the at-Turmudhi ḥadīth collection and corrected by al-Hakim (here Aisha narrated that the Prophet practiced only one taslima ); the second one is to be found in Ibn Majah and narrated by Sahl Ibn Sa’d (one taslīma is also documented here); finally the third source is a ḥadīth of Salma Ibn al-Akwa’; for more details see Saleh (2006: 16) 625 Saleh (2006:21), (my translation) 288 parties, then he should not prefer one and leave the other. He should invite all people, meet them and engage in discussion in order to know the truth … isn’t it like this? But when Sheikh Dr. Gumi came back to Nigeria; you know that relying on the Mālikī Law is one thing that divides us and the Kaduna-faction. We say that the majority of people are ignorant and if we introduce this and that, people will not know how to worship Allah. So let us have only one stand point. In the first year Sheikh Dr. Gumi said: “If a person abuses the madhhab , then is it proof that he is ignorant?” Every person who abuses the Mālikī School is an ignorant person. This is what he said (Dr. Gumi). In that first year we supported him (Dr. Gumi) because we thought that he was following the way of his father Sheikh Abubakar Gumi in teaching people. Sheikh Abubakar Gumi was Mālikī and worked according the Mālikī School of Law. We saw that Dr. Gumi only followed the path of his father and he was closed to us.” 638 Dr .Gumi addressed the media regarding the problem of money, and provoked both groups by expressing the notion of takfīr . Furthermore he suggested removing the current leadership and replacing it with a new one: “In the second year he (Dr. Gumi) said that the Jamāʿat Izalat al-Bidʿa Wa Iqamat as-Sunna should be one group under one leadership, but we should remove the current leaders in Jos and Kaduna and elect new ones. He said this on the radio. It was better to invite the leaders and discuss the issue with them instead of saying it openly on the radio. He came as a sultan accusing both groups of kufr and tried to unify us. But when the Society was established, he was studying the modern sciences in the English language. 638 Name of Interview subject, place and date are hidden. 289 He also said that they (faction of Izala in Jos) should bring him our cars, close mosques and schools and we answered: “you were not the one who built these mosques or schools from your own money. The cars were purchased when you were in Mecca and you cannot have them now.” (…) So reconciliation cannot be like this.” 639 Dr. Gumi’s comparison of the division of Izala to Ahl Ridda (in Arabic: people of apostasy) that should be fought according to the Qur’ān made reconciliation unachievable: “He also told people one day that it is allowed to kill us according to the Qur’ān… We are allowed to be killed since we are Ahl Ridda - as he said. He relied on one Qur’ānic verse saying “if two sects among believers are fighting, then reconcile between them and if one of the two refuses then fight the one that refuses (the reconciliation)” this is a proof for people to kill us. We said that this Quranic verse was there when your father was alive, but (the father; Sheikh Gumi) never relied on it to kill the Kadunafaction who refused reconciliation at that time. Your father left both parties do what they want because Allah is on the side of those who are in the right. That’s it. If you want to kill us and do this and that, then we say: “we are ready to fight.” This is the reason why he failed to bring reconciliation between us. He was inflexible in the end. He invited people to Kaduna and even the leader there didn’t go: Abubakar Ikara didn’t go; Yusuf Sambo didn’t go; Mai Gandu didn’t go. These are the leaders; the leader of the ʿulamā' , administration and the deputy to the leader. They didn’t attend the meeting.” 640 639 Ibid. 640 Ibid. 290 This is one version of why the attempt at the reconciliation of Izala undertaken by Dr. Gumi failed. These attempts took place in 2004 and 2005 and both Izalafactions boycotted it. During my field research in Nigeria it was not possible to meet Dr. Gumi or to listen to his point of view on the reconciliation project of Izala that he suggested. The leader of the Council of ʿulamā' in Katsina (Kaduna-faction), Sheikh Yakubu Musa Kafancan, assures that although several reconciliation attempts failed to bring Izala groups together, there are efforts still on the way. He argues that the intervention of the government in Izala affairs hindered its reunion. This was due to Izala’s boycott of a president who was not a Muslim. The Sheikh mentioned that Izala’s intervention was the reason why Obasanjo left his position as head of state. As a result of the work of Izala, the late Umaru Yar’Adua then became president of Nigeria. 641 641 Interview with Sheikh Yakubu Musa Kafancan in Katsina, 12th March 2008. 291 Chapter Five: Sharīʿa Debate of 1999 The military rule of Sani Abacha in 1990 was one of the worst periods of time in Nigeria’s modern history. The West African country suffered from repression, economic and political instability, ethnic conflicts, corruption, and human rights abuses. Abacha broke away from established democratic structures and turned Nigeria into an authoritarian state in which no room was given for opposition or political activism. 642 After the unexpected death of Abacha on 8th June 1998, under unclear circumstances 643 General Abdulsalami became the head of state and promised to initiate the transition of Nigeria to a civilian government. In February 1999, presidential elections resulted in Olesegun Obasanjo becoming president. This was the starting point of the Fourth Republic – another attempt to democratize the federation. This transition was accompanied with a lot of expectations in and outside of Nigeria. Nigerians wished for a better life with higher living standards, political and economic stability, and for the development of democratic structures and a more peaceful coexistence. Internationally there was interest in reintegrating Nigeria into the world community after years of political isolation. 642 Ogbondah, Chris W. (2000): Political Repression in Nigeria, 1993-1998: A Critical Examination of One Aspect of the Perils of Military Dictatorship, In: Africa Spectrum 35 (2), pp. 231-242; apart of dissolving political parties and general assemblies the Abacha’s regime persecuted political opponents and activists; see also Falola (1999), p. 196. 643 See Maier, Karl (2000): This House has fallen. Nigeria in crisis, London: Penguin Books. 292 The Fourth Republic faced big challenges at an early stage of its institutionalization. Nigeria is a rich country in terms of minerals. It is the largest exporter of petroleum in Africa and sixth worldwide. Nevertheless the country suffers from mismanagement, poverty, corruption, ethnic and religious disturbances, and increasing criminality. 644 Before all these issues can be solved, the constitution has to be revised and confirmed. This was part of the democratization process and a chance for political parties and Nigerian citizens to participate in the political debates of the federation. The discussions over the 1999-constitution and the future of Nigeria was overshadowed by another debate: namely the so-called sharīʿa -controversy. The decision of Ahmad Sani Yeriman Bakuru, Zamfara’s democratically elected governor, to implement Islamic Criminal Law in his state in November of 1999 was reminiscent of sentiments in the 1970s and the political crises related to it. Zamfara’s governor announced that Islamic Law, sharīʿa would be fundamental in his state and that Muslims could rely on it in all aspects of their lives. This decision was later followed by another eleven states of the north that also announced sharīʿa re-implementation. This chapter analyzes the sharīʿa -issue and the way in which it was initiated. The following questions are central: What type of socio-political setting facilitated the re-implementation? Who are the major actors? Who contributed to the so-called sharīʿa -project and who opposed it? Which Islamic groups stand for sharīʿa and which 644 Fatunde, Tunde (2000): Nigerias Rückkehr zur Demokratie. Eine Bewertung, in: KAS-AI/00, pp. 7476. 293 resisted it? What is the position of Izala in the controversy and what was its role in the re-implementation? 1 Who implemented Sharīʿa? The Houses of Representatives of the twelve northern states of Nigeria voted for the introduction of sharīʿa within a very short period of time. These states are Zamfara, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, Kebbi, Yobe, and Niger. The Federal Republic of Nigeria consists of thirty six states plus the Federal Territory of Abuja. The introduction of sharīʿa took place legally according to the laws of the states. Philip Ostien sums up the re-introduction of Islamic law and its implication for the north in the following five points:  Establishment of State Sharia Courts and its implementation in criminal and personal matters of Muslims. Appeal of judgement can be directed to the State Sharīʿa Court of Appeal;  introduction of new Sharia Penal Code and Code Procedure for Muslims within the Sharīʿa Courts of Appeal;  laws related to “social vices” and “un-Islamic behavior” (as Ostien calls them) including alcohol consumption, gambling, prostitution, separation between the sexes;  Zamfara State and Kano state introduced Public Complaints and AntiCorruption Commissions to fight corruption; 294  new institutions emerged from the sharīʿa re-implementation, such as the State Sharia commissions, Council of ʿulamā' , zakāt -Board and ḥisba -Board among others. These measures are not consistent and differ from one state to another. They are applied only to Muslims in the sharīʿa states. These states still recognize the Nigerian constitution. 645 646 Before the introduction of Islamic law, governors of the northern state constituted the so-called Sharia Implementation Committees . These committees defined the needs and wishes of the people, consulted Islamic experts, and made suggestions for the 645 Ostien, Philip (2007): Sharīʿa implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999-2006: A Source Book. Volume 1 “Historical Background”, p. viii. 646 (http://undhimmi.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/nigeria_sharīʿa_states.gif; 24.4.2011) 295 future implementation of sharīʿa . 647 These efforts before the re-implementation of Islamic law that took place implied that northern politicians were conscious about the importance of Islamic Law for Nigerian Muslims. From a historical perspective sharīʿa was a problem both during colonial rule and after independence. It was (and still is) an important part of the Islamic identity of Nigerian Muslims. The governor of Zamfara State as well as all the other northern states insisted that such a step should be in conformity with the Nigerian federal constitution and in no way a deviation from it. The re-implementation of sharīʿa and particularly criminal law meant that these laws should be codified as it is mentioned in chapter 36(12) of the 1999 constitution: “Subject as otherwise provided by this constitution, a person shall not be convicted of a criminal offence unless that offence is defined and the penalty therefore prescribed in a written law; and in this subsection, a written law refers to an Act of the National Assembly or a law of a State, any subsidiary legislation or instrument under the provisions of a law.” 648 The sharīʿa re-implementation was part of the political campaign of Ahmed Sani before he was elected governor in January 1999. He promised to introduce Islamic law in his state and to promote Islam and Islamic values. In a speech at Ali Akilu Square in Gusau, the capital of Zamfara State, the governor declared “It has become pertinent that we wake up from this sorry state of slumber and live up to our 647 See Ostien, Philip (2007): Sharīʿa implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999-2006: A Source Book. Volume II “Sharīʿa Implementation Committee Reports and related White Papers”, p. 3; the author indicates that the governors of the twelve northern Sharīʿa states were concerned about not violating the constitution of the federation. “In most states it [Sharīʿa implementation] was done only after wide consultation”- as Ostien formulates it. 648 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). Lagos: Federal Government Press, p. 22. 296 responsibility to the Almighty in order to avoid His curse.” 649 This decision was announced on October 27th, 1999. The Sharia Penal Code came into operation on January 27th 2000. Ahmed Sani appointed a committee of eighteen members to review existing laws and prepare the implementation. This was according to the Nigerian constitution. The Zamfara State commissioner of Justice, Hon. Attorney-General Ahmad Bello Mahmud, presented thirteen points of sharīʿa re-instatement from the time it was merely an idea until its legalization. This was introduced as part of a pattern among other northern states which were also in the process of sharīʿa reimplementation at that time. In a paper which Zamfara’s Attorney-General presented in a seminar on sharīʿa in Jigawa in 2000, he clarified the basic steps followed in Zamfara State. The elected Sharia Committee identified Sec. 6 of the 1999constitution as a legal framework for the implementation of sharīʿa . He defined the reasons behind the establishment of the law (curb social vices, moral decadence). Islamic Law was codified ( Sharia Penal Code , Penal Code Procedure, Sharia Court of Appeal ). The author also describes the policy of Zamfara State to fight corruption, to organize zakāt -collection, to make dress code compulsory ( ḥijāb for women), and to regulate marriage and trade sectors among others. The Commissioner insisted that such a process needs a transition phase during which people can be informed about sharīʿa . He also mentions obstacles that the re-implementation could face, 649 Oduyoye, Modupe (2000): The Shari’ah Debate in Nigeria. October 1999-October 2000. Ibadan: Sefer, S. 1. 297 especially human rights laws, Christian opposition and discussion regarding the general outline of the state i.e. secular or not. 650 The re-implementation of sharīʿa in Zamfara State was part of the political campaign of a single governor. This decision was appreciated by the majority of Nigerian Muslims. They expected this change of laws as a solution to many of their problems. Ahmad Sani’s campaign was successful twice and the sharīʿa -topic seems to have been a winning card during the elections in more than one state. 651 The other northern states did nothing but answer the demands of the masses. Weimann observes that the example of re-implementation in Zamfara State which was followed by the other states led to a dilemma for some states’ governors in the north. On the one hand they (as Muslims governing states of predominantly Muslim inhabitants) were put under pressure to implement Islamic law, and on the other hand, they had to comprise with the federal government and especially with the 650 For Details see Ostien (2007), Volume II, pp. 171-176; the entire paper of Alh. Ahmed Bello Mahmud untitled “On the adoption and Implementation of Sharīʿa Legal System in Zamfara State”, presented at the JNI-sponsored seminar on Sharīʿa in Jigawa State, 6 July, 2000, is available. After mentioning the thirteen steps that took place in Zamfara throughout the re-implementation of Sharīʿa, the author insists on the necessity of dialogue between the proponents and opponents of Sharīʿa. He emphasizes that Sharīʿa was introduced by law and that all Nigerian states should respect the wish of Muslims. 651 According to Weimann, Gunnar J. (2010) the governor of Zamfara played the Sharīʿa-card in both 1999 and 2003 during the elections. Also Governor I. Shekarau succeeded with a similar strategy in Kano state during the 2003 elections, see p. 17. For an overview on the “Sharīʿa-factor” in the 2003 elections in the federation, see Kogelmann, Franz (2006): The “Sharīʿa Factor” in Nigeria’s 2003 Elections, in: Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa. Benjamin F. Soares (ed.), pp. 256-274, Islam in Africa series 6. Leiden, Boston: Brill. 304 needed revision. In Zamfara State for instance, Peters speaks of a “hasty drafting” with “incorrect cross-references, incorrect and defective wording, omissions and contradictions.” 678 The sharīʿa re-implementation raises several questions about its constitutionality and conformity with the laws of the federation. Laws in Nigeria like in any federal system are complex. The constitution is the most authoritative document defining regulations within the territory of the federation. Nevertheless laws may differ from one state to the other. In Nigeria Islamic law was controversial during and after the colonial era. Islamic Law was reduced for personal and family matters. The reintroduction of criminal law implicates its codification and integration of the law of the federal state in a written form as fixed in the 1999-constitution: “Subject as otherwise provided by this constitution, a person shall not be convicted of a criminal offence unless that offence is defined and the penalty therefore prescribed in a written law; and in this subsection, a written law refers to an Act of the National Assembly or a law of a State, any subsidiary legislation or instrument under the provisions of a law.” 679 According to Rudolph Peters the notion of “codification” in an Islamic context goes back to the early 19th century. He understands it as a measure of fixing that “(…) only the state determines what law is and that the state law is the highest form of law.” 680 Nadjma Yassari, a jurist, observes that Islamic law was uncodified for more 678 Peters (2003), p. 45. 679 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). Lagos: Federal Government Press, p. 22. 680 Peters, Rudolph (2002): From Jurists’ Law to Statute Law or What happens when the Shari’a is codified, in: Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 7, 3, p. 88. 305 than a thousand years, although it was based on a collection of textbooks, annotations, and fatwā s (legal opinions). The process of codification took place through contact between Muslim societies and colonial powers. It was a sort of adaptation to the exigency of that period of time. 681 Codification of Islamic law first took place in the Ottoman Empire before it moved to other North African countries. The codification process varied from one contry to another. It changed the legal framework of sharīʿa from being “jurist law” to become “statuary law” - as Aharon Layish formulates it. 682 Apart from the codification of Islamic Law several questions were raised, especially as to whether this law violates the constitution of Nigeria. One of the controversies has to do with Section 10 of the 1999-constitution stating that “The government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as state religion”. This section was interpreted by many opponents of sharīʿa in Nigeria as a confirmation that the form of the state is “secular”. This means that none of the 36 Nigerian states can adopt a religiously inspired law (like sharīʿa ) as a state law. On the contrary supporters of the sharīʿa -project argue that the term “secular” was not mentioned in the constitution and the re-implementation was by no means a violation of it. Furthermore Muslims mention that the constitution guarantees the right of religion and reinstituting Islamic law was part of that right defined in Section 38 (1): 681 Yassari, Nadjma (2004): Islamisches Recht oder Recht der MuslimeGedanken zu Recht und Religion im Islam, in: Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaften, 103, p. 112. 682 Aharon Layish (2004): The Transformation of the Sharī’a from Jurists' Law to Statutory Law in the Contemporary Muslim World, In: Welt Des Islam 44 (1), pp. 85-113; the author provides a good historical overview on Sharīʿa codification and how it took place and what kind of methods were applied. Furthermore he gives an overview of the perception of codification by the Ulama. 306 “Every Person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance . ” 683 There was an attempt to unify the Sharia Penal Code initiated by the Institute of Islamic Legal Studies (CILS) at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. This was a project of “harmonization” of all Codes. 684 Furthermore its aim was to develop a judicial backdrop for the re-implementation in all Muslim states and at the same time the project was meant to “ (…) enhance legal certainty and facilitate the training of judicial staff and police personnel.“ 685 One of the biggest issues of the re-implementation was the legislative power between the states and the federation. According to Section 4 of the 1999 constitution, this legislative power is divided between both the state and the federation. Peters clarifies that “matters mentioned in the Exclusive Legislative List (…) are exclusively federal matters, while matters mentioned in the Concurrent Legislative List can come under both the legislative power of the Federation and the legislative power of the states.” Other matters not mentioned in both lists are part of 683 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). 684 Ostien (2007), Volume IV “The Sharīʿa Penal and Criminal and Procedure Codes” provides a good comparison of the “harmonized” Codes projects and the Penal Code of 1960. In fact, views on the CILS suggested Penal Codes are divided between “sceptics” (as Ostien calls them) who asked for reasons for such a project that may restrict Sharīʿa to what is written and those who perceive it as a chance to redraft and correct the introduced Penal Codes; see pp. 20-21. The same volume provides a copy of this “harmonized Sharīʿa Penal Code” with annotations; see pp. 33-139. 685 Peters, p. 45. 307 the state’s legislation. This was exactly what happened with the introduction of Islamic Criminal Law. Peters indicates that the Penal Code itself is unproblematic, but introducing sharīʿa as a religiously-inspired law was challenging. 686 2 Proponents and opponents of the Sharīʿa-project One may get the impression that all Muslims advocated the re-implementation of sharīʿa and that all Christians opposed it. This claim is not true. There were also Muslims who did not agree with the re-implementation but at the same time could not oppose it. This was the case among Muslim politicians, intellectuals, scholars and even among ordinary people. Allen Christelow observes a loophole in the constitution of 1999 that led the twelve northern states to implement Islamic criminal law in addition to the existing personal and family law. 687 Christelow speaks of several other secondary factors that generated the Nigerian sharīʿa -crisis. According to him, the feeling of insecurity amongst the population, social inequality, violence, and the absence of a wellstructured state system are other factors behind the call for sharīʿa . 688 Tabiu Muhammed summarizes views of the opponents of sharīʿa and their argument for a possible violation of the constitution of 1999 in the following points: 686 Peters (2003), p. 34. 687 Christelow, Allen (2002): Persistence and transformation in the politics of Sharīʿa-Nigeria, 19582002, in: search of an explanatory framework. Paper presented at the Conference on Muslim Law in Post-Colonial Africa, Centre for Contemporary Islam, University of Cape Town, 11-14 March 2002, p. 16. 688 Ibid., p. 18. 308 1. sharīʿa opponents questioned the legislative power of Zamafara as well of the other northern states to reimplement Islamic criminal law; 2. for these opponents sharīʿa is reduced to personal matters and its use in criminal law is nothing but a violation of the constitution; 3. finally they consider Nigeria to be a secular state according to Section 10 of the constitution. 689 The jurist Bashir Yusuf Ibrahim analyzes the conformity of sharīʿa with the constitution. He mentions the establishment of the National Assembly and the State Houses of Assembly . Both have different fields of legislation fixed in the Exclusive Concurrent Legislative Lists mentioned above. The fact that Islamic Criminal Law was not mentioned in one of these lists became a matter for the states. This means that any state in the federation can introduce its own legislation or its own criminal law independently whether this law is inspired by a particular religion or not. 690 When it comes to the question of sharīʿa and human rights, Ibrahim understands penalties like death by stoning or the amputation of limbs and legs as a way to fight and reduce criminality in the society and keep secure the life, property and dignity of people. In 689 Tabiu, Muhammed (2001): Sharīʿa, Federalism and Nigerian Constitution. Paper presented at the International Conference on Sharīʿa 14th April, organized by the Nigerian Muslim Forum, London, United Kingdom, pp. 6-7. 690 Ibrahim, B. Yusuf (2003): Application of the Shari’a Penal Law and Justice System in Northern Nigeria: Constitutional issues and implications, in: Ezeilo, J. Ngosi; Ladan, M. Tawfiq and A. AfolabiAkiyode (Eds): Shari’a Implementation in Nigeria: Isssues and challenges on Women’s Rights and Acces to Justice. Enugu/Port Hartcourt/Abuja: (WACOL); Lagos: (WARDC); Heinrich Böll Foundation, p. 133. 309 addition, he reminds us that there is no paragraph in the constitution forbidding the death penalty. 691 Frieder Ludwig, a scholar of religion and an expert on Christian-Muslim relations in Nigeria, clarifies that the majority of Muslims (proponents) understand the sharīʿa re-implementation as “restitution of their rights” while on the contrary, many Christians (opponents) consider Islamic law as “a step to Islamize Nigeria”. 692 This opposition within the two camps is motivated by events like the two famous stoning cases of Amina Lawal and Safiya Hussaini as well by discussions about the presidency of 2007 and whether the president should be a Muslim or a Christian. Ludwig quotes the reaction of the Anglican Archbishop Peter Akinalo when President Umaru Yar’Ardua, a Muslim and PDP (People’s Democratic Party) candidate was elected as successor of Obasanjo as head of the state: “Oh! My God, a Sharia governor”. 693 In the same vein, the reaction of the governor of Kano State, Ibrahim Shekarau, who showed his disappointment in 1999 when sharīʿa was introduced not introduced sooner. 694 These two examples illustrate stereotypes of divided views on sharīʿa re-implementation. 691 Ibid., p. 135. 692 Frieder Ludwig (2008): Christian–Muslim Relations in Northern Nigeria since the Introduction of Shari’ah in 1999, in: Journal of the academy of Religion, Vol. 76 (3), pp. 603. 693 Ibid., p. 604. 694 Ibid., p. 607. 310 2.1 Proponents of Sharīʿa Danladi A. Mohammed 695 , from the Centre of Journalism Studies in Wales, seems to be among those who defended sharīʿa . His article is an answer to the prominent Islamic scholar and sharīʿa critic, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi (whose views are reflected in the next chapter). Danladi A. Mohammad considers Sanusi to be one of those modernist scholars who is influenced by “orientalists”. For him, Sanusi is a Marxist who developed personal views on sharīʿa that are far from reality. In addition, Danladi Mohammad goes further in reproaching Sanusi for being attracted to the views of the controversial Sudanese founder of the Republican Brothers, Maḥmūd Muḥammad Ṭaha. 696 As part of his protection of sharīʿa , Mohammad goes even further when he categorizes Sanusi among secularist scholars (in the same category with Abdullahi Aḥmad An-Na’im, a prominent Sudanese law expert living in the USA) who oppose ʿulamā' and blame them of corruption and incompetence. According to Danladi A. Muhammed, Sanusi and the modernists want to reform Islam and change its rules. This step could be a danger to Islam since it leads 695 Mohammed, Danladi A. (2002): Muslim Intellectuals and the Sharīʿa debate in Nigeria, aus: www.nigeriadelta congress.com/marticles/muslim_intellectuals_and_the_Sha.htm. (22.05.2011). 696 Maḥmūd Muḥammad Ṭaha was executed in 1985 during the time of President Numeiri because of his controversial views on Islamic Qur’ān revelation. He made a differentiation between two types of revelations: one that happened before the hijra of the Prophet to Medina in 622 and one after that event. Taha believes that the Medinian-revealed Quranic text should be understood in its historical context. This point of views was heavily criticized by Muslim scholars of that time; Danladi reproaches Sanusi for being influenced by such views. 311 to total secularization and abolition of the religion, which was the case in much of Christianity: “The problem is that Sanusi and other modernists before him wanted to change the rules so that Islam would be totally reformed like Christianity, leading to complete secularisation and the abolishing of Islam just as Christianity was abolished. This is clear from the writings of Mahmud Taha and his followers.” 697 The author concludes by attacking Sanusi Lamidu Sanusi and reproaches him for practicing propaganda, manipulating Islam, and even for selecting particular chapters from the Qur’ān and the sunna in order to confirm his point of view on the rejection of sharīʿa laws. Danladi Mohammed judges most secular reforms in the Islamic world as failed reforms. He cites the example of Turkey and the program of laicism imposed by Atatürk that failed to replace the long-lasting hegemony of the Ottoman Empire. This attempt, like many others, led to a westernization of Islamic societies and the adaptation of western norms. 698 Along the same lines of defending sharīʿa re-implementation, the prominent Kaduna-based Islamic scholar, Muhammed Sanusi Gombi, argued that compared to other religious communities in Nigeria, Muslims have been disadvantaged for many years. The Islamic scholar raises the points that for a long time Muslims tolerated non-Muslim norms like accepting Saturday as a public holiday instead of Friday. He even advocates extending sharīʿa to the entire federation, not only in the north. The 697 Mohammed, Danladi A. (2002). 698 Ibid. 312 Islamic scholar Ali A. Mazrui also legitimizes the re-implementation of Islamic Law in Nigeria. According to him, this law questions western model(s) of law. Mazrui considers Nigeria a unique African state which offers an alternative to western law traditions. He adds that sharīʿa was a result of a critical reflection on existing western norms. Furthermore, sharīʿa led, according to Mazrui, to a pluralistic society and in no way to a repressed one. 699 The current Izala leader in Jos, Sheikh Sani Yahya Jingir, fully supports the sharīʿa -project of 1999 and considers it an “embryo” which is in the process of growth. He expects this “embryo” to fully mature one day. He formulates it in the following: “Yes indeed! We also support that. We wanted sharīʿa and consider it a janān (in Arabic: embryo) that will not be old in only one day, but will mature gradually. As westerners [the British] came to us and criticized the sharīʿa and reduced it until we couldn’t do anything. Now we want to react to them. We have to react gradually and when sharīʿa becomes strong enough, then we will correct what we failed to correct before…” 700 This statement reflected the views of many Muslims in northern Nigeria who viewed Islamic law as a chance to unite Muslims. This unity was deeply affected by the colonial policy of reducing Islamic law to personal and family matters. The journalist Suleiman Shehu who covered the sharīʿa -related event for Radio Kaduna in 1999 speaks about the feelings of Muslims at the gathering of Gusau, in the capital of Zamfara State when the announcement to reinstate Islamic law was made. During 699 Danfulani, U., Ludwig, F. und P. Ostien (2002), p. 89. 700 Interview with the Izala-leader in Jos in his office, 28th February 2007. 313 the re-implementation ceremonies, Shehu who was deeply moved and he confessed that he has never seen a comparable crowd of people before. For him, the project unified Islamic groups in spite of doctrinal differences: “(…) the implementation of sharīʿa involves the religion of Islam, you have all the groups, I mean the sects, the groups under Islamic organisations coming together to give their input. They were called by the state government to come and give their input because you have the ʿulamā' of the Sufis, you have ʿulamā' in the Izala, you have ʿulamā' in the other groups. So they called for unity. For the implementation of sharīʿa is basically teaching of the Prophet Muhammad – peace be upon him. That was, I think, the basis under which the groups were unified.” 701 The acceptance and support of sharīʿa happened at the level of the ʿulamā' as well as at the grassroots level where expectation were enormous. Ordinary Muslims were enthusiastic and interpreted sharīʿa as a solution to their problems in the country. Suleiman Shehu added that in most cases, people at the grassroots level are “guided by the ʿulamā' ” and consider them their “mentors”. Although many Muslims at the grassroots level are ignorant about what sharīʿa really means and what kinds of challenges and changes can occur because of it, they trusted their religious leaders who supported sharīʿa . Apart from this support, ordinary Muslims also expected sharīʿa to improve their economic and social conditions: “Yes, sharīʿa is the way. It will work for us. (…), maybe it is the cradle of the years: years of campaign, years of call, years of…, you know; people, 701 Interview with Suleiman Shehu in Arewa House, Kaduna, 16th January 2007. 320 Sanusi considers the issue of justice to be a central aspect of sharī‛a . He asks how amputation can be applied to those who steal a goat and not for corrupt civil servants of the state. He questions how justice can be proven in the case of adultery, especially when “different standards” are applied to men and women? Is that religion or ideology? Sanusi sees more ideology behind sharī‛a than religion. 721 Furthermore he draws attention to other Islamic countries that have implemented reforms in their law tradition and accommodated legislation to the needs of people without deviating from the tradition. He insists that such a step in Nigeria is more than needed – especially a critical approach towards religion. There is a need to differentiate between those who consciously manipulate religion for ideological objectives and those who tend to establish the law of God. 722 In a paper on the relationship between politics and Islam, Sanusi warns those politicians who use Islam in northern Nigeria to achieve political goals. He defines the duty of all Muslims is to oppose such “spoiled” politics. 723 For such politicians, sharī‛a should not only be a sign of harsh sentences and sanctions, but also a way to establish social justice and improve the economic situation of Nigerians. Politicians should not use sharī‛a to conceal their own corruption, abuse of office, and nepotism. 724 721 Ibid., p. 226. 722 Ibid, pp. 227-230. 723 Sanusi, Lamido Sanusi (n.d.): On the Islamization of politics and the Politicization of Islam, www.gamji.com/sanusi14.htm. (22.12.2004) 724 Sanusi, Lamido Sanusi (1999): Issues in constructing corporate Nigeria. Paper presented at the “National Conference on the 1999 Constitution”, organized by the Network For Justice and The Vision Trust Foundation, Arewa House, Kaduna from 11th – 12th September, p. 8. 321 Lamidu Sanusi was not the only Nigerian scholar who maintained a critical view of sharī‛a ; there are other critical voices of the sharī‛a project. This category of scholars stresses that there is no enforcement in Islamic faith ( lā ikrāha fī’d-dīn Qur’ān 2:256) and that the newly implemented Islamic criminal law cannot favour favor Muslims or protect them: “(...) sharīʿa rule leaves Muslims helpless before it.“ 725 A Muslim lawyer from Kano, Suleman Kumo, observes that Islamic judges of sharī‛a courts are incompetent and corrupt, and abuse of office is common in such courts. These judges, argues Kumo, would even “fail a simple character test”. 726 Lamin Saneh mentions a Muslim from the north named Mohammed Sani who in front of other Muslims in August 2000 openly criticized Zamfara’s Governor and his campaign to re-implement sharī‛a law. These critics were based on the argument that the implementation had more to do with politics than with religion. According to Sani, sharī‛a comes from Allah and not from the governor. 727 On 21st February, 2000, antisharī‛a demonstrations took place in protest against the introduction of sharī‛a . Several other riots between Muslims and Christians resulting in loss of properties and lives on both sides happened in the following days. Several mosques and churches were destroyed. Sharī‛a appears to 725 Saneh, Lamin (2003): Shari’ah Sanctions as Secular Grace? A Nigerian Islamic debate and an intellectual response, in: Transformation, 20/4 October, p. 240. 726 As quoted in Saneh (2003), p. 240 from Maier (2000), p. 178. 727 Saneh (2003), p. 240; based on his statement and criticism towards the Governor of Zamfara, Mohammed Sani was arrested and jailed for four months. He accused of violating the loyalty of Zamfara State. 322 be a violent dispute between Christians and Muslims in the federation, to say the least. 728 Christians and human rights organizations in Nigeria interpret sharī‛a as a violation of the constitution and of human rights and see in it a danger for the peaceful coexistence in a multiethnic and multi-religious state like Nigeria. Frieder Ludwig speaks of a sort of “Fundamentalism-thesis” developed and introduced to the debates by sharīʿa opponents. As an example, Ludwig mentions the chairman of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in Edo State, Archbishop Patrick Ekpu, who points to the OIC controversy and warns against Islamic Fundamentalism in northern Nigeria sponsored by Arabic countries. 729 There are some other opponents of sharī‛a who consider it a “second Jihad” comparing it to the successful movements of Usman Dan Fodio and the Islamization of northern Nigeria during the 19th century. 730 In an International Religious Freedom Report , the US Department of State judges the re-implementation of Islamic Criminal Law in Nigeria as an abuse of religious freedom and a cause for interreligious violence. The report states that although Christians in the north were not affected by sharī‛a , especially in Zamfara State where Christian minorities were only minimally influenced in one way or 728 For more details on the Sharīʿa related riots, see Ibrahim, Jibrin (2002): Democracy and minority Rights in Nigeria: Religion, Shari‘a and the 1999 Constitution. Paper for the Conference on: ”Globalisation, State capacity and self-Determination in Muslim Contexts“. Center for Global, International and Regional Studies, University of California-Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, 7th to 10th March 2002; also Danfulani, Umar H. D. (2005): The Sharīʿa Issue and Christian-Muslim relations in contemporary Nigeria. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, esp. pp. 13-38 reflect on what happened in Kaduna from different perspectives. 729 For details see Ludwig (2001), p. 266. 730 Ibid., p. 267. 323 another. Segregation of both sexes in public transport, ban of alcohol, dress codes, closing shops on Fridays, and banning cinema can be considered aspects of such an impact of sharī‛a on Christians. The US Department of State report points out that the law of the federation does not allow any religious discrimination, but the Nothern States of Nigeria violated that law and discriminated against religious minorities. 731 2.3 The Federal Government, the States, the ʿulamā' , and grassroots’ positions on sharī‛a re-implementation For the Federal Government of 1999 732 under president Obasanjo the sharī‛a re-implementation was a precarious matter. The democratic process of Nigeria and the transition to democracy was positively appreciated on the national as well as on the international level. The debates related to Islamic Law seemed to divide the country on a religious basis. The president, a born again Yoruba Christian from the south, had no choice but to reduce the tension in the country. At a very early stage of the re-implementation there was no official statement from the government for supporting or opposing sharī‛a . This is understandable since religion in Nigeria is a complicated issue. The intervention of President Obasanjo was related to the riots of Kaduna in 2000 and the heavy tension between Muslims and Christians in that state. Travelling in person to that area, President Obasanjo was shocked by the 731 US Department of State (2001): International Religious Freedom Report, Nigeria. Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 732 For an overview on the transition to democracy in Nigeria see Fatunde, Tunde (2000): Nigerias Rückkehr zur Demokratie. Eine Bewertung, in: KAS-AI/00, S. 74-91. 324 consequences arising from clashes related to the sharīʿa controversy. He expressed his deep disappointment and wondered during his visit on 27th February, 2000, if it was really the same Kaduna that he knew from earlier times: “Are you people sure this is Kaduna? Can this be Nigeria? Are we still in Nigeria at all? I don’t think people who did this could have done it for any religion. I don’t think they did this for any religion.” 733 He indicated that such acts cannot be grounded in religion and in an official address to the nation on 1st March, 2000; he described the Kaduna events as “barbarism”. Obasanjo spoke of a “the worst incident of blood-letting” since the Civil War in Nigeria. He all parties involved in the conflicts to engage in dialogue, reconciliation and to respect the federal constitution that guarantees freedom of religion. Furthermore he added that the National Council of States would hold a meeting to discuss the security situation as well the re-implementation of sharī‛a in the northern states and its constitutionality: “The Council also reviewed the remote and immediate causes of the disturbances, and noted that the Penal Code currently in force in the northern States is substantially based on Sharia Law, with the modifications that imprisonment is substituted in place of amputation of limbs, as punishment for stealing, and also as punishment for adultery, instead of stoning to death. The Council noted that these modifications are consistent with the human rights principles enshrined in our Constitution, and considered the punishments adequate in the circumstances. The Council unanimously agreed that all States that have recently adopted Sharia Law should in the meantime revert to the status 733 Quoted in Danfulani (2005), p. 24. 325 quo ante. That is, Sharia, as practiced in Penal Code, continues to be practiced by all States concerned. The Council urges all Nigerians to remain calm and law-abiding. Provocative and inciting utterances will not be tolerated. This position by the Council is a triumph of love of fatherland, triumph of maturity and sustenance of security of the nation and preservation of our corporate existence. There can be no winners in the destructions, all Nigerians are losers. And in peace and cessation of destructions of life and property, all Nigerians are winners. But to respect the feeling of one another and to hasten the process of reconciliation, there is no victory to be celebrated and no loss to be mourned.” 734 The official position of the then president and his government was moderate in order not to divide the country into proand antisharī‛a people – unlike Obasanjo’s opinion on sharī‛a few months ago before the Kaduna riot. 735 The Nigerian InterReligious Council (NIREC) 736 established in September, 1999, received the support of the president to work for more peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Christians in the country. NIREC recommended that leaders from both religions should take on the duty of quelling tensions, and members of the two different religious communities should converge. The federal government in Nigeria has no choice but to reconcile conflicting parties over sharī‛a . At the state level the situation was different. In the southern part 734 President Olusegun Obasanjo's address to the nation on Sharīʿa crisis, March 1, 2000; see the entire speech at (http://nigeriaworld.com/feature/speech/obasanjo_sharia_address.html, accessed 29/05/2011). 735 During a visit to the USA, when he was asked about the issue of Sharīʿa, President Obasanjo answered; “The government simply wished the Sharīʿa cancer would disappear into thin air.”; quoted in Danfulani (2005), p. 23; when the Zamfara governor called for the inauguration of Sharīʿa, Obasanjo called on the Vice-president, ministers, governors and emirs to boycott the event, see ibid. p. 52. 736 For history and information on this institution see its homepage http://www.nirecng.org 326 of Nigeria sharīʿa was present in the media but was not problematic since Muslims are in the minority there. Nevertheless, Muslims among the Yoruba for instance find other ways to practice sharī‛a and have established Independent sharī‛a Panels as shown by Abdulfattah Makinde. 737 In the northern part of the country the governors were influenced by the masses; public pressure seemed to be higher than they realized. Ahmad Sani Yeriman Bakuru was elected in 1999 and re-elected in 2003 because he implemented Islamic Law. The sharīʿa factor was also used in Kano by the former governor Ibrahim Shekarau who achieved two mandates (2003 and 2007) before he became one of the leading candidates for the Nigerian presidential elections of 2011. In Kaduna the situation was more complicated and the House of Assembly was divided among Christians who opposed the re-implementation and Muslims who favored it. Governor Makarfi (PDP) seemed to have won the elections of 2003 because of his moderate view on sharīʿa re-implementation, unlike his rival candidate (ANPP) who played the sharīʿa card and advocated full implementation. 738 Ludwig also shows how Gombe State chose the way of dialogue between Muslims and Christians in order to reduce tensions and religious clashes (like the riots of 2000 and 2001). This was achieved by establishing a legal system made of Sharia Courts, Customary Courts, and a Magistrate Court: 739 Even though Ahmadu Mu’azu, governor of Bauchi State (1999-2007), was among the first governors who started to implement sharī‛a in the North, he insisted on patience especially in stoning cases 737 See Makinde, A. (2007). The Institution of Sharīʿah in Oyo and Osun States, Nigeria, 1890–2005. PhD-Thesis in Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. 738 See Ludwig (2008), p. 626. 739 Ludwig (2008), p 627. 327 and admonished sharī‛a judges in adultery cases who sentenced pregnant divorced women to death by stoning. 740 Concerning the home state of late President of Nigeria (2007-2010) and former governor of the state (1999-2007) Umaru Yar‘Adua, Katsina, Christians seem to have ongoing problems with education within the state and their children face difficulties at the secondary school level in finding a school. In addition, Christian TV-programs and the building of churches seemed to be among the difficulties expressed by representatives of the Christian Association of Nigeria in that state. The re-implementation in Katsina happened under pressure and the governor practiced a moderate policy which in part assisted with pilgrimages of Muslims and Christians to Mecca and Jerusalem, respectively. Also the dialogue between both religious communities was supported by the state. 741 The ʿulamā' are important actors in the sharī‛a -project. In Northern Nigeria Islamic scholars are well-established and highly respected in the society. They have the duty of guiding the Umma (Muslim community) when it comes to religious matters. ʿulamā' are those who have access to the “sources”. The Nigerian Historian Haruna Wakili considers the role of ʿulamā' during the period immediately before the re-implementation of the sharī‛a in 1999 as “neutral”. 742 After that event they became 740 Ibid, p. 629, this happened in 2002 and quoted by Ludwig from Vanguard of 19th December 2002 “Mu’azu Cautions Sharīʿa judges”. 741 Ludwig (2008) mentions the establishment of a “Christian Pilgrims Welfare Board” in the State as well a Muslim-Christian Forum in order to promote peace and dialogue among Muslims and Christians; see pp. 630-1. 742 Wakili, Haruna (2009): Islam and the Political Arena in Nigeria: The Ulama and the 2007 Elections. ISITA Working Paper No. 09-004, p. 3. 328 more involved in politics. They insisted on more “sanitization” of the society and politics in the north in order to achieve the goals of sharīʿa re-implementation. 743 Wakili shows how ʿulamā' have the power to influence politics in the north. During the elections of 2007, Islamic scholars were fully involved in calling Muslims to register in the elections and vote for leaders who were “credible, honest and Godfearing.” Although sharīʿa did not play an important role during the election of 2007 (as it was the case during the elections of 2003) 744 , Haruna Wakili states that “anyone who campaigned against the sharī‛a in the states surely would not be voted for.” 745 He confirms that the ʿulamā' are not a homogeneous group in the north and their political orientation was not uniform. Wakili cites the example of Kano, when ʿulamā' were divided between those who supported governor Shekarau and campaigned for him and those who opposed him. Many Islamic scholars used mosques, seminars and public lectures to mobilize Muslims to vote for him. Other ʿulamā' , like the Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya leaders (Sheikh Qaribullah Kabara and Sheikh Kalifa Rabi’u, respectively) as well as Salafiyya leaders campaigned against Shekarau. 746 Ordinary Muslims consider ʿulamā' to be their spiritual guides. Apart from the political campaign related to sharīʿa at the grassroots level, the expectations were high. Sharīʿa was for Muslims a chance for changes in many aspects of life. Most 743 Ibid., p. 7. 744 Kogelmann, Franz (2006): The “Sharīʿa Factor” in Nigeria’s 2003 Elections, in: Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa. Benjamin F. Soares (ed.), pp. 256-274, Islam in Africa series 6. Leiden, Boston: Brill. 745 Wakili (2009), p. 8. 746 See Wakili (2009), p. 9. 329 ordinary Muslims do not really know much about the implication of sharīʿa , and what it really means. If you ask about sharī‛a and how people understand it, in many cases you may get answers like: ”Wonderful! Great achievement and we love it! (…) the implementation was a great achievement for a country like Nigeria. We never dreamed of having sharīʿa so soon, so even if it is not fully implemented, it has made a great impact in our hearts and those of our children. For the younger ones to know about the presence of sharīʿa is a great thing.” 747 Or statements such as: “I so much loved it. It is a great achievement, though there are certain restrictions but I am happy about it and I hope that in the future we will be able to have a caliphate that rules according to Islamic law.” 748 The sharī‛a application appealed to the feelings of Muslims. Sharī‛a was introduced as a solution to their problems and was expected to bring change in many directions, especially economically and socially. Many see in sharī‛a an answer to corruption, political mismanagement, and social injustice. The re-implementation of Islamic Law was valued as an alternative and option for a better life. This may or may notbe true, but Muslims generally follow their ʿulamā' in matters concerning the reimplementation of Islamic law: 747 Interview with J. M. on 15th March 2008 in Jos; J.M. is one among six women interviewed in Jos by R.M., by a female research assistant. For the reason of protecting the interviewees as well the name of the assistant I prefer not to write the full names. 748 Interview in Jos with H.H. on 5th march 2008. 336 more than that and has to do with education, economy, and civil service. Sharī‛a is according to him is to be found everywhere. 760 The re-implementation of sharī‛a appears to be a concretization of Izala’s world view of an Islamic society based on the Qur’ān and the tradition of the Prophet. The daʿwa of Izala consists of educating people about their religion and guiding them to follow the right way to become good Muslims. Izala insists on education at every stage of life and establishes schools and mosques to provide its adherents with education. Izala calls on women to wear ḥijāb . It stands for separation of the sexes in the society in all aspects of life. Izala propagates an ideal society without alcohol, gambling, and prostitution. It encourages knowledge about Islam and the Arabic language. It gives an important status to religious scholars. The organization demands for the application of Islamic law in all its aspects and according to the elementary sources of the Islamic religion. Izala regards itself as protector of Islam and Muslims. The organization makes efforts to defend Islamic interests. In Plateau State, which is not a sharīʿa state, Izala for instance succeeded in changing the times of public administration and schools on Fridays in order to allow Muslims to go perform their prayers. Since colonial times only Sunday is a work-free day in Nigeria. 761 At the beginning of 2007 the design of Nigerian currency was changed. The Jos-faction of Izala realized that the new Naira bills are without Arabic scripture, 760 Interview with Alhaji Abubakar Imām on 5th March 2008 in his office, Sharīʿa Court of Appeal, Maiduguri. 761 In an informal discussion on 13th December 2006 with Prof. Muslih T. Yahya in Jos, from the department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, the scholar mentions that Izala in Jos makes efforts that Muslims can stop working by 12.30 in order to go for Friday prayers and come back by 2.30 p.m. 337 so they sent letter to the President of the Federation, Obasanjo, on 27th February 2007, expressing their “(…) displeasure and total rejection of the removal of Arabic inscription”. Izala indicates that removing Arabic, as an identity marker of Muslims, may be against human rights and “endangers the interest of some Nigerians on the basis of their religion.” 762 After Islamic law was introduced Izala was adamant that all aspects of it should be applied in the northern states. Weimann mentions the example of Bauchi State and its governor Mu’azu who was visited by a delegation from Izala urging him to rush in applying Islamic criminal judgements. Aware of the implications of the law in a mixed state like Bauchi, the governor responded that it is the sharī‛a commission’s duty to deal with that. 763 Also in Jigawa State the Izala warned Ibrahim Turaki, governor of the state from 1999 until 2007, that he should not stop the “divine” law of sharī‛a from being enforced in a stoning case from the year 2002. 764 Weimann’s explanation of the enthusiasm of Izala in the sharīʿa -project sounds very plausible: “Yan Izala (…) were quick to espouse the project on the basis of common 762 This open letter entitled “Memo to Mr. President Chief Olesegun Obasanjo G.C.F.R. on the recent removal of Arabic inscription from the Nigerian currency notes”, published in the Daily Trust of 27th February 2007; a copy of this letter was send to the Senate President, The Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Deputy Senate President, The Central Bank Governor, The Sultan of Sokoto, the Emirs (Kano, Borno, Zazzau, Katsina, and Ilorin), the Etsu Nupe, and the AARE Musulmi of Yorubaland. 763 Weimann (2010), pp. 49-50. 764 This was a case of rape in 2002 in the state when the accused was found guilty and put to death by stoning after his confession. In 2003 he revealed his confession and appealed the judgment at the Sharīʿa Court of Appeal . The accused was then freed from charges and sent to psychiatry; see ibid., p. 68. 338 interests.” 765 The author emphasizes that this interest does not mean an effort for an Islamic state, but rather a kind of establishment of a particular vision of an Islamic “way of life” according to sharīʿa . 766 Historically Izala was founded to fight un-Islamic innovations ( bida’a ) in Nigeria. There were social, political, and economic changes that occurred in the federation during the last years that brought Muslims to reflect on their relationship and doctrinal differences in the entire country. Events like ethno-religious clashes in several parts of the north, debates related to the constitution, and the elections in the federation (the leader should be a Christian or Muslim) are just a few examples. In times of clashes the borders between religious groups within the same community all but disappear. For Christians in Nigeria, all Muslims re-implemented sharīʿa law and there is no difference between Izala, Sufis or Shīʿa-groups. The sharīʿa -project was an opportunity for Muslims to think about common objectives and leave internal debates aside. The re-implementation of Islamic law was an opportunity for Izala to “conquer” more space in a religious field dominated by the Sufi brotherhoods. The sharīʿa -project was also a chance for Izala to gain recognition of its ideology based on the Qur’ān and the sunna . Izala and sharīʿa can be placed side by side since both are calling for the “sanitization” of Islam and offer a solution to Muslims in all aspects of life. If Izala perceived sharīʿa positively and of its many leaders claim that the organization was directly and indirectly behind the re-implementation, then what 765 Ibid., p. 57. 766 Ibid.; in a discussion on Sharīʿa-debates in Jos with Prof. Musa Gaiya, a church historian and religion expert in Nigeria, the scholar spoke of “Islamization of the socitey” rather than an Islamic state; 18th December 2006. 339 about the Izala-Sufi-brotherhood relationship? Did sharī‛a law put an end to the long struggle between Izala and the two major Sufi brotherhoods in northern Nigeria? Did sharīʿa re-implementation really bring change with it? Did it unify the Muslim Umma ? 4 Izala, Sufis, and Sharī‛a-law: a chance for reconciliation? After the long-lasting conflict between Sheikh Gumi and the Nigerian Sufi Brotherhoods which eventually developed into clashes between Sufis and the Izala, internal issues had been increasingly weakening the organization since the beginning of the 1990s. The division of the organization between Jos and Kaduna affected the image of the movement and especially its credibility amongst Muslims in matters of leadership. Most (if not all) Izala leaders confess that the division of the movement has nothing to do with ʿaqīda but rather with orientation within the organization: are ʿulamā' at the top of Izala or not? In dealing with internal problems Izala was concerned with education, preaching, and especially with convincing Muslims in northern Nigeria of being the authentic “Izala” founded by Sheikh I. Idris. This new orientation in Izala allowed Muslims to speak of different groups in Izala: that of Jos connected with the founder and known for its strictness compared to other Islamic groups, and that of Kaduna which is more compromising when it comes Sufis and other Muslims, and even another group of Izala members who did not belong to either of these two 340 branches. 767 The concentration on their own problems led to a reduction of the tension between Izala and Sufi. Violent clashes that were the case in the 1970s and 1980s were reduced. Clashes over religious space in mosques and in the public sphere were reduced to verbal struggles. Nevertheless, differences still existed and borders became more visible (different schools, mosques, activities, interests). The re-implementation of sharī‛a was neither planned nor prepared. It was motivated by politics and part of an electoral campaign of one single governor with the intention “to gain popular support and to secure his own political survival developed into a chain reaction throughout the predominantly Muslim-inhabited northern states of Nigeria.” 768 Sufis, Izala, and many other Islamic groups had no choice but to cooperate. The northern governors called all Muslims to contribute to the sharī‛a project and asked the ʿulamā' to set up the outlines of such an undertaking. No religious leader should be excluded except if he/she is against sharī‛a . Opposing sharī‛a means opposing Islam and that can be related to social isolation. sharī‛a – as shown above – is an identity marker for Muslims in northern Nigeria. It was seen as a chance for Islamic law after years of oppression. Sharī‛a was related to change and reform of the society. Sharī‛a became a unifying issue 767 Prof. Musa Gaiya speaks of an Izala A, B, and even C. Under the third group he categorizes those Izala members who studied abroad and adapted a modern model for society, 18th December 2006. Under this third wing of Izala I consider those members who are still related to both groups without taking part to in group or the other. Among them is Alhaji Abba Damburno, from Jos, who considered himself a father to both the Jos and Kaduna factions; interview on 24 December 2006. 768 Kogelmann, Franz (2006): The ‘Sharīʿa factor’ in Nigeria’s 2003 Elections, in: Soares, Benjamin F. (ed.): Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa, pp. 257-8. 341 despite the heterogeneity of the Nigerian society and existence of other religious groups in the sharī‛a states. The publications of Philip Ostien 769 show that most (if not all) of the northern states were not ready to reinstate Islamic Law. This was confirmed by the difference between the Penal Codes and Penal Codes Procedures in the twelve sharī‛a states. Outsiders may get the impression that sharī‛a was easily implemented and consider the northern region as religiously unified. Problems emerged later with the first stoning cases that demonstrated the complexity of the sharī‛a issue. 770 The re-implementation processes of sharī‛a was initiated by establishing sharī‛a Implementation committees in each state with the duty to advise and prepare a report with the recommendation of the best way to implement Islamic law and how to codify it in conformity with the federal constitution. In these committees we find Sufis (Qādiriyya, Tijāniyya, etc.), Emirs, Salafis, Izala, independent scholars, Izala, JTI, Islamic judges, professors, and other experts. 771 At a later stage the different institutions that emerged from sharīʿa re-implementation like the zakāt -board, Council of ʿulamā' , or ḥisba -board were comprised of representatives from different religious groups. 769 Ostien (2007). 770 As an example see Ostien, Philip (ed.) (2007): “Sharīʿa implementation in….”, Vol. V, Two Famous Cases; this volume deals with the cases of Amina Lawal and Safiya Hussaini who were put by Sharīʿa Courts to death. The book provides all documents related to the two cases and shows that the reimplementation of Sharīʿa was far from being “properly” applied. 771 For more details on the structures of these committees and their reports in Bauchi, Zamfara, and Kebbi states as well for all memoranda related to the reimplementation-process see Ostien, Philip (ed.) (2007): “Sharīʿa implementation in….”, Vol. II, Sharīʿa Implementation Committees reports and related white papers. 342 For some scholars the re-implementation was more of a political than a religious project. Sheikh Khaled Aliyu, an independent scholar based in Jos observes that the re-implementation was politically colored. He speaks of a “marriage” (Arabic: zawāj ) between Izala and politicians. Izala was looking for higher influence and politicians for more voters. That is why Izala was ready to compromise. 772 This is almost congruent with Sheikh Muhammad Haris, an established Tijāniyya leader in Jos who saw a lot of fitna behind the sharīʿa re-implementation. The leader confirms that verbal attacks between Sufis and Izala are still going on. 773 Some other scholars are more optimistic, like Sheikh Alhassan Said who sees an advantage in the reimplementation, mainly; the possibility of a dialogue among the different Islamic groups: “those who implemented sharī‛a brought all of us together. We meet, speak and negotiate.” 774 A few scholars have indicated mixed feelings towards sharī‛a and reunification of Muslims including Izala and Sufis. Ustaz Ibrahim Ahmad Makari, a Tijānī scholar based in Zaria, indicates that there was great hope linked to the sharī‛a project. According to him, hundreds of gatherings (Arabic: majālis ) were set up as a result of the re-implementation. He expected that the project could result in reforms within the Muslim society in the north, but there were a lot of politics behind sharī‛a . Intafā alḥamās (in Arabic: enthusiasm is over) – this is how he phrased it. He mentioned that self-interest hindered the project from achieving its goals. In Kano for e.g. he views 772 Interview in Jos on 14th December 2006. 773 Interview Jos, 3 December 2006. 774 Interview in with the Izala Sheikh who is affiliated to the Kaduna branch, 12th December 2006. 343 those who implemented Islamic law as selective and did it for their own advantage. In addition, in the Council of ʿulamā' in Nigeria, although Tijāniyya, Qādiriyya, and Salafiyya are represented, the representatives of these groups were far from solving problems of ordinary people – as Ustaz Makari points out. In Zamfara State identity was defined through a long beard and a particular type of dress. Makari concludes that maybe five percent of sharīʿa was realistically achieved because politicians mainly appealed to the emotions of the people. Makari ensured that the future would be more promising since there is an agenda to unify all Muslims in northern Nigeria. Regardless whether the Izala initiated the sharī‛a project or another Islamic group was responsible for the most dramatic change in the judicial system of Nigeria since independence, in the aftermath of the re-implementation the conflict between Izala and the Sufi brotherhoods seemed to have been relegated to the background. Whether this challenge can be understood as reconciliation between Izala and Sufi cannot be easily answered. 344 Conclusion The major objective of this study was to look at the sharī‛a re-implementation in Nigeria from the perspective of an Islamic organization like Izala. The application of Islamic law is an integral part of the movement’s ideology. According to my knowledge, this aspect has not been studied before, since the re-implementation of Islamic law is a very recent development in the history of northern Nigeria. Izala has been studied in the context of its relationship to Sufis. 775 The Izala-Sufi controversy seems to take on another dimension. The violent clashes between Izala and Sufis that occurred during the 1970s and 1980s were reduced during the 1990s and from the beginning of the new millennium. This can be explained by the fact that the Izala movement was concentrated on its own internal problems (division, struggle for leadership, financial issues) on the one hand and on the other it underwent a process of institutionalization and became a well established and recognized Islamic organization in northern Nigeria. However, it is debatable as to whether the series of violent clashes between Christians and Muslims since the reimplementation of Islamic law in 1999 led to a reduction of tensions within the Muslim community or not i.e. intra-religious conflicts were replaced by inter-religious ones. In order to understand the current religious situation it is necessary to go back to the history of Islam and Christianity in Nigeria. A historical overview on Islam serves as a back-ground for what is going on today. This can be simplified in the following picture: Nigeria with its current borders did not exist until the coming of the 775 Loimeier 1997, Kane 2003, Umar 1983 and 1983. 345 British. In the 19th century the Sokoto Caliphate dominated the Muslim north with its emirates, and in the southern region African Traditional Religions as well as Christianity dominated the religious landscape. For many Muslims of the north the colonial domination, despite indirect rule, was a period of massive intervention in Islamic affairs. The fact that the highly developed and in Muslim eyes holy Islamic law enjoyed only the same status as other “native laws and customs” was regarded as a devaluation of sharīʿa . In addition, the reform of certain aspects of the Islamic legal tradition according to western norms and values was also an important event. This led to a conflict of laws that continued until the re-implementation of sharī‛a in 1999. Izala emerged from an intra-Islamic conflict between Sheikh Gumi and the Sufis. The organization became the major actor amongst reform-oriented Nigerian Muslims since it attacked the well-established tradition of Sufis in the country. Sufism in the Nigerian context also means that certain religious traditions were affiliated with political and economic power. The Qādiriyya Sufi brotherhood is traditionally linked to the house of Usman dan Fodio whereas the Tijāniyya Sufi-brotherhood challenged this position for a long time. The ostensible reason for the establishment of Izala was to purify Islam from all innovations. For several years Izala attacked Sufism on this matter, but it was also a struggle over the interpretative authority in Islamic issues which is directly linked to questions of power. After the division of the movement discourse on bidʿa became part of the internal struggle of the movement. One interesting finding of this study is 352 a particular doctrine led to the division of the movement. Even the several attempts to unify the different factions failed. As we have seen the same Izala is divided into two “firms”: one in Jos, related to the founder and his doctrine. To attract more followers this firm developed the strategy claiming that they are more authentic. The other group is established in Kaduna and is convinced that the division was necessary to save the organization’s initial and authentic goals. The level of success of Izala can be measured in accordance with the model suggested by Stark. In this context he proposed ten necessary points for a religious movement to be successful. First, Izala seems to be successful in retaining “cultural continuity with the conventional faith”. Izala is a continuation of the project of purification of Islam initiated by Sheikh Gumi and Sheikh Idris. Izala sees itself as the ideal protector of the sunna . It places itself within the tradition of pious predecessors that goes back to the first centuries of Islam. Second, Rodney stark assumes that new religious movements can be successful to the extent that their doctrines are non-empirical. Stark gave the example of the Jehovah’s Witnesses who ”suffered very marked decline in missionary activity” after their expectation of the end of the world did not take place. The point here is that a successful religious movement has a non-empirical doctrine. In fact, this can also be proved for the Izala case. I showed earlier that bidʿa or innovation is an “open system of meanings”. Fighting innovation in Islam and establishing the sunna are the two elements of Izala doctrine. Izala offers a unique way to achieve reward in the afterlife. This dogma cannot be proven empirically. 353 Third, religious movements succeed if they maintain a medium level of tension with their surrounding environmentthey are strict but not too strict. Indeed Izala maintained a medium level of tension with its surrounding environment. There are several markers of Izala. These vary from the way of praying to dress code of the movement. The movement opposes for e.g. wearing of amulets and justifies this by the fact that such a practice does not exist in the fundamental sources of Islam on one hand. On the other hand, Izala does not oppose non-Izala attending their schools at different levels of education. This illustrates a ‘medium’ aspect of strictness of the movement. Fourth, legitimate leaders of religious movements have adequate authority. This requires clear doctrinal justification and participants recognize themselves as members of this system of authority. In the case of Izala this assumption can be opposed by the fact that the movement was divided into two factions. The leadership of Sheikh Idris seems not to have been effective enough so that it could be recognized by all Izala members. In fact, many Izala people questioned the legitimacy of his leadership and formed another group with a new authority and more “legitimate” leaders. Fifth, religious movements can generate a highly motivated, volunteer religious force willing to proselytize. This is absolutely applicable to Izala. Members of the movement are highly motivated. Their activities and contributions within the movement are not paid. Each member considers himself an Izala-representative who can transmit its message and propagate its doctrine. 354 Sixth, the level of fertility that offset the level of mortality required for any religious movement to survive. This point can also be identified in Izala since it produced and still produces leaders and members able to guarantee the continuation of the movement’s doctrine. Seventh, Rodney Stark assumes that religious movements prosper so that they compete against weak, local religious organizations within a relatively unregulated religious market. This can be empirically proved with Izala. Since its establishment in 1978 Izala has been competing with other Muslim groups in northern Nigeria. This competition has led to the recognition of Izala as part of the religious landscape. Izala rejects ignorance about Islam and asks Muslims to intensify their knowledge in this field. Izala invites people to reject any affiliation with Sufism and join the movement’s struggle for a “purified” Islam. By doing that, Izala is in a continuous competition for legitimacy with other Muslim groups. Eighth, new religious movements will succeed to the extent that they sustain strong attachments, while remaining an open social network which is able to maintain and form ties to outsiders. This proposition can also be affirmed in the Izala context. Izala offers a religious and social service to its followers. At the same time Izala is an open social network. Its goal is to bring newcomers and “converts” non-Muslims and integrate them into its doctrine. Izala maintains “bonds” of networks to non-Izala. This happens either through education (at schools receiving pupils from different groups and orientations) or through social interaction with other Muslims/non-Muslims. This openness is necessary for the movement to be attractive to outsiders. 355 Ninth, a religious movement continues to grow so that it can maintain sufficient tension with its environment. This is applicable to Izala, since the movement maintains a certain level of strictness towards other groups. The level of strictness has decreased since the first years of the establishment until today. The movement still defines its own identity and religious orientation, but seems to be more accomodating to others. This can be a seen as a way of adaptation to the necessities of the religious environment in northern Nigeria. Tenth, a religious movement has to socialize with the young sufficiently, well as to minimize both defection and the appeal of reduced strictness. In fact, youth are the target of Izala. The movement is integrated in a particular type of education at Izala schools. These schools and institutions are known for high levels of competition. Graduates especially recognize the Izala strictness of achieving its goal of establishing an Islamic education based on the Qur’ān and sunna and far away for any innovation. Izala is known - even by outsiders of the movement – by its strictness in achieving goals. Rodney Stark listed these ten points for any religious movement willing to achieve a certain level of success. At the same time, he expects failure of any religious movement for varying reasons, like division or the appearance of new leadership with new ideas or approaches related to authenticity. Stark argues that most religious movements share one aspect which he called “eventual failure”. In fact, Izala faced this failure when it was divided into two major groups during the life time of its founder, Sheikh Idris. For many years the conflicting Izala parties 356 struggeled over legitimacy and authenticity. Both sides kept the same name and the same structure and continued preaching to people in the name of the “authentic” Izala that calls Muslims to the right path of Islam. Surprisingly, Izala found its way to reunification in 2011. 781 This may confirm Stark’s theory that failure remains “eventual”. Several aspects of the “modes of religiosity theory” (see introductory chapter) introduced by Whitehouse can be proven in the Izala context. The two basic elements of his theory (remembering and motivation) are part of Izala’s doctrine. Izala insists on revivalism of the sunna of the Prophet. This revival should happen via studying this tradition and making it an indispensable part of the daily religious routine. The organization offers an easy access to this tradition: it proposes the relevant Quranic verses and ḥadīth quotations. It produces books and preaches to the adherents. Izala develops its educational curricula according to its needs. Having this ideology repeated to adherents in schools, mosques, in media, in writings, CDs and in audio-cassettes, the doctrine can be preserved indefinitely. The motivation of Izala members (like any Muslims) is to achieve the reward of Allah. These elements can also be found in the context of Sufi brotherhoods insisting on the survival of their sheiks and their ṭarīqa . Memorization is part of their doctrine and daily repetition of litanies keeps this doctrine alive. Members of Sufi groups have the same motivation (reward, paradise) as Izala, but differ in their methods for reaching such a goal. 781 I did not conduct research on the reunification of the movement. I accomplished my PhD project before that event took place. The reunification after many years of division may be an interesting topic for future research on Izala. 357 Whitehouse gives two types of religious modes: a doctrinal and an imagistic one. All aspects of the doctrinal mode of religiosity are identifiable in Izala as well as among Sufi-groups (rituals, long-term-episodic memory, religious leaders, hierarchy and orthodoxy). The initial assumption that Sufism may be categorized under the imagistic mode of religiosity can be disproved. Sufi brotherhoods like any other Islamic groups experienced reform(s). Among the practices in Sufism that were rarely performed (imagistic modes of religiosity) became part of the doctrine itself. The use of drums ( bandiri ) was introduced by late Sheikh Nasiru Kabara, the Qādiriyya leader in Kano, and became a crucial element in the Qādiriyya-doctrine. 782 Two crucial aspects proposed by Whitehouse when it comes to imagistic modes of religiosity are: low frequency and high emotional arousal. This assumption can be rightfully observed during celebrations like the birthday of the Prophet or that of the ṭarīqa founder Sheikh ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jilānī. These celebrations take place once a year and are widely distinguished with a lot of emotions. Nevertheless, the theory can be contradicted by the fact that the daily and weekly practices of Sufis are performed frequently with high emotional arousal. Tijānī‘s recite their litanies (Arabic: awrād ) twice a day. They participate daily in so-called waẓīfa , or congregational recitation of a Tijānī formula. Also the Qādiriyya followers organize the so called ḥaḍra (in Arabic: congregational ritual) and dhikr either on Thursdays or Fridays. The use of drums and the repetition of religious songs either in the zāwiya or in the mosque go together 782 For the bandiri performance in mosques by the Qādiriyya, see Larkin, Brian (2004): Bandiri Music, Globalization, and Urban Experience in Nigeria, in: Social Text 81, Vol. 22(4), pp. 91-112; also Buba, Malami and Graham Furniss (1999): Youth Culture, bandiri, and the Continuing Legitimacy Debate in Sokoto Town, In: Journal of African Cultural Studies, Vol. 12 (1), pp. 27-46. 358 with a very high level of emotion. Whitehouse identifies “emotional bonds between participants” 783 resulted from the high emotional arousal in the context of the imagistic mode. In fact, these “emotional bonds” can be observed on a daily basis during the congregational meetings of Sufis. I would argue that these emotions are related to the doctrinal conflict between Sufis and Izala. Any religious practice performed can be a place for showing emotions and distancing from other groups. During my field work I observed that Sufis organize from time to time walīma (in Arabic: gatherings like marriage or birth). In many cases, it is accompanied with food and celebrations. The Izala group also initiated such a walīma as an answer to the Sufi brotherhoods. Izala makes a point to only recite the Qur’ān. This is also a way to show high emotions and distance from Sufi practices. 783 Whitehouse (2002), p. 307. 359 Bibliography Internet Sources as well daily or weekly journals quoted in footnotes are not mentioned again in the bibliography. Abdulkadir, Muhammed Safiyyu (2006): A literary survey of Arabic Sermons of J.I.B.W.I.S. in Bauchi Metropolis. Bauchi State, MA-dissertation in Arabic, University of Jos, Nigeria. Abun-Nasr, Jamil M. (2007): Muslim Communities of Grace: The Sufi Brotherhoods in Islamic Religious Life, London: Hurst & Company. 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